[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 151 (Friday, August 4, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 48108-48133]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-19785]



[[Page 48107]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Part III





Department of Justice

Environmental Protection Agency





-----------------------------------------------------------------------



40 CFR Chapter IV



Accidental Release Prevention Requirements; Risk Management Programs 
Under the Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(7); Distribution of Off-Site 
Consequence Analysis Information; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 151 / Friday, August 4, 2000 / Rules 
and Regulations  

[[Page 48108]]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

40 CFR Chapter IV

[AG Order No. 2318-2000]
RIN 1105-AA70

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Chapter IV

RIN 2050-AE80


Accidental Release Prevention Requirements; Risk Management 
Programs Under the Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(7); Distribution of 
Off-Site Consequence Analysis Information

AGENCIES: Department of Justice and Environmental Protection Agency.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) are promulgating a rule that provides for access to 
information concerning the potential off-site consequences of 
hypothetical accidental chemical releases from industrial facilities. 
Under section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), facilities handling 
large quantities of extremely hazardous chemicals are required to 
include that information in a risk management plan (RMP) submitted to 
EPA. As required by the Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and 
Fuels Regulatory Relief Act (CSISSFRRA), this rule provides members of 
the public and government officials with access to that information in 
ways designed to minimize the likelihood of accidental releases, the 
risk to national security associated with posting the information on 
the Internet, and the likelihood of harm to public health and welfare.

DATES: This rule is effective on August 4, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Supporting information used to develop the proposed rule and 
the final rule is contained in Docket No. A-2000-20. The docket is 
available for public inspection and copying between 8 a.m. and 5:30 
p.m., Monday through Friday (except government holidays), at Waterside 
Mall, Room M1500, 401 M Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20460. A 
reasonable fee may be charged for copying. The assessments upon which 
this rule is based are also available on the Internet at http://www.usdoj.gov and http://www.epa.gov/ceppo.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brenda Sue Thornton, Trial Attorney, 
Criminal Division, Terrorism and Violent Crime Section, Department of 
Justice, 601 D Street, N.W., Room 6500, Washington, DC 20530, (202) 
616-5210; John Ferris, Chemical Engineer, (202) 260-4043, or Vanessa 
Rodriguez, Chemical Engineer, (202) 260-7913, Chemical Emergency 
Preparedness and Prevention Office, Environmental Protection Agency 
(5104), 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20460; or the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Hotline at (800) 424-
9346 (in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area, (703) 412-9810). You 
may wish to visit the Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention 
Office (CEPPO) Internet site at http://www.epa.gov/ceppo.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This rule was published in the Federal 
Register as a proposed rule on April 27, 2000 (65 FR 24834). This 
Federal Register action announces EPA and DOJ's final decisions on the 
rule.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction
    A. Statutory Authority and Background
    B. The Proposed Rule
II. Discussion of Comments on the Proposed Rule
    A. Risk and Benefits Assessments
    1. Benefits Assessment
    2. Risk Assessment
    3. The Assessments and the Proposed Rule
    B. General Comments on the Rule
    C. Rule's Impact on Risk Reduction
    D. Reading Rooms
    1. General Comments on Reading Rooms
    2. The Number of Paper Copies
    3. Operation of Reading Rooms
    4. The Number of Reading Rooms
    5. The Location of Reading Rooms
    6. Security Measures at Reading Rooms
    7. Alternatives to Reading Rooms
    E. Enhanced Local Access to OCA Information
    F. Risk Indicator System (Vulnerable Zone Indicator System)
    G. Internet-Accessible OCA Information
    H. Access to OCA Information by Government Officials
    I. Other Provisions
III. Discussion of Final Rule
    A. Access to Paper Copies of OCA Information
    B. Enhanced Access to Local OCA Information
    C. Vulnerable Zone Indicator System
    D. Internet Access to Selected OCA Information
    E. Additional Information on Chemical Accident Risk
    F. Access to OCA Information by Government Officials and Other 
Provisions
    G. Effective Date and Implementation Schedule
IV. Administrative Requirements
    A. Docket
    B. Executive Order 12866
    C. Executive Order 12988
    D. Executive Order 13045
    E. Executive Order 13084
    F. Executive Order 13132
    G. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    H. Paperwork Reduction Act
    I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    J. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
    K. Congressional Review Act
V. Judicial Review

I. Introduction

A. Statutory Authority and Background

    As more fully described in the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) 
(65 FR 24853 (April 27, 2000)), the federal government's efforts to 
prevent and mitigate chemical accidents are reflected in several pieces 
of legislation, including section 112(r) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. 7412(r). 
In that section, Congress imposed a general duty on industrial 
facilities handling any extremely hazardous chemicals to do so safely 
(CAA section 112(r)(1)), and required EPA to establish a regulatory 
program for facilities that pose the greatest risk (CAA section 
112(r)(7)). Congress directed that the regulatory program require 
covered facilities to develop and implement a risk management program 
for preventing accidental chemical releases and minimizing the 
consequences of releases that do occur. Congress further mandated that 
facilities perform an off-site consequences analysis (OCA) for one or 
more hypothetical accidental worst case and/or alternative release 
scenarios and report the results of the analysis in a risk management 
plan (RMP) to be submitted to federal, state, and local government 
agencies and made available to the public.
    EPA issued the rules establishing the regulatory program required 
by CAA section 112(r) on January 31, 1994 (59 FR 4478) and June 20, 
1996 (61 FR 31668, the ``RMP rule''). In those rules, EPA continued the 
philosophy that EPA embraced in implementing the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA). Specifically, EPA 
recognized that regulatory requirements by themselves will not 
guarantee safety, and that providing the public with information about 
hazards in a community can and should lead government officials and the 
public to work with industry to prevent accidents. EPA thus relied on 
the public availability of RMPs to stimulate further chemical risk 
reductions efforts, which occur primarily at the local level where the 
risk is found.
    Over 15,000 facilities are subject to the RMP rule. In an effort to 
reduce the burden of collecting and disseminating RMPs, EPA designed an 
electronic RMP

[[Page 48109]]

form that could be placed on the Internet for purposes of public 
access. However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other 
representatives of the law enforcement and intelligence communities 
raised concerns that releasing the OCA portions of RMPs via the 
Internet would enable individuals anywhere in the world anonymously to 
search electronically for industrial facilities in the U.S. to target 
for purposes of causing an intentional industrial chemical release. In 
response to those concerns, EPA posted RMPs on the Internet 
(www.epa.gov/ceppo/) without the sections of the RMP that contain OCA 
results (sections 2 through 5). However, those OCA sections, and any 
EPA electronic database created from those sections, were still subject 
to public release in electronic format pursuant to the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552. On August 5, 1999, CSISSFRRA was 
enacted (Pub. L. No. 106-40) to provide at least a one-year exemption 
from FOIA for ``OCA information,'' including the OCA portions of RMPs 
and any EPA database created from those portions. CSISSFRRA amended 
section 112(r)(7) of the CAA by adding a new subparagraph (h).
    CSISSFRRA requires the President, by the end of the one-year period 
of the FOIA exemption, to decide how to disseminate OCA information. 
Specifically, CSISSFRRA requires the President to assess ``the 
increased risk of terrorist and other criminal activity associated with 
the posting of [OCA] information on the Internet'' and ``the incentives 
created by public disclosure of [OCA] information for reduction in the 
risk of accidental releases'' (CAA section 112(r)(7)(H)(ii)(I)). Based 
on those assessments, the President is required by August 5, 2000, to 
promulgate a regulation governing access to OCA information in a manner 
that minimizes the likelihood of chemical releases, however caused. 
Until that time, CSISSFRRA limits public access to OCA information but 
provides government officials access for purposes of preventing, 
planning for, or responding to chemical releases. The President 
delegated to the Attorney General and the Administrator of EPA the 
authority to conduct the required assessments and rulemaking (see the 
delegation memorandum at 65 FR 8631 (February 22, 2000)). The proposed 
and final rules are subject to approval by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB).
    The risk and benefits assessments were completed and used as the 
basis for the proposed rule. The conclusions of those assessments are 
fully described in the NPRM. Briefly, the risk assessment found that an 
increased risk of terrorist or other criminal activity would accompany 
the release of certain items of OCA information via the Internet. That 
information could be used by terrorists or other criminals for purposes 
of targeting or maximizing the results of industrial chemical releases. 
The benefits assessment concluded that public disclosure of OCA 
information would likely lead to a significant reduction in the number 
and severity of accidental chemical releases. It also found that ease 
of public access to information is important to the public's use of 
that information. The risk and benefits assessments are available in 
the docket for this rulemaking and on the EPA and DOJ websites 
(www.epa.gov/ceppo/ and www.usdoj.gov).

B. The Proposed Rule

    Based on the risk and benefits assessments, EPA and DOJ proposed 
providing the public with several means of obtaining access to OCA 
information and information about the risk expressed by OCA 
information. The complete proposal is contained in the NPRM. A brief 
summary follows.
    In order to minimize the risk of Internet dissemination of OCA 
information while still providing public access to that information, we 
proposed to provide the public with access to paper copies of OCA 
information for covered facilities at 50 or more federal reading rooms 
geographically distributed across the United States. At the reading 
rooms, members of the public would have access to OCA information for a 
limited number of facilities, located anywhere in the country, and 
would be able to read the information and take notes from it, but not 
remove or mechanically reproduce it. Reading rooms would be authorized 
to provide any member of the public with access to OCA information for 
up to 10 stationary sources per calendar month. Based upon an analysis 
of the geographic distribution of RMP-covered facilities, we concluded 
that the 10 per individual per calendar month limit would still permit 
most members of the public to have access to OCA information for 
facilities in whose ``vulnerable zone'' they live or work, as well as 
to OCA information for a few other facilities located elsewhere.
    In addition, we proposed making the less sensitive items of OCA 
information available to the public on the Internet by posting them on 
EPA's website. Those items of OCA information included information 
about passive and active safety systems used by facilities; we 
explained that that information would facilitate risk reduction 
dialogues among members of the public, state and local officials, and 
facilities. Only the items of OCA information for which the risk 
assessment found there was a significant risk of use for terrorist or 
other criminal purposes would be excluded from Internet posting.
    We also proposed creating a ``risk indicator'' system as a tool for 
providing the public with a means of understanding, via Internet 
inquiry, some aspects of the risk expressed by OCA information. Members 
of the public would be able to enter a specific address (such as that 
of a home, school, or place of employment) into the risk indicator 
system and learn if that address might be within the ``vulnerable 
zone'' of at least one facility that submitted an RMP to EPA. Members 
of the public who do not have access to the Internet would be able to 
obtain the same information by calling the EPA hotline or by mailing a 
request to the Administrator of EPA. The risk indicator system also 
would inform individuals of several means by which they could obtain 
the names of the facilities and additional information.
    Further, we proposed authorizing and encouraging members of local 
emergency planning committees (LEPCs), state emergency response 
committees (SERCs), or local fire departments to allow members of the 
public to read, but not remove or mechanically copy, paper copies of 
OCA information for all of the covered facilities in the LEPC's 
jurisdiction and for any facilities whose vulnerable zone extended into 
the LEPC's jurisdiction. To further supplement public access, under the 
proposed rule, EPA would make available to the public additional 
information on chemical accident risk through an Internet website. The 
proposal also addressed how EPA would provide access to OCA information 
to federal, state, and local government officials for their ``official 
use'' by codifying the provisions of CSISSFRRA that appear in CAA 
section 112(r)(7)(H)(ii)(II)(cc)-(ee). Finally, the proposal called for 
establishing further provisions as needed to implement CSISSFRRA, such 
as prohibiting the unauthorized release of OCA information and 
authorizing the Administrator to provide OCA information to qualified 
researchers under CAA section 112(r)(7)(H)(vii).

II. Discussion of Comments on the Proposed Rule

    The proposed rule was published for comment in the Federal Register 
on April 27, 2000. The comment period ended on June 8, with 68 comments

[[Page 48110]]

submitted. Commentors represented industry, trade associations, public 
interest groups, journalists, environmental groups, law enforcement, 
emergency response groups, state/local entities, and the general 
public. In addition, on May 9, 2000, EPA and DOJ held a public hearing 
on the proposed rule at which nine presenters representing public 
interest groups, environmental research groups, state and local 
emergency planning groups, and the general public provided comments 
about the proposed regulation. We are responding to most comments on 
the proposed rule in this preamble. We respond to additional comments 
in a supplemental document included in the public docket for this 
rulemaking.

A. Risk and Benefits Assessments

    As noted above, the assessments were available on the EPA and DOJ 
websites. We received comments on both the benefits assessment and the 
risk assessment expressing a wide range of opinion. We note at the 
outset that CSISSFRRA did not call for the assessments to be developed 
through a public rulemaking process (see CAA section 112(r)(7)(H)(ii)). 
Instead, CSISSFRRA required the President to conduct the assessments 
and then, ``based on the assessments,'' to promulgate regulations 
governing the distribution of OCA information. In requiring 
regulations, CSISSFRRA ensured the public an opportunity to participate 
in the government's consideration of the extent to which and the manner 
in which OCA information should be made available based on the 
assessments. Preparation of the risk assessment, however, necessarily 
called for the exercise of expert judgment in sensitive areas of law 
enforcement and national security, areas in which the President is 
typically accorded broad discretion. We thus believe that Congress did 
not intend the assessments to be subject to public evaluation except to 
the extent they do, or do not, adequately support the rule being 
promulgated. We nonetheless appreciate the careful consideration that 
the assessments received from the public and respond below to the 
significant concerns that were raised.
    In regard to the approach taken by both assessments, several 
commentors asserted that the assessments were fundamentally flawed 
because they failed to quantify the risk and benefit of disseminating 
OCA information. EPA and DOJ disagree with that comment. Given the 
short time frame the agencies had to develop the assessments and lack 
of a clear basis for estimating the probability of a chemical accident 
or criminal incident involving an industrial facility, it would have 
been difficult, if not impossible, to obtain or develop sufficient data 
to support such an analysis. To begin with, since OCA information is 
not yet publicly available, its effect on the risk and benefits to be 
assessed cannot be measured directly. In addition, because the RMP 
program took effect only last year and trends in terrorism are 
changing, there is little other data regarding the precise issues that 
the assessments were required to address.
    Furthermore, EPA and DOJ believe that statistical evaluation of the 
benefits and costs relating to the release of OCA information on the 
Internet was not necessary to determine how OCA information should be 
disseminated, which is the purpose of this rulemaking exercise. In the 
benefits assessment, an analysis of the effect of public release of 
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) data indicated that information 
dissemination leads to further risk reduction efforts. In the risk 
assessment, an analysis was conducted of trends related to weapons of 
mass destruction and recent terrorist events. Each assessment used 
those analyses as the basis for assessing the benefits and risks 
related to dissemination of OCA information. The findings that resulted 
from those analyses informed the rule. We believe that that methodology 
was appropriate for purposes of determining how best to disseminate OCA 
information.
1. Benefits Assessment
    As noted above, the reaction to the benefits assessment was mixed. 
Many commentors agreed with the conclusions regarding the benefits of 
public disclosure of OCA information. Other commentors took issue with 
some of the assessment's findings.
    Several commentors contended that there was no basis for drawing an 
analogy between the TRI program experience and what might be expected 
for OCA information because TRI data records are based on anticipated 
lawful releases, derived from estimates or actual measurements, while 
OCA information is based on hypothetical, unanticipated releases. We 
disagree that an analogy between TRI data and OCA information is 
inappropriate. As noted in the benefits assessment, although TRI data 
represent actual releases while OCA information represents hypothetical 
releases, our reason for examining the TRI program experience was the 
fact that TRI data are made publicly available in an easily used and 
understood format. The assessment noted a correlation between the ready 
accessibility of TRI data and the extensive use made of it by community 
and environmental groups, the news media, state and local governments, 
and industry, and concluded that a similar correlation might reasonably 
be expected from the dissemination of OCA information.
    Some commentors disagreed with the benefits assessment's 
contentions that the publication of TRI data contributed to reductions 
in TRI emissions. They attributed TRI emissions reductions mainly to 
economic incentives, technical considerations, and CAA regulatory 
programs. The commentors were also critical of the methodology and the 
conceptual and statistical support for the assessment's analysis of the 
effect of negative media attention on TRI emissions reductions. They 
criticized, for example, the assessment's focus on the ``worst 
polluting'' facilities selected by EPA. They took issue with 
comparisons between large facilities with correspondingly large 
releases to small facilities with small releases, and comparisons 
between supposedly similar facilities that may have differed in terms 
of process or industry classification. They questioned, moreover, 
whether the analysis captured the full range of TRI data available 
beginning in 1987. Based on those criticisms, the commentors viewed the 
TRI analogy as an invalid basis for the benefits assessment's 
conclusion that wide public access to OCA information would help reduce 
the risk of chemical accidents.
    As the assessment noted several times, a number of different 
factors contributed to TRI emissions reductions. Nonetheless, according 
to the literature reviewed for the assessment, the interest in TRI 
data--either in the form of published reports, negative press accounts, 
or the publication of TRI data by a company--was one of the factors 
affecting TRI emissions reductions. As explained in Appendix D of the 
assessment, the media relied on total emissions data to label certain 
facilities as the ``worst polluters.'' EPA compared the total TRI 
emissions reduction rates of those ``worst polluting'' facilities with 
the overall TRI emissions reduction rates for all other facilities 
(both large and small) since TRI data were first published in 1989 
(which includes data collected in 1987 and 1988). The ``worst 
polluting'' facilities featured in news accounts appeared to have 
reduced their emissions significantly more than did the other 
facilities. EPA also compared ``worst polluting'' facilities to others 
listed under the same TRI industry

[[Page 48111]]

classification because facilities in the same industry classification 
were likely to have similar processes. EPA recognizes that within a 
single industry classification there could be differences in chemical 
processes that might account for some of the differences in TRI 
emissions. Those variations, however, would not affect the results of 
the assessment's comparative analysis of TRI emissions reduction rates 
for facilities that were subject to significant negative publicity and 
those that were not. As indicated in Appendix D, moreover, even the 
reduction rates of facilities with relatively low levels of emissions 
that were the subject of negative press accounts were significantly 
greater than those of other facilities not subject to negative 
publicity. In light of that evidence, we continue to believe that if 
OCA information, like TRI data, were made publicly available in an 
easily understood format, there would be increased public understanding 
and dialogue about accidental release risk and risk reduction. We 
further believe that the resulting public pressure could lead to the 
adoption of additional risk reduction measures.
    Other commentors contended that the benefits assessment should not 
use the term ``risk reduction'' when referring to the TRI program since 
TRI data does not communicate ``risk,'' which is often understood to be 
the consequence of an event multiplied by the probability that the 
event will occur. They also questioned whether the OCA information has 
value for risk reduction. As the benefits assessment explained in 
detail in Chapter 6, however, OCA information by itself does not 
communicate risk; rather, OCA information in context and in comparison 
with other information can provide insights about risk. As stated in 
Chapter 6, ``[F]rom this comparison and understanding of potential 
risk, unacceptable risks can be reduced. * * *''
    Several commentors also claimed that the assessment's figures for 
the costs of chemical accidents were outdated and likely overstated 
because they did not take into account the significant risk reduction 
benefits of the RMP rule. They suggested, for example, that many 
companies reduced their inventories of hazardous chemicals in order to 
avoid being subject to the RMP rule. We believe that the costs of 
chemical accidents reported in the benefits assessment are based on the 
most current accurate data available. Some of the data come from the 
RMP five-year accident histories--data provided by the RMP facilities 
themselves.
    We recognize that before RMPs were required, many responsible 
chemical facility owners and operators were aware of the need for 
chemical accident prevention as the result of efforts by a variety of 
organizations, including the Center for Chemical Process Safety, the 
American Chemistry Council (formerly the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association) via the Responsible Care\TM\ program, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, and others. The objective of the 
benefits assessment was not to quantify the cumulative impact of 
voluntary process safety initiatives or of the 1996 RMP rule. Instead, 
as required by CSISSFRRA, the focus of the assessment was to evaluate 
the nature and extent of risk reduction benefits that would likely 
occur if OCA information were widely available and easily accessible to 
the public. We remain convinced that the assessment correctly concluded 
that readily available, easily accessible and interpreted OCA 
information, in combination with RMP information, would stimulate 
public dialogue about chemical risks and would result in at least some 
of the 15,000 covered facilities implementing additional risk reduction 
measures.
    Lastly, several commentors asserted that the benefits assessment 
overstated the importance of OCA information and underestimated the 
value of the data already released in executive summaries or available 
through local sources of risk information. The benefits assessment 
acknowledged that many facilities have provided OCA data in their 
executive summaries, and that individuals with sufficient effort and 
know-how could generate their own offsite consequence data from 
publicly available information. In fact, some organizations have 
already published their own databases of ``worst-case'' scenarios based 
upon data less accurate than OCA information. However, the assessment 
also noted that the amount of OCA data included in executive summaries 
varies widely, and that OCA data in executive summaries cannot be 
easily sorted or compared. In addition, OCA results prepared by those 
outside the company are often erroneous because they are based on 
incomplete or inaccurate information. The OCA information in an RMP is 
generated by the company submitting it, and takes into account site-
specific information; consequently, the OCA information portions of 
RMPs contain the most reliable data for comparison purposes and for 
understanding risks. The assessment made clear, however, that OCA 
information for a single facility is of limited value, and is far more 
useful when evaluated in the context of the facility's entire RMP, and 
compared to OCA information reported by similar facilities or by 
facilities handling similar chemicals.
2. Risk Assessment
    Like the benefits assessment, the risk assessment prompted a range 
of comments. Some commentors generally agreed with its conclusions. 
Others, citing DOJ's expertise, deferred to the assessment's findings, 
but urged DOJ to consider additional risks. In contrast, some 
commentors claimed that the assessment's conclusions were overstated in 
light of the availability of data comparable to OCA information or that 
it failed to consider factors that would reduce the risk assessed.
    Some commentors expressed concern that the risk assessment 
understated the security concerns posed by the dissemination of OCA 
information. Some of those commentors asserted that the assessment 
should have considered the potential danger that OCA information could 
be disseminated by persons taking handwritten notes that could be 
posted on the Internet. In fact, the risk assessment addressed that 
potential risk. While the assessment recognized that dissemination of 
handwritten notes was cause for concern, it concluded that the risk 
posed by that was less than that posed by release of government 
documents containing OCA information. Handwritten notes would not carry 
the same presumption of accuracy and reliability generally associated 
with government documents. Handwritten notes also would require 
significant time and effort to transcribe, making them less likely to 
be used for purposes of creating a large electronic OCA database that 
could be posted on the Internet.
    Other commentors stated that the risk assessment did not discuss 
other potential risks associated with the release of OCA information, 
such as exploitation of the data for purposes of conducting industrial 
espionage or locating precursor chemicals for purposes of creating 
illicit drugs. We note, however, that CSISSFRRA requires the risk 
assessment to weigh whether posting OCA information on the Internet 
would increase the risk of criminally-caused chemical releases. While 
the release of OCA information may pose other risks as well, we did 
not, and, given time constraints, could not, assess those risks.
    By contrast, a number of commentors asserted that the assessment 
overstated or mischaracterized the risk posed by the dissemination of 
OCA information.

[[Page 48112]]

Those commentors made several points. First, one stated that the 
assessment did not discuss the ``increased risk'' posed by 
dissemination of OCA information on the Internet (quoting CAA section 
112(r)(7)(H)(ii)(I)(aa)). Rather, the commentor offered, it merely 
concluded that OCA information would be helpful to a terrorist or 
criminal. In fact, however, the risk assessment did address the issue 
of ``increased risk,'' as required by CSISSFRRA. It concluded that OCA 
information would provide someone seeking to target or maximize an 
industrial chemical release with helpful information that is not 
currently available, and, therefore, that posting OCA information on 
the Internet would increase the risk of a terrorist using the 
information for that purpose.
    Other commentors argued that information identical or similar to 
OCA information is already publicly available, and, therefore, the risk 
assessment overstated the risk posed by posting OCA information on the 
Internet. The risk assessment acknowledged that some items of OCA 
information and information comparable to OCA information are currently 
available to the public. However, the risk assessment also found that 
the items of OCA information most likely to be used by a terrorist to 
plan or execute an attack (e.g., the distance to endpoint, the 
population within the distance to endpoint, and public and 
environmental receptors affected) have not been assembled into a 
publicly available resource that would be as comprehensive and 
accessible as OCA information would be if posted on the Internet, 
particularly in its database form. While several commentors noted that 
RMP executive summaries are currently available on the Internet, both 
the risk and benefits assessments found that the quantity and quality 
of OCA data contained in the posted executive summaries vary 
considerably. Some executive summaries include all of the OCA data 
elements while others include little or none. Consequently, OCA data 
that have been released through the executive summaries do not 
constitute a comprehensive collection of OCA information. Moreover, OCA 
data included in the executive summaries cannot be electronically 
searched in a manner that would allow the sort of comparisons among RMP 
facilities that would facilitate targeting. The risk assessment thus 
reasonably concluded that full publication of OCA information on the 
Internet would pose a significantly greater risk than that currently 
posed by the public availability of executive summaries and other 
information, even though executive summaries have been posted on the 
Internet.
    Similarly, some commentors questioned the risk posed by OCA 
information, since data similar to OCA information could be calculated 
using publicly available sources of information. The risk assessment 
found that calculating information like OCA information using available 
sources of data would be possible but would require significant effort 
and know-how. To date, no comprehensive collection of data on the off-
site consequences of chemical releases is available on the Internet. To 
the extent that EPCRA information is available on the Internet, the 
risk assessment found that such information does not pose the same 
degree of risk as would OCA information because EPCRA information does 
not furnish the type of targeting data (such as the distance a chemical 
release would travel and the population that lives within that area) 
that could be used to plan terrorist events. Furthermore, the 
assessment found that some publicly available information similar to 
the key items of OCA information is only available through SERCs and 
LEPCs, and is not Internet-accessible. The risk assessment found that 
the ability to access information anonymously posed significant 
security concerns and that, for information attainable only through 
personal contact, for example, by contacting a SERC or LEPC, there is 
less of a risk that the information would be misused by criminals, who 
typically avoid such contact in executing their plans. Thus, to the 
extent that information similar to OCA information is currently 
available, it can be obtained only through means that do not pose a 
risk comparable to that which would be created by Internet access to 
OCA information.
    Another commentor maintained that OCA information has already 
entered the public domain because every covered facility in its state 
had held the public meeting required by CSISSFRRA section 4. That 
section specifies that every covered facility must provide the public 
with a summary of the OCA portions of its RMPs at a meeting or in a 
public notice no later than February 1, 2000. We do not believe, 
however, that those meetings (and notices) provided OCA information in 
a way that presents a significant risk. Facilities were required to 
share only a summary of their OCA information, and facilities were free 
to do so in various ways, making it unlikely that the information they 
shared with the public was sufficiently detailed or uniform to make it 
easy to assemble and distribute over the Internet. Also, the meetings 
were a one-time requirement and thus are not an ongoing source of OCA 
information.
    Several commentors questioned the risk assessment's conclusions 
regarding the helpfulness of OCA information to terrorists and 
criminals; they asserted that it does not provide a ``roadmap'' for 
terrorists and that it fails to provide all of the information that a 
terrorist would need to conduct an attack. The risk assessment, 
however, did not claim that OCA information provides a comprehensive 
``how-to'' manual for attacks on chemical facilities. Nor did it claim 
that OCA information provides all of the information that would be 
sought by someone seeking to cause an intentional chemical release. 
Rather, the risk assessment found that OCA information supplies some 
pieces of information that would be useful to someone seeking to target 
or maximize an industrial chemical release. The risk assessment noted 
that information such as the population that could be affected, the 
distance that a plume of chemical could radiate, and the types of 
buildings and landmarks in the local area are precisely the type of 
information that would be of interest to a terrorist seeking to 
maximize the effect of an industrial chemical attack. Thus, even if OCA 
information does not provide a ``roadmap'' for terrorists or all of the 
necessary information for an attack, it still provides crucial pieces 
of information that would increase the risk of terrorist or other 
criminal activity.
    A few commentors argued that several of the examples cited in the 
risk assessment were irrelevant to whether terrorists or criminals in 
the United States might seek to cause an industrial chemical release. 
In particular, those commentors considered irrelevant the examples of 
chemical releases that occurred in Bosnia and the incidents involving 
criminals in the United States who had personal knowledge of the 
industrial facilities they targeted. We disagree. Those incidents were 
included in the risk assessment because they establish specific, 
important points relevant to the risk assessment. The examples in 
Bosnia demonstrate that it is in fact possible to cause large-scale 
chemical releases using explosives or other means; and the two criminal 
incidents that occurred in the United States demonstrate that criminals 
in this country have indeed considered using--although they have not 
successfully caused--chemical releases to inflict mass casualties.
    Lastly, two commentors asserted that the risk assessment should 
have taken into account the risk reduction that would be achieved by 
informing the

[[Page 48113]]

community of OCA information. We agree that the dissemination of OCA 
information can assist the community in preventing, preparing for, and 
responding to chemical releases, regardless of how they are caused, and 
thereby may mitigate the damage that such releases could cause. 
However, that point does not contradict the risk assessment's finding 
that the release of OCA information on the Internet would increase the 
risk of an intentional chemical release or other related criminal 
conduct. Moreover, while the benefits assessment concluded that public 
release of OCA information would likely result in a significant 
reduction in chemical risk, it did not find that the reduction in risk 
would offset the increase in risk that would accompany Internet 
dissemination of OCA information. As explained above, we do not have 
sufficient data to estimate the number of lives that could be lost or 
saved by various approaches to the dissemination of OCA information. 
But we are concerned that terrorists or criminals would use anonymous 
Internet access to OCA information to maximize the effects of a 
release, and that those effects are likely to be large compared to the 
effects of unintentional releases. Moreover, it will take time for the 
public release of OCA information to create the incentives that will in 
turn lead to risk reduction. The increased risk created by Internet 
dissemination of OCA information, by contrast, would be immediate. For 
those reasons, we do not believe that unfettered release of OCA 
information would achieve the statutory objective of minimizing the 
risks of chemical releases, however caused.
3. The Assessments and the Proposed Rule
    We received a number of comments related to the assessments and 
their role in informing the proposed rule. Some commentors believed 
that the proposed rule appropriately balanced the findings of the 
assessments. Those commentors noted the tension between the concerns 
raised in the assessments, but offered that the proposed rule 
represented a reasonable accommodation of those concerns. Others 
asserted that the conclusions of the risk assessment were given too 
much weight in view of the evidence presented, or that the conclusions 
of the benefits assessment were given too little weight.
    One commentor noted that while the benefits assessment chronicled 
actual, significant damages from accidental releases in terms of 
casualties, evacuations, and property damage, the risk assessment did 
not cite a successful terrorist attack on an industrial facility in the 
United States. The commentor was thus concerned that the proposed rule 
ignored the ``very real risks'' of chemical accidents in favor of what 
the commentor characterized as ``greatly exaggerated fears of the 
unknown.''
    While there have thankfully been no successful terrorist or 
criminal chemical releases in the United States (although there have 
been several abroad), the risk assessment discussed two recent plots to 
cause chemical releases that were thwarted by law enforcement. As the 
risk assessment also pointed out, it is important to recognize that the 
consequences of an intentional release could be devastating. A chemical 
release intended and designed to cause maximum damage to property and 
life--as terrorist events increasingly are--would have dire 
consequences. The fact that an intentional release has not yet occurred 
in the United States does not mean that the risk of such an incident 
should be discounted or ignored. Nor does it mean that steps to prevent 
such an incident should not be taken. As the risk assessment concluded, 
trends suggest that the odds of such an event are increasing. The rule 
recognizes that fact and balances that concern with the benefits to be 
gained from providing the public with access to OCA information.
    Similarly, one commentor asserted that the proposed rule sought to 
eliminate the risk associated with posting OCA information on the 
Internet rather than balancing that risk with the incentives for risk 
reduction that would be created by making the information available to 
the public. We disagree. CSISSFRRA requires the government to 
promulgate a regulation that ``minimizes'' the likelihood of accidental 
and intentional releases based upon the findings of the risk and 
benefits assessments. The proposed rule was designed to do so. It would 
not have eliminated all the risks cited by the risk assessment. To 
further reduce the risk, the proposal could have called for any member 
of the public to have access to OCA information for no more than one 
facility per month or even per year, or could have made reading rooms 
less numerous. Instead, the proposal called for any member of the 
public to obtain OCA information for up to 10 facilities per month at 
the 50 or more reading rooms across the country. It also called for an 
Internet-based risk indicator system to stimulate the public's interest 
in OCA information and the potential for risk reduction. The proposed 
rule thus was an attempt to minimize the risk of chemical releases, 
however caused, by providing the public with access to OCA information 
while establishing safeguards intended to discourage criminal use of 
the information.
    Several commentors asserted that the proposed rule was ``arbitrary 
and capricious'' because it failed to make a rational connection 
between the facts found in the benefits assessment and the decisions 
made in regard to the rule. In particular, the commentors pointed to 
the benefits assessment's findings that the public will use information 
to reduce risks to the extent the information is easy to access, 
understandable, and in a format that facilitates comparison and 
analysis. They claimed that the proposed rule would make OCA 
information difficult to obtain. They argued that the proposed 
restrictions would thus undermine the potential benefits of releasing 
OCA information, and that EPA and DOJ essentially disregarded the 
benefits assessment's findings.
    We agree that there must be a rational connection between the 
regulatory limitations established in this rulemaking and the findings 
in the benefits and risk assessments. However, the final rule should 
not, and cannot, respond to each of the assessments' findings standing 
alone. CSISSFRRA requires the final regulations to govern the 
distribution of OCA information in a manner that ``minimizes the 
likelihood of accidental releases and the [increased risk of terrorist 
and other criminal activity associated with the posting of OCA 
information on the Internet] and the likelihood of harm to public 
health and welfare,'' in light of the assessments. To meet that 
requirement, the findings of both assessments must be considered to 
determine how best to distribute OCA information in a way that reduces 
the risk to public health and welfare of chemical releases, however 
caused. We believe the final rule is informed by the findings of both 
the benefits and the risk assessments.
    Another commentor asserted that EPA and DOJ's justification for 
withholding OCA information from the Internet is ``unique and 
arbitrary.'' The commentor argued that, if posting OCA information on 
the Internet is unacceptably dangerous due to the assistance it could 
give a terrorist in identifying a potential target and planning an 
attack, then many other types of information on the Internet could be 
seen as equally dangerous, such as baseball schedules and stadium 
seating capacities. The commentor explained that a terrorist could use 
that information to determine potential casualty figures for a planned 
attack during a game.

[[Page 48114]]

    This criticism misinterprets the basis of our concern about OCA 
information. The risk assessment found evidence that terrorists are 
increasingly interested in using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
that chemical releases can be triggered from an industrial facility, 
thereby converting that facility into a WMD. Based in part on that 
evidence, the assessment concluded that posting OCA information on the 
Internet would increase the risk of terrorists or criminals targeting 
chemical facilities for attack. OCA information provides data that is 
qualitatively superior to the sort of information cited by the 
commentor. In particular, OCA information includes the number of 
people, the size of the area, and the types of buildings and landmarks 
that could be affected by a chemical release. As the assessment 
emphasizes, that is precisely the type of information that terrorists 
seek for purposes of planning an attack. Stadium seating capacities and 
schedules, by contrast, provide information only about the number of 
people that could be affected. For those reasons, EPA and DOJ conclude 
that the release of some items of OCA information presents a terrorism 
risk that warrants their exclusion from the Internet. Moreover, the 
fact that chemical facilities, as opposed to baseball stadiums and many 
other places where the public congregates, are themselves potential 
WMD, makes clear that there is heightened risk in making OCA 
information easily available to terrorists or other criminals.
    We also received a comment that the proposed rule makes OCA 
information more difficult to access than information currently 
reported under EPCRA section 312, even though the benefits assessment 
found that EPCRA section 312 information was not widely used because it 
was difficult to obtain. However, the commentor did not correctly 
characterize the benefits assessment's findings. The benefits 
assessment found that several reasons account for the infrequent use of 
EPCRA section 312 information. First, the public is not aware of the 
availability of the EPCRA information because limited resources have 
allowed only about half of the SERCs and LEPCs to publicize its 
availability. Second, the effort required by members of the public to 
locate their SERC or LEPC and request that information has been a 
disincentive. Lastly, EPCRA data is not in a format that is easily 
understood by the public.
    As will be described in more detail later, under the final rule, 
the public will more likely be aware of OCA information and have the 
means to access and understand it. First, the EPA's website on the 
Internet--a widely accessible medium--will inform the public of the 
existence and availability of OCA information. Second, the website will 
provide contact information and instructions for obtaining access to 
OCA information, so members of the public will not have to locate that 
information for themselves. Third, OCA information will be accessible 
from more sources than is EPCRA section 312 information; while EPCRA 
section 312 information is available only through SERCs and LEPCs, OCA 
information will be available through federal reading rooms, as well as 
through SERCs, LEPCs, and other related state and local agencies that 
opt to provide access to local OCA information, as described in more 
detail later. Fourth, some OCA information will be readily accessible 
on the Internet. Finally, the public is more apt to use OCA information 
because it is easier to comprehend than is the EPCRA section 312 data. 
OCA information does not require calculations or analysis to determine 
the potential consequences of potential releases; it communicates that 
information directly and is designed to allow easy comparisons among 
RMP facilities.

B. General Comments on the Rule

    We received comments raising a variety of general or overarching 
concerns with the proposed rule. One commentor asserted that the 
proposed rule does not further right-to-know efforts. Other commentors 
argued that terrorists will be able to get OCA information while the 
proposed rule's restrictions on OCA information will only harm the 
public. As stated above, DOJ and EPA agree that the public's right-to-
know is an important element in the reduction of accidental releases 
and that risk reduction benefits will flow from the public's access to 
OCA information. Accordingly, the proposed rule provided the public 
with multiple avenues for obtaining access to OCA information, 
including federal reading rooms, LEPCs, SERCs, and fire departments 
that opt to provide read-only access. It also provided the public with 
hazard information through a risk indicator system and clarified that 
state and local government officials, as well as federal officials, can 
communicate the substance of OCA information to the public as long as 
they do not release the restricted forms of that information. While the 
proposed rule would not have permitted unfettered release of OCA 
information, it would have provided for dissemination of OCA 
information in ways that are consistent with right-to-know efforts and 
would have allowed the public and industry to better prevent and 
prepare for chemical releases, whether or not intentionally caused. As 
explained further in this preamble, the final rule adopts and improves 
on those public access provisions.
    One commentor argued that the proposed system for providing the 
public with access to OCA information would undermine the utility of 
the CAA's citizen suit enforcement provision by denying members of the 
public the information they need to prosecute such suits. But as noted 
above, the system would not deny public access to OCA information, only 
control it. Federal, state, and local reading rooms, and the Internet 
would all be potential outlets for the information. As described later, 
we have also sought to improve the proposed system's ability to assure 
reasonable access to OCA information by all members of the public.
    One commentor expressed concern that the proposed regulation would 
``disenfranchise'' U.S. citizens located outside the country by 
withholding access to OCA information from them. The basis for that 
concern was our proposal to define ``member of the public or person'' 
as an individual located in the United States. We did not intend to 
withhold access to OCA information from any U.S. citizen. Rather, we 
intended only to limit our reading room obligation to establishing 
rooms in the United States, where the vast majority of persons affected 
by RMP facilities are located. Given the resource implications of 
establishing federal reading rooms, we considered it appropriate to 
commit to locating at least 50 rooms in the United States and retain 
discretion to locate more elsewhere. We continue to believe that that 
is the appropriate course to take.
    As described later, we are developing an approach to operating 
reading rooms that will give us flexibility in where we locate them; to 
the extent we learn that there is demand for reading room access by 
U.S. citizens abroad, we will consider providing reading room access in 
appropriate locations. Nonetheless, we realize that the definition of 
``member of the public or person'' need not be limited in the way 
proposed to accomplish our objective. The reading room provision of the 
rule itself specifies that the required reading rooms be located across 
the United States. Moreover, we realize that the proposed definition 
would have been problematic for some other rule provisions that used 
the terms ``public'' or ``person.'' We have thus deleted the phrase 
``located in the United States'' from the definition. At the same time,

[[Page 48115]]

we have revised the rule provision calling for a system that indicates 
whether an address is within a facility's vulnerable zone so that our 
obligation extends only to persons located within any state (defined to 
include the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories). 
The vast majority of persons affected by vulnerable zones are within a 
state, and we consider it reasonable and prudent to limit our 
obligation in order to limit the potential impact of that obligation on 
our resources. We expect, however, to answer inquiries from persons 
located outside the U.S. unless those inquiries become voluminous.
    Several commentors voiced concern that, without ready access to OCA 
information, the public would be unable to hold EPA accountable for the 
effectiveness of the RMP program. We disagree. We do not believe that 
changes over time in any single set of data (e.g., distance to 
endpoint) are sufficient to measure the effects of the RMP program on a 
facility's practices. Differences in OCA data may reflect differences 
in assumptions and models used in conducting the analysis. Other RMP 
information, including accident histories and information about 
prevention and response programs, offers a more comprehensive basis for 
measuring a facility's progress or comparing facilities' safety 
practices. Moreover, RMP information except for OCA information is 
already available on the Internet. Consequently, there is already a 
wealth of information that an individual can use to determine the 
compliance status of an individual facility, even without the 
additional OCA information offered by the proposed rule. We thus 
believe that the ready access to that information sufficiently enables 
interested individuals to evaluate the effectiveness of the RMP 
program.
    One commentor claimed that the proposed rule distorted the notion 
of a ``public record'' because the proposed rule would not allow 
publicly released OCA information to be copied or carried away from 
reading rooms. The commentor noted that the proposal treated OCA 
information as ``public'' in the setting of the reading rooms but 
prohibited it from release to the public in the context of the 
Internet. We find that the proposal's treatment of OCA information is 
consistent with CSISSFRRA's statutory framework. Congress anticipated 
that OCA information in different forms could be disseminated 
differently; under CSISSFRRA the government is required to provide the 
public with access to paper copies of OCA information in limited 
quantities, and in addition the government is required to assess 
whether and how to provide OCA information on the Internet (CAA section 
112(r)(7)(H)(ii)(II)). Thus, the proposed rule's approach to 
dissemination of OCA information was well within the scheme 
contemplated by the CSISSFRRA.
    We received a comment that the proposed rule is illogical because 
it tracks members of the public who review OCA information at federal 
reading rooms but allows companies to release OCA information to the 
public without restriction. Both of those aspects of the proposed rule, 
however, flow from the statute itself. First, CAA section 
112(r)(7)(H)(ii)(II)(aa) specifies that the final rule must provide 
access to paper copies of OCA information for a ``limited number'' of 
facilities. The only way the government can implement the ``limited 
number'' provision is to limit the number of facilities for which an 
individual can receive access to OCA information. Second, CAA section 
112(r)(7)(H)(v)(III) contemplates that facilities will release their 
OCA information to the public if they so choose. It provides that the 
statute's restrictions on dissemination of OCA information do not apply 
to information released without restriction by facilities, and it 
requires facilities that provide OCA information to the public under 
those terms to notify the Administrator, who is directed to maintain a 
public list of such facilities. Congress thus clearly intended to allow 
facilities to release their OCA information as they consider 
appropriate. Congress' approach to facilities' release of their own 
information does not conflict with the concern expressed in the risk 
assessment that large quantities of OCA information would be 
disseminated in a searchable format on the Internet. Individual 
facilities separately releasing their OCA information does not 
significantly raise that concern.
    Relatedly, one commentor asserted that the federal government 
should provide access to OCA information that facilities release 
without restriction. As noted above, CSISSFRRA requires EPA to make 
publicly available a list of the facilities that have notified EPA that 
they have released their OCA information without restriction. 
Approximately 1,000 facilities have notified EPA, and EPA has made a 
list of those facilities available on its website. That list will 
enable members of the public to obtain OCA information from those 
facilities. At the same time, CSISSFRRA does not require that EPA and 
DOJ make publicly available the OCA information released by listed 
facilities. Neither EPA nor DOJ will provide the OCA information merely 
because it has been released by the listed facilities, for the security 
reasons cited above.
    Several commentors asserted that even greater restrictions should 
have been proposed because the rule would not stop OCA information from 
being hand-copied and posted on the Internet. We do not believe 
Congress intended for us to prevent members of the public from hand-
copying the OCA data that they view. CAA section 
112(r)(7)(H)(ii)(II)(aa) guarantees the public ``access'' to paper 
copies of OCA information for at least a limited number of facilities, 
and the utility of ``access'' would be greatly diminished if the public 
had to rely on memory alone to recall that information. Also, CAA 
section 112(r)(7)(H)(viii) expressly precludes mechanical and 
electronic copying of the electronic OCA information made available 
under that provision. It is silent with regard to copying by hand. The 
fact that Congress expressly precluded mechanical and electronic copies 
suggests that it was aware of the problem of copying and made an 
affirmative decision to prohibit only certain forms of copying. We thus 
believe that Congress' silence with regard to copying by hand is 
properly interpreted to mean that hand copies are to be permissible.
    Another commentor claimed that the best manner of determining 
whether the proposed rule provided adequate public access to OCA 
information compared to other alternatives was to give the full RMP 
database to qualified researchers so that they could use it to conduct 
a peer review analysis of the proposal. CSISSFRRA mandates that the 
means of disseminating paper copies of OCA information be based upon 
assessments conducted by the government; it does not appear to 
contemplate the sort of peer review process that the commentor 
proposed. Further, it is unlikely that the short time frame provided by 
the statute would have allowed for such a process. Moreover, we do not 
believe that the commentor's method of assessing the various 
alternatives for providing the public with access to OCA information 
would be preferable to the method of analysis that we conducted through 
our assessments. We agree, however, that there are public benefits to 
providing qualified researchers with access to OCA information. 
CSISSFRRA does not require that this rulemaking establish a means of 
doing so, but we are working on devising and implementing a system for 
giving qualified researchers access to

[[Page 48116]]

OCA information, as required by CAA section 112(r)(7)(H)(vii).
    One commentor asserted that it was unnecessary for the public to 
receive information about facilities outside their communities, and 
that a facility's OCA information should only be available to members 
of the community in which it is located. Such an approach, however, 
would be inconsistent with CSISSFRRA and the findings of the benefits 
assessment. CAA section 112(r)(7)(H)(ii)(II)(aa) expressly guarantees 
access to paper copies of OCA information for a limited number of 
facilities ``located anywhere in the United States, without any 
geographical restriction.'' The benefits assessment also notes that a 
person interested in assessing a local facility's safety practices may 
find it useful to compare that facility's OCA information with that of 
similar facilities located elsewhere.
    Some commentors suggested that the creation of 50 federal reading 
rooms, or approximately one per state, has environmental justice 
implications. The Environmental Justice Executive Order (Exec. Order 
No. 12898, 59 FR 7629 (1994)) requires that each federal agency conduct 
all activities affecting the environment or human health in a manner 
that does not discriminate by race, color, or national origin, and 
address, as appropriate, any disproportionately high and adverse human 
health or environmental effects on minority and low-income populations. 
Executive Order 12898 also encourages agencies to work to ensure that 
public documents relating to human health and the environment are 
readily accessible to the public. We believe that our approach, 
including various means of access in addition to federal reading rooms, 
will not have a disparate impact upon minority groups or low-income 
groups. As discussed below, we are committed to providing reasonable 
access to everyone seeking to view OCA information and have made 
changes to the rule reflecting that intention. We expect that the vast 
majority of federal reading rooms will be placed in urban areas with 
relatively large minority and low-income communities. Those locations 
will provide practical access to OCA information for those communities, 
some of which have historically suffered from a disproportionate 
environmental hazard burden. The rule provides for additional access to 
OCA information by allowing state and local government agencies to 
provide access under the ``enhanced local access'' section of the rule. 
Also, the vulnerability zone indicator system, which is accessible via 
email, telephone, and U.S. mail, will provide an individual with 
additional data on some aspects of the risk expressed by OCA 
information.
    Some commentors also expressed concern that little had been done to 
involve minority and poor communities in the development or public 
review of the proposed rule, contrary to the Environmental Justice 
Executive Order. EPA and DOJ disagree. Especially in light of the 
relatively short period of time we had to conduct the risk and benefits 
assessments, as well as to propose and finalize this rule, we believe 
that we provided a reasonable opportunity for review of the proposed 
rule by minority and poor communities in compliance with that Executive 
Order. The proposed rule outlining the federal government's policy was 
published in the Federal Register and available on the EPA website. In 
addition, we provided additional notice of the proposal by holding a 
public hearing and providing individual notification to thousands of 
individuals across the country, including state and local government 
agencies.
    Another commentor faulted the proposed rule for not acknowledging 
Indian country, tribal governments, or tribal equivalents of SERCs and 
LEPCs. CSISSFRRA itself does not address Indian country or tribes. It 
amends the CAA, which defines ``state'' in a way that does not include 
Indian country. However, CAA section 301(d) authorizes EPA to 
promulgate regulations specifying those CAA provisions for which it is 
appropriate to treat Indian tribes as states. EPA has promulgated that 
regulation (63 FR 7271 (Feb. 12, 1998)), which provides that tribes can 
take delegation of programs under CAA section 112, including the RMP 
program, if EPA finds they meet specified criteria. Thus, a tribe found 
to meet those criteria may be treated as a state and receive and 
disseminate OCA information to the same extent and in the same manner 
as any state under the rule being promulgated.

C. Rule's Impact on Risk Reduction

    A number of commentors agreed that the proposed rule generally 
provided for public access to OCA information in a way that would 
minimize the likelihood and consequences of chemical releases, however 
caused. Some of those commentors noted that other information available 
in RMPs, under EPCRA or other programs, would, on their own or in 
tandem with OCA information, allow the public to learn about and 
understand the hazards and risks posed by chemical plants in their 
communities. In contrast, some commentors expressed concern that the 
proposed rule would not minimize overall risk, and even more 
significantly, might increase overall risk by making it too difficult 
for the public to access OCA information that could be used to reduce 
the likelihood of accidents.
    Some commentors argued that the proposed rule would take away a 
risk reduction tool without decreasing existing dangers. We disagree 
with that statement. The agencies did not propose to ``take away a risk 
reduction tool,'' since there still would be public access to OCA 
information. In order to reduce the risk associated with Internet 
posting of OCA information, the proposed rule delineated procedures for 
obtaining access to the information and limitations on the amount of 
information that could be obtained by any member of the public. It 
provided for access to up to 10 facilities' OCA information per 
individual per month, access that would allow members of the public in 
the vast majority of counties to obtain information for local 
facilities and a few additional facilities for a basis for comparison. 
In addition, the proposal in no way attempted to restrict the use of 
that risk reduction tool once obtained.
    A few commentors argued that the proposed rule encouraged secrecy, 
which would breed incompetence and complacency. While we agree that 
secrecy can have such an effect, in this case the public will have 
access to OCA information, so facilities' information will be far from 
secret. In addition, other RMP information currently available on the 
Internet, including information concerning facilities' accident 
prevention programs, provide important information for assessing and 
comparing facilities' practices. Likewise, other publicly available 
environmental reports--such as those concerning accidents reported 
under EPCRA and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act--are useful in evaluating a facility's safety 
practices. OCA information provides a particularly simple way of 
roughly assessing and comparing the hazards facilities pose, but it is 
not the only information capable of communicating such hazards, as a 
number of commentors pointed out.
    Several commentors argued that, by making OCA information difficult 
to access, the proposed rule would force the public to rely on 
government officials for risk information without being able to check 
the accuracy of that information. Other commentors claimed that the 
public might resort to other forms of less reliable, more exaggerated 
information that would make local risk

[[Page 48117]]

reduction efforts more difficult. Relatedly, another commentor argued 
that, to the extent other, more exaggerated information is generated as 
a substitute for OCA information, terrorists and other criminals may be 
led to believe that consequences of a release would be greater, thereby 
increasing the risk of a release. The fundamental premise of those 
comments is that the rule would render OCA information inaccessible. We 
disagree. As mentioned above, we are committed to making OCA 
information reasonably available to the public and have made changes in 
the final rule to ensure such access. Consequently, local and state 
governments need not ask the public to trust their representations but 
may provide access to OCA information and other information that the 
public may use to verify government assertions about the risk of 
chemical releases.
    Several commentors asserted that the proposed rule, in validating 
the idea that public dissemination of OCA information poses a risk, 
would have a ``chilling effect'' on local officials' communication of 
OCA data, thus curtailing accident prevention efforts that result from 
public awareness and pressure. We did not intend to create such a 
chilling effect. Indeed, we believe dialogue among government, the 
public, and industry is essential to further risk reduction efforts. As 
we explained in the proposal, we have attempted to address the concern 
about CSISSFRRA's perceived chilling effect by explaining in the rule 
the ways in which state and local government agencies may legitimately 
disseminate OCA information, or descriptions thereof, to the public. In 
fact, the rule encourages appropriate local and state agencies to 
provide public access to such information, which should counter any 
inference to the contrary. Further, it is worth reiterating that 
government officials may be held criminally liable only for ``willful'' 
violations of the restrictions on OCA information dissemination. In 
other words, the government would be required to demonstrate that the 
official knew his or her actions to be unlawful. EPA and DOJ moreover, 
will continue to provide guidance to state and local covered persons to 
explain the extent to which they may lawfully disseminate OCA 
information, or communicate the substance of that information, under 
the final rule.
    Similarly, one commentor expressed concern that the proposed rule 
might discourage members of industry from participating in SERCs and 
public meetings at which OCA information is discussed. In particular, 
the commentor asserted that proposed section 1400.6(b) could be 
interpreted to render it unlawful for industry members serving on SERCs 
to provide OCA information for their facilities to the public, if those 
facilities have not formally decided to release that information. In 
many instances, whether CSISSFRRA is applicable will depend upon the 
context in which OCA information is being disseminated. For example, in 
the instance cited by the commentor, 1400.6(b)'s restrictions on 
dissemination apply only if the member of industry is distributing OCA 
information to the public in his or her capacity as a representative of 
the SERC. In addition, CSISSFRRA does not restrict his or her ability 
to participate in public discussions about OCA information; in fact, 
CSISSFRRA section 4 anticipates that members of industry will engage in 
such discussions with the public.
    Several commentors argued that, if the rule makes public access to 
OCA information difficult, it should compensate for any resulting 
decrease in risk reduction incentives by requiring facilities to secure 
their sites and/or take prescribed risk reduction steps, such as 
reducing their inventory of dangerous chemicals or substituting safer 
chemicals to the extent feasible. Other commentors disagreed, asserting 
that requiring facilities to make themselves secure from terrorist 
attacks or to take other risk reduction measures would be an 
inappropriate remedy for the risk posed by broad release of OCA 
information. To begin with, we note that CSISSFRRA requires the final 
rule to ``govern[] the distribution of [OCA] information.'' It does not 
call on the government to decide whether to impose further substantive 
requirements on facilities to reduce the risk of chemical releases, 
however caused. In the short time available to conduct the assessments 
and rulemaking on the distribution of OCA information, it was not 
possible for us to address the broader policy, programmatic, and legal 
issues posed by the commentors' suggestion for additional regulatory 
requirements. CSISSFRRA does, however, include a requirement that DOJ, 
in consultation with relevant federal, state, and local agencies, as 
well as members of industry and the public, conduct studies to examine 
the issue of site security at RMP facilities and the extent to which 
the RMP rule effectively addresses that issue. DOJ is working to comply 
with that requirement. In the meantime, EPA has issued a site security 
alert informing industry of various risks posed by criminal activity 
related to chemical facilities.

D. Reading Rooms

1. General Comments on Reading Rooms
    As indicated above, the proposed rule called for providing the 
public with access to paper copies of OCA information through the 
creation of at least 50 federal reading rooms geographically 
distributed across the United States. Several commentors expressed 
concern that the costs of creating federal reading rooms could outweigh 
the benefits. Further, several other commentors suggested that it would 
be more appropriate for LEPCs, SERCs and/or other local groups to be 
the principal providers of OCA information; some commentors also urged 
EPA to help fund such efforts. Some commentors recommended that the 
reading room approach be abandoned or scaled down out of concern that 
reading rooms would not adequately safeguard the OCA information and 
could result in the widespread dissemination of OCA material. Other 
commentors questioned whether federal reading rooms would provide 
reasonable access, particularly for people who live some distance from 
reading rooms. Finally, other commentors supported the federal reading 
room approach but made suggestions about how to make reading rooms more 
effective and secure.
    For the reasons discussed below, we continue to believe that 
providing the public with access to paper copies of OCA information is 
best done through reading rooms. We are developing an implementation 
approach for federal reading rooms that will allow read-only access to 
OCA information in a reasonably secure manner that is convenient for 
the public and efficient for the government. We do not believe that 
existing federal statutes authorize us to rely solely on LEPCs, SERCs, 
or other state or local entities to provide reading room access; 
requiring such agencies to do so, moreover, might raise constitutional 
concerns regarding the appropriate relationship of federal and state 
power. CSISSFRRA makes the federal government responsible for 
distributing OCA information. Nevertheless, LEPCs, SERCs, and other 
emergency prevention, planning, and response agencies can play an 
important part in facilitating public access to OCA information, and 
the final rule being promulgated encourages them to do so. We also 
intend to provide assistance to interested state and local agencies.
    As for whether reading rooms can provide reasonable access, we are 
committed to establishing a network of federal reading rooms and other 
potential state and local outlets (further

[[Page 48118]]

described below) that would ensure that every member of the public has 
a reasonable opportunity to obtain access to OCA information. We 
believe that federal reading rooms can and will be an appropriate and 
cost-effective mechanism for providing the required public access to 
OCA information.
2. The Number of Paper Copies
    We received a comment interpreting the limit on the number of RMP 
facilities for which an individual may view paper copies of OCA 
information as 10 per person per visit. Today's notice clarifies that 
the limit is 10 per person per month, regardless of the number of 
reading room visits a person makes. Any person may visit a reading room 
multiple times during a single calendar month to view the OCA 
information for the same 10 facilities. A person may not visit multiple 
reading rooms to view OCA information for more than 10 different 
facilities in a single month. We have changed the text of the 
regulation to clarify that point.
    We received many comments on what the appropriate ``limited 
number'' should be. Some commentors expressed concern that the proposed 
limit of 10 per month was too generous considering the potential 
criminal use of that information and suggested a lower number, such as 
10 per year. Several commentors indicated that the proposed limit of 10 
was arbitrary, unreasonable, and/or would hamper the goal of providing 
the public with access to paper copies of OCA information because the 
proposed limit of 10 per month would be insufficient for citizens 
living or working in areas with high concentrations of RMP reporting 
facilities, or would hinder individuals wishing to conduct nationwide 
comparative research. Finally, some commentors stated that the limit of 
10 per month was appropriate.
    Several commentors also raised issues concerning the application of 
the 10 per month limit. One commentor suggested that the limit apply 
not to individuals but to organizations, so that an organization could 
not use its employees or members to compile collectively OCA 
information for more than the prescribed ``limited number'' of 
facilities. Another commentor argued that members of the public have a 
legitimate interest only in OCA information for facilities in their 
community, and that the limited number should thus be applied in a way 
that provides access to information only for such facilities. Two other 
commentors recommended that OCA information be provided only to state 
and local officials with emergency planning, prevention, or response 
responsibilities.
    We note at the outset that CSISSFRRA requires that these 
regulations provide access for ``any member of the public'' to paper 
copies of OCA information for a limited number of facilities ``located 
anywhere in the United States, without any geographical restriction'' 
(CAA section 112(r)(r)(H)(ii)(II)(aa)). We thus do not have the 
discretion to deny the public access to paper copies of OCA 
information, to establish a limit that applies to organizations instead 
of individuals, or to restrict the geographical scope of the facilities 
for which a member of the public may request OCA information. The 
benefits assessment also makes clear that public access to OCA 
information would stimulate further risk reduction and that the 
public's ability to compare the hazards and safety practices of similar 
facilities located in different places is important to stimulating that 
risk reduction.
    With respect to the appropriate numbers limit, we explained in the 
proposal that we chose a limit of 10 facilities per individual per 
month based on consideration of many of the issues expressed in the 
comments received. As required by the law, we weighed the risks that 
would result from unlimited reading room access to paper copies against 
the benefits that would accrue from public awareness of potential 
release hazards, as communicated through OCA information. A limit was 
proposed that would hinder the ability of an individual or group to 
gather large quantities of OCA information to post on the Internet, 
while allowing individuals in most parts of the country or in most 
counties to gain access to OCA data for all the facilities in their 
community and a few more for purposes of comparison.
    In determining that limit, we conducted an analysis of the 
geographic distribution of RMP facilities across the nation. The 
analysis showed that 82% of all counties that have RMP facilities have 
no more than 10 such facilities. Because residents of most counties 
would be able to review OCA information for all the facilities in their 
county in a single visit to a federal reading room, EPA and DOJ 
believed that a limit of 10 per month would provide reasonable access 
for persons living or working in areas with RMP facilities. Moreover, 
under the 10 per month limit, in the great majority of those counties, 
residents would also be able to review OCA data for RMP facilities 
located outside their county.
    At the same time, we recognized that the proposed limit of 10 per 
individual per month would not permit all members of the public to 
obtain OCA information for every facility in their own communities. The 
proposed rule, therefore, included provisions to authorize and 
encourage LEPCs, SERCs, and fire departments to supplement the access 
provided by federal reading rooms by providing read-only access to OCA 
information for facilities located in the LEPC's jurisdiction and 
facilities with vulnerable zones that extend into that jurisdiction. 
However, as discussed more fully below, we received comments that many 
LEPCs and SERCs would be unwilling and/or unable to provide such 
access.
    In passing CSISSFRRA, Congress emphasized that members of the 
public should have access to OCA information, particularly for 
facilities in their local communities (see 145 Cong. Rec. S7545, daily 
ed. June 23, 1999 (statement of Sen. Chafee)). We agree that every 
member of the public should be able to access OCA information for 
facilities in the communities where he or she lives or works without 
making multiple trips to a federal reading room. We have thus decided 
to require federal reading rooms to provide any person with access to 
OCA information that the LEPC in whose jurisdiction the person lives or 
works is authorized to provide (i.e., access to OCA information for 
facilities located in the jurisdiction of the LEPC and facilities with 
a vulnerable zone that extends into that jurisdiction). That access 
will be in addition to access to OCA information for up to 10 
facilities located anywhere in the country, without geographical 
restriction. With reading room access to OCA information for local 
facilities assured, access to OCA information for 10 facilities located 
anywhere will allow members of the public to compare facilities in 
their community with similar facilities located elsewhere and to learn 
about facilities in communities where they might move or where 
relatives or friends live or work.
    In providing federal reading room access to OCA information for a 
person's local facilities, we do not want to discourage LEPCs, SERCs, 
and others from providing local access to the same. Obviously, it will 
be more convenient for a member of the public to access information 
locally than at a federal reading room that may be located many miles 
away. Also, we want to encourage dialogue between members of the public 
and their local officials responsible for chemical emergency planning 
and response. By making local OCA information available locally, LEPCs,

[[Page 48119]]

SERCs, and other state and local agencies can encourage the public to 
become involved in chemical risk reduction efforts. As more fully 
discussed in the next section of this notice, we are committed to 
helping LEPCs, SERCs, and others provide that local access.
3. Operation of Reading Rooms
    Some commentors suggested that federal reading rooms be open at 
nights and on weekends. We understand that some members of the public 
may find it difficult to reach reading rooms during the normal work 
week. However, due to cost, personnel, and security concerns, reading 
rooms will be located in federal buildings, which are typically open 
only during normal business hours. We will explore the extent to which 
reading rooms can also be open at other hours to accommodate members of 
the public.
    As urged by several commentors, we have endeavored to develop a 
cost-effective and secure means of operating federal reading rooms. At 
some reading rooms, access will be available on a walk-in basis because 
the OCA data will be maintained at the reading room. At other reading 
rooms, however, the OCA data will not be maintained on-site, and 
therefore a person wishing to view OCA data at those reading rooms will 
need to contact a central office at a toll-free number at least three 
days prior to the date on which the person would like to view the OCA 
information at the reading room. During the toll-free call, the 
requestor will be asked to provide his or her name, telephone number, 
and the names of the facilities for which he or she is requesting OCA 
information. That information will enable the central office to 
schedule an appointment for the requestor at a reading room, relay the 
requested copies of OCA information to that reading room, and, if 
necessary, contact the requestor. That information will not be retained 
beyond the requestor's appointment date.
    As discussed below, at the reading room, the requestor will need to 
display photo identification issued by a federal, state, or local 
government agency, sign a sign-in sheet, and certify that the requestor 
has not received access to OCA information for more than 10 facilities 
during that calendar month. The requestor will then receive access to 
the requested OCA information. Requestors will be limited to access to 
paper copies of OCA information for a total of 10 facilities during a 
calendar month, regardless of how many reading rooms they visit during 
a single month.
    As discussed above, any person will also receive access at a 
federal reading room to OCA information that the LEPC in whose 
jurisdiction the person lives or works is authorized to provide (i.e., 
access to OCA information for facilities located in the jurisdiction of 
the LEPC and facilities with a vulnerable zone that extends into that 
jurisdiction). Persons seeking such access will also be asked to sign 
in and to provide proof demonstrating that he or she lives or works in 
the LEPC jurisdiction for which the OCA information has been requested. 
They will not, however, be required to sign a certification.
4. The Number of Reading Rooms
    We received a range of comments on the appropriate number of 
reading rooms. Several commentors suggested that fewer reading rooms 
would be adequate and appropriate while many commentors expressed 
concern that 50 reading rooms would not provide reasonable public 
access due to issues such as time and travel costs, especially in large 
states and for low income groups.
    We are committed to providing reasonable access to OCA information. 
We intend to establish reading rooms in virtually every state, the 
District of Columbia, and outlying territories having RMP facilities. 
In addition, we will work to set up additional reading rooms in states 
that have a significant number of RMP facilities, such as California 
and Texas. While we anticipate establishing more than 50 reading rooms, 
we have not increased the number of rooms required by the rule because 
the need for additional rooms may be affected by the extent to which 
state or local government agencies provide access under the enhanced 
access provisions of the rule. Moreover, as we implement the reading 
room provision and learn more about the demand for reading rooms in 
different parts of the country, it may become appropriate to relocate 
reading rooms.
5. The Location of Reading Rooms
    As for the specific locations of the federal reading rooms, a 
number of commentors suggested a number of factors to consider in 
determining locations. We agree with those suggestions and have decided 
to use the following criteria in making our decisions: equitable 
distribution across the United States and its territories; the density 
of the population surrounding the location; the availability of public 
transportation to the location; the ability to provide security at the 
location; and the availability of federal offices that could readily 
implement the reading room requirement at reasonable cost. Federal 
offices, it should also be noted, are handicapped accessible. The 
location of federal reading rooms will be posted on EPA's and DOJ's 
websites when they are determined.
6. Security Measures at Reading Rooms
    We proposed that a reading room representative be required to view 
a government document identifying that individual before granting that 
individual access to OCA information. Some commentors stated that that 
requirement would have a chilling effect on the public's use of reading 
rooms because some people may be reluctant to show identification to 
the government. Other commentors urged that we require photo 
identification to ensure that the person presenting the identification 
is in fact the person to whom the identification was issued.
    We recognize that some individuals may be reluctant to show 
identification to a government official. However, the personal 
identification requirement is a reasonable means of accomplishing the 
statutory requirement that individuals have access to ``a limited 
number'' of paper copies of OCA information. Further, as noted in the 
risk assessment, EPA and DOJ believe that the identification 
requirement will also decrease the likelihood that OCA information 
would be obtained by individuals seeking it for criminal purposes 
because such individuals prefer to conceal their activities. With 
respect to the type of identification, EPA and DOJ agree that photo 
identification issued by a local, state, or federal government agency 
(e.g., a driver's license or passport) should be required. That 
requirement will significantly reduce the risk that someone will 
attempt to use identification not his or her own.
    One commentor suggested that there should be some type of 
identification validation system to ensure the accuracy of an 
individual's identification document. EPA and DOJ have concluded that 
it would be too costly to create an independent identification 
validation mechanism. The responsibility for checking individuals' 
identification documents will be left to those operating the federal 
reading rooms. EPA and DOJ do not consider that to be a significant 
problem, since the majority of locations at which the reading rooms 
will be located are federal agencies that have security staff that 
already visually check the identification of all persons seeking entry 
to the federal facility or other areas of limited access. Individuals 
using the federal reading rooms will have their identification checked 
in the same manner as would any member of

[[Page 48120]]

the public seeking entry into federal buildings.
    As discussed above, the final rule will require federal reading 
rooms to provide any member of the public with access to the OCA 
information that the LEPC where the person lives or works would be able 
to provide to them. To implement that provision, it will be necessary 
for reading rooms to check identification and documentation to ensure 
that a requestor receives access only to the local OCA information to 
which he or she is entitled (i.e., OCA information for stationary 
sources located within the jurisdiction of the LEPC in which the 
individual lives or works and for any other stationary sources that 
have a vulnerable zone that extends into that LEPC's jurisdiction). We 
will create guidelines for federal reading room personnel regarding 
such procedures.
    In the NPRM we described procedures by which reading rooms would 
determine whether a requestor had exceeded the 10 per month allotment. 
We anticipated that reading rooms would keep daily sign-in sheets to 
record the name of any person who received access to OCA information 
and the name and number of facilities to which that person had received 
access. Whenever someone requested access to OCA information, reading 
room personnel would review the sign-in sheets for that day and the 
previous days during the month to determine how many, if any, 
facilities' OCA information that person had already received that 
month. We noted that sign-in sheets would be protected under the 
Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) and would be retained for three years.
    We received several comments on the record keeping aspect of the 
proposed rule. Several commentors expressed concern that the use of 
sign-in sheets would raise privacy concerns, and one commentor 
expressed a related concern that the proposed rule was silent as to how 
the federal government would use the information. Other commentors 
agreed with the identification requirement and the concept of keeping 
some type of record, but recommended that the final rule require record 
keeping and a corresponding check on people using a reading room in 
order to ensure that they have not had access to OCA information for 
more than 10 facilities per month. Two commentors suggested that EPA 
and DOJ establish a national database as a means of enforcing the 10 
paper copy per month limit.
    We recognize that privacy concerns are raised whenever the 
government collects information about individuals. We also are mindful 
of the need, identified by the risk assessment and required by 
CSISSFRRA, to limit the number of facilities for which individuals can 
access OCA information in paper form. We thus have endeavored to design 
a system that will effectively implement the limitation but minimize 
the need for keeping records on individuals' access to OCA information.
    Specifically, we will use the sign-in sheet system discussed in the 
NPRM (65 FR 24853 (April 27, 2000)), and keep the sign-in sheets in a 
manner that will minimize privacy concerns and that will not entail the 
creation of a system of records under the Privacy Act. The Privacy Act 
applies to records retrieved by name within systems of records. Federal 
reading rooms will not create an elaborate tracking system; they will 
not index or otherwise manipulate the sign-in sheets according to 
individuals' names. Instead, a reading room representative will 
visually inspect the sign-in sheet(s), which will be organized 
chronologically, for the month in which an individual seeks access to 
paper copies to see if that individual's name appears on the sign-in 
sheet(s) for dates earlier in the month and, if so, if that individual 
has already received OCA information for the allotted 10 facilities 
without geographical restriction.
    We believe that the sign-in system will help deter individuals from 
seeking improperly to obtain OCA information exceeding the 10 
facilities per month national limit. To further deter individuals from 
attempting to exceed their allotment by visiting more than one federal 
reading room in a month, reading room personnel will be instructed to 
provide access to OCA information only to individuals who have signed a 
certification that they have not exceeded their allotment. The 
certification will inform members of the public that they may be 
subject to criminal penalties under federal law for falsely certifying 
that they have not received OCA information for more than 10 facilities 
that month.
    It should also be noted that the information recorded on sign-in 
sheets may be used by law enforcement in the event of a duly authorized 
investigation of a violation of civil or criminal law. For that reason, 
the reading rooms will retain the sign-in sheets for three years. In 
the event that the sign-in sheets are compiled into a system retrieved 
by name for purposes of such an investigation, they will be subject to 
the Privacy Act and will be handled accordingly. Federal law 
enforcement agencies have already established Privacy Act systems 
applicable to their indexed investigative records, and if the 
information from sign-in sheets were so compiled, it would receive 
those protections.
    The reading room records will not be used beyond the purposes 
outlined above (i.e., to ensure compliance with the 10 facility per 
month limit and to carry out authorized law enforcement 
investigations).
    In deciding to adopt the sign-in certification approach, EPA and 
DOJ have decided not to institute a national database for enforcing the 
10 facility per month limit, as some commentors recommended. We 
anticipate sign-in sheets with certifications should provide adequate 
assurance that the monthly limit on OCA information is not exceeded. 
However, after gaining experience with the federal reading rooms, we 
will evaluate whether the sign-in sheet system is in fact effective. 
For that purpose, we will review a sample of sign-in sheets for several 
reading rooms to determine if the existing system is adequately 
enforcing the limit. Based on that review, DOJ, EPA, and OMB will 
consider whether a national database or other tracking system should be 
instituted to enforce the limit.
    One commentor asserted that the establishment of such records would 
violate the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 because it would not 
provide the government with information that has practical utility. 
That assertion is not correct. As discussed above, the information 
collected would have practical utility, namely to ensure that the 
statutory and regulatory limit on access to OCA information in paper 
form is properly applied.
7. Alternatives to Reading Rooms
    We expressly asked for comments on whether, as an alternative to 
reading room access to information, paper copies should be released to 
the public upon request. Some commentors stated that there should be an 
alternative system of direct delivery of OCA paper copies to interested 
parties. They asserted that the proposed federal reading room system 
would be insufficient to provide OCA paper copy access to all 
interested citizens. In addition, they indicated that, because only a 
limited number of federal reading rooms would be established, some 
citizens would find it inconvenient to travel the distances necessary 
to access the information.
    Other commentors opposed off-site distribution of paper copies or 
allowing individuals to take away paper copies from reading rooms. Some 
noted that such a system would pose a significant security risk because 
it would increase the risk of OCA information being

[[Page 48121]]

disseminated widely, thus violating the intent of CSISSFRRA. Some 
emphasized that paper copies, once outside the control of the 
government, could easily be scanned into an Internet database and that 
such a system would provide potential terrorists with the type of 
Internet access to OCA information that the proposed rule was designed 
to prevent. Further, in noting that potential terrorists may forgo 
attempts to gain access to OCA information if they must do so in person 
and submit to an identification check, some commentors stated that the 
mail delivery alternative would lessen the deterrence benefit of on-
site access.
    We have considered the alternatives of mail delivery of OCA 
information to interested citizens and the distribution of take-away 
copies, and have determined that both would present an unacceptable 
security risk. With respect to mail delivery upon request, any 
safeguards, such as a requirement of proof of residence at the delivery 
location, could easily be circumvented by an individual or group 
establishing a ``phantom residence.'' We also agree with the commentors 
who noted that requiring persons to go to a federal reading room and 
provide identification would provide some deterrence to those potential 
terrorists who might wish to keep their interest in the information 
hidden. We further agree that, once paper copies have left the federal 
reading rooms, they can easily be scanned onto the Internet where they 
could be viewed anonymously by those with criminal intent. Anonymous 
access to significant amounts of OCA information is precisely what this 
rule is designed to prevent. As a result, the final rule will use 
reading rooms to provide access to paper copies because reading rooms 
allow for that access to occur within a controlled setting.

E. Enhanced Local Access to OCA Information

    Commentors generally supported the proposed rule's provisions for 
enhanced local access as a promising means of facilitating the public's 
access to OCA information and public-private dialogue about chemical 
safety in their communities. Many of those commentors, however, also 
pointed out a number of obstacles to making enhanced local access a 
reality and suggested ways of overcoming those obstacles.
    A key element of the proposal for enhanced local access was 
clarification that state and local government officials (as well as 
federal officials) may communicate to the public the substance of OCA 
information (i.e., the OCA data elements reported in RMPs), even though 
they may not disseminate the official forms in which the data is 
reported and compiled (i.e., the OCA portions of RMPs and EPA's OCA 
database). While developing the proposed rule, we learned that many 
state and local officials were concerned that CSISSFRRA may preclude 
them from communicating OCA data in any form. As we explained in the 
proposal, the ``scope'' section of ``CSISSFRRA'' (CAA section 
112(r)(7)(H)(xii)(II)) expressly provides that the statute ``does not 
restrict the dissemination of [OCA] information by any covered person 
[defined by CSISSFRRA as government officials and qualified 
researchers] in any manner or form except in the form of a risk 
management plan or an electronic data base created by the Administrator 
from [OCA] information.'' In other words, while covered persons may not 
disseminate the OCA portions of RMPs or any EPA database created from 
those portions, they may discuss or otherwise communicate the data 
reported in those portions. We thus proposed capturing that important 
point in the proposed regulations.
    We received comments supporting and questioning the proposed 
clarification. Several commentors from LEPCs and SERCs indicated the 
clarification was helpful but sought further guidance on how OCA data 
could be lawfully disseminated. Other commentors were concerned that 
the clarification was not consistent with the law, and that 
communication of OCA data was risky because it is dissemination of the 
information's content, not its format, that they believed poses the 
risk. Another commentor expressed concern that the clarification could 
be interpreted to allow dissemination of the restricted portions of 
RMPs with only minor changes in format, which would undermine the 
protections of CSISSFRRA.
    After revisiting CSISSFRRA and its legislative history, we have 
concluded that the proposed rule's clarification not only is consistent 
with the law but virtually mirrors it. As noted above, CSISSFRRA itself 
provides that it does not restrict the dissemination of OCA information 
in any manner or form except in two specified forms--the OCA portions 
of an RMP and any EPA database created from those portions. RMPs, 
including the sections containing OCA data, are designed to make 
information contained therein easy to compile into an electronic 
database, which would be capable of Internet posting. The legislative 
history confirms that Congress intended to make clear that government 
officials could communicate the substance of OCA information if not the 
restricted forms of that information--in order to allow the type of 
public dialogue that is important to chemical emergency prevention, 
planning, and response. As one House member explained, CSISSFRRA was 
passed to address the risk posed by Internet posting of a large OCA 
database, not to prevent public officials from sharing OCA data for 
individual plants with their communities. (See 145 Cong. Rec. H6083, 
daily ed. July 21, 1999 (statement of Rep. Dingell)).
    We share the concern voiced by one commentor that the protections 
provided by CSISSFRRA would be undone if minor changes in the format of 
OCA information were sufficient to allow a government official to 
disseminate lawfully the OCA portions of RMPs or EPA's OCA database. We 
believe CSISSFRRA's scope provision must be interpreted in a common 
sense manner that achieves Congress' intent both to protect OCA 
information from Internet dissemination and to allow government 
officials to discuss risk. As noted above, Congress' concern with the 
OCA portions of RMPs arose from the fact that they are easy to compile 
into an electronic database. Minor changes in format most likely would 
not change that problematic characteristic. We have thus removed the 
word ``replicate'' from the relevant provision of the final rule in 
order to avoid the implication that minor changes in the format of OCA 
information would be sufficient to permit their release. That change is 
consistent with the point made by the House member cited above who 
stated that OCA information may be used ``in any other format that 
avoids compilation of a national database.'' Under that view, for 
example, discussion of OCA data at a public meeting would be 
appropriate because it would not be a form of communication amenable to 
the creation of such a database.
    Several LEPCs asked us to further clarify how they may communicate 
the substance of OCA information (referred to as ``OCA data elements'' 
in the rule). We appreciate their concerns and plan to provide 
additional guidance in the future. Because it is impossible to foresee 
all the ways in which government officials may wish to communicate OCA 
data elements, we believe it would be most efficient and productive to 
work with representatives of LEPCs, SERCs, and other relevant 
government agencies in reviewing possible means of communication and 
responding to inquiries about the same.

[[Page 48122]]

    Many commentors expressed doubt that the enhanced local access 
provisions would work as proposed. They noted that, because many LEPCs 
are inactive or have limited funding, few LEPCs would be willing or 
able to afford to provide secure OCA read-only access. Relatedly, a 
national organization of fire department officials expressed strong 
opposition to the proposed specification of fire departments as 
institutions that could volunteer to provide the public with local OCA 
information. One commentor suggested we authorize not only LEPCs and 
fire departments but also other local government agencies involved in 
chemical emergency planning, prevention, or response, such as police 
and planning departments. Local governments would then have several 
options for providing the public with read-only access.
    We recognize that a large number of LEPCs are currently inactive, 
but EPCRA survey data indicate that most heavily populated industrial 
areas have active LEPCs. Those LEPCs are providing EPCRA information 
(chemical inventory data and contingency plans, some of which include 
possible consequences of hypothetical accidents) to the public. 
Although the final rule does not require LEPCs to disseminate OCA 
information, we expect that those with active EPCRA public information 
programs could easily provide enhanced local access to OCA information.
    Since some areas of the country do not have active LEPCs, we have 
decided to expand the types of entities that are authorized to provide 
read-only access, as suggested by a commentor. The final rule provides 
that LEPCs and any other ``related local government agency'' may 
provide the public with read-only access to OCA information for 
facilities in the LEPC's jurisdiction and any other facilities with a 
vulnerable zone that extends into that LEPC's jurisdiction. Related 
local government agencies include fire, police, and planning 
departments and any other local government agency involved in chemical 
emergency planning, prevention, or response.
    One commentor asked whether state agencies that take delegation of 
the CAA 112(r) program would be authorized to provide read-only access. 
The final rule expands the types of state entities that may provide 
read-only access to OCA information. Along with SERCs, any ``related 
state government agency'' (e.g., emergency management, environmental 
protection, and natural resources departments involved in chemical 
emergency planning, prevention, or response) would be authorized to 
provide a person with access to OCA information that the LEPC in whose 
jurisdiction that person lives or works could provide. Thus, a state 
agency that takes responsibility for implementing the RMP program under 
CAA section 112(r) may provide that access. It is also worth noting 
that the final rule does not prescribe the locations where read-only 
access to OCA information may be provided by LEPCs, SERCs, and state 
and local government agencies. They may provide access at any facility 
they choose, including municipal buildings and courthouses.
    As described earlier, to further address concerns that enhanced 
local access may not become a reality in every part of the country, we 
have also decided to require federal reading rooms to provide any 
member of the public with access to OCA information that the LEPC in 
whose jurisdiction the person lives or work would be authorized to 
provide. By expanding the number of state and local entities that may 
provide enhanced access and the scope of access to OCA information that 
federal reading rooms are required to provide, we believe the final 
rule will provide reasonable access to OCA information for all members 
of the public.
    Several commentors recommended that the federal government provide 
LEPCs and SERCs with the resources necessary to provide local access, 
including a binder containing all of the OCA information that a 
particular LEPC would be authorized to show the public. A commentor 
also requested model procedures for operating a local OCA reading room. 
Further, a few commentors suggested that, in those communities with RMP 
reporting facilities that do not have LEPCs, EPA work with the local 
governments to establish them. We agree that federal assistance and 
guidance are warranted. As explained below, we intend to supply the 
binders suggested by one of the commentors to LEPCs, SERCs, and related 
local and state agencies that decide to provide enhanced local access. 
Providing that and other support to local access efforts will become an 
important component of the EPA's chemical accident prevention program.
    Additional commentors stated that most LEPCs and SERCs would be 
unable to determine whether a facility outside their jurisdiction has a 
vulnerable zone that would affect their area. One commentor suggested 
that the final rule should simply authorize LEPCs to distribute the OCA 
for any facility within 25 miles of their local boundaries. We are not 
changing our approach in today's final rule. As noted above, we intend 
to provide any LEPC or related local agency willing to provide local 
access with a binder that contains the OCA information it is authorized 
to show the public. We will also work with SERCs and related state 
agencies to provide them with a similar resource (depending on the 
number of facilities in a state, binders may be too cumbersome, so 
there may be a need to explore other means of providing the 
information). Moreover, contiguous LEPCs can, and often do, work 
together to determine which RMP facilities have vulnerable zones that 
affect their areas. LEPCs, SERCs and other emergency planning 
organizations have historically engaged in joint planning activities to 
better prepare for emergencies. We are thus confident that the rule's 
provision allowing local or state agencies to share OCA information 
with adjoining jurisdictions can be implemented in a manner that would 
assist LEPCs and SERCs to determine which facilities outside their 
jurisdictions have vulnerable zones that extend into their 
jurisdiction.
    Two SERCs and one LEPC commented that the proposal to authorize 
SERCs to provide individuals with OCA information on the basis of that 
individual's residence or workplace was too burdensome. They questioned 
whether SERCs would be able to verify the requestor's place of 
residence or workplace. We understand that SERCs and related state 
agencies will have to request and review proof of residence and/or 
workplace. Federal reading rooms will have to do the same for any 
person requesting OCA information on those bases. We believe that that 
requirement is necessary, however. SERCs have much broader 
jurisdictions than do the vast majority of LEPCs. Thus, the number of 
facilities within their jurisdictions is typically much greater. If 
SERCs were allowed to share OCA information for all the facilities in 
their jurisdictions with any member of the public, the risk of persons 
using SERCs to amass OCA information would be significant. To avoid 
that risk, we must limit the amount of OCA information a SERC or 
related state agency can share. We appreciate the extra work that that 
may involve, but believe it would be manageable. A driver's license or 
other identification can establish someone's home address while a pay 
stub can establish a work address. As we address the same issue in 
federal reading rooms, we will share our ideas and experiences with the 
states.
    One commentor also questioned our authority to limit the release of 
OCA information to individuals on the basis of their residence or 
workplace. The

[[Page 48123]]

commentor claimed that there is no statutory authority for such a 
limitation. In fact, the local enhanced access provision is being 
implemented under CAA section 112(r)(7)(H)(ii)(II)(bb), which 
authorizes the regulation to allow public access to OCA information 
``as appropriate.'' In light of the previously discussed concerns that 
would arise were SERCs allowed to provide OCA information for the 
entire state, we believe that it is appropriate to adopt the residence 
and workplace limitation for local agency dissemination of OCA 
information.
    Several commentors from LEPCs and SERCs expressed great reservation 
about the potential criminal liability associated with the improper 
disclosure of OCA information. Some stated that, because of those 
concerns, they have not requested the OCA information that they are 
entitled to obtain and are authorized to show the public. The final 
rule is intended to address those concerns. It makes clear that state 
and local (as well as federal) officials may communicate OCA data 
elements to the public in a form other than the OCA sections of RMPs 
and EPA's OCA database. It also authorizes LEPCs, SERCs, and related 
local and state agencies to show the OCA sections of RMPs to members of 
the public in accordance with specified geographical limitations. In a 
subsequent section of this preamble, we discuss what OCA information 
state and local officials may share with one another. Moreover, as we 
noted earlier, government officials may be held criminally liable for 
unlawfully disseminating OCA information only if they ``willfully'' 
violate CSISSFRRA (i.e., by distributing OCA information with the 
knowledge that they are doing so unlawfully).
    One commentor asserted that only local persons who live or work 
within the vulnerable zone of a facility should have access to local 
reading rooms. Several commentors also recommended that local reading 
room staff be required to implement the same security procedures that 
federal reading rooms will follow--asking users for photo 
identification and recording information about their access to OCA 
information. That, the commentors argued, would close a loophole in the 
proposal that would allow persons to obtain OCA information without 
being tracked. We understand that asking local providers of OCA 
information to follow security procedures would further reduce the 
risks identified by the risk assessment. However, we did not propose 
those security procedures at the local level because of the burden that 
that would create and the effect that that burden might have on the 
ability and willingness of local entities to provide OCA information 
access. We also took into account the fact that the vast majority of 
LEPCs have a relatively small number of RMP facilities located in, or 
affecting, their jurisdiction. We thus concluded that any risk posed by 
local read-only access without additional security procedures was 
small. The comments we received from LEPCs, SERCs, and others confirm 
our concerns about requiring local agencies to follow the type of 
security procedures that federal reading rooms will follow. Indeed, the 
comments indicate that local agencies will find it a challenge to 
provide local access, even with the help we intend to provide. We have 
thus decided not to impose any further requirements on local agencies 
willing to provide read-only access to local OCA information.
    We also do not agree that local access should be restricted to 
local residents. First, implementing such a restriction would require 
local agencies to institute much, if not all, of the security 
procedures that we have decided would be too burdensome. Second, 
members of the public who do not live or work in a community may 
nevertheless have a legitimate interest in obtaining OCA information 
for that community. For example, a requestor may have relatives who 
live in the community, or may be considering purchasing a home or 
working in the area.
    Lastly, several commentors recommended that LEPCs be authorized to 
provide take-away paper copies of local OCA information. Several others 
recommended against permitting LEPCs to do so. We have concluded that 
if users were permitted to obtain paper copies of OCA information LEPC-
by-LEPC, it would not be long before a large collection would be 
accumulated and possibly posted on the Internet. For that reason, the 
final rule retains the proposed prohibition on LEPC and SERC 
dissemination of take-away paper copies of local OCA information.

F. Risk Indicator System (Vulnerable Zone Indicator System)

    Many of the comments on the proposed risk indicator system were 
positive, stating that the system would provide useful information that 
would encourage the general public to become more active in addressing 
chemical safety concerns in their communities. At the same time, those 
and other commentors raised various concerns with the system and made 
suggestions for improving it. A few commentors considered the system so 
troublesome that they urged us to abandon it altogether.
    Several commentors thought the proposed indicator system might 
frighten recipients of the information and had the potential for 
depressing property values. They noted that the system would 
communicate information based on worst-case release scenarios that are 
highly unlikely and that the information provided would necessarily be 
imprecise given the nature of RMP data. Based on those concerns, some 
commentors urged us not to implement the system, or to convert the 
system so that it would identify the RMP facilities near a particular 
address, but would not indicate whether facilities' vulnerable zones 
extend to that address. Other commentors recommended that we avoid 
potential misunderstandings by including in the system caveats 
explaining the nature and limitations of the vulnerable zone 
derivations.
    We continue to believe that an indicator system can help spark the 
public's awareness of chemical risks in its community and interest in 
working with government and industry to reduce them. Members of the 
public can already use RMP*Info to locate nearby facilities by asking 
the system to search for facilities by zip code or county. We proposed 
an indicator system to allow members of the public to determine if 
their homes, schools, or other places of interest might be affected by 
a worst-case or alternative scenario release from a facility. The 
benefits assessment found that the public is more apt to use such 
interpreted data, and we thus developed the indicator system as a way 
of providing the public with information that communicates risk without 
disseminating OCA information itself. At the same time, we agree that 
it is important that users of the indicator system understand the 
nature and limitations of the information thereby provided. We will 
therefore design the system to include sufficient explanatory 
information so that users will not become unduly alarmed if the system 
reports that their address might be in a vulnerable zone. The system 
will display a notice explaining that it is designed to perform the 
limited function of helping users quickly determine whether the off-
site consequences of any facility's worst-case or alternative release 
scenarios might affect a particular address. It will also explain the 
limitations of the data used to calculate the vulnerable zones.
    Relatedly, several commentors thought the proposed name, ``Risk 
Indicator System,'' was inaccurate because it would not provide an 
indication of ``risk,'' understood to be

[[Page 48124]]

the probability of an event multiplied by the consequences of that 
event. Those commentors suggested changing the name of the indicator 
system to ``Hazard Indicator System'' or ``Vulnerable Zone Indicator.'' 
We agree with those comments, and have decided in the final rule to 
change the name of the system to ``Vulnerable Zone Indicator System'' 
(VZIS). That name more accurately reflects the limited purpose and 
capabilities of the system.
    Several commentors expressed concern that the proposed indicator 
system could be used to determine distance to endpoints and thus would 
provide useful targeting information. We do not agree. The indicator 
system will consist of very limited query and response software located 
in RMP*Info. The information provided by the system will be whether an 
address might be within a vulnerable zone. There will be no indication 
whether the address is at or near the outer boundary of a vulnerable 
zone. Nor will the system provide the name or location of the facility 
that is the origin of the vulnerable zone. Thus, no one would be able 
to determine from the indicator system the distance to endpoints 
reported as part of OCA information.
    A number of commentors asserted that the proposed indicator system 
should be deployed only if it identifies the facility that is the 
origin of the vulnerable zone and/or the chemical involved in the 
hypothetical release defining the zone. They were concerned that, 
without that information, the system would alarm users without 
providing them with the information necessary to address their 
concerns. A number of other commentors recommended strongly against 
identifying facilities, arguing that to do so would compromise the 
security achieved by the rule's restrictions on access to OCA 
information. Some commentors suggested that the indicator system 
instruct users on how to obtain facility identities; one recommended 
including instructions on how to contact the facility or facilities 
directly.
    We recognize that system users who learn that their address might 
be within a vulnerable zone would likely want to learn more about the 
hazards they may face. Indeed, we hope that that would be their 
reaction. However, we remain concerned that the indicator system would 
pose security concerns if the public could immediately obtain, on an 
anonymous basis, the name of the facility and chemical involved. 
Instead, we intend that the system furnish instructions on how to 
obtain the names of facilities in whose vulnerable zones they live or 
work.
    Several commentors stated that the indicator system should not 
direct recipients of the indicator system data to LEPCs or SERCs for 
further information unless those agencies have agreed to provide access 
to such information. We agree in part with those commentors. We believe 
that chemical safety is most effectively addressed at the local level. 
SERCs, LEPCs, and other state and local entities are generally in 
closer contact than is EPA with local facilities and communities that 
would be affected by releases. For more than a decade, EPA has 
endeavored to work cooperatively with local agencies so that they can 
realize their potential to help prevent and respond to accidental 
releases. We therefore believe that SERCs, LEPCs, and other local 
entities can and should be encouraged to assume an important role in 
communicating OCA information to members of the public. While we do not 
intend for the indicator system to direct users specifically to SERCs 
and LEPCs, the indicator system will inform users of the several ways, 
including through their SERCs and LEPCs, through which they can obtain 
additional information about the facilities whose vulnerable zones 
might affect an address of interest. We have thus revised the last 
sentence in proposed Sec. 1400.4(a) accordingly.
    While we cannot at this time name all potential sources of 
information, at least facility names, locations, and vulnerable zones 
will be available at all federal reading rooms and all SERCs, LEPCs, or 
other state and local agencies that opt to provide local access to OCA 
information. The indicator system will note specifically state and 
local entities that do not seek and/or provide that information. The 
system will also advise users that, once they know the name of a 
facility, they can turn to RMP*Info to learn more about the facility's 
chemical accident history and the steps the facility is taking to 
prevent such accidents. Individuals may also contact a facility 
directly to request access to OCA information. The system will also 
inform users that they can obtain not only OCA information but further 
information on risk through contacting a SERC, LEPC, or other state or 
local ``covered person.'' Federal, state, and local government 
officials are authorized and encouraged in the proposed rule to provide 
reading-room access to OCA information, and are permitted to convey and 
discuss the substance of OCA information, as long as they do so in a 
manner that does not disseminate the OCA sections of the RMPs or EPA's 
OCA database.
    Several commentors also expressed concern about whether the 
indicator system would be easy for local covered persons to operate. 
EPA intends to provide an enhanced version of the RMP*Review software 
to those federal, state, and local covered persons providing local 
access so that they can easily identify the facilities whose vulnerable 
zones extend to a particular address, and provide that facility 
identification information to individuals who request it.
    Some commentors worried that the indicator system would ``rate'' 
facilities for potential risk. Nothing in the proposed rule required 
the indicator system to include rating information, and no such 
requirement has been added to the final rule. The risk a facility poses 
is a function of many factors, at least some of which are site-
specific. No computer system could adequately account for all relevant 
factors. As discussed below, we intend to maintain a website of 
chemical safety-related information that will assist the public in 
assessing hazards posed by facilities and measures that can reduce 
those hazards. In addition, RMP*Info already allows the public to learn 
about facilities' prevention and response programs.

G. Internet-Accessible OCA Information

    As explained in detail in the NPRM, the risk assessment segregated 
the OCA information that would be helpful to terrorists or other 
criminals into three categories. The first category of OCA information 
provided a general account of the consequences of a chemical release in 
terms of the damage that might be inflicted on the community. It was 
composed of the distance to endpoint, the residential population within 
the distance to endpoint, the public receptors, the environmental 
receptors, and the map or graphic of the worst-case or alternative 
release scenario. The second category of information consisted of OCA 
information that provided a rough sketch of what is involved in 
triggering a release from an RMP facility. Included in this category 
were the name of the chemical involved in the worst-case or alternative 
release scenario; the projected quantity of chemical released; the 
release rate; the duration of the release; and the scenario that 
results in the release. The third category of information consisted of 
OCA information on passive and active mitigation measures.
    The risk assessment concluded that Internet access to categories 
one and two of OCA information posed the greatest risk of being used in 
relation to an attempted industrial chemical release. However, there 
were certain

[[Page 48125]]

items of OCA information within category two that posed less risk 
because they were fixed values that were widely known. Thus, the 
proposed rule would have posted on the Internet the OCA information in 
category three and parts of the information in category two, but 
withheld the remaining information in category two and all of category 
one.
    We solicited public comment on whether any additional items of OCA 
information should be placed on the Internet or whether any items of 
OCA information that we have proposed posting should not be. The 
comments we received were divided. Some commentors asserted that the 
risk assessment's findings in regard to the dangers of posting category 
2 information should be heeded and that no category 2 information 
should be placed on the Internet. Others argued that category 3 
information should not be posted because the risk assessment found that 
it would be helpful to terrorists (although the assessment found that 
it would be much less so than would category 1 or 2 information). Still 
others argued that no OCA information, especially the passive and 
active mitigation system information in category 3, should be placed on 
the Internet.
    Other commentors maintained that the OCA information that we 
proposed posting would be meaningless unless viewed in the context of 
the rest of the OCA information. Several commentors similarly argued 
that all OCA information should be placed on the Internet without 
restriction. Still another commentor believed that at least the 
chemical name should be included in the information posted.
    We have considered those comments and still believe that the public 
will benefit from posting the items of OCA information that we 
proposed. Such information can be used for purposes of comparing 
various risk reduction characteristics of RMP facilities. Further, 
posting it would not create an unacceptable security risk. While some 
commentors have expressed concern about the release of information 
about active and passive mitigation measures, similar RMP information 
has already been released on the Internet and the release of that 
information was found by the risk assessment to pose the least degree 
of risk. Furthermore, such information is precisely the type of 
information that could be used by the public to further its dialogue 
with industry.
    In regard to the comments that all OCA information be placed on the 
Internet, the risk assessment found that wholesale release of OCA 
information in that manner would unacceptably heighten the risk of 
intentional releases. Similarly, we disagree with the comment 
concerning the names of chemicals. While we recognize that there would 
be public benefit resulting from the posting of that information, we 
find that the risk that it could be used in concert with other OCA 
information for illicit purposes is too great to permit it to be 
posted. As one commentor noted, while an individual item of OCA 
information may not appear to pose a significant risk standing alone, 
its release could raise ``mosaic'' concerns: some items of OCA 
information may not raise significant security concerns considered 
individually but pose greater concerns when assembled with other items 
of OCA information. For example, some items of OCA information in 
category 2 can be used to calculate items of information that are in 
category 1. We believe that while the items of OCA information that we 
proposed posting will not pose mosaic problems, others would. Thus, 
only the items of OCA information that were proposed to be posted will 
be placed on the Internet.

H. Access to OCA Information by Government Officials

    The proposed rule called for codifying CSISSFRRA's provisions 
regarding access to OCA information by state and local governmental 
officials for ``official use.'' We received comments raising questions 
and concerns about various aspects of the proposed codification.
    One commentor criticized the proposed definition of ``official 
use,'' claiming that it would exclude the use of OCA information for 
purposes of enforcing the RMP rule or other legal requirements. We 
disagree. The proposed definition of ``official use'' is substantively 
identical to the statutory definition of that term. Consequently, to 
the extent that definition limits the use of OCA information, we have 
no discretion to change that result. However, we believe that the 
statutory and regulatory definition of ``official use'' does permit the 
use of OCA information in enforcement actions against facilities. 
``Official use'' is defined as ``an action of a federal, state, or 
local government agency or an entity [such as LEPC, SERC or volunteer 
fire or police department] intended to carry out a function relevant to 
preventing, planning for, or responding to accidental releases.'' 
(Final rule, Sec. 1400.2(h)). Determining compliance with, and 
enforcing the terms of, the RMP rule is surely carrying out a function 
relevant to preventing, planning for, or responding to accidental 
releases. The same can be said about determining compliance with, and 
enforcing, EPCRA and other legal requirements related to chemical 
accident prevention, planning, and response.
    Several commentors raised concerns about the proposed restrictions 
on state and local officials' dissemination of OCA information to their 
counterparts in other states. One commentor considered the restrictions 
arbitrary and claimed they would interfere with useful communications 
among states. Another commentor urged us to avoid hindering OCA 
information sharing between fire and emergency service personnel from 
jurisdictions involved in joint planning. By contrast, another 
commentor recommended that the rule not allow a state or local official 
access to OCA information for facilities not located in the official's 
state.
    Based on our review of the statute and its legislative history, we 
believe that the proposed provisions for state and local official 
access are legally required. CSISSFRRA itself expressly provides that 
the final rule must allow for state and local officials to gain access 
to OCA information for facilities not only in their own state but in 
other states as well. EPA will provide state or local government 
officials with OCA information for their state upon request. In 
addition, to avoid unnecessarily broad dissemination of OCA information 
to state and local officials, CSISSFRRA requires that those officials 
specifically request information for facilities in other states, rather 
than provide that the federal government unilaterally distribute it to 
them. CSISSFRRA leaves no doubt, however, that the final rule must 
allow a state or local official, upon request, to access OCA 
information for official use for his or her state or any other states. 
Morever, as the benefits assessment points out, persons interested in 
evaluating the safety practices of local facilities may find it helpful 
to compare OCA information for those facilities with that of similar 
facilities located elsewhere. This statement is as true for government 
officials as it is for members of the general public.
    Similarly, CSISSFRRA itself limits the extent to which a state or 
local official can share OCA information with officials of other states 
or of localities in other states. It specifies that the regulations 
allow such officials to share OCA information for their states with 
officials of contiguous states. We do not anticipate that this 
limitation will hinder useful communication among officials of 
different states and localities. Since under CSISSFRRA and the final

[[Page 48126]]

rule any state or local official may request OCA information for 
facilities in any state, it will not be necessary for state and local 
officials to disseminate their own information. A state or local 
official interested in obtaining information for a noncontiguous state 
may simply request it from EPA, and an official interested in sharing 
that information with another state's officials may suggest to those 
officials that they request it themselves.
    The commentors' general point that the rule not hinder 
communications among government officials nevertheless is well taken. 
We have reviewed the relevant regulatory provisions and made several 
changes to improve their clarity and practicality. While the proposed 
rule authorized EPA to provide a state or local official with OCA 
information for ``his or her'' official use, the final rule deletes the 
quoted language so that every official in a state or locality with an 
official use for the information need not request it separately. 
Relatedly, we have revised the regulatory language to make clear that 
officials within a state or locality may share OCA information with one 
another for official purposes. Consequently, an official from a county 
planning department, for example, may request OCA information for 
official use and distribute it to his or her colleagues who also need 
to review the information ``to carry out a function relevant to 
preventing, planning for, or responding to accidental releases.''
    As indicated above, CSISSFRRA provides government officials with 
access to OCA information for ``official use.'' One commentor suggested 
that EPA ensure that the government official requesting OCA information 
has an ``official `need to know.' '' We believe that approach is 
unnecessary and impracticable. CSISSFRRA contains a definition of 
``official use'' that describes the purposes for which such officials 
may lawfully use OCA information. The final rule adopts the statutory 
definition verbatim. Before providing OCA information to a government 
official as required under CAA section 112(r)(7)(H)(iv) (regarding 
availability of OCA information during the first year following 
enactment of CSISSFRRA), we ask the official to state in writing that 
access is for ``official use'' as defined by the statute. If the 
official uses OCA information for other than official purposes, he or 
she might be exposed to administrative, and possibly criminal, 
sanctions. As an added precaution, and as required by CSISSFRRA, we 
will continue to provide officials receiving OCA information with a 
security notice that includes examples of what constitutes ``official 
use.''
    Finally, several states and LEPCs commented on the logistics of 
obtaining and safeguarding OCA information. One commentor urged us not 
to charge local officials for paper copies of OCA information, 
particularly in light of the proposal that LEPCs and other state and 
local entities be allowed to make paper copies of OCA information 
available to the public in read-only form. Another commentor urged us 
to provide OCA information in an ``organized'' way, that is, according 
to LEPC jurisdiction. As stated above we intend to provide paper copies 
of OCA information, free of charge, for facilities on the basis of LEPC 
jurisdiction to LEPCs, SERCs, and others interested in providing read-
only access. For local and state officials with limited electronic 
resources, we also intend to provide paper copies of OCA information 
for facilities within their state.

I. Other Provisions

    The proposed rule also included provisions prohibiting government 
officials, as well as researchers who receive OCA information under CAA 
section 112(r)(7)(h)(vii), from disseminating OCA information and ``OCA 
rankings'' to the public except as authorized by the rule or a 
specified provision of CSISSFRRA. The proposed rule defined ``OCA 
rankings'' as ``any statewide or national ranking of identified 
stationary sources derived from OCA information.'' One commentor 
criticized that definition, claiming that it is vague and raises due 
process issues. The commentor also was concerned that the definition 
would prevent state or local officials from ranking facilities based on 
parameters similar or even identical to the data reported in the OCA 
sections of RMPs.
    The proposed definition was drawn virtually verbatim from 
CSISSFRRA, which prohibits government officials and qualified 
researchers from disseminating to the public OCA information ``or any 
statewide or national ranking of identified stationary sources from 
such information'' (CAA section 112(r)(7)(H)(v)(I)). We believe the 
statutory language, and thus the regulatory definition, are not 
unconstitutionally vague, as individuals clearly can identify in 
advance what constitutes a ranking of stationary sources, on a 
statewide or nationwide basis, and whether the OCA information provided 
to them was used to create the ranking. We do not believe the 
definition prevents state or local officials from using information 
other than OCA information to rank facilities. ``OCA information'' is 
defined by CSISSFRRA and the rule as the OCA portions of RMPs and any 
EPA database created from those portions; ``RMP'' is defined as the 
risk management plan submitted to EPA pursuant to the RMP rule. If 
state or local officials, without resort to OCA information, have 
developed or gained access to data similar or even identical to the OCA 
data reported in RMPs, they are not precluded from using that data to 
rank facilities.

III. Discussion of Final Rule

    After considering the comments received, we have sought to craft a 
final rule that meets CSISSFRRA's requirements and reflects 
consideration of both assessments' findings. CSISSFRRA's requirements 
include providing any member of the public with access to paper copies 
of OCA information for a ``limited number'' of facilities (CAA section 
1129r)(7)(H)(ii)(II)(aa)) and other access ``as appropriate'' (CAA 
section 112(r)(7)(H)(ii)(II)(bb)). The risk assessment concluded that 
posting certain portions of OCA information on the Internet would 
increase the risk that terrorists or other criminals will attempt to 
cause an industrial chemical release in the United States. Easy access 
to OCA information would assist someone seeking to identify the most 
lethal potential targets from among the 15,000 facilities that have 
submitted OCA information. The benefits assessment, however, concluded 
that public disclosure of OCA information would likely lead to a 
significant reduction in the number and severity of accidental chemical 
releases. Widespread access to OCA information would serve the 
functions Congress originally intended in enacting the CAA and 
requiring the collection of OCA information to inform members of the 
public of potential environmental hazards and to allow them to 
participate in decisions that affect their lives and communities.
    While chemical accidents take a significant toll on life, property, 
and the environment each year, we believe that the property damage, 
personal injuries, and loss of life resulting from a single, successful 
terrorist attack on a chemical facility could be considerable and would 
likely cause more damage than would many accidental chemical releases. 
We therefore have attempted to balance those concerns by making as much 
OCA information as appropriate available online, but not posting the 
information that the risk assessment found would, if disseminated 
without restriction, pose a significant risk for terrorist or criminal 
purposes. Although

[[Page 48127]]

the Internet provides a tremendous benefit by offering people easy 
access to a wealth of information, we also recognize that it provides a 
new means for criminals and terrorists to carry out traditional 
criminal activities. The final rule provides several means for 
individuals to obtain OCA information not only for facilities within 
their community but also for a sufficient number of facilities located 
elsewhere, thereby enabling individuals to compare facilities' safety 
and prevention measures and records. Those means are described below.
    Both the proposed and final rules have been approved by the 
Director of OMB.

A. Access to Paper Copies of OCA Information

    The final rule creates federal reading rooms to fulfill CSISSFRRA's 
requirement to provide individuals with access to paper copies of OCA 
information of a limited number of facilities. A minimum of 50 federal 
reading rooms will be geographically located across the United States, 
with approximately one federal reading room per state. The number and 
location of those reading rooms may be adjusted based upon public 
demand and the agencies' experience in administering them.
    Under the rule, any person shall be provided with access to a paper 
copy of the OCA information for up to 10 stationary sources per 
calendar month located anywhere in the country, without geographical 
restriction. In addition, the final rule directs federal reading rooms 
to provide access to paper copies of OCA information for facilities 
located within the LEPC jurisdictions where the individual lives or 
works and for any additional facilities that have vulnerable zones that 
extend into those LEPC jurisdictions. Individuals will be allowed to 
read and take handwritten notes from, but not remove or mechanically 
reproduce, the paper copy of OCA information.
    Reading room personnel will be required to ascertain a requestor's 
identity by viewing a photographic identification for an individual 
issued by a government agency and obtain a signature on a sign-in sheet 
and a certification before providing that person with access to OCA 
information for up to 10 facilities per month without geographical 
restriction. Similarly, reading room personnel will be required to view 
documentation of where an individual lives or works and obtain a 
signature on a sign-in sheet before providing any person with access to 
the OCA information that the LEPC in whose jurisdiction lives or works 
would be authorized to provide. Reading rooms will also be required to 
keep records to ensure that no individual receives OCA information 
beyond the limits established by the rule.

B. Enhanced Access to Local OCA Information

    Several provisions of the final rule are designed to enhance the 
public's access to OCA information for local stationary sources. In 
response to comments regarding the appropriate governmental agencies to 
provide enhanced access, EPA and DOJ have modified the final rule to 
permit related local government agencies and related state government 
agencies, as defined in the regulation, to provide access. The rule 
authorizes and encourages LEPCs and related local government agencies 
to provide read-only access to OCA information for sources located 
within an LEPC's jurisdiction and for any other stationary sources that 
have a vulnerability zone extending into that jurisdiction. Likewise, 
SERCs and related state government agencies are authorized and 
encouraged to provide read-only access to the same OCA information that 
the LEPC in whose jurisdiction the person lives or works would be 
authorized to provide. Federal reading rooms are similarly authorized 
to provide read-only access to OCA information. Such information will 
not be subject to the 10 facility per month limit.
    The final rule also codifies the statutory provisions of CSISSFRRA 
that allow any member of an LEPC or SERC or any other state or local 
government official to convey to the public any OCA data elements 
orally or in writing, provided that the data elements are not conveyed 
in the format of sections 2 through 5 of an RMP or any electronic 
database that EPA has developed that includes OCA data elements.

C. Vulnerable Zone Indicator System

    The final rule establishes a ``vulnerable zone indicator system'' 
(VZIS) which provides persons located in any state with a means of 
obtaining, via electronic mail or other inquiry, information regarding 
the risk expressed by OCA information without providing Internet access 
to the OCA information itself. Members of the public will be able to 
learn whether a specific address (such as that of a home, school, or 
place of employment) falls within a reported ``vulnerable zone'' (i.e., 
within any RMP facility's worst-case or alternative release scenario's 
``distance to endpoint''). Electronic mail inquiries will usually 
receive a response within two working days. Members of the public who 
do not have access to the Internet will be able to obtain the same 
information by calling an EPA toll-free number or by sending regular 
mail to the Administrator of EPA. VZIS will consist primarily of query 
and response software located in RMP*Info.
    VZIS will also provide individuals with information on how to 
identify the specific facilities affecting the address submitted to 
VZIS. It will also provide contact information and sources of 
additional information explaining chemical accident risk. Any federal 
reading room or local reading room providing enhanced access under this 
rule, for example, may be a source for identifying the facility or 
facilities whose vulnerable zones extend to the address entered into 
the indicator system, as well as the location of the facilities. System 
users will be provided with the addresses and telephone numbers of the 
federal reading rooms. The system will also supply users with up-to-
date contact information for the SERCs and LEPCs, and note that only 
some LEPCs provide local OCA information access services. The indicator 
system will advise users that, once they know the name of the facility, 
they can use RMP*Info to learn more about the facility's chemical 
accident history and its accident prevention measures, and they may 
contact the facility directly to gain access to OCA information.

D. Internet Access to Selected OCA Information

    The final rule makes some items of OCA information available to the 
public through the Internet by posting it on EPA's website. Those 
provisions of the final rule are identical to those in the proposed 
rule. The items of information that will be posted on the Internet are 
those that the risk assessment found would pose the least serious 
security risk if posted on the Internet. The following items of OCA 
information will be posted on the Internet, along with other RMP data 
elements available in EPA's RMP*Info:
     The concentration of the chemical (RMP Sections 2.1.b; 
3.1.b);
     The physical state of the chemical (RMP Sections 2.2; 
3.2);
     The duration of the chemical release for the worst-case 
scenario (RMP Section 2.7);
     The statistical model used (RMP Sections 2.3; 3.3; 4.2; 
5.2);
     The endpoint used for flammables for the worst-case 
scenario (RMP Section 4.5);
     The wind speed during the chemical release (RMP Sections 
2.8; 3.8);

[[Page 48128]]

     The atmospheric stability (RMP Sections 2.9; 3.9);
     The topography of the surrounding area (RMP Sections 2.10; 
3.10);
     The passive mitigation systems considered (RMP Sections 
2.15; 3.15; 4.10; 5.10); and
     The active mitigation systems considered (RMP Sections 
3.16; 5.11).
    The final rule precludes the following items of OCA information 
from being posted on the EPA website based upon the risk assessment's 
findings that their release on the Internet would pose significant 
security concerns:
     The name of the chemical involved (RMP Sections 2.1.a; 
3.1.a; 4.1; 5.1);
     The scenario involved (RMP Sections 2.4; 3.4; 4.3; 5.3);
     The quantity of chemical released (RMP Sections 2.5; 3.5; 
4.4; 5.4);
     The release rate of the chemical involved for the worst-
case scenario (RMP Section 2.6);
     The release rate of the chemical involved in the 
alternative release scenario (RMP Section 3.6);
     The duration of the chemical release in the alternative 
release scenario (RMP Section 3.7);
     The distance to endpoint (RMP Sections 2.11; 3.11; 4.6; 
5.6);
     The endpoint used for flammables for the alternative 
release scenario (RMP Section 5.5);
     The residential population within the distance to endpoint 
(RMP Sections 2.12; 3.12; 4.7; 5.7);
     The public receptors within the distance to endpoint (RMP 
Sections 2.13; 3.13; 4.8; 5.8);
     The environmental receptors within the distance to 
endpoint (RMP Sections 2.14; 3.14; 4.9; 5.9); and
     Any map or other graphic used to illustrate a scenario 
(RMP Sections 2.16; 3.17; 4.11; 5.12).

E. Additional Information on Chemical Accident Risk

    As a supplement to the provisions of this rule, EPA will make 
available to the public additional information on chemical accident 
risk through an Internet website. Some of that information is currently 
available through EPA's website. RMPs (except for the OCA information, 
sections 2 through 5) are currently accessible to the public through 
RMP*Info. Through Envirofacts, the public can easily access other 
information about facilities that have submitted RMPs. EPA's website 
also has links to a web-based chemical guide (http://chemicalguide.com). Another helpful link found on the EPA website that 
provides valuable information to the public is the NSC website (http://www.nsc.org/xroads.cfm), which is aimed at the news media and provides 
suggestions for information to request of facility management and local 
officials, for approaches to sifting through the information, and for 
presenting the information in a way that helps communities interpret 
local RMPs.
    EPA is also developing new sources of information through which the 
public can learn about chemical accident risk. Research on accident 
histories based on the data provided in RMPs and other sources, both 
national and international in nature, will be posted on the EPA 
website. Moreover, EPA will expand the number of links to environmental 
organizations, industry trade groups, and academic institutions to 
provide the public with a comprehensive means of finding chemical risk 
and safety information. EPA will also provide guidance that it, along 
with other organizations, has developed to assist community members and 
interested groups to work with facility management and local officials 
to better understand and manage the risks posed by the storage of large 
quantities of toxic or flammable chemicals. EPA is developing examples 
of facilities and industries that can serve as models for ``best 
practices'' in chemical accident risk prevention and successful 
practices in RMP implementation. EPA and other organizations are 
developing background information about the nature of chemical accident 
risk, and that information will be posted on EPA's website when it 
becomes available. In addition, through a cooperative agreement, EPA 
and Clean Air Action (a non-profit organization) will develop a primer 
for lay persons on basic risk management terms and principles that help 
to provide a basis for understanding chemical accident risks. EPA will 
be making available an updated list of LEPC, SERC, and other emergency 
response contacts.
    That information is intended to give the public a better 
understanding of the general nature of the risks associated with 
potential accidental releases posed by hazardous chemicals. In 
combination with OCA data about specific facilities, that information, 
we expect, will better enable the public to engage in productive 
dialogues at the local, state, and federal levels to prevent chemical 
accidents and to minimize the consequences of accidents that occur. EPA 
will provide that information through its Internet website, http://www.epa.gov/ceppo. Much of that information is already available there. 
EPA will continue to supplement that information as necessary or 
appropriate to provide the public with a full understanding of chemical 
accident risk and prevention.

F. Access to OCA Information by Government Officials and Other 
Provisions

    The final rule adopts the proposed provisions for access to OCA 
information by federal, state, and local government officials, as well 
as qualified researchers. In accordance with CAA section 
112(r)(7)(H)(ii)(II)(cc)-(ee), the final rule provides state or local 
government officials with access, for official use, to OCA information 
for facilities located in their states, and, at the officials' request, 
for facilities located in other states. Also in keeping with that 
section, the final rule allows state or local government officials to 
share for official use OCA information for facilities within their 
state with one another and with state or local government officials in 
contiguous states. Similarly, the final rule allows federal government 
officials to share OCA information with each other for official use.
    The final rule also establishes the other necessary provisions of 
the distribution system for OCA information. Specifically, it prohibits 
the dissemination of OCA information by government officials and 
qualified researchers (researchers who receive OCA information under 
CAA section 112(r)(7)(H)(vii)) to the public and to state and local 
officials except as authorized by the rule and a related CAA provision. 
It also authorizes the Administrator to disseminate OCA information as 
required by two other CAA provisions concerning qualified researchers 
and a read-only information technology system (CAA section 
112(r)(7)(H)(viii)).

G. Effective Date and Implementation Schedule

    The final rule is effective immediately so that we may continue to 
make OCA information available to government officials (``covered 
persons'') without interruption. CSISSFRRA and its legislative history 
make clear that Congress intended government officials to have ongoing 
access to OCA information to help them perform their jobs, as related 
to chemical emergency planning, prevention, and response. CAA section 
112(r)(7)(H)(iv) requires EPA to make OCA information available to 
government officials during the ``transition period,'' the year 
following the enactment of CSISSFRRA when the assessments and the 
rulemaking must be conducted. (see 145 Cong. Rec. S7545, daily ed. June 
23, 1999 (statement of Sen. Chafee)). However, that authority

[[Page 48129]]

ends on the earlier of the date of promulgation of the regulations or 
the one-year anniversary of the enactment of CSISSFRRA, August 5, 2000. 
In order to avoid a gap in government officials' access to OCA 
information, we believe that there is good cause to make the final rule 
effective immediately, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3).
    We will need time to implement and coordinate the operation of the 
federal reading room system. We believe we can complete that process 
within three months and begin opening reading rooms soon thereafter. We 
anticipate that federal reading room access will be available by 
December 31, 2000. To provide public access to OCA information as soon 
as possible, we will not wait for every reading room to be operational 
before opening any reading room. We will begin operating reading rooms 
as they become available, and will post on EPA's website the locations 
of reading rooms as they open.
    The vulnerable zone indicator system will begin operation no later 
than October 5, 2000. That will permit us to develop, test, and deploy 
the software systems necessary for the implementation of VZIS. Further, 
the OCA information to be disseminated on the EPA website will be 
posted by December 31, 2000.

IV. Administrative Requirements

A. Docket

    The docket is an organized and complete file of all the information 
that we considered in the development of this rule. The docket is a 
dynamic file because it allows members of the public and industry 
readily to identify and locate documents so that they can effectively 
participate in the rulemaking process. Along with the proposed and 
promulgated rules and their preambles, the contents of the docket serve 
as the record for purposes of judicial review. See CAA section 
307(d)(7)(A), 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(7)(A).
    The official record for this rulemaking has been established under 
Docket No. A-2000-20 (including comments and data submitted 
electronically). A public version of this record, including printed, 
paper versions of electronic comments, which does not include any 
information claimed as Confidential Business Information, is available 
for inspection from 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
excluding legal holidays. The official rulemaking record is located at 
the address specified in the ADDRESSES section at the beginning of this 
document.

B. Executive Order 12866

    OMB has determined that this rule is a ``significant regulatory 
action'' under Executive Order 12866, section 3(f), ``Regulatory 
Planning and Review'' (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993). OMB also has 
determined that this rule would not be economically significant because 
it would have an annual effect on the economy of less than $100 million 
and would not affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the 
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public 
health or safety, or state, local, or tribal governments or 
communities. Under the terms of Executive Order 12866, OMB has reviewed 
the rule.

C. Executive Order 12988

    This rule meets the applicable standards set forth in sections 3(a) 
and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, ``Civil Justice Reform'' (61 FR 
4729, February 5, 1996).

D. Executive Order 13045

    Executive Order 13045, ``Protection of Children from Environmental 
Health Risks and Safety Risks'' (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997), does not 
apply to this rule because it is not economically significant under 
Executive Order 12866.

E. Executive Order 13084

    Under Executive Order 13084, ``Consultation and Coordination with 
Indian Tribal Governments,'' section 3, Consultation (63 FR 27655, May 
19, 1998), federal agencies may not promulgate a regulation that is not 
required by statute, that significantly or uniquely affects the 
communities of Indian tribal governments, and that imposes substantial 
direct compliance costs on those communities, unless the federal 
government provides the funds necessary to pay the direct compliance 
costs incurred by the tribal governments, or the regulating agencies 
consult with those governments before formal promulgation of the rule. 
This rule does not significantly or uniquely affect the communities of 
Indian tribal governments or impose substantial direct compliance costs 
on those communities. Accordingly, the requirements of section 3(b) of 
Executive Order 13084 do not apply to this rule. Nonetheless, we 
consulted two tribal organizations that represent tribal environmental 
officials (Tribal Association on Solid Waste & Emergency Response, and 
National Tribal Environmental Council) and neither expressed any 
concerns with the provisions of this rule.

F. Executive Order 13132

    Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism'' (64 FR 43255, August 10, 
1999), requires federal agencies to develop an accountable process to 
ensure ``meaningful and timely input by state and local officials in 
the development of regulatory policies that have federalism 
implications.'' ``Policies that have federalism implications'' is 
defined in the Executive Order to include regulations that have 
``substantial direct effects on the states, on the relationship between 
the national government and the states, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.''
    Under section 6 of Executive Order 13132, a federal agency may not 
issue a regulation that has federalism implications, that imposes 
substantial direct compliance costs, and that is not required by 
statute, unless the federal government provides the funds necessary to 
pay the direct compliance costs incurred by state and local 
governments, or the agency issuing the regulation consults with state 
and local officials early in the process of developing the proposed 
regulation. A federal agency also may not issue a regulation that has 
federalism implications and that preempts state law unless the agency 
consults with state and local officials early in the process of 
developing the proposed regulation.
    This final rule does not have federalism implications. It will not 
have substantial direct effect on the states, on the relationship 
between the national government and the states, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government, 
as specified in Executive Order 13132. The statute itself--CSISSFRRA--
currently restricts the dissemination of OCA information by state and 
local officials and supersedes inconsistent provisions of state or 
local law. This rule only slightly narrows those statutory 
restrictions, allowing certain state and local entities to provide the 
public with read-only access to OCA information for local facilities. 
Nevertheless, we have consulted with seven organizations that represent 
state and local elected officials in developing this rule (i.e., 
National Governors Association, National Conference of State 
Legislatures, U.S. Conference of Mayors, National League of Cities, 
Council on State Governments, International City/County Management 
Association, National Association of Counties, and National Association 
of Towns and Townships). We have also consulted with state and local

[[Page 48130]]

representatives of the Accident Prevention Subcommittee of the CAA 
Advisory Committee (under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)) 
about the implementation of the OCA provisions of CSISSFRRA. In 
response to concerns some have raised about the potential chilling 
effect of CSISSFRRA's restrictions on state and local officials' 
willingness to obtain OCA information and to communicate the substance 
of that information to the public, this rule includes a provision 
clarifying that state and local officials can share OCA data with the 
public as long as they do so in a way that does not disseminate or 
permit mechanical replication of the OCA sections of RMPs or provide 
access to EPA's OCA database. As noted above, this rule also authorizes 
some state and local officials to share OCA information itself in 
certain ways.
    Section 4 of the Executive Order contains additional requirements 
for rules that preempt state or local law, even if those rules do not 
have federalism implications (i.e., the rules will not have substantial 
direct effects on the states, on the relationship between the national 
government and the states, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government). Those 
requirements include providing all affected state and local officials 
notice and an opportunity for appropriate participation in the 
development of the regulation. If the preemption is not based on 
express or implied statutory authority, EPA also must consult, to the 
extent practicable, with appropriate state and local officials 
regarding the conflict between state law and federally protected 
interests within the agency's area of regulatory responsibility. 
Consequently, we consulted to the extent practicable with the seven 
organizations mentioned above. Other than requesting further 
clarification on the proposed rule, none of those organizations raised 
federalism concerns with the rule's approach.

G. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et 
seq.), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness 
Act of 1996, agencies are required to give special consideration to the 
effect of federal regulations on small entities and to consider 
regulatory options that might mitigate any such effect. However, an 
agency need not prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis if the rule 
would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities. Small entities include small businesses, small not-for-
profit enterprises, and small government jurisdictions.
    In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 605(b), we certify that this rule does 
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. Although the rule authorizes small government jurisdictions 
to provide read-only access to OCA information, it does not require 
those jurisdictions to provide that access. This rule contains a 
prohibition on local government officials (and other government 
officials) disclosing OCA information to the public except in 
authorized ways, but that prohibition already existed under CAA section 
112(r)(7)(H)(v). Moreover, we do not expect that any burden resulting 
indirectly from the provisions of this rule will have a significant 
economic impact on the operations of local governments.

H. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The information collection requirements in this rule have been 
submitted for approval to OMB under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 
U.S.C. 3501 et seq. An Information Collection Request (ICR) document 
has been prepared by EPA (ICR No. 1981.01) and a copy may be obtained 
from Sandy Farmer by mail at Collection Strategies Division, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (2822), 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., 
Washington, DC 20460; by e-mail at [email protected]; or by 
calling (202) 260-2740. A copy may also be downloaded off the Internet 
at http://www.epa.gov/icr. The ICR for the proposed rule was listed as 
ICR No. 1656.08. To avoid confusion with the ICR for the full RMP 
Program (i.e., RMP Program Requirements and Petitions to Modify the 
List of Regulated Substances under section 112(r) of the CAA), the ICR 
has been changed for the final rule. The information requirements are 
not enforceable until OMB approves them.
    This rule will impose minimal information collection requirements 
but will require record keeping. The respondent universe for this rule 
is state and local officials and members of the public.
    None of the respondent activities for state and local agencies are 
mandatory and all depend on the state or local agency deciding to 
obtain OCA information and/or communicating the substance of the 
information or the information itself to the public. The respondent 
activities for those agencies include reading and understanding the 
Security Notice to federal, state, and local officials and researchers; 
requesting OCA information and certifying that they are covered 
persons; providing secure storage for the CD Rom or paper copies when 
not in use; learning how to use the database and software, if needed, 
to produce a copy of OCA information; providing a location for the 
public to review OCA information for local facilities; ensuring that 
members of the public do not remove or mechanically copy OCA 
information they review; and making OCA data available in formats other 
than the RMP format.
    The number of respondents undertaking one or more of these 
activities is estimated to be at least one agency in each state, 
territory, and the District of Columbia. These agencies are assumed to 
be the SERCs and may be environmental protection agencies, emergency 
management agencies, or both. Based on a recent survey, EPA estimates 
that there are 1,500 active LEPCs (in compliance with EPCRA). These 
agencies may request OCA information from EPA for their own use for 
emergency planning. Out of these, we estimate that only 1,000 LEPCs 
will be providing local access by the third year covered by this ICR. 
EPA estimates the total burden hours for state and local agencies to be 
86,000 hours annually (258,000 hours for three years) at a cost of 
$2,400,000 annually ($7,200,000 for three years).
    For members of the public, the respondent activity includes calling 
for an appointment, displaying photographic identification, and signing 
a sign-in sheet and a certification form at a federal reading room. If 
an individual would like to obtain information on local facilities, he 
or she would need to provide documentation demonstrating his or her 
place of residence or employment. In addition, members of the public 
are assumed to use the VZIS system and to make follow-up calls to 
obtain additional information. It is assumed that approximately 20,000 
people will use the VZIS system each year and that 5,000 of those will 
seek additional information. Those individuals without access to the 
Internet will be able to call an EPA toll-free number or send the 
request by mail. The total burden hours for the public are estimated to 
be 14,000 hours annually (42,000 hours for three years) at a cost of 
$293,000 annually ($879,000 for three years).
    Burden means the total time, effort, or financial resources 
expended by persons to generate, maintain, retain, disclose, or provide 
information to or for a federal agency. That includes the time needed 
to review instructions to develop, acquire, install, and utilize 
technology and systems for the purposes of collecting, validating, 
verifying, processing, maintaining, disclosing, and

[[Page 48131]]

providing information; to adjust existing ways to comply with any 
previously applicable instructions and requirements; to train 
personnel; to search data sources; to complete and review the 
collection of information; and to transmit or otherwise disclose the 
information.
    An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required 
to respond to, a collection of information unless the collection 
displays a currently valid OMB control number. The OMB control numbers 
for EPA's regulations are listed in 40 CFR Part 9 and 48 CFR Chapter 
15. The OMB control numbers for the information collection requirements 
in this rule will be listed in an amendment to 40 CFR part 9 in a 
subsequent Federal Register document after OMB approves the ICR.

I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    This rule will not result in the expenditure by state, local, and 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year, and it contains no requirements that 
might significantly or uniquely affect small governments. This rule 
requires small governments that wish to obtain OCA information to 
request it, and once they obtain it, they will be prohibited from 
disseminating it except in accordance with the rule. We do not expect 
that those provisions will impose a significant burden. Moreover, 
certain members of small governments would be authorized, but not 
required, to provide public access to OCA information in a manner that 
is less burdensome than would be required of federal covered persons. 
Therefore, no actions are deemed necessary under the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act of 1995.

J. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996

    This rule is not a major rule as defined by section 251 of the 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. 
804. This rule will not result in an annual effect on the economy of 
$100 million or more; a major increase in costs or prices; or 
significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, 
productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-based 
companies to compete with foreign-based companies in domestic and 
export markets.

K. Congressional Review Act

    The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally 
provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating 
the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, 
to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the 
United States. EPA will submit a report containing this rule and other 
required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of 
Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior 
to publication of the rule in the Federal Register. A major rule cannot 
take effect until 60 days after it is published in the Federal 
Register. This rule is not a ``major rule'' as defined by 5 U.S.C. 
Sec. 804(2). This rule will be effective August 4, 2000.

V. Judicial Review

    Under section 307(b)(1) of the CAA, judicial review of this final 
rule is available only by filing a petition for review in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit within 60 days of 
publication of this rule. Under section 307(b)(2) of the CAA, the 
requirements established by the final rule may not be challenged later 
in civil or criminal proceedings brought to enforce these requirements. 
This rule has been promulgated pursuant to CAA section 307(d).

List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 1400

    Environmental protection, Chemicals, Chemical accident prevention.

    Dated: July 31, 2000.
Janet Reno,
Attorney General.
    Dated: July 31, 2000.
Carol M. Browner,
Administrator.

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, EPA and DOJ establish 
chapter IV of title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, consisting 
of subchapter A, part 1400, as follows:

CHAPTER IV--ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

SUBCHAPTER A--ACCIDENTAL RELEASE PREVENTION REQUIREMENTS; RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT SECTION 112(r)(7); 
DISTRIBUTION OF OFF-SITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS INFORMATION

PART 1400--DISTRIBUTION OF OFF-SITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
INFORMATION

Subpart A--General
Sec.
1400.1   Purpose.
1400.2   Definitions.
Subpart B--Public Access
1400.3   Public access to paper copies of off-site consequence 
analysis information.
1400.4   Vulnerable zone indicator system.
1400.5   Internet access to certain off-site consequence analysis 
data elements.
1400.6   Enhanced local access.
Subpart C--Access to Off-Site Consequence Analysis Information by 
Government Officials
1400.7   In general.
1400.8   Access to off-site consequence analysis information by 
federal government officials.
1400.9   Access to off-site consequence analysis information by 
state and local government officials.
Subpart D--Other Provisions
1400.10   Limitation on public dissemination.
1400.11   Limitation on dissemination to state and local government 
officials.
1400.12   Qualified researchers.
1400.13   Read-only database.

    Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(7)(H)(ii).

Subpart A--General


Sec. 1400.1  Purpose.

    Stationary sources subject to the Chemical Accident Prevention 
Provisions of 40 CFR part 68 are required to analyze the potential harm 
to public health and welfare of hypothetical chemical accidents and 
submit the results of their analyses to the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency as part of risk management plans. This part governs 
access by the public and by government officials to the portions of 
risk management plans containing the results of those analyses and 
certain related materials. This part also restricts dissemination of 
that information by government officials.


Sec. 1400.2  Definitions.

    For the purposes of this part:
    (a) Accidental release means an unanticipated emission of a 
regulated substance or other extremely hazardous substance into the 
ambient air from a stationary source.
    (b) Administrator means the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency or his or her designated representative.
    (c) Attorney General means the Attorney General of the United 
States or his or her designated representative.
    (d) Federal government official means--
    (1) An officer or employee of the United States; and
    (2) An officer or employee of an agent or contractor of the federal 
government.
    (e) State or local government official means--
    (1) An officer or employee of a state or local government;

[[Page 48132]]

    (2) An officer or employee of an agent or contractor of a state or 
local government;
    (3) An individual affiliated with an entity that has been given, by 
a state or local government, responsibility for preventing, planning 
for, or responding to accidental releases, such as a member of a Local 
Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) or a State Emergency Response 
Commission (SERC), or a paid or volunteer member of a fire or police 
department; or
    (4) An officer or employee or an agent or contractor of an entity 
described in paragraph (e)(3) of this section.
    (f) LEPC means a Local Emergency Planning Committee created under 
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. 11001 
et seq.
    (g) Member of the public or person means an individual.
    (h) Official use means an action of a federal, state, or local 
government agency or an entity described in paragraph (e)(3) of this 
section intended to carry out a function relevant to preventing, 
planning for, or responding to accidental releases.
    (i) Off-site consequence analysis (OCA) information means sections 
2 through 5 of a risk management plan (consisting of an evaluation of 
one or more worst-case release scenarios or alternative release 
scenarios) for an identified facility and any electronic database 
created by the Administrator from those sections.
    (j) Off-site consequence analysis (OCA) data elements means the 
results of the off-site consequence analysis conducted by a stationary 
source pursuant to 40 CFR part 68, subpart B, when presented in a 
format different than sections 2 through 5 of a risk management plan or 
any Administrator-created electronic database.
    (k) Off-site consequence analysis (OCA) rankings means any 
statewide or national rankings of identified stationary sources derived 
from OCA information.
    (l) Qualified researcher means a researcher who receives OCA 
information pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(7)(H)(vii).
    (m) Related local government agencies means local government 
agencies, such as police, fire, emergency management, and planning 
departments, that are involved in chemical emergency planning, 
prevention, or response.
    (n) Related state government agencies means state government 
agencies, such as emergency management, environmental protection, 
health, and natural resources departments, that are involved in 
chemical emergency planning, prevention, or response.
    (o) Risk management plan (RMP) means a risk management plan 
submitted to the Administrator by an owner or operator of a stationary 
source pursuant to 40 CFR part 68, subpart G.
    (p) SERC means a State Emergency Response Commission created under 
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. 11001 
et seq.
    (q) State has the same meaning as provided in 42 U.S.C. 7602(d) (a 
state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the 
Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands).
    (r) Stationary source has the same meaning as provided in 40 CFR 
part 68 subpart A, Sec. 68.3.
    (s) Vulnerable zone means the geographical area that could be 
affected by a worst-case or alternative scenario release from a 
stationary source, as indicated by the off-site consequence analysis 
reported by the stationary source in its risk management plan pursuant 
to the applicable requirements of 40 CFR Part 68. It is defined as a 
circle, the center of which is the stationary source and the radius of 
which is the ``distance-to-endpoint,'' or the distance a toxic or 
flammable cloud, overpressure, or radiant heat would travel after being 
released and before dissipating to the point that it no longer 
threatens serious short-term harm to people or the environment.

Subpart B--Public Access


Sec. 1400.3  Public access to paper copies of off-site consequence 
analysis information.

    (a) General. The Administrator and the Attorney General shall 
ensure that any member of the public has access to a paper copy of OCA 
information in the manner prescribed by this section.
    (b) Reading-room access. Paper copies of OCA information shall be 
available in at least 50 reading rooms geographically distributed 
across the United States and its territories. The reading rooms shall 
allow any person to read, but not remove or mechanically reproduce, a 
paper copy of OCA information, in accordance with paragraphs (c) 
through (g) of this section and procedures established by the 
Administrator and Attorney General.
    (c) Limited number. Any person shall be provided with access to a 
paper copy of the OCA information for up to 10 stationary sources 
located anywhere in the country, without geographical restriction, in a 
calendar month.
    (d) Additional access. Any person also shall be provided with 
access to a paper copy of the OCA information for stationary sources 
located in the jurisdiction of the LEPC where the person lives or works 
and for any other stationary source that has a vulnerable zone that 
extends into that LEPC's jurisdiction.
    (e) Personal identification for access to OCA information without 
geographical restriction. Reading rooms established under this section 
shall provide a person with access to a paper copy of OCA information 
under paragraph (c) of this section only after a reading room 
representative has
    (1) Ascertained the person's identity by viewing photo 
identification issued by a federal, state, or local government agency 
to the person; and
    (2) Obtained the person's signature on a sign-in sheet and a 
certification that the person has not received access to OCA 
information for more than 10 stationary sources for that calendar 
month.
    (f) Personal identification for access to local OCA information. 
Reading rooms established under this section shall provide a person 
with access to a paper copy of OCA information under paragraph (d) of 
this section only after a reading room representative has
    (1) Ascertained where the person lives or works by viewing 
appropriate documentation; and
    (2) Obtained the person's signature on a sign-in sheet.
    (g) Record keeping. Reading room personnel shall keep records of 
reading room use and certifications in accordance with procedures 
established by the Administrator and the Attorney General. These 
records shall be retained for no more than three years. Federal reading 
rooms will not index or otherwise manipulate the sign-in sheets 
according to individuals' names, except in accordance with the Privacy 
Act.


Sec. 1400.4  Vulnerable zone indicator system.

    (a) In general. The Administrator shall provide access to a 
computer-based indicator that shall inform any person located in any 
state whether an address specified by that person might be within the 
vulnerable zone of one or more stationary sources, according to the 
data reported in RMPs. The indicator also shall provide information 
about how to obtain further information.
    (b) Methods of access. The indicator shall be available on the 
Internet or by request made by telephone or by mail to the 
Administrator to operate the indicator for an address specified by the 
requestor. SERCs, LEPCs, and other related state or local government 
agencies are authorized and encouraged to operate the indicator as 
well.

[[Page 48133]]

Sec. 1400.5  Internet access to certain off-site consequence analysis 
data elements.

    The Administrator shall include only the following OCA data 
elements in the risk management plan database available on the 
Internet:
    (a) The concentration of the chemical (RMP Sections 2.1.b; 3.1.b);
    (b) The physical state of the chemical (RMP Sections 2.2; 3.2);
    (c) The statistical model used (RMP Sections 2.3; 3.3; 4.2; 5.2);
    (d) The endpoint used for flammables in the worst-case scenario 
(RMP Section 4.5);
    (e) The duration of the chemical release for the worst-case 
scenario (RMP Section 2.7);
    (f) The wind speed during the chemical release (RMP Sections 2.8; 
3.8);
    (g) The atmospheric stability (RMP Sections 2.9; 3.9);
    (h) The topography of the surrounding area (RMP Sections 2.10; 
3.10);
    (i) The passive mitigation systems considered (RMP Sections 2.15; 
3.15; 4.10; 5.10); and
    (j) The active mitigation systems considered (RMP Sections 3.16; 
5.11).


Sec. 1400.6  Enhanced local access.

    (a) OCA data elements. Consistent with 42 U.S.C. 
7412(r)(7)(H)(xii)(II), members of LEPCs and SERCs, and any other state 
or local government official, may convey to the public OCA data 
elements orally or in writing, as long as the data elements are not 
conveyed in the format of sections 2 through 5 of an RMP or any 
electronic database developed by the Administrator from those sections. 
Disseminating OCA data elements to the public in a manner consistent 
with this provision does not violate 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(7)(H)(v) and is 
not punishable under federal law.
    (b) OCA information. (1) LEPCs and related local government 
agencies are authorized and encouraged to allow any member of the 
public to read, but not remove or mechanically copy, a paper copy of 
the OCA sections of RMPs (i.e., sections 2 through 5) for stationary 
sources located within the jurisdiction of the LEPC and for any other 
stationary source that has a vulnerable zone that extends into that 
jurisdiction.
    (2) LEPCs and related local government agencies that provide read-
only access to the OCA sections of RMPs under this paragraph (b) are 
not required to limit the number of stationary sources for which a 
person can gain access, ascertain a person's identity or place of 
residence or work, or keep records of public access provided.
    (3) SERCs and related state government agencies are authorized and 
encouraged to allow any person to read, but not remove or mechanically 
copy, a paper copy of the OCA sections of RMPs for the same stationary 
sources that the LEPC in whose jurisdiction the person lives or works 
would be authorized to make available to that person under paragraph 
(b)(1) of this section.
    (4) Any LEPC, SERC, or related local or state government agency 
that allows a person to read the OCA sections of RMPs in a manner 
consistent with this paragraph (b) shall not be in violation of 42 
U.S.C. 7412(r)(7)(H)(v) or any other provision of federal law.

Subpart C--Access to off-site consequence analysis information by 
government officials.


Sec. 1400. 7  In general.

    The Administrator shall provide OCA information to government 
officials as provided in this subpart. Any OCA information provided to 
government officials shall be accompanied by a copy of the notice 
prescribed by 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(7)(H)(vi).


Sec. 1400.8  Access to off-site consequence analysis information by 
federal government officials.

    The Administrator shall provide any federal government official 
with the OCA information requested by the official for official use. 
The Administrator shall provide the OCA information to the official in 
electronic form, unless the official specifically requests the 
information in paper form. The Administrator may charge a fee to cover 
the cost of copying OCA information in paper form.


Sec. 1400.9  Access to off-site consequence analysis information by 
state and local government officials.

    (a) The Administrator shall make available to any state or local 
government official for official use the OCA information for stationary 
sources located in the official's state.
    (b) The Administrator also shall make available to any state or 
local government official for official use the OCA information for 
stationary sources not located in the official's state, at the request 
of the official.
    (c) The Administrator shall provide OCA information to a state or 
local government official in electronic form, unless the official 
specifically requests the information in paper form. The Administrator 
may charge a fee to cover the cost of copying OCA information in paper 
form.
    (d) Any state or local government official is authorized to 
provide, for official use, OCA information relating to stationary 
sources located in the official's state to other state or local 
government officials in that state and to state or local government 
officials in a contiguous state.

Subpart D--Other Provisions


Sec. 1400.10  Limitation on public dissemination.

    Except as authorized by this part and by 42 U.S.C. 
7412(r)(7)(H)(v)(III), federal, state, and local government officials, 
and qualified researchers are prohibited from disseminating OCA 
information and OCA rankings to the public. Violation of this provision 
subjects the violator to criminal liability as provided in 42 U.S.C. 
7412(r)(7)(H)(v) and civil liability as provided in 42 U.S.C. 7413.


Sec. 1400.11  Limitation on dissemination to state and local government 
officials.

    Except as authorized by this part and by 42 U.S.C. 
7412(r)(7)(H)(v)(III), federal, state, and local government officials, 
and qualified researchers are prohibited from disseminating OCA 
information to state and local government officials. Violation of this 
provision subjects the violator to civil liability as provided in 42 
U.S.C. 7413.


Sec. 1400.12  Qualified researchers.

    The Administrator is authorized to provide OCA information, 
including facility identification, to qualified researchers pursuant to 
a system developed and implemented under 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(7)(H)(vii), 
in consultation with the Attorney General.


Sec. 1400.13  Read-only database.

    The Administrator is authorized to establish, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
7412(r)(7)(H)(viii), an information technology system that makes 
available to the public off-site consequence analysis information by 
means of a central database under the control of the federal government 
that contains information that users may read, but that provides no 
means by which an electronic or mechanical copy of the information may 
be made.

[FR Doc. 00-19785 Filed 8-3-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-14-U