[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 157 (Monday, August 14, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49609-49610]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-20583]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-382, License No. NPF-38 EA-00-093]


Entergy Operations, Inc., Waterford 3; Confirmatory Order 
Modifying License (Effective Immediately)

I

    Entergy Operations, Inc. (Licensee) is the holder of Facility 
Operating License No. NPF-38 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50 on March 16, 
1985. The license authorizes the operation of Waterford 3 (facility) in 
accordance with conditions specified therein. The facility is located 
on the Licensee's site in Taft, Louisiana.

II

    10 CFR 73.55(a) states, in part, that the Licensee shall establish 
and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security 
organization which will have as its objective to provide high assurance 
that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to 
the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable 
risk to the public health and safety. The physical protection system 
shall be designed to protect against the design basis threat as stated 
in Paragraph 73.1(a).
    Paragraph 1.3.3 of the Waterford 3 Safeguards Contingency Plan 
states, in part, that the security concept of operations was based on 
response to unauthorized entry or activity, and delay of intruders 
short of the vital areas by barriers and the security/response force. 
Further, that these basic functions are the responsibility of the 
security organization in order to assure protection of the plant 
against hostile acts of sabotage.
    On October 4-7, 1999, the NRC conducted an inspection at the 
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 facility to review the 
Licensee's compliance with 10 CFR Part 73 and its physical security 
plan (reference NRC Inspection Report 50-382/99-17). Based on the 
conduct of tabletop exercises, weaknesses were identified with the 
Licensee's capabilities to respond adequately to a design basis threat 
intrusion. Specific information about the inspection findings has been 
classified as Safeguards Information and is not available to the 
public.
    As a result of these October 1999 inspection findings, the Licensee 
attended a management meeting in the NRC Region IV office on November 
10, 1999, to discuss the identified weaknesses. During that meeting, 
the Licensee indicated that corrective actions would be taken to 
improve weapons deployment, defensive strategy, and hardened barriers, 
and that additional training would be conducted as appropriate. The 
Licensee indicated its belief that, although there were problems, its 
physical security plan was capable of meeting its intended function, 
and invited the NRC to assess its program during the conduct of force-
on-force exercises. Subsequently, it was agreed that an inspection of 
the conduct of force-on-force exercises would occur in March 2000.
    On March 20-23, 2000, the NRC conducted the follow-up inspection at 
the Waterford facility, which included tabletop and force-on-force 
exercises (reference NRC Inspection Report 50-382/00-03). In addition 
to identifying findings which were similar to those identified during 
the October 1999 inspection, the NRC identified additional significant 
weaknesses. Problem areas included target sets, defensive positions, 
armed responder staffing levels, response time calculations, 
operations/security interface particularly with respect to drill/target 
set development and participation, command and control, guidance on the 
use of protective masks by the armed responders, response weapon 
proficiency, and administrative controls to ensure that plant 
conditions are evaluated to ensure protective strategy assumptions 
remain valid. More specific information about the inspection findings 
has been classified as Safeguards Information, and is not available to 
the public. During the exit briefing, the NRC identified an apparent 
violation of 10 CFR 73.55(a) and the safeguards contingency plan for 
the failure to demonstrate a capability to protect vital equipment by 
locating and stopping adversaries during force-on-force exercises. The 
Licensee implemented immediate interim corrective actions and 
compensatory measures which were satisfactory to the NRC.
    A closed, predecisional enforcement conference was conducted on May 
30, 2000, with the Licensee. During the conference, the Licensee 
identified as the root cause of its weaknesses in the physical security 
program a breakdown in management controls; specifically that: 
responsibility and accountability had not been clearly defined; 
repetitive management changes had resulted in a lack of organization; 
reduced staffing levels had affected security force training; change 
management practices had not been applied to a changing environment; a 
lack of accountability had resulted in a failure to act on available 
information; and Entergy Operations had not exercised adequate 
oversight of several critical functions being conducted by contractors. 
The Licensee identified several contributing causes for its 
deficiencies as well, including: inadequate design of the security 
program; poor security program implementation; a complacent culture; 
and inadequate training. In addition, the Licensee identified several 
missed opportunities to identify these problems.
    During the conference, the Licensee noted the interim compensatory 
measures it had taken to address these problems and discussed its 
Security Improvement Plan (SIP) which would provide more permanent 
improvements. By letter dated June 8, 2000, the NRC requested 
additional information regarding the SIP. The Licensee responded by 
letter dated June 23, 2000, and revised the SIP to reflect its 
response. While acknowledging the interim compensatory measures the 
Licensee has taken, the NRC believes

[[Page 49610]]

issuance of this Order is necessary to ensure corrective actions are 
effectively implemented over the long term. By letter and telephone 
call dated July 21, 2000, the NRC proposed that specified commitments 
be confirmed by Order, and that the Order require the Licensee to 
demonstrate the ability to protect the plant from the design basis 
threat. By letter dated July 27, 2000, the Licensee agreed to 
confirming the identified commitments by Order, and the Licensee waived 
its right to request a hearing on all or part of the Order.

III

    By letter dated July 27, 2000, the Licensee has agreed to the 
following conditions:
    A. Entergy Operations, Inc., shall complete the following items by 
November 30, 2000:
    1. Protective Strategy Corrective Actions
    a. Perform independent assessments of the protective strategy to 
identify areas for improvement, and evaluate the results of the 
assessments for enhancing the protective strategy.
    b. Develop and implement an enhanced protective strategy for 
protection of target sets and document this strategy.
    c. Revise the Physical Security Plan, Safeguards Contingency, and 
Security Training and Qualifications plans to reflect the enhanced 
protective strategy.
    2. Train the current security response force and other staff, as 
necessary, on the enhanced protective strategy.
    3. Implement modifications within and outside the plant, as 
necessary, to implement the enhanced protective strategy.
    B. Entergy Operations, Inc., shall demonstrate the ability to 
protect the plant against the design basis threat within 90 days after 
completion of the conditions set forth above in A.1 through A.3. Such 
demonstration will be accomplished by conducting force-on-force 
exercises evaluated by the NRC.
    On July 27, 2000, the Licensee consented to issuing this Order with 
the commitments, as described in Section IV below. The Licensee further 
agreed in its July 27, 2000, letter that this Order is to be effective 
upon issuance and that it has waived its right to a hearing. 
Implementation of these commitments will provide enhanced assurance 
that the Licensee will be capable of protecting the plant from the 
design basis threat.
    I find that the Licensee's commitments as set forth in Section IV 
are acceptable and necessary and conclude that with these commitments 
the plant's safety is reasonably assured. In view of the foregoing, I 
have determined that public health and safety require that the 
Licensee's commitments be confirmed by this Order. Based on the above 
and Licensee's consent, this Order is immediately effective upon 
issuance.

IV

    Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 103, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and 
186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's 
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR Part 50, It is hereby ordered, 
effective immediately, that License No. NPF-38 is modified as follows:
    A. Entergy Operations, Inc., shall complete the following items by 
November 30, 2000:
    1. Protective Strategy Corrective Actions
    a. Perform independent assessments of the protective strategy to 
identify areas for improvement, and evaluate the results of the 
assessments for enhancing the protective strategy.
    b. Develop and implement an enhanced protective strategy for 
protection of target sets and document this strategy.
    c. Revise the Physical Security Plan, Safeguards Contingency, and 
Security Training and Qualifications plans to reflect the enhanced 
protective strategy.
    2. Train the current security response force and other staff, as 
necessary, on the enhanced protective strategy.
    3. Implement modifications within and outside the plant, as 
necessary, to implement the enhanced protective strategy.
    B. Entergy Operations, Inc., shall demonstrate the ability to 
protect the plant against the design basis threat within 90 days after 
completion of the conditions set forth above in A.1 through A.3. Such 
demonstration will be accomplished by conducting force-on-force 
exercises evaluated by the NRC.
    The Regional Administrator, Region IV, may relax or rescind, in 
writing, any of the above conditions upon a showing by the Licensee of 
good cause.

V

    Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other 
than the Licensee, may request a hearing within 20 days of its 
issuance. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to 
extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of 
time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a 
statement of good cause for the extension. Any request for a hearing 
shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, ATTN: Chief, Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, 
Washington, DC 20555. Copies of the hearing request shall also be sent 
to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Associate General Counsel for 
Hearings, Enforcement & Administration at the same address, to the 
Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, 
Arlington, Texas 76011, and to the Licensee. If such a person requests 
a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in 
which his interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall 
address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.714(d).
    If the hearing is requested by a person whose interest is adversely 
affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and 
place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered 
at such hearing shall be whether this Confirmatory Order should be 
sustained.
    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions 
specified in Section IV above shall be final 20 days from the date of 
this Order without further order or proceedings. If an extension of 
time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions 
specified in Section IV shall be final when the extension expires if a 
hearing request has not been received. An answer or a request for 
hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this order.

    Dated this 4th day of August 2000.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
R. W. Borchardt,
 Director, Office of Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 00-20583 Filed 8-11-00; 8:45 am]
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