[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 49 (Monday, March 13, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13336-13339]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-6043]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-341]


Detroit Edison Company; Fermi 2, Notice of Consideration of 
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a 
Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-43, issued to the Detroit Edison Company (the licensee), for 
operation of Fermi 2, located in Monroe County, Michigan.
    The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specifications by 
changing (1) the design features description of the fuel storage 
equipment and configuration to allow an increase in the spent fuel pool 
(SFP) storage capacity and (2) the description of the high-density 
spent fuel racks program to clarify that the surveillance program is 
applicable only to racks containing Boraflex as a neutron absorber.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:

    1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    The following previously postulated accident scenarios are 
considered:
    a. A spent fuel assembly drop in the SFP.
    b. Loss of SFP cooling flow.
    c. A seismic event.
    d. Misplaced fuel assembly.
    The probability that any of the accidents in the above list can 
occur is not significantly increased by the modification itself. The 
probabilities of a seismic event or loss of SFP cooling flow are not 
influenced by the proposed changes. The probabilities of accidental 
fuel assembly drops or misplacement of a fuel assembly are primarily 
influenced by the methods used to lift and move these loads. The 
method of handling loads during normal plant operations is not 
changed, since the same equipment (i.e., Refuel Bridge) and 
procedures will be used. Since the methods used to move loads during 
normal operations remain the same as those used previously, there is 
no significant increase in the probability of an accident.
    During rack removal and installation, all work in the pool area 
will be controlled and performed in strict accordance with specific 
written procedures. Any movement of fuel assemblies required to 
support the modification (e.g., removal and installation of racks) 
will be performed in the same manner as during normal refueling 
operations. Spent Fuel shipping cask movements will not be performed 
during the modification period.
    Accordingly, the proposed modification does not involve a 
significant increase in the probability of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    The consequences of the previously postulated scenarios for an 
accidental drop of a fuel assembly in the SFP have been re-evaluated 
for the proposed change. The results show that the postulated 
accident of a fuel assembly striking the top of the storage racks 
will not distort the racks sufficiently to impair their 
functionality. The minimum subcriticality margin, keff 
less than or equal to 0.95, will be maintained. The structural 
damage to the Reactor Building, pool liner, and fuel assembly 
resulting from a fuel assembly drop striking the pool floor or 
another assembly located within the racks is primarily dependent on 
the mass of the falling object and the drop height. Since these two 
parameters are not changed by the proposed modification, the 
structural damage to these items remains unchanged. The radiological 
dose at the exclusion area boundary will not be increased due to the 
changes. Thus, the results of the postulated fuel drop accidents 
remain acceptable and do not represent a significant increase in 
consequences from any of the same previously evaluated accidents 
that have been reviewed and found acceptable by the NRC.
    The time to boil represents the onset of loss of pool water 
inventory and is commonly used as a gage for

[[Page 13337]]

establishing the comparison of consequences before and after a 
reracking project. The heat up rate in the SFP is a nearly linear 
function of the fuel decay heat load. The fuel decay heat load will 
increase subsequent to the proposed changes because of the increase in 
the number of fuel assemblies stored in the spent fuel pool. The 
thermal-hydraulic analysis determined the maximum fuel decay heat loads 
and the corresponding time to boil conditions subsequent to complete 
loss of forced cooling. These results show that, in the extremely 
unlikely event of a complete failure of both the FPCCS [fuel pool 
cooling and cleanup system] and RHR [residual heat removal] System, 
there would be at least 4.20 hours available for corrective actions. 
The maximum water boiloff rate is less than 91 gpm. This is less than 
the normal makeup capacity of 100 gpm available from the condensate 
storage tanks, and additional sources of makeup are available. It has 
been determined that this duration provides sufficient time for the 
operators to provide alternate means of makeup (i.e., fire hoses) 
before the onset of pool boiling. Therefore, the proposed change 
represents no increase in the consequences of loss of pool cooling.
    The consequences of a design basis seismic event are not increased. 
The consequences of this accident are evaluated on the basis of 
subsequent fuel damage or compromise of the fuel storage or building 
configurations leading to radiological or criticality concerns. The 
racks are analyzed in their new configuration and found safe during 
seismic motion. Fuel has been determined to remain intact and the 
storage racks maintain the fuel and fixed poison configurations 
subsequent to a seismic event. The structural capability of the pool 
and liner will not be exceeded under the appropriate combinations of 
dead weight, thermal, and seismic loads. The Reactor Building structure 
will remain intact during a seismic event and will continue to 
adequately support and protect the fuel racks, storage array, and pool 
moderator/coolant. Thus, the consequences of a seismic event are not 
increased.
    A fuel misplacement accident represents a fuel assembly 
inadvertently lowered or dropped outside of and adjacent to a storage 
rack. The consequence of a fuel misplacement accident has been analyzed 
for the worst possible storage configuration subsequent to the proposed 
modification, and it has been shown that the consequences remain 
acceptable with respect to the neutron multiplication factor staying 
below 0.95 (i.e. the same acceptance criteria as used for normal 
conditions). Therefore, there is no increase in consequences.
    Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not 
significantly increase the probability or consequences of any accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from any previously evaluated.
    Load drops were determined to be events that might represent a new 
or different kind of accident. The new loads that will be required 
during or subsequent to installation of the new racks include the rack 
modules, the overhead platforms, and the pool gates. Racks will not be 
allowed to travel over any racks containing fuel assemblies, thus a 
rack drop onto fuel is precluded. A construction accident of a rack 
dropping onto the pool floor liner is not a postulated event due to the 
defense-in-depth approach to be taken, as discussed in detail within 
Section 10.2 of the attached Licensing Report (Enclosure 4 [to the 
November 19, 1999, application]). A new temporary hoist and rack lift 
rig will be introduced to lift and suspend the racks from the bridge of 
the Reactor Crane. These temporary lift items are designed in 
accordance with the requirements of NUREG 0612 and ANSI N14.6. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of a rack dropping to the liner has been 
performed and shown to be acceptable. The integrity of the liner will 
be maintained and no loss of pool coolant would occur subsequent to a 
rack dropping to the liner. Since fuel integrity is maintained and 
significant loss of coolant does not occur, the drop of a rack is not 
considered a new type of accident.
    A drop of a pool gate is also an extremely unlikely event. The new 
storage racks will not be located directly beneath the gates. However, 
the drop of a gate, weighing approximately 9500 pounds, onto racks 
containing irradiated fuel assemblies, and the drop of a gate onto the 
pool liner have been analyzed. The analysis performed for the drop of a 
pool gate onto fuel demonstrates that the number of fuel rods damaged 
(81) remains below the Fermi 2 fuel handling accident design basis (of 
140 rods). The analysis performed for the drop of a pool gate onto the 
liner demonstrates that the liner would be locally ruptured. However, 
the underlying concrete slab remains intact and possible leakage would 
be confined to the leak chase system, which is monitored and 
controllable. The kinetic energy associated with the drop of the 
heaviest (1460 pound) overhead platform is enveloped by the kinetic 
energy associated with the gate drop. Therefore, the potential 
structural damage to fuel and the liner would be bounded by the results 
for the gate. Since the resulting fuel damage does not exceed the 
previously analyzed design basis condition and significant loss of 
coolant would not occur, the drops of a gate or an overhead platform 
are not considered a new type of accident.
    The additional heat load resulting from additional storage of spent 
fuel has been evaluated for the possibility of creating a new or 
different kind of accident. The existing Fermi 2 SFP cooling system, 
has been shown by analysis, to be capable of removing the decay heat 
generated by the additional spent fuel assemblies. The pool coolant 
will not be significantly affected. Thus, the increased heat load does 
not create the possibility a new or different kind of accident.
    No unproven technology has been utilized in the design, analysis or 
in the proposed installation methodology. The basic technology for the 
Fermi 2 spent fuel pool capacity increase is consistent with other 
license amendments (over 80) approved by the USNRC. This change has 
been evaluated in accordance with the USNRC position paper ``OT 
Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling 
Applications,['' dated] April 14, 1978 and Addition dated January 18, 
1979.
    The proposed change does not alter the operating requirements of 
the plant or of the equipment credited in the mitigation of the design 
basis accidents. The proposed change does not affect the parameters 
required for safe fuel storage. Therefore, this change does not create 
the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any 
previously evaluated.
    3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
    The function of the SFP is to store the fuel assemblies in a 
subcritical and coolable configuration through all environmental and 
abnormal loadings, such as an earthquake or fuel assembly drop. The new 
rack design must meet all applicable requirements for safe storage and 
be functionally compatible with the SFP.
    Detroit Edison has addressed the safety issues related to the 
expanded pool storage capacity in the following areas:
    1. Material, mechanical and structural considerations.
    2. Nuclear criticality.
    3. Thermal-hydraulic and pool cooling.
    The mechanical, material, and structural designs of the new racks 
are

[[Page 13338]]

reviewed in accordance with the applicable provisions of the USNRC 
position paper ``OT Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel 
Storage and Handling Applications,'' [dated] April 14, 1978 and 
Addition dated January 18, 1979. The rack materials used are compatible 
with the spent fuel assemblies and the SFP environment. The design of 
the new racks preserves the proper margin of safety during abnormal 
loads such as a dropped assembly and tensile loads from a stuck 
assembly. It has been shown that such loads will not invalidate the 
mechanical design and material selection to safely store fuel in a 
coolable and subcritical configuration.
    The methodology used in the criticality analysis of the expanded 
SFP storage capacity meets the appropriate NRC requirements and the 
ANSI standards (GDC 62, NUREG-0800, Section 9.1.2, the OT Position for 
Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications, 
Reg. Guide 1.13, and ANSI ANS 8.17). The margin of safety for 
subcriticality is maintained by having the neutron multiplication 
factor equal to, or less than, 0.95, including uncertainties, under all 
accident conditions. This criterion is the same as that used previously 
to establish criticality safety evaluation acceptance and remains 
satisfied for all analyzed accidents. Therefore, the accepted margin of 
safety remains the same.
    The thermal-hydraulic and cooling evaluation of the pool 
demonstrated that the pool can be maintained below the specified 
thermal limits under the conditions of the maximum heat load and during 
all credible accident sequences and seismic events. The bulk pool 
temperature will not exceed 150 deg.F during any conditions when forced 
cooling is available. The increase from the current maximum normal SFP 
bulk temperature of 125 deg.F is not significant, because the existing 
racks and cooling system were previously evaluated for the 150 deg.F 
condition, as stated in UFSAR [Updated Final Safety Analysis Report] 
sections 9.1.2.2.2 and 9.1.3.1, respectively. The maximum local water 
temperature in the hottest rack cell will remain below the boiling 
point. The fuel will not undergo any significant heat up after an 
accidental drop of a fuel assembly on top of the rack blocking the flow 
path. The time of 4.20 hours for the onset of pool boiling, subsequent 
to total loss of forced cooling allows sufficient time for the 
operators to intervene and line up alternate cooling paths and/or the 
means of inventory make-up before the onset of pool boiling.
    Thus, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in the margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days of the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of 
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By April 12, 2000, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and accessible 
electronically through the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room link at 
the NRC Web site (http://www.nrc.gov). If a request for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert

[[Page 13339]]

opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner 
intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The 
petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and 
documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner 
intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner 
must provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute 
exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. 
Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the 
amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if 
proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails 
to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with 
respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate 
as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to John Flynn, Esq., Detroit Edison 
Company, 2000 Second Avenue, Detroit, Michigan 48226, attorney for the 
licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    The Commission hereby provides notice that this is a proceeding on 
an application for a license amendment falling within the scope of 
Section 134 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 42 U.S.C. 
10154. Under Section 134 of the NWPA, the Commission, at the request of 
any party to the proceeding, must use hybrid hearing procedures with 
respect to ``any matter which the Commission determines to be in 
controversy among the parties.''
    The hybrid procedures in Section 134 provide for oral argument on 
matters in controversy, preceded by discovery under the Commission's 
rules and the designation, following argument of only those factual 
issues that involve a genuine and substantial dispute, together with 
any remaining questions of law, to be resolved in an adjudicatory 
hearing. Actual adjudicatory hearings are to be held on only those 
issues found to meet the criteria of Section 134 and set for hearing 
after oral argument.
    The Commission's rules implementing Section 134 of the NWPA are 
found in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart K, ``Hybrid Hearing Procedures for 
Expansion of Spent Fuel Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear Power 
Reactors' (published at 50 FR 41662 dated October 15, 1985). Under 
those rules, any party to the proceeding may invoke the hybrid hearing 
procedures by filing with the presiding officer a written request for 
oral argument under 10 CFR 2.1109. To be timely, the request must be 
filed within ten (10) days of an order granting a request for hearing 
or petition to intervene. The presiding officer must grant a timely 
request for oral argument. The presiding officer may grant an untimely 
request for oral argument only upon a showing of good cause by the 
requesting party for the failure to file on time and after providing 
the other parties an opportunity to respond to the untimely request. If 
the presiding officer grants a request for oral argument, any hearing 
held on the application must be conducted in accordance with the hybrid 
hearing procedures. In essence, those procedures limit the time 
available for discovery and require that an oral argument be held to 
determine whether any contentions must be resolved in an adjudicatory 
hearing. If no party to the proceeding timely requests oral argument, 
and if all untimely requests for oral argument are denied, then the 
usual procedures in 10 CFR part 2, subpart G, apply.
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated November 19, 1999, which is available 
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the 
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and accessible 
electronically through the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room link at 
the NRC Web site (http://www.nrc.gov).

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of March 2000.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Andrew J. Kugler,
Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate III, Division of 
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 00-6043 Filed 3-10-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P