[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 49 (Monday, March 13, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13412-13414]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-6062]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

[Docket No. NHTSA-2000-6992; Notice 1]


Blue Bird Body Company; Receipt of Application for Decision of 
Inconsequential Noncompliance

    Blue Bird Body Company (Blue Bird), 402 N. Camellia Blvd., P.O. Box 
937, Fort Valley, Georgia 31030, has determined that 25,839 model TC/
2000 Conventional and MiniBird school buses do not meet the 60 percent 
tensile strength requirements of 49 CFR 571.221, Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 221, ``School bus Body Joint Strength,'' 
and has filed an appropriate report pursuant to 49 CFR part 573, 
``Defect and Noncompliance Reports.'' Blue Bird has also applied to be 
exempted from the notification and remedy requirements of 49 U.S.C. 
Chapter 301--``Motor Vehicle Safety'' on the basis that the 
noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.
    This notice of receipt of an application is published under 49 
U.S.C. 30118 and 30120 and does not represent any agency decision or 
other exercise of judgement concerning the merits of the application.
    FMVSS No. 221, S5 requires that when tested in accordance with the 
test procedures of S6., each body panel joint shall be capable of 
holding the body panel to the member to which it is joined when 
subjected to a force of 60 percent of the tensile strength of the 
weakest joined body panel determined pursuant to S6.2.
    Blue Bird has notified the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration that the subject school buses were manufactured at their 
Mount Pleasant, Iowa, plant between November 1, 1993 through December 
6, 1999. The noncompliance involves a failure to meet the 60 percent 
joint strength requirements on certain 8 inch segments of the exterior 
roof joints. Agency compliance tests, performed by General Testing 
Laboratories (GTL), determined that the tensile strength of the roof 
joint tested was 54.9 percent of the required load. Blue Bird stated 
that a variance in rivet spacing in the vicinity of the roof stringers 
occurred as some assembly workers at this plant without authorization, 
departed from manufacturing procedures of using the pre-punched holes 
in the roof bows as drill guides to control fastener spacing and, as a 
result, there are fewer than the six (6) rivets required by Blue Bird 
in certain eight (8) inch segments of the roof joints in the affected 
buses.
    Blue Bird supported its application for inconsequential 
noncompliance with the following:

I. Overall Joint and Body Strength

    The stated purpose of the School Bus Body Joint Strength Standard 
No. 221 is ``* * * to reduce deaths and injuries resulting from the 
structural collapse of school bus bodies during crashes.'' In Docket 
No. 7334: Notice 1, Federal Register, Vol. 39, No. 15--Tuesday, January 
22, 1974, the agency observed that FMVSS 221 ``derives from section 5.6 
of the Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission's Regulation VESC-6 * * * '' 
Docket No. 73-34 went on to state that,

``In order to bring the basic VESC--6 requirement into a form that 
satisfied the legal and operational requirements of the motor 
vehicle safety standards, the agency has included a test procedure 
to make possible an objective determination of a joint's strength.''

    The selected test procedure established the use of a twelve (12) 
inch wide test specimen necked down to eight (8) inches at the center, 
such that the strength of the joint is evaluated by tensile testing of 
a randomly selected eight (8) inch long segment of the joint being 
evaluated. Later in the docket NHTSA outlined its regulatory objective:
    ``The agency therefore anticipates that the procedure will 
permit the overall strength of a bus's joints to be determined 
without resorting to an unduly burdensome amount of testing.``

    Blue Bird concludes from the above discussion that the strength of 
the overall joint and consequently the strength of the overall bus body 
is the safety objective of standard 221 and that the measured 
performance of an eight (8)-inch long joint segment is merely a 
procedure chosen to evaluate the overall joint in a practical manner.
    During a December 2, 1999 Blue Bird personnel visit to the GTL 
facility in Leedstown, VA, the 1998 Blue Bird test bus was inspected 
and photographed. Paper tape was secured at each roof joint and the 
location of each rivet in each joint was marked on the tape. Blue Bird 
thereafter analyzed each tape and the length of each joint and the 
total number of fasteners in each joint were determined. On average, 
the seven (7) roof joints on the test bus had 6.76 rivets per eight (8) 
inches of length. Based on the reported test results of 6220 pounds for 
the roof joint tested that had five (5) rivets, the strength per rivet 
is 1244 pounds per rivet, and for the average joint with 6.76 rivets, 
this equates to a strength of 8409 pounds per eight (8) inch length 
which far exceeds the required strength of 6788 pounds. This 8409 pound 
strength equates to a 73.3 percent efficiency as compared to the 60 
percent required by Standard 221.
    Similarly, the worst case roof joint on the test bus had 6.62 
rivets per eight (8) inches of length, which equates in a similar 
manner to 8239 pounds per eight (8) inch length for an efficiency of 
72.8 percent. Here again, this comfortably exceeds the 60 percent 
requirement of Standard 221.
    This analysis shows that the overall strengths of the roof joints 
on the subject test bus not only meet--but comfortably exceed the 
strength performance requirements of FMVSS 221. Consequently, Blue Bird 
believes that the noncompliance of several small selected segments of 
these roof joints is not representative of actual, overall bus body 
strength performance and is inconsequential as it relates to motor 
vehicle safety.

II. Occupants Not Exposed to Roof Joints

    In reviewing the regulatory history of FMVSS 221, Blue Bird notes 
that this rulemaking had a complementary purpose to minimize the 
likelihood of sharp edges of sheet metal being

[[Page 13413]]

produced by joint separations or gross body deformation in crashes. For 
interior panel joints it could be argued that the eight (8) inch joint 
segment length was also chosen to help accomplish this purpose. 
However, in a crash, vehicle occupants are not exposed to exterior 
joints like the roof joint in question, and the interior panel sheet 
metal concern would not be applicable. Also of importance is the fact 
that the few small segments of exterior roof joints believed to be in 
noncompliance are completely separated from the occupant compartment by 
headlining panels with joints in full compliance (71.3%) with FMVSS 221 
requirements.

III. Interior Headlining Joint and Overall Bus Body Joint Strength

    For school bus bodies, Blue Bird reiterates that the overall 
strength of the joints is of critical importance with regard to the 
purpose of Standard 221. Blue Bird notes and emphasizes that the GTL 
test results showed that the headlining joint performance was 71.3 
percent vs. the 60 percent requirement. Extending the analysis in I 
above, if the strength of the entire body joint consisting of both the 
interior headlining joint and the exterior roof joint were to be 
analyzed together, the overall performance of the joint would be 62.4 
percent, which exceeds the 60 percent requirement of FMVSS 221 and 
satisfies the stated purpose and safety objectives of the standard.

IV. The Remedy in this Case Could Result in Degradation and Leakage 
of Bus Body Panels

    There is no safety need to require notification and remedy of the 
subject school buses to add additional fasteners. Blue Bird believes 
that in reality, a recall of the subject buses would be 
counterproductive to safety in that the resulting inconvenience to the 
owners/operators of the buses could disrupt the service they provide, 
resulting in the use of much less safe means of transportation.
    Equally important, the only feasible remedy on completed buses is 
the addition of blind repair (pop type) rivets in the areas where there 
are less than six (6) rivets in each eight (8) inch segment. Blind 
rivets are susceptible to water leaks and the installation of these 
rivets could result in mechanical damage to the roof joint sealer and 
possible damage to the exterior body paint. Water leaks and/or possible 
corrosion could occur as a result of the mechanical damage done during 
drilling and rivet installation.

V. The Current Status of FMVSS 221 Indicates That Curved Joints Are 
Not a Safety Concern

    The current version of FMVSS 221, which permitted optional early 
compliance as of November 5, 1998, provides an instructive insight into 
the agency's position with respect to curved joint testing. The 
November 1998 final rule (see Reference 3), in Sec. S5.2.2, appears to 
exclude all curved and complex joints from the 60 percent strength. 
requirements of Sec. S5.1.2.
    While in a technical sense this revised Standard 221 does not apply 
to the September 1998 test bus, Blue Bird notes that (1) the GTL test 
occurred one year after the revised FMVSS 221 became optionally 
effective, and (2) the roofjoint tested in November 1999 by GTL was in 
fact a curved panel joint.
    To Blue Bird, the thinking and intent of the agency to exclude all 
curved joints from the joint tensile strength requirements of revised 
Standard 221 was unambiguous, as borne out by the following statements 
from the rule's preamble:

    ``This rule excludes from the joint tensile strength requirement 
joints from which a test sample cannot be obtained because of the 
size of the joint or the curvature of the panels comprising the 
joint.''
    ``NHTSA recognizes that the curved shape of such joints poses 
difficulty in obtaining accurate test results. The application of 
force on a curved surface would cause the surface to flatten, thus 
misrepresenting the actual force loading on the panel.'' ``Since the 
agency is not aware of any data indicating that injuries have been 
caused disproportionately by curved joint separation, NHTSA believes 
that the potential costs and technical difficulty of testing curved 
joints more than outweigh any potential safety benefits.''
    ``Accordingly, NHTSA has decided that test specimens from joints 
with discrete fasteners will be taken from 305 mm (12 inch) segments 
(203 mm (8 inches) at the neck) of only flat body panels.''
    ``While curved, small and complex joints are excluded from the 
tensile test requirement because they cannot be accommodated on the 
test apparatus, they are nevertheless subject to the requirement in 
S5. 1.1 that no body panel, when joined to another body panel, shall 
have an unattached segment at the joint longer than 203 mm. (8 
inches). Presumably rivets or other fasteners will be used. This 
requirement helps ensure that the joints will maintain their 
integrity in a crash.''

    Based on the belief that the final rule excluded all curved joints, 
and for other reasons, Blue Bird first initiated an urgent meeting with 
NHTSA in early December 1998, then petitioned the agency in a December 
16, 1998 letter to reconsider the final rule and thereafter attended a 
second meeting with NHTSA and other major school bus manufacturers in 
January 1999. In each instance, Blue Bird urged the agency to properly 
address the issue of curved joints, including properly defining them 
and/or showing side and end views of Figure I with tolerances. The 
meetings and petitions also pointed out other problems with the final 
rule. In Blue Bird's December 16, 1998 Petition for Reconsideration, 
the Company went so far as to provide the recommended regulatory text 
needed to properly amend the final rule. Even so, this final rule has 
been allowed to stand without corrective amendment or extension for 
approximately fifteen (15) months despite the objections, petitions and 
continued urging from the industry.
    Until the standard properly defines what does or does not 
constitute a ``curved joint,'' the actual requirements that roof and 
ceiling joints must meet will continue to be unclear. By not taking 
action to correct or clarify the final rule, Blue Bird believes that 
the agency is saying that one rivet per eight inch segment is 
sufficiently safe for these joints, as well as other curved, complex 
and small joints, and is allowing school buses to be manufactured in 
this manner. Since no action has been forthcoming, we must conclude 
that curved joints, including roof and ceiling joints, do not 
constitute enough of a safety issue to warrant making corrections and/
or clarifications to the final rule of Reference 3.

VI. There Have Been No Roof Joint Failures in the Field

    Blue Bird has never had a field complaint regarding the strength of 
roof joints and is not aware of any accidents or crash tests which 
resulted in roof joint separations within the scope of the Standard. 
The NHTSA test bus from which the subject roof joint was obtained had 
other joints tested and all were found to be in full compliance with 
all FMVSS 221 requirements. Further, the same bus had previously been 
tested and found to be compliant with the agency's other school bus 
body construction standard, FMVSS 220--School Bus Roll Over Protection.

VII. Blue Bird's Corrective Actions Were Immediate on Learning of 
the Test Failure

    Blue Bird responded quickly to the reported test failure. An 
internal review was initiated immediately and field inspection and 
analysis of vehicles in service was conducted to determine the 
potential scope of the reported test failure. A visit to the General 
Testing Laboratories facility in Leedstown, Virginia, to gather testing 
details and

[[Page 13414]]

related vehicle information was immediately requested and quickly 
accomplished. All production facilities were alerted of the situation 
so assembly procedures would be checked and any required corrective 
action taken.
    The Company's internal review, field inspection and analysis showed 
that the departure from manufacturing procedures that resulted in the 
reported test failure was limited to Blue Bird's Midwest Plant in Mount 
Pleasant, Iowa, during the period beginning November 1, 1993 and ending 
when corrective action was implemented in early December 1999. All 
other plants reported ongoing conformance with assembly instructions, 
such that all such bus roof and other joints were manufactured in 
compliance with FMVSS 221 requirements.
    Blue Bird Midwest initiated corrective procedures in its assembly 
processes immediately upon notification of the test failure. All units 
placed in assembly on or after December 6, 1999, have roof joint rivets 
spaced in conformance with assembly procedures to assure compliance 
with FMVSS 221 joint strength performance requirements. Further, once a 
determination of noncompliance was made, a stop delivery order was 
issued to insure that all units still in Blue Bird Midwest's possession 
and control were corrected prior to delivery to distributors.

Conclusion

    The above facts and discussion have described a noncompliance that 
has been determined to exist on certain Blue Bird school buses. The 
Company does not in any way wish to discredit or minimize the 
performance requirements or test procedures of FMVSS 221 because of 
this noncompliance. Blue Bird takes full responsibility for the 
noncompliance that occurred and has explained how it occurred, why the 
noncompliance is not a safety problem and that corrective action to 
prevent future occurrences has been taken.

    Blue Bird firmly believes that the noncompliance is 
inconsequential and in no way compromises the safety of the subject 
school buses and that the disruption of our customers and likely 
degradation of these buses by the indicated remedy is not in the 
public interest. For the reasons provided herein, Blue Bird 
respectfully requests that its petition for exemption be granted.

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments on the application of described above. Comments should refer 
to the docket number and be submitted to: U.S. Department of 
Transportation Docket Management, Room PL-401, 400 Seventh Street, SW, 
Washington, DC 20590. It is requested, but not required, that two 
copies be submitted.
    All comments received before the close of business on the closing 
date indicated below will be considered. The application and supporting 
materials, and all comments received after the closing date, will also 
be filed and will be considered to the extent possible. When the 
application is granted or denied, notice will be published in the 
Federal Register pursuant to the authority indicated below.
    Comment closing date: April 12, 2000. (49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120; 
delegations of authority at 49 CFR 1.50 and 501.8)

    Issued on: March 8, 2000.
Stephen R. Kratzke,
Acting Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards.
[FR Doc. 00-6062 Filed 3-10-00; 8:45 am]
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