[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 115 (Wednesday, June 14, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 37414-37417]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-15001]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-440]


FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company; Notice of Consideration of 
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a 
Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-58, issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (the licensee), 
for operation of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, located in Lake 
County, Ohio.
    The proposed amendment would permit changes to the Perry Nuclear 
Power Plant Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to incorporate 
descriptions (in the form of text, tables, and drawings) of 
modifications to the Emergency Service Water (ESW) alternate intake 
sluice gate. The modifications will include: (1) Installation of a 
safety-related Class 1E selector switch that will be used to disable 
the automatic opening function of the sluice gate during warm weather 
and (2) installation of a non-safety inflatable sealing device on the 
gates between the ESW forebay and the alternate intake tunnel. The 
modifications are designed to increase overall reliability of the ESW 
system and to eliminate undesired operation of the ESW pumps.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) 
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:

    1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    The new selector switch is procured as safety-related Class 1E, 
is fully qualified environmentally and seismically, and is also 
qualified in regard to mechanical and electrical operational cycles. 
Based on these characteristics, the switch is deemed to be highly 
reliable and will not introduce any new failure modes to the gate 
control circuit. In addition, the key operated feature of the 
selector switch ensures that inadvertent positioning of the switch, 
i.e., an operator error, is not possible. Re-positioning of the 
switch will be procedurally controlled and will require conscious 
operator action along with use of a key. Therefore, it is concluded 
that addition of the new selector switch will not introduce any new 
failure modes and it will not cause or create any malfunctions of 
equipment.
    The new inflatable seal and supporting mechanical equipment was 
procured as non-safety. The frequent verification of sluice gate 
seal integrity assures that the seals will be

[[Page 37415]]

functional during accident and transient mitigation. This is 
supported by the probabilistic analysis that determined that the 
inflatable seal use results in a negligible increase in the Core 
Damage Frequency (7.4 E-8). Therefore, it is concluded that the new 
inflatable seals will not introduce any new failure modes and it 
will not cause or create any malfunctions of equipment.
    The effect of disabling the automatic opening of the sluice 
gates with the proposed selector switch was evaluated and determined 
that the requirements of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.27, Ultimate Heat 
Sink For Nuclear Power Plants, are met which ensures compliance with 
General Design Criteria (GDC) 44, Cooling Water.
    Analyzed events are initiated by the failure of plant 
structures, systems or components. The ESW system is an accident 
mitigating system that provides a reliable source of cooling water 
during accident conditions and is not an accident initiator. The 
proposed change does not have a detrimental impact on the integrity 
of any plant structure, system or component that initiates an 
analyzed event. The proposed change will not alter the operation of, 
or otherwise increase the failure probability of any plant equipment 
that initiates an analyzed accident. As a result, the probability of 
any accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased.
    Sufficient water is available to the ESW pumps to satisfy 
requirements for all modes of operation, accounting for minimum lake 
levels. The alternate intake tunnel that branches from the main 
discharge tunnel is isolated from the ESW pumphouse by the normally 
closed sluice gates. The alternate intake tunnel and sluice gates 
are not relied upon for mitigation of a Loss of Coolant Accident 
(LOCA) or other accidents with radiological consequences analyzed in 
the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The probabilistic 
analysis demonstrates that the unavailability of the alternate 
intake tunnel is acceptable during the time period that the sluice 
gate manual open/close circuit and the automatic opening signal is 
defeated, due to the extremely low probability of normal intake 
failure. The modifications do not result in changes to initial 
conditions of an accident nor alter assumptions used in any 
consequence determinations. This activity cannot increase the dose 
to the public nor on-site radiation doses such that actions to 
mitigate the radiological consequences of an accident would be 
impeded; nor does this modification directly or indirectly affect 
the ability of any other plant system to mitigate the radiological 
consequences of an accident. The proposed change will not alter the 
operation of any plant equipment assumed to function in response to 
the aforementioned analyzed events. Therefore, the probability of 
occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated 
remains unchanged.
    2. The proposed change would not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
    The proposed modification of the opening circuit has been 
designed, and will be procured and installed in accordance with the 
original ESW system design codes and standards. ESW system functions 
as required by GDC 44 and RG 1.27, have not been impacted by the 
change. Systems supporting the operation of the ESW system have not 
been affected. Failure of the modification to perform its design 
function due to electrical or mechanical failure would be identical 
to the current ESW system performance.
    Inflating the seals and defeating the automatic gate-opening 
signal results in the availability of only one intake path from the 
ultimate heat sink. Availability of only one intake during the time 
that the automatic opening function is disabled has been 
demonstrated to be acceptable because a water supply from the normal 
intake to the ESW pumps will be available. Cooling water supply from 
only one intake path cannot initiate an accident of a different type 
than previously evaluated because the cooling water supply paths 
cannot create or initiate an accident.
    The ESW system is an accident mitigating system and is not an 
accident initiator. Consequently, the alternate intake tunnel, the 
sluice gates, the sluice gate seals, and the sealing system are all 
components contained in the ESW system and are therefore not 
accident initiators. The operational change to the sluice gates, 
i.e., inflation of the seals and disabling of the sluice gate 
automatic opening feature, does not result in any interactions or 
interfaces with other plant systems, structures, or components that 
could create the possibility of an accident of a different type. The 
operational change prevents leakage past the sluice gates. 
Similarly, the sluice gates in the closed position does not result 
in any interactions or interfaces with other plant systems, 
structures, or components that could create the possibility of an 
accident of a different type. Performance of these isolation 
functions cannot initiate an accident.
    This change will not affect any known accident initiators or 
contributors; therefore, it will not increase the probability of an 
accident previously thought to be incredible. The proposed 
modifications do not affect any system or component that could 
initiate an accident. Therefore, this change will not create any 
different type of accident than previously evaluated in the USAR. 
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated remains unchanged.
    3. The proposed change will not involve a significant reduction 
in the margin of safety.

    The design of the ESW system includes suitable redundancy and 
reliability to assure that an adequate supply of cooling water is 
provided and that no single failure will prevent safe shutdown of the 
unit. The normal cooling water supply to the ESW pump house is provided 
by a branch tunnel from the main intake tunnel, while a backup supply 
is available by means of a branch tunnel (alternate intake) from the 
main discharge tunnel. Currently, the sluice gates automatically open 
upon receipt of a signal from low water level switches in the ESW pump 
house forebay. Opening of a sluice gate ensures the necessary cooling 
water is available to the ESW pumps from the alternate intake tunnel. 
The licensing basis assumes that two supply paths are available and 
that automatic initiation would restore the cooling supply from the 
alternate path if the normal cooling supply were lost. The proposed 
modification will disable the manual/automatic-opening feature of the 
sluice gates during the summer months and will thus isolate the 
alternate supply path. A probabilistic study has demonstrated 
compliance with the requirements of RG 1.27. The study determined that 
an alternate source is not required due to having demonstrated that 
there is extremely low probability that a single aqueduct can 
functionally fail as the result of natural or site-related phenomena. 
Therefore, the proposed modification does not involve a significant 
reduction in the margin of safety.
    The closed sluice gates and the non-safety sluice gate seals 
prevent recirculation of plant discharge water to the ESW forebay and 
therefore maintain the forebay at or below its design temperature 
limit. The ESW system must be capable of providing cooling water at a 
temperature such that the heat exchangers serviced by ESW can remove 
their design heat loads for safe plant shutdown and for accident and 
transient mitigation. In order to prevent a reduction in the margin of 
safety associated with the ESW inlet temperature, the ESW forebay must 
not exceed 85 deg.F. With the seals inflated, the closed sluice gates 
will prevent recirculation and subsequent increase of the forebay 
temperature above 85 deg.F and therefore the closed sluice gates do not 
reduce the margin of safety associated with the ESW inlet temperature. 
The back-up air supply for the sluice gate seals, the frequent 
verification of the integrity of the sluice gate seals provided via 
administrative controls, and the functional and leak testing of the air 
system isolation check valves provides assurance that the inflated non-
safety sluice gate seals can be credited during accident and transient 
mitigation and normal plant operation. Therefore, the margin of safety 
associated with ESW inlet temperature will not be reduced since the 
seals will be available to prevent leakage and subsequent increase of 
the forebay temperature above 85 deg.F. Further, a probabilistic study 
supports this conclusion by demonstrating that seal failure, when 
needed, is highly improbable and would result in a negligible increase 
to core damage frequency. Therefore, it is concluded that inflation of 
the non-safety seals and

[[Page 37416]]

reliance on them to prevent sluice gate leakage during all modes of 
operation does not represent a reduction to the margin of safety.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of 
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By July 14, 2000, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and accessible 
electronically through the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room link at 
the NRC Web site (http://www.nrc.gov). If a request for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Mary E. O'Reilly, FirstEnergy 
Corporation, 76 South Main St., Akron, OH 44308, attorney for the 
licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions,

[[Page 37417]]

supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be 
entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated June 1, 2000, which is available for 
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and accessible 
electronically through the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room link at 
the NRC Web site (http://www.nrc.gov).

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of June, 2000.


    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Anthony J. Mendiola,
Chief, Section 2, Project Directorate III, Division of Licensing 
Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 00-15001 Filed 6-13-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P