[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 164 (Wednesday, August 23, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 51342-51344]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-21517]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-412]


Pennsylvania Power Company, Ohio Edison Company, the Cleveland 
Electric Illuminating Company, the Toledo Edison Company, Firstenergy 
Nuclear Operating Company, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2; Notice 
of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating 
License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, 
and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-73 issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (the licensee) 
for operation of the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 (BVPS-2), 
located in Beaver County, Pennsylvania.
    This notice supersedes the notice published on July 12, 2000 (65 FR 
43046) in its entirety.
    The proposed amendment would: (1) revise Technical Specification 
(TS) requirements regarding the minimum number of radiation monitoring 
instrumentation channels required to be operable during movement of 
fuel within the containment; (2) revise the Modes in which the 
surveillance specified by Table 4.3-3, ``Radiation Monitoring 
Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements,'' Item 2.c.ii is required; 
(3) revise TS 3.9.4, ``Containment Building Penetrations,'' to allow 
both personnel air lock (PAL) doors and other containment penetrations 
to be open during movement of fuel assemblies within containment, 
provided certain conditions are met; (4) revise applicability and 
action statement requirements of TS 3.9.4. to be for only during 
movement of fuel assemblies within containment; (5) revise periodicity 
and applicability of Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.9.4.1; (6) revise 
SR 4.9.4.2 to verify flow rate of air to the supplemental leak 
collection and release system (SLCRS) rather than verifying the flow 
rate through the system; (7) add two new SRs, 4.9.4.3 and 4.9.4.4, for 
verification and demonstration of SLCRS operability; (8) modify TS 3/
4.9.9 for the containment purge exhaust and isolation system to be 
applicable only during movement of fuel assemblies within containment; 
(9) revise associated TS Bases as well as make editorial and format 
changes; and, (10) revise the BVPS-2 Updated Final Safety Analysis 
Report (UFSAR) description of a fuel-handling accident (FHA) and its 
radiological consequences. The changes to the BVPS-2 UFSAR reflect a 
revised FHA analysis that the licensee performed to evaluate the 
potential consequences of having containment penetrations and/or the 
PAL open during movement of fuel assemblies within containment. These 
UFSAR revisions include potential exclusion area boundary, low 
population zone, and control room operator doses as a result of an FHA.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its 
analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is 
presented below:

    1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    The proposed amendment involves changes to accident mitigation 
system requirements. These systems are related to controlling the 
release of radioactivity to the environment and are not considered 
to be accident initiators to any previously analyzed accident.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.
    Based on the current technical specification requirements, an 
environmental release due to a fuel handling accident (FHA) 
occurring within containment is precluded by a design which 
automatically isolates the containment following detection of 
radioactivity by redundant containment purge monitors. The proposed 
amendment, which permits containment penetrations to be open during 
movement of fuel assemblies within containment, increases the dose 
at the site boundary and the control room operator dose due to a FHA 
occurring within containment; however, the dose remains within 
acceptable limits. Based on a radiological analysis of a FHA within 
containment with open containment penetrations being filtered by the 
Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS), the 
resultant radiological consequences of this event are well within 
the 10 CFR Part 100.11 limits, as defined by acceptance criteria in 
the Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 15.7.4. Control room operator 
doses remain less than the 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A General Design 
Criteria (GDC) 19 limit of 5 rem whole body or its equivalent to any 
part of the body. The proposed changes to LCO 3.9.4 and associated 
surveillance requirements will ensure that SLCRS filtration 
assumptions in the associated radiological analysis are met.
    LCO 3.9.10 titled ``Water Level--Reactor Vessel'' will continue 
to ensure that at least 23 feet of water is maintained over the fuel 
during fuel movement when the plant is in Mode 6. LCO 3.9.3 titled 
``Decay Time'' will continue to ensure that irradiated fuel is not 
moved in the reactor pressure vessel until at least 150 hours after 
shutdown. These LCOs will continue to ensure that two of the key 
assumptions used in the radiological safety analysis are met.
    The radiological consequences of the Core Alteration events 
other than the FHA remain unchanged. These events do not result in 
fuel cladding integrity damage. A radioactive release to the 
environment is not postulated since the activity is contained in the 
fuel rods. Therefore, the affected containment systems are not 
required to mitigate a radioactive release to the environment due to 
a Core Alteration event.
    The proposed revision in the minimum number of the Containment 
Purge Exhaust

[[Page 51343]]

Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation channels required to be 
operable from one to two, ensures that redundant instrument channels 
are available to detect and initiate isolation of the containment 
purge and exhaust containment penetrations during a FHA inside 
containment.
    The proposed administrative, editorial, and format changes do 
not affect plant safety. The Bases section has been revised as 
necessary to reflect the changes to these Specifications. Bases 
Section 3/4.9.9 will also be revised to remove text pertaining to 
Mode 5 applicability that is not relevant to this specification.
    Therefore, the proposed amendment does not significantly 
increase the consequences of any previously evaluated accident.
    2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    The proposed amendment affects a previously evaluated accident; 
e.g., FHA. The proposed amendment does not represent a significant 
change in the configuration or operation of the plant. The proposed 
amendment does not impact Technical Specification requirements for 
systems needed to prevent or mitigate other Core Alteration events. 
The filtered SLCRS that will be utilized to control and filter the 
radioactive release from a FHA occurring within containment is the 
same system (with the exception of the flow path to the filter 
banks) currently relied upon to control and filter the release from 
a FHA in the fuel building. The primary function of SLCRS is to 
ensure that radioactive leakage from the primary containment 
following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or radioactive release due 
to a fuel building FHA is collected and filtered for iodine removal 
prior to discharge to the atmosphere at an elevated release point 
through a ventilation vent. This system will be relied upon to 
control the releases from open containment penetrations should a FHA 
occur inside of containment until such time that these open 
containment penetrations can be isolated. The proposed amendment 
contains the requirement to maintain the capability to close open 
containment penetrations within 30 minutes following a FHA inside 
containment.
    The filtered SLCRS that will be relied upon to mitigate a FHA 
within containment is classified as Quality Assurance (QA) Category 
I, Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category I as stated in Updated Final 
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 6.5.3.2.1 titled ``Design 
Bases.'' As described in UFSAR Section 6.5.1 titled ``Engineered 
Safety Feature Filter Systems,'' filtered SLCRS is considered to be 
an engineered safety features (ESF) filter system used to mitigate 
the consequences of accidents.
    Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.
    3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin 
of safety?
    Based on the current technical specification requirements, an 
environmental release due to a FHA occurring within containment is 
precluded by a design which automatically isolates the containment 
following detection of radioactivity by redundant containment purge 
monitors. The proposed amendment increases the dose at the site 
boundary and the control room operator dose due to a FHA occurring 
within containment; however, the dose remains within acceptable 
limits. The margin of safety as defined by 10 CFR Part 100 has not 
been significantly reduced.
    The revised radiological analysis based on the proposed 
amendment demonstrates that during a FHA inside containment, the 
projected offsite doses will be well within the applicable 
regulatory limits of 10 CFR Part 100.11 of 300 rem thyroid and 25 
rem whole body, and are less than the more restrictive guidance 
criteria in the SRP Section 15.7.4 of 75 rem thyroid and 6 rem whole 
body. Control room operator doses are less than the 10 CFR Part 50 
Appendix A GDC 19 limit of 5 rem whole body or its equivalent to any 
part of the body. This radiological analysis is based on all 
airborne activity reaching the containment atmosphere, as a result 
of a FHA inside containment, being released to the environment over 
a 2 hour period. The 2 hour release period is based on the guidance 
contained in Regulatory Guide 1.25 titled ``Assumptions Used for 
Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Fuel 
Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for 
Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors.'' The proposed amendment 
contains a Bases requirement to maintain the capability to close 
open containment penetrations within 30 minutes following a FHA 
inside containment. Completion of this action will reduce the dose 
consequence of a FHA within containment by terminating the release 
to the environment prior to all airborne activity being released 
from the containment.
    The margin of safety for Core Alteration events other than the 
FHA is not significantly reduced due to this proposed amendment. The 
proposed amendment does not impact Technical Specification 
requirements for systems needed to prevent or mitigate such Core 
Alteration events. These events do not result in fuel cladding 
integrity damage. Therefore, a radioactive release to the 
environment is not postulated since the activity is contained in the 
fuel rods.
    The proposed revision in the minimum number of the Containment 
Purge Exhaust Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation channels required 
to be operable from one to two, ensures that redundant instrument 
channels are available to detect and initiate isolation of the 
containment purge and exhaust containment penetrations during a FHA 
occurring inside containment.
    The proposed changes to SR 4.9.4.1 and SR 4.9.9, to remove 
unnecessary detail on when these surveillances are required to be 
performed, are administrative in nature and do not affect plant 
safety.
    The proposed revision of the words ``through the'' to the words 
``to filtered'' in SR 4.9.4.2.a does not change the LCO 3.9.4 
requirements. This change makes the LCO and surveillance 
requirements consistent. This change is administrative in nature and 
does not affect plant safety.
    The proposed administrative, editorial, and format changes do 
not affect plant safety. The Bases section has been revised as 
necessary to reflect the changes to these Specifications. Bases 
Section 3/4.9.9 will also be revised to remove text pertaining to 
Mode 5 applicability that is not relevant to this specification.
    Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of 
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By September 22, 2000, the licensee may file a request for a 
hearing with

[[Page 51344]]

respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating 
license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and accessible 
electronically through the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room link at 
the NRC Web site (http://www.nrc.gov). If a request for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Mary O'Reilly, FirstEnergy Nuclear 
Operating Company, FirstEnergy Corporation, 76 South Main Street, 
Akron, OH 44308, attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated May 1, 2000, as supplement by letter 
dated July 21, 2000, which are available for public inspection at the 
Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, 
NW., Washington, DC, and accessible electronically through the ADAMS 
Public Electronic Reading Room link at the NRC Web site (http://www.nrc.gov).

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of August, 2000.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Daniel S. Collins,
Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate I, Division of 
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 00-21517 Filed 8-22-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P