[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 28 (Thursday, February 10, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 6544-6548]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-3068]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 73

[MM Docket No. 97-247; FCC 99-362]


Fees for Ancillary or Supplementary Use of Digital Television 
Spectrum

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This document denies Petitions for Reconsideration of the 
Report and Order in this proceeding. It reaffirms the previously 
established fee of five percent of gross revenues received from feeable 
ancillary or supplementary services provided by DTV stations. It also 
reaffirms the conclusion that home shopping, infomercial, and direct 
marketing services are not feeable.

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 15, 1999.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mania Baghdadi, Policy and Rules 
Division, Mass Media Bureau (202) 418-2120.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, (``MO&O''), FCC 99-362, adopted November 
19, 1999 and released November 24, 1999. The full text of this

[[Page 6545]]

Commission MO&O is available for inspection and copying during normal 
business hours in the FCC Dockets Branch (Room TW-A306), 445 12 St. SW, 
Washington, DC, 20554. The complete text of this MO&O may also be 
purchased from the Commission's copy contractor, International 
Transcription Services (202) 857-3800, 1231 20th Street, NW, 
Washington, DC 20036.

Synopsis of Report and Order

I. Introduction

    1. In our Report and Order (``R&O'') in this proceeding, (63 FR 
69208, December 14, 1998), we implemented Section 201 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (``1996 Act'') which adopted Section 336 
of the Communications Act of 1934, requiring broadcast television 
licensees to pay a fee if they provide certain types of ancillary or 
supplementary services on their digital television (``DTV'') bitstream. 
Based on the criteria set forth in Section 201, we adopted rules to 
require DTV licensees to pay a fee of five percent of the gross 
revenues received from the provision of such ``feeable'' ancillary or 
supplementary services. We also provided guidance on which services are 
subject to this fee and specifically concluded that home shopping, 
infomercial, and direct marketing services would not be feeable.
    2. The National Association of Broadcasters and the Association for 
Maximum Service Television have filed a joint petition (the ``NAB/MSTV 
Petition'') asking us to set the fee at two percent of gross revenues 
rather than five percent. The Office of Communication Inc. of the 
United Church of Christ, the Benton Foundation, the Center for Media 
Education, the Civil Rights Forum and Media Access Project have filed a 
joint petition (the ``UCC, et al. Petition'') asking us to hold that 
home shopping, infomercials, and direct marketing services are subject 
to fees. We deny both petitions for reconsideration.

II. Background

    3. Pursuant to the 1996 Act, the Commission has assigned each 
existing broadcast television station an additional channel to convert 
to digital technology. We are requiring broadcasters to provide on 
their DTV bitstream at least one over-the-air video program signal at 
no direct charge to viewers. 47 CFR 73.624(b). Aside from this 
requirement, we have given broadcasters great flexibility in the 
services they provide over their DTV bitstream. They may offer a wide 
range of ancillary or supplementary services such as computer software 
distribution, data transmission, teletext, interactive materials, aural 
messages, paging services, audio signals, and subscription video.
    4. The 1996 Act requires broadcasters to pay a fee to the U.S. 
Treasury to the extent they use their DTV bitstream to provide 
ancillary or supplementary services--
    (A) For which the payment of a subscription fee is required in 
order to receive such services, or
    (B) For which the licensee directly or indirectly receives 
compensation from a third party in return for transmitting material 
furnished by such a third party (other than commercial advertisements 
used to support broadcasting for which a subscription fee is not 
required). 47 U.S.C. 336(e)(1).
    The 1996 Act directed the Commission to establish a program to 
assess and collect this fee based on the following three objectives:
     ``To recover for the public a portion of the value of the 
public spectrum resource made available for such commercial use'';
     ``To avoid unjust enrichment through the method employed 
to permit such uses of that resource'';
     To ``recover for the public an amount that, to the extent 
feasible, equals but does not exceed (over the term of the license) the 
amount that would have been recovered had such services been licensed 
pursuant to [the competitive bidding process.]'' 47 U.S.C. 336(e)(2).
    5. In the R&O, we established a fee program that requires 
broadcasters to pay a fee of five percent of the gross revenues they 
receive from feeable ancillary or supplementary services offered on 
their DTV bitstream. We reasoned that this fee is consistent with the 
three objectives set forth in the Act. It also represented a reasonable 
fee in light of the record in the proceeding, in which some parties 
argued for a very low or nominal fee and others for a fee of more than 
ten percent.

III. The NAB/MSTV Petition

    6. NAB/MSTV argue that we failed to consider two studies they 
submitted that they believe call for a fee of two percent of gross 
revenues rather than five percent. The first study, prepared by Jerry 
Hausman, purports to establish ``the low and declining value of 
comparable spectrum,'' and also that digital ancillary or supplementary 
services ``face significant business and technological uncertainty.'' 
The second study, prepared by Kent Anderson, describes several surveys 
of technology licensing fees in the private sector. The Association of 
Local Television Stations (``ALTV'') submitted comments supporting the 
NAB/MSTV Petition. The National Cable Television Association (``NCTA'') 
filed an opposition to the petition.
    7. Contrary to NAB/MSTV's suggestion, we did consider the two 
studies in reaching our decision in the R&O. Indeed, consistent with a 
recommendation in the Hausman Study, we declined to impose an upfront 
or hybrid fee on DTV licensees that provide feeable services. Although 
we rejected arguments based on the two studies to set the fee lower 
than five percent, we explained in the R&O our reasons for doing so. We 
reaffirm this decision and amplify our reasons below.
    8. The Anderson Study describes several surveys of royalty rates 
used in licensing various technologies in the private sector. Although 
we did not cite the Anderson Study explicitly and our discussion of the 
issue was brief, the R&O did reject arguments that we should set a 
lower fee based on analogies to copyright royalty rates. We declined to 
do so because the policy concerns and economic considerations involved 
in setting a fee for ancillary or supplementary services appear to be 
different from the considerations involved in negotiations over private 
licensing rights. We have more closely examined the Anderson Study and 
are not persuaded that we should alter our decision. Indeed, the 
Anderson Study itself acknowledges that ``[e]ach licensing negotiation 
has unique characteristics, making it very difficult to demonstrate 
that the royalty observed for any one licensing agreement reasonably 
applies to another.'' This statement confirms our reluctance in the R&O 
to directly base the fee required under Section 336(e) on analogies to 
private licensing arrangements.
    9. Aside from this concern, the Anderson Study can actually be read 
to support a fee of five percent of gross revenues. The NAB/MSTV 
Petition, at 5, argues that the Anderson Study ``found that licensing 
rates for unproven technologies without `highly favorable economics' 
tended to be very low.'' But the full sentence in the Anderson Study 
that is cited to support this statement states: ``For `minor' 
innovations the range [of running royalty rates] is 1 to 5 percent, and 
for `major' innovations it is 3 to 8 percent. Only in the case of 
innovations characterized as `revolutionary' (i.e., suggesting highly 
favorable economics) do the rates rise to the 5 to 10 percent range.'' 
The five percent fee we have established thus falls somewhere in the 
middle of these reported ranges and could even be

[[Page 6546]]

characterized as falling within the range of royalty rates for ``minor 
innovations.'' More generally, Anderson summarizes the overall results 
of his research as ``show[ing] that some technologies earn royalties on 
the order of 2 to 3 percent or less, most earn royalties of 5 percent 
or less, and only those technologies with unusually favorable economics 
receive rates of more than 10 percent.'' Again, this places a five 
percent fee squarely in the average range, which we believe is 
reasonable. This is especially the case since we are not imposing an 
upfront or hybrid fee on DTV licensees. By comparison, a fair number of 
the royalty arrangements described in the Anderson Study appear to 
involve upfront payments in addition to royalty fees. Taking these 
upfront payments into account suggests that the five percent fee we 
have established may actually fall toward the low end of the total 
licensing payments (royalties plus upfront fees) surveyed in the 
Anderson Study.
    10. We now turn to the Hausman Study. Based on an econometric study 
of the FCC's previous auctions, Hausman reports that prices for 
spectrum auctioned by the Commission have been decreasing over time on 
a per megahertz per population basis. He also posits that there will be 
significant sunk cost investments required to provide DTV ancillary or 
supplementary services, and also significant business and technological 
uncertainty facing these services. Hausman concludes that ``the 
combination of overall declining auction results over time and the 
significant business and technological uncertainty with respect to sunk 
costs would lead to an expected outcome of relatively low auction 
results for spectrum used for ancillary services.'' Noting that the 
Notice had sought comment on setting the fee in the range of one to ten 
percent, Hausman recommends ``that the Commission initially begin with 
a fee toward the low end of the range.''
    11. As an initial matter, we question a number of the underlying 
assertions made in the Hausman Study. Even assuming it is true that 
there is a downward trend in per megahertz, per population prices for 
the spectrum auctions the Commission has previously held, this does not 
necessarily mean that an auction of the spectrum used for DTV ancillary 
or supplementary services would follow this trend. As we stated in the 
R&O, the auction values realized by the Commission in conducting a 
particular spectrum auction reflect factors that are specific to the 
particular spectrum being auctioned. These factors include the 
anticipated demand for the telecommunications services provided using 
the particular spectrum and the technological uncertainty associated 
with the application. The R&O pointed to evidence that suggests that 
the broadcast spectrum that will be used to provide DTV ancillary or 
supplementary services could command higher prices than predicted by 
the trend described in the Hausman Study. In particular, we noted that 
the sales values of broadcast properties have increased sharply over 
the past several years, reflecting the increasing value of their 
spectrum licenses. The NAB/MSTV Petition faults the R&O for focusing on 
this evidence and for not placing greater weight on the value of non-
broadcast spectrum because most ancillary or supplementary services 
will be non-broadcast in nature. But we think it is reasonable to 
expect that the prices investors pay for television stations reflect 
not only the anticipated profits from providing broadcast video 
programming on the station but also the projected profits from ``non-
broadcast'' ancillary or supplementary services that they can now 
provide on the station's DTV bitstream. The recent sales prices for 
television stations thus shed some light on the value of the spectrum 
used to provide the ancillary or supplementary services.
    12. In addition, we question the Hausman Study's assertions 
regarding the degree of uncertainty and sunk costs DTV licensees will 
face in providing ancillary or supplementary services. Whether or not 
they choose to provide ancillary or supplementary services, DTV 
licensees will need to invest in DTV facilities in order to provide a 
free, over-the-air digital broadcast service. Given this, it would 
appear that the incremental or marginal cost of providing any feeable 
ancillary or supplementary services may not be as significant as 
Hausman and NAB/MSTV suggest. The most substantial costs incurred by 
broadcasters, such as transmitters and towers, will be sunk or fixed 
costs that are already incurred in connection with the provision of 
nonfeeable services, thus minimizing the additional investment required 
to provide feeable services. We consequently agree with NCTA that the 
risk associated with offering ancillary or supplementary services will 
be diminished by the fact that DTV licensees will be providing 
nonfeeable broadcast services.
    13. We also think Hausman and NAB/MSTV overstate the level of 
uncertainty broadcasters face in developing ancillary or supplementary 
services. We fully recognize developing and implementing these services 
will entail challenges and risks. But broadcasters are not venturing 
into completely uncharted territory. They have been authorized to 
provide ancillary services on parts of their analog signals for years, 
although these services have been limited due to the lack of capacity 
on analog channels. Broadcasters have also become increasingly involved 
over the years in developing and selling programming carried on cable 
networks, and they can translate this experience into providing 
subscription programming over their DTV bitstream should that appear 
profitable to them. More recently, a number of broadcasters have 
invested in internet-related companies, suggesting that the internet's 
interactive and datacasting applications, which potentially could also 
be offered over the DTV bitstream, may prove profitable.
    14. Aside from the questions we have about some of the Hausman 
Study's underlying assertions, we have a more fundamental objection to 
the conclusion NAB/MSTV seek to draw from it. In particular, neither 
NAB/MSTV nor Hausman provides a persuasive basis to conclude that 
Hausman's assertions, even taken at face value, require us to set the 
fee at two percent rather than five percent of gross revenues. The 
Hausman Study seems to acknowledge this in that it has no firm 
recommendation on the level of the fee, only suggesting that the FCC 
initially set the fee ``toward the low end of the range'' and that the 
Commission ``might consider'' initially setting the fee at one percent 
or less. For its part, the NAB/MSTV Petition argues that the studies it 
has submitted ``provide [ ] strong support for the Commission to set a 
low initial fee'' and concludes that the fee should be two percent of 
gross revenues, yet it provides no rationale why a ``low fee'' 
necessarily means a fee of two percent as opposed to five percent.
    15. We continue to think that a fee of five percent of gross 
revenues is reasonable in light of the criteria set forth in Section 
336(e). A central theme underlying NAB/MSTV's arguments and the studies 
they have submitted is that we should set the fee so as not ``to 
discourage the development of new ancillary and supplementary 
services'' and to ``promote [ ] the efficient use of digital 
spectrum.'' We agree that this is a worthy goal and, indeed, Section 1 
of the Communications Act states that one of the Act's purposes is to 
promote an ``efficient'' radio communication service. 47 U.S.C. 151. 
But this general policy cannot trump the specific statutory criteria 
set forth in Section 336(e)(2) for establishing the fee, none

[[Page 6547]]

of which require that the fee be designed to maximize efficiency. 
Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, the goal of maximizing 
efficiency and encouraging ancillary or supplementary services would 
mean that the fee should be set at zero or some nominal percentage rate 
as this would eliminate any influence the fee would have on a DTV 
licensee's decision to provide ancillary or supplementary services as 
opposed to nonfeeable broadcast video programming. But clearly this is 
not what Congress intended. A fee system that raised no or only nominal 
revenue from licensees that provide ``feeable'' ancillary or 
supplementary services would (quite literally) make Congress's 
enactment of Section 336(e) all for naught.
    16. In the end, implementing Section 336(e) is not, to paraphrase 
one of the parties, an exact science. NAB/MSTV acknowledge that the 
Commission has ``broad discretion under the Act in setting the fee 
level.'' In exercising this discretion, we have sought to promote the 
efficient use of the spectrum and the development of innovative 
ancillary or supplementary services by DTV licensees. But this 
discretion is bounded by Section 336(e), which requires us to design 
the fee not only to approximate the revenue that would have been 
received had these services been licensed through an auction, but also 
to recover a portion of the value of the spectrum used for these 
services and avoid ``unjust enrichment'' of DTV licensees who have been 
given the exclusive right to apply for DTV channels without having to 
bid for them at an auction. Weighing these factors and the comments 
submitted in the proceeding--some of which argued for a fee of less 
than one percent while others argued for a fee of over ten percent--we 
established a fee of five percent of gross revenues generated from 
feeable ancillary or supplementary services. The amount raised by this 
fee will vary with the gross revenues from these services, i.e., with 
the willingness of consumers to pay for such services. As a 
consequence, if the consumer value for these services is low, the fee 
payment will be small. Given this, and the record in this proceeding 
and the criteria set forth in Section 336(e), we continue to believe 
this is a reasonable fee and consistent with the statute, and therefore 
deny the NAB/MSTV Petition.

IV. The UCC, et al. Petition

    17. In the R&O, we decided not to impose fees on revenues received 
from home shopping, infomercial or direct marketing services. We 
reasoned that:

[t]he purpose of this proceeding is not to exact fees from existing 
broadcasters for existing services but, rather, to design a program 
for the assessment of fees on ancillary or supplementary services 
which will be provided on the DTV bitstream. We agree with the 
commenters who argued that home shopping and infomercials are 
commercial advertisements, excluded by statute from the scope of 
ancillary and supplementary services as they are video services 
received by viewers without a fee. [Footnote omitted.] We therefore 
find that home shopping channels and infomercials are free, over-
the-air television services, supported by commercial advertisements, 
and not subject to a fee.

    18. UCC, et al. ask the Commission to reconsider this decision. 
They interpret the 1996 Act as requiring us to impose fees on home 
shopping, infomercial, and direct marketing services. NAB, MSTV, ALTV, 
and Home Shopping Network (``HSN'') and ValueVision International 
(``ValueVision'') have opposed UCC, et al.'s petition for 
reconsideration and argue that the Commission was correct in concluding 
that these services are not subject to fees.
    19. UCC, et al. interpret the R&O as basing this conclusion on two 
rationales: (1) That home shopping, infomercials, and direct marketing 
services are ``existing'' services, and therefore grandfathered from 
the fee requirements in the Act; and (2) that these services are 
``commercial advertisements'' rather than programming services, and 
consequently fall within Section 336(e)(1)(B), which exempts from fees 
``commercial advertisements used to support broadcasting for which a 
subscription fee is not required.'' As to the first rationale, UCC, et 
al. argue that the 1996 Act does not give the Commission authority to 
grandfather existing services from the new statutory fee requirements. 
As to the second rationale, UCC, et al. maintain that it is arbitrary 
and capricious to categorize home shopping and similar services as 
``commercial advertisements'' exempt under Section 336(e)(1)(B) because 
Congress, the Commission, and the broadcast industry have consistently 
characterized these services as programming not as commercial 
advertisements.
    20. We think UCC, et al. have misconstrued the R&O on these points. 
Our decision was not intended to grandfather existing services. Nor was 
it based on whether home shopping and similar services should be 
categorized as ``commercial advertisements'' or ``programming.'' We 
recognize that the R&O, may have been unclear on this point in that it 
referred to these services as ``commercial advertisements.'' But we did 
not intend this characterization to be the basis for our decision not 
to impose fees on these services. Rather, we based this decision on 
what we see as a threshold criterion in the statute: only ancillary or 
supplementary services are subject to fees under the Act. Because 
traditional home shopping, infomercial and direct marketing services 
are free, over-the-air, video services and therefore do not qualify as 
ancillary or supplementary services as we have defined that term in our 
rules, 47 CFR 73.624(c), they are not subject to fees. Or, as we put it 
in the R&O, these services are ``excluded by statute from the scope of 
ancillary and supplementary services as they are video services 
received by viewers without a fee.'' We take this opportunity to 
elaborate on this reasoning.
    21. Section 336(e)(1), which defines the ``services to which fees 
apply,'' speaks only in terms of ``ancillary or supplementary 
services'' in delineating in subsections (A) and (B) the two types of 
such services that are subject to fees. In doing so, it necessarily 
excludes from the fees requirement services that are not ``ancillary or 
supplementary'' to begin with. Although the Act does not define the 
phrase ``ancillary or supplementary services,'' the Commission did so 
in implementing Section 336 in its DTV rulemaking proceeding, Fifth R&O 
in MM 87-268, (62 FR 26966, May 16, 1997). In that proceeding, we 
adopted Sec. 73.624(c) of our rules, which provides an illustrative 
list of ancillary or supplementary services: they include, but are not 
limited to, ``computer software distribution, data transmissions, 
teletext, interactive materials, aural messages, paging services, audio 
signals, subscription video, and any other services that do not 
derogate DTV broadcast stations' obligations'' to ``transmit at least 
one over-the-air video program signal at no direct charge to viewers.'' 
47 CFR 73.624 (b) and (c). Section 73.624(c) goes on to state ``that 
any video broadcast signal provided at no direct charge to viewers 
shall not be considered ancillary or supplementary.''
    22. Traditional home shopping, infomercial, or direct marketing 
services are video broadcast signals and are offered at no direct 
charge to viewers. As such, they fall outside the scope of our 
definition of ``ancillary or supplementary services,'' and therefore 
are not subject to fees under Section 336(e)(1) of the Act. We think 
this is consistent with Congress's intent in enacting Section 
336(e)(1). To be sure, we adopted our definition of ``ancillary or 
supplementary services'' after

[[Page 6548]]

enactment of the 1996 Act. But as HSN and ValueVision state, ``the 
Act's specific instruction that fees were to be assessed only on 
`ancillary and supplementary' digital services was arrived at in the 
context of the Commission's contemporaneous consideration of [its then 
pending DTV rulemaking proceeding], in which the Commission repeatedly 
and consistently made clear that `ancillary and supplementary' services 
are separate and distinct from existing, traditional over-the-air 
broadcast services.' We believe Congress drew the same distinction in 
enacting Section 336, excluding free, over-the-air broadcast video 
programming service from fees. Traditional home shopping, infomercials, 
and direct marketing services have long been a free, over-the-air 
broadcast service, or, in Sec. 73.624(c)'s rubric, a ``video broadcast 
signal provided at no direct charge to viewers.'' It follows that in 
enacting Section 336 Congress did not intend to include these existing 
services within the phrase ``ancillary or supplementary services'' and 
subject them to fees.
    23. Further evidence of this can be found in Section 336(b)(3), 
which states, among other things, that ``no ancillary or supplementary 
service shall have any rights to carriage under section 614 or 615,'' 
i.e., the statutory ``must carry'' rights broadcast television stations 
have to be carried on cable systems in their local area. 47 U.S.C. 
336(b)(3). If a free, over-the-air home shopping broadcast service is 
considered an ``ancillary or supplementary service,'' stations carrying 
such programming would be rendered ineligible for must carry rights 
under Section 336(b)(3). We do not think Congress could have intended 
such a result given that, in Section 4(g) of the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the ``1992 Cable 
Act''), it directed the FCC to determine whether home shopping stations 
served the public interest and were entitled to must carry rights. It 
would make little sense for Congress to charge us with this duty, and 
then four years later preclude home shopping stations from must carry 
rights under Section 336(b)(3) without a mention, either in the 1996 
Act or its legislative history, of Section 4(g) of the 1992 Cable Act. 
A basic principle of statutory construction is to seek to construe 
statutory provisions so that they are consistent with each other. We 
think the most reasonable way to square Section 336 and Section 4(g) of 
the 1992 Cable Act is not to treat traditional home shopping, 
infomercials, and direct marketing services as ancillary or 
supplementary services.
    24. We do not agree with UCC, et al.'s suggestion that our decision 
not to apply fees to home shopping, infomercials and direct marketing 
services means any service provided without charge to the viewer is 
exempt from fees regardless of whether a third party compensates a 
broadcaster for carriage. Nor do we agree with UCC, et al.'s argument 
that our decision effectively nullifies Section 336(e)(1)(B), which 
requires us to impose fees on ancillary or supplementary services ``for 
which the licensee directly or indirectly receives compensation from a 
third party in return for transmitting material furnished by such third 
party (other than commercial advertisements used to support 
broadcasting for which a subscription fee is not required).'' Our 
decision today does not exempt, for example, payments made to a DTV 
licensee by a stock broker to transmit stock quote data to the broker's 
clients even though the clients pay no direct fee for this service. 
This clearly would be an ``ancillary or supplementary service'' that is 
feeable under Section 336(e)(1)(B).
    25. But where, as here, the service is a video broadcast signal 
provided at no direct charge to viewers, it is not feeable, even though 
the broadcaster may be receiving compensation from a third party to 
carry the service. As HSN and ValueVision point out, to hold otherwise 
would mean that ``all the affiliates of the ABC, CBS and NBC broadcast 
television networks arguably would be subject to fees for their free, 
over-the-air broadcast services because they receive compensation from 
their networks for airing network programming.'' These are video 
broadcast signals provided to viewers at no direct charge, and 
therefore are not ancillary or supplementary services and are not 
subject to fees. We consequently deny UCC, et al.'s Petition.
    26. We make one final note. Our decision in the R&O, like our 
decision today, applies only to traditional home shopping, 
infomercials, direct marketing and similar services with no interactive 
or ``clickable'' elements and which can entail viewers purchasing 
products by calling a telephone number identified during the broadcast. 
We recognize that it may be possible in the future for these purchases 
to be made via an interactive system provided by the licensee on its 
DTV bitstream. For example, a DTV viewer may be able to purchase a 
product shown on a home shopping program by clicking a special icon 
displayed on the screen and transmitting a purchase order via the 
licensee's DTV bitstream. In reply comments submitted in the initial 
round of comments of this proceeding, ValueVision and HSN stated that 
such an interactive purchase order system was being explored and argued 
that revenues generated from this sort of system should be exempt from 
fees. Because such services are only at a nascent stage and the 
particular circumstances are unclear at this point, we decline to 
decide whether they would constitute an ancillary or supplementary 
service subject to a fee under Section 336(e)(1)(B).

V. Administrative Matters

    27. The action contained herein has been analyzed with respect to 
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and found to impose no new or 
modified reporting and record-keeping requirements or burdens on the 
public. In addition, the Final Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis set 
forth in the R&O in this proceeding remains unchanged.
    28. Accordingly, pursuant to the authority granted by 47 U.S.C. 
4(i), 303, 336(e), and 47 CFR 1.429, the Petition for Reconsideration 
filed jointly by the National Association of Broadcasters and the 
Association for Maximum Service Television, and the Petition for 
Reconsideration filed jointly by the Office of Communication Inc. of 
the United Church of Christ, the Benton Foundation, the Center for 
Media Education, the Civil Rights Forum and Media Access Project, are 
both hereby denied.
    1. This proceeding is terminated.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 73

    Television, television broadcasting.

Federal Communications Commission.
Magalie Roman Salas,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-3068 Filed 2-9-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P