[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 5 (Friday, January 7, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 1215-1219]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-411]


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SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION


Social Security Ruling, SSR 00-1c; Disability Insurance 
Benefits--Claims Filed Under Both the Social Security Act and the 
Americans With Disabilities Act

AGENCY: Social Security Administration.

ACTION: Notice of Social Security Ruling.

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SUMMARY: In accordance with 20 CFR 402.35(b)(1), the Commissioner of 
Social Security gives notice of Social Security Ruling (SSR) 00-1c. 
This Ruling, based on the Supreme Court's decision in

[[Page 1216]]

Carolyn C. Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation et al., 
____ U.S. ____, 119 S.Ct. 1597 (1999), concerns whether a claim for 
disability insurance benefits filed under the Social Security Act would 
preclude the claimant from pursuing relief under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 7, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joanne K. Castello, Office of Program 
Support, Social Security Administration, 6401 Security Boulevard, 
Baltimore, MD 21235-6401, (410) 965-1711.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Although we are not required to do so 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1) and (a)(2), we are publishing this 
Social Security Ruling in accordance with 20 CFR 402.35(b)(1).
    Social Security Rulings make available to the public precedential 
decisions relating to the Federal old-age, survivors, disability, 
supplemental security income, and black lung benefits programs. Social 
Security Rulings may be based on case decisions made at all 
administrative levels of adjudication, Federal court decisions, 
Commissioner's decisions, opinions of the Office of the General 
Counsel, and Agency interpretations of the law and regulations.
    Although Social Security Rulings do not have the same force and 
effect as the statute or regulations, they are binding on all 
components of the Social Security Administration, in accordance with 20 
CFR 402.35(b)(1), and are to be relied upon as precedents in 
adjudicating cases.
    If this Social Security Ruling is later superseded, modified, or 
rescinded, we will publish a notice in the Federal Register to that 
effect.

    Dated: December 20, 1999.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Programs 96.001 Social 
Security--Disability Insurance; 96.005 Special Benefits for Disabled 
Coal Miners; 96.006 Supplemental Security Income)
Kenneth S. Apfel,
Commissioner of Social Security.

Sections 222(c) and 223(a), (d)(2)(a), and (e)(1) of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 422(c) and 423(a), (d)(2)(A), and (e)(1)) 
Disability Insurance Benefits--Claims Filed Under Both the Social 
Security Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act

20 CFR 404.1520(b)-(f), 404.1525, 404.1526, 404.1560(c), 404.1592, 
and 404.1592a
Carolyn C. Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation et 
al., ____U.S.____, 119 S.Ct. 1597 (1999)

    This Ruling concerns whether an individual's claim for, or receipt 
of, disability insurance benefits filed under the Social Security Act 
(the SSAct) would preclude the individual from pursuing relief under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
    The SSAct and the ADA both help individuals with disabilities but 
in different ways. The SSAct provides monetary benefits to insured 
individuals who are under a disability, as defined in the SSAct. The 
ADA seeks to eliminate unwarranted discrimination against any 
individual who is considered a ``qualified individual with a 
disability'' as defined in the ADA.
    In January 1994, the claimant filed for Social Security disability 
insurance benefits. By April 1994, her condition improved and she 
returned to work. She reported this to the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) which denied her claim. Her employer subsequently 
terminated her. She then asked SSA to reconsider its denial of her 
claim. SSA again denied her claim, but following a hearing, she was 
awarded benefits. However, before her Social Security award, the 
claimant brought an ADA lawsuit contending that her employer terminated 
her employment without reasonably accommodating her disability.
    The District Court did not evaluate her ``reasonable 
accommodation'' claim on the merits, but granted summary judgment to 
the defendant because, in the court's view, the plaintiff, by applying 
for and receiving Social Security disability insurance benefits, had 
conceded that she was totally disabled. This fact, the court concluded, 
estopped the plaintiff from proving an essential element of her ADA 
claim, i.e., that she could ``perform the essential functions'' of her 
job with ``reasonable accommodation.''
    The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff's statement 
on her Social Security application that she was totally disabled and 
unable to work was sufficient evidence to judically estop her later ADA 
claim. In her ADA claim, the plaintiff contended that, for the time in 
question, with reasonable accommodation, she could perform the 
essential functions of her job. The Court of Appeals thought that her 
claims under both Acts would incorporate two directly conflicting 
propositions; namely, ``I am too disabled to work'' and ``I am not too 
disabled to work.'' That court, in an effort to prevent two conflicting 
claims under both Acts, used a special judicial presumption that it 
believed would prevent the plaintiff from successfully pursuing her ADA 
claim.
    The Supreme Court (the Court) granted certiorari in light of the 
disagreement among the circuits concerning the legal effect upon an ADA 
claim of the application for, or receipt of, Social Security disability 
insurance benefits. The Court held that, despite the appearance of 
conflict between the two statutes, the two claims do not conflict to 
the point where courts should apply a special negative presumption as 
in the Court of Appeals' decision in this case. The Court believed that 
there are too many situations in which a Social Security claim and an 
ADA claim can comfortably exist side by side. The Court, therefore, 
vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for 
further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.

BREYER, Supreme Court Justice:

    The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program provides 
benefits to a person with a disability so severe that she is ``unable 
to do (her) previous work'' and ``cannot * * * engage in any other kind 
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.'' 
Sec. 223(a) of the Social Security Act, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. 
423(d)(2)(A). This case asks whether the law erects a special 
presumption that would significantly inhibit an SSDI recipient from 
simultaneously pursuing an action for disability discrimination under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), claiming that ``with 
* * * reasonable accommodation'' she could ``perform the essential 
functions'' of her job. Section 101, 104 Stat. 331, 42 U.S.C. 12111(8).
    We believe that, in context, these two seemingly divergent 
statutory contentions are often consistent, each with the other. Thus 
pursuit, and receipt, of SSDI benefits does not automatically estop the 
recipient from pursuing an ADA claim. Nor does the law erect a strong 
presumption against the recipient's success under the ADA. Nonetheless, 
an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore her SSDI contention that she was 
too disabled to work. To survive a defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, she must explain why that SSDI contention is consistent with 
her ADA claim that she could ``perform the essential functions'' of her 
previous job, at least with ``reasonable accommodation.''
    After suffering a disabling stroke and losing her job, Carolyn 
Cleveland sought and obtained SSDI benefits from the Social Security 
Administration (SSA). She has also brought this ADA suit in which she 
claims that her former

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employer, Policy Management Systems Corporation, discriminated against 
her on account of her disability. The two claims developed in the 
following way:
    August 1993: Cleveland began work at Policy Management Systems. Her 
job required her to perform background checks on prospective employees 
of Policy Management System's clients.
    January 7, 1994: Cleveland suffered a stroke, which damaged her 
concentration, memory, and language skills.
    January 28, 1994: Cleveland filed an SSDI application in which she 
stated that she was ``disabled'' and ``unable to work.'' App. 21.
    April 11, 1994: Cleveland's condition having improved, she returned 
to work with Policy Management Systems. She reported that fact to the 
SSA two weeks later.
    July 11, 1994: Noting that Cleveland had returned to work, the SSA 
denied her SSDI application.
    July 15, 1994: Policy Management Systems fired Cleveland.
    September 14, 1994: Cleveland asked the SSA to reconsider its July 
11th SSDI denial. In doing so, she said, ``I was terminated [by Policy 
Management Systems] due to my condition and I have not been able to 
work since. I continue to be disabled.'' Id., at 46. She later added 
that she had ``attempted to return to work in mid April,'' that she had 
``worked for three months,'' and that Policy Management Systems 
terminated her because she ``could no longer do the job'' in light of 
her ``condition.'' Id., at 47.
    November 1994: The SSA denied Cleveland's request for 
reconsideration. Cleveland sought an SSA hearing, reiterating that ``I 
am unable to work due to my disability,'' and presenting new evidence 
about the extent of her injuries. Id., at 79.
    September 29, 1995: The SSA awarded Cleveland SSDI benefits 
retroactive to the day of her stroke, January 7, 1994.
    On September 22, 1995, the week before her SSDI award, Cleveland 
brought this ADA lawsuit. She contended that Policy Management Systems 
had ``terminat[ed]'' her employment without reasonably 
``accommodat(ing) her disability.'' Id., at 7. She alleged that she 
requested, but was denied, accommodations such as training and 
additional time to complete her work. Id., at 96. And she submitted a 
supporting affidavit from her treating physician. Id., at 101. The 
District Court did not evaluate her reasonable accommodation claim on 
the merits, but granted summary judgment to the defendant because, in 
that court's view, Cleveland, by applying for and receiving SSDI 
benefits, had conceded that she was totally disabled. And that fact, 
the court concluded, now estopped Cleveland from proving an essential 
element of her ADA claim, namely that she could ``perform the essential 
functions'' of her job, at least with ``reasonable accommodation.'' 42 
U.S.C. 12111(8).
    The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment. 120 F.3d 513 (1997). The court wrote:
    ``[T]he application for or the receipt of social security 
disability benefits creates a rebuttable presumption that the claimant 
or recipient of such benefits is judicially estopped from asserting 
that he is a `qualified individual with a disability.' '' Id., at 518.
    The Circuit Court noted that it was ``at least theoretically 
conceivable that under some limited and highly unusual set of 
circumstances the two claims would not necessarily be mutually 
exclusive.'' Id., at 517. But it concluded that, because
    ``Cleveland consistently represented to the SSA that she was 
totally disabled, she has failed to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact rebutting the presumption that she is judicially estopped from now 
asserting that for the time in question she was nevertheless a 
`qualified individual with a disability' for purposes of her ADA 
claim.'' Id., at 518-519.
    We granted certiorari in light of disagreement among the Circuits 
about the legal effect upon an ADA suit of the application for, or 
receipt of, disability benefits. Compare, e.g., Rascon v. U S West 
Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (C.A.10 1998) (application 
for, and receipt of, SSDI benefits is relevant to, but does not estop 
plaintiff from bringing, an ADA claim); Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 382 (C.A.6 1998) (same), cert. pending, No. 97-
1991; Swanks v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 116 
F.3d 582, 586 (C.A.D.C. 1997) (same), with McNemar v. Disney Store, 
Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618-620 (C.A.3 1996) (applying judicial estoppel to 
bar plaintiff who applied for disability benefits from bringing suit 
under the ADA), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115, 117 S.Ct. 958, 136 L.Ed.2d 
845 (1997), and Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481-1482 
(C.A.9 1996) (declining to apply judicial estoppel but holding that 
claimant who declared total disability in a benefits application failed 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was a 
qualified individual with a disability).
    The Social Security Act and the ADA both help individuals with 
disabilities, but in different ways. The Social Security Act provides 
monetary benefits to every insured individual who ``is under a 
disability.'' 42 U.S.C. 423(a)(1). The Act defines ``disability'' as an

``inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason 
of any * * * physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 
continuous period of not less than 12 months.'' Section 
423(d)(1)(A).

    The individual's impairment, as we have said, supra, at 1599, must 
be

``of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do [her] 
previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work 
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work 
which exists in the national economy * * * .'' Section 423(d)(2)(A).

    The ADA seeks to eliminate unwarranted discrimination against 
disabled individuals in order both to guarantee those individuals equal 
opportunity and to provide the Nation with the benefit of their 
consequently increased productivity. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(8), 
(9). The Act prohibits covered employers from discriminating ``against 
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of 
such individual.'' Section 12112(a). The Act defines a ``qualified 
individual with a disability'' as a disabled person ``who * * * can 
perform the essential functions'' of her job, including those who can 
do so only ``with * * * reasonable accommodation.'' Section 12111(8).
    We here consider but one of the many ways in which these two 
statutes might interact. This case does not involve, for example, the 
interaction of either of the statutes before us with other statutes, 
such as the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq. Nor 
does it involve directly conflicting statements about purely factual 
matters, such as ``The light was red/green,'' or ``I can/cannot raise 
my arm above my head.'' An SSA representation of total disability 
differs from a purely factual statement in that it often implies a 
context-related legal conclusion, namely ``I am disabled for purposes 
of the Social Security Act.'' And our consideration of this latter kind 
of statement consequently leaves the law related to the former, purely 
factual, kind of conflict where we found it.
    The case before us concerns an ADA plaintiff who both applied for, 
and received, SSDI benefits. It requires us to review a Court of 
Appeals decision upholding the grant of summary judgment on the ground 
that an ADA plaintiff's ``represent(ation) to the SSA that she was 
totally disabled'' created a

[[Page 1218]]

``rebuttable presumption'' sufficient to ``judicially esto[p]'' her 
later representation that, ``for the time in question,'' with 
reasonable accommodation, she could perform the essential functions of 
her job. 120 F.3d, at 518-519. The Court of Appeals thought, in 
essence, that claims under both Acts would incorporate two directly 
conflicting propositions, namely ``I am too disabled to work'' and ``I 
am not too disabled to work.'' And in an effort to prevent two claims 
that would embody that kind of factual conflict, the court used a 
special judicial presumption, which it believed would ordinarily 
prevent a plaintiff like Cleveland from successfully asserting an ADA 
claim.
    In our view, however, despite the appearance of conflict that 
arises from the language of the two statutes, the two claims do not 
inherently conflict to the point where courts should apply a special 
negative presumption like the one applied by the Court of Appeals here. 
That is because there are too many situations in which an SSDI claim 
and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side by side.
    For one thing, as we have noted, the ADA defines a ``qualified 
individual'' to include a disabled person ``who * * * can perform the 
essential functions'' of her job ``with reasonable accommodation.'' 
Reasonable accommodations may include:

``job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, 
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of 
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of 
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of 
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar 
accommodations.'' 42 U.S.C. 12111(9)(B).

    By way of contrast, when the SSA determines whether an individual 
is disabled for SSDI purposes, it does not take the possibility of 
``reasonable accommodation'' into account, nor need an applicant refer 
to the possibility of reasonable accommodation when she applies for 
SSDI. See Memorandum from Daniel L. Skoler, Associate Comm'r for 
Hearings and Appeals, SSA, to Administrative Appeals Judges, reprinted 
in 2 Social Security Practice Guide, App. Section 15C[9], pp. 15-401 to 
15-402 (1998). The omission reflects the facts that the SSA receives 
more than 2.5 million claims for disability benefits each year; its 
administrative resources are limited; the matter of ``reasonable 
accommodation'' may turn on highly disputed workplace-specific matters; 
and an SSA misjudgment about that detailed, and often fact-specific 
matter would deprive a seriously disabled person of the critical 
financial support the statute seeks to provide. See Brief for United 
States et al. as Amici Curiae 10-11, and n. 2, 13. The result is that 
an ADA suit claiming that the plaintiff can perform her job with 
reasonable accommodation may well prove consistent with an SSDI claim 
that the plaintiff could not perform her own job (or other jobs) 
without it.
    For another thing, in order to process the large number of SSDI 
claims, the SSA administers SSDI with the help of a five-step procedure 
that embodies a set of presumptions about disabilities, job 
availability, and their interrelation. The SSA asks:
    Step One: Are you presently working? (If so, you are ineligible.) 
See 20 CFR 404.1520(b) (1998).
    Step Two: Do you have a ``severe impairment,'' i.e., one that 
``significantly limits'' your ability to do basic work activities? (If 
not, you are ineligible.) See Sec. 404.1520(c).
    Step Three: Does your impairment ``mee[t] or equa[l]'' an 
impairment on a specific (and fairly lengthy) SSA list? (If so, you are 
eligible without more.) See Secs. 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.
    Step Four: If your impairment does not meet or equal a listed 
impairment, can you perform your ``past relevant work?'' (If so, you 
are ineligible.) See Sec. 404.1520(e).
    Step Five: If your impairment does not meet or equal a listed 
impairment and you cannot perform your ``past relevant work,'' then can 
you perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 
national economy? (If not, you are eligible.) See Secs. 404.1520(f), 
404.1560(c).
    The presumptions embodied in these questions--particularly those 
necessary to produce Step Three's list, which, the Government tells us, 
accounts for approximately 60 percent of all awards, see Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 20--grow out of the need to administer a large benefits system 
efficiently. But they inevitably simplify, eliminating consideration of 
many differences potentially relevant to an individual's ability to 
perform a particular job. Hence, an individual might qualify for SSDI 
under the SSA's administrative rules and yet, due to special individual 
circumstances, remain capable of ``perform[ing] the essential 
functions'' of her job.
    Further, the SSA sometimes grants SSDI benefits to individuals who 
not only can work, but are working. For example, to facilitate a 
disabled person's reentry into the workforce, the SSA authorizes a 9-
month trial-work period during which SSDI recipients may receive full 
benefits. See 42 U.S.C. 422(c), 423(e)(1); 20 CFR 404.1592 (1998). See 
also Sec. 404.1592a (benefits available for an additional 15-month 
1 period depending upon earnings). Improvement in a totally 
disabled person's physical condition, while permitting that person to 
work, will not necessarily or immediately lead the SSA to terminate 
SSDI benefits. And the nature of an individual's disability may change 
over time, so that a statement about that disability at the time of an 
individual's application for SSDI benefits may not reflect an 
individual's capacities at the time of the relevant employment 
decision.
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    \1\ Effective January 1, 1988, the law was amended to lengthen 
the reentitlement period to SSDI benefits from 15 months to 36 
months. See section 223(a)(1) of the SSAct. [Ed. note]
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    Finally, if an individual has merely applied for, but has not been 
awarded, SSDI benefits, any inconsistency in the theory of the claims 
is of the sort normally tolerated by our legal system. Our ordinary 
rules recognize that a person may not be sure in advance upon which 
legal theory she will succeed, and so permit parties to ``set forth two 
or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or 
hypothetically,'' and to ``state as many separate claims or defenses as 
the party has regardless of consistency.'' Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 
8(e)(2). We do not see why the law in respect to the assertion of SSDI 
and ADA claims should differ. (And, as we said, we leave the law in 
respect to purely factual contradictions where we found it.)
    In light of these examples, we would not apply a special legal 
presumption permitting someone who has applied for, or received, SSDI 
benefits to bring an ADA suit only in ``some limited and highly unusual 
set of circumstances.'' 120 F.3d, at 517.
    Nonetheless, in some cases an earlier SSDI claim may turn out 
genuinely to conflict with an ADA claim. Summary judgment for a 
defendant is appropriate when the plaintiff ``fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to (her) 
case, and on which (she) will bear the burden of proof at trial.'' 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 
265 (1986). An ADA plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is a 
``qualified individual with a disability''--that is, a person ``who, 
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions'' of her job. 42 U.S.C. 12111(8). And a plaintiff's sworn 
assertion in an application for disability benefits that she is, for 
example, ``unable to work'' will appear to negate an essential element 
of her ADA case--

[[Page 1219]]

at least if she does not offer a sufficient explanation. For that 
reason, we hold that an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore the apparent 
contradiction that arises out of the earlier SSDI total disability 
claim. Rather, she must proffer a sufficient explanation.
    The lower courts, in somewhat comparable circumstances, have found 
a similar need for explanation. They have held with virtual unanimity 
that a party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to 
survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own 
previous sworn statement (by, say, filing a later affidavit that flatly 
contradicts that party's earlier sworn deposition) without explaining 
the contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity. See, e.g., 
Colantuoni v. Alfred Calcagni & Sons, Inc., 44 F.3d 1, 5 (C.A.1 1994); 
Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (C.A.2 1996); Hackman v. Valley 
Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 241 (C.A.3 1991); Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 
F.2d 946, 960 (C.A.4 1984); Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 
223, 228 (C.A.5 1984); Davidson & Jones Development Co. v. Elmore 
Development Co., 921 F.2d 1343, 1352 (C.A.6 1991); Slowiak v. Land 
O'Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1297 (C.A.7 1993); Camfield Tires, Inc. 
v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1365-1366 (C.A.8 1983); Kennedy 
v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (C.A.9 1991); Franks v. 
Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (C.A.10 1986); Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 
F.2d 949, 953-954 (C.A.11 1986); Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. IB 
Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1123 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 822, 112 S.Ct. 85, 116 L.Ed.2d 57 (1991); Sinskey v. Pharmacia 
Ophthalmics, Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 498 (C.A.Fed. 1992), cert. denied, 508 
U.S. 912, 113 S.Ct. 2346, 124 L.Ed.2d 256 (1993). Although these cases 
for the most part involve purely factual contradictions (as to which we 
do not necessarily endorse these cases, but leave the law as we found 
it), we believe that a similar insistence upon explanation is warranted 
here, where the conflict involves a legal conclusion. When faced with a 
plaintiff's previous sworn statement asserting ``total disability'' or 
the like, the court should require an explanation of any apparent 
inconsistency with the necessary elements of an ADA claim. To defeat 
summary judgment, that explanation must be sufficient to warrant a 
reasonable juror's concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the 
plaintiff's good faith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff 
could nonetheless ``perform the essential functions'' of her job, with 
or without ``reasonable accommodation.''

III

    In her brief in this Court, Cleveland explains the discrepancy 
between her SSDI statements that she was ``totally disabled'' and her 
ADA claim that she could ``perform the essential functions'' of her 
job. The first statements, she says, ``were made in a forum which does 
not consider the effect that reasonable workplace accommodations would 
have on the ability to work.'' Brief for Petitioner 43. Moreover, she 
claims the SSDI statements were ``accurate statements'' if examined 
``in the time period in which they were made.'' Ibid. The parties 
should have the opportunity in the trial court to present, or to 
contest, these explanations, in sworn form where appropriate. 
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand 
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    It is so ordered.
    Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

[FR Doc. 00-411 Filed 1-6-00; 8:45 am]
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