[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 156 (Friday, August 11, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49271-49277]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-20419]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation on 
Technical Specification Improvement To Eliminate Requirements on Post 
Accident Sampling Systems Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement 
Process

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Request for comment.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model safety evaluation (SE) 
relating to the elimination of requirements on post accident sampling 
imposed on licensees through orders, license conditions, or technical 
specifications. The NRC staff has also prepared a model no significant 
hazards consideration (NSHC) determination relating to this matter. The 
purpose of these models is to permit the NRC to efficiently process 
amendments that propose to remove requirements for the Post Accident 
Sampling System (PASS). Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which 
the models apply could request amendments confirming the applicability 
of the SE and NSHC determination to their reactors and providing the 
requested plant-specific verifications and commitments. The NRC staff 
is requesting comments on the model SE and model NSHC determination 
prior to announcing their availability for referencing in license 
amendment applications.

DATES: The comment period expires September 11, 2000. Comments received 
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received 
on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or via U.S. 
mail.
    Submit written comments to: Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, 
Division of Administrative Services, Office of

[[Page 49272]]

Administration, Mail Stop: T-6 D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays.
    Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC's Public 
Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW (Lower Level), Washington, DC.
    Comments may be submitted by electronic mail to [email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Reckley, Mail Stop: O-8E2, 
Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone 301-415-1323.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item 
Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specification 
Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The 
consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP) is intended to 
improve the efficiency and transparency of NRC licensing processes. 
This is accomplished by processing proposed changes to the Standard 
Technical Specifications (STS) in a manner that supports subsequent 
license amendment applications. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for 
the public to comment on proposed changes to the STS following a 
preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and finding that the change 
will likely be offered for adoption by licensees. This notice is 
soliciting comment on a proposed change to the STS that removes 
requirements for the PASS. The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate 
any comments received for a proposed change to the STS and to either 
reconsider the change or to proceed with announcing the availability of 
the change for proposed adoption by licensees. Those licensees opting 
to apply for the subject change to technical specifications are 
responsible for reviewing the staff's evaluation, referencing the 
applicable technical justifications, and providing any necessary plant-
specific information. Each amendment application made in response to 
the notice of availability would be processed and noticed in accordance 
with applicable rules and NRC procedures.
    This notice involves the elimination of requirements for PASS and 
related administrative controls in technical specifications. This 
proposed change was proposed for incorporation into the standard 
technical specifications by the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) and the 
Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) participants in the 
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF-366.

Applicability

    This proposed change to remove requirements for PASS from technical 
specifications (and other elements of the licensing bases) is 
applicable to plants with Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering 
designs.
    To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications, 
the staff requests each licensee applying for the changes addressed by 
TSTF-366 using the CLIIP to address the following plant-specific 
verifications and regulatory commitments. The CLIIP does not prevent 
licensees from requesting an alternative approach or proposing the 
changes without the requested verifications and regulatory commitments. 
Variations from the approach recommended in this notice may, however, 
require additional review by the NRC staff and may increase the time 
and resources needed for the review. In making the requested regulatory 
commitments, each licensee should address: (1) That the subject 
capability exists (or will be developed) and will be maintained; (2) 
where the capability or procedure will be described (e.g., severe 
accident management guidelines, emergency operating procedures, 
emergency plan implementing procedures); and (3) a schedule for 
implementation. The amendment request need not provide details about 
designs or procedures.
    Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory 
commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and 
maintain):
    a. contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive 
samples from the reactor coolant system, containment sump, and 
containment atmosphere;
    b. a capability for classifying fuel damage events at the Alert 
level threshold (typically this is 300 Ci/ml dose equivalent 
iodine). This capability may use the normal sampling system and/or 
correlations of sampling or letdown line dose rates to coolant 
concentrations; and
    c. the capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been 
released to offsite environs.

Public Notices

    The staff issued a Federal Register Notice (64 FR 66213, November 
24, 1999) that requested public comment on the NRC's pending action to 
approve topical reports submitted by the WOG and the CEOG in which they 
proposed to eliminate regulatory requirements for PASS. In particular, 
the staff sought comment from offsite emergency response organizations 
so that any impact of the elimination of PASS on their response could 
be factored into the staff's evaluation. Appendices to the staff's 
safety evaluations for topical reports submitted by the CEOG and the 
WOG contain a synopsis of the public comments received and the staff's 
evaluation of the comments. The safety evaluations for the topical 
reports are available on the NRC website posting for this change 
(www.nrc.gov/NRR/sts/sts.htm) and the official record copies are 
available on the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management 
System (ADAMS) (Accession Numbers ML003715250 dated May 16, 2000, for 
the CEOG topical report and ML003723268 dated June 14, 2000, for the 
WOG topical report).
    This notice requests comments from interested members of the public 
within 30 days of the date of publication in the Federal Register. 
Following the staff's evaluation of comments received as a result of 
this notice, the staff may reconsider the proposed change or may 
proceed with announcing the availability of the change in a subsequent 
notice (perhaps with some changes to the safety evaluation or proposed 
no significant hazards consideration determination as a result of 
public comments). If the staff announces the availability of the 
change, licensees wishing to adopt the change will submit an 
application in accordance with applicable rules and other regulatory 
requirements. The staff will in turn issue for each application a 
notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to facility operating 
license(s), a proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination, and an opportunity for a hearing. A notice of issuance 
of an amendment to operating license(s) will also be issued to announce 
the elimination of the PASS requirements for each plant that applies 
for and receives the requested change.

Proposed Safety Evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation; Consolidated Line Item Improvement, Technical Specification 
Task Force (TSTF) Change TSTF-366, Elimination of Requirements for Post 
Accident Sampling System (PASS)

[[Page 49273]]

1.0  Introduction

    In the aftermath of the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI), Unit 
2, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) imposed requirements on 
licensees for commercial nuclear power plants to install and maintain 
the capability to obtain and analyze post-accident samples of the 
reactor coolant and containment atmosphere. The desired capabilities of 
the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) were described in NUREG-0737, 
``Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements.'' The NRC issued 
orders to licensees with plants operating at the time of the TMI 
accident to confirm the installation of PASS capabilities (generally as 
they had been described in NUREG-0737). A requirement for PASS and 
related administrative controls was added to the technical 
specifications (TS) of the operating plants and was included in the 
initial TS for plants licensed during the 1980s and 90s. Additional 
expectations regarding PASS capabilities were included in Regulatory 
Guide 1.97, ``Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power 
Plants To Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an 
Accident.''
    Significant improvements have been achieved since the TMI accident 
in the areas of understanding risks associated with nuclear plant 
operations and developing better strategies for managing the response 
to potentially severe accidents at nuclear plants. Recent insights 
about plant risks and alternate severe accident assessment tools have 
led the NRC staff to conclude that some TMI Action Plan items can be 
revised without reducing the ability of licensees to respond to severe 
accidents. The NRC's efforts to oversee the risks associated with 
nuclear technology more effectively and to eliminate undue regulatory 
costs to licensees and the public have prompted the NRC to consider 
eliminating the requirements for PASS in TS and other parts of the 
licensing bases of operating reactors.
    The staff has completed its review of the topical reports submitted 
by the Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) and the Westinghouse 
Owners Group (WOG) that proposed the elimination of PASS. The 
justifications for the proposed elimination of PASS requirements center 
on evaluations of the various radiological and chemical sampling and 
their potential usefulness in responding to a severe reactor accident 
or making decisions regarding actions to protect the public from 
possible releases of radioactive materials. As explained in more detail 
in the staff's safety evaluations for the two topical reports, the 
staff has reviewed the available sources of information for use by 
decision-makers in developing protective action recommendations and 
assessing core damage. Based on this review, the staff found that the 
information provided by PASS is either unnecessary or is effectively 
provided by other indications of process parameters or measurement of 
radiation levels. The staff agrees, therefore, with the owners groups 
that licensees can remove the TS requirements for PASS, revise (as 
necessary) other elements of the licensing bases, and pursue possible 
design changes to alter or remove existing PASS equipment.

2.0  Background

    In a letter dated May 5, 1999 (as supplemented by letter dated 
April 14, 2000), the CEOG submitted the topical report CE NPSD-1157, 
Revision 1, ``Technical Justification for the Elimination of the Post-
Accident Sampling System From the Plant Design and Licensing Bases for 
CEOG Utilities.'' A similar proposal was submitted on October 26, 1998 
(as supplemented by letters dated April 28, 1999, April 10 and May 22, 
2000), by the WOG in its topical report WCAP-14986, ``Post Accident 
Sampling System Requirements: A Technical Basis.'' The reports provided 
evaluations of the information obtained from PASS samples to determine 
the contribution of the information to plant safety and accident 
recovery. The reports considered the progression and consequences of 
core damage accidents and assessed the accident progression with 
respect to plant abnormal and emergency operating procedures, severe 
accident management guidance, and emergency plans. The reports provided 
the owners groups' technical justifications for the elimination for the 
various PASS sampling requirements. The specific samples and the 
staff's findings are described in the following evaluation.
    The NRC staff prepared this model safety evaluation (SE) relating 
to the elimination of requirements on post accident sampling and 
solicited public comment [ FR ] in accordance with the consolidated 
line item improvement process (CLIIP). The use of the CLIIP in this 
matter is intended to help the NRC to efficiently process amendments 
that propose to remove the PASS requirements from TS. Licensees of 
nuclear power reactors to which this model apply were informed [ FR ] 
that they could request amendments confirming the applicability of the 
SE to their reactors and providing the requested plant-specific 
verifications and commitments.

3.0  Evaluation

    The technical evaluations for the elimination of PASS sampling 
requirements are provided in the safety evaluations dated May 16, 2000, 
for the CEOG topical report CE NPSD-1157 and June 14, 2000, for the WOG 
topical report WCAP-14986. The NRC staff's safety evaluations approving 
the topical reports are located in the NRC's Agencywide Documents 
Access and Management System (ADAMS) (Accession Numbers ML003715250 for 
CE NPSD-1157 and ML003723268 for WCAP-14986).
    The ways in which the requirements and recommendations for PASS 
were incorporated into the licensing bases of commercial nuclear power 
plants varied as a function of when plants were licensed. Plants that 
were operating at the time of the TMI accident are likely to have been 
the subject of confirmatory orders that imposed the PASS functions 
described in NUREG-0737 as obligations. The issuance of plant specific 
amendments to adopt this change, which would remove PASS and related 
administrative controls from TS, would also supercede the PASS specific 
requirements imposed by post-TMI confirmatory orders.
    As described in its safety evaluations for the topical reports, the 
staff finds that the following PASS sampling requirements may be 
eliminated for plants of Combustion Engineering and Westinghouse 
designs:
    1. reactor coolant dissolved gases.
    2. reactor coolant hydrogen.
    3. reactor coolant oxygen.
    4. reactor coolant pH.
    5. reactor coolant chlorides.
    6. reactor coolant boron.
    7. reactor coolant conductivity.
    8. reactor coolant radionuclides.
    9. containment atmosphere hydrogen concentration.
    10. containment oxygen.
    11. containment atmosphere radionuclides.
    12. containment sump pH.
    13. containment sump chlorides.
    14. containment sump boron.
    15. containment sump radionuclides.
    The staff agrees that sampling of radionuclides is not required to 
support emergency response decision making during the initial phases of 
an accident because the information provided by PASS is either 
unnecessary or is effectively provided by other indications of process 
parameters or measurement of radiation levels. Therefore, it is not 
necessary to have dedicated equipment to obtain this sample in a prompt 
manner.

[[Page 49274]]

    The staff does, however, believe that there could be significant 
benefits to having information about the radionuclides existing post-
accident in order to address public concerns and plan for long-term 
recovery operations. As stated in the safety evaluations for the 
topical reports, the staff has found that licensees could satisfy this 
function by developing contingency plans to describe existing sampling 
capabilities and what actions (e.g., assembling temporary shielding) 
may be necessary to obtain and analyze highly radioactive samples from 
the reactor coolant system (RCS), containment sump, and containment 
atmosphere. (See item 4.1 under Licensee Verifications and 
Commitments.) The contingency plans for obtaining samples from the RCS, 
containment sump, and containment atmosphere may also enable a licensee 
to derive information on parameters such as hydrogen concentrations in 
containment and boron concentration and pH of water in the containment 
sump. The staff considers the sampling of the containment sump to be 
potentially useful in confirming calculations of pH and boron 
concentrations and confirming that potentially unaccounted for acid 
sources have been sufficiently neutralized. The use of the contingency 
plans for obtaining samples would depend on the plant conditions and 
the need for information by the decision-makers responsible for 
responding to the accident.
    In addition, the staff considers radionuclide sampling information 
to be useful in classifying certain types of events (such as a 
reactivity excursion or mechanical damage) that could cause fuel damage 
without having an indication of overheating on core exit thermocouples. 
However, the staff agrees with the topical reports' contentions that 
other indicators of failed fuel, such as letdown radiation monitors (or 
normal sampling system), can be correlated to the degree of failed 
fuel. (See item 4.2 under Licensee Verifications and Commitments.)
    In lieu of the information that would have been obtained from PASS, 
the staff believes that licensees should maintain or develop the 
capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been released to 
offsite environs. Although this capability may not be needed to support 
the immediate protective action recommendations during an accident, the 
information would be useful for decision makers trying to limit the 
public's ingestion of radioactive materials. (See item 4.3 under 
Licensee Verifications and Commitments.)
    The staff believes that the changes related to the elimination of 
PASS that are described in the topical reports, related safety 
evaluations and this proposed change to TS are unlikely to result in a 
decrease in the effectiveness of a licensee's emergency plan. Each 
licensee, however, must evaluate possible changes to its emergency plan 
in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine if the change decreases 
the effectiveness of its site-specific plan. Evaluations and reporting 
of changes to emergency plans should be performed in accordance with 
applicable regulations and procedures.
    The staff notes that redundant, safety-grade, containment hydrogen 
concentration monitors are required by 10 CFR 50.44(b)(1), are 
addressed in NUREG-0737 Item II.F.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.97, and are 
relied upon to meet the data reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, 
Appendix E, Section VI.2.a.(i)(4). The staff concludes that during the 
early phases of an accident, the safety-grade hydrogen monitors provide 
an adequate capability for monitoring containment hydrogen 
concentration. The staff sees value in maintaining the capability to 
obtain grab samples for complementing the information from the hydrogen 
monitors in the long term (i.e., by confirming the indications from the 
monitors and providing hydrogen measurements for concentrations outside 
the range of the monitors). As previously mentioned, the licensee's 
contingency plan (see item 4.1) for obtaining highly radioactive 
samples will include sampling of the containment atmosphere and may, if 
deemed necessary and practical by the appropriate decision-makers, be 
used to supplement the safety-related hydrogen monitors.

[Note 1--Each licensee should specify a desired implementation 
period for its specific amendment request. The implementation period 
would be that period necessary to develop and implement the items in 
4.1 through 4.3 and, as necessary, to make other changes to 
documentation or equipment to support the elimination of PASS 
requirements. As an alternative, the licensee may choose to have a 
shorter implementation period and include the scheduling of items 
4.1 through 4.3 as part of the regulatory commitments associated 
with this amendment request. Amendment requests that include 
commitments for implementation of the items in Section 4 within 6 
months of the implementation of the revised TS will remain within 
the CLIIP.]
[Note 2--There may be some collateral changes to the TS as a result 
of the removal of the administrative controls section for PASS. The 
following paragraphs address three potential changes that the staff 
is aware of (editorial changes, mention of PASS as a potential 
leakage source outside containment, and revision of the bases 
section for post accident monitoring instrumentation).]

    (A) The elimination of the TS and other regulatory requirements for 
PASS would result in additional changes to TS such as [e.g., the 
renumbering of sections or pages or the removal of references]. The 
changes are included in the licensee's application to revise the TS in 
order to take advantage of the CLIIP. The staff has reviewed the 
changes and agrees that the revisions are necessary due to the removal 
of the TS section on PASS. The changes do not revise technical 
requirements beyond that reviewed by the NRC staff in connection with 
the supporting topical reports or the preparation of the TS improvement 
incorporated into the CLIIP.
    (B) The TS include an administrative requirement for a program to 
minimize to levels as low as practicable the leakage from those 
portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly 
radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident. The program 
includes preventive maintenance, periodic inspections, and leak tests 
for the identified systems. PASS is specifically listed in TS [5.5.2] 
as falling under the scope of this requirement. The applicability of 
this specification depends on whether or not PASS is maintained as a 
system that is a potential leakage path.

[Note that several options (see following) exist for handling the 
impact that eliminating PASS requirements would have on the 
specification for the program to control leakage outside 
containment]

    (i) The licensee has stated that a plant change would be 
implemented such that PASS would not be a potential leakage path 
outside containment for highly radioactive fluids (e.g., the PASS 
piping that penetrates the containment would be cut and capped). The 
modification would be made during the implementation period for this 
amendment such that it is appropriate to delete the reference to PASS 
in TS [5.5.2]. Requirements in NRC regulations (e.g., 10 CFR Part 50, 
Appendix J) and other TS provide adequate regulatory controls over the 
licensee's proposed modification to eliminate PASS as a potential 
leakage path.
    (ii) The licensee has stated that a plant change might be 
implemented such that PASS would not be a potential leakage path 
outside containment for highly radioactive fluids (e.g., the PASS 
piping that penetrates the containment might be cut and capped). The 
modification would not be made during

[[Page 49275]]

the implementation period for this amendment. The licensee has proposed 
to add the following phrase to the reference to PASS in TS [5.5.2]: 
``(until such time as a modification eliminates the PASS penetration as 
a potential leakage path).''
    The above phrase would make clear that TS [5.5.2] remains 
applicable to the PASS as long as it is a possible leakage path and 
reflects that the actual modification of the piping system may be 
scheduled beyond the implementation period for this amendment. 
Requirements in NRC regulations (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J) and other 
TS provide adequate regulatory controls over the licensee's 
modification to eliminate PASS as a potential leakage path. Following 
the modification to eliminate PASS as a potential leakage path, the 
licensee may elect (in order to maintain clarity and simplicity of the 
requirement) to revise TS [5.5.2] to remove the reference to PASS, 
including the phrase added by this amendment.
    (iii) The licensee has stated that the configuration of the PASS 
will continue to be a potential leakage path outside containment for 
highly radioactive fluids (e.g., the PASS piping will penetrate the 
containment with valves or other components in the system from which 
highly radioactive fluid could leak). The licensee has [not proposed to 
change TS (5.5.2) or has changed TS (5.5.2) to revise the reference to 
this system from PASS to (  )]. The staff agrees [that TS 5.5.2 is not 
affected or that the change to revise the reference from PASS to (  )] 
is acceptable. A separate amendment request will be required if the 
licensee, subsequent to this amendment, decides to modify the plant to 
eliminate this potential leakage path and proposes to change the 
requirements of TS [5.5.2].
    (C) [Note-optional section if licensee provides markup of affected 
Bases pages] The elimination of PASS requires that the licensee revise 
the discussion in the Bases section for TS [3.3.3, ``Post Accident 
Monitoring Instrumentation'']. The current Bases mention the 
capabilities of PASS as part of the justification for allowing both 
hydrogen monitor channels to be out of service for a period of up to 72 
hours. Although the licensee's application included possible wording 
for the revised Bases discussion for TS [3.3.3], the licensee will 
formally address the change to the Bases in accordance with [the Bases 
Control Program or its administrative procedure for revising Bases]. 
The staff does not believe that the Bases change will require prior NRC 
approval when evaluated against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.59, 
``Changes, tests, and experiments,'' and, therefore, agrees that the 
revision of the Bases to TS [3.3.3] should be addressed separately from 
this amendment and should be included in a future update of the TS 
Bases in accordance with [the Bases Control Program or the licensee's 
administrative controls].

4.0  Verifications and Commitments

    As requested by the staff in the notice of availability for this TS 
improvement, the licensee has addressed the following plant-specific 
verifications and commitments.
    4.1  Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory 
commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and 
maintain), contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly 
radioactive samples of reactor coolant, containment sump, and 
containment atmosphere.
    The licensee has [verified that it has or made a regulatory 
commitment to develop] contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing 
highly radioactive samples from the RCS, containment sump, and 
containment atmosphere. The licensee has committed to maintain the 
contingency plans within its [specified document or program]. The 
licensee has [implemented this commitment or will implement this 
commitment by (specified date)].
    4.2  Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory 
commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and 
maintain), a capability for classifying fuel damage events at the Alert 
level threshold (typically this is 300 Ci/ml dose equivalent 
iodine). This capability may utilize the normal sampling system and/or 
correlations of sampling or letdown line dose rates to coolant 
concentrations.
    The licensee has [verified that it has or made a regulatory 
commitment to develop] a capability for classifying fuel damage events 
at the Alert level threshold. The licensee has committed to maintain 
the capability for the Alert classification within its [specified 
document or program]. The licensee has [implemented this commitment or 
will implement this commitment by (specified date)].
    4.3  Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory 
commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and 
maintain), the capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been 
released to offsite environs.
    The licensee has [verified that it has or made a regulatory 
commitment to develop] the capability to monitor radioactive iodines 
that have been released to offsite environs. The licensee has committed 
to maintain the capability for monitoring iodines within its [specified 
document or program]. The licensee has [implemented this commitment or 
will implement this commitment by (specified date)].
    The NRC staff finds that reasonable controls for the implementation 
and for subsequent evaluation of proposed changes pertaining to the 
above regulatory commitments are provided by the licensee's 
administrative processes, including its commitment management program. 
Should the licensee choose to incorporate a regulatory commitment into 
the emergency plan, final safety analysis report, or other document 
with established regulatory controls, the associated regulations would 
define the appropriate change-control and reporting requirements. The 
staff has determined that the commitments do not warrant the creation 
of regulatory requirements (items requiring prior NRC approval of 
subsequent changes). The NRC staff has agreed that NEI 99-04, Revision 
0, ``Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes,'' provides 
reasonable guidance for the control of regulatory commitments made to 
the NRC staff. (See letter dated March 31, 2000 from S. Collins, 
Director of NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to to R. Beedle, 
Nuclear Energy Institute (ADAMS Accession Number ML003696998)) The 
commitments should be controlled in accordance with the industry 
guidance or comparable criteria employed by a specific licensee. The 
staff may choose to verify the implementation and maintenance of these 
commitments in a future inspection or audit.

5.0  State Consultation

    In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [ ] State 
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The 
State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following comments--with 
subsequent disposition by the staff].

6.0  Environmental Consideration

    The amendments change a requirement with respect to the 
installation or use of a facility component located within the 
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance 
requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve 
no significant increase in the amounts and no

[[Page 49276]]

significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released 
offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or 
cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has 
previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no 
significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment 
on such finding (FR). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility 
criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or 
environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the 
issuance of the amendments.

7.0  Conclusion

    The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed 
above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and 
safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the 
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance 
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 
amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or 
to the health and safety of the public.

Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

    Description of Amendment Request: The proposed amendments delete 
requirements from the Technical Specifications (and, as applicable, 
other elements of the licensing bases) to maintain a Post Accident 
Sampling System (PASS). Licensees were generally required to implement 
PASS upgrades as described in NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI [Three 
Mile Island] Action Plan Requirements,'' and Regulatory Guide 1.97, 
``Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess 
Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident.'' 
Implementation of these upgrades was an outcome of the lessons learned 
from the accident that occurred at TMI, Unit 2. Requirements related to 
PASS were imposed by Order for many facilities and were added to or 
included in the technical specifications (TS) for nuclear power 
reactors currently licensed to operate. Lessons learned and 
improvements implemented over the last 20 years have shown that the 
information obtained from PASS can be readily obtained through other 
means or is of little use in the assessment and mitigation of accident 
conditions.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated
    The PASS was originally designed to perform many sampling and 
analysis functions. These functions were designed and intended to be 
used in post accident situations and were put into place as a result of 
the TMI-2 accident. The specific intent of the PASS was to provide a 
system that has the capability to obtain and analyze samples of plant 
fluids containing potentially high levels of radioactivity, without 
exceeding plant personnel radiation exposure limits. Analytical results 
of these samples would be used largely for verification purposes in 
aiding the plant staff in assessing the extent of core damage and 
subsequent offsite radiological dose projections. The system was not 
intended to and does not serve a function for preventing accidents and 
its elimination would not affect the probability of accidents 
previously evaluated.
    In the 20 years since the TMI-2 accident and the consequential 
promulgation of post accident sampling requirements, operating 
experience has demonstrated that a PASS provides little actual benefit 
to post accident mitigation. Past experience has indicated that there 
exists in-plant instrumentation and methodologies available in lieu of 
a PASS for collecting and assimilating information needed to assess 
core damage following an accident. Furthermore, the implementation of 
Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG) emphasizes accident 
management strategies based on in-plant instruments. These strategies 
provide guidance to the plant staff for mitigation and recovery from a 
severe accident. Based on current severe accident management strategies 
and guidelines, it is determined that the PASS provides little benefit 
to the plant staff in coping with an accident.
    The regulatory requirements for the PASS can be eliminated without 
degrading the plant emergency response. The emergency response, in this 
sense, refers to the methodologies used in ascertaining the condition 
of the reactor core, mitigating the consequences of an accident, 
assessing and projecting offsite releases of radioactivity, and 
establishing protective action recommendations to be communicated to 
offsite authorities. The elimination of the PASS will not prevent an 
accident management strategy that meets the initial intent of the post-
TMI-2 accident guidance through the use of the SAMGs, the emergency 
plan (EP), the emergency operating procedures (EOP), and site survey 
monitoring that support modification of emergency plan protective 
action recommendations (PARs).
    Therefore, the elimination of PASS requirements from Technical 
Specifications (TS) (and other elements of the licensing bases) does 
not involve a significant increase in the consequences of any accident 
previously evaluated.
Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated
    The elimination of PASS related requirements will not result in any 
failure mode not previously analyzed. The PASS was intended to allow 
for verification of the extent of reactor core damage and also to 
provide an input to offsite dose projection calculations. The PASS is 
not considered an accident precursor, nor does its existence or 
elimination have any adverse impact on the pre-accident state of the 
reactor core or post accident confinement of radionuclides within the 
containment building.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety
    The elimination of the PASS, in light of existing plant equipment, 
instrumentation, procedures, and programs that provide effective 
mitigation of and recovery from reactor accidents, results in a neutral 
impact to the margin of safety. Methodologies that are not reliant on 
PASS are designed to provide rapid assessment of current reactor core 
conditions and the direction of degradation while effectively 
responding to the event in order to mitigate the consequences of the 
accident. The use of a PASS is redundant and does not provide quick 
recognition of core events or rapid response to events in progress. The 
intent of the requirements established as a result of the TMI-2 
accident can be adequately met without reliance on a PASS.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in 
the margin of safety.
    Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous 
discussion of

[[Page 49277]]

the amendment request, the requested change does not involve a 
significant hazards consideration.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of August, 2000.
    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William D. Beckner,
Chief, Technical Specification Branch, Division of Regulatory 
Improvement Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 00-20419 Filed 8-10-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P