[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 17 (Wednesday, January 26, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 4237-4240]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-1743]


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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 2000-1]


The Need to Stabilize and Safely Store Large Amounts of 
Fissionable and Other Nuclear Material That for Safety Reasons Should 
Not Be Permitted to Remain Unremediated

AGENCY:  Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION:  Notice, recommendation.

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SUMMARY:  The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a 
recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
Sec. 2286a(a)(5) concerning the need to stabilize and safely store 
large amounts of fissionable and other nuclear material that for safety 
reasons should not be permitted to remain unremediated.

DATES:  Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this 
recommendation are due on or before February 25, 2000.

ADDRESSES:  Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this 
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 
Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2901.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:  Kenneth M. Pusateri or Andrew L. 
Thibadeau at the address above or telephone (202) 694-7000.

    Dated: January 20, 2000.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.

Recommendation 2000-1

    It is now almost six years since the Defense Nuclear Facilities 
Safety Board (Board) transmitted to the Secretary of Energy its 
Recommendation 94-1 entitled, ``Improved Schedule for Remediation in 
Defense Nuclear Facilities Complex.'' That Recommendation pointed to 
the existence of large quantities of unstable fissionable material and 
other radioactive material that had been left in the production 
pipeline following termination of nuclear weapons production. These 
materials required prompt conversion to more stable forms, to prevent 
deterioration leading to inevitable spread of radioactive 
contamination. Further, some of the material was in such a state that 
serious safety problems could be expected in a very short period of 
time if remediation did not take place.
    The Recommendation identified safety problems posed by plutonium 
both as metal and in chemical compounds, and plutonium-bearing 
materials such as residues and spent nuclear fuel. Most of this 
material was and still is at three sites: Savannah River, Hanford, and 
Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS). A substantial amount 
of spent nuclear fuel also existed at the Idaho National Engineering 
and Environmental Laboratory. In the Implementation Plan responding to 
the Recommendation, the Department of Energy (DOE) justifiably saw fit 
to add to the sources of concern the enriched uranium solution stored 
at the Savannah River Site, accumulated from processing of spent 
nuclear fuel, and the highly radioactive uranium-233 in the 
decommissioned Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) at the Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory. The highly enriched uranium solution, amounting to 
many thousands of gallons of liquid, is stored outside the H-Canyon in 
large tanks where over a period of time precipitation resulting from 
freezing, chemical changes, or evaporation of liquid could produce 
sediments posing a threat of accidental criticality. The MSRE has been 
shut down for many decades, and deterioration, the onset of which had 
already been detected, could in time release its radioactive material 
into the environment.

Materials Stabilized Since the Recommendation

    In the years since the Recommendation, progress has been made at 
defense nuclear facilities in remediating the most hazardous material. 
Most sites have repackaged plutonium metal and oxides that had been 
left in containers in contact with plastic that could become a source 
of hydrogen gas. Deteriorating spent nuclear fuel elements stored in 
the 603 Basin at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory have been moved to the 666 Basin where control of water 
purity is much better. Substantial amounts of spent nuclear fuel 
elements and nuclear targets stored in basins at the Savannah River 
Site have been chemically processed and plutonium and other radioactive 
material so extracted have been stored. Most of the plutonium in 
solution at the Savannah River Site has been converted to metal and 
along with other plutonium metal at the Site has been packaged in seal-
welded containers with inert atmospheres by means of the bagless 
transfer system. Almost all of the plutonium-bearing solutions in 
facilities at the RFETS have been chemically treated to remove the 
plutonium, which has then been stored as more stable oxide. Numerous 
drums containing radioactive residues, mostly at the RFETS, have been 
vented to prevent buildup of pressure by gas liberated through chemical 
reactions and by effects of radioactive decay. Though non-technical 
problems continue to plague actions to store nuclear waste in the Waste 
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility in New Mexico, some storage at 
that site has taken place, and presumably momentum will build toward 
highly important shipment of more material to that disposal site. In 
these ways, most of the very immediate concerns prompting the 
Recommendation have been eased.
    Furthermore, after a long period when it seemed that little was 
being accomplished, progress has been made toward cleanup of the 
important K-East and K-West fuel storage basins at the Hanford Site. 
Remediation of many of the cleanup problems at the RFETS has taken on 
momentum after a long initial period when little was accomplished. Some 
of the most notable advances have been made by arrangements to ship 
plutonium-bearing material to the Savannah River Site and to WIPP.
    Approximately 300,000 liters of plutonium solution in the F-Canyon 
at

[[Page 4238]]

the Savannah River Site have now been converted to metal in the FB-
Line. This material is stored in approximately 80 welded stainless 
steel cans that will serve as the inner containers to meet DOE-STD-
3013. Plutonium solutions resulting from stabilization of Mark-31 spent 
nuclear fuel have also been converted to metal, and along with the 
preexisting metal items in the FB-Line, are also stored in similar DOE-
STD-3013 inner containers.

Problems Remaining

    Severe problems continue to impede other remedial measures that had 
been promised in the original Implementation Plan issued by the 
Secretary of Energy in response to Recommendation 94-1, and in Revision 
1 to that Plan as issued on December 28, 1998. For a variety of 
reasons, many of them stated below, most of the remaining milestones in 
the Implementation Plans will not be met. Among the remaining problems 
are the following:
     Approximately 34,000 liters of plutonium-bearing solution 
remain in the H-Canyon at the Savannah River Site. Originally this 
material was to have been stabilized by March 2000 in the HB-Line Phase 
2 facility; however, preparing that facility for operation was not 
funded in FY 1999. The revised Implementation Plan deferred 
stabilization until June 2002. The contractor has provided an 
unofficial revised estimate of completion by December 2002, but that 
date is alleged to be at risk because the resources (mainly technical 
personnel) are not available to support development of procedures and 
Authorization Basis documents. There is at present no high confidence 
startup schedule.
     In the F-Area at the Savannah River Site are approximately 
800 kilograms of plutonium oxide. This oxide was to have been fired at 
high temperature in accordance with DOE-STD-3013 and packaged in 3013-
compliant containers by May 2002. So far there has been no appreciable 
action toward these objectives. The stated reason has been deferral of 
a decision to build the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF), 
though as the Board noted in an earlier letter to the Assistant 
Secretary for Environmental Management, a decision not to build the 
facility appears already to have been made. This activity is at present 
not funded, nor is any funding planned for a facility which could be 
used in stabilizing and storing this material. Though Implementation 
Plans had originally set target dates for accomplishment of the 
actions, no dates based on revised plans have been established.
     In the F-Area at the Savannah River Site are also about 
400 kilograms of plutonium in the form of miscellaneous residues. 
Several paths for processing the residues have been proposed, depending 
on their characteristics, but all the plutonium should end up as metal 
or oxide fired at high temperature according to DOE-STD-3013. 
Originally all were to occur by May 2002. Other than startup of the FB-
Line for characterizing the material, there has been no appreciable 
action so far toward the final objectives. As for the oxides referred 
to above, stabilization and packaging of this material were to be 
accomplished in the APSF, and are now being delayed.
     One tank in the F-Canyon at Savannah River contains 
approximately 14,400 liters of a solution of americium and curium. 
These elements, which are highly radioactive, are raw materials for 
production of californium-252 (Cf 252) in the High Flux 
Isotope Reactor at Oak Ridge. There are continuing needs for Cf 
252. Dispersal of the americium and curium material through 
loss of integrity of the tank and its appendages, such as might be 
caused by corrosion or seismic action, would create an almost 
insurmountable problem of spread of radioactive contamination. The 
original Implementation Plan foresaw conversion of the dissolved 
elements by November 1999 to a vitreous form suitable for storage until 
use. Difficulties with the melter planned for the operation caused 
deferral of the operation to September 2002 according to the revised 
Implementation Plan. At present the activity is alleged to be under-
funded, though a Request for Proposal has been issued seeking a 
commercial contract for the action. The most optimistic estimate of a 
completion date is November 2004.
     About 6,000 liters of a solution of neptunium-237 
(Np237) are in tanks in the H-Canyon at the Savannah River 
Site. This isotope is the raw material for production of plutonium-238 
(Pu238), which has such uses as a heat source for production 
of electricity for some NASA missions. Initial plans were to vitrify 
this material by September 2003. The revised Implementation Plan stated 
that instead it was to be converted to oxide through use of the HB-Line 
Phase 2 facility. The revised Implementation Plan deferred the 
estimated date of completion to December 2005. An additional six-month 
delay is now foreseen, though that view may still be optimistic since 
adequacy of funding so far in the future cannot be assured.
     About 230,000 liters of highly-enriched uranyl nitrate 
solution are held in tanks outside the H-Canyon at the Savannah River 
Site. The quantity of solution will continue to increase as a result of 
stabilization of spent Mark 16/22 fuel elements. This solution is a 
hazard because freezing, evaporation, or chemical change could lead to 
a uranium concentration and a threat of accidental criticality. The 
intent has been to add depleted uranium to this solution, reducing the 
enrichment to a range suitable for use in fuel elements for Tennessee 
Valley Authority's light water reactors. Though the Tennessee Valley 
Authority has concurred in principle with the arrangement, an agreement 
to proceed has been held up by allegedly insufficient out-year funding 
by DOE to execute its share of the agreement. Meanwhile, the estimated 
costs have been increasing. An original date of December 1997 had been 
set for conversion of the uranium to oxide. The revised Implementation 
Plan delayed that date by six years to December 2003. There is no 
credible date for removal of the hazard. Assigned storage space for the 
solution is now nearly full.
     About seven tonnes of heavy metal, principally highly-
enriched uranium, is still in irradiated Mark 16/22 fuel elements at 
the Savannah River Site. A campaign to process Mark 16/22 fuel elements 
was to have been completed by December 2000, according to the original 
Implementation Plan. The revised Plan changed that date to December 
2001. The processing is now only about 25% complete, because of an 
alleged shortage of personnel and some technical issues delaying 
restart of the H-Canyon second solvent extraction cycle. Mark 16/22 
fuel element processing stopped in September 1999 and will not resume 
until startup of second cycle operations, which is now scheduled for 
April 2000. The stated completion date is now about May 2003, though 
processing may have to be halted again in the future because of 
inadequate additional space for storage of uranium solutions (see the 
previous item).
     The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) at the Hanford Site 
contains more than 300 kilograms of plutonium in 4,300 liters of 
solution. This was to have been stabilized by January 1999 through use 
of a vertical denitration calciner. Technical problems and allegedly 
insufficient financial resources hampered completion of the vertical 
calciner and treatment of the solution by that date, and attempts to 
improve the schedule through use of a prototype calciner were also 
inadequate. The plan

[[Page 4239]]

has recently been changed, and it is now intended that the plutonium 
will be precipitated and thermally stabilized by December 2001, by 
means of the magnesium hydroxide process. Although this process has 
already been used to stabilize thousands of liters of solution at the 
RFETS, DOE and its contractor at Hanford are still trying to prove it 
will work with the PFP solutions. The story of inability to treat 
plutonium solutions at PFP has been typical of a sequence of 
ineffective activities at that Plant, generally the result of poor 
management.
     Approximately 700 kilograms of plutonium exist at PFP in 
the form of metal or alloys. The facility has spent a significant 
amount of time pursuing various alternative strategies for processing 
and packaging this material and now plans to brush loose oxide from the 
metal and package it in welded double containers in accordance with 
DOE-STD-3013 by March 2001, a noteworthy improvement over the original 
Implementation Plan's date of May 2002. The oxide from brushing and 
some severely corroded metal would be thermally stabilized to oxide as 
called for by the standard and added to the material in the following 
item.
     About 1,500 kilograms of plutonium exist at PFP in the 
form of oxide. About one year ago the staff at PFP began stabilizing 
this material through use of two muffle furnaces. The throughput of two 
furnaces was not enough to deal with the quantity of material in 
existence, but it was initially claimed that available funds were 
inadequate for installation of additional furnaces. It is now planned 
that three additional furnaces are to be brought on line by February 
2000, and four more double capacity furnaces in May 2002. The oxide 
will be packaged to meet DOE-STD-3013 after stabilization. The original 
Implementation Plan proposed completion of packaging by May 2002. The 
present plan would accomplish the job by about May 2004.
     Several dozen kilograms of plutonium exist at the PFP 
dispersed in approximately 1,600 polystyrene cubes, called polycubes. 
This material was used in the past in criticality studies. The 
polycubes have become friable through the effects of radiolysis and 
have become a contamination dispersal hazard. The method of treatment 
and stabilization of this material was under discussion for some time 
with various alternatives being considered. At present it is planned to 
oxidize the material in the muffle furnaces with the polystyrene 
converted to gas and the plutonium converted to stable oxide and then 
packaged as above. The original Implementation Plan proposed completion 
of treatment by some method by January 2001. Although the current goal 
is treatment by August 2002, this date may be delayed when the 
throughput of the muffle furnaces is determined in February 2000.
     Hundreds of kilograms of plutonium are in residues of 
various forms at PFP. These were to have been packaged and disposed of 
by different methods by May 2002 according to the original 
Implementation Plan. Cementation of sand, slag, and crucible materials 
began, but that process was shut down several years ago after only 240 
kilograms had been treated. It is now planned that the activity will be 
completed by April 2004.
     The K-East and K-West fuel storage basins at the Hanford 
Site contain approximately 2,100 tonnes of spent uranium fuel from past 
operation of the N-Reactor. At one time this material was to have been 
chemically processed in the Purex plant, but it was left stranded when 
DOE decided about ten years ago to decommission Purex. The spent fuel 
at these basins has been corroding for some decades and since the 
Basins are very near the Columbia River and have been known to leak 
during the past, remediation of this situation has been high on the 
Board's priority list. Progress toward remediation had seemed adequate 
some time ago, but with the change of contractors at Hanford a few 
years ago progress appeared to stall. Resumption of progress has 
recently been noted, but years of schedule loss have occurred. This 
activity has consumed a large part of the financing that had been 
planned for other activities at the Hanford Site such as cleanup of 
PFP. The planned date of cleanout of the Basins had been December 1999 
according to the original Implementation Plan. It is now anticipated 
that removal of fuel from the Basins will be completed by December 
2003, and removal of sludge from oxidation will have been accomplished 
by August 2005. By that time cleanup of these Basins will have cost 
between one and two billion dollars.
     About one tonne of plutonium metal and oxide at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory was recently declared to be excess to the 
needs of the defense program, and it awaits repackaging in accordance 
with DOE-STD-3013. According to the original Implementation Plan 
repackaging should take place by May 2002. At present there is no plan 
for repackaging any of the material.
     More than one tonne of plutonium exists in residues at the 
Los Alamos National Laboratory. The original Implementation Plan 
estimated that all would have been stabilized and repackaged by May 
2002. All high risk items have been processed at this time. Although 
newly produced residues are being properly packaged, little work is 
being done at this time to take care of legacy residues. The estimated 
date for dealing with the legacy materials is now September 2005.
    The above are not all of the materials referred to in 
Recommendation 94-1, but they are the major ones for which remediation 
schedules have fallen well behind those contemplated by the 
Recommendation and by the original Implementation Plan.

Fiscal Problem

    The most common reason given for failure to meet schedules has been 
insufficient financial support. That being so, the Board does not 
understand why the Department of Energy has not obeyed the statutory 
requirement in the Atomic Energy Act as amended in 42 
U.S.C.Sec. 2286d(f)(2),

    (2) If the Secretary of Energy determines that the 
implementation of a Board recommendation (or part thereof) is 
impracticable because of budgetary considerations, or that the 
implementation would affect the Secretary's ability to meet the 
annual nuclear weapons stockpile requirements established pursuant 
to section 91 of this Act [42 U.S.C. Sec. 2121], the Secretary shall 
submit to the President, to the Committees on Armed Services and on 
Appropriations of the Senate, and to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives a report containing the recommendation and the 
Secretary's determination.

    In any case, simultaneous implementation of all elements of 
Recommendation 94-1 to schedules previously committed seems to be 
impossible under present circumstances allegedly because of budgetary 
constraints. Given this fiscal reality, DOE is faced with the need to:
    1. advise Congress and the President of the shortfall in funds to 
satisfy all the safety enhancements to meet Recommendation 94-1, and
    2. prioritize and schedule tasks to be undertaken with available 
funds according to consideration of risks.

Recommendation

    In the Board's view, material remaining in liquids generally poses 
the greatest hazard, because of higher possibility of dispersal and 
because of potential criticality. Among these liquids the highly 
enriched uranium solutions stored in tanks outside the H-Canyon at the 
Savannah River Site require the most attention because of criticality 
concerns. Following the solutions in importance are unstabilized

[[Page 4240]]

plutonium oxides and plutonium metal remaining in containers with 
normal atmosphere, especially at locations in moist climates. Closely 
following in importance are various plutonium-bearing residues which 
are not as well isolated or packaged as they should be. Accordingly, 
the Board recommends the following technical actions in descending 
order of priority.
    1. Stabilize the uranium solution in tanks outside the H-Canyon at 
the Savannah River Site, to remove criticality concerns. This should 
not await plans to convert the uranium to fuel for Tennessee Valley 
Authority's nuclear reactors.
    2. Remediate the highly-radioactive solutions of americium and 
curium in the F-Canyon at the Savannah River Site. The currently-
planned deferral of vitrification of this material is highly 
undesirable.
    3. Remediate the solution of neptunium now stored in H-Canyon at 
the Savannah River Site.
    4. Convert remaining plutonium solutions to stable oxides or 
metals, and subsequently package them into welded containers with inert 
atmosphere. The principal remaining solutions are in H-Canyon at the 
Savannah River Site, and the Plutonium Finishing Plant at the Hanford 
Site.
    5. Treat the plutonium-bearing polycubes at PFP to remove and 
stabilize the plutonium.
    6. Continue stabilization of spent nuclear fuel at Savannah River.
    7. Stabilize and seal within welded containers with an inert 
atmosphere the plutonium oxides produced by various processes at 
defense nuclear facilities, and which are not yet in states conforming 
to the long-term storage envisaged by DOE-STD-3013. These oxides are 
found at the F Area of the Savannah River Site, the RFETS, the 
Plutonium Finishing Plant at the Hanford Site, the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
    8. Enclose existing and newly-generated legacy plutonium metal in 
sealed containers with an inert atmosphere. Removal of loose oxide 
should of course take place just before sealing.
    9. Remediate and/or safely store the various residues which are 
found at all three of the production sites, as well as the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
    It is assumed that the schedule for remediation of the spent fuel 
in the K-Basins at the Hanford Site will continue as currently planned.
    The ordering of priorities should not be understood as implying a 
lack of importance attached to those lower in the sequence. It is 
simply a recognition that under the circumstances the greater hazards 
should be addressed first and with greatest firmness. All elements of 
the original Recommendation 94-1 retain their importance and none are 
to be considered unessential.
    Also, the Board's staff has been discussing with DOE staff an 
ordering of tasks subject to Recommendation 94-1 in accordance with 
ease of their performance. Those actions which can readily be conducted 
within present resources should certainly go forward, as long as items 
of high safety priority receive the proper attention.
    The severity of the problems which are the subject of this 
Recommendation and Recommendation 94-1 and the urgency to remediate 
them argue forcefully for the Secretary to avail himself of the 
authority under the Atomic Energy Act to ``implement any such 
Recommendation (or part of any such Recommendation) before, on, or 
after the date on which the Secretary transmits the implementation plan 
to the Board under this subsection.'' See, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286d(e). The 
Board suggests that the Secretary avail himself of this provision.
    In addition, because stabilization of materials remaining from the 
Weapons Production Program continues to be of such importance, the 
Board recommends that:
    10. An estimate be made of the total funding shortfall for timely 
completion of all 94-1 commitments according to the accepted 
Implementation Plans, and
    11. Congress and the President be notified of the shortfall in 
accordance with statutory requirements.

John T. Conway,
Chairman.

Appendix--Transmittal Letter to the Secretary of Energy, Defense 
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

January 14, 2000.
The Honorable Bill Richardson, Secretary of Energy, 1000 
Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585-1000.
    Dear Secretary Richardson: On May 26, 1994, the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board (Board) submitted to the Secretary of Energy 
Recommendation 94-1, dealing with the need to stabilize and safely 
store large amounts of fissionable and other nuclear material that 
for safety reasons should not be permitted to remain unremediated. 
The Board was especially concerned about specific liquids and solids 
in spent fuel storage pools, reactor basins, reprocessing canyons, 
processing lines and various defense facilities remaining in the 
manufacturing pipeline when pit production was terminated in 1988. 
On August 31, 1994, Secretary O'Leary agreed with and accepted the 
recommendation. On February 28, 1995, Secretary O'Leary forwarded to 
the Board the Department of Energy's (DOE) plan for implementation 
of the Board's recommendation on this issue. Subsequently, on 
December 28, 1998, you forwarded to the Board a revision to 
Secretary O'Leary's original Implementation Plan for Recommendation 
94-1.
    During the past year, the Board and its staff have been closely 
following and noting further slippage in the time table for meeting 
the dates set forth in the Implementation Plan. While a great deal 
has been accomplished in meeting the safety objective set forth in 
Recommendation 94-1 particularly with regard to those materials that 
constituted the most imminent hazards, the Board is concerned that 
severe problems continue to exist and delay the implementation of 
Recommendation 94-1. After careful consideration, the Board has 
concluded that the progress being made in certain of the 
stabilization activities addressed by Recommendation 94-1 does not 
reflect the urgency that the circumstances merit and that was 
central to the Board's recommendation.
    The Board will continue to follow and urge DOE to implement 
Recommendation 94-1. In addition, the Board, on January 14, 2000, 
unanimously approved Recommendation 2000-1 which is enclosed for 
your consideration.
    42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286d(a) requires that after your receipt of this 
recommendation, the Board promptly make it available to the public 
in DOE's regional public reading rooms. The Board believes the 
recommendation contains no information that is classified or 
otherwise restricted.
    To the extent this recommendation does not include information 
restricted by DOE under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 
Secs. 2161-68, as amended, please arrange to have it promptly placed 
on file in your regional public reading rooms.
    The Board will also publish this recommendation in the Federal 
Register.

    Sincerely,
John T. Conway,
Chairman.

[FR Doc. 00-1743 Filed 1-25-00; 8:45 am]
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