[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 202 (Wednesday, October 18, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 62375-62376]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-26761]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-368]


In the Matter of Entergy Operations, Inc. (Arkansas Nuclear One, 
Unit 2); Exemption

I.

    Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy, or the licensee) is the holder 
of Facility Operating License No. NPF-6, which authorizes operation of 
the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2). The license provides, among 
other things,

[[Page 62376]]

that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of 
the Commission now or hereafter in effect.

II.

    Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) part 50, 
appendix J, Option B requires, in part, that licensees of all power 
reactors conduct integrated leakage rate tests (ILRT) under conditions 
representing design basis loss-of-coolant accident (DBLOCA) containment 
peak pressure. The regulation at 10 CFR 50.12 states, in part, that in 
order for the Commission to consider granting an exemption, special 
circumstances must be present.
    By letter dated June 29, 2000, Entergy requested that the NRC 
exempt ANO-2 from the application of the specific requirements of 10 
CFR part 50, appendix J, Option B. Specifically, appendix J, Option B 
requires that licensees of all power reactors conduct ILRTs under 
conditions representing DBLOCA containment peak pressure. The DBLOCA 
containment peak pressure at ANO-2 is 58 psig, however, Entergy would 
like an exemption in order to conduct the test at 68 psig. Entergy also 
addresses special circumstances in its June 29, 2000, application.

III.

    The ANO-2 steam generators (SGs) are scheduled for replacement 
during the fall of 2000. The replacement SGs (RSGs) will require that 
an access opening be cut in the containment building structure. Upon 
closure of the structure, an ILRT will be required to test for primary 
containment leakage integrity.
    The ANO-2 containment building was originally designed and tested 
for an internal pressure of 54 psig. The ANO-2 containment building has 
recently been reevaluated, to address the containment post-accident 
response resulting from the RSGs, for an increase in accident pressure 
to 58 psig with a design pressure of 59 psig, and shown to be 
acceptable as discussed in a letter to the NRC dated November 3, 1999, 
as revised by a letter dated June 29, 2000. As a result of this 
increase, a structural integrity test (SIT) will be performed to 
evaluate the ANO-2 containment building for the change in containment 
design pressure. The purpose of the SIT is to verify that the 
containment building structure can safely carry design loads and that 
the structural behavior is similar to that predicted by analysis. The 
post-RSG SIT will be performed at 68 psig (1.15 times the revised 
design pressure). The licensee desires to also perform the ILRT 
concurrently with the post-RSG SIT, at the SIT pressure of 68 psig, in 
order to recover approximately 30 hours of projected plant outage time. 
However, Appendix J, Option B requires that the ILRT be conducted at a 
pressure representing DBLOCA containment peak pressure, which is 58 
psig.
    Entergy cited special circumstances regarding achievement of the 
underlying purpose of the regulation as part of its basis for 
requesting this exemption [10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii)]. Entergy noted in 
support of the 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) criteria that the application of 
the current regulation is not necessary to achieve the underlying 
purpose of the rule. Entergy stated that the underlying purpose of 10 
CFR part 50, appendix J, Option B is still achieved in that the ILRT 
will continue to measure the containment system's overall integrated 
leakage rate under conditions representing DBLOCA containment peak 
pressure and that leakage through the primary reactor containment will 
not exceed the allowable leakage rate values as specified in the 
Technical Specifications (TSs) or associated Bases. The 68-psig SIT 
pressure is performed at a pressure that is greater than the DBLOCA 
containment peak pressure of 58 psig. Therefore, performing the ILRT at 
68 psig meets and exceeds the requirement for performing the ILRT at a 
pressure representing the DBLOCA containment peak pressure (58 psig). 
In addition, meeting the TS requirement for acceptable leakage at a 
higher test pressure is conservative and well within the intent of 
appendix J, Option B. Entergy concluded that the above information 
demonstrates that there is reasonable assurance that performing the 
post-RSG ILRT at the SIT test pressure of 68 psig will provide 
continued validation of the leak integrity of the containment 
structure.
    Entergy also cited additional special circumstances as part of its 
basis for requesting this exemption, namely that compliance would 
result in undue costs [10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii)]. Entergy stated that 
the proposed exemption meets the criteria for special circumstances in 
10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) in that approximately 30 hours of plant outage 
time could be recovered, resulting in substantial savings. Entergy 
added that since performance of the ILRT at the SIT pressure is 
conservative, they believe that realizing this benefit is acceptable.

IV.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's application. Regarding 
assurance of safe operation, the staff finds that since the use of the 
higher SIT pressure is conservative and since the licensee will be 
following the applicable regulations and guidance for performing the 
ILRT, the use of the SIT pressure for the ILRT is technically 
acceptable. Regarding compliance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), the staff 
finds that since the licensee will still perform an ILRT, and it will 
be performed at a pressure which is conservative with respect to that 
required by 10 CFR part 50, Appendix J, Option B, the underlying 
purpose of the rule, to ensure an essentially leak tight containment, 
is satisfied and this special circumstance applies. Regarding 
compliance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), the staff disagrees that this 
special circumstance applies. Since ANSI/ANS 56.8-1994 (section 5.4) 
recognizes the situation in which an ILRT is performed after an SIT, 
this situation cannot be considered as an undue hardship or a burden 
significantly in excess of that which might be incurred by other 
licensees in similar circumstances. The staff's detailed Safety 
Evaluation (and this exemption) are enclosures in the letter to the 
licensee dated

V.

    The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, this 
exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the 
public health and safety, is consistent with the common defense and 
security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the 
Commission hereby grants Entergy Operations, Inc. a one-time exemption 
from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix J, Option B in order 
to provide a one-time allowance to conduct the containment ILRT at the 
same pressure that is used for the SIT.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will have no significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment (65 FR 59216, dated October 4, 2000).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th October, 2000.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
John A. Zwolinski,
Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 00-26761 Filed 10-17-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P