[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 188 (Wednesday, September 27, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 57980-57992]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-24839]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Part 571
[Docket No. NHTSA-98-4515; Notice 2]
RIN 2127-AF43
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This document establishes a new Federal motor vehicle safety
[[Page 57981]]
standard (FMVSS) FMVSS No. 305, ``Electric-powered vehicles:
electrolyte spillage and electrical shock protection'' addressing
safety issues exclusive to electric vehicles (EVs). The standard is
based upon a notice of proposed rulemaking published on October 13,
1998. It applies to all EVs (except EVs to which FMVSS No. 500 ``Low-
Speed Vehicles'' applies) that have a propulsion power source greater
than 48 volts and a GVWR of 4536 kg (10,000 lbs) or less.
DATES: The final rule is effective October 1, 2001.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For non-legal issues, contact Charles
Hott, Office of Safety Performance Standards, NHTSA (202-366-0427). For
legal issues, contact Taylor Vinson, Office of Chief Counsel, NHTSA
(202-366-5263).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
1. Background of this Rulemaking Action.
2. SAE J1766 FEB96 ``Recommended Practice for Electric and Hybrid
Electric Vehicle Battery System Crash Integrity Testing.''
3. Proposed FMVSS No. 305.
4. Specific Issues for Which We Sought Comment.
5. Modifications to the Final Rule Based Upon Comments:
A. Vehicles to Which FMVSS No. 305 Applies.
i. The standard will apply to vehicles that use more than 48
volts as propulsion power.
ii. The standard will not apply to Low-Speed Vehicles (LSVs).
iii. The standard will not apply to large electric-powered
schoolbuses.
B. S5.1 Electrolyte Spillage From Propulsion Batteries.
C. S5.2 Battery Retention.
D. S5.3 Electrical Isolation.
E. S6.1 Pre-Impact Test Static Rollover.
F. S6.3 Side Moving Deformable Barrier Impact.
G. S7.1 Battery State of Charge.
H. S7.7 Electrical Isolation Test Procedure.
I. Editorial Comments.
6. Effective Date.
7. Regulatory Impacts and Analyses.
1. Background of This Rulemaking Action
The 1990s may be remembered as the beginning of a new generation of
electric vehicles (EVs). In mid-decade, General Motors Corporation (GM)
introduced the EV1, an electric-powered passenger car, offered for
lease in selected western markets in the United States. Other
manufacturers, such as Honda and Nissan, have also introduced new EVs.
The primary impetus for the introduction of EVs into the marketplace
appears to be the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 which included
provisions for zero emission vehicles (ZEVs). EVs are the only known
vehicles that will meet the emission requirements for ZEVs. In
California, these provisions were to become effective beginning in
model year 1998, and would have required automobile manufacturers to
sell, collectively, 40,000 EVs in the model year. However, those
provisions were delayed by the California Air Resources Board until
model year 2003. At that time, car companies will be required to meet
10 percent of their sales with ZEVs. In addition, the Energy Policy Act
of 1992 requires Federal and State fleets to acquire increasing
percentages of alternative fueled vehicles.
On December 27, 1991, we published an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking (ANPRM) on EV safety (56 FR 67038). The purpose of that
notice was to help us to determine which existing Federal motor vehicle
safety standards (FMVSS) may need modification to better accommodate
the unique technology of EVs and what new FMVSS may need to be
developed and issued to assure their safe introduction. We requested
comments on a broad range of potential EV safety issues including
battery electrolyte spillage and electric shock hazard. The ANPRM
elicited widespread public interest and 46 comments were received.
After reviewing the comments and information received in response
to the ANPRM, we concluded in a November 18, 1992 notice (57 FR 54354)
that it was premature to initiate rulemaking for FMVSSs specifically
addressing EVs. In that notice, we stated that further research was
needed in the areas of battery electrolyte spillage and electric shock
hazard.
Shortly thereafter, in 1993, we conducted research and testing on
two converted EVs. We tested these vehicles as specified in FMVSS No.
208, ``Occupant Crash Protection.'' Both vehicles were equipped with
flooded (i.e., filled with liquid electrolyte) lead-acid batteries
located in the engine and luggage compartments in the front and rear of
the vehicle. One vehicle was equipped with twelve 12-volt batteries
(five in the front and seven in the rear). The other vehicle was
equipped with ten 12-volt batteries (four in the front and six in the
rear). Both vehicles were subjected to 48 km/h frontal crashes into a
fixed barrier. In both cases, the front batteries sustained significant
damage, spilling large quantities of electrolyte. On one vehicle, 17.7
liters of electrolyte spilled from the front batteries as a result of
the crash and in the other vehicle, 10.4 liters. In addition,
electrical arcs were observed under the hood of one vehicle during the
crash.
In the following year, we published a notice of request for
comments (59 FR 49901, September 30, 1994 ) to help us to assess the
need to regulate battery electrolyte spillage and electric shock hazard
of EVs during a crash or rollover. We received 32 comments from
automobile manufacturers, EV converters, and industry associations. The
majority of the commenters supported some type of Federal regulation
for electrolyte spillage and electric shock prevention, provided that
the requirements of the regulation were performance-based and not
design restrictive to the extent that they might inhibit technology
development. Two manufacturers, Ford Motor Company (Ford) and Nissan,
and two industry associations (Electric Vehicle Industry Association
and Electric Vehicles of America) did not believe that Federal
regulation was necessary because electric vehicle design was constantly
changing due to technological breakthroughs. However, Ford did state
that it would follow the recommendation of industry associations such
as the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) which, at the time, was
developing SAE J1766 ``Recommended Practice For Electric and Hybrid
Electric Vehicle Battery Systems Crash Integrity Testing.''
In 1995, we again conducted research and testing, this time on four
EVs. Three vehicles were converted to run on electricity and one was
built as an EV. The three converted vehicles were equipped with starved
(i.e., electrolyte that is absorbed in an inert material to prevent
leakage in case of rupture) lead-acid batteries and the vehicle built
as an EV was equipped with flooded lead-acid batteries. We subjected
three vehicles to 48 km/h frontal crashes similar to the test described
in FMVSS No. 208, ``Occupant Crash Protection'' and a fourth to a 54
km/h side crash similar to the test specified in FMVSS No. 214,'' Side
Impact Protection.'' Each vehicle was also subjected to pre and post-
crash rollover tests to measure electrolyte spillage. The crash and
rollover tests revealed that the vehicles with the starved lead-acid
batteries had very little leakage (as expected because of their
design), while the vehicle with the flooded lead-acid batteries leaked
approximately 50 liters of electrolyte. We also performed electrical
isolation tests on these vehicles before and after each of the crash
tests. Two of the converted EVs maintained their electrical isolation
after the crash tests. The other converted EV was the vehicle subjected
to a side impact test. That EV
[[Page 57982]]
chafed a wire which came in contact with the vehicle structure during
the crash and did not maintain electrical isolation. The vehicle built
as an EV was subjected to a frontal crash test. That vehicle lost
electrical isolation when two of the battery connectors came in contact
with the battery tunnel during the crash.
2. SAE J1766 FEB96 ``Recommended Practice for Electric and Hybrid
Electric Vehicle Battery Systems Crash Integrity Testing''
During our earlier rulemaking activities, there was not yet an
industry standard in place that addressed potential safety problems in
EVs. However, in February 1996, SAE published its Recommended Practice
SAE J1766 ``Recommended Practice for Electric and Hybrid Electric
Vehicle Battery Systems Crash Integrity Testing.'' The purpose of SAE
J1766 is to define minimum performance standards and establish test
methods which evaluate battery system spillage, retention, electrical
system isolation, and liquid interaction in electric and hybrid
electric vehicles during crash scenarios. The Recommended Practice
covers all electric and hybrid EVs with a GVWR of 4536 kg (10,000 lbs)
or less.
As the document notes, electric and hybrid EVs contain many types
of battery systems. J1766 promotes the use of barriers between
occupants and battery systems which are necessary to provide protection
from potentially harmful factors and materials within the battery
system, which can cause injury to vehicle occupants during different
crash scenarios.
The potentially harmful factors and materials include:
electrical isolation integrity, electrolyte spillage and liquid
interactions, and retention of the battery system. Maintaining
electrical isolation of the system is important to prevent hazardous
shock of vehicle occupants. Electrolyte spillage and battery fluid
interactions should be minimized to prevent chemical reactions and
electrical conductance. The latter could lead to an electrical shock
hazard.
SAE J1766 establishes certain performance criteria to be met when
an EV is subjected to the frontal impact procedures of FMVSS No. 208
(including the 30-degree oblique), the side impact procedures of FMVSS
214, and the rear impact procedure of FMVSS No. 301. No spillage of
electrolyte into the occupant compartment is permitted. Electrolyte
spillage outside the passenger compartment is limited to 5 liters for a
30-minute period after vehicle motion ceases and throughout the post
crash rollover test. Battery modules must stay restrained in the
vehicle, without any component intruding into the occupant compartment.
Electrical isolation between the chassis and high voltage system is at
least 500 ohms per nominal volt.
3. Proposed FMVSS No. 305
On October 13, 1998, we proposed that provisions similar to those
of SAE J1766 be adopted in a new FMVSS No. 305 to afford the public
protection from electrolyte spillage and electric shock hazards in
crashes (63 FR 54652). These provisions should help secure the safe
introduction of new EVs into the marketplace.
As proposed, FMVSS No. 305 would apply to all passenger cars, and
to multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses with a GVWR of
4536 kg (10,000 lbs) or less, and to school buses with a GVWR over 4536
kg (10,000 lbs), that use more than 72 volts of electricity as
propulsion power. Seventy-two volts is the equivalent of six 12-volt
batteries. Under proposed FMVSS No. 305, EVs covered by the standard,
other than heavy school buses, would be required to meet leakage and
battery retention requirements that are essentially those of SAE J1766
after front (FMVSS No. 208), side (FMVSS No. 214), and rear impact
barrier crash tests (FMVSS No. 301). A static rollover test (FMVSS No.
301) would also be conducted both before and after each of these crash
tests. Heavy school buses (those with a GVWR greater than 4536 kg)
would be required to meet the same performance requirements after a
moving contour barrier crash test, without the pre- and post-test
rollovers. The performance requirements proposed were that there shall
be no electrolyte spillage in the passenger compartment, with spillage
outside the compartment limited to 5 liters total in a 30-minute period
following the cessation of motion after a crash test. Intrusion of the
battery system components into the occupant compartment would also be
prohibited. Batteries must be restrained in the vehicle in their
original installations. The electric isolation value must be at least
500 ohms per nominal volt, as determined by the SAE procedure for the
measurement of the insulation resistance of the propulsion battery of
an EV. The standard known resistance Ro (in ohms) should be
approximately 500 times the nominal operating voltage of the vehicle
(in volts). The Ro is not required to be precisely this value since the
equations are valid for any Ro. However, a Ro value in this range
should provide good resolution for the voltage measurements.
However, FMVSS No. 305 would not apply to passenger-carrying EVs
with a maximum speed of 40 km/h (25 mph) or less. We noted that we had
recently issued a standard expressly for low-speed vehicles (LSVs),
FMVSS No. 500 (63 FR 33194; June 17, 1998). LSVs are any 4-wheeled
vehicles, other than trucks, with a maximum speed of not less than 32
km/hr nor more than 40 km/h. EVs subject to FMVSS No. 500 could include
Neighborhood Electric Vehicles (NEVs) and those battery-powered golf
cars within the speed range. FMVSS No. 500 does not require LSVs to
meet FMVSS Nos. 208, 214, and 301, which contain some 48 and 54 km/h
impact barrier tests like those proposed for FMVSS No. 305.
4. Specific Issues for Which We Sought Comment
We received comments from the following 14 companies/organizations:
Bombardier Motor Corporation of America, Navistar International
Transportation Corp., Blue Bird Body Company, Infrastructure Working
Council, Toyota Technical Center, USA, Inc., Ford Motor Company, Nissan
North America, Inc., DaimlerChrysler Corporation, General Motors/North
American Operations, Applied Safety Technologies Corporation, Mike
Beebe, Honda/American Honda Motor Co., Inc., Mitsubishi Motors R & D of
America Inc., and Volvo Cars of North America, Inc.
We asked for comments on six specific issues.
The first issue was the extent to which the proposed rule would
necessitate expenditures by manufacturers of EVs to meet electrolyte
spillage, battery retention, and electrical isolation test
requirements.
Ford and DaimlerChrysler commented specifically on the cost to
conform vehicles with a GVWR of 4536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less.
Neither believed that there would be any additional cost since the
tests for these requirements will be conducted in the course of
conventional testing for existing FMVSS. Blue Bird, a manufacturer of
large school buses, on the other hand, stated that the cost to conform
in terms of dollars, weight, compliance tests, etc. would drastically
impair, if not destroy, current research and development activities
regarding electric and hybrid electric large school buses. This
commenter also stated that it is not aware of any electric or hybrid
electric powered school buses currently being offered on a regular
production basis. It therefore appears that the cost
[[Page 57983]]
to conform to FMVSS No. 305 will be negligible for vehicles with a GVWR
of 4536 kg (10,000 lbs.) or less.
The second issue was the adequacy of the proposed spillage
specification. We present and address these comments below in our
discussion pertaining to the adoption of S5.1, a requirement on
electrolyte spillage from propulsion batteries.
The third issue was the adequacy of the proposed specification for
electrical isolation. We address these comments below on our discussion
of S5.3, the specification for electrical isolation that we are
adopting.
The fourth and fifth issues concerned the coverage of the proposed
standard, and whether the proposed standard should apply to electric
Low-Speed Vehicles. We address these issues below in our discussion on
the applicability of the final rule.
Sixth, we asked about the appropriateness of a rollover test. The
SAE currently recommends that the vehicle undergo a rollover test
before the barrier impact test. We are concerned that damage may occur
to the test vehicle during rollover that could affect the results of
the barrier impact test. Accordingly, we asked for comments as to
whether there should be a rollover test before the barrier impact test
and as to the importance of conducting a rollover test before the
barrier impact test.
None of the commenters believe that the pre-test rollover procedure
is necessary. The SAE Electric Vehicle Safety Committee has revised the
February 1996 standard. This revised standard was reissued in June
1998. In the revised standard, the SAE determined that it was not
necessary to perform the pre-crash static rollover test. It found that
no failures occurred to any of the vehicles tested using this
procedure. The most significant information regarding safety was only
found during a post-crash condition. We believe that the likelihood of
electrolyte spillage or shock hazard without a related crash event is
extremely remote. Further, we do not see any additional safety benefit
in conducting the static rollover test prior to the crash tests.
Therefore, this test is not included in the final rule.
5. Modifications to the Final Rule Based Upon the Comments
A. Vehicles to Which FMVSS No. 305 Applies
i. The Standard Will Apply to Vehicles That Use More Than 48 Volts as
Propulsion Power
We proposed that the new standard apply to vehicles that use 72
volts or more as propulsion power. However, we were unsure whether
there might be vehicles or vehicle designs which are powered, in whole
or in part (perhaps a hybrid electric configuration), by less than 72
volts of electricity. We asked whether there were any such and whether
it would be appropriate to apply FMVSS No. 305 to them.
Navistar commented that the industry seems to have developed closer
to a 50-volt segregation between high and low voltage. SAE J1673 ``High
Voltage Automotive Wiring Assembly Design'' covers systems over 50-
volts nominal. SAE J1797 ``Packaging of Electric Vehicle Battery
Modules'' recommends against exceeding 60-volts DC in a single module
during any state. This value equates to a 48-50 volt nominal battery.
SAE Information Report 52232 ``Vehicle System Voltage--Initial
Recommendations'' suggests not to exceed 65-volts during periodic
ripple and 50-volts AC RMS. Again, these values equate to 48-50 volts
nominal voltage.
ASTC commented that the final rule should not totally exclude
vehicles which are propelled by 72 volts or less. Currently, SAE
Standard J52344 JUN98 ``Guidelines for Electric Vehicle Safety,''
defines ``potentially hazardous voltage'' as 60 VDC and above. This is
based on the UL standards UL 223 1 and UL 2202. Above this level, it is
recommended to design with the intent to protect as one would for any
high voltage system.
Mitsubishi argued that the application threshold should be set at
or below 60 volts. This is the level specified by the National Electric
Code (NEC, article 725) and UL as the limit above which a risk is posed
to the human body by high voltage.
On the basis of these comments, we have concluded that that FMVSS
No. 305 should not apply only to vehicles that use more than 72 volts
as propulsion power as we proposed. It is clear from the commenters and
industry standards that 60 volts DC can cause bodily injury. Further,
we are not aware of any EV manufacturer which is presently producing
motor vehicles propelled by 48 volts DC or less; it seems that these
lower voltages are not detrimental to the safety of humans in the same
manner that 60 volts DC may be. Accordingly, FMVSS No. 305 will apply
to EVs that are propelled by 48 volts or more of electricity.
ii. The Standard Will Not Apply to Low-Speed Vehicles (LSVs)
Although we were aware that two Low-Speed Vehicles ( LSVs) will be
produced with six 12-volt batteries totaling 72 volts, the Bombardier
NV and the GEM vehicle (the Trans2 NEV design upgraded from 48 volts),
the proposed rule nevertheless excluded LSVs. However, we asked whether
the standard ought not to apply to LSVs after all, and, if so, whether
the proposed requirements would be reasonable, practicable, and
appropriate for them.
Two commenters recommended against including LSVs in FMVSS No. 305.
Bombardier commented that we had extensively discussed the safety
features incorporated into FMVSS No. 500 based upon LSVs' design and
performance characteristics and concluded in the final rule that this
``rule requires safety equipment on low-speed vehicles consistent with
their characteristics and operating environment.'' Bombardier further
commented that, in issuing FMVSS No. 500, we had concluded that LSVs,
given their limited-speed capability and relatively controlled
operating environments, need not be designed to meet the full range of
FMVSSs, especially those incorporating dynamic crash requirements.
Moreover, complying with the proposed dynamic crash test standards
would require LSVs to undergo impact barrier tests at speeds of 48.3
km/h (30 mph). This speed is above the maximum speed of 40 km/h (25
mph) set forth in FMVSS No. 500 of which an LSV is capable.
Ford also argued that FMVSS No. 305 should not apply to electric-
powered LSV's. Ford believes that compliance with FMVSS No. 305 would
not provide appreciable additional safety benefit for LSV's beyond that
provided by compliance to FMVSS No. 500 which is now required. Ford
stated that the primary patterns of use for LSVs are anticipated to be
Closed Community environments where it is highly unlikely they will be
involved in a crash at 30 mph. Ford argued that if LSVs would have to
meet the crash requirements of FMVSS No. 305, the manufacturers may be
more likely to develop gasoline LSVs than develop zero emission
electric-powered LSVs.
Contrary to these comments, Mitsubishi argued that it is possible
that flooded lead-acid batteries may be used
[[Page 57984]]
in LSVs and that the electrolyte leakage from LSVs's so equipped could
be far greater than the proposed 5.0 liter limit, and thus pose a risk
to humans and the environment. Therefore, Mitsubishi recommended that
LSVs be covered by FMVSS No. 305. It is true that LSVs are not required
to meet any of the crash test standards and their structures are not
the equivalent in strength of conventional passenger cars, presenting
the possibility of electrolyte spillage and failure of battery
retention in crashes. NHTSA is developing a proposal to add performance
requirements for the equipment required by FMVSS No. 500 for LSVs. We
will carefully consider Mitsubishi's points about electrolyte leakage
in developing that proposal. We prefer to take a comprehensive look at
appropriate requirements for LSVs, instead of a piecemeal, standard-by-
standard approach.
We noted that FMVSS No. 500's definition of LSV does not include
trucks and asked whether trucks that are powered by less than 72 volts
of electricity should be covered if their maximum speed is not more
than 40 km/h (25 mph). Ford commented, in essence, that trucks should
be included in the standard unless they cannot achieve a maximum speed
of 25 mph regardless of their voltage. Inasmuch as load-carrying
vehicles with a maximum speed that exceeds 20 mph are classified as
``trucks'' and therefore must meet requirements in 30 mph barrier crash
tests of other FMVSS, we see no logical basis on which low-speed trucks
should be excused from the barrier crash specifications of FMVSS No.
305, and therefore they are not excluded from the standard. However, we
shall revisit this issue if FMVSS No. 500 is ever amended to include
low-speed trucks.
iii. The Standard Will Not Apply to Large Electric-Powered Schoolbuses
We proposed that FMVSS No. 305 also apply to electric school buses
with a GVWR of greater than 4356 kg (10,000 lbs). Blue Bird, Navistar
and IWC commented that FMVSS No. 305 should not be applicable to large
school buses. Navistar argued that it may seem logical to apply the
same requirements to electric-powered school buses with a GVWR of
greater than 4536 kg, but that, in reality, these vehicles can be quite
different from electric-powered passenger vehicles. The electric
propulsion system and components have to be much larger for school
buses with a GVWR greater than 4536 kg and this creates packaging,
shock hazard protection, and costs that are different from electric-
powered passenger vehicles.
Blue Bird argued that the standard should not apply to large school
buses until appropriate testing and research are conducted to determine
if the requirements are justified, reasonable, appropriate and
practicable. The school bus manufacturer commented that there currently
are limited applications in which electric vehicle technology may be
practical and that school bus service is one of these. It also said
that the research that is currently in progress may be vitally
important to the successful development of large electric-powered
vehicles. Blue Bird stated that it is not aware of any electric or
hybrid electric powered school buses currently being offered on a
regular production basis. The few electric school buses that it
currently produces contain 3636 kg (8,000 pounds) of batteries and
support structure. The weight of the additional structure required to
protect the battery modules could be substantial and this can only be
accomplished by a reduction in capacity or an addition of a tandem
axle. Blue Bird further argued that the extension of the proposed
requirements to large school buses would constitute regulation of
research and development activities rather than the regulation of
production vehicles for consumer use.
IWC argued that it would be premature at this time to require bus
manufacturers to comply with a standard which was developed without
consideration for their application.
We agree that, in terms of cost and weight, FMVSS No. 305 could
have a substantial effect on large school buses. Further, it is
plausible that the additional weight and cost associated with applying
FMVSS No. 305 to large school buses could restrict the development of
electric-powered school buses. We do not believe that at this time
large school buses should be covered by FMVSS No. 305 because the
testing we proposed would require a massive safety cage to prevent the
batteries from becoming damaged and leaking the electrolyte. Current
school bus construction appears sufficient to prevent the electrolyte
from entering the passenger compartment. There are many issues that
must be resolved before issuing an FMVSS applicable to the
crashworthiness of large electric-powered school buses, such as
appropriate test procedures and the added weight of more battery
containment. Accordingly, this aspect of the proposed rule has not been
adopted.
We note that we do not regard electric school buses as ``research
and development vehicles.'' They are production vehicles and certified
as conforming to all applicable FMVSS. We anticipate that Blue Bird and
other manufacturers developing electric school buses will take all
appropriate measures to ensure the safety of school children from
electrolyte spillage and electrical shock hazards even though these
buses are not required to comply with FMVSS No. 305.
B. S5.1 Electrolyte Spillage From Propulsion Batteries.
We proposed that:
S5.1 Electrolyte spillage from propulsion batteries. There shall
be no spillage of electrolyte from propulsion batteries into the
passenger compartment. Not more than 5.0 liters of electrolyte from
propulsion batteries shall leak outside the passenger compartment.
Spillage and leakage are measured from the time the vehicle ceases
motion after a crash until 30 minutes thereafter, and throughout any
static rollover before or after a crash test.
DaimlerChrysler believes that a requirement of ``no spillage'' may
be appropriate for a voluntary standard, but not for a regulation. In
this commenter's view, during the post-test static rollover, a
measurable quantity of spillage should be specified in S5.1, for
example, 100 ml maximum of spillage into the passenger compartment in
the first 30 minutes after the crash test.
GM agrees with the intent of this requirement, and participated in
writing the provision into SAE J1766. GM also argued that this
provision is appropriate in the context of an SAE Recommended Practice.
The literal inability to measure zero--i.e., ``no spillage''--creates a
practicability problem in the context of an FMVSS. GM noted that the
agency's other fuel integrity standards do allow a small non-zero
amount of fuel spillage. GM recommended that proposed S5.1 be revised
to allow a small non-zero amount (perhaps one deciliter) of electrolyte
spillage into the passenger compartment.
Our desired goal is zero spillage, and we believe that it can be
achieved with current battery technology. Although a requirement of
``no spillage'' would differ from the performance required of fuel
systems in other FMVSS, there is a distinction: batteries are not
subject to the same operating conditions as fuel tanks. Fuel tanks are
filled frequently, which requires that the be opened and closed.
Batteries recharge through applying electricity to the terminals and do
not require opening on a regular basis. However, given the concern
about the phrase ``no spillage,'' we are adopting the phrase ``no
visible trace'' as a substitute which we believe is a more practicable
specification.
The value of 5.0 liters derives from SAE J1766 and is based upon
the
[[Page 57985]]
amount of electrolyte that is contained in present large automotive
batteries. Commenters were asked for their views on whether a different
amount may be more appropriate to protect the public in EV crashes.
Ford and DaimlerChrysler commented specifically on the proposed
limit. Ford argued that the 5.0 liters of electrolyte spillage should
be the maximum that is allowed. DaimlerChrysler believes the 5.0 liter
limit to be satisfactory and stated that, in all probability, spillage
will be a blend of electrolyte and battery coolant, rather than
electrolyte alone.
Navistar and Blue Bird both argued that the proposed limit of 5.0
liters is too restrictive for large school buses. Given the fact that
we have decided to exclude large school buses from FMVSS No. 305, we
simply note, without discussion, that these comments were submitted.
Upon review, we have replaced the words ``crash'' and ``crash
test'' in S5.1 with the more accurate ``barrier impact test.'' For the
same reason, we have also substituted ``impact'' for ``crash'' in other
paragraphs of the standard.
Accordingly, S5.1 as adopted reads:
S5.1 Electrolyte spillage from propulsion batteries. Not more
than 5.0 liters of electrolyte from propulsion batteries shall spill
outside the passenger compartment, and no visible trace of
electrolyte shall spill into the passenger compartment. Spillage is
measured from the time the vehicle ceases motion after any barrier
impact test until 30 minutes thereafter, and throughout any static
rollover after any barrier impact test.
Note that we have eliminated the word ``leakage'' from the final
rule. We used it as a synonym for ``spillage'' in the proposed rule.
Both words indicate the escape of electrolyte from the battery.
Elimination of ``leakage'' will avoid questions of whether we intended
different meanings for these words. You will note also that rollover
before a crash test has also been deleted. The reason for this is
discussed in the paragraph below relating to S6.1.
C. S5.2 Battery Retention
We proposed that:
Battery modules shall remain restrained in the location in which
they are installed in the vehicle. No part of any battery system
component shall enter the passenger compartment, as determined by a
visual inspection.
Navistar argued that this is too restrictive and that the wording
can have a variety of meanings. It suggested adopting the wording of
J1766 in which the battery modules must stay restrained to the vehicle.
Blue Bird commented that the batteries or any part thereof pose no more
danger or safety threat than any other part of a school bus that may
become detached during a barrier crash test. Echoing Navistar, it said
that the requirement that battery modules shall remain restrained in
the location in which they are installed in the vehicle may not be
necessary from a safety viewpoint. Mitsubishi argued that slight
movement of the batteries does not necessarily pose a safety risk, and
suggested modifying that the ``Battery module must not separate from
the battery system.'' In Toyota's view, the definition of battery
module includes the venting system and it is unlikely the venting
system entering the passenger compartment could cause harm. Volvo
argued that the proposed requirement is unnecessarily design
restrictive and may prevent innovative and better (safer) solutions
that would have the potential of improving occupant protection as
compared to a design solution that would comply with the proposed
requirement.
GM focused on the proposal that ``no part of any battery system
component shall enter the passenger compartment, as determined by a
visual inspection.'' Proposed S4 defines a battery system component as:
``* * * any part of a battery module, interconnect, venting system,
battery restraint device, and battery box or container which holds the
individual battery modules.'' GM noted that the proposed battery
retention requirement should recognize the possibility that battery
system components may be located inside the passenger compartment by
design. GM further argued that the prohibition against the presence of
the battery container inside the passenger compartment per se serves no
safety purpose and that the proposed language could be interpreted as
an unnecessary design restriction. GM recommended the following
alternative wording for S5.2:
S5.2 Battery retention. Battery modules shall remain restrained
in the location in which they are installed in the vehicle. No part
of any battery system component that is positioned outside the
passenger compartment shall enter the passenger compartment during
the test procedures described in S7 of this standard, as determined
by visual inspection.
We note that the intent of the proposed requirements in S5.2 was to
ensure that the battery modules would not become unattached and become
flying projectiles in a crash or subsequent rollover. We agree with
Navistar that the wording can have a variety of meanings, as is clearly
shown based on the comments received. We have also concluded that the
proposed language is unnecessarily design restrictive and should be
modified to avoid unnecessary confusion. Further, the test procedures
are located in S6 (S7 specifies the test conditions). We therefore are
adopting the following wording for S5.2:
S5.2 Battery Retention. Battery modules located inside the
passenger compartment shall remain restrained in the location in
which they are installed. No part of any battery system component
that is located outside the passenger compartment shall enter the
passenger compartment during the test procedures of S6 of this
standard, as determined by visual inspection.
D. S5.3 Electrical Isolation
We proposed that:
Electrical isolation between the battery system and the vehicle
electricity-conducting structure shall be maintained at a minimum of
500 ohm/volt.
Navistar and GM argued that momentary loss of isolation should not
be regarded as a noncompliance. If electrical isolation measurements
were made real-time during the crash test, a detected momentary loss of
isolation could be interpreted as violating this requirement. In GM's
opinion, paragraph 4.4.3 of SAE J1766 recognizes that, during a crash,
electrical isolation may be lost momentarily and should be immediately
restored.
We concur that S5.3 as proposed could be interpreted to mean that
any loss of isolation is prohibited. In our view, momentary loss is not
an undue safety risk provided that the system subsequently restores
itself. We are revising S5.3 to indicate that the measurement is to be
taken after each crash test. S5.3 as adopted reads:
S5.3 Electrical isolation. Electrical isolation between the
battery system and the vehicle electricity-conducting structure
after each test shall be not less than 500 ohms/volt.
E. S6.1 Pre-Impact Test Static Rollover
We proposed that a vehicle must meet the requirements of S5.1,
S5.2, S5.3 after being rotated on its longitudinal axis to successive
increments of 90 degrees, before each crash test. Upon review, however,
we are concerned that damage may occur to the test vehicle during
rollover that could affect the results of the barrier impact test.
Further, none of the commenters argued that the pre-impact test static
rollover procedure was necessary. We also believe that the likelihood
of electrolyte spillage or shock hazard without a related impact event
is extremely remote. Accordingly, we have eliminated the proposed
pre'impact static rollover from the final rule.
[[Page 57986]]
F. S6.3 Side Moving Deformable Barrier Impact
We proposed that:
S6.3 Side impact moving deformable barrier crash. After a static
rollover, when the vehicle is impacted from the side by a deformable
barrier moving at 54 km/h, the vehicle shall meet the requirements
of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3.
Honda stated that the side impact test specified in S6.3 of
proposed FMVSS 305 does not mention the installation of the test dummy
in the test vehicle. Honda argued that, in order to prevent any
possible misunderstanding, we should prescribe a dummy installation in
the final rule that is identical to that in FMVSS No. 214.
We agree, and are so specifying. The test dummy that should be used
in this and other tests is a 50th percentile male dummy as specified in
subpart F of 49 CFR Part 572. To simplify the regulatory text, we are
adopting that definition of ``dummy'' in S3. The final rule, then,
revises S6.3 to read as follows:
S6.3 Side moving deformable barrier impact. The vehicle must
meet the requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3 when it is impacted
from the side by a barrier conforming to part 587 of this chapter
that is moving at any speed up to and including 54 km/h, with
dummies positioned in accordance with S7 of Sec. 571.214 of this
chapter.
G. S7.1 Battery State of Charge
We proposed that:
S7.1 Battery state of charge. The battery system is charged
using the vehicle manufacturer's recommended charging system. All
tests are performed with the propulsion batteries charged to not
less than 95 percent capacity.
Navistar commented that it may be unrealistic to obtain 95 percent
state of charge on some hybrid electric vehicles. Typically hybrid
electric vehicles do not operate with batteries fully charged like
fully electric vehicles. It may be more representative to test at
nominal working voltage or state of charge for the system. Similarly,
Toyota commented that the 95 percent requirement seems unreasonable for
hybrid electric vehicles. It suggested that the test be performed with
the batteries charged to the level recommended by the manufacturer.
DaimlerChrysler argued that the batteries will not maintain 95 percent
capacity because they are under a load at the point of impact, and will
have been discharged somewhat. Honda stated that, for hybrid vehicles,
the vehicle controls the batteries' state of charge with its vehicle's
Electrical Control Unit. Finally, Honda reminded us that, in the final
rule of FMVSS 105, we agreed to revise the proposed rule from ``95
percent battery state of charge'' to ``manufacturer's recommended state
of charge or 95 percent battery state of charge.''
We agree with the above comments and note that the June 1998
revised version of SAE J1766 changed 4.1.2 to read ``The Battery system
shall be fully charged prior to the crash test using the vehicle
manufacturers recommended charging procedure.'' We therefore are
adopting the following wording:
S7.1 Battery state of charge: The battery system shall be at the
maximum state of charge recommended by the manufacturer, as stated
in the vehicle operator's manual or on a label that is permanently
attached to the vehicle, or, if the manufacturer has made no
recommendation, at a state of not less than 95 percent of the
maximum capacity of the battery system.
H. S7.7 Electrical Isolation Test Procedure
We proposed that S7.7.1 read as follows:
S7.7.1 The propulsion battery system is connected to the
vehicle's propulsion system, and the vehicle ignition is in the
``on'' (traction (propulsion) system energized) position.
GM asked that this sentence be clarified in the final rule, to
avoid confusion and inconsistent interpretations of the test procedure,
and state that the isolation measurement is from the battery side of
the contactors or automatic disconnect system and the vehicle chassis,
consistent with SAE J1766. Navistar argued that the specification that
the propulsion battery be connected to the vehicle propulsion system
during the electrical isolation test indicates that any safety devices
such as fuses or contractors that were opened during or as a result of
the crash would have to be re-closed for this test. Navistar stated
that since such devices would be included in the design to provide a
high degree of safety in a crash, it does not seem appropriate to
require these safety features be defeated to determine if the test has
met the requirements. Navistar is incorrect. The propulsion battery is
connected to the vehicle propulsion system before a dynamic test.
During the electrical isolation test, any safety devices such as fuses
or contactors are not closed.
We agree with GM that we intended to have the voltage measurement
taken from the battery side of the contactors if they are used. We do
not agree with Navistar that the contactors would need to be reclosed
for this test. During the SAE discussions in which the revisions to SAE
J1766 were being developed, there was considerable attention focused on
whether the electrical isolation measurement to chassis should be taken
from the battery side or the traction side of the contactors. All
agreed that the measurement is taken from the battery side of the
contactors to the vehicle chassis because the procedure is meaningless
if the voltage measurement is made between the output side of opened
contactors and vehicle chassis, since there would likely be no voltage
between those points.
GM recommended that S7.7.1 be revised to read as follows, and we
have accepted that recommendation (note that the deletion of proposed
S7.6 pertaining to the testing of large school buses has resulted in a
renumbering of S7.7 to S7.6):
S7.6.1 Prior to the barrier crash, the propulsion battery system
is connected to the vehicle's propulsion system, and the vehicle
ignition is in the ``on'' (traction (propulsion) system energized)
position. If the vehicle utilizes an automatic disconnect between
the propulsion battery system and the traction system, the
electrical isolation measurement after the crash is made from the
battery side of the automatic disconnect to the vehicle chassis.
Proposed paragraph S7.7.3 (now S7.6.3) set forth a procedure for
measuring voltage in Figure 1. Upon review, we have decided that only
the first two sentences related to the procedure itself. We are
adopting these sentences as proposed. The remaining material we set
forth here, as it relates to propulsion battery voltage (Vb). We
anticipate that Vb after the crash test will be approximately the same
as Vb before the crash test. After the crash test, a Vb greater than
zero is required in order to conduct the remainder of the procedure of
S7.6.3. If Vb after the crash test is zero, this indicates that a short
across the propulsion battery has occurred, which precludes the
remainder of this test procedure. A short across the propulsion battery
may be conspicuous by virtue of arcing, fire, and/or component
meltdown.
Navistar stated S7.7.6 and S7.7.7 in the proposal specify a
standard known resistance without reference to any approximate size.
Navistar agrees that the magnitude of this resistor is not critical to
the measurement. Navistar recommended that the word ``standard'' be
deleted. We agree, and have eliminated it from S7.6.6 and S7.6.7. With
respect to S7.6.7, we did not provide in the NPRM the background for
the equation used to calculate electrical isolation for SAE J1766. We
have placed a copy of the derivation in Docket No. NHTSA-98-4515.
[[Page 57987]]
I. Editorial Comments
GM called our attention to typographical or technical corrections
that should be corrected in the final rule. We have done so. In Figure
1, the description is revised to ``Measurement Location for Vb
Voltage.'' In Figure 3, the symbol within the circle is ``V2'' rather
than ``Vb.'' In Figure 4, the equation for Ri is revised to:
Ri = Ro[1 +(V2/V1)][(V1-V1')/V1']
In Figure 5, the equation for Ri is revised:
Ri = Ro[1 +(V1 /V2)][(V2-V2')V2']
6. Effective Date
We have concluded that an effective date of approximately one year
after the issuance of the final rule is sufficient for manufacturers
covered by FMVSS No. 305 to comply with the proposed new safety
standard. The major EV manufacturers all are using, or plan to use,
battery types that are not susceptible to leaking large amounts of
electrolytes. To our knowledge, all incorporate a device that would
shut-off the propulsion battery current or prevent loss of electrical
isolation in the event of a crash or short circuit.
7. Rulemaking Analyses
Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures.
This document was not reviewed under Executive Order 12866. It has been
determined that the rulemaking action is not significant under
Department of Transportation regulatory policies and procedures.
Informal discussions with some EV manufacturers indicate that the
industry is aware of SAE J1766 and that manufacturers are planning or
producing EVs with batteries designed for minimal leakage, and to shut
off the current or prevent loss of electrical isolation in the event of
a crash. We believe that a substantial portion of the nascent EV
industry is already designing its production to comport with SAE J1766.
The added costs of our tests are minimal, as reflected in the comments
on this issue in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking. The
frontal barrier impact test of S6.1 of FMVSS No. 305 is the same test
specified in FMVSS Nos. 208 and 301. The rear moving barrier impact
test is the same test specified in FMVSS No. 301. The lateral moving
barrier impact test is the same test specified in FMVSS No. 214. This
means that there will be no additional costs imposed for testing an EV
to which FMVSS Nos. 208, 214, and 301 already apply. To the extent that
one or more of these standards do not apply to a specific EV type, the
additional testing costs are not considered significant. The cost of a
frontal impact test is $18,600 and the rollover test following, $1,500.
The cost of a rear moving barrier impact test is $5,200, and the
rollover test following, $1,500. The cost of a lateral moving barrier
impact test is $18,000, and the rollover test following, $1,500. To
this must be added the cost of the test vehicle for each test, to which
we have assigned an approximate figure of $30,000. Accordingly, the
impacts of the rule are so minimal as not to warrant preparation of a
full regulatory evaluation.
Regulatory Flexibility Act. We have also considered the impacts of
this rulemaking action in relation to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. Sec. 601 et seq. I certify that this rulemaking action does not
have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small
entities.
The following is our statement providing the factual basis for the
certification (5 U.S.C. Sec. 605(b)). The technology to prevent leakage
of electrolytes, battery retention, and electrical isolation in the
event of the crash of a battery-powered motor vehicle is simple and has
been well known for years. The specifications of the industry standard,
J1766, have been settled since February 1996. As noted above, we
believe that a substantial portion of the nascent EV industry is
already designing its production to comport with SAE J1766.
Verification of compliance with FMVSS No. 305 can be determined by
rollover tests conducted after an EV is tested for compliance with the
barrier impact specifications of FMVSS No. 301 and the cost of testing
to this standard is not impacted, as we have discussed above. However,
as noted above, if an EV is not required to comply with FMVSS No. 301,
there will be the added cost of three rollover tests and a rear moving
barrier impact test, plus the cost of a test vehicle, if the EV
manufacturer chooses to certify its vehicle on the basis of an actual
test rather than on engineering studies, computer simulations,
mathematical calculations, or other means. We estimate the total costs
for these tests as $38,200 for this segment of the EV industry. Since
the overall economic impact is not considered to be significant, the
agency has not determined formally whether the entities affected by the
rules are ``small businesses'' within the meaning of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. In NHTSA's experience, manufacturers of motor vehicles
are generally not ``small businesses.'' Accordingly, no regulatory
flexibility analysis has been prepared.
Executive Order 13132 (Federalism). Executive Order 13132 on
``Federalism'' requires us to develop an accountable process to ensure
``meaningful and timely input by State and local officials in the
development of ``regulatory policies that have federalism
implications.'' The E.O. defines this phrase to include regulations
``that have substantial direct effects on the States, on the
relationship between the national government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government.'' This final rule, which regulates the manufacture of
certain motor vehicles, will not have substantial direct effect on the
States, on the relationship between the national government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government, as specified in E.O. 13132.
National Environmental Policy Act. We have analyzed this rulemaking
action for purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act. The
rulemaking action will not have a significant effect upon the
environment as it does not affect the present method of manufacturing
motor vehicle lighting equipment.
Civil Justice Reform. This rule will not have any retroactive
effect. Under 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1), whenever a Federal motor vehicle
safety standard is in effect, a state may not adopt or maintain a
safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance which is
not identical to the Federal standard. Section 30161 sets forth a
procedure for judicial review of final rules establishing, amending, or
revoking Federal motor vehicle safety standards. That section does not
require submission of a petition for reconsideration or other
administrative proceedings before parties may file suit in court.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. The Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written
assessment of the cost, benefits and other effects of proposed or final
rules that include a Federal mandate likely to result in the
expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate,
or by the private sector, of more than $100 million annually. Because
this rule will not have a $100 million effect, we have not prepared an
Unfunded Mandates assessment.
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act. Section 12(d) of
the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (the Act) requires
agencies to evaluate and use existing
[[Page 57988]]
voluntary consensus standards in its regulatory activities unless doing
so would be inconsistent with applicable law (e.g., the statutory
provisions regarding our vehicle safety authority) or otherwise
impractical. In meeting that requirement, we are required to consult
with voluntary, private sector, consensus standards bodies. Examples of
organizations generally regarded as voluntary consensus standards
bodies include the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM),
the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), and the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI). If we do not use available and potentially
applicable voluntary consensus standards, we are required by the Act to
provide Congress, through OMB, an explanation for not using such
standards.
As we have explained in the preamble, this final rule is based upon
SAE J1766 FEB96 ``Recommended Practice for Electric and Hybrid Electric
Vehicle Battery Systems Crash Integrity Testing,'' and is substantially
similar to it in its specifications for prohibition of electrolyte
spillage in front, side, and rear impacts, and batter retention during
such impacts, and electrical isolation. No other voluntary consensus
standards are addressed by this rulemaking.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571
Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Motor vehicles, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS
In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR part 571 is amended as
follows:
1. The authority citation for part 571 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30166; delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.
2. A new Sec. 571.305 is added to subpart B to read as set forth
below:
Sec. 571.305 Standard No. 305; Electric-powered vehicles: electrolyte
spillage and electrical shock protection.
S1. Scope. This standard specifies requirements for limitation of
electrolyte spillage, retention of propulsion batteries during a crash,
and electrical isolation of the chassis from the high-voltage system,
to be met by vehicles that use electricity as propulsion power .
S2. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is to reduce deaths and
injuries during a crash which occur because of electrolyte spillage
from propulsion batteries, intrusion of propulsion battery system
components into the occupant compartment, and electrical shock.
S3. Application. This standard applies to passenger cars, and to
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR of 4536
kg or less, that use more than 48 volts of electricity as propulsion
power and whose speed attainable in 1.6 km on a paved level surface is
more than 40 km/h.
S4. Definition.
Battery system component means any part of a battery module,
interconnect, venting system, battery restraint device, and battery box
or container which holds the individual battery modules.
Dummy means a 50th percentile male test dummy as specified in
subpart F of part 572 of this chapter.
S5. General requirements. Each vehicle to which this standard
applies, when tested according to S6 under the conditions of S7, must
meet the requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3.
S5.1 Electrolyte spillage from propulsion batteries. Not more than
5.0 liters of electrolyte from propulsion batteries shall spill outside
the passenger compartment, and no visible trace of electrolyte shall
spill into the passenger compartment. Spillage is measured from the
time the vehicle ceases motion after a barrier impact test until 30
minutes thereafter, and throughout any static rollover after a barrier
impact test.
S5.2 Battery Retention. Battery modules located inside the
passenger compartment must remain in the location in which they are
installed. No part of any battery system component that is located
outside the passenger compartment shall enter the passenger compartment
during the test procedures of S6 of this standard, as determined by
visual inspection.
S5.3 Electrical isolation. Electrical isolation between the battery
system and the vehicle electricity-conducting structure after each test
must be not less than 500 ohms/volt.
S6. Test requirements. Each vehicle to which this standard applies,
under the conditions of S7, must be capable of meeting the requirements
of any applicable single barrier crash/static rollover test sequence,
without alteration of the vehicle during the test sequence. A
particular vehicle need not meet further test requirements after having
been subjected to a single barrier crash/static rollover test sequence.
S6.1 Frontal barrier crash. The vehicle must meet the requirements
of S5.1, S5.2 and S5.3 when it is traveling longitudinally forward at
any speed, up to and including 48 km/h, and impacts a fixed collision
barrier that is perpendicular to the line of travel of the vehicle, or
at any angle up to 30 degrees in either direction from the
perpendicular to the line of travel of the vehicle.
S6.2 Rear moving barrier impact. The vehicle must meet the
requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3, when it is impacted from the rear
by a barrier moving at any speed up to and including 48 km/h, with a
dummy at each front outboard designated seating position.
S6.3 Side moving deformable barrier impact. The vehicle must meet
the requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3 when it is impacted from the
side by a barrier that conforms to part 587 of this chapter that is
moving at any speed up to and including 54 km/h, with dummies
positioned in accordance with S7 of Sec. 571.214 of this chapter.
S6.4 Post-impact test static rollover. The vehicle must meet the
requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3, after being rotated on its
longitudinal axis to each successive increment of 90 degrees after each
impact test specified in S6.1, S6.2, and S6.3.
S7. Test conditions. When the vehicle is tested according to S6,
the requirements of S5 must be met under the conditions in S7.1 through
S7.6.7. Where a range is specified, the vehicle must be capable of
meeting the requirements at all points within the range.
S7.1 Battery state of charge. The battery system is at the maximum
state of charge recommended by the manufacturer, as stated in the
vehicle operator's manual or on a label that is permanently affixed to
the vehicle, or, if the manufacturer has made no recommendation, at a
state of not less than 95 percent of the maximum capacity of the
battery system.
S7.2 Vehicle conditions. The switch or device that provides power
from the propulsion batteries to the propulsion motor(s) is in the
activated position or the ready-to-drive position.
S7.2.1 The parking brake is disengaged and the transmission, if
any, is in the neutral position. In a test conducted under S6.3, the
parking brake is set.
S7.2.2 Tires are inflated to the manufacturer's specifications.
S7.2.3 The vehicle, including test devices and instrumentation, is
loaded as follows:
(a) A passenger car is loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight plus
its rated cargo and luggage capacity weight, secured in the luggage
area, plus the necessary test dummies as specified in S6, restrained
only by means that are installed in the vehicle for protection at its
seating position.
[[Page 57989]]
(b) A multipurpose passenger vehicle, truck, or bus with a GVWR of
4536 kg or less is loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight plus the
necessary dummies, as specified in S6, plus 136 kg or its rated cargo
and luggage capacity weight, whichever is less. Each dummy is
restrained only by means that are installed in the vehicle for
protection at its seating position.
S7.3 Static rollover test conditions. In addition to the conditions
of S7.1 and S7.2, the conditions of S7.4 of Sec. 571.301 of this
chapter apply to the conduct of static rollover tests specified in
S6.4.
S7.4 Rear moving barrier impact test conditions. In addition to the
conditions of S7.1 and S7.2, the conditions of S7.3 of Sec. 571.301 of
this chapter apply to the conduct of the rear moving barrier impact
test specified in S6.2. The rear moving barrier is described in S8.2 of
Sec. 571.208 of this chapter and diagramed in Figure 1 of Sec. 571.301
of this chapter.
S7.5 Side moving deformable barrier impact test conditions. In
addition to the conditions of S7.1 and S7.2, the conditions of S6.10,
S6.11, and S6.12 of Sec. 571.214 of this chapter apply to the conduct
of the side moving deformable barrier impact test specified in S6.3.
S7.6 Electrical isolation test procedure. In addition to the
conditions of S7.1 and S7.2, the conditions in S7.6.1 through S7.6.7
apply to the measurement of electrical isolation specified in S5.3.
S7.6.1 Prior to any barrier impact test, the propulsion battery
system is connected to the vehicle's propulsion system, and the vehicle
ignition is in the ``on'' (traction (propulsion) system energized)
position. If the vehicle utilizes an automatic disconnect between the
propulsion battery system and the traction system, the electrical
isolation measurement after the impact is made from the battery side of
the automatic disconnect to the vehicle chassis.
S7.6.2 The voltmeter used in this test measures direct current
values and has an internal resistance of at least 10 M
S7.6.3 The voltage is measured as shown in Figure 1 and the
propulsion battery voltage (Vb) is recorded. Before any vehicle impact
test, Vb is equal to or greater than the nominal operating voltage as
specified by the vehicle manufacturer.
S7.6.4 The voltage is measured as shown in Figure 2, and the
voltage (V1) between the negative side of the propulsion battery and
the vehicle chassis is recorded.
S7.6.5 The voltage is measured as shown in Figure 3, and the
voltage (V2) between the positive side of the propulsion battery and
the vehicle chassis is recorded.
S7.6.6 If V1 is greater than or equal to V2, insert a known
resistance (Ro) between the negative side of the propulsion battery and
the vehicle chassis. With the Ro installed, measure the voltage (V1')
as shown in Figure 4 between the negative side of the propulsion
battery and the vehicle chassis. Calculate the electrical isolation
(Ri) according to the formula shown. This electrical isolation value
(in ohms) divided by the nominal operating voltage of the propulsion
battery (in volts) must be equal to or greater than 500.
S7.6.7 If V2 is greater than V1, insert a known resistance (Ro)
between the positive side of the propulsion battery and the vehicle
chassis. With the Ro installed, measure the voltage and record the
voltage (V2') between the positive side of the propulsion battery and
the vehicle chassis as shown in Figure 5. Calculate the electrical
isolation (Ri) according to the formula shown. This electrical
isolation value (in ohms) divided by the nominal operating voltage of
the propulsion battery (in volts) must be equal to or greater than 500.
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
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Issued on: September 21, 2000.
Sue Bailey,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 00-24839 Filed 9-26-00; 8:45 am]
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