[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 158 (Tuesday, August 15, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 49735-49737]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-20650]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2000-NM-49-AD; Amendment 39-11865; AD 2000-13-03 R1]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 Series 
Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; correction.

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SUMMARY: This document corrects information in an existing 
airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain McDonnell Douglas 
Model DC-8 series airplanes that have been converted from a passenger 
to a cargo-carrying (``freighter'') configuration. That AD currently 
requires a revision to the Airplane Flight Manual Supplement to ensure 
that the main deck cargo door is closed, latched, and locked; 
inspection of the door wire bundle to detect discrepancies and repair 
or replacement of discrepant parts. That AD also requires, among other 
actions, modification of the hydraulic and indication systems of the 
main deck cargo door, and installation of a means to prevent 
pressurization to an unsafe level if the main deck cargo door is not 
closed, latched, and locked. This document corrects an error that 
resulted in the omission of a note, which informs operators of an 
alternative approved means of compliance for certain requirements. This 
correction is necessary to ensure operators are informed of this 
approved means of compliance.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 1, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael E. O'Neil, Aerospace Engineer,

[[Page 49736]]

Airframe Branch, ANM-120L, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los 
Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, 
Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5320; fax (562) 
627-5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June 21, 2000, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) issued AD 2000-13-03, amendment 39-11802 (65 FR 
39539, June 27, 2000), which applies to certain McDonnell Douglas Model 
DC-8 series airplanes that have been converted from a passenger to a 
cargo-carrying (``freighter'') configuration. That AD requires a 
revision to the Airplane Flight Manual Supplement to ensure that the 
main deck cargo door is closed, latched, and locked; inspection of the 
door wire bundle to detect discrepancies and repair or replacement of 
discrepant parts. That AD also requires, among other actions, 
modification of the hydraulic and indication systems of the main deck 
cargo door, and installation of a means to prevent pressurization to an 
unsafe level if the main deck cargo door is not closed, latched, and 
locked. That AD was prompted by the FAA's determination that certain 
main deck cargo door systems do not provide an adequate level of 
safety, and that there is no means to prevent pressurization to an 
unsafe level if the main deck cargo door is not closed, latched, and 
locked. The actions required by that AD are intended to prevent opening 
of the cargo door while the airplane is in flight, and consequent rapid 
decompression of the airplane including possible loss of flight control 
or severe structural damage.

Need for the Correction

    The FAA inadvertently omitted a note in the final rule that reads, 
``[i]nstallation of National Aircraft Service, Inc. (NASI) Vent Door 
System STC ST01244CH, is an approved means of compliance with the 
requirements of paragraph (c) of this AD.'' Therefore, the FAA has 
determined that a correction to AD 2000-13-03 is necessary to inform 
operators of this approved means of compliance.

Correction of Publication

    This document corrects the error and correctly adds the AD as an 
amendment to Sec. 39.13 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
39.13).
    The AD is reprinted in its entirety for the convenience of affected 
operators. The effective date of the AD remains August 1, 2000.
    Since this action only corrects, it has no adverse economic impact 
and imposes no additional burden on any person. Therefore, the FAA has 
determined that notice and public procedures are unnecessary.

List of Subject in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

Adoption of the Correction

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of 
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec. 39.13  [Corrected]

    2. Section 39.13 is amended by correctly adding the following 
airworthiness directive (AD):

2000-13-03 R1  McDonnell Douglas: Amendment 39-11865. Docket 2000-
NM-49-AD.

    Applicability: Model DC-8 series airplanes that have been 
converted from a passenger to a cargo-carrying (``freighter'') 
configuration in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) 
SA1063SO; certificated in any category.

    Note 1:
    This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding 
applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been otherwise 
modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the 
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, 
altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of 
this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an 
alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (e) of 
this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of 
the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition 
addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been 
eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to 
address it.

    Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished 
previously.
    To prevent opening of the cargo door while the airplane is in 
flight, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane including 
possible loss of flight control or severe structural damage, 
accomplish the following:

Actions Addressing the Main Deck Cargo Door

    (a) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, 
accomplish a general visual inspection of the wire bundle of the 
main deck cargo door between the exit point of the cargo liner and 
the attachment point on the main deck cargo door to detect crimped, 
frayed, or chafed wires; and perform a general visual inspection for 
damaged, loose, or missing hardware mounting components. If any 
crimped, frayed, or chafed wire, or damaged, loose, or missing 
hardware mounting component is detected, prior to further flight, 
repair in accordance with FAA-approved maintenance procedures.

    Note 2:
    For the purposes of this AD, a general visual inspection is 
defined as ``A visual examination of an interior or exterior area, 
installation, or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure, or 
irregularity. This level of inspection is made under normally 
available lighting conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting, 
flashlight, or drop-light, and may require removal or opening of 
access panels or doors. Stands, ladders, or platforms may be 
required to gain proximity to the area being checked.''

    (b) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, revise 
the Limitations Section of the appropriate FAA-approved Airplane 
Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS) for STC SA1063SO by inserting 
therein procedures to ensure that the main deck cargo door is fully 
closed, latched, and locked prior to dispatch of the airplane, and 
install any associated placards. The AFMS revision procedures and 
installation of any associated placards shall be accomplished in 
accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles 
Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane 
Directorate.

Actions Addressing the Main Deck Cargo Door Systems

    (c) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD, 
accomplish the actions specified in paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), 
(c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(5) of this AD in accordance with a method 
approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.
    (1) Modify the indication system of the main deck cargo door to 
indicate to the pilots whether the main deck cargo door is fully 
closed, latched, and locked;
    (2) Modify the mechanical and hydraulic systems of the main deck 
cargo door to eliminate detrimental deformation of elements of the 
door latching and locking mechanism;
    (3) Install a means to visually inspect the locking mechanism of 
the main deck cargo door;
    (4) Install a means to remove power to the door while the 
airplane is in flight;
    (5) Install a means to prevent pressurization to an unsafe level 
if the main deck cargo door is not fully closed, latched, and 
locked.

    Note 3:
    Installation of National Aircraft Service, Inc. (NASI) Vent Door 
System STC ST01244CH, is an approved means of compliance with the 
requirements of paragraph (c) of this AD.

    (d) Compliance with paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4), 
and (c)(5) of this AD constitutes terminating action for the 
requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD, and the AFMS 
revision and placards may be removed.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (e) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the 
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be 
used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. Operators shall 
submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal 
Maintenance Inspector, who may

[[Page 49737]]

add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

    Note 4:
    Information concerning the existence of approved alternative 
methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the 
Los Angeles ACO.

Special Flight Permit

    (f) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 
Secs. 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the 
requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Effective Date

    (g) The effective date of this amendment remains August 1, 2000.

Appendix 1

    Excerpt from an FAA Memorandum to Director-Airworthiness and 
Technical Standards of ATA, dated March 20, 1992.
    ``(1) Indication System:
    (a) The indication system must monitor the closed, latched, and 
locked positions, directly.
    (b) The indicator should be amber unless it concerns an outward 
opening door whose opening during takeoff could present an immediate 
hazard to the airplane. In that case the indicator must be red and 
located in plain view in front of the pilots. An aural warning is 
also advisable. A display on the master caution/warning system is 
also acceptable as an indicator. For the purpose of complying with 
this paragraph, an immediate hazard is defined as significant 
reduction in controllability, structural damage, or impact with 
other structures, engines, or controls.
    (c) Loss of indication or a false indication of a closed, 
latched, and locked condition must be improbable.
    (d) A warning indication must be provided at the door operators 
station that monitors the door latched and locked conditions 
directly, unless the operator has a visual indication that the door 
is fully closed and locked. For example, a vent door that monitors 
the door locks and can be seen from the operators station would meet 
this requirement.
    (2) Means to Visually Inspect the Locking Mechanism:
    There must be a visual means of directly inspecting the locks. 
Where all locks are tied to a common lock shaft, a means of 
inspecting the locks at each end may be sufficient to meet this 
requirement provided no failure condition in the lock shaft would go 
undetected when viewing the end locks. Viewing latches may be used 
as an alternate to viewing locks on some installations where there 
are other compensating features.
    (3) Means to Prevent Pressurization:
    All doors must have provisions to prevent initiation of 
pressurization of the airplane to an unsafe level, if the door is 
not fully closed, latched and locked.
    (4) Lock Strength:
    Locks must be designed to withstand the maximum output power of 
the actuators and maximum expected manual operating forces treated 
as a limit load. Under these conditions, the door must remain 
closed, latched and locked.
    (5) Power Availability:
    All power to the door must be removed in flight and it must not 
be possible for the flight crew to restore power to the door while 
in flight.
    (6) Powered Lock Systems:
    For doors that have powered lock systems, it must be shown by 
safety analysis that inadvertent opening of the door after it is 
fully closed, latched and locked, is extremely improbable.''


    Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 9, 2000.
Donald L. Riggin,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 00-20650 Filed 8-14-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-U