[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 166 (Friday, August 25, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 51769-51772]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-21778]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. NHTSA-98-4807]
RIN 2127-AH72


Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Compressed Natural Gas 
Fuel Containers

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule, correcting amendment; Response to Petitions for 
Reconsideration.

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SUMMARY: On December 3, 1998, we published a final rule that deleted 
the material and manufacturing process requirements in the Federal 
motor vehicle safety standard on compressed natural gas fuel 
containers. As part of this final rule, we amended the provisions 
relating to the hydrostatic burst test to remove any reference to the 
deleted requirements. Those amendments also inadvertently amended the 
hydrostatic burst test requirement to require the stress ratio to be 
applied as a pressure ratio. This document corrects that error, and 
thereby moots requests related to that amendment in several petitions 
for reconsideration of the 1998 final rule.
    This document also denies the request in a petition for 
reconsideration from Lincoln Composites, Inc., to link the deletion of 
the material and manufacturing process requirements with the addition 
of new performance tests to the standard.

DATES: This final rule is effective August 25, 2000. Petitions for 
reconsideration must be received by October 10, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Petitions should refer to the docket number of this rule and 
be submitted to: Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 400 7th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
    For non-legal issues: Mr. Charles Hott, NPS-12, Office of 
Crashworthiness Standards, National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 400 Seventh

[[Page 51770]]

Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590 (Telephone 202-366-0247) (FAX 202-
366-4329).
    For legal issues: Mr. Stephen P. Wood, NCC-20, Assistant Chief 
Counsel for Rulemaking, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590 (Telephone 202-366-2992) 
(FAX 202-366-3820).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    In a final rule published on December 3, 1998, we deleted the 
material and manufacturing process requirements from Federal Motor 
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 304, Compressed Natural Gas Fuel Container 
Integrity, and amended S7.2.1 and S7.2.2 of the Standard to eliminate 
any reference to the deleted requirements. We explained that we 
believed that deleting these requirements would facilitate 
technological innovation without having an adverse affect on safety.
    In addition, we noted that we were not replacing the deleted 
requirements with other requirements, as had been suggested by some 
commenters on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). We gave several 
reasons for that decision.
    First, we determined that the current testing requirements in 
Standard No. 304 for pressure cycling, burst, and bonfire were 
sufficient to ensure an appropriate level of safety for CNG fuel 
containers. These tests indirectly ensure that the containers are 
manufactured using appropriate materials and wall thicknesses. We 
concluded, therefore, that the Standard's design and material 
requirement unnecessarily restricted the ability of manufacturers to 
use the latest technology in manufacturing CNG fuel containers.
    Second, we explained that we had no evidence indicating the 
existence of a safety problem that would be addressed by adding 
additional tests to the Standard. We explained that we knew of six CNG 
fuel container ruptures that had occurred since 1993. Mishandling, 
misuse, and improper placement and maintenance of the CNG fuel 
containers caused the failures. We determined that all six ruptures 
could have been prevented if appropriate precautions had been taken 
(e.g., proper placement and shielding of the CNG fuel containers along 
with a periodic inspection of the container, as directed by the labels 
on the CNG fuel containers). We also found that none of the additional 
testing provisions \1\ in the new American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI) industry standard (ANSI/NGV2) would have prevented these 
cylinder failures. We concluded, therefore, that addition of those 
tests was unnecessary.
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    \1\ ANSI/NGV2 includes the following three enhanced material 
performance test requirements:
    1. Sulfide stress cracking resistance of high strength steels 
using the methods of NACE Standard TM0177-90;
    2. Sustained load cracking for aluminum alloys in accordance 
with Annex D of ISO/DIS 7866; and
    3. Intercrystalline corrosion and stress corrosion tests for 
aluminum alloys in accordance with Annex A of ISO/DIS 7866.
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    Third, we concluded that testing for such time-related failures as 
corrosion, stress rupture, viscoelastic yielding, and aging may be 
impracticable due to the small sample size and short time period 
involved with testing. Thus, we explained that even if there were a 
safety problem that could not be addressed by the standard's current 
testing requirements, we believed it would be inappropriate to require 
these particular tests given the current uncertainty about their 
effectiveness.
    Fourth, we explained that we did not believe that manufacturers 
would fail to exercise care in selecting appropriate materials to 
manufacture CNG containers and stressed that any CNG fuel containers 
that might be found in the future to have an unanticipated safety 
related failure would be subject to recall. Fifth, we stated that we 
would continue to monitor the performance of CNG fuel containers 
closely and said that should a safety problem arise, we would take the 
appropriate regulatory or enforcement action.

II. Petitions for Reconsideration and Technical Amendment of the 
Final Rule

    Lincoln Composites (Lincoln) and Pressed Steel Tank Co. (PST) each 
submitted a petition for reconsideration of the final rule. In 
addition, General Motors (GM) petitioned for a technical amendment to 
that final rule.

A. Hydrostatic Burst Test Requirements in S7.2.2

    Lincoln, PST, and GM all objected to the revision of S7.2.2, which 
specifies requirements for the hydrostatic burst test. Both PST and 
Lincoln argued that no notice was given in the NPRM that we were 
considering amending those requirements. PST stated that the revision 
to S7.2.2 altered the burst test performance requirement for composite 
reinforced CNG containers by requiring the stress ratio in Table 1 of 
the Standard to be applied as a pressure ratio. PST explained that this 
regulatory change reversed a prior amendment to S7.2.2 that had been 
made in a July 24, 1995 final rule.
    GM stated that the changes to the regulatory language of S7.2.2 not 
only removed a reference to S5.5.1, but altered the burst performance 
requirement. GM stated that it believed this change was inadvertent and 
requested that we issue a technical correction to correct the problem.
    Lincoln stated that the removal of Sections 5.5, 5.5.1, and 5.5.2 
along with the revision of Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2, modified the 
intent of the stress ratios and amended the hydrostatic burst test 
requirement. To address this problem, Lincoln stated that we should 
reinstate Sections 5.5, 5.5.1, and 5.5.2 and return Sections 7.2.1 and 
7.2.2 to their original wording. Lincoln also stated that, if we failed 
to do this, we should withdraw the rule in its entirety or stay the 
rule pending reconsideration and court review of its merits.
    As part of the December 3 final rule, we amended the requirement in 
S7.2.2 for the hydrostatic burst test to remove any reference to the 
deleted material and manufacturing requirements. Our intent in amending 
S7.2.2 was simply to remove any reference to the deleted requirements--
not to alter the burst performance requirement. However, the regulatory 
language of the final rule inadvertently amended the hydrostatic burst 
test requirement to require the values in Table 1 to be applied as 
pressure ratios.
    This document corrects that error. We are amending S4 to remove the 
definition of ``stress ratio.'' We are revising S7.2.2 to remove the 
reference to stress ratio and to state that burst pressure shall not be 
less than the 2.25 times the service pressure as suggested by PST. 
Finally, we are removing Table 1 from the standard because it will no 
longer be needed.
    We are not reinstating S5.5, S5.5.1, and S5.5.2 and returning 
S7.2.1 and S7.2.2 to their original wording, as requested by Lincoln, 
nor are we withdrawing the rule in its entirety. As stated above, we 
are making a technical correction that essentially returns S7.2.2 to 
the burst test performance requirement that existed prior to the 
December 3 final rule. We believe that this technical correction 
adequately addresses Lincoln's concern that we had altered the 
hydrostatic burst test requirement and the intent of the stress ratios.

B. Additional Performance Tests

    In its petition, Lincoln also reiterated the concerns that it 
raised in its comments on the NPRM and asked the agency to reconsider 
its decision to remove the material and manufacturing requirements 
without adding new

[[Page 51771]]

performance tests to the standard. Lincoln argued that the following 
performance tests were necessary to ensure safety:
    1. Sulfide stress cracking resistance of high strength steels using 
the methods of NACE Standard TM0177-90;
    2. Sustained load cracking for aluminum alloys in accordance with 
Annex D of ISO/DIS 7866;
    3. Intercrystalline corrosion and stress corrosion tests for 
aluminum alloys in accordance with Annex A of ISO/DIS 7866; and
    4. Cycling tests to determine leak before rupture failure modes or 
high cyclic fatigue safety margins.
    Lincoln stated that ANSI, the Canadian Standards Association (CSA), 
and the International Standards Organization (ISO) included such tests 
in their individual CNG container standards (ANSI NGV2, CSA B51 Part 2, 
and ISO/FDIS 11439). Lincoln explained that these tests were based on 
extensive testing and an examination of field events that caused damage 
but not rupture and were included in response to safety failures. 
Lincoln cited one instance of a safety failure: the rupture of a steel 
cylinder after a small number of fills. This incident was discussed at 
a November 28, 1990, NHTSA public meeting. Lincoln argued that the lack 
of additional field ruptures was due, in part, to the fact that most of 
the NGV fuel containers sold in the United States were qualified to 
NGV2 in addition to Standard No. 304. Lincoln argued that new 
manufacturers could make and sell unsafe fuel containers if additional 
tests were not included in Standard No. 304.
    We are denying Lincoln's request and affirming our earlier decision 
to not replace the deleted requirements with other requirements for 
several reasons. First, we continue to believe that Standard No. 304's 
current testing requirements--pressure cycling, burst, and bonfire--are 
sufficient to ensure an appropriate level of safety for CNG fuel 
containers.
    Second, we still have no evidence indicating the existence of a 
safety problem that would be addressed by including additional tests in 
the Standard.\2\ As stated in the December 3, 1998 final rule, we know 
of six CNG fuel container ruptures that have occurred since 1993. 
According to a safety bulletin published by the Gas Research Institute 
in October 1996, all six ruptures could have been prevented if 
appropriate precautions had been taken. Mishandling, misuse, and 
improper placement and maintenance of the CNG fuel containers caused 
the failures. In four of the cases, the CNG fuel container did not have 
a shield to protect it from impact damage. A vehicle design change 
would address this problem. In the other two cases, the CNG fuel 
containers ruptured after prolonged exposure to acidic fluids. In those 
two cases, the shielding surrounding the CNG fuel containers lacked 
adequate drainage. Consequently, acidic fluids accumulated in the area 
beneath the containers and damaged the CNG fuel containers. We believe 
that the proper placement and shielding of the CNG fuel containers 
along with a periodic inspection of the container, as directed by the 
CNG fuel containers label, could have prevented these failures.
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    \2\ We note that while several of the commenters to the NPRM 
stated that NHTSA should amend Standard No. 304 to require 
additional tests to prevent in-service failures of CNG containers, 
none provided evidence indicating the existence of a safety problem 
with in-service failures that was not addressed by the Standard's 
current tests and would be addressed by the inclusion of additional 
tests.
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    Third, none of the additional testing provisions in ANSI/NGV2, CSA 
B51 Part 2, or ISO/FDIS 11439 would have prevented these cylinder 
failures. The only failure cited by Lincoln occurred prior to 1990, 
before Standard No. 304 was issued. We believe that Standard No. 304's 
current testing requirements--pressure cycling, burst, and bonfire--
would have prevented such a failure. In addition, while Lincoln stated 
that ANSI, CSA, and ISO included additional tests in their standards in 
response to safety failures, it did not provide any evidence of these 
failures. Further, although it stated that these additional tests were 
based on extensive testing and examination of field events that caused 
damage but not rupture, they did not provide any data.
    Fourth, we do not believe that manufacturers will fail to exercise 
care in selecting appropriate materials to manufacture CNG containers. 
We will continue to monitor the performance of CNG fuel containers 
closely. Should a safety problem arise, we will take the appropriate 
regulatory or enforcement action.
    Finally, Lincoln also argued that our decision not to include 
additional performance tests, such as those included in ANSI NGV2, CSA 
B51 Part 2, and ISO/FDIS 11439 disrupts international harmonization 
efforts. We disagree. While we do not require manufacturers to certify 
their CNG containers to these additional tests, nothing prohibits them 
from doing so.

III. Effective Date

    We find good cause for making this final rule effective 
immediately. The stated purpose of the final rule was to delete the 
material and manufacturing requirements for CNG containers and to 
remove any references to those requirements in S7.2.1 and S7.2.2, not 
to amend the hydrostatic burst test requirements. This rule corrects an 
error which resulted unintentionally amending the hydrostatic burst 
test requirement. We have, therefore, determined that there is good 
cause for this final rule to be effective immediately upon publication.

VI. Rulemaking Analyses

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This final rule was reviewed under E.O. 12866. We have analyzed 
this rule and determined that it is not ``significant'' within the 
meaning of the Department of Transportation's regulatory policies and 
procedures. This rule does not impose any new requirements on 
manufacturers. It simply corrects an error.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    We have considered the effects of this rulemaking action under the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.). I hereby certify 
that the final rule would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
    The following is our statement providing the factual basis for the 
certification (5 U.S.C. 605(b)). The final rule primarily affects 
manufacturers of CNG containers. The Small Business Administration's 
size standards (13 CFR part 121) are organized according to Standard 
Industrial Classification Codes (SIC). SIC Code 3714 ''Motor Vehicle 
Parts and Accessories`` has a small business size standard of 750 
employees or fewer.
    This rule does not impose any new requirements on manufacturers. It 
simply corrects an error. Thus, we believe that this final rule will 
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
businesses.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    We have analyzed this rule under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1995 (Pub. L. 104-13) and determined that it will not impose any 
information collection requirements as that term is defined by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 5 CFR part 1320.

D. National Environmental Policy Act

    We have considered the environmental implications of this final 
rule in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
and

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determined that it will not significantly affect the human environment.

E. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires 
agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits and 
other effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate 
likely to result in the expenditure by State, local or tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of more than 
$100 million annually. Annual expenditures from this final rule will 
not exceed the $100 million threshold.

F. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

    The agency has analyzed this rulemaking in accordance with the 
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132 and has 
determined that it does not have sufficient federalism implications to 
warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation 
of a federalism summary impact statement. The final rule has no 
substantial effects on the States, or on the current Federal-State 
relationship, or on the current distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various local officials.

G. Civil Justice Reform

    This rule has no retroactive effect. We are not aware of any state 
law that would be preempted by this rule. This rule does not repeal any 
existing Federal law or regulation. This rule does not impose any new 
requirements on manufacturers. It simply corrects an error. This rule 
does not require submission of a petition for reconsideration or the 
initiation of other administrative proceedings before a party may file 
suit in court.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571

    Motor vehicle safety, Reporting and record keeping requirements, 
Tires.

    In consideration of the foregoing, the agency is amending part 571 
of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS

    1. The authority citation for part 571 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166; 
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50


    2. Section 571.304 is amended by removing the definition of 
``stress ratio'' from S4, republishing S7.2, and revising S7.2.2 to 
read as follows:


Sec. 571.304  Standard No. 304; Compressed natural gas fuel container 
integrity.

* * * * *
    S7.2  Hydrostatic burst test.
* * * * *
    S7.2.2  Each Type 2, Type 3, or Type 4 CNG fuel container shall not 
leak when subjected to burst pressure and tested in accordance with 
S8.2. Burst pressure shall be not less than 2.25 times the service 
pressure.

    Issued on: August 22, 2000.
L. Robert Shelton,
Executive Director.
[FR Doc. 00-21778 Filed 8-24-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P