[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 154 (Wednesday, August 9, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48822-48824]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-20164]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

[Docket No. NHTSA-2000-6992; Notice 2]


Blue Bird Body Company; Denial of Application for Decision of 
Inconsequential Noncompliance

    Blue Bird Body Company (Blue Bird), 402 N. Camellia Blvd., P.O. Box 
937, Fort Valley, Georgia 31030, has determined that 25,839 model TC/
2000 Conventional and MiniBird school buses do not meet the 60 percent 
tensile strength requirements of 49 CFR 571.221, Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 221, ``School bus body joint strength,'' 
and has filed an appropriate report pursuant to 49 CFR Part 573, 
``Defect and Noncompliance Reports.'' Blue Bird has also applied to be 
exempted from the notification and remedy requirements of 49 U.S.C. 
Chapter 301--``Motor Vehicle Safety'' on the basis that the 
noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.
    Notice of receipt of the application was published, with a 30-day 
comment period, on March 13, 2000 in the Federal Register (65 FR 
13412). The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
received no comments.
    FMVSS No. 221, S5, requires that, when tested in accordance with 
the test procedures of S6, each body panel joint shall be capable of 
holding the body panel to the member to which it is joined when 
subjected to a force of 60 percent of the tensile strength of the 
weakest joined body panel, determined pursuant to S6.2.
    Blue Bird has notified NHTSA that the subject school buses were 
manufactured at its Mount Pleasant, Iowa, plant from November 1, 1993 
through December 6, 1999. The noncompliance involves a failure to meet 
the 60 percent joint strength requirements on certain 8-inch segments 
of the exterior roof joints. Agency compliance tests, performed by 
General Testing Laboratories (GTL), determined that the tensile 
strength of the roof joint tested was 54.9 percent of the required 
load. Blue Bird stated that a variance in rivet spacing in the vicinity 
of the roof stringers occurred as some assembly workers at this plant, 
without authorization, departed from manufacturing procedures of using 
the pre-punched holes in the roof bows as drill guides to control 
fastener spacing and, as a result, there are fewer than the six rivets 
required by Blue Bird in certain 8-inch segments of the roof joints in 
the affected buses.
    Blue Bird supported its application for inconsequential 
noncompliance with the following statements which have been quoted from 
its petition:

I. Overall Joint and Body Strength

    Blue Bird stated that the purpose of the School Bus Body Joint 
Strength Standard No. 221 is to reduce deaths and injuries resulting 
from the structural collapse of school bus bodies during crashes. Blue 
Bird concluded from the previous rulemakings discussion that the 
strength of the overall joint and consequently the strength of the 
overall bus body is the safety objective of Standard 221 and that the 
measured performance of an eight (8) -inch long joint segment is merely 
a procedure chosen to evaluate the overall joint in a practical manner.
    Blue Bird stated that by that its analysis shows that the overall 
strengths of the roof joints on the subject test bus not only meet, but 
comfortably exceed the strength performance requirements of FMVSS 221. 
Consequently, Blue Bird believes that the noncompliance of several 
small selected segments of these roof joints is not representative of 
actual, overall bus body strength performance and is inconsequential as 
it relates to motor vehicle safety.

[[Page 48823]]

II. Occupants Not Exposed to Roof Joints

    Blue Bird stated that, in a crash, vehicle occupants are not 
exposed to exterior joints like the roof joint in question. Also of 
importance is the fact that the few small segments of exterior roof 
joints believed to be in noncompliance are completely separated from 
the occupant compartment by headlining panels with joints in full 
compliance with FMVSS 221 requirements.

III. Interior Headlining Joint and Overall Bus Body Joint Strength

    Blue Bird reiterated that the overall strength of the joints is of 
critical importance with regard to the purpose of Standard 221. Blue 
Bird argued that the test results showed that the headlining joint 
performance was 71.3 percent vs. the 60 percent requirement. Blue Bird 
further argued that if the strength of the entire body joint consisting 
of both the interior headlining joint and the exterior roof joint were 
to be analyzed together, the overall performance of the joint would be 
62.4 percent, which exceeds the 60 percent requirement of FMVSS 221 and 
satisfies the stated purpose and safety objectives of the standard.

IV. The Remedy in This Case Could Result in Degradation and Leakage 
of Bus Body Panels

    Blue Bird argued that there is no safety need to require 
notification and remedy of the subject school buses to add additional 
fasteners. Blue Bird stated that in reality, a recall of the subject 
buses would be counterproductive to safety in that the resulting 
inconvenience to the owners/operators of the buses could disrupt the 
service they provide, resulting in the use of much less safe means of 
transportation.
    Blue Bird stated that the only feasible remedy on completed buses 
is the addition of blind repair (pop type) rivets in the areas where 
there are fewer than six (6) rivets in each eight (8)-inch segment. 
Blue Bird argued that blind rivets are susceptible to water leaks and 
the installation of these rivets could result in mechanical damage to 
the roof joint sealer and possible damage to the exterior body paint. 
Water leaks and/or possible corrosion could occur as a result of the 
mechanical damage done during drilling and rivet installation.

V. The Current Status of FMVSS 221 Indicates that Curved Joints Are 
Not A Safety Concern

    Blue Bird argued that the current version of FMVSS 221, which 
permitted optional early compliance as of November 5, 1998, provides an 
instructive insight into the agency's position with respect to curved 
joint testing. The November 1998 final rule (see Reference 3), in 
Sec. S5.2.2, appears to exclude all curved and complex joints from the 
60 percent strength requirements of Sec. S5.1.2. Blue Bird argued that 
intent of the agency was to exclude all curved joints from the joint 
tensile strength requirements of revised Standard 221. Blue Bird argue 
that until the standard properly defines what does or does not 
constitute a ``curved joint,'' the actual requirements that roof and 
ceiling joints must meet will continue to be unclear.

VI. There Have Been No Roof Joint Failures in the Field

    Blue Bird argued that they have never had a field complaint 
regarding the strength of roof joints and is not aware of any accidents 
or crash tests which resulted in roof joint separations within the 
scope of the Standard. The test bus from which the subject roof joint 
was obtained had other joints tested and all were found to be in full 
compliance with all FMVSS 221 requirements.
    Blue Bird concluded that the noncompliance is not a safety problem 
and that the noncompliance is inconsequential and in no way compromises 
the safety of the subject school buses and that the disruption of our 
customers and likely degradation of these buses by the indicated remedy 
is not in the public interest.

[[Page 48824]]

NHTSA's Decision

    We have reviewed Blue Bird's arguments and do not agree. The 
primary safety purpose of joint strength requirements in FMVSS No. 221 
is to ensure that school bus bodies do not structurally collapse during 
crashes, thereby causing deaths and injuries. Another purpose is to 
ensure that school bus body panels do not separate during crashes 
leaving exposed edges that can result in severe lacerations to 
passengers. NHTSA does not agree with Blue Bird's assessment that 
overall joint strength is the intended purpose of FMVSS No. 221. 
Failure to include adequate joint strength in localized areas of joints 
can lead to body panel separation in those areas and thus pose a hazard 
of joints becoming unattached in collisions. Separated joints can lead 
to occupants becoming seriously or fatally injured from lacerations 
caused by the separated bus body panels.
    In the final rule promulgating FMVSS No. 221, January 27, 1997, 
NHTSA stated that this standard established the minimum requirements 
for school bus body crashworthiness and that, ``Its purpose is to 
prevent panels from separating at the joint in the event of an 
accident. In order to deal with the problem of laceration, this 
regulation must be applicable to both exterior and interior joints.'' 
The 60 percent joint strength requirement applied equally to both the 
interior and exterior body panels to ensure that school bus bodies 
maintained it's integrity in severe crashes. Prior to the 
implementation of this standard the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) investigated several school bus crashes in which the 
sparsely riveted panels separated in severe crashes contributing to 
deaths, injuries and ejections when the bus body disintegrated. In a 
1987 follow up study ``Crashworthiness of Large Poststandard School 
Buses'' NTSB stated that, ``School bus bodies withstood crash forces 
very well, maintaining structural integrity even in severe crash 
forces.'' The agency maintains its earlier conclusion that both 
interior and exterior joints in bus body panels must meet the 60 
percent strength requirement to maintain effective crashworthiness of 
the school body to mitigate against injuries caused by body panel 
separation.
    The agency also does not agree with Blue Bird that school bus 
occupants are not exposed to exterior roof joints during crashes. While 
the agency is not aware of any fatalities or injuries caused by joint 
separations in the roofs of school buses, the potential exists that 
inadequate external localized joint strength can lead to possible joint 
failure of internal joints. Separated exterior joints can cause 
interior joints to be subjected to higher crash forces and can cause 
the interior joints to become separated in a crash. Separated joints 
can lead to the occupants being exposed to the jagged edges and 
increase the threat of becoming seriously or fatally injured. In the 
final rule promulgating FMVSS No. 221, January 27, 1997, NHTSA stated 
that, ``In order to deal with the problem of laceration, this 
regulation must be applicable to both exterior and interior joints.''
    The agency also does not agree with Blue Bird that its proposed 
remedy (blind repair, pop-type rivets) would necessarily result in 
degradation and leakage of bus body panels. We believe that with the 
proper use of modern sealants any leakage caused by adding additional 
discreet fasteners can adequately be prevented. More importantly, if 
Blue Bird believes that the above remedy is unsafe or inadequate, it is 
up to Blue Bird to develop and implement an alternative remedy for the 
noncompliance.
    NHTSA also does not agree with Blue Bird's conclusion that the 
November 5, 1998 final rule amending FMVSS No. 221 excluded all curved 
joints. The final rule excluded small curved and complex joints from 
the tensile test requirement that cannot be accommodated in the test 
apparatus. The joint the agency tested fit in the test apparatus 
without compromising the integrity of the joint. Blue Bird's internal 
review, field inspection and analysis showed that the failure to meet 
the joint strength requirement specified in FMVSS No. 221 was caused by 
departure from manufacturing procedures. Issues regarding petitions for 
reconsideration of the November 5, 1998 final rule are irrelevant to 
petitions for inconsequential noncompliance. These issues will be 
discussed when the agency responds to the petitions for 
reconsideration.
    In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that the 
applicant has not met its burden of persuasion that the noncompliance 
described above is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. 
Accordingly, its application is denied, and the applicant must now 
provide the notification of the noncompliance that is required by 49 
U.S.C. 30119, and the remedy of the noncompliance, as required by 49 
U.S.C. 30120.

(49 U.S.C. 30118, 30120, with delegations of authority at 49 CFR 
1.50 and 501.8).

    Issued on: August 4, 2000.
Stephen R. Kratzke,
Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards.
[FR Doc. 00-20164 Filed 8-8-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P