[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 206 (Tuesday, October 24, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 63637-63640]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-27289]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366]


Southern Nuclear Operating Company Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, 
Units 1 and 2; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

    By letter dated May 3, 2000, Mr. David A. Lochbaum, on behalf of 
the Union of Concerned Scientists (Petitioner), pursuant to Section 
2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206), 
requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission or 
NRC) ask questions via a demand for information concerning the liquid 
and gaseous radwaste systems at Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 
and 2 (Hatch), which is operated by Southern Nuclear Operating Company 
(SNC). As the basis for the Petitioner's request, the Petitioner 
contended that Hatch is being operated outside its design and licensing 
bases because the material condition of piping, tanks, and other 
components of the liquid and gaseous radwaste systems is not being 
properly inspected and maintained.
    The NRC, in a letter dated June 27, 2000, requested SNC to furnish 
the information requested by the Petitioner, which, in essence, 
satisfied the action requested by the Petitioner. SNC provided this 
information in a letter to NRC dated July 26, 2000. The Director of the 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has addressed the technical 
concerns raised by the Petitioner in the ``Director's Decision Pursuant 
to 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-00-05). DD-0-05 concludes that the NRC staff does 
not agree with the Petitioner's contention that Hatch is being operated 
outside its design and licensing bases because the material condition 
of piping, tanks, and other components of the liquid and gaseous 
radwaste systems is not being properly inspected and maintained. The

[[Page 63638]]

complete text of the Director's Decision is available for public 
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room located at 1 White 
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (1st floor), Rockville, MD., and is 
accessible electronically from the Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS) public library component on the NRC Web site, 
http://www.nrc.gov (the electronic reading room).
    A copy of the Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary 
of the Commission in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the 
Commission's regulations. As provided by this regulation, the 
Director's Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 
25 days after issuance of the Director's Decision unless the 
Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Director's 
Decision within that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of October 2000.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

    By letter dated May 3, 2000, Mr. David A. Lochbaum, on behalf of 
the Union of Concerned Scientists (Petitioner), pursuant to Section 
2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206), 
requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission or 
NRC) take action with respect to Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 
and 2 (Hatch). Hatch is owned and operated by the Southern Nuclear 
Operating Company (the licensee). The Petitioner requested that the NRC 
ask questions of the licensee via a demand for information, related to 
the liquid and gaseous radwaste systems at Hatch.

II. Background

    The Petitioner contended that Hatch is being operated outside its 
design and licensing bases because the material condition of the 
piping, tanks, and other components of the liquid and gaseous radwaste 
systems is not being properly inspected and maintained. The NRC, by 
letter of June 27, 2000, asked for the information from the licensee, 
which partially satisfied the action requested by the Petitioner. The 
licensee responded in its letter of July 26, 2000. The NRC staff has 
reviewed the licensee's response and concluded that the information 
provided by the licensee is responsive to your contentions.

III. Discussion

    Contention No. 1: The Hatch Nuclear Plant is being operated outside 
its design and licensing bases because the material condition of 
piping, tanks, and other components of the liquid radwaste system [is] 
not being properly inspected and maintained.
    The Petitioner cited General Design Criterion (GDC) 60 and GDC 4 as 
the design and licensing bases. The Petitioner stated the following 
three specific concerns as the reason for the Petitioner's assertion 
that the liquid radwaste system at Hatch does not conform to its 
licensing and design bases: (1) Susceptibility of liquid radwaste 
system piping to degradation, (2) susceptibility of liquid radwaste 
system tanks and vessels to degradation, and (3) degraded capability of 
valves that isolate liquid radwaste discharge. The Petitioner asserts 
that the liquid radwaste system is vulnerable to degradation 
mechanisms, such as flow-accelerated corrosion and microbiologically 
induced corrosion, but the liquid radwaste system piping is not covered 
by aging management programs. These aging management programs include 
the flow-accelerated corrosion program, the treated-water systems 
piping inspection program, and the evaluation program for buried or 
embedded piping. The Petitioner asserted, therefore, that it is 
reasonable to expect that the liquid radwaste system is degraded to an 
unknown extent and that it appears that Hatch is not in compliance with 
the licensing requirements.
    Response: The liquid radwaste system is not needed to mitigate the 
effects of accidents and therefore is not considered safety related. 
The staff agrees with the Petitioner on the applicability of GDC 60 as 
a design and licensing basis, but GDC 4 does not apply. Standard Review 
Plan (SRP) 11.2, ``Liquid Waste Management Systems,'' discusses the 
regulations that apply to the liquid radwaste system. GDC 60 is 
included as one of the regulatory requirements because the nuclear 
power plant needs to be designed to control the release of radioactive 
materials in liquid and gaseous effluents during normal reactor 
operation, including anticipated operational occurrences. The staff has 
reviewed Section 9.2 of the Hatch Unit 1 Final Safety Analysis Report 
(FSAR) and Section 11.2.1 of the Hatch Unit 2 FSAR and confirmed that 
GDC 4 is not a design or licensing basis for the liquid radwaste 
system.
    In support of the contention that the liquid radwaste system at 
Hatch is being operated outside of its design and licensing bases, the 
Petitioner cites an installation deficiency in the liquid radwaste 
system at Hatch, evidence of degradation in other systems at Hatch, and 
evidence of degradation in the liquid radwaste system at Millstone.
    The Petitioner cites an installation deficiency in the Hatch Unit 1 
liquid radwaste system which was reported in the Notice of Reportable 
Occurrence No. 50-321/1979-43, dated June 29, 1979. Subsequent to this 
notice, Licensee Event Report (LER) 79-43 was submitted on August 
17,1979, to address the installation deficiency. The LER included 
corrective action taken and stated that ``the piping supports were 
redesigned and installed to meet seismic Class I requirements.''
    The Petitioner cites degradation problems with other systems at 
Hatch, such as plant service water and residual heat removal service 
water. The Petitioner states that the liquid radwaste system is as 
vulnerable as these other systems to certain degradation mechanisms. 
The Petitioner also cites three examples, in systems other than the 
radwaste systems, of the detrimental effects of valve aging at Hatch. 
The licensee, in its July 26, 2000, response stated that the conditions 
such as pressure, volume, and quality of the fluid in the liquid 
radwaste system are different than the conditions in other systems. 
Thus, the licensee concludes that the radwaste system is not as 
susceptible to many of the aging mechanisms that could affect other 
systems at Hatch.
    The Petitioner cites NRC Information Notices (IN) 79-07 and 96-14 
as examples of degradation that actually occurred at U.S. nuclear power 
plants; both involved the Millstone Nuclear Power Station. IN 79-07 
stated that ``such events can be avoided by proper procedures and 
periodic examination if personnel are aware of the problem''. IN 96-14 
stated that ``a lack of continuing and preventive maintenance appeared 
to have allowed several systems and components to significantly 
degrade''. The licensee, in its July 26, 2000, response stated that 
Hatch operations personnel perform daily rounds during which systems 
are observed for proper performance and material condition (major 
portions of the radwaste systems at Hatch are accessible for 
observation).
    NRC resident inspectors, during their inspection rounds, regularly 
tour the plant, including the radwaste systems. In addition, NRC 
inspectors specializing in radiation protection periodically inspect 
portions of the liquid radwaste system. Recent inspections of this 
nature have not identified any significant problems. For example, as

[[Page 63639]]

discussed in Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/99-08 and 50-366/99-08, 
dated January 20, 2000, NRC inspectors reviewed the performance of 
several radiation monitors and the quantification of selected liquid 
samples, and found no problem. The Inspection Report stated that the 
radiation doses resulting from liquid effluent releases were a small 
percent of regulatory limits.
    If a degraded condition is identified by the licensee, or is 
reported to the licensee by the NRC, the licensee should generate a 
condition report and the condition should be evaluated and repaired as 
required in accordance with the plant's corrective action program. In 
addition, these condition reports are trended by the licensee. Further 
evaluation and appropriate corrective actions would be taken if an 
adverse trend was identified. Periodic inspections of the corrective 
action program are conducted according to the NRC inspection program to 
verify that licensees are identifying and correcting plant problems. 
For example, ``NRC Integrated Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/99-11, 50-
366/99-11 and 76-36/00-01,'' dated March 6, 2000, stated that 
inspectors reviewed the Hatch Condition Reporting System procedure, 
which describes the licensee's program for identifying and correcting 
deficiencies. The Inspection Report concluded that the licensee had 
satisfactorily identified and corrected deficiencies.
    The Petitioner raised a concern related to the consequences of 
failures in the liquid radwaste system. The consequences of a potential 
simultaneous failure of all liquid radwaste tanks have been analyzed 
and reviewed by the staff in the ``Safety Evaluation of the Edwin I. 
Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1,'' dated May 11, 1973. The analyses showed 
that the resulting releases would be a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 20 
release limits. In the ``Safety Evaluation Report Related to Operation 
of Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2,'' (Unit 2 SER) dated June 
1978, the NRC staff ``determined that the estimated releases due to 
postulated failure of components of the liquid radwaste system will not 
result in concentrations in the unrestricted area in excess of the 
limits set forth in Table II of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 20.'' In 
addition, Hatch has a Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program in 
place, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I. This surveillance and 
monitoring program applies to various pathways through which 
radioactive material might be released to the air, river water, milk, 
and vegetation and entails taking periodic samples and conducting 
analyses of these samples. Any detected concentrations of radioactive 
material above predetermined limits are required to be reported. Also, 
the Georgia Department of Natural Resources monitors ground water in 
the vicinity around the plant. Neither program has identified 
concentrations of radioactive material above or near permitted limits.
    The Petitioner asserts that a break in a liquid radwaste pipe 
inside one of the plant's buildings could result in significant 
exposure to the plant workers. The licensee is required by regulation 
(10 CFR part 20) to have and maintain a radiation protection program to 
ensure that radiation exposure of plant workers is not only controlled 
below limits, but to go further and have a program to keep doses as low 
as reasonably achievable (ALARA). As part of this program, plant 
workers wear digital alarming dosimeters when entering plant areas 
containing liquid radwaste system piping. Furthermore, radiation 
monitors are located in these areas. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes 
that there is reasonable assurance the plant workers will not receive a 
significant exposure in the event of a break in a liquid radwaste pipe 
inside one of the plant's buildings.
    The liquid radwaste system is operated on a regular basis to 
control effluents, and any significant degradation of the material 
condition of the system would be quickly detected. Thus, operability of 
the system is demonstrated without the need for special inspections or 
testing. However, the licensee does perform quarterly testing on the 
discharge valves which close to terminate the release of radioactive 
water to the river.
    The liquid radwaste system is designed and licensed to limit the 
doses from effluents to individual members of the public to levels as 
low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) to comply with Appendix I to 10 
CFR Part 50. Based on the discussion above, the NRC believes that the 
liquid radwaste system is being operated within its design and 
licensing bases.
    Contention No. 2: The Hatch Nuclear Plant is being operated outside 
its design and licensing bases because the material condition of piping 
and components of the gaseous radwaste system [is] not being properly 
inspected and maintained.
    The Petitioner cited GDC 60 and GDC 4 as the design and licensing 
bases. The Petitioner stated the following two specific concerns as the 
reason for the Petitioner's assertion that the gaseous radwaste system 
at Hatch does not conform to its licensing and design bases: (1) 
Susceptibility of gaseous radwaste system piping to degradation and (2) 
degraded capability of the gaseous radwaste system to preclude hydrogen 
burns and detonations. The Petitioner asserted that the offgas systems 
at Hatch are vulnerable to aging degradation but are not covered by 
aging management programs.
    Response: The gaseous radwaste system is not needed to mitigate the 
effects of accidents and therefore is not considered safety related. 
The staff agrees with the Petitioner on the applicability of GDC 60 as 
a design and licensing basis, but GDC 4 does not apply. SRP 11.3, 
``Gaseous Waste Management Systems,'' discusses the regulations that 
apply to the gaseous radwaste system. GDC 60 is included as one of the 
regulatory requirements because the nuclear power plant needs to be 
designed to control the release of radioactive materials in liquid and 
gaseous effluents during normal reactor operation, including 
anticipated operational occurrences. The staff has reviewed Section 9.4 
of the Hatch Unit 1 FSAR and Section 11.3.1 of the Hatch Unit 2 FSAR 
and confirmed that GDC 4 is not a design or licensing basis for the 
gaseous radwaste system.
    The Petitioner raises concerns that the piping and other components 
of the offgas system may be degraded to an unknown extent. Evidence of 
degradation is monitored by operations personnel through daily rounds 
during which systems are observed for proper performance and material 
condition. NRC resident inspectors, during their inspection rounds, 
regularly tour the plant, including the radwaste systems. In addition, 
NRC inspectors specializing in radiation protection periodically 
inspect portions of the gaseous radwaste system. Recent inspections of 
this nature have not identified any significant problems. If a degraded 
condition is identified by the licensee or reported to the licensee by 
NRC inspectors, the licensee should generate a condition report and the 
condition should be evaluated and repaired as required in accordance 
with the plant's corrective action program. Periodic inspections of the 
corrective action program are conducted according to the NRC inspection 
program to verify that licensees are identifying and correcting plant 
problems.
    The Petitioner raised concerns regarding a break in the offgas 
system piping running to the main stack. In section 9.4.6.1 of the Unit 
1 FSAR and section 15.4.15.1.4.1 of the Unit 2 FSAR, the licensee has 
evaluated the consequences of a potential complete

[[Page 63640]]

rupture of this piping and concluded that the resulting calculated 
doses at the plant site boundary would not exceed the limits for normal 
plant operation specified in 10 CFR part 20. The NRC staff has reviewed 
the results of the licensee's analyses and finds that the results 
satisfy the criteria stated in Branch Technical Position ETSB 11-5 and 
are therefore acceptable. In addition, Hatch has a Radiological 
Environmental Monitoring Program in place, as required by 10 CFR Part 
50, Appendix I. This surveillance and monitoring program applies to 
various pathways through which radioactive material might be released 
to the air, river water, milk, and vegetation. Any detected 
concentrations of radioactive material above predetermined limits are 
required to be reported. This program has not identified concentrations 
of radioactive material above or near permitted values. Any leakage 
from the offgas system in the plant building would be detected by plant 
radiation monitoring instrumentation.
    The Petitioner asserts that a break of the offgas piping running to 
the main stack could cause the radiation exposures to individuals in 
the power block to increase above negligible. As previously mentioned, 
the licensee is required by regulation to have and maintain a radiation 
protection program to limit radiation exposure of plant workers. As 
part of this program, workers wear digital alarming dosimeters when 
entering plant areas in the power block that contain the offgas piping 
which runs to the main stack. Furthermore, radiation monitors are 
located in these areas. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that there 
is reasonable assurance that individuals in the power block will not 
receive significant radiation exposure in the event of a break of the 
offgas piping which runs to the main stack.
    NRC inspectors periodically review portions of the gaseous radwaste 
system. For example, Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/99-04 and 50-366/99-
04, dated August 4, 1999, stated that inspectors observed the filter 
change out for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 gaseous and particulate effluent 
monitors and determined that it was done in accordance with licensee 
procedures. The Inspection Report also stated that, based on a review 
of the licensee's 1998 Annual Effluent Release Report issued prior to 
May 1, 1999, the amounts of activity released from the plant in liquid 
and gaseous effluents had remained stable over the last several years 
and the radiation doses resulting from those releases were a small 
percentage of regulatory limits.
    The Petitioner questions the degraded capability of the gaseous 
radwaste systems to preclude hydrogen burns and detonations. Hydrogen 
burns and detonations are prevented by keeping the hydrogen 
concentration of gases from the air ejector below the flammable limit. 
This goal is achieved by maintaining adequate process steam flow for 
dilution at all times. This steam flow is monitored and alarmed in the 
control room. Hydrogen analyzers are used to monitor the offgas system 
to provide further assurance that the hydrogen concentration is 
maintained below the flammable limit. However, in the unlikely event of 
an uncontrollable hydrogen increase, plant procedures require that the 
plant be shut down. The offgas system piping and components are 
designed to withstand the unlikely event of a hydrogen burn or 
detonation. The NRC staff stated in the Unit 2 SER that design 
provisions incorporated to reduce the potential for gaseous releases 
due to hydrogen explosions in the gaseous radwaste system were 
acceptable.
    The Petitioner states that there have been more than 25 hydrogen 
burns and detonations in offgas systems at plants similar to Hatch. In 
1990, Hatch experienced an event involving possible ignition of 
hydrogen in the Unit 1 offgas system. The event was discussed in LER 
321/90-012, dated July 20, 1990. The LER included corrective actions to 
replace valves and to revise system operating and abnormal occurrence 
procedures to assure specific actions are taken if hydrogen 
concentrations exceed certain limits. The LER also stated that Hatch 
Unit 2 was not susceptible to the identified cause of the Unit 1 event 
because of a difference in design of the offgas system. The LER 
concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected by 
the event. The LER was reviewed by NRC inspectors and discussed in an 
inspection report dated June 23, 1992. The inspection report discusses 
a number of corrective actions that were taken following the event. 
These corrective actions included repair or replacement of various 
components in the offgas system and revisions to procedures which 
directly affect the operation of the offgas system. The inspection 
report stated that these procedural revisions properly implemented 
corrective actions for this event.
    The gaseous radwaste system is operated on a regular basis to 
control effluents, and any significant degradation of the material 
condition of the system would be quickly detected. Thus, operability of 
the system is demonstrated without the need for special inspections or 
testing.
    The gaseous radwaste system is designed and licensed to limit the 
doses from effluents to individual members of the public to ALARA 
levels to comply with Appendix I to 10 CFR part 50. Based on the 
discussion above, the NRC concludes that the gaseous radwaste system is 
being operated within its design and licensing bases.

IV. Conclusion

    The NRC requested information from the licensee, which, in essence, 
satisfied the action requested by the Petitioner. However, for the 
reasons discussed above, the NRC staff does not agree with the 
Petitioner's contentions that Hatch is being operated outside its 
design and licensing bases because the material condition of piping, 
tanks, and other components of the liquid and gaseous radwaste systems 
is not being properly inspected and maintained.
    A copy of this Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary 
of the Commission in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c). As provided by 
that regulation, this Director's Decision will constitute the final 
action of the Commission 25 days after the date of issuance of this 
Director's Decision unless the Commission, on its own motion, 
institutes a review of this Director's Decision within that time.

[FR Doc. 00-27289 Filed 10-23-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P