[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 177 (Tuesday, September 12, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 55059-55061]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-23357]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-302]


Florida Power Corporation; Crystal River Unit 3; Environmental 
Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering 
issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 
issued to Florida Power Corporation (FPC or the licensee), for 
operation of Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) located in Citrus County, 
Florida.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

    The proposed action would increase the number of fuel assemblies 
that can be stored in the CR-3 spent fuel pools (SFPs) from 1357 fuel 
assemblies to 1474 fuel assemblies, an increase of approximately 8 
percent, and change the configuration of fresh fuel storage in spent 
fuel pool A. In addition, the new spent fuel storage racks will use 
Boral as the neutron absorber material, replacing the present neutron 
absorber material, Boraflex, which is continuing to degrade.
    The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's 
application for amendment dated September 16, 1999, as supplemented by 
letters dated May 3 and June 29, 2000.

The Need for the Proposed Action

    The currently available storage capacity for spent fuel at CR-3, 
allowing for the required reserve capacity to accommodate a full core 
offload, is projected to be exceeded in the year 2013. The CR-3 
operating license has an expiration date of December 3, 2016. Thus, the 
additional 117 locations for storage of fuel assemblies are necessary 
to provide adequate spent fuel storage capacity for the remainder of 
the CR-3 operating license. In addition, the existing racks utilize 
Boraflex as the neutron absorber material. The new spent fuel storage 
racks utilize Boral as the neutron absorber material, which will 
minimize the water clarity problems associated with use of Boraflex.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

Radioactive Waste Treatment

    CR-3 uses waste treatment systems designed to collect and process 
gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that might contain radioactive 
material. These radioactive waste treatment systems were evaluated in 
the Final Environmental Statement (FES) dated May 1973. The proposed 
changes to the SFP will not involve any change in the waste treatment 
systems described in the FES.

Gaseous Radioactive Wastes

    The storage of additional spent fuel assemblies in the pool is not 
expected to affect the releases of radioactive gases from the spent 
fuel pool. Gaseous fission products such as Krypton-85 and Iodine-131 
are produced by the fuel in the core during reactor operation. A small 
percentage of these fission gases can be released to the reactor 
coolant from the small number of fuel assemblies that are expected to 
develop leaks during reactor operation. During refueling operations, 
some of these fission products would then enter the pools and be 
subsequently released into the air. At CR-3, there has been no measured 
Krypton-85 release from the fuel building ventilation system for the 2 
years preceding the September 16, 1999, submittal. Since the frequency 
of refueling (and, therefore, the number of freshly offloaded spent 
fuel assemblies stored in the pools at any one time) will not increase, 
there will be no increase in the amounts of these types of fission 
products released to the atmosphere as a result of the increased pool 
fuel storage capacity.
    The increased heat load on the pool from the storage of additional 
spent fuel assemblies was determined by the licensee to be 
insignificant, and therefore there would be no significant increase in 
the pools' evaporation rate. Therefore, no increase in the amount of 
gaseous tritium released from the pool is expected. The overall release 
of radioactive gases from CR-3 will remain a small fraction of the 
limits of 10 CFR 20.1301.

Solid Radioactive Wastes

    Spent resins are generated by the processing of SFP water through 
the pools' purification system. These spent resins are disposed of as 
solid radioactive waste. Resin replacement is determined primarily by 
the requirement for water clarity and is normally done approximately 
once per year. No significant increase in the volume of solid 
radioactive waste is expected with the expanded storage capacity. 
During reracking operations, small amounts of additional waste resin 
may be generated by the pools' cleanup systems on a one-time basis. 
Additional solid radwaste will consist of the old spent fuel rack 
modules themselves, as well as any interferences of pool hardware that 
may have to be removed from the pool to permit installation of the new 
rack modules. The old racks will be washed down in preparation for 
packaging and shipment. Shipping containers and procedures will conform 
to Federal regulations as specified in 10 CFR Part 71, ``Packaging and 
Transportation of Radioactive Material,'' and to the requirements of 
any state through which the shipment may pass, as set forth by the 
state's department of transportation.

Liquid Radioactive Wastes

    The release of radioactive liquids will not be affected directly as 
a result of the SFP modifications. The SFP ion exchanger resins remove 
soluble radioactive materials from the pool water. When the resins are 
replaced, the small amount of resin sluice water that is released is 
processed by the radwaste systems. As previously stated, the frequency 
of resin replacement may increase slightly during the installation of 
the new racks. However, the increase in the amount of radioactive 
liquid released to the environment as a result of the proposed SFP 
expansion is expected to be negligible.

Occupational Dose Consideration

    Radiation protection personnel at CR-3 will monitor the doses to 
the workers during the SFP expansion operations. The total occupational 
dose to plant workers as a result of the SFP reracking operations is 
estimated to be approximately 3 person-rem, which includes estimates of 
person-rem exposures associated with washdown and preparation of the 
existing racks for shipping. No diving operations are planned for the 
actual rack replacement operation. The dose estimate is comparable to 
doses for similar SFP modifications performed at other nuclear plants. 
The SFP rack installations will follow detailed procedures prepared 
with full consideration of as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) 
principles.
    On the basis of its review of the licensee's proposal, the NRC 
staff concludes that the CR-3 SFP reracking operations can be performed 
in a manner that will ensure that doses to workers will be maintained 
ALARA. The estimated dose of 3 person-rem to perform the proposed SFP 
reracking operations is a small fraction of the annual collective dose 
accrued at CR-3.

Accident Considerations

    A fuel handling accident outside the reactor building at CR-3 is 
postulated as the dropping of a fuel assembly into the SFP, resulting 
in damage to all 208 fuel pins in the dropped fuel assembly. The

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radiological consequences of this accident are based solely on the 
damage to the dropped assembly. The replacement racks only increase the 
storage capacity of the SFP and do not change the frequency or method 
for handling fuel assemblies. The revised fuel storage configuration 
does not affect the construction or fuel enrichment of individual fuel 
assemblies. Therefore, the probability or consequences of a fuel 
handling accident is not increased.
    The licensee evaluated spent fuel drop accidents onto the spent 
fuel racks, assuming three different orientations, and the dropping of 
a rack onto the spent fuel pool floor. The three orientations for the 
fuel assembly drops were; (1) Drop of a fuel assembly onto the top of a 
rack with the assembly in a vertical position, (2) drop of a fuel 
assembly onto the top of a rack with the assembly in an inclined 
position, and (3) drop of a fuel assembly through an empty rack cell to 
the bottom of the rack. In each case, the rack structure retained the 
functional capability to maintain the fuel in a non-critical state. For 
orientation 3, the drop to the bottom of the empty rack cell did not 
result in penetration of the pool liner.
    An analysis was performed to determine the consequences of a rack 
drop into SFP B (racks will not be moved over SFP A). The heaviest load 
to be lifted as part of the rack replacement project is a rack 
currently in SFP B with a weight of 17,715 pounds. The combined weight 
of this rack and the lifting rig is less than 20,000 pounds. The load 
drop analysis was performed using a bounding load of 20,000 pounds, 
assumed to be dropped from the highest lift point of 6 inches above the 
spent fuel pool operating deck to the pool floor.
    The results of dropping a rack directly onto the SFP floor were the 
puncturing of the SFP liner and penetrating the 5-foot thick concrete 
floor slab below the liner to a depth of less than 6 inches. The seams 
between all sections of concrete are sealed and a waterproof sealant 
applied to the inside surfaces of the concrete. The floor and walls of 
the CR-3 SFP have a system of leak chases at the welded joints of the 
stainless steel liner panels. The leak chase trenches collect liner 
leakage and drain by gravity to a leak test hopper/funnel. Isolation 
valves are provided in each drain line from the leak chase trenches to 
the hopper. These valves will be maintained closed during rack 
movements, thereby precluding excessive leakage that might occur 
following a load drop. The only non-isolable leakage from the SFP would 
be a slow migration of the water from the site of the puncture. The 
rate of this leakage would be limited by the low permeability of the 
concrete to a negligible value.
    CR-3 has various sources of make-up to the SFP. The sources are the 
Decay Heat System, the Demineralized Water Supply System, and temporary 
fire hoses. Based on the isolation valves being maintained closed, the 
negligible leakage rate through the concrete, and the various sources 
of make-up, the make-up capability exceeds any leakage resulting from a 
rack drop. Uncovery of the fuel stored in the SFP B is precluded, and, 
therefore, there is no increase in consequences as a result of a rack 
drop onto the SFP floor.
    The change in fresh fuel storage configuration in SFP A will result 
in the effective neutron multiplication factor remaining well below 
0.95. Therefore, there is no reduction in the margin to criticality as 
a result of the change in fresh fuel storage configuration in SFP A, 
and no increase in the probability of an inadvertent criticality.
    The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action 
and concludes that the proposed action will not increase the 
probability or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in 
the amount or types of any effluents that may be released off site, and 
there is no significant increase in occupational or public radiation 
exposure. Therefore, there are no significant radiological 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
    With regard to potential non-radiological impacts, the proposed 
action does not involve any historical sites. It does not affect non-
radiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. 
Therefore, there are no significant non-radiological environmental 
impacts associated with the proposed action.
    Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Shipping Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility

    Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility 
is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity. 
However, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) high-level radioactive 
waste repository is not expected to begin receiving spent fuel until 
approximately 2010, at the earliest. To date, no location has been 
identified and an interim federal storage facility has yet to be 
identified in advance of a decision on a permanent repository. 
Therefore, shipping the spent fuel to the DOE repository is not 
considered an alternative to increased onsite fuel storage capacity at 
this time.

Shipping Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility

    Reprocessing of spent fuel from CR-3 is not a viable alternative 
since there are no operating commercial reprocessing facilities in the 
United States. Therefore, spent fuel would have to be shipped to an 
overseas facility for reprocessing. However, this approach has never 
been used and it would require approval by the Department of State as 
well as other entities. Therefore, shipping fuel to a reprocessing 
facility is not a viable option.

Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation

    Operation at a reduced power level would decrease the amount of 
fuel being stored in the pool and thus increase the amount of time 
before full core off-load capacity is lost. However, operating the 
plant at a reduced power level would not make effective use of 
available resources, and the generation of replacement power would also 
result in environmental impacts. Therefore, reducing the amount of 
spent fuel generated by reducing power would not result in a 
significant improvement in environmental impacts and is not considered 
a practical alternative.

Transshipment of the Fuel Offsite to Another FPC Site

    CR-3 is the only nuclear unit of FPC. Therefore, transshipment of 
spent fuel to another facility with FPC is not an available option.

Decommissioning

    Power generation from CR-3 is essential to meet the current growth 
rate for energy demand in the State of Florida. Additional replacement 
capacity would be required if CR-3 were to be retired early. Permanent 
shutdown of CR-3 would result in loss of valuable power resources. The 
environmental impact would be similar to that for operation at a 
reduced power level.

Alternatives Creating Additional Storage Capacity

    Dry cask storage is a method of transferring spent fuel, after 
storage in the pool for several years, to high-capacity casks with 
passive heat dissipation features. Storage of fuel in a private 
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) located away from 
the CR-3 site is not available, since such a facility has not been 
constructed by FPC or licensed by the NRC. An on-site

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ISFSI is a long-term solution for CR-3, but cost and schedule 
considerations do not allow this alternative to meet current needs at 
CR-3 for near term spent fuel storage needs.
    The alternative technology of constructing an ISFSI that could 
create additional storage capacity involves additional fuel handling 
with an attendant opportunity for a fuel handling accident, involves 
higher cumulative dose to workers affecting the fuel transfers, and 
would not result in a significant improvement in environmental impacts 
compared to the proposed reracking modifications.

The No-Action Alternative

    The NRC staff also considered denial of the proposed action (i.e., 
the ``no-action'' alternative). Denial of the application would result 
in no significant change in current environmental impacts. The 
environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative 
actions are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

    This action does not involve the use of any resources not 
previously considered in the FES for CR-3.

Agencies and Persons Contacted

    In accordance with its stated policy, on August 7, 2000, the NRC 
staff consulted with William Passetti, Chief, Department of Health, 
Bureau of Radiation Control, for the State Florida, regarding the 
environmental impact of the proposed action. The state official had no 
comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

    On the basis of the environmental assessment, the NRC concludes 
that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the NRC has determined 
not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed 
action.
    For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
licensee's letter dated September 16, 1999, as supplemented by letters 
dated May 3 and June 29, 2000, which are available for public 
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC. Publicly available 
records will be accessible electronically from the ADAMS Public Library 
Component on the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of September 2000.

Richard P. Correia,
Chief, Section 2, Project Directorate II, Division of Licensing Project 
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 00-23357 Filed 9-11-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P