[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 40 (Tuesday, February 29, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 10841-10844]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-4757]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. STN 50-454, STN 50-455, STN 50-456 and STN 50-457]


Commonwealth Edison Company, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, 
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2; Environmental Assessment and Finding 
of No Significant Impact

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering 
issuance of amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. NPF-37, NPF-
66, NPF-72 and NPF-77 issued to Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd or 
the licensee), for operation of Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 (Byron),

[[Page 10842]]

located in Ogle County, Illinois, and Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 
(Braidwood), located in Will County, Illinois.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

    The proposed action would increase the number of fuel assemblies 
that can be stored in the Byron and Braidwood spent fuel pools (SFPs) 
from 2,870 fuel assemblies per SFP to 2,984 fuel assemblies per SFP, an 
increase of approximately 4 percent. In addition, the new spent fuel 
storage racks will use Boral as the neutron absorber material, 
replacing the present neutron absorber material, Boraflex, which is 
continuing to degrade.
    The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's 
application for amendments dated March 23, 1999, as supplemented by 
letters dated October 21 and December 15, 1999.

The Need for the Proposed Action

    The existing racks utilize Boraflex as the neutron absorber 
material. Degradation of Boraflex has caused water chemistry and 
clarity problems and has also resulted in the need to rely on soluble 
boron in the SFPs to maintain the plants' design bases. The new spent 
fuel storage racks utilize Boral as the neutron absorber material, 
which has been used successfully at a number of plants. In replacing 
the SFP racks, the licensee decided not to include failed fuel cells. 
That change, in addition to differences in cell design between the 
existing and new racks, will result in the capacity of the SFP being 
changed from 2,864 normal fuel cells and six failed fuel cells to 2,984 
normal fuel cells.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

Radioactive Waste Treatment
    Byron and Braidwood use waste treatment systems designed to collect 
and process gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that might contain 
radioactive material. These radioactive waste treatment systems were 
evaluated in the Final Environmental Statements (FESs) dated April 1982 
(Byron) and June 1984 (Braidwood). The proposed changes to the SFP will 
not involve any change in the waste treatment systems described in the 
FESs.
Gaseous Radioactive Wastes
    The storage of additional spent fuel assemblies in the pools is not 
expected to affect the releases of radioactive gases from the spent 
fuel pools. Gaseous fission products such as Krypton-85 and Iodine-131 
are produced by the fuel in the core during reactor operation. A small 
percentage of these fission gases is released to the reactor coolant 
from the small number of fuel assemblies that are expected to develop 
leaks during reactor operation. During refueling operations, some of 
these fission products enter the pools and are subsequently released 
into the air. Since the frequency of refueling (and, therefore, the 
number of freshly offloaded spent fuel assemblies stored in the pools 
at any one time) will not increase, there will be no increase in the 
amounts of these types of fission products released to the atmosphere 
as a result of the increased pool fuel storage capacity.
    The increased heat load on the pools from the storage of additional 
spent fuel assemblies will potentially result in an increase in the 
pools' evaporation rate. However, this increased evaporation rate is 
not expected to result in an increase in the amount of gaseous tritium 
released from the pool. The overall release of radioactive gases from 
Byron and Braidwood will remain a small fraction of the limits of 10 
CFR 20.1301.
Solid Radioactive Wastes
    Spent resins are generated by the processing of SFP water through 
the pools' purification system. These spent resins are disposed of as 
solid radioactive waste. Resin replacement is determined primarily by 
the requirement for water clarity and is normally done approximately 
once per year. No significant increase in the volume of solid 
radioactive waste is expected with the expanded storage capacity. 
During reracking operations, small amounts of additional waste resin 
may be generated by the pools' cleanup systems on a one-time basis. 
Additional solid radwaste will consist of the old spent fuel rack 
modules themselves, as well as any interferences of pool hardware that 
may have to be removed from the pool to permit installation of the new 
rack modules. The old racks will be washed down in preparation for 
packaging and shipment. Shipping containers and procedures will conform 
to Federal regulations as specified in 10 CFR Part 71, ``Packaging and 
Transportation of Radioactive Material,'' and to the requirements of 
any state through which the shipment may pass, as set forth by the 
state department of transportation.
Liquid Radioactive Wastes
    The release of radioactive liquids will not be affected directly as 
a result of the SFP modifications. The SFP ion exchanger resins remove 
soluble radioactive materials from the pool water. When the resins are 
replaced, the small amount of resin sluice water that is released is 
processed by the radwaste systems. As previously stated, the frequency 
of resin replacement may increase slightly during the installation of 
the new racks. However, the increase in the amount of radioactive 
liquid released to the environment as a result of the proposed SFP 
expansion is expected to be negligible.
Occupational Dose Consideration
    Radiation protection personnel at Byron and Braidwood will monitor 
the doses to the workers during the SFP expansion operations. The total 
occupational dose to plant workers as a result of the SFP is estimated 
to be between 6 and 12 person-rem which includes an estimated dose for 
potential diver exposure, if one is needed, and estimates of person-rem 
exposures associated with washdown and preparation of the existing 
racks for shipping. The dose estimate is comparable to doses for 
similar SFP modifications performed at other nuclear plants. The SFP 
rack installations will follow detailed procedures prepared with full 
consideration of as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles.
    On the basis of its review of the licensee's proposal, the NRC 
staff concludes that the Byron and Braidwood SFP reracking operations 
can be performed in a manner that will ensure that doses to workers 
will be maintained ALARA. The estimated dose of 6 to 12 person-rem to 
perform the proposed SFP reracking operations is a small fraction of 
the annual collective dose accrued at Byron and Braidwood.
Accident Considerations
    The licensee evaluated five spent fuel drop accidents, a spent fuel 
cask drop accident, and a change in the SFP water temperature. Because 
of the similarity between the new racks and the existing ones, and the 
small increase (4 percent) in the spent fuel capacity of the new racks, 
the consequences of the spent fuel and fuel cask drop accidents were 
either bounded by the previous accident analyses as incorporated in the 
plants' design bases or unaffected by the changeout of the SFP racks.
    The change in temperature of the SFP water was evaluated for the 
potential increase in reactivity. Because the reactivity coefficient in 
the SFP is negative, a temperature increase will result in a decrease 
in reactivity. The initiators of this event are unaffected by the SFP 
rack replacement because there are no features of the design change

[[Page 10843]]

affecting the SFP cooling system or that would prompt a SFP water 
temperature decrease.
    As a consequence of the analyses, the NRC staff concludes that 
increases in the capacity of the SFPs at Byron and Braidwood will not 
be accompanied by an associated increase in the radiological 
consequences of fuel-handling accidents. The potential offsite doses 
will not be increased over the values given in the updated Final Safety 
Analysis Report.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Shipping Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility
    Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility 
is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity. 
However, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) high-level radioactive 
waste repository is not expected to begin receiving spent fuel until 
approximately 2010, at the earliest. To date, no location has been 
identified and an interim federal storage facility has yet to be 
identified in advance of a decision on a permanent repository. 
Therefore, shipping the spent fuel to the DOE repository is not 
considered an alternative to increased onsite fuel storage capacity at 
this time.
Shipping Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility
    Reprocessing of spent fuel from Byron and Braidwood is not a viable 
alternative since there are no operating commercial reprocessing 
facilities in the United States. Therefore, spent fuel would have to be 
shipped to an overseas facility for reprocessing. However, this 
approach has never been used and it would require approval by the 
Department of State as well as other entities. Additionally, the cost 
of spent fuel reprocessing is not offset by the salvage value of the 
residual uranium; reprocessing represents an added cost.
Shipping the Fuel Offsite to Another Utility or Another ComEd Site
    The shipment of fuel to another utility or transferring fuel to 
another of the licensee's facilities would provide short-term relief 
from the problems at Byron and Braidwood. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
of 1982, Subtitle B, Section 131(a)(1), however, clearly places the 
responsibility for the interim storage of spent fuel with each owner or 
operator of a nuclear plant. The SFPs at the other reactor sites were 
designed with capacity to accommodate spent fuel from those particular 
sites. Therefore, transferring spent fuel from Byron or Braidwood to 
other sites would create storage capacity problems at those locations. 
The shipment of spent fuel to another site or transferring it to 
another ComEd site is not an acceptable alternative because of 
increased fuel handling risks and additional occupational radiation 
exposure, as well as the fact that no additional storage capacity would 
be created.
Alternatives Creating Additional Storage Capacity
    Alternative technologies that would create additional storage 
capacity include rod consolidation, dry cask storage, modular vault dry 
storage, and constructing a new pool. Rod consolidation involves 
disassembling the spent fuel assemblies and storing the fuel rods from 
two or more assemblies into a stainless steel canister that can be 
stored in the spent fuel racks. Industry experience with rod 
consolidation is currently limited, primarily due to concerns for 
potential gap activity release due to rod breakage, the potential for 
increased fuel cladding corrosion due to some of the protective oxide 
layer being scraped off, and because the prolonged consolidation 
activity could interfere with ongoing plant operations. Dry cask 
storage is a method of transferring spent fuel, after storage in the 
pool for several years, to high capacity casks with passive heat 
dissipation features. After loading, the casks are stored outdoors on a 
seismically qualified concrete pad. Concerns for dry cask storage 
include the need for special security provisions and high cost. Vault 
storage consists of storing spent fuel in shielded stainless steel 
cylinders in a horizontal configuration in a reinforced concrete vault. 
The concrete vault provides missile and earthquake protection and 
radiation shielding. Concerns for vault dry storage include security, 
land consumption, eventual decommissioning of the new vault, the 
potential for fuel or clad rupture due to high temperatures, and high 
cost. The alternative of constructing and licensing new spent fuel 
pools is not practical for Byron and Braidwood because such an effort 
would require about 10 years to complete and would be an expensive 
alternative.
    The alternative technologies that could create additional storage 
capacity involve additional fuel handling with an attendant opportunity 
for a fuel handling accident, involve higher cumulative dose to workers 
effecting the fuel transfers, require additional security measures that 
are significantly more expensive, and would not result in a significant 
improvement in environmental impacts compared to the proposed reracking 
modifications.
Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation
    Generally, improved usage of the fuel and/or operation at a reduced 
power level would be an alternative that would decrease the amount of 
fuel being stored in the SFPs and, thus, increase the amount of time 
before the maximum storage capacities of the SFPs are reached. However, 
operating the plant at a reduced power level would not make effective 
use of available resources, and would cause unnecessary economic 
hardship on the licensee and its customers. In addition, the primary 
reason for the licensee reracking the SFPs is to replace the degrading 
Boraflex with a stable neutron absorber, Boral. The increase in fuel 
storage capacity is primarily the result of the differences in design 
between the existing and the new spent fuel racks. Therefore, reducing 
the amount of spent fuel generated by increasing burnup further or 
reducing power is not considered a practical alternative.

The No-Action Alternative

    The NRC staff also considered denial of the proposed action (i.e., 
the ``no-action'' alternative). Denial of the application would result 
in no significant change in current environmental impacts. The 
environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative 
actions are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

    This action does not involve the use of any resources not 
previously considered in the Final Environmental Statements for Byron 
Station, Units 1 and 2, and Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2.

Agencies and Persons Contacted

    In accordance with its stated policy, on December 20, 1999, the NRC 
staff consulted with Illinois State official, Frank Niziolec of the 
Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety, regarding the environmental 
impact of the proposed action. The state official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

    On the basis of the environmental assessment, the NRC concludes 
that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the NRC has determined 
not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed 
action.
    For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
licensee's letter dated March 23, 1999, as supplemented by letters 
dated October 21 and December 15, 1999, which are available

[[Page 10844]]

for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The 
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC. Publicly available 
records will be accessible electronically from the ADAMS Public Library 
component on the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov (the Electronic 
Reading Room).

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 23rd day of February, 2000.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Anthony J. Mendiola,
Chief, Section 2, Project Directorate III, Division of Licensing 
Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 00-4757 Filed 2-28-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P