[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 3 (Wednesday, January 5, 2000)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 560-611]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-16]



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Part II





Department of Transportation





_______________________________________________________________________



Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Parts 108, 109, 111, 129, and 191



Certification of Screening Companies; Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 3 / Wednesday, January 5, 2000 / 
Proposed Rules  

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 108, 109, 111, 129, and 191

[Docket No. FAA-1999-6673; Notice No. 99-21]
RIN 2120-AG84


Certification of Screening Companies

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: This document proposes to require that all companies that 
perform aviation security screening be certificated by the FAA and meet 
enhanced requirements. This proposal is in response to a recommendation 
by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and to a 
Congressional mandate in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 
1996. The proposal is intended to improve the screening of passengers, 
accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo and to provide 
standards for consistent high performance and increased screening 
company accountability.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before April 4, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this document should be mailed or delivered, in 
duplicate, to: U.S. Department of Transportation Dockets, Docket No. 
FAA-1999-6673, 400 Seventh Street SW., Room Plaza 401, Washington, DC 
20590. Comments may be filed and examined in Room Plaza 401 between 10 
a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays, except Federal holidays. Comments also may be 
sent electronically to the Dockets Management System (DMS) at the 
following Internet address: http://dms.dot.gov/ at any time. Commenters 
who wish to file comments electronically should follow the instructions 
on the DMS web site.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Shrum, Manager, Civil Aviation 
Security Division, Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and 
Planning (ACP-100), Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, telephone (202)267-3946.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the 
proposed action by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as 
they may desire. Comments relating to the environmental, energy, 
federalism, or economic impact that might result from adopting the 
proposals in this document are also invited. Substantive comments 
should be accompanied by cost estimates. Comments must identify the 
regulatory docket or notice number and be submitted in duplicate to the 
DOT Rules Docket address specified above.
    All comments received, as well as a report summarizing each 
substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed 
rulemaking, will be filed in the docket. The docket is available for 
public inspection before and after the comment closing date. All 
comments received on or before the closing date will be considered by 
the Administrator before taking action on this proposed rulemaking. 
Comments filed late will be considered as far as possible without 
incurring expense or delay. The proposals in this document may be 
changed in light of the comments received.
    Comments received on this proposal will be available both before 
and after the closing date for comments in the Rules Docket for 
examination by interested persons. However, the Assistant Administrator 
for Civil Aviation Security has determined that the security programs 
required by parts 108, 109, and 129 contain sensitive security 
information. As such, the availability of information pertaining to 
these security programs is governed by 14 CFR part 191. Carriers, 
screening companies, and others who wish to comment on this document 
should be cautious not to include in their comments any information 
contained in any security program.
    Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments 
submitted in response to this document must include a pre-addressed, 
stamped postcard with those comments on which the following statement 
is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-1999-6673.'' The postcard will be 
date stamped and mailed to the commenter.
    To give the public an additional opportunity to comment on the 
NPRM, the FAA anticipates planning public meetings. If the FAA 
determines that it is appropriate to hold such meetings, a separate 
notice announcing the times, locations, and procedures for public 
meetings will be published in the Federal Register.

Availability of NPRMs

    An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem 
and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section 
of the Fedworld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: (703) 
321-3339) or the Government Printing Office (GPO)'s electronic bulletin 
board service (telephone: (202) 512-1661).
    Internet users may reach the FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/
avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm, or the GPO's web page at http://
www.access.gpo.gov/nara for access to recently published rulemaking 
documents.
    Any person may obtain a copy of this document by submitting a 
request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, 
ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by 
calling (202) 267-9680. Communications must identify the notice number 
or docket number of this NPRM.
    Persons interested in being placed on the mailing list for future 
rulemaking documents should request from the above office a copy of 
Advisory Circular No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution 
System, which describes the application procedure.

Outline of Preamble

I. Introduction

A. Current Requirements.
B. History.
C. Aviation Security Screening.
D. The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM).
E. Related Rulemakings.

II. The Proposal: Overview

A. Summary.
B. Certification of All Who Perform Screening.
C. Roles of Carriers and Screening Companies.
D. Compliance and Enforcement Issues.
E. New Part 111.
F. Screening of Cargo.
G. Screening Standard Security Program (SSSP).
H. Screener Qualifications.
I. Performance Measurements and Standards.

III. Proposed Part 111: Section-by-Section Discussion

Subpart A--General

A. 111.1 Applicability.
B. 111.3 Definitions.
C. 111.5 Inspection authority.
D. 111.7 Falsification.
E. 111.9 Prohibition against interference with screening personnel.

Subpart B--Security Program, Certificate, and Operations Specifications

F. 111.101 Performance of screening.
G. 111.103; 111.105; and 111.107 Security programs.
H. 111.109 Screening company certificate.
I. 111.111; 111.113; and 111.115 Operations specifications
J. 111.117 Oversight by air carriers, foreign air carriers, or 
indirect air carriers.
K. 111.119 Business office.

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Subpart C--Operations

L. 111.201 Screening of persons and property and acceptance of 
cargo.
M. 111.203 Use of screening equipment.
N. 111.205 Employment standards for screening personnel.
O. 111.207 Disclosure of sensitive security information.
P. 111.209 Screening company management.
Q. 111.211 Screening company instructor qualifications.
R. 111.213 Training and knowledge of persons with screening-related 
duties.
S. 111.215 Training tests: requirements.
T. 111.217 Training tests: cheating and other unauthorized conduct.
U. 111.219 Screener letter of completion of training.
V. 111.221 Screener and supervisor training records.
W. 111.223 Automated performance measurement and standards.

IV. Proposed Revisions to Parts 108, 109, and 129

A. 108.201(h); 109.203(a); and 129.25(k) Certification requirement.
B. 108.5 and 109.5 Inspection authority.
C. 108.103(b); 109.103(b); and 129.25(c)  Security program form, 
content, and availability.
D. 109.105 and 129.25(e)  Approvals and amendments of security 
programs.
E. 108.201(i), (j), and (k); 109.203(b), (c), and (d); and 
129.25(l), (m), and (n) Responsibilities of carriers and screening 
companies.
F. 108.201(l) and 129.25(o)  Public notification regarding 
additional security measures.
G. 108.205; 109.207; and 129.26  Use of X-ray systems.
H. 108.207 and 129.28  Use of explosives detection systems.
I. 108.229, 109.205, and 129.25(p)  Monitoring of screener training 
tests.
J. Additional proposed requirements to parts 108, 109, and 129.

V. Proposed Revisions to Part 191

A. Protection of sensitive security information (SSI).
B. 191.1 Applicability and definitions.
C. 191.5 Records and information protected by others.
D. 191.7 Description of SSI.

VI. Paperwork Reduction Act

VII. Compatibility With ICAO Standards

VIII. Regulatory Analyses

A. Regulatory evaluation summary.
B. Initial regulatory flexibility determination.
C. International trade impact statement.
D. Unfunded mandates.
E. Federalism implications.

I. Introduction

I.A. Current Requirements

    The Administrator is required to prescribe regulations to protect 
passengers and property on aircraft operating in air transportation or 
intrastate air transportation against acts of criminal violence or 
aircraft piracy. Such protections include searches of persons and 
property that will be carried aboard an aircraft to ensure that they 
have no unlawful dangerous weapons, explosives, or other destructive 
substances (49 U.S.C. 44901-44903). Screening of all passengers and 
property that will be carried in a cabin of an aircraft in air 
transportation or intrastate air transportation must be done before the 
aircraft is boarded, using weapon-detecting facilities or procedures 
used or operated by employees or agents of the air carriers, intrastate 
air carriers, or foreign air carriers (49 U.S.C. 44901).
    Part 108 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, contains rules 
in Secs. 108.9, 108.17, and 108.20 for air carrier screening 
operations. These rules, which are available to the general public, 
provide basic standards for the screeners, equipment, and procedures to 
be used. In addition, each air carrier required to conduct screening 
has a nonpublic security program (required under current Secs. 108.5 
and 108.7) that contains detailed requirements for screening of 
persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo. All air 
carriers subject to part 108 have adopted the Air Carrier Standard 
Security Program (ACSSP). The ACSSP provides identical measures for air 
carriers. Individual air carriers may request alternate procedures in 
specific situations if the required level of security can be 
maintained.
    Part 109 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), 
contains rules in Sec. 109.3 for conducting security procedures by 
indirect air carriers. An indirect air carrier is any person or entity 
within the United States, not in possession of an FAA air carrier 
operating certificate, that undertakes to engage indirectly in the air 
transportation of property, and uses, for all or any part of such 
transportation, the services of a passenger air carrier. This does not 
include the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) or its representative while 
acting on behalf of the USPS. This definition does include freight 
forwarders and air couriers. Each indirect air carrier has a nonpublic 
security program (Sec. 109.5) that contains detailed requirements for 
screening cargo. All indirect air carriers adopt the Indirect Air 
Carrier Standard Security Program (IACSSP). The IACSSP provides 
identical measures for indirect air carriers. IACSSP requirements are 
essentially the same as the requirements in the ACSSP for screening 
cargo.
    Part 129 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, contains rules 
in Secs. 129.25, 129.26, and 129.27 for foreign air carrier screening. 
Each foreign air carrier conducting screening has a nonpublic security 
program (Sec. 129.25) that contains detailed requirements for screening 
persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo. All foreign 
air carriers conducting operations in the United States are subject to 
part 129 and have adopted the Model Security Program (MSP) for their 
security programs in the United States. The MSP provides identical 
measures for foreign air carriers. MSP requirements applicable within 
the United States are essentially the same as the requirements in the 
ACSSP.
    Throughout this notice, air carriers, indirect air carriers, and 
foreign air carriers are collectively referred to as ``carriers.''
    There are several means by which a carrier can conduct screening. 
It can use its own employees. It can contract with another company to 
conduct the screening in accordance with the carrier's security 
program. It can contract with another carrier to conduct screening. In 
each case, the carrier is required to provide oversight to ensure that 
all FAA requirements are met.

I.B. History

    Since 1985, at least 10 major international terrorist incidents 
involving aviation have occurred worldwide, including the bombing of 
Pan Am flight 103 on December 21, 1988, which killed 243 passengers, 16 
crewmembers, and 11 people on the ground. While all of the attacks 
against U.S. civil aviation in this period have taken place abroad, the 
link between the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 
January 1995 plot to bomb several U.S. airliners in the Far East 
suggests that civil aviation in the United States may have become a 
more attractive target for terrorist attacks. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef was 
convicted (along with different sets of co-conspirators) for his roles 
in both plots as well as for the bombing of Philippine Airlines flight 
434 in December 1994. Had Yousef's plot to bomb U.S. airliners 
succeeded, hundreds if not thousands of passengers would almost 
certainly have been killed.
    These incidents have demonstrated the capabilities and intentions 
of international terrorists to attack the United States and its 
citizens as well as the ability of such terrorists to operate in the 
United States. The threat posed by foreign terrorists in the United 
States remains a serious concern, and the FAA believes that the threat 
will continue for the foreseeable future.
    The threat of terrorist acts against aircraft has led to several 
actions by the United States Government to strengthen

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aviation security. These actions include two Presidential commissions, 
the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, the Federal Aviation 
Reauthorization Act of 1996, and several FAA rulemakings to improve 
security measures at airports. The action proposed in this notice 
therefore is part of a broad, continuing effort to increase aviation 
security.
    Following the tragic crash of TWA flight 800 on July 17, 1996, the 
President created the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and 
Security (the White House Commission). The White House Commission 
issued an initial report on September 9, 1996, with 20 specific 
recommendations for improving security. One recommendation was for the 
development of uniform performance standards for the selection, 
training, certification, and recertification of screening companies and 
their employees. The final report, issued on February 12, 1997, 
reiterated this recommendation.
    Before the crash of TWA flight 800, the FAA had become concerned as 
well that there was a need to reevaluate the overall level of civil 
aviation security. The FAA asked the Aviation Security Advisory 
Committee (ASAC) to review the threat assessment of foreign terrorism 
within the United States, consider the warning and interdiction 
capabilities of intelligence and law enforcement, examine the 
vulnerabilities of the domestic civil aviation system, and consider the 
potential consequences of a successful attack. The ASAC, which consists 
of representatives from the FAA and other Federal agencies, the 
aviation industry, and public interest groups, formed a subgroup called 
the Baseline Working Group (BWG) on July 17, 1996, to evaluate the 
domestic aviation security ``baseline'' in light of the new threat 
environment. The BWG released its Domestic Security Baseline Final 
Report on December 12, 1996. The report presented multiple 
recommendations for improving aviation security through certifications 
of screeners and screening companies, rapid deployments of available 
technologies, and institutional and procedural changes in the U.S. 
aviation security system.
    On October 9, 1996, the President signed the Federal Aviation 
Reauthorization Act of 1996, Public Law 104-264. Section 302 (49 U.S.C. 
44935 note) states:

    The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration is 
directed to certify companies providing security screening and to 
improve the training and testing of security screeners through 
development of uniform performance standards for providing security 
screening services.

I.C. Aviation Security Screening

    Effective aviation security screening is critical to protecting 
passengers in air transportation against acts of criminal violence and 
aircraft piracy. It is the front line of defense against potential acts 
of aviation terrorism. It is therefore imperative that airports, 
carriers, screening companies, and the FAA work together to strengthen 
continually the aviation security screening system.
    The FAA first required domestic passenger screening in 1973 in 
response to increasing numbers of hijackings. The focus at that time 
was to detect weapons, such as handguns and knives, through the use of 
X-ray and metal detector technologies at security checkpoints. The 
introduction of screening greatly reduced hijackings in the United 
States. Since then, the greater challenge to security has been the 
prevention of aircraft bombings, a challenge that became particularly 
urgent in the 1980's as various terrorist elements succeeded in 
bringing down aircraft and causing mass casualties by means of on-board 
bombs. Some of the bombs used against aircraft have been crude devices, 
easily detectable by screeners utilizing X-ray machines, but the trend 
has been toward smaller improvised explosive devices (IED's) and 
plastic explosives that are more difficult to detect without explosives 
detection systems (EDS). The threat of IED's has also expanded the 
initial scope of screening from passengers and carry-on baggage only to 
include checked baggage and cargo.
    The FAA has conducted extensive research regarding how the United 
States can best counter these evolving threats. The research has 
centered around both technologies and human factors issues; each is 
important to thorough, effective screening and poses unique challenges.
    The traditional X-ray and metal detector technologies have been 
supplemented since the mid-1990's with several new advanced screening 
technologies. An advanced screening technology, as that term is used 
here, is any technology that is capable of automatic threat 
identification. These advanced screening technologies include 
explosives detection systems, explosive trace detectors (ETD), and 
advanced technology (AT) X-ray-based machines for automatic bulk 
explosives detection, some of which employ screener assist 
technologies. At this time EDS-type technologies certified by the FAA 
apply medical computed axial tomography (CAT) scan technology, but 
other types of technologies also may meet EDS criteria in the future. 
The EDS are used to screen checked baggage and have the ability to 
automatically detect threat types and quantities of bulk explosives at 
FAA-specified detection and false alarm rates, up to the initial system 
alarm and without human intervention. The AT systems also focus on 
detecting bulk explosives in checked baggage and have automatic alarm 
capabilities; however, AT systems do not meet the full EDS standards 
required by the FAA for all categories of explosives, amounts, 
detection rates, and false alarm rates. The AT's still have more 
sophisticated detection capabilities than the standard X-ray systems 
used for imaging only. The ETD's also detect explosives, but differ in 
that they are used to analyze and detect minute amounts of explosive 
residues or vapors, are much smaller in size and less costly than the 
EDS's and AT's, and are primarily used at screening checkpoints to 
screen items entering sterile areas.
    The FAA currently is deploying several types of advanced screening 
technologies in the Nation's airports. Each advanced screening 
technology is capable of detecting specific items. The FAA believes 
that the most effective approach to screening at this time is to use a 
combination of these technologies at screening locations.
    Some of the technologies being developed focus on the human element 
of screening. The FAA currently is developing and deploying computer 
based training (CBT) and threat image projection (TIP) systems that 
provide initial and recurrent training and monitor screener 
performance. The potential benefits of CBT are self-paced learning, 
enhanced opportunities for realistic practice, combined training and 
performance testing, and instruction that is uniform throughout the 
country. CBT currently is being used to train screeners in many of the 
Nation's busiest airports, and the FAA is evaluating its effectiveness 
at these locations. The FAA anticipates making CBT available for use by 
all of the carriers but does not anticipate requiring its use at this 
time. Some private companies also are developing CBT systems that may 
earn FAA acceptance and the FAA encourages this development.
    TIP also has significant potential benefits and is a critical 
component of this proposed rule. TIP systems currently are being 
deployed and tested on both X-ray and explosives detection systems. The 
TIP systems use two different methods of projection--fictional threat 
image (FTI) and

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combined technology image (CTI). FTI superimposes a threat image from 
an extensive library of images onto the X-ray image of actual passenger 
baggage being screened. The image appears on the monitor as if a threat 
object actually exists within the passenger's bag. The screener can 
check whether the image is an actual threat image before requesting 
that the bag be screened further. The CTI is a prefabricated image of 
an entire threat bag and also can be electronically inserted onto a 
display monitor. For both types of images, screeners are immediately 
provided with feedback on their ability to detect each threat. TIP 
exposes screeners to threats on a regular basis to train them to become 
more adept at detecting threats and to enhance their vigilance. TIP 
allows the FAA to expose screeners to the latest potential threats and 
should allow the FAA and the industry to determine what elements make a 
screener more effective, such as training methods and experience 
levels. Future TIP data may affect requirements proposed in the 
security programs.
    The FAA also is validating a series of screener selection tests to 
help screening companies identify applicants who may have natural 
aptitudes to be effective screeners. Currently, the cognitive skills 
and processes for optimal detection of threat objects are poorly 
understood. The FAA sees an immediate need to identify valid tests to 
select job applicants who should be able to become successful 
screeners. The FAA currently is administering several screener 
selection tests to groups of screener trainees as part of their CBT and 
then measuring their subsequent job performance using TIP. If valid 
selection tests are developed, the FAA may offer them to carriers and 
screening companies for optional use but does not anticipate requiring 
their use at this time.
    The FAA will continue its human factors research. Although the new 
technologies described are highly effective in detecting explosives, 
the FAA realizes that each one is ultimately dependent on the human 
operator. Screeners are critical to the screening process. Future human 
factors research will focus on the attributes, skills, and abilities 
that make for an effective screener. Such elements may include an 
individual's cognitive ability, learned skills, education level, 
quality and amount of training, and experience (i.e., time on the job). 
Screener pay levels and the quality of supervision may also affect 
screener performance (i.e., threat detection rates). Analyzing TIP data 
will help the FAA to explore and confirm or refute many hypotheses 
regarding the factors that affect screener performance.
    What is known currently is that each type of screening and 
screening technology is unique and requires different skills and 
abilities. For example, monitoring a walk-through metal detector 
requires a limited understanding of the technology involved and does 
not involve image interpretations. Conversely, operating an EDS is much 
more complex and requires operators to exercise independent judgment as 
they interpret and make decisions regarding images that are all 
distinctly different. The screening tasks described in these examples 
require different types of skills and abilities and require training 
designed to optimize performance for those particular tasks. The FAA's 
human factors research will attempt to isolate these skills and 
abilities and determine how they can best be recognized and developed. 
With regard to compensation, wages for screeners in the United States 
currently average $5.75 per hour and some screeners do not receive 
fringe benefits. Average annual screener turnover rates exceed 100 
percent in many locations. Screeners repeatedly state that low wages 
and minimal benefits, along with infrequent supervisor feedback and 
frustrating working conditions, cause them to seek employment 
elsewhere.
    Experience in other countries seems to indicate that higher 
compensation, more training, and frequent testing of their screeners 
may result in lower turnover rates and more effective screener 
performance. The FAA has reports from many sources that screening, 
particularly screening of checked baggage, is conducted more 
effectively in many other countries than it is in the United States. 
U.S. citizens traveling abroad also have expressed concern that 
screening in the United States appears to be less thorough than it is 
in other countries. While the FAA until recently did not have actual 
performance data from other countries to substantiate these views, it 
now has test results that are strongly indicative of better screener 
performance by some European authorities than by some U.S. screening 
operators. The test results were derived from joint testing of 
screeners that the FAA conducted with a European country. FAA special 
agents and government personnel from the European country tested 
screeners in each country using the same methods. On average, screeners 
in the European country were able to detect more than twice as many 
test objects as screeners in the United States. Screeners in the 
European country receive significantly more training and higher 
salaries than screeners in the United States and receive comprehensive 
benefits. Screeners in the European country also have more screening 
experience on average than their United States counterparts. U.S. air 
carriers and screening companies may want to pursue any and all of 
these factors to achieve higher performance. The FAA will continue to 
conduct research and examine operational data to determine how these 
factors affect screener performance and retention, both domestically 
and in conjunction with foreign governments.
    It is clear that the United States can improve upon practices in 
many of these human factors areas making its aviation screening 
operations as strong and effective as its other aviation operations and 
endeavors. Several issues related to human factors in screening, such 
as performance and the environment in which screeners work, are 
addressed in this NPRM. The FAA invites comments and supporting data 
regarding human factors issues such as the potential affects of 
increased wages, benefits, experience, and training on screener 
performance.

I.D. The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM)

    In response to the Congressional mandate and to the White House 
Commission report, the FAA published an ANPRM on March 17, 1997 (62 FR 
12724), requesting comments on certification of companies providing 
security screening. The FAA received 20 comments from the public on the 
ANPRM, all of which were substantive.
    Subsequent to the publication of the ANPRM, the FAA began field 
testing threat image projection systems and evaluating their potential 
for measuring screener performance. The FAA determined that the TIP 
systems would be integral to proposing requirements for performance 
measurements and standards. Therefore, the FAA published an ANPRM 
withdrawal notice on May 13, 1998 (63 FR 26706), to allow TIP to be 
adequately field tested and validated before the FAA proceeded with the 
rulemaking. Although the ANPRM was withdrawn, the FAA considered and 
incorporated many of the commenters' suggestions in this proposal. The 
following is a brief summary of the overall comments.
    While commenters disagreed on several issues, including the level 
of oversight responsibility that air carriers should have over 
certificated screening companies, commenters generally agreed that 
national standards for security screening operations are

[[Page 564]]

needed. Approximately one-third of the commenters stated that 
certificating individual screeners would have a greater impact on 
improving security than certificating screening companies. Most of 
these commenters also stated that certificating individual screeners 
would improve screener professionalism and performance.
    Approximately half of the commenters agreed that air carriers 
conducting screening operations should be subject to the same standards 
as certificated screening companies. A majority of commenters stated 
that the same screening operation requirements that apply to U.S. 
carriers should apply to foreign carriers providing services in this 
country. Several commenters disagreed with any proposal by the FAA to 
regulate joint-use checkpoints and checkpoint operational 
configurations. More detailed discussions of the issues raised by 
commenters are provided throughout the proposed rule section of this 
preamble.

I.E. Related Rulemakings

    On August 1, 1997, the FAA published two NPRM's. Notice No. 97-12 
(62 FR 41730) proposes to revise 14 CFR part 108 to update the overall 
regulatory structure for air carrier security. Notice No. 97-13 (62 FR 
41760) proposes to revise 14 CFR part 107 to update the overall 
regulatory structure for airport security. Notice No. 97-12 and notice 
No. 97-13 are the result of several years of work by the FAA, airports 
and air carriers, and the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC), 
a committee formed under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C., 
appendix II) in April 1989 by the Secretary of Transportation.
    This document proposes to amend the proposed rule language of part 
108 in Notice No. 97-12 rather than the current part 108. The numbering 
system for part 108 of this NPRM is based on the numbering system for 
Notice No. 97-12. The numbering systems for proposed part 111 and 
revised part 109 are also closely aligned with the Notice No. 97-12 
numbering system for clarity and consistency.

II. The Proposal: Overview

    This document has two objectives: to propose procedures for 
certification of screening companies; and to propose other requirements 
to improve screening, such as performance measurements and new training 
and FAA testing requirements for screeners. The FAA believes that this 
proposal would improve performance, improve the consistency and quality 
of screening, and meet the congressional mandate stated in the Federal 
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 and the intent of the White House 
Commission recommendations.
    This overview contains a summary of the basic framework of the 
proposed rule for certification of screening companies. It also 
contains more detailed discussions of some of the approaches to 
regulating screening that are implemented in the proposals and the 
FAA's reasons for using these approaches.

II.A. Summary

    The major proposals contained in part 111 and the changes and 
additions proposed to parts 108, 109, and 129 are as follows:
    (1) The proposed rule would require certification of all screening 
companies that inspect persons or property for the presence of any 
unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon in 
the United States on behalf of air carriers, indirect air carriers, or 
foreign air carriers required to adopt and carry out FAA-approved 
security programs (proposed Secs. 111.1 and 111.109(a)).
    (2) The certification requirement would include all persons 
conducting screening within the United States under parts 108, 109, and 
129. An air carrier, indirect air carrier, or foreign air carrier that 
performs screening for itself or for other carriers would have to 
obtain a screening company certificate (proposed Secs. 108.201(h), 
109.203(a), and 129.25(k)).
    (3) The proposed rule would provide for provisional certificates 
for new screening companies and screening companies already performing 
screening at the time of publication of the final rule. Before the end 
of the provisional period, screening companies would apply for 
screening company certificates, that would be valid for 5 years 
(proposed Sec. 111.109(d) and (e)).
    (4) Responsibility for the performance of a screening company would 
be borne by the screening company and the relevant air carrier(s), 
indirect air carrier(s), or foreign air carrier(s). Carrier oversight 
would be required (proposed Secs. 111.117; 108.103(b); 108.201(i) and 
(j); 109.103(b); 109.203(b) and (c); and 129.25(c), (l), and (m)).
    (5) The proposed rule would require approvals of operations 
specifications that would include locations of screening sites; types 
of screening; equipment and methods used to screen; and screener 
training curricula (proposed Secs. 111.113 and 111.115).
    (6) The proposed rule would require that screening companies adopt 
and implement FAA-approved screening company security programs that 
would include procedures to perform screening functions, including 
operating equipment; screener testing standards and test administration 
requirements; threat image projection standards, operating 
requirements, and data collection methods; and performance standards 
(proposed Secs. 111.103, 111.105, and 111.107).
    (7) The proposed rule would set forth requirements for screening 
companies regarding the screening of persons and property and the use 
of screening equipment (proposed Secs. 111.201 and 111.203).
    (8) The proposed rule would add requirements for the use of X-ray 
systems to part 109 and for the use of explosives detection systems to 
part 129 (proposed Secs. 109.207 and 129.28).
    (9) The proposed rule would provide consolidated employment 
standards for all screening company personnel, including new training 
requirements for screeners regarding courteous and efficient screening 
and U.S. civil rights laws and for supervisors regarding leadership and 
management subjects (proposed Sec. 111.205).
    (10) The proposed rule would require that screening companies have 
qualified management and technical personnel (proposed Sec. 111.209).
    (11) The proposed rule would require that screening instructors 
meet minimum experience and training standards (proposed Sec. 111.211).
    (12) The proposed rule would specify training requirements for 
screening companies regarding training programs and knowledge of 
subject areas and would require that the training programs be submitted 
to the FAA for approval (proposed Sec. 111.213).
    (13) The proposed rule would require that all screening personnel 
pass computerized FAA knowledge-based and X-ray interpretation tests 
before and after their on-the-job training and at the conclusion of 
their recurrent training and that the tests be monitored by carrier 
personnel in accordance with the carriers' security programs. The 
proposed rule would also describe and prohibit specific instances of 
cheating and other unauthorized conduct (proposed Secs. 111.215, 
111.217, 108.229, 109.205, and 129.25(p)).
    (14) The proposed rule would require that all carriers install 
threat image projection (TIP) systems on their X-ray systems and that 
all air carriers and foreign air carriers install TIP systems on their 
explosives detection systems unless otherwise authorized by the 
Administrator. Screening companies would be required to use the TIP 
systems as specified in their security

[[Page 565]]

programs, including collecting and analyzing the TIP data, and to meet 
the performance measurements and standards set forth in their security 
programs (proposed Secs. 108.205 and 108.207; 129.26 and 129.28; 
109.207; and 111.223).
    (15) The proposed rule would prohibit interference with screening 
personnel in the course of their screening duties (proposed 
Sec. 111.9).
    In addition to the above proposed changes, the proposal would amend 
part 191 to extend SSI requirements to certificated screening companies 
and their employees.
    The FAA is not proposing to require certifications for individual 
screeners, as some commenters to the ANPRM recommended. The FAA does 
not have the statutory authority under Title 49 or the Federal Aviation 
Reauthorization Act of 1996 to require such certification. Other 
requirements in this proposal would help to improve the professionalism 
of screeners; e.g., by providing for mobility of screener records 
(proposed Sec. 111.221) and by requiring letters of completion to be 
issued to screeners and screener supervisors upon their successful 
completion of initial, recurrent, and specialized courses of training 
(proposed Sec. 111.219).
    The FAA has also decided not to specifically address joint-use 
screening locations in this rulemaking, although comments were invited 
with respect to this issue in the ANPRM. A joint-use screening location 
is a security location that is screening for multiple carriers. The FAA 
received several comments to the ANPRM that stated that an agreement 
should be required for all air carriers to sign with the managing air 
carrier of a screening location. However, other commenters stated that 
the concept of joint-use screening locations is an internal management 
tool of the air carriers that allows flexibility. These commenters 
believe that it is not appropriate for the FAA to place undue 
restraints on the management process for joint-use screening locations. 
After considering the ANPRM comments and reviewing representative 
samples of joint-use screening location agreements, the FAA has 
determined that rulemaking is not the best way to address these issues. 
They would be better addressed in future security program amendments 
and/or compliance and enforcement policies.

II.B. Certification of All Who Perform Screening

    This proposal would require that all companies that perform 
screening be certificated under part 111, even if they are air 
carriers, foreign air carriers, or indirect air carriers. This approach 
is consistent with several comments to the ANPRM that stated that air 
carriers conducting screening should be subject to the same standards 
as certificated screening companies.
    Certifying all screening companies, including carriers that perform 
screening, would:
     Provide uniform standards for all companies that intend to 
provide screening.
     Ensure that all companies that conduct screening benefit 
from the enhanced requirements imposed upon screening companies in part 
111.
     Clearly differentiate between the roles of the air 
carriers, indirect air carriers, and foreign air carriers as carriers 
and as certificated screening companies.
     Clarify the relationships among air carriers, indirect air 
carriers, and foreign air carriers that contract with each other for 
screening services.
    Some commenters to the ANPRM questioned the need to certificate air 
carriers for the purpose of screening since they are already 
certificated by the FAA. Air carriers currently are certificated to 
operate as air carriers under part 119. However, the certification 
process in part 119 does not include an evaluation of whether an 
applicant can adequately perform screening functions. The FAA has 
determined that to fulfill the congressional mandate, all who perform 
screening shall establish their ability to do so by qualifying for 
screening company certificates. Any air carrier, indirect air carrier, 
or foreign air carrier that does not choose to hold a screening company 
certificate could contract with a certificated screening company to 
perform its screening.

II.C. Roles of Carriers and Screening Companies

    Currently, carriers have statutory and regulatory responsibilities 
to conduct screening properly. The FAA cannot propose to relieve 
carriers of these responsibilities. The responsibility of air carriers 
and foreign air carriers to ensure that screening is conducted on 
persons and property to be carried in the cabin of an aircraft is in 
the statute (49 U.S.C. 44901(a)) and cannot be changed by the FAA. As 
discussed previously, the requirement to certificate screening 
companies also is in the statute. Issues arise, then, concerning the 
relationships between the carriers and the screening companies and the 
proper roles for each. The FAA interprets these statutory provisions as 
leaving the ultimate responsibility for screening with the carriers and 
providing for concurrent carrier and screening company responsibilities 
for some tasks. This relationship is not unlike that between repair 
stations and air carriers. Repair stations are certificated under part 
145 and are responsible for performing maintenance in accordance with 
regulations; however, the air carriers remain ultimately responsible 
for the airworthiness of their aircraft. The FAA recognizes that this 
relationship may be difficult to define, but proposes the following 
general guidance.
    The FAA envisions that the carriers would continue to be 
responsible for providing proper screening equipment, such as X-ray 
machines and metal detectors. The carriers would also have primary 
responsibility to deal with the airport operators on issues regarding 
the locations of screening equipment in the airports. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, the carriers would be responsible for 
overseeing the performance of the screening companies to ensure that 
they carry out their duties.
    The screening companies would be responsible for inspecting persons 
and property for unauthorized explosives, incendiaries, and deadly or 
dangerous weapons. They would be responsible for ensuring that they use 
the equipment properly, staff the screening locations adequately, train 
their screeners properly, and otherwise manage the screening locations 
so as to enable them to meet the standards for screening in their 
security programs.

II.D. Compliance and Enforcement Issues

    As discussed previously, this proposed rule would not shift the 
responsibility for screening from air carriers, indirect air carriers, 
and foreign air carriers to screening companies. Rather, certificating 
screening companies is a way to assist carriers in ensuring that those 
who conduct screening are fully qualified to do so. Certification also 
would make screening companies directly accountable to the FAA for 
failures to carry out their screening duties. This rule would increase 
the level of responsibility required of screening companies while 
improving screening oversight by air carriers, indirect air carriers, 
and foreign air carriers.
    The FAA envisions that screening companies would be primarily 
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the screening locations. 
Screening companies generally would be held accountable for screening 
location failures. The FAA intends to look to screening companies to 
maintain the

[[Page 566]]

highest standards and to continuously monitor and improve their 
capabilities.
    The full range of actions would be available for use against 
screening companies that failed to comply with the regulations, their 
operations specifications, and their security program. These include 
counseling, administrative action (warning notices and letters of 
correction), civil penalties, and certificate actions (suspension or 
revocation of a certificate). In addition, if the screening company was 
unable to carry out its duties at a specific screening location, the 
FAA could amend its operations specifications (see Sec. 111.111) to 
withdraw its authority to screen at that location.
    If a company was removed from a location because of its failure to 
screen properly, the FAA would continue to monitor closely that 
location as another company came in to conduct screening. The FAA is 
concerned about situations in which incoming companies use the same 
equipment and hire the same employees from the unsatisfactory companies 
and make no real changes in the quality of screening. The FAA would 
consider requiring incoming companies to take additional corrective 
measures to ensure that the problems that affected the performance of 
the previous companies do not recur.
    Carriers would continue to be responsible for the overall proper 
screening of persons and property. They would be directly accountable 
for failing to carry out duties specifically assigned to them, such as 
providing the proper screening equipment and carrying out specific 
oversight functions (such as Ground Security Coordinator duties and 
auditing functions). In addition, when a screening company failed to 
screen properly or otherwise failed to carry out its duties, the FAA 
would carefully evaluate all facts and circumstances to determine 
whether the carrier should be the subject of enforcement action. In 
general, repeated or systemic failures of a screening company to comply 
with the regulations or fundamental failures of the screeners to comply 
with security requirements might lead to the conclusion that the 
carrier has failed to conduct screening properly or to oversee the 
screening company's operations, even if the carrier had conducted the 
required audits and did not discover problems. The audits would be one 
tool for the carrier to use but would not limit its responsibility to 
ensure proper screening. Carriers would be expected to identify 
problems with the screening company and take corrective action in a 
timely manner.
    If the FAA determines that a screening company is performing 
poorly, whether at a particular location or in its overall operations, 
the FAA could require the screening company and/or the responsible air 
carriers to implement additional security measures under this proposal 
to maintain system performance. Such additional measures would vary 
depending on the circumstances and might involve, for example, 
additional training for screeners, redundant screening of property, or 
increased management oversight. The measures could slow screening 
operations at affected locations but would help ensure that thorough, 
effective screening was being performed. If the additional measures 
proved ineffective or if the circumstances were extreme, amendments of 
the screening companies' operations specifications or suspensions or 
revocations of certificates could result.
    The proposal would require that each air carrier or foreign air 
carrier required by the FAA to implement additional security measures 
to maintain system performance notify the public of the increased 
measures by posting signs at affected screening locations (see section 
IV.F.). The signs would be required to state that the additional 
security measures being implemented by the air carriers could slow 
screening operations at those locations, but that the measures are 
necessary to ensure the safety and security of flights. The proposal is 
intended to ensure that the traveling public is informed and to 
increase screening company and air carrier accountability for their 
operations. The specific language and specifications to be required for 
the signs would be included in the security programs.

II.E. New Part 111

    The FAA proposes to create a new part 111, which would contain all 
the requirements for screening companies. Part 111 would require 
certification of all screening companies that perform screening for air 
carriers under part 108, indirect air carriers under part 109, and 
foreign air carriers under part 129.
    The proposal would affect only the screening that is done by 
inspecting persons or property for the presence of any unauthorized 
explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon, as required under 
parts 108, 109, and 129. These inspections currently are performed by a 
variety of methods such as manual searches, metal detectors, X-ray 
machines, explosives detection systems, explosives trace detection 
systems, and advanced technology devices. The proposal would also amend 
certain requirements in parts 108, 109, and 129 to accommodate the 
proposed new part 111.
    Forms of screening other than inspection, such as determining that 
a person is a law enforcement officer with authority to carry a weapon 
on board aircraft, would not be covered in part 111. These other forms 
of screening would not have to be done by a certificated screening 
company. These types of screening would continue to be the 
responsibility of the carriers. They could be performed, as they are 
now, by such methods as ticket agents checking the documentation of law 
enforcement officers flying armed, local law enforcement officers at 
the checkpoint checking the credentials of law enforcement officers 
entering the sterile area, or checkpoint security supervisors checking 
the law enforcement officer's credentials. The checkpoint security 
supervisors checking these credentials would be doing so as 
representatives of the carriers, rather than as part of their duties 
for the certificated screening companies.

II.F. Screening of Cargo

    Certain cargo carried on passenger air carriers must be screened. 
The FAA considered whether this screening should be done only by 
certificated screening companies and has decided to propose that it 
should be. If unauthorized explosives or incendiaries are introduced 
aboard passenger aircraft in cargo, it would be just as devastating as 
if introduced in checked or carry-on baggage or on passengers. The FAA 
believes that cargo also must be subjected to rigorous screening 
controls to avoid such a result.
    Accordingly, the FAA proposes that inspections of cargo for 
unauthorized explosives and incendiaries be done only by certificated 
screening companies, similar to the proposal for persons, accessible 
property, and checked baggage. Under this proposal, air carriers and 
foreign air carriers carrying passengers would be required to ensure 
that cargo screening is conducted by certificated screening companies. 
Indirect air carriers that elect to perform required screening (instead 
of referring their cargo to air carriers or foreign air carriers for 
required screening) also would be required to hold screening company 
certificates or contract with certificated screening companies to 
perform the screening. The FAA believes that a comprehensive approach 
to certificating all screening companies, including companies that 
screen cargo, is vital to having a safe, secure, and effective aviation 
security system. The FAA requests public comments on the issues

[[Page 567]]

relating to certificating indirect air carriers in this NPRM.

II.G. Screening Standard Security Program (SSSP)

    In addition to the regulatory requirements, the proposed rule would 
establish a separate security program for screening companies that 
would accompany the requirements in proposed part 111. The Screening 
Standard Security Program (SSSP) would contain detailed and sensitive 
requirements relating to screening that currently are contained in the 
carrier security programs, as well as additional requirements related 
to proposals in part 111. The carriers as well as the screening 
companies would be required to ensure that their screening companies' 
security programs are carried out.
    The FAA considered proposing that screening companies be required 
to comply with the standardized security programs for air carriers, 
foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers. Requiring screening 
companies to comply with the ACSSP, MSP, and IACSSP would emphasize 
that the carriers are primarily responsible for ensuring that screening 
is properly carried out. It would also prevent having to relocate the 
screening-related language from the carrier security programs to the 
screening standard security program. However, the FAA recognizes that 
this system could result in confusion in some cases where screening 
companies might have to observe portions of three different security 
programs--the ACSSP, the MSP, and the IACSSP. Having a separate 
security program for screening companies would also more clearly 
delineate the responsibilities of screening companies and those of the 
carriers, which would continue to be responsible for proper screening. 
Both part 111 and the Screening Standard Security Program would state 
that the requirements also are applicable to carriers that conduct 
screening.
    The FAA requests comments on consolidating all screening-related 
program requirements into one screening standard security program. The 
FAA has prepared a draft SSSP proposal to accompany the release of this 
NPRM. Commenters with a need to know, as specified in 14 CFR part 191, 
may request copies of the draft proposed SSSP from the Office of Civil 
Aviation Security Policy and Planning as listed in the section titled 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.

II.H. Screener Qualifications

    As discussed in section I.C., it is critical that screeners be 
highly qualified in order to counter the increasing sophistication of 
the threats. This proposal contains a number of provisions to promote 
improved qualifications of screeners. Most notable are the proposed 
requirements to include FAA testing standards for screening personnel, 
test administration requirements for carriers, and additional 
monitoring of screener performance made possible by TIP as discussed in 
section II.I.
    Under this proposal, screeners would be required to pass knowledge-
based and X-ray interpretation tests developed by the FAA before 
beginning on-the-job training. This would help to ensure that all 
screeners have uniform understanding of their tasks and a consistent 
high level of achievement. The FAA would provide the tests by amending 
the screening companies' security programs through notice and comment 
procedures and would expect the screening companies to train their 
personnel to pass those tests. Screening companies would have 
flexibility in designing their training programs and would submit them 
to the FAA for approval. The FAA is not proposing that training 
programs be designed in a specific manner, only that they thoroughly 
and effectively address all of the testing standard subjects. The 
proposal also would require that the carriers administer and monitor 
the tests to promote carrier involvement in the training process and to 
establish closer accountability for the administration of the training 
tests.

II.I. Performance Measurements and Standards

    For the FAA, carriers, and screening companies to monitor the 
performance of screening companies and to track their level of 
performance, a consistent means of regularly measuring performance is 
needed. The FAA, carriers, and screening companies need to be able to 
monitor how well screeners are detecting threat objects and must be 
able to determine whether performance is decreasing and whether 
corrective measures are needed. The FAA, carriers, and screening 
companies need to be able to measure performance of a screening 
location to determine what factors lead to better or worse detection 
and what corrective measures are effective.
    Factors that may lead to better or worse detection include the 
amount of passenger traffic, the type of training that the screeners 
receive, how often screener functions are rotated, and the conditions 
under which screeners are working. The FAA, carriers, and screening 
companies also need to determine which types of threat objects the 
screeners can readily detect and which types they have difficulty 
detecting. All of these factors can be analyzed along with other 
elements that may affect screening ability, such as education level, 
screening experience, and screener compensation levels. The analyses 
would be used by the FAA to work more effectively with screening 
companies and carriers to improve screening continuously. Further, it 
appears that regular testing of screeners promotes vigilance. Frequent 
testing can increase screeners' ability to recognize threats that they 
rarely, if ever, encounter in reality but must be ready to detect 
should the unlikely event occur.
    In order to monitor screening performance and to examine the 
effects of all of these factors, the means of measuring performance 
must be consistent, reliable, cost effective, and frequent. The two 
options for conducting testing are anonymous testing by individuals and 
computer testing. The FAA and the carriers now rely on testing 
conducted by individuals. Carriers currently are required to test each 
screener periodically, as set forth in their security programs.
    The FAA uses FAA employees to submit for screening items of baggage 
that contain test objects that will appear on the X-ray screens to be 
weapons or explosives. There are a number of limitations involved with 
this method, however. For instance, the FAA tests cannot be conducted 
frequently at many screening locations due to the large number of 
airports in the United States and their diverse locations. The FAA must 
arrange for different employees to travel to airports and have them 
change their appearance after each test to prevent the screeners from 
recognizing them as FAA testers. It is therefore very difficult, 
costly, and labor-intensive to obtain a large number of tests that 
accurately measure screeners' success rates and that provide a 
continuous measure of the success of screening locations, either 
overall or under specific conditions. Further, when screening personnel 
realize that the FAA is conducting tests, they sometimes alert other 
nearby screening locations to expect testing, which can skew the 
testing results. Because FAA testing is infrequent at many locations, 
it also can limit the number and variety of test objects that the 
screeners are exposed to. Also, because the tests are

[[Page 568]]

conducted by individuals, there is the possibility that different FAA 
employees will apply the test protocols differently, which also could 
skew the testing results.
    To deal with these problems, the FAA has developed TIP, discussed 
previously in section I.C. This computer-based system is capable of 
introducing test objects to screeners on the X-ray and EDS systems at 
various rates set on the computers. The TIP program can be set to run 
the entire time that a screening location is in use. Test items can be 
easily added to or changed by simply loading new images or parameters 
into the computers, providing an efficient means to regularly expose 
screeners to the most recent and sophisticated threats. The success 
rates can easily be recorded and later analyzed by the FAA, carriers, 
and screening companies to monitor continuously how well the screening 
locations are operating.
    The FAA has conducted validation testing of TIP. In addition, at 
one location one screening company conducted extensive testing of TIP 
and provided its data to the FAA for analysis. The FAA determined that 
the detailed results of the FAA and screening company testing should 
not be made available to the general public because they could be used 
to attempt to discover ways to defeat the screening system; therefore, 
the FAA has determined that this information is sensitive security 
information under 14 CFR part 191. Air carriers, foreign air carriers, 
and indirect air carriers that have security programs under parts 108, 
129, and 109, respectively, may obtain further information on these 
tests and the FAA's analysis by contacting the Office of Civil Aviation 
Security Policy and Planning as listed in the section titled FOR 
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. Screening companies that are screening for 
carriers may obtain copies of the testing results through their 
carriers. Comments on the data and analyses should be submitted to the 
Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and Planning, rather than to 
the public docket, because of the sensitivity of the information.
    Based on all of the data gathered to date, the FAA has determined 
that TIP is an effective and reliable means to measure screener 
performance. Accordingly, the proposed rule would require the use of 
threat image projection systems on all X-ray and explosives detection 
systems. TIP would be installed over a period of time as specified in 
the security programs. The specific TIP equipment requirements 
acceptable to the Administrator would be set forth in the carriers' 
security programs. The screening companies and carriers would be 
required to download the data or allow the FAA to download the data in 
accordance with standards that would be adopted in the security 
programs through notice and comment procedures. The screening companies 
and carriers would be able to download the data at any time to monitor 
their own performance.
    The results of TIP would be used to monitor the performance of 
screening locations, screening companies, and individual screeners. TIP 
operational data would be analyzed to focus resources on most 
effectively improving screening to detect threats. TIP data can be used 
to determine such things as what working conditions lead to better 
performance, on which topics the screeners need further instruction, 
and what corrective action or training programs prove to be most 
successful. The FAA would look at the success rates of screeners 
detecting various kinds of test objects, the success rates at different 
times of day and during different traffic levels, and the other factors 
that may affect screening effectiveness.
    TIP also serves as a continuous means of on-the-job training for 
screeners. Screeners report that being exposed to TIP images keeps them 
alert and interested, supplements their classroom training, and fosters 
healthy competition among them to continuously improve their detection 
rates. The use of TIP provides screeners with immediate feedback 
regarding their performance and indicates specific areas for 
improvement.
    The FAA anticipates that in the future, TIP data may provide a 
basis not only to monitor the performance of screening locations but 
also to establish performance standards. Under such a system, the 
screening companies and carriers could be required to meet the 
standards set forth in their security programs for the detection of 
various threat objects. For instance, the FAA anticipates that it would 
analyze TIP data to determine the range of screening company detection 
rates in the United States. It might then set minimum detection 
percentages that each screening company would have to meet based on the 
higher detection rates within the range. The minimum detection 
percentages could be incrementally raised as overall screener 
performance in the United States rises. The performance standards might 
vary depending on such factors as the screening system being used and 
the type of threat object. Initially, however, the FAA could implement 
overall performance measurement requirements whereby the FAA would 
collect performance data from all TIP systems installed in the United 
States and then require corrective action of the screening companies 
with the lowest performance. These performance standards would be 
developed based on extensive additional data from TIP systems.
    The FAA would propose to add these performance measurement and 
performance standard requirements as amendments to the security 
programs through notice and comment procedures. Including these 
requirements in the security programs would protect them as sensitive 
security information and allow for flexibility in changing the 
standards as screening company performance improves in the United 
States. The use of TIP systems to establish performance measurements 
and ultimately performance standards would allow the FAA to monitor 
closely the performance of screening companies.
    If performance standards were adopted in the security programs, 
screening companies and carriers that the FAA determined were not 
performing to specified standards could be held accountable in any 
number of ways, as discussed in section II.D.
    The FAA currently tests other forms of screening, such as walk-
through metal detectors and handwands, similar to the way it currently 
tests X-ray screening. The FAA may in the future develop performance 
standards for other screening equipment and proposed amendments to the 
security programs would be issued.

III. Proposed Part 111: Section-by-Section Discussion

    Proposed part 111 would prescribe the requirements for screening 
company certifications and operations. Part 111 would apply to all 
screening companies, whether they are performing screening under part 
108, 109, or 129. Carriers would be required to ensure that their 
screening operations, whether conducted by the carriers themselves or 
by screening companies with which the carriers contract, are conducted 
in accordance with part 111 requirements.
    Subpart A would contain general information relating to 
applicability, definitions, inspection authority, falsification, and 
prohibition against interference with screening personnel and is 
described in paragraphs III.A. through III.E. Subpart B would prescribe 
requirements for security programs, screening company certificates, 
operations specifications, and carrier oversight and is described in 
paragraphs

[[Page 569]]

III.F. through III.K. Subpart C would prescribe requirements relating 
to screening operations such as the screening of persons and property, 
the use of screening equipment, employment standards, screening company 
manager and instructor qualifications, training and testing, and 
performance measurement and standards among others and is described in 
paragraphs III.L. through III.W. The following discussion provides 
details on each part 111 requirement.

Subpart A--General

III.A. Sec. 111.1  Applicability

    Proposed Sec. 111.1 states that the part would prescribe the 
requirements for the certification and operation of screening 
companies. The requirements in proposed part 111 would apply to each 
screening company that screens for an air carrier under part 108, for 
an indirect air carrier under part 109, or for a foreign air carrier 
under part 129. The proposed requirements would also apply to the air 
carriers (including those air carriers voluntarily adopting aviation 
security programs), indirect air carriers, and foreign air carriers 
that are responsible for conducting, and therefore overseeing, 
screening operations. Portions of proposed part 111 would also apply to 
two groups of individuals: all persons conducting screening within the 
United States under parts 111, 108, 109 and 129 and all persons who 
interact with screening personnel during screening. ``Person'' as 
defined in 14 CFR 1.1 means ``an individual, firm, partnership, 
corporation, company, association, joint-stock association, or 
governmental entity.''
    The certification requirements in the proposed rule would apply 
only to screening companies performing screening in the United States. 
The FAA does not propose at this time to certify screening companies 
that perform screening for air carriers at foreign airports. Screening 
in other countries is performed either by the host governments or by 
private sector screening companies, but under the authority and 
operational control of the host governments. However, where air 
carriers have operational control over screening outside of the United 
States they would be required under this proposal to carry out and 
comply with all relevant sections of part 111 to the extent allowable 
by local law, with the exception of those requirements related to 
screening company certification.

III.B. Sec. 111.3  Definitions

    Proposed Sec. 111.3 would define for the purpose of part 111 
``carrier,'' ``screening company,'' ``screening company security 
program,'' and ``screening location.'' The proposed definitions are 
needed to clarify the use of these terms in the proposed rule language.
    The term ``carrier'' would be defined for the purposes of parts 
108, 109, 111, and 129 to refer to an air carrier, an indirect air 
carrier, or a foreign air carrier.
    The term ``screening company'' would be defined to mean an air 
carrier, indirect air carrier, foreign air carrier, or other entity 
that inspects persons or property for the presence of any unauthorized 
explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon, as required under 
part 111 and 108, 109, or 129, before their entry into a sterile area 
or carriage aboard an aircraft.
    The term ``screening company security program'' would be defined to 
mean the security program approved by the Administrator under this 
part.
    The term ``screening location'' would be defined to mean any site 
at which persons or property are inspected for the presence of any 
unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon. 
Examples of screening locations are checkpoints where persons and 
accessible property are screened, ticket counters and baggage makeup 
rooms where checked bags may be screened, and cargo areas where cargo 
may be screened.
    Additional terms to be defined in the part 108 final rule would 
also apply to part 111, as would any other definitions contained in 
parts 109 and 129 of the chapter. Of particular relevance to this rule 
are the definitions for ``cargo'' and ``checked baggage.''
    The term ``cargo'' would be defined in part 108 to mean property 
tendered for air transportation accounted for on an air waybill. All 
accompanied commercial courier consignments, whether or not accounted 
for on an air waybill, are also classified as cargo. Security programs 
further define the term cargo.
    The term ``checked baggage'' would be defined in part 108 to mean 
property tendered by or on behalf of a passenger and accepted by an air 
carrier for transport, which will be inaccessible to passengers during 
flight. Accompanied commercial courier consignments are not classified 
as checked baggage.

III.C. Sec. 111.5  Inspection Authority

    This proposed section would clarify that a screening company shall 
allow FAA inspections and tests to determine its compliance with part 
111, its security program, and its operations specifications. The 
screening company shall also allow FAA inspections and tests of 
equipment and procedures at screening locations that relate to carrier 
compliance with their regulations. This proposed section would also 
require screening companies to provide the FAA with evidence of 
compliance. Both of these proposed requirements are similar to those in 
proposed Sec. 108.5 of Notice No. 97-12.

III.D. Sec. 111.7  Falsification

    This proposed section would apply falsification requirements to 
screening companies that are similar to those that apply under current 
Sec. 108.4. While the provisions of Sec. 108.4 apply to matters 
involving screening, the inclusion of a falsification rule in part 111 
would serve to emphasize the requirements. Under this rule, no person 
would be permitted to make or cause to be made any fraudulent or 
intentionally false statement in any application for any security 
program, certificate, or operations specifications or any amendment 
thereto under part 111. No person would be permitted to make or cause 
to be made any fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any record or 
report that would be kept, made, or used to show compliance with part 
111 or to exercise any privileges under part 111. Also, any 
reproduction or alteration for fraudulent purpose of any report, 
record, security program, certificate, or operations specifications 
issued under part 111 would be subject to civil penalties under this 
proposed rule. There are also criminal statutes that might apply to 
such activities.

III.E. Sec. 111.9  Prohibition Against Interference with Screening 
Personnel

    The proposed rule would include new requirements prohibiting any 
person from interfering with, assaulting, threatening, or intimidating 
screening personnel in the performance of their screening duties. The 
proposed rule is intended to prohibit interference that might distract 
or inhibit a screener from effectively performing his or her duties. 
This rule is necessary to emphasize the importance to safety and 
security of protecting screeners from undue distractions or attempts to 
intimidate. Previous instances of such distractions have included 
excessive verbal abuse of screeners by passengers and certain air 
carrier employees. Screeners encountering these situations are taken 
away from their normal duties to deal with the disruptive people, which 
may affect the screening of other people. The

[[Page 570]]

disruptive persons may be attempting to discourage the screeners from 
being as thorough as required. Screeners may also need to summon 
checkpoint screening supervisors and law enforcement officers, taking 
them away from other duties. Checkpoint disruptions can be potentially 
dangerous in these situations. This proposal would help support 
screeners' efforts to be thorough and would help prevent persons from 
unduly interfering with the screening process. This proposed rule is 
similar to 14 CFR Sec. 91.11, which prohibits interference with 
crewmembers aboard aircraft and which also is essential to passenger 
safety and security. Note that this proposed rule is not intended to 
prevent good-faith questions from persons seeking to understand the 
screening of their persons or property. But abusive, distractive 
behavior and attempts to prevent screeners from performing required 
screening would be subject to civil penalties under this proposed rule.

Subpart B--Security Program, Certificate, and Operations Specifications

III.F. Sec. 111.101  Performance of Screening

    Proposed Sec. 111.101 states that each screening company shall 
conduct screening and screener training in compliance with the 
requirements of part 111, its approved screening company security 
program (see section III.G.), its approved operations specifications, 
and applicable portions of security directives (SD) and emergency 
amendments (EA) to security programs. When a response to an imminent 
threat is required, the FAA issues SD's to air carriers under current 
Sec. 108.18, and EA's to foreign air carriers and indirect air carriers 
under Secs. 129.25 and 109.5, to require immediate action and response 
to the threat.
    SD's and EA's may be issued to carriers to help them respond to 
threats that require quick responses. SD's and EA's typically involve a 
range of differing requirements, only a portion of which may pertain to 
how the screening companies shall perform their duties. Currently, 
carriers are required to provide to their screening companies any 
screening-related information from SD's and EA's and any other 
applicable information pertaining to threats. Carriers extract the 
screening-related requirements from the SD's and EA's and forward them 
to the screening companies.
    It appears that the most efficient means for the FAA to issue the 
SD and EA requirements to screening companies would be to continue the 
practice of issuing them to the carriers, who then provide appropriate 
information to their screening companies. It would be inefficient for 
the FAA to attempt to issue two different SD or EA documents, one with 
the requirements solely applicable to screening companies and one with 
all of the requirements for the carriers. Moreover, this emphasizes the 
ultimate statutory and regulatory responsibilities of the carriers to 
perform aviation security screening and to ensure that screening 
companies carry out the requirements in the SD's and EA's.

III.G. Secs. 111.103; 111.105; and 111.107  Security Programs

    As discussed in II.G., the FAA is proposing to establish a separate 
security program to accompany proposed part 111. The Screening Standard 
Security Program (SSSP) would contain requirements for screening 
persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo for air 
carriers, foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers. This would 
consolidate all of the screening-related requirements into a single 
source that screening companies could use to carry out their duties. 
The ACSSP would continue to contain the nonpublic details regarding the 
air carriers' responsibility to conduct screening under part 108, as 
would the MSP for foreign air carriers and the IACSSP for indirect air 
carriers. However, much of the screening information to be contained in 
the Screening Standard Security Program would be relocated from the 
ACSSP, MSP, and IACSSP.
    Under the proposal, screening companies would be directly 
responsible for compliance with their security programs and might be 
subject to enforcement actions if they fail to comply. Screening 
companies would therefore have a strong interest in complying with the 
program requirements. Carriers would continue to have an interest in 
the screening requirements in the security programs, because they would 
remain responsible for their implementation and oversight by statute 
and in the case of air carriers and foreign air carriers would be 
transporting the persons and property being screened. As part of their 
oversight responsibilities, carriers would be required to have access 
to, understand, and make available to the FAA upon request copies of 
the security programs of the companies with which they contract.
    Under the proposal, the sections pertaining to security program 
requirements are organized in the same format that is used in Notice 
No. 97-12 for part 108. Proposed Sec. 111.103 would be titled 
``Security program: adoption and implementation'' and would require 
that each screening company adopt and carry out an FAA-approved 
screening company security program that meets the requirements of 
proposed Sec. 111.105. Proposed Sec. 111.105 would be titled ``Security 
program: form, content, and availability'' and would provide specific 
requirements for security programs. Proposed Sec. 111.107 would be 
titled ``Security program: approval and amendments'' and would describe 
the procedures for approvals of and amendments to security programs.
    Proposed Sec. 111.105 would be divided into three paragraphs. 
Paragraph (a) would state that a security program shall provide for the 
safety of persons and property traveling on flights provided by the air 
carriers and/or foreign air carriers for which a screening company 
screens against acts of criminal violence and air piracy and the 
introduction of explosives, incendiaries, or deadly or dangerous 
weapons. This same wording appears under proposed Sec. 108.103 of 
Notice No. 97-12 for air carriers, as both parties are responsible for 
passenger safety. Paragraph (a) would also require that screening 
company screening performance coordinators (see section III.P.) 
acknowledge receipt of amendments to their programs in signed, written 
statements to the FAA within 72 hours. The security programs would have 
to contain the items listed under paragraph (b) of Sec. 111.105 and be 
approved by the Administrator.
    Proposed Sec. 111.105(b) would list three items that a screening 
company's security program shall include at a minimum. The security 
program shall include the following: the procedures used to perform the 
screening functions specified in proposed Sec. 111.201; the testing 
standards and training guidelines for screening personnel and 
instructors; and the performance standards and operating requirements 
for threat image projection systems. These requirements are further 
explained in the detailed discussions of the sections.
    Proposed Sec. 111.105(c) would describe logistical and availability 
requirements related to a security program. A screening company would 
be required to maintain at least one complete copy of its security 
program at its principal business office and at each airport served and 
to make a copy of the program available for inspection upon the request 
of an FAA special agent. All screening companies and applicants for 
screening company certificates,

[[Page 571]]

regardless of type, would be required to restrict the availability of 
information in their security programs to those persons with an 
operational need to know in accordance with Sec. 191.5 and refer 
requests for such information by other persons to the Administrator. 
All of these requirements are similar to the requirements for air 
carriers under proposed Sec. 108.105.
    Proposed Sec. 111.107 would be divided into four sections: 
``Approval of security program,'' ``Amendment requested by a screening 
company,'' Amendment by the FAA,'' and ``Emergency amendments.'' The 
proposed language is based on the language in proposed Sec. 108.105 
(Notice No. 97-12) with the exception of the following changes unique 
to screening companies.
    Proposed Sec. 111.107(a) would differ from proposed Sec. 108.105 
(Notice No. 97-12) in several ways due to the proposed application 
process for screening company certifications. The language would state 
that unless otherwise authorized by the Assistant Administrator, each 
screening company required to have a security program under this part 
would be required to submit a signed, written statement to the 
Assistant Administrator within 30 days of receiving the SSSP from the 
FAA indicating what its intentions are for adopting and carrying out a 
security program. A screening company could choose to adopt the SSSP as 
is or adopt the SSSP after making amendments to it. If a screening 
company chooses to adopt the SSSP without changing it, the granting of 
a screening company certificate by the Assistant Administrator would 
serve as FAA approval of the SSSP. If the screening company chooses to 
adopt the SSSP after making amendments to it, the Assistant 
Administrator would either approve the proposed security program within 
30 days or give the screening company written notice to modify its 
program to comply with the applicable security program requirements. 
The remaining procedures for accepting a notice to modify or petition 
the notice would be the same as the procedures in proposed Sec. 108.105 
of Notice No. 97-12. In this case as well, the Assistant 
Administrator's granting a screening company certificate to the 
screening company would serve as FAA approval of the screening 
company's security program.
    Under proposed Sec. 111.107(b), once a screening company is 
employed by one or more carriers, it would be required to include in 
any application for amendment to its security program a statement that 
all carriers for which it screens have been advised of the proposed 
amendment and have no objection to it. The screening company would also 
be required to include the name and phone number for each individual 
who was advised at each carrier. This would ensure that screening 
companies would have the opportunity to apply to amend their security 
programs, and also would ensure that carriers would be aware of the 
applications and have no objections to them. Because carriers would 
retain primary responsibility for screening, it would be essential that 
they concur with any changes requested by screening companies that 
screen on their behalf.
    Under proposed Sec. 111.107(c) and (d), if the FAA were to seek to 
amend a portion of a security program that covers the activities of 
screening companies, it would provide to screening companies notice and 
opportunity to comment. Carriers would also be notified and provided 
opportunities to comment regarding proposed changes to the SSSP that 
apply to their operations. In the case of an emergency, there would be 
no prior notice or opportunity to comment.

III.H. Sec. 111.109  Screening Company Certificate

    Certificate required. Proposed Sec. 111.109(a) states that a 
screening company may not perform required screening except under the 
authority of and in accordance with the provisions of a screening 
company certificate.
    Section 302 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 
(Public Law 104-264, 49 U.S.C. 44935 note) requires the Administrator 
to certificate companies providing security screening. The FAA proposes 
to certificate screening companies under 49 U.S.C. 44707, which 
provides for examinations and ratings of air agencies. Under that 
section, certain pilot schools (14 CFR part 141) and repair stations 
(14 CFR part 145) hold air agency certificates. That section also 
permits certifications of ``other air agencies the Administrator 
decides are necessary in the public interest'' (49 U.S.C. 44707(3)).
    By certificating screening companies under section 44707 as air 
agencies, the companies would be under the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 
44709. That section makes clear that the Administrator may re-inspect 
an air agency at any time. Section 44709 also contains the procedure by 
which the Administrator may amend, modify, suspend, or revoke a 
certificate. This procedure includes an air agency's right to appeal to 
the National Transportation Safety Board an order amending, modifying, 
suspending, or revoking its certificate. The Board's procedure for 
hearing such appeals, found at 49 CFR part 821, includes a hearing 
before an administrative law judge and an appeal to the full Board. A 
party may petition the U.S. Court of Appeals to review a decision of 
the Board. In this way, a screening company would receive full due 
process if the FAA were to take action against its certificate.
    Application for a screening company certificate. Under proposed 
Sec. 111.109(b), an application for a screening company certificate 
shall be made in a form and manner prescribed by the Administrator. The 
FAA anticipates a two-phase application process as follows. A company 
interested in applying for certification as a screening company would 
write to the FAA to request application instructions. The application 
instructions would require the applicant to submit several items in 
writing in a standard format. This same application package would 
eventually become the screening company's operations specifications if 
the company is approved for certification. (See next preamble section 
for discussion of operations specifications.) The completed application 
package would be submitted to the FAA as part of phase one and would 
contain the following items: the name of the applicant's company; the 
company's address; incorporation and tax identification information; a 
letter of intent; an organization chart; a description of the company's 
ability to perform and comply with regulations; the name of the 
company's chief executive officer; the names, titles, qualifications, 
and references for the screening performance coordinators; and the 
company's procedures for safeguarding and distributing sensitive 
security information under part 191.
    Upon receiving an application package, the FAA would review and 
verify all relevant information. This review might include verifying 
past employment and training references for the company's screening 
performance coordinator. Once the FAA completes its review, it would 
notify the applicant and provide the applicant with a copy of the 
Screening Standard Security Program (SSSP). The applicant would need 
the security program to complete phase two of the application process.
    After obtaining a copy of the SSSP, the applicant would review it 
to determine whether the company wants to adopt the SSSP as is or amend 
it to incorporate additional company-specific information. The 
applicant would be instructed to inform the FAA of its decision 
regarding the SSSP in writing within 30 days of receipt of the SSSP. At 
that time or soon thereafter the

[[Page 572]]

applicant would prepare and submit to the FAA a copy of its training 
curriculum and any FAA-requested changes to its original application. 
(See later discussions regarding these requirements in this notice.) 
The FAA would provide guidance to the applicant in preparing these 
documents, as needed. The applicant would submit the documents as part 
of phase two, and the FAA would review them. If the FAA finds that the 
documents from phase two meet all requirements, they would be combined 
with the phase one documents and signed by the Administrator as the 
company's operations specifications. The Administrator would then issue 
the company a screening company certificate. If changes are needed, the 
FAA would request that the applicant make the specific amendments and 
resubmit them before the Administrator would issue a certificate.
    Issuance and renewal-general. Under proposed Sec. 111.109(c), an 
applicant would be entitled to a certificate if the applicant applies 
not less than 90 days before the applicant intends to begin screening 
or the applicant's certificate expires; the Administrator determines 
that the applicant has met the requirements of this part for the type 
of screening certificate requested; the issuance would not be contrary 
to public safety and security; and, unless otherwise authorized by the 
Administrator, the applicant has not had a screening company 
certificate revoked within the past 12 months.
    Under proposed Sec. 111.109(c)(2), the applicant would have to be 
able to meet the requirements of this part, to include adopting and 
carrying out an FAA-approved security program and approved operations 
specifications for it to be issued a provisional screening company 
certificate. Proposed Sec. 111.109(c)(3) would describe the 
requirements that a screening company would have to meet for issuance 
or renewal of its 5-year screening company certificate. Failure to meet 
the performance standards set forth in its security program would be 
grounds for denial of the screening company certificate. Under proposed 
Sec. 111.109(c)(5), if the FAA revokes a screening company's 
certificate, the company would have to wait 1 year before a new 
certificate could be issued unless otherwise authorized by the FAA. 
This would ensure that the company that had proven unqualified to hold 
its certificate could not immediately seek a new certificate. This 
provision is similar to a provision in 49 U.S.C. 44703(c), which 
relates to airmen certificates.
    Provisional Certificates. Under proposed paragraph (d), companies 
that do not hold screening company certificates would be able to apply 
for provisional screening company certificates. The FAA would issue a 
provisional certificate to an applicant if the Administrator finds that 
the applicant is able to meet the requirements of this part, to include 
adopting and carrying out an FAA-approved security program and approved 
operations specifications (proposed Sec. 111.109(c)(2)). The applicant 
for the provisional screening certificate would be subject to FAA 
investigation and required to show that it has met the requirements of 
this part. Under proposed Sec. 111.109(g)(1), a provisional screening 
company certificate would expire at the end of the 12th month after the 
month in which it was issued.
    The purpose of the proposed provisional certificate would be to 
provide a probationary period for the FAA to monitor a company's 
screening performance. During that year, a new screening company would 
undergo rigorous scrutiny by the FAA, during which time the company 
would have to demonstrate that it has met the requirements for FAA 
certification. If before the end of the 12-month period the new 
screening company has met the requirements of this part, and had 
adopted and carried out an FAA-approved security program and approved 
operations specifications, the company would be able to apply for and 
may be granted a certificate. In accordance with Sec. 111.109(c)(1), 
the screening company would be required to apply for a screening 
certificate not less than 60 days before the expiration of the 
provisional certificate. Companies that cannot demonstrate that they 
are qualified during the year or that do not meet the performance 
standards specified in the security program would be denied 
certification.
    The proposed requirements for using a provisional certificate are 
consistent with several comments to the Advanced Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking that stated that new companies should have to operate in a 
provisional status during which time the FAA would perform compliance 
and records audits.
    Under proposed Sec. 111.109(d)(2), the holder of a provisional 
certificate would not begin screening at a screening location without 
first giving the Administrator 7 days' notice, unless otherwise 
authorized by the Administrator. This notice would allow the FAA to 
monitor the startup of new company operations at each location. The FAA 
anticipates that this requirement for 7 days' notice would not result 
in any start-up delays should a new company replace a company whose 
operations are decertified at a location. The FAA anticipates that it 
usually would notify the responsible carriers in advance that they must 
replace their existing screening company with a different company if 
performance does not improve within a certain amount of time. This 
advance notification to the carriers would allow them ample time to 
make arrangements with a new company, if necessary, and to provide the 
required 7 days' notice to the FAA. If for some reason the FAA was 
unable to notify carriers in advance, it would have the authority to 
waive the 7 days' notice to keep the screening location in operation.
    Screening company certificate. Under proposed Sec. 111.109(e), the 
holder of a provisional screening company certificate could be issued a 
screening company certificate. The certificate would expire at the end 
of the 60th month after the month in which it is issued (proposed 
Sec. 111.109(g)(2)). To issue or renew a screening company certificate, 
the Administrator would have to determine that the applicant has met 
the requirements of part 111, to include adopting and carrying out an 
FAA-approved security program and approved operations specifications, 
and has implemented applicable portions of the security directives 
(proposed Sec. 111.109(c)(3)).
    As part of its renewal procedures, the FAA would consider the 
company's performance under the performance standards that could be 
added to the company's security program. As discussed in section II.I., 
the FAA anticipates using threat image projection (TIP) data to measure 
a screening company's overall performance for X-ray and EDS machines 
and eventually amending the SSSP to include performance standards. This 
data would then be used to help evaluate whether a screening company 
certificate should be issued or renewed.
    The FAA is proposing that a certificate be valid for 60 months. The 
screening company would be required to apply for a renewal at least 60 
days before the expiration date in order to continue screening 
operations. The 60-month (5-year) renewal would allow the benefits of 
renewal without creating an undue burden on the screening company. As 
with carriers, the FAA would inspect screening companies regularly and 
would continually monitor operations and tests to determine that each 
screening company is in compliance with the regulations, its security 
program, and its operations

[[Page 573]]

specifications. This would result in consistent and close monitoring of 
screening operations. If significant deficiencies are found during the 
5-year period, the FAA would take appropriate action to require 
correction of those deficiencies or if necessary would revoke the 
screening company's certificate. In addition, requiring a 5-year 
renewal of a screening company's certificate would create a more in-
depth review than that conducted during periodic inspections. Before 
the FAA would renew a certificate, it would review the company's 
operations specifications (including the training curriculum), required 
records, the results of FAA inspections and any enforcement actions 
that were taken, performance data, and any other relevant information.
    There are several precedents in the FAA regulations for periodic 
renewals of certificates and approvals. For example, exemptions from 
certain Federal Aviation Regulations are typically issued for 3 years, 
and Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFAR) rarely are issued for 
longer than 5 years. The duration of pilot school certificates in part 
145 is 24 months. Having a specific duration encourages a thorough 
review of any changes in the environment of a company, such as the 
addition of new equipment or an increase in the size of operations, as 
well as a review of past performance and an evaluation of what should 
be done to improve performance if necessary.
    The FAA considered proposing a shorter duration for the screening 
company certificates but decided to propose the 60-month duration as a 
reasonable option for obtaining the most benefits with the least 
burden. The FAA invites comments on the costs and benefits of the 
proposed duration and of a shorter duration such as 2 or 3 years.
    Certificate contents. Proposed paragraph Sec. 111.109(f) lists the 
information that would be contained on a certificate, such as the name 
of a company and a certificate number, certificate issuance date, and 
expiration date.
    Proposed compliance. The FAA is considering how much time after the 
publication of the final rule should be given for carriers and 
screening companies to come into compliance. The FAA proposes in 
paragraph Sec. 111.109(k) that the effective date for the final rule be 
60 days after its publication in the Federal Register. As of that date, 
no company could begin screening under part 108, 109, or 129 unless it 
holds a screening company certificate.
    The FAA also proposes, however, to provide some accommodation for 
existing screening companies. There are many companies that have been 
providing required screening services for years. The FAA has observed 
their operations and is familiar with these companies. The FAA proposes 
in Sec. 111.109(k) that companies actively screening at any time during 
the year before the date of publication of the final rule be able to 
continue screening after the effective date if they submit applications 
for provisional certificates within 60 days after publication of the 
final rule. The FAA would review the applications and issue provisional 
certificates to those qualified. A company that applied on time and 
that submitted complete and accurate documentation as required would be 
able to continue screening unless and until it is issued a denial of 
its application.
    After an existing screening company receives its provisional 
certificate, it would be subject to a rigorous application process to 
achieve certification. The company would be required to achieve 
certification before the expiration of its provisional certificate in 
order to continue screening. Existing screening companies could apply 
for certificates any time after they receive provisional certificates 
but not later than 60 days before the expiration of their provisional 
certificates.
    Duration. In addition to establishing a 12-month provisional 
certificate and a 60-month certificate (discussed previously), proposed 
Sec. 111.109(g)(3) would provide that a certificate would expire if a 
screening company has not provided required screening during the 
previous 12 months. Under this provision, a company not actively 
screening and maintaining its proficiency could lose its authority to 
screen. If the company intends to screen again, it would need to apply 
for a provisional certificate.
    A screening company would have the responsibility for keeping track 
of its compliance with this requirement and for returning its 
certificate, as required in Sec. 111.109(h), if it has automatically 
expired. During the FAA's yearly inspections of screening locations, it 
intends to compare its list of screening companies with those companies 
that are performing screening at locations. If a screening company does 
not appear to have a screening location, the FAA would check with the 
company to determine when it last conducted screening for a carrier.
    Proposed paragraph (h) would require the holder of a screening 
company certificate that is expired, suspended, or revoked to return 
the certificate to the Administrator within 7 days. Suspension or 
revocation of a certificate would follow established procedures for 
certificates issued by the FAA such as airport, air carrier, and airmen 
certificates (see earlier discussion of this issue in ``Certificate 
required'').
    Amendment. Under proposed Sec. 111.109(i), a screening company 
would be required to apply for an amendment to its certificate to 
change any of the information listed on the certificate, such as the 
name of the screening company, and/or any names under which it would do 
business.
    Inspection. Under proposed Sec. 111.109(j), screening company 
certificates would be made available for inspection upon request of the 
Administrator.

III.I. Secs. 111.111; 111.113; and 111.115 Operations specifications

    Under proposed Sec. 111.111, screening companies would be required 
to have approved operations specifications before they could perform 
screening. Screening companies would prepare operations specifications 
with FAA guidance. Under proposed Sec. 111.115, during the application 
process for a provisional certificate, a company would submit its 
operations specifications to the FAA for approval. Once the operations 
specifications have been approved, the screening company would not need 
to obtain subsequent approval when it applies for a certificate or 
renews its certificate. However, the FAA would review the operations 
specifications to consider whether changes are needed. Further FAA 
approval of operations specifications would only be necessary if the 
screening company seeks to amend its operations specifications. The 
proposed requirements for approvals and amendments of operations 
specifications would follow the same process as is currently provided 
for air carrier security programs.
    Under proposed Sec. 111.113, operations specifications would list 
the following items: the locations at which a company may conduct 
screening; the types of screening that the company is authorized to 
perform (persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo); the 
equipment and methods of screening that the company may employ; the 
name of the company's screening performance coordinator (SPC) (see 
discussion in the next section of this preamble); the procedures for 
notifying the Administrator and any carrier for which the company is 
performing screening if an equipment or

[[Page 574]]

facility failure makes the performance of adequate screening 
impracticable; and the curriculum used to train persons performing 
screening functions. The operations specifications would also be 
required to contain a statement signed by the person required by 
Sec. 111.209(b) on behalf of the company, confirming that the 
information is true and correct. The operations specifications would 
also contain any other information that the Administrator would deem 
necessary. Portions of the above items and the format may be provided 
by the Administrator as standard operations specifications.
    Screening companies in most cases would be authorized to screen at 
all locations in the United States. However, where a special 
circumstance occurs, the FAA would have the ability to amend a 
screening company's operations specifications to limit the company's 
authority to screen at a particular location in accordance with the 
procedure in Sec. 108.105(c). One example would be where the FAA is 
deploying new technology that required a high degree of oversight, such 
as the recent deployments of explosives detection systems. In such a 
case, the FAA might limit the locations at which a screening company 
could operate the new technology. Another example would be where a 
company demonstrates an inability or unwillingness to comply with 
required procedures at one location, but at other locations is in 
compliance. The FAA could amend the company's operations specifications 
to remove the company's authority to operate at the one location. If 
the company later comes into compliance at that location the operations 
specifications could be amended to restore its authority to screen 
there.
    Operations specifications would list the types of screening that 
companies are authorized to perform. This requirement would emphasize 
the different capabilities and needs of the various companies that 
perform screening. For instance, cargo screening involves procedures 
different from those for screening persons. A company's required 
operations specifications, including its training program, would 
reflect the type(s) of screening that it would be authorized to 
perform.
    The operations specifications would include the equipment and 
methods of screening that the Administrator has authorized the company 
to operate and carry out. Examples include manual searches of items, 
metal detector inspections of persons, and X-ray inspections. The 
operations specifications would also include procedures for notifying 
the Administrator and the carrier(s) for which the company is 
performing screening in the event that the procedures, facilities, or 
equipment that the company is using are not adequate for it to perform 
screening. Each company's operations specifications, including its 
training program, would specify the methods and equipment on which it 
was authorized. There shall be a training curriculum for each type of 
equipment that a company operates in performing screening. The training 
program curriculum would have to be approved as part of the operations 
specifications before the company would be certificated as a screening 
company.
    Proposed Sec. 111.113(c) would require a screening company to 
maintain a complete copy of its operations specifications at its 
principal business office and at each airport where it conducts 
security screening. The screening company would also have to ensure 
that the operations specifications are amended to remain current and 
made available to the Administrator upon request. The screening company 
would be required to provide a current copy of its operations 
specifications to the carrier(s) for which it screens. The screening 
company would also be required to restrict the availability of 
information in its operations specifications to those persons with an 
operational need to know. Persons with an operational need to know are 
specified in Sec. 191.5(b). The screening company would be required to 
direct to the Administrator requests for information that is in 
operations specifications if the requests are from persons other than 
persons with an operational need to know. These proposed requirements 
would be necessary to ensure that operations specifications are 
available to persons who need to know them and at the same time to 
protect security sensitive information in the operations 
specifications. Furthermore, these requirements would ensure that 
carriers have current copies of screening companies' operations 
specifications for monitoring and auditing purposes.

III.J. Sec. 111.117  Oversight by air carriers, foreign air carriers, 
or indirect air carriers

    Proposed Sec. 111.117(a) would make clear that each screening 
company holding a certificate under part 111 would be required to allow 
any air carrier, indirect air carrier, or foreign air carrier for which 
it performs screening to inspect its facilities, equipment, and records 
to determine its compliance with part 111, its security program, and 
operations specifications. The proposed regulation would also require 
that a screening company allow any carrier for which the company is 
performing screening to test the screening company's screening 
personnel using the procedures specified in the applicable security 
program. This is a natural consequence of the fact that carriers are 
ultimately responsible for proper screening and must be able to ensure 
that their screening companies are in compliance and that screening 
personnel are performing adequately.
    Because the carriers are ultimately responsible for screening and 
contract with screening companies to perform the service on their 
behalf, the FAA does not consider it essential from a legal standpoint 
to include proposed Sec. 111.117. However, it appears that inclusion of 
this section may avoid confusion concerning the roles of the carriers 
and screening companies. The FAA requests comments on whether to 
include this section in the final rule.
    If a carrier chooses to hold a screening company certificate and to 
conduct screening at a particular location on its own behalf, it would 
still have to perform oversight functions. In its capacity as a 
screening company, it would be responsible for day-to-day operations; 
in its capacity as a carrier, it would have to audit and test the 
performance of its screening functions. Any other carrier using that 
screening location also would be responsible for auditing and testing 
the carrier in its capacity as a screening company.
    In performing oversight responsibilities, the carriers need to know 
when the FAA discovers significant compliance problems with the 
screening companies. Currently, when the FAA discovers an alleged 
violation, it typically brings it to the attention of the appropriate 
carrier(s) to initiate corrective action as soon as possible. This 
often is done in a discussion with the station manager or other carrier 
official at the time of the inspection. Depending on the circumstances, 
enforcement action may be taken later. The FAA envisions that if it 
finds an alleged violation committed by a screening company, it would 
discuss the matter not only with the screening company, but also with 
the relevant carrier(s).
    The FAA also proposes in Sec. 111.117(b) that each screening 
company shall provide a copy of each letter of investigation and final 
enforcement action to each carrier using the screening location where 
the alleged violation occurred. Final enforcement actions include 
warning letters, letters

[[Page 575]]

of correction, orders assessing civil penalties, and orders of 
suspension and revocation. The screening company would be required to 
provide a copy to each applicable carrier's corporate security officer 
within 3 business days of receipt of the letter of correction or final 
enforcement action. This proposed requirement would assist the 
carriers(s) in evaluating the performance of the screening company. 
Such enforcement actions could include warning notices and letters of 
correction, civil penalty actions, suspensions or revocations of 
certificates, cease and desist orders, or other actions. The FAA 
proposes that a screening company would have to provide copies of these 
documents to only those carriers for which it conducted screening at 
the location of an alleged violation, rather than to all carriers for 
which it conducted screening nationwide. The proposed requirement to 
provide the copies within 3 business days of receipt would ensure that 
the carrier(s) receive(s) timely notice.
    The FAA considered proposing that the FAA would provide copies 
directly to the carriers involved. However, the FAA believes that this 
responsibility more correctly belongs with the screening companies. A 
screening company should keep the carriers for which it is performing 
screening informed of the company's compliance status. During its 
regular inspections of screening companies, the FAA would check to make 
certain that the screening companies are keeping carriers informed. The 
FAA requests comments on any alternative means for keeping the carriers 
informed of their screening companies' compliance.

III.K. Sec. 111.119  Business office

    Under the proposal, each certificated security screening company 
would be required to have a principal business office with mailing 
address and would be required to notify the Administrator of any 
address changes. The FAA would not expect all files to be maintained at 
the business office. Most files would be retained onsite and be 
available for inspection.

Subpart C--Operations

III.L.  Sec. 111.201  Screening of persons and property and acceptance 
of cargo

    The language in proposed Sec. 111.201 is similar to the proposed 
language contained in Sec. 108.201 for air carriers (Notice No. 97-12). 
The FAA is not proposing to remove any of the language from proposed 
Sec. 108.201 or from similar language in Sec. 129.25, because the 
carriers will remain responsible under statute for screening persons 
and property. This proposal does, however, include similar provisions 
under proposed Sec. 111.201, because screening companies are the 
primary screeners of persons and property in most situations, and they 
must be aware of and be held accountable for their screening 
responsibilities.
    Under proposed Sec. 111.201(a), each screening company would be 
required to use the procedures included in its approved screening 
company security program to inspect each person and his or her 
accessible property entering a sterile area. Under proposed 
Sec. 111.201(a), each screening company would also be required to deter 
and prevent the introduction into a sterile area of any explosive, 
incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon on or about each person or 
the person's accessible property.
    Note that this NPRM also proposes to change the wording in 
Sec. 108.201(a) and (b) to indicate that the screening procedures, 
facilities, and equipment may also be described in the screening 
companies' approved security programs as well as in the air carriers' 
approved security programs. The FAA expects that differing requirements 
would appear in one or the other of the programs, depending on the 
requirement. Similar requirements also appear in proposed Sec. 109.201 
for indirect air carriers and in existing Sec. 129.25 for foreign air 
carriers. These changes are further explained in the detailed proposed 
rule discussion for parts 108, 109, and 129.
    Under proposed Sec. 111.201(b), each screening company would be 
required to deny entry into a sterile area at a checkpoint to the 
following: any person who does not consent to a search of his or her 
person in accordance with the screening system prescribed in paragraph 
(a) of this section; and any property of any person who does not 
consent to a search or inspection of that property in accordance with 
the screening system prescribed by paragraph (a) of this section.
    Proposed Sec. 111.201(c) would state that the provisions of 
paragraph (a) of Sec. 111.201, with respect to firearms and weapons, 
would not apply to law enforcement personnel required to carry firearms 
or other weapons while in the performance of their duties at the 
airport; persons authorized to carry firearms in accordance with 
Sec. 108.213, 108.215, 108.217, or 129.27 of the chapter; and persons 
authorized to carry firearms in sterile areas under FAA-approved or 
FAA-accepted security programs.
    Under proposed Sec. 111.201(d), each screening company would be 
required to staff the screening locations that it operates with 
supervisory and nonsupervisory personnel in accordance with the 
standards specified in its security program. This language is similar 
to the language contained in proposed Sec. 108.201(g) of Notice No. 97-
12; however, it would be relocated to part 111 because screening 
companies are responsible for their own staffing. Also, the words 
``security screening checkpoints'' would be replaced with the words 
``screening locations'' to include screening that is conducted at 
checkpoints and at other locations.
    Under proposed Sec. 111.201(e), each screening company would be 
required to use the procedures included in its approved security 
program to inspect checked baggage, or cargo presented for inspection 
by a carrier, and therefore prevent or deter the carriage of explosives 
or incendiaries in checked baggage or cargo onboard passenger aircraft. 
This language is similar to the language contained in proposed 
Sec. 108.201(h) of Notice No. 97-12; however, it has been amended to 
more clearly indicate this requirement's applicability to checked 
baggage and cargo.

III.M.  Sec. 111.203  Use of screening equipment

    Under proposed Sec. 111.203(a), each screening company would be 
required to operate all screening equipment in accordance with its 
approved security program. This equipment would include metal 
detectors, X-ray systems, explosives detection systems, explosives 
trace detectors, and any other screening equipment that is approved for 
use by the FAA. In most cases, the carriers that contract with the 
screening companies for their screening services own and maintain the 
equipment and provide it to the screening companies for their use. 
While screening companies would be responsible for the day-to-day 
operational testing and operation of the equipment, the carriers would 
still retain responsibility for the calibration and maintenance of the 
equipment.
    Proposed Sec. 111.203(b)-(d) would contain several X-ray-related 
requirements that were originally included as part of Sec. 108.205 (see 
Notice No. 97-12) but which the FAA is proposing to relocate to 
proposed part 111, because they are functions that screening companies 
typically carry out. Specifically, some of the language from proposed 
Sec. 108.205 would be repeated in Sec. 111.203 and amended to apply to 
screening companies. Proposed Sec. 111.203(b) would state that the

[[Page 576]]

Administrator authorizes certificated screening companies to use X-ray 
systems for inspecting property under approved screening company 
security programs if several items are met. A screening company would 
be required to show that it has established a mandatory program for the 
initial and recurrent training of operators of the X-ray systems, which 
includes training in radiation safety, the efficient use of X-ray 
systems, and the identification of unauthorized weapons, explosives, 
incendiaries, and other dangerous articles. The screening company also 
would be required to show that the X-ray systems that it operates meet 
the imaging requirements set forth in its approved security program. 
These requirements are currently contained in the carrier standard 
security programs but would be relocated to the screening standard 
security program to accompany the relocation of these requirements.
    Under proposed Sec. 111.203(c), screening companies would be 
required to inspect individuals' photographic equipment and film 
packages without exposure to X-ray or explosives detection systems if 
requested by the individuals. Proposed Sec. 111.203(d) would require 
that each screening company comply with any X-ray operator duty time 
limitations specified in its approved security program.
    As will be explained in the detailed proposed rule discussion for 
parts 108, 109, and 129, all requirements related to the use of X-ray 
systems would also be extended to indirect air carriers and their 
screening companies. The proposed Sec. 111.203 requirements above would 
also apply to indirect air carriers. All remaining requirements related 
to the use of X-ray systems would remain in parts 108 and 129 and be 
included in part 109 as carrier responsibilities. These requirements 
involve conducting radiation surveys, meeting imaging requirements, 
meeting Food and Drug Administration (FDA) standards and compliance 
standards regarding FDA defect notices or modification orders, and 
meeting other equipment-related requirements.

III.N. Sec. 111.205  Employment standards for screening personnel

    Under existing regulations, employment standards for screening 
personnel are provided as requirements for air carriers under 
Sec. 108.31 (proposed Sec. 108.209), for foreign air carriers under 
their model security program (MSP), and for indirect air carriers under 
their security program. Since these requirements include standards 
regarding the screening personnel to be hired by screening companies, 
the FAA proposes to relocate them from part 108, the MSP, and the 
IACSSP to part 111, and assign responsibility for them to screening 
companies. This would establish one consolidated list of employment 
standards for all screeners performing screening in the United States.
    The consolidation of all employment standards would impose some 
additional requirements on screeners performing screening for air 
carriers, foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers. Under 
proposed Sec. 111.205(a)(2), two additional requirements would be added 
for screeners performing screening for air carriers and foreign air 
carriers, which were incorporated in recent cargo-related security 
program amendments. First, under proposed Sec. 111.205(a)(2)(i), 
screeners would have to be able to identify the components that might 
constitute an explosive or an incendiary. Second, under proposed 
Sec. 111.205(a)(2)(ii), screeners would have to be able to identify 
objects that appear to match those items described in all current 
security directives and emergency amendments. The addition of these 
proposals and other proposals below would result in the rearrangement 
of the numbering structure of proposed Sec. 108.209(a)(2) (Notice No. 
97-12).
    Another proposal under Sec. 111.205(a)(2)(iii) would require that 
screeners operating both X-ray and explosives detection system 
equipment be able to distinguish on the equipment monitors the 
appropriate imaging standards specified in the screening companies' 
approved security programs. The FAA is proposing to amend this 
requirement that already exists in part 108 to include explosives 
detection systems and to change the location of all screener employment 
standards from the carrier programs to the screening companies' 
security programs.
    Screeners performing screening for foreign air carriers operating 
their own screening checkpoints in the United States theoretically 
would have to meet additional standards under this proposal that 
currently are not required of them. Specific differences from the 
current MSP standards and this proposal are that these proposed rule 
requirements would expand the English language requirements, add 
education requirements, add specific screener evaluation requirements, 
and provide allowances for special circumstances. Most foreign air 
carriers, however, use screening checkpoints operated by U.S. air 
carriers, and all of these foreign air carriers already voluntarily 
comply with the existing 14 CFR part 108 employment standards to be 
consistent and to allow for screener shift rotations with screening 
checkpoints operated by domestic air carriers.
    Screeners performing cargo screening may also have to meet an 
additional standard under this proposal that is not currently required 
of them. Under proposed Sec. 111.205(a)(1), these screeners would be 
required to have high school diplomas, general equivalency diplomas, or 
combinations of education and experience that the screening companies 
have determined to have equipped the persons to perform the duties of 
their positions. No other new standards would be required of screeners 
performing cargo screening.
    The FAA may revisit the current screener education requirements 
after threat image projection (TIP) data becomes available regarding 
education level as it relates to screener performance. If it appears 
from the data that different employment standards are appropriate, the 
FAA would propose such standards for comment and make the supporting 
data available to the carriers and screening companies.
    In addition to relocating the standards, a proposed requirement 
would be added to Sec. 111.205(a)(4) stating that initial and recurrent 
training for all screeners shall include screening persons in a 
courteous and efficient manner and in compliance with the applicable 
civil rights laws of the United States. The statute requires that FAA 
rules for passenger screening ensure the courteous and efficient 
treatment of passengers by air carriers or foreign air carriers or 
agents or employees of air carriers or foreign air carriers (49 U.S.C. 
44903(b)(3)(B)). Further, there are a number of laws requiring air 
carriers to observe the civil rights of persons (e.g., see 42 U.S.C. 
1981, 2000a, and 2000d; and 49 U.S.C. 41310 and 41702). The FAA and the 
DOT's Office of the Secretary have received reports that some screeners 
were discourteous and might have discriminated against certain 
individuals. The FAA proposes to require that in initial and recurrent 
training, screeners receive instruction in screening in a courteous and 
efficient manner and in compliance with the civil rights laws. For 
instance, it would not be appropriate for a screener to subject a 
person to increased inspection based on the screener's view that the 
person appears to be of an ethnic group that the screener considers of 
a higher threat to air transportation. Further, while different methods 
are required to screen persons in wheelchairs, persons with implanted 
medical devices that

[[Page 577]]

may alarm the metal detector, and other persons with certain 
disabilities, screeners are required to be courteous and to avoid 
violating the civil rights laws while they conduct the screening. (See, 
e.g., 49 U.S.C. 41705 and 14 CFR part 382, and Sec. 382.49 in 
particular.) Training would help ensure that screeners are aware of 
their duties in this regard.
    Proposed Sec. 111.205(a)(5) would require persons with supervisory 
screening duties to have initial and recurrent training that includes 
leadership and management subjects. In response to noted deficiencies 
in training for checkpoint security supervisory personnel and a 
determination that they lacked communication skills training, 
leadership development, and general supervisory skills training, the 
FAA developed the Supervisor Effectiveness Training (SET) Program which 
focuses on communication and leadership skills. While the SET program 
is intended to serve as a model for teaching these supervisory 
subjects, it is not required at this time. However, the FAA intends to 
propose for comment specific standards that the leadership and 
management training for checkpoint supervisors shall meet in the SSSP, 
and the SET Program would meet those standards.
    The FAA is seeking comments on whether additional or different 
selection and employment standards are appropriate to improve the 
screening companies' ability to hire qualified, effective screeners.

III.O. Sec. 111.207  Disclosure of sensitive security information

    Certain information related to civil aviation security must be 
protected from unauthorized disclosure because it could be used to 
attempt to defeat the security system if it falls into the wrong hands. 
In Sec. 191.7 the FAA has designated this information as sensitive 
security information (SSI). SSI includes information about security 
programs, technical specifications of certain screening equipment and 
objects used to test screening equipment, and other information. Under 
Sec. 191.3, the FAA does not disclose such information. Under 
Sec. 191.5, carriers are required to protect SSI from disclosure, 
including disclosing it to only those with a need to know.
    Some SSI must be revealed to persons being trained to be screeners. 
There is a high rate of turnover among screener trainees, however. A 
large portion of the trainees do not complete training. It is advisable 
to avoid providing SSI to those who will never need it to perform 
security duties. The FAA therefore is proposing that the appropriate 
steps of the employment history, verification, and criminal history 
records checks that air carriers or airport operators are required to 
conduct are carried out before trainees are given SSI during training.
    Airport operators are required to ensure that persons with 
unescorted access to security identification display areas (SIDA) have 
their checks completed beforehand (see Sec. 107.31). The checks may be 
carried out by the airport operators or the air carriers. Air carriers 
are required to ensure that checks are completed on certain persons, 
including persons who screen passengers or property that will be 
carried into the cabins of aircraft (see Sec. 108.33; to appear as 
Sec. 108.221 under Notice No. 97-12). Most persons who screen cargo and 
checked baggage are either also qualified to screen persons and 
property that will be carried into aircraft cabins, and/or have 
unescorted access to SIDA's and therefore will be subject to the checks 
in Sec. 107.31 or 108.33.
    The checks required under current Sec. 107.31 or 108.33 are in two 
parts. In most cases, only part 1 is required. Part 1 includes the 
individuals providing certain information on applications, with the air 
carriers or airport operators verifying selected parts of that 
information. If certain conditions (triggers) are discovered during 
part 1 (such as an individual is unable to support statements made on 
his or her application form), the air carriers or airport operators 
shall accomplish part 2 of the checks, which involves criminal history 
records checks based on fingerprints.
    The FAA proposes under Sec. 111.207 that each screening company 
would be required to ensure that no SSI is provided to a screener 
trainee who will be required to have an employment history verification 
until part 1 of the trainee's check is completed. If the individual has 
a history of a disqualifying crime set forth in Sec. 107.31 or 108.33, 
that individual would not be permitted to screen persons or property to 
be carried into aircraft cabins and thus would not be eligible to be a 
screener. Under the statute, if a part 2 criminal history records check 
is needed, an individual may be employed as a screener until his or her 
check is completed if the person is subject to supervision (see 49 
U.S.C. 44936(a)(1)(D)). This means that the person would be permitted 
to receive SSI unless or until his or her records check reveals a 
disqualifying crime.
    The FAA considered duplicating these employment history and 
verification requirements in proposed part 111 for screening companies 
but did not because the statute makes the air carriers responsible for 
the checks; only the air carriers, not the screening companies, can 
obtain the criminal histories that may be called for under proposed 
Sec. 108.221 (current Sec. 108.33). If an airport operator or an air 
carrier completes part 1, the screening company would have to receive 
confirmation from one of them indicating that it has been completed. 
Many airport operators or air carriers authorize screening companies to 
obtain applicants' part 1 employment history information and verify the 
applicants' most recent 5 years of employment history. In these 
situations, the airport operators or air carriers are responsible for 
ensuring that the screening companies are complying with these 
requirements.

III.P. Sec. 111.209  Screening company management

    This proposed section would require that each screening company 
have sufficient qualified management and technical personnel to ensure 
the highest degree of safety in its screening. This is based on a 
requirement in Sec. 119.65(a) that applies to air carriers operating 
under part 121.
    Proposed Sec. 111.209(b) would require that each screening company 
have a screening performance coordinator (SPC). The SPC would, at a 
minimum, be responsible for monitoring the quality and performance of 
screening at each screening location and ensuring that corrective 
action is taken to remedy any performance deficiencies. The SPC would 
also serve as the primary point of contact for the company for FAA and 
carrier communications regarding security-related issues. In most cases 
the FAA anticipates that the SPC's would be responsible for managing 
the screening operations for their companies. Management experience, 
technical training, and knowledge of screening-related information 
would be critical to SPC's effectiveness in their positions.
    Under the proposed rule, an SPC would be required to have 
successfully completed the initial security screener training course, 
including the X-ray interpretation portion of the course and the end-
of-course FAA exam. The SPC's completion of initial security screener 
training would ensure that he or she would have formal training in the 
screener's job. The SPC would not be required to complete the on-the-
job portion of the training, because he or she would not actually 
perform required

[[Page 578]]

screening, and it would not be necessary for the SPC to accomplish the 
same level of proficiency as that required of a screener. The FAA 
requests comments regarding which portions of the training that the 
SPC's should be required to successfully complete in order to manage 
screening operations effectively.
    Furthermore, to ensure that the SPC's have management skills and 
practical experience in the aviation security environment necessary to 
act as SPC's, proposed Sec. 111.209(b)(1)(i) would require that each 
SPC have at least 1 year of supervisory or managerial experience within 
the last 3 years in a position that exercised control over any aviation 
security screening required under part 108, 109 or 129. This 
requirement is intended to provide SPC's with solid experience and 
knowledge bases regarding managing and coordinating aviation screening 
operations, including knowledge to apply new procedures and 
technologies. The proposal would include exceptions in Sec. 111.209(d) 
for those who screen only cargo for indirect air carriers (IAC's) under 
part 109. During the 3-year period following the publication of the 
final rule, a person who does not satisfy the experience requirements 
of Sec. 111.209(b)(1)(i) would be able to serve as SPC for IAC 
screening operations if authorized to do so by the Administrator. IAC's 
have not been involved in screening for very long, and there might be 
few individuals who could meet this standard at first. In deciding to 
grant exceptions, the FAA would consider such factors as individuals' 
other management experience, nonmanagement screening experience or 
training, and security experience other than aviation screening.
    The name and business address of an SPC would be listed in the 
screening company's operations specifications. If a change in SPC's or 
a vacancy occurs, the screening company would be required to notify the 
Administrator within 10 days of the change under proposed 
Sec. 111.209(b)(2).
    Under proposed Sec. 111.209(c), each SPC would be required to have 
a working knowledge of parts 111 and 191 and part 108, 109, or 129, as 
applicable; his or her screening company's security program; his or her 
screening company's operations specifications; relevant statutes; and 
relevant technical information or manuals regarding screening 
equipment, security directives, advisory circulars, and information 
circulars on aviation security. This proposed requirement would help to 
ensure that each SPC has a satisfactory understanding of the 
fundamental regulatory and statutory requirements for screening 
operations and that he or she understands the challenges involved with 
screening. Well-trained, experienced SPC's would be better able to 
manage safe, effective, professional screening operations. These 
requirements are based on the management requirements in 
Sec. Sec. 119.65-119.71 for air carriers. The requirements are 
consistent with comments received on the ANPRM that stated that 
management personnel should be required to have aviation screening 
experience, training, and knowledge.

III.Q. Sec. 111.211  Screening company instructor qualifications

    As discussed in II.H., it is increasingly important that screeners 
be well qualified and receive proper training from qualified 
instructors. Under proposed Sec. 111.211, screening company instructors 
would have to have a minimum of 40 hours of actual experience as 
security screeners making independent judgments and pass the FAA 
screener knowledge-based and performance tests for each type of 
screening to be taught and for the procedures and equipment for which 
the instructors would be providing training. Each instructor would also 
have to be briefed regarding the objectives and standards of each 
course taught.
    The emphasis with this proposal is to ensure that screening 
companies employ instructors with important minimum qualifications. 
Requiring screening instructors to have actual experience as screeners 
would allow them to better understand the challenges involved in 
screening and to relay helpful, realistic advice and information to 
screener trainees. Requiring instructors to pass the FAA screener 
knowledge-based and performance tests in each area of screening taught 
would help ensure that the instructors have attained the knowledge and, 
as applicable, the skills and abilities needed to be effective as 
instructors. The FAA expects that screening companies would hire 
instructors who are knowledgeable about the screening process, who are 
able to demonstrate correctly screening procedures to trainees, and who 
can effectively and thoroughly communicate screening-related objectives 
and lesson plans to trainees. Conducting on-the-job training would keep 
instructors proficient regarding screening technologies and procedures.

III.R. Sec. 111.213  Training and knowledge of persons with screening-
related duties

    The language in proposed Sec. 111.213 mirrors parts of the proposed 
language contained in Sec. 108.227 for air carriers (Notice No. 97-12). 
Under proposed Sec. 111.213(a), no screening company would be permitted 
to use any screener, screener-in-charge, or checkpoint security 
supervisor unless that person had received training as specified in its 
approved screening company security program, including the 
responsibilities in Sec. 111.105. Under Sec. 111.213(c), each screening 
company would be required to ensure that screeners, screeners-in-
charge, or checkpoint security supervisors have knowledge of the 
provisions of part 111, the screening company's security program, and 
any applicable security directive (SD), emergency amendment (EA), and 
information circular (IC) information to the extent that such 
individuals need to know this information to perform their duties.
    Proposed Secs. 111.213(b) would require that each screening company 
submit its training program for screeners, screeners in charge, and 
checkpoint security supervisors to the Administrator for approval. Each 
training program should address the subject material contained in the 
security program's training and testing standards. The FAA proposes to 
create a performance-based training environment where screening 
companies would be expected to train their screening personnel to pass 
specific tests developed by the FAA. The FAA proposes to do away with 
the hourly training requirements for initial and recurrent training and 
give screening companies the flexibility to train their screeners using 
their own FAA-approved training programs. Screening companies would be 
responsible for ensuring that their trainees are able to pass an FAA 
knowledge-based and, if applicable, X-ray interpretation test at the 
end of their initial training and that their screening personnel are 
meeting performance standards thereafter (see proposed Sec. 111.215 for 
discussion regarding FAA tests). The FAA testing standards would 
encompass the subjects currently outlined in the Air Carrier Standard 
Security Program and might include additional standards regarding, for 
example, operating new screening technologies. The testing standards 
would differ for tests of persons who will screen persons and 
accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo, because each type of 
screening has some different features. As discussed above,

[[Page 579]]

the FAA is developing computer-based instruction and has made this 
available for use by the industry.
    In addition to the testing standards, the Screening Standard 
Security Program also would contain a list of subjects and types of 
training that the FAA would require that screening companies brief and 
demonstrate to their trainees. Trainees might not be tested on all of 
the subjects, but the information would be critical to their positions 
and performance. Examples of training standards would be demonstrating 
effective handwanding and manual search techniques, demonstrating a 
variety of improvised explosive device configurations, and briefing 
trainees on the definition of sensitive security information (SSI) and 
why SSI must be protected.

III.S. Sec. 111.215  Training tests: requirements

    This proposed section would introduce several new requirements all 
related to testing screeners at the completion of their classroom 
training sessions. The provisions would impose more control and 
consistency in the training environment, emphasize the importance of 
proper training and testing, and promote professionalism by both 
trainees and instructors. The proposals under this section are similar 
to other FAA regulations related to testing, such as those required for 
pilots and flight instructors under 14 CFR part 61. They are designed 
to help ensure that screener trainees have attained the knowledge and 
skills that they need to perform their jobs effectively.
    Currently, air carriers can design and administer their own written 
tests for screeners. The tests usually consist of approximately 20 
basic multiple-choice questions (the knowledge-based portion), and the 
air carriers have latitude in choosing the subject matter to be 
addressed and in designing the questions. The performance-based portion 
of the tests often consists of X-ray interpretation scenarios using 
overhead slides.
    Proposed Sec. 111.215(a) would require that each screener trainee 
pass one standardized FAA screener readiness test for each type of 
screening to be performed (persons, accessible property, checked 
baggage, and cargo) and for the procedures and equipment to be used 
prior to beginning on-the-job training. Since most screeners conduct 
screening of persons, accessible property, and checked baggage, the FAA 
envisions designing one test to address all of these types of 
screening. Since cargo screening involves some unique factors and does 
not involve screening persons, the FAA would most likely develop a 
separate test for cargo screeners. These standardized tests would 
address the traditional methods of screening and equipment used to 
conduct screening, such as metal detector devices, hand wand devices, 
and X-ray systems. The standardized tests might also encompass such 
explosives detection devices as explosives trace detection (ETD) 
devices. For more complex explosives detection equipment, such as 
explosives detection systems (EDS), an additional FAA knowledge-based 
and performance test would be required before the screeners could 
operate that equipment.
    Proposed Sec. 111.215(b) would require that each screening company 
ensure that each screener trainee completes 40 hours of on-the-job 
training and passes an FAA on-the-job training test before exercising 
independent judgment as a screener. Screeners would have to 
successfully pass that test before qualified supervisory-level 
individuals could sign the certification statements in the screeners' 
training and qualification records. The FAA envisions that this on-the-
job training test would be a computer-based test that is similar to the 
image interpretation portion of the FAA screener readiness test, but 
that it might require a higher score. The test would supplement all 
realistic carrier testing required before screeners are permitted to 
make independent judgments. Applicants for pilot certificates under 
part 61 and mechanic certificates under part 65 must also pass FAA 
knowledge and performance tests.
    Under proposed Sec. 111.215(c), each screening company would be 
required to ensure that each screener passes an FAA review test at the 
conclusion of his or her recurrent training. The written tests that are 
currently administered at the conclusion of recurrent training are 
required by the FAA and are designed by the carriers or screening 
companies; screening companies would now be required to provide their 
screeners with FAA recurrent tests, and carriers would be required to 
monitor the testing and grading process.
    The specific requirements and guidelines for the tests proposed 
under Sec. 111.215(a), (b), and (c) would be outlined in the screening 
companies' security programs. Using the same tests and grading them the 
same way throughout the country would ensure that trainees all meet the 
same, appropriate standards before making independent judgments and 
would promote uniformity among all screeners.
    Currently, many screening companies administer end-of-course 
knowledge-based tests to screener trainees in a paper format and 
administer the performance tests to trainees using overhead slides. 
This increases opportunities for cheating, because many screener 
trainees receive the same versions of the tests and because classes as 
a whole are usually interpreting the X-ray images at the same time. 
Instances have occurred where trainees or instructors have helped other 
trainees answer test questions or interpret X-ray images.
    Proposed Sec. 111.215(d) would address this issue by requiring that 
each screening company use an FAA computer-based test to administer the 
FAA tests for screener readiness, on-the-job training, and recurrent 
training unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator. This 
proposal would standardize the screener testing process, provide a 
unique mix of challenging and relevant test questions for each 
screener, discourage the sharing of test information, provide X-ray 
images for the X-ray interpretation portion of the test that are more 
like those on an actual X-ray machine, and automatically score the 
trainees' responses. The questions and interpretation images would be 
varied for each trainee (making it impossible to copy from one 
another), but would always address the key subjects contained in the 
testing standards. The FAA is currently developing these automated 
tests based on existing requirements for screeners. The tests are being 
designed to be user friendly and easily loaded onto standard personal 
computers to minimize costs and maximize flexibility.
    Proposed Sec. 111.215(e) would require each screening company to 
ensure that each test that it administers under Sec. 111.215(a) and (c) 
is monitored by an employee of the carrier for which it screens. When 
the screening company plans to administer a test to screener trainees 
it would be responsible for requesting that the applicable carrier(s) 
provide a test monitor during the entire testing and grading process. 
Each applicable carrier would be responsible for providing a test 
monitor upon request and ensuring that the test monitor meets the 
qualifications contained in proposed Sec. 108.229, 109.205, or 
129.25(p) and the supporting requirements in the screening company's 
security program. (See section IV.I. regarding monitoring of screener 
training tests and sharing of carrier responsibilities.)

III.T. Sec. 111.217  Training tests: cheating and other unauthorized 
conduct

    Proposed Sec. 111.217 is included to emphasize that cheating is not 
permitted on any training test

[[Page 580]]

administered to or taken by screening personnel, to include test 
monitors, screeners, screeners-in-charge, checkpoint security 
supervisors, and screening performance coordinators. Under proposed 
Sec. 111.217, no person may copy or intentionally remove a knowledge-
based or performance test under this part; give to another or receive 
from another any part or copy of that test; or give help on that test 
to or receive help on that test from any person during the period that 
test is being given. In addition, no person may take any part of that 
test on behalf of another person; use any material or aid during the 
period that test is being given; or intentionally cause, assist, or 
participate in any act prohibited by this paragraph except as 
authorized by the Administrator. These requirements are similar to the 
testing regulations set forth in Sec. 61.37 for pilots. These 
prohibitions apply ``except as authorized'' by the FAA, to provide for 
the possibility that in the future the FAA would authorize such conduct 
as the use of certain outside materials. For instance, in pilot exams, 
the applicants may bring flight computers to perform required 
calculations.
    Any instances reported to the FAA involving allegations that 
screening companies or screening company employees are permitting 
cheating on tests would be investigated, and those companies or 
individuals involved in the incidents could be held accountable. It 
would be particularly important that the test monitors explain the 
consequences of cheating on tests to their trainees and be alert to any 
occurrences of cheating. If an instance of cheating occurs, a test 
monitor would be required to declare the test invalid and inform 
appropriate screening company and carrier management officials of the 
incident. FAA special agents also would regularly monitor screening 
company testing.

III.U. Sec. 111.219  Screener letter of completion of training

    Throughout this proposal, the FAA has sought ways to more 
effectively train, challenge, and motivate screeners and their 
supervisors. The following proposal would provide screeners and 
supervisors with verification of their training, and may provide a 
modest means of motivation by encouraging pride in the employees 
regarding their accomplishments. Under proposed Sec. 111.219, each 
screening company would issue letters of completion of training to 
screeners, screeners-in-charge (SIC), and checkpoint security 
supervisors (CSS) upon each successful completion of approved initial, 
recurrent, or specialized courses of training. Specialized training 
would encompass, for example, training for explosives detection 
equipment. These letters of completion would not serve as certification 
for screeners, CSS's, and SIC's, but would provide them with records of 
their specific training accomplishments. The FAA believes that 
requiring screening companies to issue letters of completion to 
screeners and screener supervisors for their successful completion of 
training would help enhance the professionalism of this critical 
security job.
    Each letter of completion of training would be required to contain 
the trainee's name, course of training completed and date of 
completion, name of the screening company providing the training, and a 
statement signed by a GSC, CSS, or SIC indicating that the trainee has 
satisfactorily completed each required stage of the approved course of 
training and the associated tests. Each letter of completion would also 
be required to indicate the types of screening that the screener was 
trained to perform (persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and/
or cargo) and the equipment and methods of screening that the screener 
was trained to operate and carry out. Examples of equipment would be X-
ray systems and EDS. An example of a method of screening would be a 
manual search.
    Screening companies could include letters of completion of training 
as part of their required screener and screener supervisor training and 
qualification records, but the letters would not serve as substitutes 
for the remaining records requirements.

III.V. Sec. 111.221  Screener and supervisor training records

    Under proposed Sec. 111.221, a screening company would be required 
to forward training records for a screener, screener-in-charge, or 
checkpoint security supervisor to another screening company upon the 
request of the employee. The other screening company would be able to 
use the employee without fully retraining him or her if it provides 
training on the procedures that differ from those of the previous 
company. In the event that a screening company ceases operations at a 
site, it would also be required to return its original screener records 
to the carrier for which it was conducting screening. These 
improvements would increase mobility for screeners, screeners-in-
charge, and checkpoint security supervisors. They would also ensure 
that training documentation would not be lost if a screening company 
leaves a location. These proposed requirements are consistent with 
several comments received on the ANPRM which stated that making 
screener personnel and training files transferable would enhance 
professionalism.
    Proposed Sec. 111.221(f), in particular, would require that 
training, testing, and certification records be made available promptly 
to FAA special agents upon request and be maintained for a period of at 
least 180 days following the termination of duty for a screener, 
screener-in-charge, or checkpoint security supervisor. Test records 
would include all tests to which the employee was subjected, not just 
those satisfactorily completed. Carriers currently are required to 
maintain these records under their security programs. Including this 
requirement as part of proposed part 111 would result in transferring 
the responsibility to maintain the records to screening companies, who 
often already maintain the records, and would standardize the length of 
time that records have to be maintained.

III.W. Sec. 111.223  Automated performance measurement and standards

    As discussed in section II.I., the FAA is proposing to enhance the 
FAA's, carriers', and screening companies' abilities to measure the 
performance of screening locations and to set FAA standards for their 
operation. Under proposed Sec. 111.223(a), each screening company would 
be required to use a threat image projection (TIP) system for each X-
ray and explosives detection system that it uses as specified in its 
security program to measure the performance of individual screeners, 
screening locations, and screening companies. It is important to note 
that this requirement would not require screening companies to install 
physically the TIP systems on the X-ray systems that they operate. 
Rather, it would require screening companies to operate the TIP systems 
that the carriers have installed in accordance with the procedures 
contained in their screening company security programs. The security 
program procedures would specify usage procedures, log on/log off 
procedures for each screener, and any data collection requirements. 
Proper operation of the TIP units and collection of data would be 
critical to measuring accurately the performance of screening 
companies.
    Under proposed Sec. 111.223(b), each screening company would be 
required to meet the performance standards set forth in its security 
program. These

[[Page 581]]

performance standards would be established through the notice and 
comment procedures for amending security programs. The FAA envisions 
establishing a range of performance that all screening companies would 
be required to fall within to be considered effective at detecting 
possible threats. If a screening company falls short of the minimum 
performance standards, it may be required to carry out additional 
security measures to maintain the required level of security, depending 
on the circumstances involved, and could ultimately lose its FAA 
certification if its performance does not improve (see discussion of 
possible additional security measures in section II.I.).
    The FAA expects that each screening company would regularly monitor 
its overall performance as well as its individual screeners' 
performance and take corrective actions as necessary. The FAA also 
expects that each carrier that contracts with a screening company would 
regularly monitor that screening company's performance. These oversight 
responsibilities would be outlined in the carriers' security programs, 
and the carriers would be responsible for working with their screening 
companies to remedy any performance problems.
    The FAA would collect and analyze screening company performance 
data regularly to monitor performance and to determine whether 
screening companies and carriers are in compliance with the required 
performance standards. The FAA would also closely review data regarding 
screening companies' performance at the time of initial certification 
(if historical performance data are available) and before each 
subsequent certification renewal.
    The FAA proposes to require that TIP systems be installed on X-ray 
and explosives detection systems at the U.S. screening locations 
specified in the carriers' security programs. The FAA proposes to 
require that TIP systems be installed initially at the busiest 
screening locations. The specific screening locations affected by this 
requirement would be described in the carriers' security programs. The 
FAA then would phase in requirements to install TIP systems at the 
remaining U.S. screening locations where property is screened. The 
process of phasing in requirements for TIP systems would allow the FAA 
to address promptly the higher threat airports and would allow 
realistic timeframes for updating older equipment to make it TIP-
compatible. The FAA already has installed TIP systems at many of the 
Nation's major airports and will advocate additional installations at 
other airports and cargo facilities. During the phase-in process, the 
FAA will continue to measure screening companies' performance through 
testing and assessments.

IV. Proposed Revisions to Parts 108, 109, and 129

    The following section discusses the detailed rule proposals for 
parts 108, 109, and 129. The proposed additions for part 109 have been 
organized in a new regulatory format similar to that of Notice No. 97-
12 for part 108, for clarity and consistency.

IV.A. Secs. 108.201(h); 109.203(a); and 129.25(k)  Certification 
requirement

    Proposed new Sec. 108.201(h) would require that each carrier 
required to conduct screening of persons and property under a security 
program hold a screening company certificate issued under part 111 if 
the carrier will conduct the screening or use another screening company 
certificated under part 111 to conduct such screening.
    Proposed new Sec. 109.203(a) would require that each indirect air 
carrier that elects to conduct screening of property under a security 
program hold a screening company certificate issued under part 111 or 
use another screening company certificated under part 111 to conduct 
such screening.
    Proposed Sec. 129.25(k) would require that each foreign air carrier 
required to conduct screening of persons and property under a security 
program either hold a screening company certificate issued under part 
111 or use a screening company certificated under that part for 
screening locations within the United States.
    Proposed Sec. 108.201(h), 109.203(a), and 129.25(k) would all state 
that FAA-certified canine teams are not required to be operated by 
certificated screening companies. This statement is included to provide 
clarification for situations where FAA-certified canine teams are used 
to conduct screening.

IV.B. Secs. 108.5 and 109.5  Inspection authority

    Proposed Sec. 108.5, Inspection authority, would be amended to 
require that each air carrier also allow the Administrator, including 
FAA special agents, to make any inspections or tests at any time or 
place to determine screening company compliance with the new part 111 
of this chapter and the carrier's screening company security 
program(s). Proposed Sec. 108.5 also would be amended to require that 
an air carrier provide evidence of compliance with the new part 111 of 
this chapter and its screening company security program(s) at the 
request of the Administrator.
    Similar inspection authority language would also be proposed as 
Sec. 109.5 to be consistent with the requirements in Secs. 108.5 and 
119.59. This proposed parallel section would not be a new requirement, 
because it is already required by statute. Rather, the proposed section 
is intended to resolve any confusion regarding the FAA's statutory 
authority to conduct inspections and tests under title 49, U.S.C., 
Subtitle VII.

IV.C. Secs. 108.103(b); 109.103(b); and 129.25(c)  Security program 
form, content, and availability

    Proposed Sec. 108.103 in Notice No. 97-12 sets forth the form, 
content, and availability of security programs required under part 108. 
Proposed Sec. 108.103(b) of Notice No. 97-12 lists items to be included 
in the security programs. The proposed rule in this notice would add to 
that list of items in Notice No. 97-12 two new items: a description of 
how an air carrier would provide oversight to each screening company 
performing screening on its behalf, and a description of how the air 
carrier would evaluate and test the performance of screening. The 
proposed rule would also add comparable requirements as proposed 
Secs. 109.103(b)(4) and (5) and 129.25(c)(5) and (6). These 
requirements also would apply to indirect air carriers that elect to 
perform the screening functions themselves.
    The proposed requirement regarding a description of carrier 
oversight is based on proposed Secs. 108.201(j), 109.201(c), and 
129.25(m), which would require that each carrier required to conduct 
screening under parts 108, 109, and 129 provide oversight to each 
screening company performing screening on behalf of the carrier. The 
specific oversight requirements would be included in the carrier's 
security programs.
    The proposed requirement regarding a description of testing and 
evaluation procedures would include the process that the carrier would 
use to collect and evaluate automated screener and screening company 
performance data on a regular basis as required in proposed 
Sec. 111.223. Requiring the air carriers, indirect air carriers, and 
foreign air carriers to provide these descriptions would help to ensure 
that the carriers adequately oversee and manage the performance of 
screening companies employed by them.
    In addition to adding the new requirements above to part 109, the 
proposal would rename the current Sec. 109.3 as Sec. 109.103 and 
reorganize it to parallel Sec. 108.103. Proposed

[[Page 582]]

Sec. 109.103(a) would state several overall requirements for the 
indirect air carrier security program. All of the requirements are 
stated in the current Sec. 109.3 with the exception of one new 
requirement. This proposed addition would require indirect air carriers 
to state in their programs that upon receipt of an approved security 
program or security program amendment from the FAA, the indirect air 
carriers shall acknowledge receipt of it to the Assistant Administrator 
in writing and signed by the indirect air carriers or persons delegated 
authority in this matter within 72 hours. This is a proposed 
requirement in Sec. 108.103 and would also be applicable to indirect 
air carriers.
    Section 109.103(b) would list all of the items that the indirect 
air carrier security programs shall include. In addition to adding the 
two description requirements to Sec. 109.103(b), the proposal would 
also require that the security programs include the following: the 
procedures and descriptions of the facilities and equipment used to 
perform screening functions specified in Sec. 109.201; and the 
procedures and descriptions of the equipment used to comply with the 
requirements of Sec. 109.207 of this part regarding the use of X-ray 
systems should indirect air carriers elect to perform screening 
functions. These requirements would be added to support the new cargo 
screening requirements, with an emphasis on X-ray systems.
    Section 109.103(c) would describe how the indirect air carriers 
should maintain their programs and to whom they should make security 
program information available. All of these requirements already are 
required by the current Sec. 109.3.

IV.D. Secs. 109.105 and 129.25(e)  Approvals and amendments of security 
programs

    The proposal would reorganize the current regulatory text of 
Secs. 109.5 (proposed Sec. 109.105) and 129.25(e)(2), (3), and (4) to 
clarify the requirements and make them consistent with the organization 
of Sec. 108.105. The only substantive changes would affect indirect air 
carriers under proposed Sec. 109.105(c) and (d). Section 109.105(c) 
would allow indirect air carriers to petition the Administrator to 
reconsider a notice of amendment if the petitions are submitted no 
later than 15 days before the effective date of the amendment. Section 
109.105(d) would allow indirect air carriers the opportunity to file 
petitions for reconsideration under Sec. 109.105(c).

IV.E. Secs. 108.201(i), (j), and (k); 109.203(b), (c), and (d); and 
129.25(l), (m), and (n)  Responsibilities of carriers and screening 
companies

    Proposed new Secs. 108.201(i), 109.203(b), and 129.25(l) would 
require each carrier to ensure that each screening company performing 
screening services on the carrier's behalf do so consistent with part 
111, the screening company's security program, and the screening 
company's operations specifications. Proposed new Secs. 108.201(j), 
109.203(c) and 129.25(m) would require each carrier required to conduct 
screening to oversee each screening company performing screening on its 
behalf as directed in the carrier's security program. The requirements 
for oversight would all be listed in the ACSSP, MSP, and IACSSP. For 
example, the security programs may require periodic audits by the 
carriers to look at different aspects of the screening companies' 
operations. The frequency of such audits and the specific aspects to be 
audited would be described in the security programs and could be 
tailored to the different types of screening operations conducted. The 
FAA recently issued an amendment to the ACSSP that meets the intent of 
this proposal for air carriers. The proposed amendment strengthens 
checkpoint auditing and testing requirements for ground security 
coordinators.
    As part of their oversight responsibilities, each carrier required 
to conduct screening under a security program would be required under 
proposed Secs. 108.201(k), 109.203(d), and 129.25(n) to maintain at 
least one complete copy of each of its screening companies' security 
programs at its principal business office; have available complete 
copies or the pertinent portions of its screening companies' security 
programs or appropriate implementing instructions at each location 
where the screening companies conduct screening for the carrier; and 
make copies of its screening companies' security programs available for 
inspection by an FAA special agent upon request. Each carrier would 
also be required to restrict the distribution, disclosure, and 
availability of information contained in its screening companies' 
security programs to persons with a need to know as described in part 
191 of this chapter, and refer requests for such information by other 
persons to the Administrator.
    These proposed requirements are consistent with several comments on 
the ANPRM that stated that air carriers must ensure that the screening 
companies are conducting screening on their behalf in compliance with 
the applicable security programs and all other regulations. Some 
commenters also stated that while air carriers should retain 
responsibility for checkpoint screening activities, certificated 
screening companies should be directly responsible for their own 
regulatory compliance.

IV.F. Secs. 108.201(l) and 129.25(o)  Public notification regarding 
additional security measures

    As discussed in section III.W., the FAA envisions that performance 
standards eventually may be established using TIP data. If a screening 
company were to fall short of the minimum standards it may be required 
to carry out additional measures to maintain the required level of 
security. These measures may result in slowing the screening operation 
at that location. Proposed Secs. 108.201(l) and 129.25(o) would be 
added to require that each carrier required by the FAA to implement 
additional security measures to maintain system performance notify the 
public by posting signs at affected locations as specified in its 
security program. This would explain to the public why it might take 
longer than usual for screening to be accomplished and why baggage may 
be subjected to additional searches. This is further discussed in 
section II.I.

IV.G. Secs. 108.205; 109.207; and 129.26  Use of X-ray systems

    Proposed Sec. 108.205 would be amended to require that air carriers 
use X-ray systems in accordance with their approved security programs 
and their screening companies' approved security programs. Both 
programs are included here, because the air carriers would be required 
to ensure that the X-ray systems meet the standards for cabinet X-ray 
systems issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), have had 
radiation surveys as required, have met the required imaging 
requirements at the time of initial installation and when the systems 
are relocated, are in full compliance with any defect notices or 
modifications orders issued for those systems by the FDA, and meet 
other equipment-related requirements as described in proposed 
Sec. 108.205. However, an air carrier would also be responsible for 
ensuring that its screening companies comply with the X-ray-related 
requirements to be relocated to the Screening Standard Security 
Program. Specifically, Sec. 108.205(a)(2), which requires that a 
program for initial and recurrent training of operators of X-ray 
systems be established, would be relocated to

[[Page 583]]

Sec. 111.203. Screening companies would assume responsibility for 
training their employees under this proposed rule. Section 
108.205(a)(3) would then be renumbered to read (a)(2) and would be 
revised to indicate that the screening companies' security programs 
would contain the imaging requirements. Also, Sec. 108.205(h), which 
would require each air carrier to comply with X-ray operator duty time 
limitations, would be relocated to Sec. 111.203.
    A new paragraph (h) would be added to state that unless otherwise 
authorized by the Administrator, each air carrier shall ensure that 
each X-ray system that it uses have a functioning threat image 
projection (TIP) system that meets the standards set forth in its 
security program. The FAA has worked with some X-ray system vendors to 
develop TIP systems and acceptable TIP standards and will continue to 
do so; these TIP systems currently are being used in several U.S. 
airports.
    The FAA, carriers, and screening companies would use the data 
gathered from the TIP systems to measure performance of the screening 
location and screeners, as described in section II.I. It therefore is 
necessary that the TIP systems be functioning properly and that the 
carriers use them as specified in their screening companies' security 
programs at all times unless they obtain amendments from the 
Administrator. Such amendments could be approved by the FAA for a 
limited time period if, for example, there were not enough X-ray 
systems with functioning TIP systems available for necessary screening 
operations at particular screening locations.
    Paragraph (h)(1) would state that automated X-ray TIP data will be 
collected as specified in the air carriers' security programs and in 
the responsible screening companies' security programs. Paragraph 
(h)(2) would state that air carriers shall make X-ray TIP data 
available to the FAA upon request and shall allow the FAA to download 
TIP data upon request.
    Section 129.26 would contain proposed amendments similar to those 
described previously for Sec. 108.205. Section 129.26(a)(3), which 
requires that a program for initial and recurrent training of operators 
of X-ray systems be established, would be relocated to Sec. 111.203. 
Screening companies would assume responsibility for training their 
employees under this proposed rule. Section 129.26(a)(5) would then be 
renumbered to read (a)(3) and would be amended to indicate that the 
imaging requirements for X-ray systems will now be set forth in the 
approved Screening Standard Security Program rather than in the foreign 
air carriers' security programs.
    Currently, Sec. 129.26(a)(4) requires foreign air carriers using X-
ray systems to establish procedures to ensure that all operators of the 
systems be provided with individual personal dosimeters to measure 
exposure to X-rays and that they evaluate them every month. The FAA is 
proposing to omit this requirement, as was also proposed in Notice No. 
97-12 for part 108. In 1975, the FAA first adopted rules regarding the 
use of X-ray machines to screen accessible property. At that time, the 
use of X-ray systems for this purpose was relatively new, and the FAA 
took a number of steps to evaluate the safety and environmental impacts 
of these systems. Although the experts who submitted comments did not 
find it necessary for operators of the equipment to wear dosimeters, 
the FAA's rules included such a requirement. The FAA now proposes to 
remove this requirement based on the determinations of those agencies 
with the expertise.
    The FAA proposes to add a new paragraph as Sec. 129.26(a)(4) that 
would parallel the proposed new paragraph (h) in Sec. 108.205. 
Paragraph (a)(4) would state that unless otherwise authorized by the 
Administrator, each foreign air carrier shall ensure that each X-ray 
system that it uses has a functioning threat image projection system 
that meets the standards set forth in its security program. The FAA, 
carriers, and screening companies would use the data gathered from the 
TIP systems to measure performance of the screening location and 
screeners, as described in section II.I. Paragraph (a)(4)(i) would 
state that automated X-ray TIP data will be collected as specified in 
the SSSP and the MSP. Paragraph (a)(4)(ii) would state that foreign air 
carriers shall make X-ray TIP data available to the FAA upon request 
and shall allow the FAA to download their TIP data upon request.
    Proposed Sec. 109.207 would be added to provide regulations on the 
use of X-ray systems consistent with the requirements of proposed 
Sec. 108.205 and Sec. 129.26. These requirements are a slightly edited 
version of rule language in proposed Sec. 108.205, with minor 
differences related to the unique nature of screening cargo.

IV.H. Secs. 108.207 and 129.28  Use of Explosives Detection Systems

    Because most screening-related procedures would be moved to the 
Screening Standard Security Program, proposed Sec. 108.207 would be 
reworded to state the following: When the Administrator shall require 
by an amendment under Sec. 108.105 of this part, each air carrier 
required to conduct screening under a security program shall use an 
explosives detection system that has been approved by the Administrator 
to screen checked baggage on each international flight in accordance 
with the air carrier's and its screening company security programs.
    This proposal would designate this revised paragraph as paragraph 
(a), and create a paragraph (b) to state that unless otherwise 
authorized by the Administrator, each air carrier shall ensure that 
each explosives detection system that it uses has a functioning TIP 
system that meets the standards set forth in its security program. The 
FAA is working with explosives detection system vendors to develop TIP 
systems and to establish acceptable standards similar to those being 
developed for X-ray systems. The FAA would use the data gathered from 
the TIP systems to measure performance of screening locations and 
screeners, as described in section II.I. Paragraph (b)(1) would state 
that automated explosives detection system TIP data will be collected 
as specified in the air carriers' and screening companies' security 
programs. Paragraph (b)(2) would state that air carriers shall make 
explosives detection system TIP data available to the FAA upon request 
and shall allow the FAA to download their TIP data upon request.
    A new Sec. 129.28 would also be added to part 129 to extend the TIP 
requirements for explosives detection systems to foreign air carriers. 
The language in this proposed addition would be similar to the proposed 
revised language for Sec. 108.207 but would require foreign air 
carriers to comply with their security programs and their screening 
companies' security programs.

IV.I. Secs. 108.229, 109.205, and 129.25(p) Monitoring of Screener 
Training Tests

    Proposed new Secs. 108.229, 109.205, and 129.25(p) would require 
that each carrier monitor each screener training test required under 
Sec. 111.215(a) and (c) for all screening companies that conduct 
screening on its behalf in accordance with its security program. As 
discussed in section II.H., this proposed requirement is intended to 
increase carrier involvement with the training and testing processes 
and to help deter possible cheating. It is one of many proposals in 
this NPRM intended to emphasize how critical it is that screeners 
individually demonstrate a fundamental knowledge of screening-related 
information and that they meet

[[Page 584]]

the standards that are needed for them to perform their screening 
responsibilities effectively and without inappropriate assistance.
    The FAA does not intend to impose unrealistic burdens on carriers 
with this requirement. In a situation where multiple carriers contract 
with one screening company, one carrier could be designated to monitor 
the screener tests, or the responsibility could be rotated among all of 
the responsible carriers. The FAA is not proposing to require that 
carriers monitor the tests under proposed Sec. 111.215(b) because of 
the logistical difficulties involved with screeners' completing their 
40 hours of on-the-job training at varied times. In this way, screening 
companies would have added flexibility in administering these automated 
on-the-job training tests to their screening personnel.
    Each test monitor would be required to meet specific 
qualifications, which are listed in the three proposed carrier 
sections. A test monitor would have to be an employee of a carrier who 
is not a contractor, instructor, screener, screener-in-charge, 
checkpoint security supervisor, or other screening company supervisor. 
However, if the carrier is unable to provide a test monitor who meets 
these requirements, it could seek an amendment from the FAA allowing it 
to use one or more test monitors who do not meet the qualifications 
requirements. Requiring that monitors be employees of the carriers 
would prevent carriers from designating contracted screening company 
employees as test monitors, resulting in increased carrier involvement 
with monitors who are independent from the screening companies. 
Carriers could designate any qualified carrier employees as test 
monitors, including ground security coordinators. In addition to the 
qualifications requirement, test monitors would be required to be 
familiar with the testing and grading procedures contained in their 
screening companies' security programs and would be required to monitor 
the procedures as specified in the security programs.

IV.J. Additional Proposed Requirements to Parts 108, 109, and 129

    Proposed Sec. 109.1, ``Applicability,'' would revise current 
Sec. 109.1 to clarify and simplify the applicability for the part. The 
proposal would state that Sec. 109.1 prescribes aviation security rules 
governing each indirect air carrier (IAC) engaged indirectly in the air 
transportation of property.
    Proposed Sec. 109.3, ``Definitions,'' would define the term 
``indirect air carrier'' to clarify its meaning for the purpose of part 
109.
    Proposed Sec. 109.7, ``Falsification,'' would be a new section in 
part 109. This section would be added to be consistent with the 
falsification requirements in proposed Sec. 108.7.
    Proposed Sec. 109.101, ``Adoption and implementation,'' would be 
created to emphasize the requirement for each indirect air carrier to 
adopt and carry out a security program that meets the requirements of 
Sec. 109.103. Creating this separate section would also make the 
statement of this requirement consistent with the ``Adoption and 
implementation'' section in Sec. 108.101.
    Proposed Sec. 109.201, ``Screening of Cargo,'' would be added to 
clarify under paragraph (a) that each indirect air carrier that elects 
to conduct screening under a security program shall use the procedures 
included and the facilities and equipment described in its approved 
security program and its screening company approved security program(s) 
to inspect cargo and prevent the carriage of explosives or incendiaries 
onboard any aircraft. Proposed Sec. 109.201(b) would be added to 
clarify that each indirect air carrier that elects to conduct screening 
under a security program shall detect and prevent the carriage of 
explosives or incendiaries aboard aircraft and into sterile areas in 
cargo. This section would be added to be consistent with the applicable 
requirements in the ``Screening of persons and property and acceptance 
of cargo'' section in proposed Sec. 108.201.
    Proposed Sec. 108.201(m) would be added under ``Screening of 
persons and property and acceptance of cargo'' to clarify that although 
all screening-related requirements for screening in the United States 
have been relocated to part 111, certain requirements still apply at 
screening locations outside the United States at which air carriers 
have operational control over screening. Specifically, proposed 
Sec. 108.201(m) would state that air carriers that do have operational 
control over screening outside the United States shall carry out and 
comply with all relevant sections of part 111 of this chapter, except 
for those requirements related to screening company certification, to 
the extent allowable by local law. An air carrier would be permitted to 
use screeners who do not meet the requirements of Sec. 111.205(a)(3) 
provided that at least one representative of the air carrier who has 
the ability to read and speak English functionally is present while the 
air carrier's passengers are undergoing security screening. In the 
event that an air carrier is unable to implement any of the 
requirements for screening, the air carrier would be required to notify 
the Administrator of those air carrier stations or screening locations 
so affected. Most of proposed Sec. 108.201(m) consists of requirements 
contained in Sec. 108.209(e) and (f) of proposed Notice No. 97-12. 
Proposed Sec. 108.201(n) would be added to require that air carriers 
notify the Administrator of any screening locations outside the United 
States at which they do have operational control. To the FAA's 
knowledge, there are currently no foreign locations where part 108 air 
carriers have operational control over screening; however, this 
proposal includes these requirements in the event of such a situation.
    Proposed Sec. 108.203, ``Use of metal detection devices,'' would be 
revised to state that no air carrier may use a metal detection device 
contrary to its approved security program or its screening company 
approved program(s). The section would also be revised to require that 
metal detection devices meet the calibration standards established by 
the Administrator in the screening company approved security 
program(s).
    Proposed Sec. 108.227(b) would be amended to also require that each 
air carrier ensure that individuals performing security-related 
functions on its behalf have knowledge of their screening company 
approved security program(s) to the extent that such individuals need 
to know in order to perform their duties.
    Proposed Sec. 108.301(b)(1) would be amended to require that the 
ground security coordinator (GSC) at each airport also conduct a review 
of all security-related functions for effectiveness and compliance with 
its screening company security program(s). Proposed Sec. 108.301(b)(2) 
would be amended to require that the GSC at each airport also 
immediately initiate corrective action with its applicable screening 
company for each instance of noncompliance with the screening company's 
security program.
    Proposed Sec. 129.25(j) would revise current (j) to more clearly 
break out and include the operations requirements consistent with 
Sec. 108.201.

V. Proposed Revisions to Part 191

V.A. Protection of Sensitive Security Information (SSI)

    The carriers' security programs are not available to the public 
because the information that they contain would be helpful to 
individuals who might intend to attack civil aviation. Part 191 of 
Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, contains rules to protect 
security

[[Page 585]]

programs and other sensitive security information (SSI) from disclosure 
to unauthorized persons. For example, under Sec. 191.5, a carrier and 
each individual employed by, contracted to, or acting for that carrier 
are required to restrict disclosure of and access to SSI to persons 
with a need to know.

V.B. Sec. 191.1 Applicability and Definitions

    Part 191.1(c) indicates that for matters involving the release or 
withholding of information and records containing information described 
in Sec. 191.7 (a) through (g) and related documents described in (l), 
the authority of the Administrator may be further delegated. The FAA 
proposes to add Sec. 191.7(m) to this list.

V.C. Sec. 191.5 Records and Information Protected by Others

    Currently, screeners are required to protect SSI because they are 
employed by, contracted to, or acting for carriers. This would remain 
true under the screening company certification rules proposed in this 
notice. However, to emphasize the need for screening companies and 
their employees to protect SSI, the FAA proposes to add to Sec. 191.5 
the requirement that screening companies also shall restrict access to 
SSI.
    As discussed previously, the FAA anticipates that in the course of 
applying for and qualifying for a screening company certificate, an 
applicant would receive the Screening Standard Security Program. To 
ensure that applicants for certificates are under the same requirements 
to protect SSI as are persons who hold certificates, the FAA proposes 
to add Sec. 191.5(e). Proposed Sec. 191.5(e) provides that references 
in part 191 to an air carrier, airport operator, indirect air carrier, 
foreign air carrier, or certificated screening company include 
applicants. Thus, an applicant for a screening company certificate 
would be required to restrict disclosure of the security program 
information that it receives. The same would be true of an applicant 
for an air carrier certificate who also is seeking an approved security 
program. The amount of SSI that carrier applicants now receive is very 
limited, and there usually is very little time between when they might 
receive standard security program information and when they might 
become certificated. However, they should protect the security program 
information from unauthorized disclosure.
    In some parts of the industry, individuals may be placed in 
training for positions, such as a screener position, before they are on 
the companies' payrolls. The training may include SSI. If a person 
completes training, he or she is hired. There has been some 
misunderstanding as to whether such trainees are covered by part 191. 
The FAA does consider them to be covered and proposes to add 
Sec. 191.5(f) to make this clear. Such trainees meet one or more of the 
criteria of employed by, contracted to, or acting for a carrier, 
airport operator, or screening company.

V.D. Sec. 191.7 Description of SSI

    Section 191.7 defines what information and records are SSI and 
therefore are subject to the protections in Sec. 191.5. Under this 
proposal, Sec. 191.7 would be amended to treat screening companies the 
same as carriers and to emphasize the need for them to protect 
sensitive security information. Section 191.7(a) describes various 
security programs that are protected. It would be amended to include 
screening company security programs.
    Section 191.7(h) describes the information that the Administrator 
has determined may reveal systemic vulnerabilities of the aviation 
system or vulnerabilities of aviation facilities to attack. It would be 
amended to include alleged violations and findings of violations of 
part 111 and any information that could lead to the disclosure of 
security information or data developed during FAA evaluations of 
certificated screening companies. For events that occurred less than 12 
months before the date of the release of the information, Sec. 191.7(h) 
would be amended to allow the FAA to release summaries of certificated 
screening companies' total security violations in specified time ranges 
without identifying specific violations. For events that occurred 12 
months or more before the date of the release of the information, 
Sec. 191.7(h) would be amended to allow the FAA to release the names of 
certificated screening companies cited in the alleged violations.
    A new Sec. 191.7(m) would be added to cover the operations 
specifications of screening companies. Specific portions of the 
operations specifications would be considered SSI and would be 
protected from disclosure to unauthorized persons. Some parts of the 
operations specifications, however, would be considered not to be SSI 
and would not be protected under part 191. These nonprotected items 
include the name of the company, the locations at which the 
Administrator has authorized the company to conduct business, the type 
of screening that the Administrator has authorized the company to 
perform, and the title and name of the person required by proposed 
Sec. 111.209(b).
    A new Sec. 191.7(n) would be added to cover the screener tests that 
the FAA will develop and require under proposed Sec. 111.215. These 
tests will contain information that is in the security programs and 
must be protected in the same way.

VI. Paperwork Reduction Act

    This proposal would create a new part 111 within Title 14, Code of 
Federal Regulations, titled ``Certification of Screening Companies.'' 
It would also result in conforming amendments to 14 CFR parts 108, 109, 
129, and 191. This proposal contains information collections that the 
FAA has submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as 
required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. section 
3507(d)).
    Title: Certification of Screening Companies.
    The following proposed sections include new information collection 
requirements: Sec. Sec. 108.103(b)(14) and (15), 108.201(j), and (k), 
108.205, 108.207, 108.229, 109.103(b)(4) and (5), 109.105, 109.203(b) 
and (c), 109.205, 109.207(e), (f), and (h), 111.105-111.109, 111.113-
111.119, 111.205, 111.209, 111.215, 111.219, 111.221, 129.25(c)(5) and 
(6), (l), (m), and (o), 129.26(a)(4), and 129.28.
    The FAA proposes to require that all companies that perform 
aviation security screening be certificated by the FAA and meet 
enhanced requirements. The FAA also proposes specific requirements that 
are intended to improve the screening of passengers, accessible 
property, checked baggage, and cargo and proposes to provide standards 
for consistent high performance and increased accountability of 
screening companies. The proposal is in response to a recommendation by 
the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and to a 
Congressional mandate in Section 302 of the Federal Aviation 
Reauthorization Act of 1996.
    The FAA would collect several types of information from screening 
companies. The FAA would collect and analyze information during the 
application process before issuing certificates to screening companies. 
This would be the most significant collection of information involved 
but would ccur only initially for provisional screening company 
certificates, after approximately 1 year for ``standard'' certificates, 
and once every 5 years thereafter. In addition, the FAA would

[[Page 586]]

require that screening companies notify the FAA and provide information 
as applicable when adopting their security programs and when proposing 
to amend their security programs, operations specifications, or 
screening company certificates. During periodic assessments of 
screening company operations, the screening companies would be required 
to provide any information requested to the FAA. The FAA would use this 
information to ensure that the screening companies and carriers are 
complying with screening requirements.
    Next, the FAA would collect information from air carriers, foreign 
air carriers, and indirect air carriers. These carriers would be 
required to show evidence of compliance with specified regulations and 
programs. This includes a proposed requirement that carriers maintain 
copies of their screening companies' security programs at their 
principal business offices and at their screening locations, and be 
able to obtain copies of these programs to show the FAA upon request. 
Carriers would be required to include in their security programs 
descriptions of the systems that they would use to evaluate and test 
the performance of all screening that they conduct. This requirement 
would ensure that all carriers plan how they would remain actively 
involved in evaluating and testing their screening operations and then 
carry out those security program provisions. The FAA would review each 
security program to ensure that the systems descriptions provide for 
effective oversight and would evaluate the carriers periodically to 
ensure that they are complying with their security programs. Each 
carrier would also be required to collect threat image projection data 
as specified in its carrier security program and in its responsible 
screening company security programs and make the data available to the 
FAA if requested.
    In addition to the FAA collecting information, carriers would also 
collect information from screening companies. First, when the FAA 
issues an enforcement action to a screening company, that company would 
be required to provide a copy of the enforcement action to the 
carrier(s) for which it is providing screening. The carriers would use 
the information that they collect regarding enforcement actions to 
monitor the effectiveness of the screening operations being conducted 
on their behalf. This would be a third party disclosure. Second, 
carriers would also receive copies of their screening companies' 
certificates, operations specifications, and security programs as well 
as all of their screening companies' proposed changes to any of this 
documentation. A screening company would be required to submit with its 
amendment request a statement that all carriers for which it screens 
have been advised of the proposed amendment and have no objection to 
it. The Administrator would review this application and determine 
whether or not to approve the proposed amendment. Third, upon 
termination of screening services at a site, a screening company would 
be required to surrender all its records of individual screeners to the 
carrier(s) for which it conducts screening. The carrier(s) would use 
this information from the screening company as needed for future 
contracts.
    Air carriers and foreign air carriers also would be required under 
this proposal to notify the public by posting signs at screening 
locations as specified in their security programs when they are 
required by the FAA to implement additional security measures to 
maintain system performance. This would be a third-party disclosure. 
Indirect air carriers, in particular, would be required under this 
proposal to post signs or provide written notifications to their 
customers to caution them that certain X-ray systems being used may 
damage specified types of film contained in their property. Indirect 
air carriers also would be required under this proposal to maintain 
copies of the results of their most recent radiation surveys conducted 
at their principal business offices and the places where the X-ray 
systems are in operation and would be required to make the surveys 
available for FAA inspection upon request.
    Screening companies would also be required to collect and retain 
information under this proposed rule. Screening companies would be 
required to collect copies of applicable regulations as specified in 
the proposed rule and maintain records regarding the requirements in 
the rule. Such records would include copies of their certificates, 
operations specifications, security programs, and training records. 
Screening companies would be required to ensure that the steps in 
current Sec. 108.33(c)(1-4) have been completed before providing 
sensitive security information to screener trainees. Screening 
companies would be required to annotate screeners' training records 
when screeners complete or terminate their training or transfer to 
other companies. Screening companies would on occasion collect brief 
permission statements from screeners that would require them to release 
screener training and performance records to other screening companies 
or to the screeners directly upon the screeners' request. These would 
be third-party disclosures. Screening companies would also be required 
under this proposal to issue letters of completion of training to all 
screeners, screeners-in-charge, and checkpoint security supervisors 
upon their successful completion of approved initial, recurrent, and 
specialized courses of training.
    It is estimated that this proposal would affect 640 screening 
companies and carriers annually. This estimate consists of 66 screening 
companies, 150 air carriers, 145 foreign air carriers, and 264 indirect 
air carriers. This estimate also takes into account the FAA's 
assumption that approximately 15 of the air carriers would apply for 
and receive screening company certificates in order to screen cargo and 
thus counts these 15 air carriers twice--once, which takes into account 
the costs they would accrue as air carriers and once more, which takes 
into account the costs they would accrue as screening companies. The 
estimated annual reporting and recordkeeping burden hours are estimated 
to be 173,577 hours.
    Individuals and organizations may submit comments regarding the 
information collection requirements. The comments must be received on 
or before April 4, 2000 and must be submitted to the address for 
comments listed in the ADDRESSES section of this document. These 
comments should reflect whether the proposed collection is necessary; 
whether the agency's estimate of the burden is accurate; how the 
equality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected can 
be enhanced; and how the burden of the collection can be minimized.
    An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required 
to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a 
currently valid OMB control number. When OMB assigns a control number, 
a notification of that number will be published in the Federal 
Register.

VII. Compatibility With ICAO Standards

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. This proposal 
is consistent with the ICAO security standards. The ICAO standards do 
not differentiate security requirements by aircraft seating capacity, 
and they require the screening of passengers for all international 
flights. The FAA is not aware of any

[[Page 587]]

differences that this proposal would present if adopted. Any 
differences that may be presented in comments to this proposal, 
however, will be taken into consideration.

VIII. Regulatory Analyses

VIII.A. Regulatory Evaluation Summary

    This proposed rule is considered significant under the regulatory 
policies and procedures of the Department of Transportation (44 FR 
11034; February 26, 1979) but does not reach the threshold for an 
``economically significant'' action (i.e., annual costs greater than 
$100 million).
    Proposed and final rule changes to Federal regulations must undergo 
several economic analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that 
each Federal agency propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its 
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended March 
1996, requires agencies to analyze the economic effects of regulatory 
changes on small entities. Third, the Office of Management and Budget 
directs agencies to assess the effects of regulatory changes on 
international trade. In conducting these analyses, the FAA has 
determined that the proposed rule would generate benefits that justify 
its costs. Although the FAA was unable to determine if the proposed 
rule would have a significant impact on a substantial number of small 
entities and given the complexity of the issues, the FAA conducted a 
regulatory flexibility analysis. The proposed rule would not constitute 
a barrier to international trade and does not contain Federal 
intergovernmental or private sector mandates. The full analyses 
performed in response to the above requirements are contained in the 
docket and are summarized below.
    The FAA has analyzed the expected costs of this regulatory proposal 
for a 10-year period, from 2000 through 2009. As required by the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB), the present value of this cost stream 
was calculated using a discount factor of 7 percent. All costs in this 
analysis are expressed in 1997 dollars.
    Companies that have traditionally been providing passenger 
screening for air carriers would be covered by these proposed 
regulations. Some direct air carriers do their own passenger screening 
and/or provide screening for other direct air carriers; in the context 
of passenger screening, these carriers will be referred to as screening 
companies. There currently are 66 screening companies performing 
screening for part 108 and part 129 air carriers. The FAA estimates 
that in 2000, there would be approximately 19,600 screeners and 
screener supervisors, working for these screening companies who would 
be affected by this proposed rule. The FAA estimates that there would 
be an additional 3 screening companies that would be covered by these 
regulations each year starting in 2001.
    This proposed rule also would affect the 150 U.S. air carrier 
operators certificated under part 108 providing scheduled and other 
domestic and international passenger service in the United States as 
well as the 2,634 U.S. indirect air carriers certificated under part 
109 and 145 foreign air carriers certificated under part 129. The FAA 
assumes that the number of direct, indirect, and foreign air carriers 
would remain constant for each year of the analysis.
    The FAA assumes that 10 percent of the direct and indirect air 
carriers that currently transport cargo would elect to screen this 
cargo. The FAA assumes that these carriers would choose to do their own 
screening, with time being a very expensive commodity, for it would be 
cost beneficial for them to do so rather than depend on other screening 
companies to perform the services. Air carriers that screen cargo would 
need to comply with the provisions that regulate screening companies; 
this compliance would generate new costs.
    Some of the sections of the proposed part 111 make references to 
parts 108 and 109, and this analysis also examines potential changes to 
parts 108 and 109. The numbering system for part 108 of this NPRM is 
based on the numbering system of a recently published NPRM; on August 
1, 1997, the FAA published Notice No. 97-12, which proposes to revise 
14 CFR part 108 to update the overall regulatory structure for air 
carrier security (62 FR 41730). This notice proposes to amend the 
proposed rule language of part 108 in Notice No. 97-12 rather than the 
current part 108. The numbering systems for revised part 109 (and 
proposed part 111) also are closely aligned with the Notice No. 97-12 
numbering system for clarity and consistency. If the text refers to a 
proposed section in part 108 that is simply a renumbered section (based 
on Notice No. 97-12), the current section number will be placed in 
parentheses.
    Many of the proposals for part 111 are either definitional or 
discuss requirements in other sections. In addition, many of the 
proposed changes to parts 108, 109, and 129 simply change definitions 
or make minor word changes. These changes would not result in any 
incremental costs and will not be covered in this summary. Twenty-one 
proposed sections would result in costs and these are covered below.
    Proposed Sec. 111.5 would require all companies performing 
screening to allow FAA inspection to determine compliance with these 
proposals. The screening company must also allow for FAA inspections 
and tests of equipment as well as procedures at screening locations 
that relate to the carrier's compliance with their regulations. The FAA 
estimates that it would need 12 additional inspectors, 3 based at FAA 
headquarters and 1 each stationed at the 9 FAA regions. The additional 
personnel would process all the paperwork involved with issuing the 
certificates, writing and approving the Standard Security Screening 
Program (SSSP), and approving operations specifications as well as 
processing any changes and amendments and analyzing performance data. 
Ten-year costs sum to $10.10 million (net present value, $7.10 
million).
    Proposed Sec. 111.105 would provide specific requirements for each 
screening company's SSSP. The FAA would write the basic SSSP document 
and provide copies of the document to the screening companies. After 
the SSSP is finalized, each screening company would be required to 
maintain at least 1 complete copy of the SSSP at its principal business 
office, at each airport that it serves, and each carrier that it 
screens for. The 10-year costs for this proposed section sum to $65,600 
(net present value, $50,400).
    Proposed Sec. 111.107 describes the procedures for seeking SSSP 
approvals and making future amendments. A screening company would 
review the basic SSSP document obtained from the FAA, and then could 
choose to adopt the SSSP as is or adopt the SSSP after making 
amendments to it. Either the company providing screening services or 
the FAA could initiate amendments to the SSSP after its initial makeup 
has been agreed upon. The FAA assumes, for the purpose of this 
analysis, that amendments to the SSSP would occur 3 times a year on 
average. Each company would then need to brief its employees on these 
changes. In addition, both screening companies and the FAA would be 
required to make sure that all carriers using those screening companies 
are aware of and concur with all SSSP changes. Total 10-year costs for 
Sec. 111.107 sum to $48.13 million (net present value, $33.27 million).
    Proposed Sec. 111.109 would require all screening companies to have

[[Page 588]]

certificates. All companies would apply initially for provisional 
certificates that would be good for 1 year. Existing companies would be 
permitted to continue their screening activities uninterrupted while 
their applications are considered. Both existing and new screening 
companies would then have to apply for standard certificates, which 
would be effective for 5 years. The FAA would inspect screening 
companies regularly and would monitor operations and tests continually 
to determine that each screening company is in compliance with the 
regulations. Once a certificate is obtained, a screening company would 
need to apply to the FAA for an amendment to change any of the 
information on the certificate; the FAA assumes that a certificate 
would be amended once every other year on average. Total 10-year costs 
sum to $133,000 (net present value, $96,400).
    Proposed Sec. 111.113 would stipulate what each screening company 
would need to have in its operations specifications (ops specs) in 
order to get a screening certificate. Each screening company would 
write its own ops specs; this document would emphasize the capabilities 
and needs of the screening company, and it would need to be submitted 
to the FAA for approval. Once the certificate is approved, the 
screening company would be required to maintain a complete copy of its 
ops specs at its principal business office and at each airport where it 
conducts security screening as well as provide a current copy to each 
carrier for which it screens. The FAA assumes that the ops specs would 
be amended 4 times a year, twice by the screening company and twice by 
the FAA. Total 10-year costs sum to $513,700 (net present value, 
$447,400).
    Proposed Sec. 111.115 describes the procedures for approving a 
company's ops specs and future amendments to these ops specs. After a 
company's ops specs are submitted, the FAA would review them to 
consider whether changes are needed. Further FAA approval of the ops 
specs would be necessary only if the screening company sought to amend 
them. The screening company would need to brief its employees after 
initial FAA acceptance of the ops specs and after each amendment. The 
FAA assumes, for the purpose of this analysis, that changes to the ops 
specs would occur twice a year on average. Total 10-year costs sum to 
$5.29 million (net present value, $3.70 million).
    Proposed Sec. 111.117 would require each screening company to allow 
each carrier for which it performs screening to inspect the screening 
company's personnel, facilities, equipment, and records to determine 
compliance. Direct air carriers currently inspect the locations of the 
screening companies that are screening for them; the FAA assumes that 
the new requirements would result in additional inspections. Should an 
audit result in an alleged violation, a screening company would provide 
a copy of any proposed and final enforcement action to each carrier for 
which it screens. This proposed requirement would assist the carriers 
in evaluating the performance of their screening companies. Ten-year 
costs sum to $10.36 million (net present value, $7.38 million).
    Proposed Sec. 111.119 would require each certificated security 
screening company to have a principal business office with mailing 
address and to notify the FAA of any address changes. The FAA assumes 
that virtually all businesses currently have a principal business 
office, and expects that a screening company would change its mailing 
address once every 3 years on average. Ten-year costs sum to $4,800 
(net present value, $3,300).
    Under proposed Sec. 111.201, screening companies would be required 
to prevent the introduction of explosives, incendiaries, or deadly or 
dangerous weapon into sterile areas. In addition, screening companies 
would be required to staff their security screening checkpoints. 
Companies that currently screen would not incur additional costs. 
However, indirect air carriers that choose to screen would have new 
responsibilities and costs; these costs would include those for 
training new personnel and, in some cases, purchasing new equipment 
(the costs of which are included in proposed Sec. 109.207). Total 10-
year costs for Sec. 111.201 sum to $1.01 million (net present value, 
$711,300).
    Proposed Sec. 111.205 would require initial and recurrent training 
for persons who screen passengers, checked baggage, and carry-on items. 
This training would include ensuring that screeners work in a courteous 
and efficient manner and in compliance with the applicable civil rights 
laws of the United States. This proposed section also would require 
persons with supervisory screening duties to have initial and recurrent 
training that includes leadership and management subjects. Ten-year 
costs would be $8.29 million (net present value, $5.78 million).
    Proposed Sec. 111.209 would require all companies providing 
screening services to have qualified management and technical personnel 
available at each major screening locations. Among these would be the 
screening performance coordinator (SPC), CSS's and Screeners in charge 
(SIC's). The SPC would be the focal point for FAA communication on 
security-related issues and communication. All SPC's would be required 
to take annual classes in leadership training, which would be a new 
requirement. While each screening company would be required to fill 
this position, the FAA does not assume that it would be a full time 
position at every screening company. At smaller companies, the persons 
who fill the SPC positions could perform SPC duties on a part time 
basis while performing other duties at other times. The FAA calls for 
comments from screening companies as to the number of companies that 
already have personnel performing these SPC duties, and requests that 
all comments be accompanied with clear documentation. Ten-year costs 
for Sec. 111.209 would be $67.27 million (net present value, $47.06 
million).
    Proposed Sec. 111.213 would specify the requirements for screening 
companies regarding training programs and knowledge of subject areas. 
The FAA proposes to create performance-based training where screening 
companies could use FAA-approved computer-based training (CBT) 
programs. Screening companies would be responsible for ensuring that 
their trainees are able to pass FAA knowledge-based and X-ray 
interpretation tests at the end of their initial training and that 
screening personnel meet performance standards thereafter. Ten-year 
costs sum to $7.78 million (net present value, $5.41 million).
    Proposed Sec. 111.215 would require that all screening personnel 
pass computerized tests at the conclusion of their initial training and 
every year thereafter and that the tests be administered by air carrier 
personnel. Each screening company would be required to use an FAA-
designed computer-based test. The tests would be designed to help 
ensure that screener trainees have achieved the knowledge and skills 
that they need to perform their jobs effectively. In addition, the FAA 
would require that all screening personnel pass additional 1 hour tests 
after their on-the-job-training. These additional tests would be 
designed to test proficiency and may require higher scores than those 
the tests after initial training. These subsequent tests would not need 
to be administered by air carrier personnel. Ten-year costs for this 
proposed section sum to $3.44 million (net present value, $2.38 
million).
    To increase screener professionalism, proposed Sec. 111.219 would 
require all

[[Page 589]]

screening companies to issue letters of completion of training to 
screeners upon their successful completion of approved courses of 
training. These letters of completion would provide personnel with 
official records of their specific training accomplishments. The FAA 
anticipates that screeners with evidence of training could move more 
smoothly between employers and that they would be valued more highly 
because they would not require as much training as new hires. Most 
importantly, the FAA believes that requiring screening companies to 
issue letters of completion to screeners for successful completion of 
training would help enhance professionalism in this essential security 
job. Ten years' costs sum to $1.38 million (net present value, 
$963,600).
    Under proposed Sec. 111.221, companies that provide screening 
services would be required to forward screener training records to 
other screening providers when requested by the screeners. This 
requirement would help increase each screener's control over his or her 
own mobility, and would resolve current problems relating to control of 
screener documents. Ten-year costs above and beyond the SPC's time sum 
to $151,300 (net present value, $105,500).
    Under proposed Sec. 111.223, each screening company would be 
required to use a threat image projection (TIP) system for each X-ray 
and explosives detection system (EDS) that it uses to measure the 
screening company's performance. (TIP is capable of introducing test 
objects to screeners on the X-ray machines and EDS machines at any 
rates set on the computers. The success rates can easily be recorded 
and later analyzed by the FAA, the carriers, and the screening 
companies to monitor continuously how well screening locations are 
operating.) Proper operation of TIP systems and data collection would 
be critical to measuring accurately screening company performances. The 
FAA would ultimately establish a performance range that all screening 
companies would be required to fall within to be considered effective 
at detecting possible threats. The FAA would be responsible for 
collecting TIP-related data; 10-year costs would sum to $20.46 million 
(net present value, $14.37 million).
    Proposed Secs. 108.103 (current Sec. 108.7), 109.103, and 129.25(c) 
set forth changes to the direct, indirect, and foreign air carrier 
security programs. New program sections would be required; these new 
sections would reference each carrier's new responsibilities and 
requirements vis-a-vis screening companies. Hence, new sections would 
have to be written and submitted to the FAA for approval, and air 
carriers would need to expend resources to maintain these new sections. 
The proposed changes to Sec. 109.103 also would require indirect air 
carriers to acknowledge in writing their receipt of approved security 
programs or security program amendments from the FAA. Ten-year costs 
for these sections total $15.29 million (net present value, $10.74 
million).
    The proposal would modify the current regulatory text of proposed 
Sec. Sec. 109.105 (current Sec. 109.5) and 129.25(e) to clarify the 
requirements and make them consistent with the organization of proposed 
Sec. 108.105 (current Sec. 108.25). Under these proposals, the only 
substantive change would affect indirect air carriers, as they would be 
allowed to petition the FAA to reconsider FAA amendments if the 
petitions are submitted no later than 15 days before the effective 
dates of the FAA amendment. Ten-year costs total $14,800 (net present 
value, $10,400).
    Proposed Secs. 108.201(i) and (j); 109.203(b) and (c); and 
129.25(l) and (m) (all new sections) would require each carrier to 
ensure that each of its screening company's actions are consistent with 
part 111, the screening company's SSSP, and the screening company's ops 
specs. Each air carrier would need to expend resources to amend its 
security programs to include these new oversight responsibilities. Air 
carriers would also have to purchase and maintain computer equipment 
required to test screeners. The amounts and types of equipment that air 
carriers would need to provide to screening companies would vary 
depending on the size of the airports where the screening is taking 
place. The FAA currently is providing screening companies at certain 
airports with computers for CBT but would not provide for the 
computer's maintenance; all other equipment would have to be purchased 
and maintained by the applicable air carriers. Ten-year costs for these 
proposed sections sum to $21.07 million (net present value, $15.52 
million).
    Proposed Secs. 108.205 (current Sec. 108.17), 109.207, and 129.26 
would be amended to require that carriers use X-ray systems in 
accordance with their security program and applicable screening company 
security programs. Each carrier would need to ensure that each X-ray 
system that uses TIP meets the standards set forth in its security 
program. As TIP is a new system, X-ray systems that have been used at 
airports have not been designed to run it. Accordingly, many X-ray 
machines at airports would need to be replaced with equipment that is 
TIP compatible. The FAA is providing carriers at certain airports with 
the equipment required but would not provide the maintenance of these 
X-ray machines; all other equipment would have to be purchased and 
maintained by the applicable carriers. The FAA proposes that the 
deployment of these machines be phased in over a 5-year period based on 
the size and complexity of the airport. In addition, foreign air 
carriers would no longer have to ensure that their screening operators 
be provided with individual personal dosimeters to measure exposure to 
X-rays; removal of this requirement would result in cost savings. Ten-
year costs for this proposed section sum to $69.39 million (net present 
value, $57.20 million).
    Proposed new Secs. 108.229, 109.205, and 129.25(n) would require 
that each carrier monitor each screener training test required under 
proposed Sec. 111.215 for all screening companies screening on the 
carrier's behalf. This proposed requirement is intended to increase air 
carrier involvement with the training and testing processes and to help 
deter cheating. Each test monitor would have to be a direct carrier 
employee (not a contracted employee) who does not have part 111 or 
other screening-related responsibilities. These proposed sections also 
would require that screeners be evaluated by non-screening supervisors 
once a year; direct and foreign air carriers already have supervisors 
do this, so the only additional cost would be for indirect air 
carriers. Ten-year costs for this proposed section sum to $9.04 million 
(net present value, $6.32 million).
    Total 10-year costs for these proposals would be $300.02 million 
(present value, $219.22 million).

Benefits

    The primary benefit of the proposed rule would be significantly 
increased protection to U.S. citizens and other citizens traveling on 
U.S. domestic and foreign air carrier flights from acts of terrorism as 
well as increased protection for those operating aircraft. 
Specifically, the proposed rule is aimed at deterring terrorism by 
preventing explosives, incendiaries, and deadly or dangerous weapons 
from being carried aboard commercial flights in checked baggage, carry-
on baggage, cargo, and on persons.
    Terrorism can occur within the United States. Members of foreign 
terrorist groups, representatives from state sponsors of terrorism, and 
radical fundamentalist elements from many nations are present in the 
United States. In addition, Americans are joining

[[Page 590]]

terrorist groups. The activities of some these individuals and groups 
go beyond fund raising to recruiting other persons (both foreign and 
U.S.) for activities that include training with weapons and making 
bombs. These extremists operate in small groups and can act without 
guidance or support from state sponsors. This makes it difficult to 
identify them or to anticipate and counter their activities. The 
following discussion outlines some of the concrete evidence of the 
increasing terrorist threat within the United States and to domestic 
aviation.
    Investigation into the February 1993 attack on the World Trade 
Center (WTC) uncovered a foreign terrorist threat in the United States 
that is more serious than previously known. The WTC investigation 
disclosed that Ramzi Yousef had arrived in the United States in 
September 1992 and had presented himself to immigration officials as an 
Iraqi dissident seeking asylum. Yousef and a group of Islamic radicals 
in the United States then spent the next 5 months planning the bombing 
of the WTC and other acts of terrorism in the United States. Yousef 
returned to Pakistan on the evening of February 26, 1993, the same day 
that the WTC bombing took place. Yousef traveled to the Philippines in 
early 1994 and by August of the same year had conceived a plan to bomb 
as many as 12 U.S. airliners flying between East Asian cities and the 
United States.
    Yousef and co-conspirators Abdul Murad and Wali Khan tested the 
type of explosive devices to be used in the aircraft bombings and 
demonstrated the group's ability to assemble such a device in a public 
place, in the December 1994 bombing of a Manila theater. Later the same 
month, the capability to get an explosive device past airport screening 
procedures and detonate it aboard an aircraft also was successfully 
tested when a bomb was placed by Yousef aboard the first leg of 
Philippine Airlines Flight 424 from Manila to Tokyo. The device 
detonated during the second leg of the flight, after Yousef had 
deplaned at an intermediate stop in the Philippine city of Cebu.
    Preparations for executing the plan were progressing rapidly. 
However, the airliner bombing plot was discovered in January 1995 by 
chance after a fire led Philippine police to the Manila apartment where 
the explosive devices were being assembled. Homemade explosives, 
batteries, timers, electronic components, and a notebook full of 
instructions for building bombs were discovered. Subsequent 
investigations of computer files taken from the apartment revealed the 
plan, in which 5 terrorists were to have placed explosive devices 
aboard United, Northwest, and Delta airline flights. In each case, a 
similar technique was to be used. A terrorist would fly the first leg 
of a flight out of a city in East Asia, planting the device aboard the 
aircraft and then deplane at an intermediate stop. The explosive device 
would then destroy the aircraft, continuing on a subsequent leg of the 
flight to the United States. It is likely that thousands of passengers 
would have been killed if the plot had been successfully carried out.
    Yousef, Murad, and Khan were arrested and convicted in the bombing 
of Philippine Airlines flight 424 and in the conspiracy to bomb U.S. 
airliners. Yousef was sentenced to life imprisonment for his role in 
the Manila plot, while the 2 other co-conspirators have been convicted. 
Yousef also was convicted and sentenced to 240 years for the World 
Trade Center bombing. However, there are continuing concerns about the 
possibility that other conspirators remain at large. The airline 
bombing plot, as described in the files of Yousef's laptop computer, 
would have had 5 participants. This suggests that, while Yousef, Murad 
and Khan are in custody, there may be others at large with the 
knowledge and skills necessary to carry out similar plots against civil 
aviation.
    The fact that Ramzi Yousef was responsible for both the WTC bombing 
and the plot to bomb as many as 12 United States air carrier aircraft 
shows that: (1) Foreign terrorists are able to operate in the U.S. and 
(2) Foreign terrorists are capable of building and artfully concealing 
improvised explosive devices that pose a serious challenge to aviation 
security. This, in turn, suggests that foreign terrorists conducting 
future attacks in the U.S. may choose civil aviation as a target. Civil 
aviation's prominence as a prospective target is clearly illustrated by 
the circumstances of the 1995 Yousef conspiracy.
    The bombing of a Federal office building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 
shows the potential for terrorism from domestic groups. While the 
specific motivation that led to the Oklahoma City bombing would not 
translate into a threat to civil aviation, the fact that domestic 
elements have shown a willingness to carry out attacks resulting in 
indiscriminate destruction is worrisome. At a minimum, the possibility 
that a future plot hatched by domestic elements could include civil 
aircraft among possible targets must be taken into consideration. Thus, 
an increasing threat to civil aviation from both foreign sources and 
potential domestic ones exists and needs to be prevented and/or 
countered.
    That both the international and domestic threats have increased is 
undeniable. While it is extremely difficult to quantify this increase 
in threat, the overall threat can be roughly estimated by recognizing 
the following:
     U.S. aircraft and American passengers are representatives 
of the United States, and therefore are targets;
     Up to 12 airplanes could have been destroyed and thousands 
of passengers killed in the actual plot described above;
     These plots came close to being carried out; it was only 
through a fortunate discovery and then extra tight security after the 
discovery of the plot that these incidents were thwarted;
     It is just as easy for international terrorists to operate 
within the United States as domestic terrorists, as evidenced by the 
World Trade Center bombing; therefore,
     Based on these facts, the increased threat to domestic 
aviation could be seen as equivalent to some portion of 12 Class I 
Explosions on U.S. airplanes. (The FAA defines Class I Explosions as 
incidents that involve the loss of an entire aircraft and incur a large 
number of fatalities.)
    In 1996, both Congress and the White House Commission on Aviation 
Safety and Security (Commission) recommended further specific actions 
to increase civil aviation security. The Commission stated that it 
believes that the threat against civil aviation is changing and 
growing, and recommended that the Federal Government commit greater 
resources to improving civil aviation security. President Clinton, in 
July 1996, declared that the threat of both foreign and domestic 
terrorism to aviation is a national threat. The U.S. Congress 
recognized this growing threat in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization 
Act of 1996 by: (1) Authorizing money for the purchase of specific 
anti-terrorist equipment and the hiring of extra civil aviation 
security personnel; and (2) Requiring the FAA to promulgate additional 
security-related regulations, including this proposal.
    In the absence of increased protection for the U.S. domestic 
passenger air transportation system, it is conceivable that the system 
would be targeted for future acts of terrorism. If even one such act 
were successful, the traveling public would demand immediate increased 
security. Providing immediate protection on an ad hoc emergency basis 
would result in major inconveniences, costs, and delays to air 
travelers that may substantially exceed those imposed

[[Page 591]]

by the planned and measured steps contained in this proposal.
    Based on the above statement, and after evaluating feasible 
alternative measures, the FAA concludes that this proposed rule sets 
forth the best method to provide increased security at the present 
time. Notwithstanding the above, it is helpful to consider, to the 
limited extent possible, the benefits of this proposal in reducing the 
costs associated with terrorist acts. The following analysis describes 
alternative assumptions regarding the number of terrorist acts 
prevented and potential market disruptions averted that result in the 
proposed rule benefits at least equal to the proposed rule costs. This 
is intended to allow the reader to judge the likelihood of benefits of 
the proposed rule equaling or exceeding its cost.
    The cost of a catastrophic terrorist act can be estimated in terms 
of lives lost, property damage, decreased public utilization of air 
transportation, etc. Terrorists acts can result in the complete 
destruction of an aircraft with the loss of all on board. The FAA 
considers a Boeing 737 as representative of a typical airplane flown 
domestically. The fair market value of a Boeing 737 is $16.3 million, 
and the typical 737 airplane has 113 seats. It flies with an average 
load factor of 64.7%, which translates into 73 passengers per flight; 
the airplane would also have two pilots and three flight attendants.
    A terrorist catastrophic event could also result in fatalities on 
the ground. However, looking at the number of accidents including 
aircraft covered by this proposed rule and the number of fatalities on 
the ground over the last ten years, the average fatality was less than 
0.5 persons per accident. Therefore, the FAA will not assume any ground 
fatalities in this analysis.
    In order to provide a benchmark comparison of the expected safety 
benefits of rulemaking actions with estimated costs in dollars, a 
minimum of $2.7 million is used as the value of avoiding an aviation 
fatality (based on the willingness to pay approach for avoiding a 
fatality). In these computations, the present value of each incident 
was calculated using the current discount rate of 7 percent. Applying 
this value, the total fatality loss of a single Boeing 737 is 
represented by a cost $210.6 million (78  x  $2.7 million). The safety 
related costs of a single domestic terrorist act on civil aviation sum 
to $271.18 million (net present value, $190.46 million).
    Certainly the primary concern of the FAA is preventing loss of 
life, but there are other considerations as well. Another large 
economic impact is related to decreased airline travel following a 
terrorist event. A study performed for the FAA by Pailen-Johnson 
Associates, Inc., An Econometric Model of the Impact of Terrorism on 
U.S. Air Carrier North Atlantic Operations, indicated that it takes 
about 9 to 10 months for passenger traffic to return to the pre-
incident level after a single event. Such a reduction occurred 
immediately following the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988. In general, 1988 enplanements 
were above 1987's. There was a dramatic fall-off in enplanement in the 
first 3 months of 1989 immediately following the Pan Am 103 tragedy, 
and it took until November 1989 for enplanements to approximate their 
1987 and 1988 levels.
    Trans-Atlantic enplanements increased, from 1985 to 1988, at an 
annual rate of 10.7 percent. Projecting this rate to 1989 would have 
yielded 1989 enplanements of 8.1 million, or 1.6 million more than Pan 
Am actually experienced. This represents almost a 20 percent reduction 
in expected enplanements caused by the destruction of Pan Am 103 by 
terrorists.
    The estimated effect of a successful terrorist act on the domestic 
market has not been studied. Although there are important differences 
between international and domestic travel (such as the availability of 
alternative destinations and means of travel), the FAA believes that 
the traffic loss associated with international terrorist acts is 
representative of the potential domestic disruption.
    There is a social cost associated with travel disruptions and 
cancellations caused by terrorist events. The cost is composed of 
several elements. First is the loss associated with passengers opting 
not to fly--the value of the flight to the passenger (consumer surplus) 
in the absence of increased security risk and the profit that would be 
earned by the airline (producer surplus). Even if a passenger opts to 
travel by air, the additional risk may reduce the associated consumer 
surplus. Second, passengers who cancel plane trips would not purchase 
other goods and services normally associated with the trip, such as 
meals, lodging, and car rental, which would also result in losses of 
related consumer and producer surplus. Finally, although spending on 
air travel would decrease, pleasure and business travelers may 
substitute spending on other goods and services (which produces some 
value) for the foregone air trips. Economic theory suggests that the 
sum of the several societal value impacts associated with canceled 
flights would be a net loss. As a corollary, prevention of market 
disruption (preservation of consumer and producer welfare) through 
increased security created by the proposed rule is a benefit.
    The FAA is not able to estimate the actual net societal cost of 
travel disruptions and the corollary benefit gained by preventing the 
disruptions. However, there is a basis for judging the likelihood of 
attaining benefits by averting market disruption sufficient, in 
combination with safety benefits, to justify the proposed rule. The 
discounted cost of this proposed rule is $219.22 million, while the 
discounted benefits for each Class I Explosion averted comes to $190.46 
million. Hence, if 1 Class I Explosion is averted, the present value of 
losses due to market disruption must at least equal $28.77 million 
($219.22 million less $190.46 million--one Class I Explosion).
    The value of market loss averted is the product of the number of 
foregone trips and the average market loss per trip (combination of all 
impacts on consumer and producer surplus). If one uses an average 
ticket price of $160 as a surrogate of the combined loss, preservation 
of 179,800 lost trips would be suffered, in combination with the safety 
benefits of 1 averted Class I Explosion, for the benefits of proposed 
rule to equal costs. This represents less than 0.1 percent of annual 
domestic trips (the traffic loss caused by Pan Am 103 on trans-Atlantic 
routes was 20 percent). Calculations can be made on the minimum number 
of averted lost trips needed if the net value loss was only 75 percent 
of the ticket price or exceeded the ticket price by 25 percent. If 
total market disruption cost was $130 or $200 per trip, a minimum 
retention of 221,300 and 143,800 lost trips, respectively, would need 
to occur for the proposed rule benefits to equal the proposed rule 
costs, assuming 1 Class I Explosion would be prevented. The FAA 
requests comments on the potential size of market loss per trip and 
number of lost trips averted.
    The FAA used the same set of benefits for another proposed rule, 
``Security of Checked Baggage on Flights Within the United States; 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking'' (64 FR 19220, April 19, 1999) as both 
rulemakings have the same goals--to increase significantly the 
protection to U.S. citizens and other citizens traveling on U.S. 
domestic air carrier flights from acts of terrorism and to increase 
protection to those persons operating aircraft. Accordingly, the FAA 
calculated the economic impact and the potential averted market 
disruption sufficient, in combination with safety benefits, to justify 
both proposed rules.

[[Page 592]]

These values can be seen in the full analysis contained in the docket.
    The FAA stresses that the range of trips discussed in the above 
paragraph should be looked upon as examples and does not represent an 
explicit endorsement that these would be the exact number of trips that 
would actually be lost. As noted above, it is important to compare, to 
the limited extent possible, the cost of this proposal to some estimate 
of the benefit of increased security it would provide as that level of 
security relates to the threat level.
    Based on the White House Commission recommendation, recent 
Congressional mandates and the known reaction of U.S. citizens to any 
air carrier disaster, the FAA determines that proactive regulation is 
warranted to prevent terrorist acts (such as Class I Explosions) before 
they occur.

VIII.B. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) was enacted by 
Congress to ensure that small entities (small business and small not-
for-profit Government jurisdictions) are not unnecessarily and 
disproportionately burdened by Federal regulations. The RFA, which was 
amended in March 1996, requires regulatory agencies to review rules to 
determine if they have ``a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities.'' The Small Business Administration defines 
small entities to be those with 1,500 or fewer employees for the air 
transportation industry. For this proposed rule, the small entity 
groups are considered to be both scheduled air carrier operators 
(subject to FAR part 108) and screening companies having 1,500 or fewer 
employees. The FAA has identified a total of 41 direct air carriers and 
38 screening companies that meet this definition.
    The FAA has estimated the annualized cost impact on each of the 
small entities, but has not conclusively determined whether or not the 
proposed rule would have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small air carrier and screening company entities. 
Accordingly, the Agency prepared an initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis and invites comments on the Agency's conclusion and on the 
analysis. This decision is based on the following analyses:
     One percent of the 1997 annual median revenue of the 41 
small direct air carriers impacted by this proposed rule, which is 
$809,610 in 1997 dollars, is considered economically significant. None 
of these entities would incur a substantial economic impact in the form 
of annualized costs in excess of $809,610 as the result of the proposed 
rule. However, as will be discussed further below, several of the small 
direct air carriers are having financial difficulties and may have 
trouble meeting the requirements of this proposed rule. Furthermore, 
the cost burden is not strictly proportionate to the size of the 
airline as measured by the number of employees. In addition, as 
discussed below, the FAA was unable to obtain complete financial data 
on approximately one third the air carriers and believes it important 
to show the potential impact on these entities for the sake of 
completeness and in the hope of eliciting substantive comments.
     One percent of the 1997 annual median revenue of the 38 
small screening companies impacted by this proposed rule, which is 
$296,830 in 1997 dollars, is considered economically significant. None 
of these entities would incur a substantial economic impact in the form 
of annualized costs in excess of $296,830 as the result of the proposed 
rule. However, based on the data available, some of the screening 
companies may have trouble meeting the requirements of the proposed 
rule due to financial difficulties. In addition, as discussed below, 
the FAA was unable to obtain any data on half of the screening 
companies and complete data on most of the rest, and so believes it 
important to show the potential impact on these entities for the sake 
of completeness and in the hope of eliciting substantive comments.
    The FAA has not performed this type of analysis for the indirect 
carriers that would choose to screen cargo. Each of these carriers 
would have chosen to be certificated under part 111 and thus would be 
voluntarily subjected to these proposals. Since the carriers would have 
chosen to incur the costs, the FAA believes that none of these carriers 
would have done so if it were not in their financial interests. The FAA 
does not know which carriers would be certificated under proposed part 
111 and so does not know how many of these carriers would be small 
entities. The FAA seeks comments concerning whether any small indirect 
carriers would screen cargo and requests that all comments be 
accompanied with clear documentation.
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
    Under section 603(b) of the RFA (as amended), each initial 
regulatory flexibility analysis is required to address the following 
points: (1) Reasons why the FAA is considering the proposed rule, (2) 
The objectives and legal basis for the proposed rule, (3) The kind and 
number of small entities to which the proposed rule would apply, (4) 
The projected reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance 
requirements of the proposed rule, and (5) All Federal rules that may 
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the proposed rule. The FAA will 
perform this analysis for small direct air carrier and small screening 
companies separately.
1. Air Carriers
    Reasons why the FAA is considering the proposed rule.--Over the 
past several years, both Congress and the FAA have recognized that the 
threat against civil aviation is changing and growing (see the 
background section of the preamble for a more detailed discussion of 
this threat). Terrorist and criminal activities within the United 
States have forced the Congress, the FAA and other Federal agencies to 
reevaluate the domestic threat against civil aviation. The proposed 
rule is intended to counter this increased threat to U.S. civil 
aviation security.
    The objectives and legal basis for the proposed rule.--The 
objective of the proposed rule is to increase protection to Americans 
and others traveling on U.S. domestic air carrier flights from 
terrorist acts. Specifically, the proposed rule is aimed at preventing 
explosives from being on board commercial flights either in carry-on 
baggage or checked cargo.
    The legal basis for the proposed rule is found in 49 U.S.C. 44901 
et seq. Among other matters the FAA must consider as a matter of policy 
are maintaining and enhancing safety and security in air commerce as 
its highest priorities (49 U.S.C. 40101(d)).
    The kind and number of small entities to which the proposed rule 
would apply.--The proposed rule applies to 150 scheduled airlines 
subject to FAR part 108, of which 41 are small scheduled operators 
(with 1,500 or fewer employees).
    The projected reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance 
requirements of the proposed rule.--As required by the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has submitted a copy 
of these proposed sections to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
for its review. Four proposed sections would impose paperwork costs on 
small direct air carriers; these are described in detail in the full 
analysis contained in the docket. The average amount of paperwork time 
and costs for each small direct air carrier sums to 270.9 hours, 
costing $6,395 per year. Over 10 years,

[[Page 593]]

total time and costs for all small direct air carriers sum to 111,048.5 
hours costing $2,621,950.
    All federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the 
proposed rule.--The FAA is unaware of any Federal rules that either 
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the proposed rule.
Other Considerations:

Affordability Analysis

    For the purpose of this analysis, the degree to which small 
entities can ``afford'' the cost of compliance is predicated on the 
availability of financial resources. Initial implementation costs can 
be paid from existing company assets such as cash, by borrowing, or 
through the provision of additional equity capital. Continuing annual 
costs of compliance may be accommodated either by accepting reduced 
profits, by raising ticket prices, or by finding other ways of 
offsetting costs.
    In this analysis, one means of assessing the affordability is the 
ability of each of the small entities to meet its short-term 
obligations. According to financial literature, a company's short-run 
financial strength is substantially influenced by its working capital 
position and its ability to pay short-term liabilities, among other 
things.
    Net working capital is the excess of current assets over current 
liabilities. It represents the margin of short-term debt-paying ability 
over existing short-term debt. In addition to the amount of net working 
capital, two analytical indexes of current position are often computed: 
(1) Current ratio; and (2) Quick ratio. The current ratio (i.e., 
current assets divided by current liabilities) helps put the amount of 
net working capital into perspective by showing the relationship 
between current assets and short-run debt. And the quick ratio 
(sometimes called the acid test ratio) focuses on immediate liquidity 
(e.g., cash, marketable securities, accounts receivable, divided by 
current liabilities). A decline in net working capital, the current 
ratio, and the quick ratio over a period of time (say, 3 years, 4 
years, etc.) may indicate that a company is losing financial solvency. 
Negative net working capital is an indication of financial difficulty. 
If a company is experiencing financial difficulty, it is less likely to 
be able to afford additional costs.
    There is an alternative perspective to the assessment of 
affordability based on working capital of this proposed rule. The 
alternative perspective pertains to the size of the annualized costs of 
the proposed rule relative to annual revenues. The lower the relative 
importance of the costs, the greater the likelihood that implementing 
offsetting cost-saving efficiencies or raising fares to cover increased 
costs will not substantially decrease the number of passengers.
    The FAA collected financial information on small air carriers for 
1994 to 1997. Unfortunately, some of the needed information was not 
available; in those cases, the FAA estimated revenue, assets, and 
liabilities based on taking averages of similar sized companies. For 
example, many of the financial statistics for 13 of the small regional 
operators were not available. Hence, because of the paucity of data for 
small regionals, many of the conclusions for many of the small regional 
carriers may be questionable.
    The financial information suggests the following:

Liquidity Analysis/Profitability Analysis--Small Air Carriers

     Six of these entities have experienced increases in their 
net working capital as well as their current and quick ratios over the 
past 3 or 4 years. They also are generally profitable and, therefore, 
probably would have financial resources available to meet the 
requirements of this proposed rule.
     One small entity was unprofitable in 1997; however, it was 
profitable in the 3 previous years. In addition, it has positive net 
working capital, and its current and quick ratios have been strong. It 
is likely that this carrier would not have trouble meeting the costs of 
this proposed rule.
     For 10 currently profitable small entities, their ability 
to afford the cost of compliance is less certain. This uncertainty 
stems from the fact that the financial performances of these entities 
have been inconsistent over the past 4 years.
     The current liquidity and profitability of 11 small 
entities would require action to finance the expected cost of 
compliance imposed by this NPRM. Over the past 2 or 3 years, each of 
these small entities has had negative net working capital. In addition, 
their respective current and quick ratios have generally been on a 
decline. They have frequently experienced financial losses.
     For the 13 air carriers classified as small regionals for 
which the FAA does not have complete data, it appears likely that 7 of 
these air carriers would probably be able to afford the cost of 
compliance associated with this proposed rule, but the other 6 may have 
problems. This conclusion is based on their projected 1997 
profitability.

Relative Cost Impact

     The other alternative of assessing affordability, 
annualized cost of compliance relative to the total operating revenues, 
shows that for each of the 41 small air carriers impacted by this NPRM, 
there would be relatively small impacts for most of the small entities. 
The annualized cost of compliance relative to total operating revenues 
would be less than or equal to 0.61 percent in all cases.
     Hence, for all of the air carriers, the ratio of 
annualized proposed rule costs to revenues would be less than 1.0 
percent for each of the 3 years from 1995 through 1997. For all air 
carriers that have liquidity and/or profitability problems, there 
appears to be the prospect of absorbing the cost of the proposed rule 
through some combination of fare increases and cost efficiencies.
    No clear conclusion can be drawn with regard to the abilities of 
some small entities to afford the cost of compliance that would be 
imposed by this NPRM. On one hand, the Liquidity Analysis/Profitability 
Analysis does not paint a positive picture of the ability of some of 
the small entities impacted by this NPRM to pay near-term expenses 
imposed by this rule, whereas the Relative Cost Impact Analysis 
indicates that most of those same small entities may be able, over 
time, to find ways to offset the increased cost of compliance. As the 
result of information ascertained from both of these analyses, there is 
uncertainty as to whether all of the small entities would be able to 
afford the additional cost of doing business due to compliance with 
this NPRM. Because of this uncertainty, the FAA solicits comments from 
the aviation community (especially from small air carriers with less 
than 1,500 employees) as to what extent small operators subject to this 
NPRM would be able to afford the cost of compliance. The FAA requests 
that all comments be accompanied with clear supporting data.

Disproportionality Analysis

    On average, the 41 small entities would be disadvantaged relative 
to large air carriers due to disproportionate cost impacts. This would 
occur due to several reasons:
     Individual large air carrier's total operational revenues 
and current assets are, on average, well over 100 times larger than the 
revenues and assets for small air carriers. However, the large air 
carriers don't deal with 100 times as many checkpoints, X-ray systems, 
or screening companies. So, these air

[[Page 594]]

carriers enjoy economies of scale in terms of the costs of complying 
with this proposed rule;
     All of the X-ray systems that the FAA anticipates 
purchasing would be purchased at the higher volume airports, so that 
almost all of them would be purchased for large air carriers; indeed, 
only 1 of these systems would be purchased for a small air carrier. 
This would save large air carriers almost $22 million; and
     All air carriers, whether large or small, would have some 
of the same fixed administrative costs, such as writing up and 
maintaining new sections to their security programs. Having such costs 
the same would give an advantage to large air carriers when looking at 
the proportionate effect of this proposed rule.

Competitiveness Analysis

    This proposed rule would not impose significant costs on any small 
carriers. However, due to the financial problems that certain air 
carriers are having, there may be some impacts on the relative 
competitive positions of these carriers in markets served by them. A 
more detailed evaluation is described in the full analysis contained in 
the docket.
    The FAA solicits comments on this issue from the U.S. airline 
industry and small airlines in particular. Specifically, commenters are 
asked to provide information on the impact that this proposed rule 
would have on the continued ability of small airlines to compete in 
their current markets. Comments are especially sought from operators 
with 1,500 or fewer employees who would be impacted by this proposed 
rule. The FAA requests that supporting data on markets and cost be 
provided with the comments.

Business Closure Analysis

    The FAA is unable to determine with certainty the extent to which 
those small entities that would be significantly impacted by this 
proposed rule would have to close their operations. However, the 
profitability information and the affordability analysis can be 
indicators in business closures.
    In determining whether or not any of the 41 small entities would 
close as the result of compliance with this proposed rule, one question 
must be answered: ``Would the cost of compliance be so great as to 
impair an entity's ability to remain in business?'' A number of these 
small entities are already in serious financial difficulty. To what 
extent the proposed rule makes the difference in whether these entities 
remain in business is difficult to answer. The FAA believes that the 
likelihood of business closure for any of these small air carriers as a 
result of this proposed rule is low to moderate. However, since there 
is uncertainty associated with whether some of the small entities would 
go out of business as the result of the compliance cost of this 
proposed rule, the FAA solicits comments from the aviation community as 
to the likelihood of this occurrence. As noted above, the FAA requests 
that all comments be accompanied with clear supporting data.

Alternatives

    The FAA considered alternatives to the proposed rule for small 
direct air carriers. These alternatives have compliance costs that 
range from $13.30 million to $19.95 million.
    Alternative 1--Status Quo. Under this alternative, the FAA would 
exempt small direct air carriers from all requirements of this proposed 
rule. Continuing with this policy would be the least costly course of 
action but also would be less safe than the proposed rule; direct air 
carriers are ultimately responsible for proper screening, as they must 
be able to ensure that the screening companies are in compliance and 
that screening personnel are performing adequately. The FAA believes 
that the threat to civil aviation within the United States has 
increased and that further rulemaking is necessary. Thus, this 
alternative is not considered to be acceptable because it permits 
continuation of an unacceptable level of risk to U.S. airline 
passengers. In addition, the FAA would not meet the Congressional 
mandate.
    Alternative 2.--The FAA considered doing away with the test 
monitoring requirements of screening companies by small direct air 
carriers.
    The proposal would require that each carrier monitor each screener 
training test for all screening companies that conduct screening on the 
air carrier's behalf. Each test monitor would have to be a direct air 
carrier employee. This alternative would result in cost savings to each 
small direct air carrier. Small carriers would no longer have to 
process request letters from the screening companies or have employees 
monitor the tests. Over 10 years, this alternative would save all small 
direct air carriers $2.68 million (net present value, $1.73 million), 
resulting in total compliance costs of $17.27 million (net present 
value, $12.54 million).
    The FAA believes that this alternative would not enhance security. 
Because air carriers are ultimately responsible for ensuring the safe 
and proper screening of persons and property, the FAA believes that it 
is important to ensure air carrier involvement with critical aspects of 
this rulemaking. Monitoring testing is a critical aspect of this 
rulemaking, for it helps to prevent potential screeners from passing 
the tests by cheating and other unauthorized conduct. Removing the 
monitoring requirement would diminish the emphasis and importance that 
this proposed rule places on air carrier oversight. In addition, 
retaining the monitoring requirement helps to support the concept of a 
balance of responsibilities between screening companies and the air 
carriers for which they screen. Under this alternative, there would be 
less coordination between small air carriers and screening companies. 
The FAA believes that potential cost savings would be outweighed by a 
reduction in security.
    Alternative 3.--The FAA considered not requiring that smaller 
screening companies obtain approval from their carriers before 
submitting their security program amendments to the FAA.
    The proposal would require screening companies to include in any 
proposed amendment packages that they send to the FAA statements that 
all carriers for which they screen have been advised of the proposed 
amendments and approve of them. Hence, each air carrier would have to 
process and respond to any proposed amendment by the screening 
companies that conduct screening on its behalf. This alternative would 
result in cost savings to each small direct air carrier. These carriers 
would not need to spend time evaluating the proposed amendments for the 
screening companies. Hence, the direct air carriers would no longer 
have to expend resources evaluating the proposed amendments by the 
screening companies. Over 10 years, this alternative would save all 
small direct air carriers $6.65 million (net present value, $4.67 
million), resulting in total compliance costs of $13.30 million (net 
present value, $9.60 million).
    The FAA believes that this alternative would harm security. Air 
carriers are responsible, by statute, for screening and would be held 
responsible along with the screening companies for complying with part 
111 and the SSSP. The carriers would therefore need to be kept informed 
about any changes to screening-related regulations and should have the 
opportunity to comment on and approve of them before the FAA approves 
the changes. The FAA would have a difficult time holding carriers 
accountable for changes of which they were not made aware; this 
alternative would ensure that some air carriers were not made aware of 
all changes. Hence, under this alternative,

[[Page 595]]

all carriers would not be informed of all screening-related changes to 
the applicable SSSP. The FAA believes that potential cost savings would 
be outweighed by a reduction in security.
    Alternative 4--The FAA considered not requiring that small air 
carriers install and operate TIP on their X-ray systems.
    Under the proposal, each air carrier would need to ensure that each 
X-ray system that it uses has a TIP system that meets the standards set 
forth in its security program. As TIP is a new system, some older X-ray 
systems have not been designed to run TIP. Accordingly, many X-ray 
systems at airports would need to be replaced with newer systems that 
are TIP compatible. This alternative would result in cost savings to 
all small air carriers. These carriers would not have to purchase these 
new X-ray systems or maintain the TIP portions of the systems annually. 
Over 10 years, this alternative would save all small air carriers $6.09 
million (net present value, $4.58 million), resulting in total 
compliance costs of $13.30 million (net present value, $9.60 million).
    The FAA believes that this alternative would harm security. 
Promoting this alternative would result in inconsistent measurements of 
performance at different airports and even at different screening 
locations within airports; the FAA believes that it is important to 
have consistent measurements of performance at all screening locations. 
In addition, the FAA needs to ensure the same level of safety and 
continuity at all of the Nations airports and screening locations. Not 
having TIP would result in a reduction in security for those small air 
carriers covered under this alternative in particular and for the 
entire aviation system in general. Hence, under this alternative, there 
would be a decrease in screener effectiveness and a reduction in the 
number of ways to measure this decrease. The FAA believes that 
potential cost savings would be outweighed by a reduction in security.
    Alternative 5.--Proposed Rule. This alternative represents the 
proposed rule for direct air carriers. Under this alternative, small 
direct air carriers would be subject to all aspects of this proposed 
rulemaking. The cost of compliance expected to be incurred by the 41 
small entities subject to the requirements of the proposed rule is 
estimated to be $19.95 million ($14.27 million, discounted) over the 
next 10 years. This alternative is preferred because the FAA believes 
that it has the best balance between costs and benefits for all 
screening companies while enhancing aviation safety and security (in 
the form of risk reduction) for the traveling public.
2. Screening Companies
    Reasons why the FAA is considering the proposed rule.--The reasons 
are the same as those discussed above for the small air carriers.
    The objectives and legal basis for the proposed rule.--The 
objectives and legal basis are the same as those discussed previously 
for the small air carriers.
    The kind and number of small entities to which the proposed rule 
would apply.--The proposed rule applies to 66 screening companies that 
screen for direct air carriers subject to FAR parts 108 and 129, of 
which 38 are small entities (with 1,500 or fewer employees).
    The projected reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance 
requirements of the proposed rule.--As required by the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has submitted a 
copies of these proposed sections to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) for its review. Twelve proposed sections would impose 
paperwork costs on small screening companies; these are described in 
detail in the full analysis contained in the docket. The average amount 
of paperwork for each small screening company totals 1,861.0 hours 
costing $78,259 over 10 years. Over 10 years, total time and costs for 
all small screening companies sum to 70,718 hours costing $2,973,836.
    All Federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the 
proposed rule.--The FAA is unaware of any Federal rules that either 
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the proposed rule.
Other Considerations

Affordability Analysis

    The previous discussion under ``Affordability Analysis'' for small 
air carriers is applicable to small screening companies.
    The FAA attempted to collect financial information on small 
screening companies. In many cases, the data were not available; data 
were available for only 19 companies for 1994 to 1997. Of the 38 small 
screening companies, 8 were small air carriers that screen for 
themselves and other air carriers; the financial information available 
is the same as was used in the previous small air carrier analysis. 
Unfortunately, though, there is no requirement for screening companies 
to report their financial data as there is for air carriers, so there 
is no readily available source for financial information. In addition, 
many of these companies are privately held companies that do not have 
to report their assets, liabilities, profits, and revenues. The FAA was 
able to find some information for 11 screening companies, but the scope 
of the data varied extensively; some of these companies have not 
updated their publicly disclosed financial data in several years. For 2 
of the companies, the most recent data publicly available were from 
1993, another had current assets and liabilities available only for 
1994, while a fourth had net profits, current assets, and current 
liabilities available for only 1994 and 1995. In many cases, total 
operating revenue and quick assets were available, at most, for 1 year.
    Another problem facing this type of financial analysis for a 
company that provides many services to include screening is that no 
matter how small a percentage of its business comes from screening, the 
company is being considered under this Initial Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis if it has less than 1,500 employees. Neither finding data for 
such companies nor applying this data to other screening companies is 
straightforward. In addition, of the 18 screening companies for which 
the FAA had (or estimated) 1997 financial data, 8 of the 9 largest 
companies were small air carriers (and some of the data for these were 
based on estimates). Hence, it is difficult to extrapolate their 
financial information to makes estimations for other small screening 
companies.
    The FAA attempted to make estimates based on the available data. 
The FAA requests financial data for all screening companies, 
particularly those where no information was publicly available; in all 
cases, the FAA requests that all data be accompanied by clear 
documentation.
    The financial information suggests the following:

Liquidity Analysis/Profitability Analysis

     Of the 6 screening companies that are also air carriers 
for which the FAA has complete data on, 2 would probably have no 
problem meeting the proposed rule's requirements; two might have 
trouble meeting the proposed rule's requirements due to their 
inconsistent financial performance in previous years; and two probably 
would have trouble meeting the proposed rule's requirements due to poor 
financial performance.
     The other 2 screening companies that also are air carriers 
are small regional air carriers for which, as noted

[[Page 596]]

previously, the FAA did not have complete data; it appears that both 
would probably be able to afford the cost of compliance associated with 
this proposed rule. This conclusion is based on their projected 1997 
profitability.
    As discussed above, the FAA has incomplete data on the remaining 11 
screening companies and had to estimate portions of their financial 
data. Accordingly, these conclusions are less certain:
     Five of these entities have experienced increases in their 
net working capital as well as their current and quick ratios over the 
past 3 or 4 years. They also are generally profitable and therefore 
probably would have financial resources available to meet the 
requirements of this proposed rule.
     One small entity was unprofitable in 1994 but has been 
profitable in the last 3 years. Another small entity has been 
profitable in the past 2 years. Both now have positive net working 
capital, and their current and quick ratios have been strong. It is 
likely that these companies would not have trouble meeting the costs of 
this proposed rule.
     For two small entities, their ability to afford the cost 
of compliance is less certain. For one of these, while it was 
profitable for all 4 years, its net working capital as well as its 
current and quick ratios have been declining; in addition, it had 
negative net working capital in 1996 and 1997. For the other, while it 
has had positive net working capital for the last 3 years, it has not 
been profitable in 2 of these 3 years.
     The current liquidity and profitability of 2 small 
entities would require action to finance the expected cost of 
compliance imposed by this NPRM. Over the past 2 or 3 years, each of 
these small entities has had negative net working capital. In addition, 
their respective current and quick ratios have generally been on a 
decline. They have frequently experienced financial losses.

Relative Cost Impact

     In looking at the annualized cost of compliance relative 
to the total operating revenues for each of the 8 small air carriers 
that also provide screening services, the FAA notes that the costs show 
relatively small impacts for these small entities. The annualized cost 
of compliance relative to total operating revenues would be less than 
or equal to 0.12 percent.
     In looking at the annualized cost of compliance relative 
to the total operating revenues for the other 11 small entities, these 
ratios are not as benign. The annualized cost of compliance relative to 
total operating revenues would be less than or equal to 3.19 percent. 
For two companies, this ratio exceeds 1.0 percent for all three years 
examined; each of these 3 companies was profitable for the years 
examined. It is important to emphasize, once again, that many of these 
ratios are based on estimated total operating revenues.
     Hence, for each of the small screening companies, the 
ratio of annualized proposed rule costs to revenues would be no more 
than 3.19 percent for each of the 3 years from 1995 through 1997. For 
the 4 screening companies that had liquidity and/or profitability 
problems in 1997, this ratio has been no greater than 0.38 percent over 
this 3-year period, so there appears to be the prospect of absorbing 
the cost of the proposed rule through price and production 
efficiencies.
    No clear conclusion can be drawn with regard to the abilities of 
some small entities to afford the costs of compliance that would be 
imposed by this NPRM. On one hand, the Liquidity Analysis/Profitability 
Analysis does not portray a positive picture of the ability of some of 
the small entities impacted by this NPRM to pay near-term expenses 
imposed by this rule, whereas the Relative Cost Impact Analysis 
indicates that most of those same small entities may be able, over 
time, to find ways to offset the incremental costs of compliance. As 
the result of information ascertained from both of these analyses, 
there is uncertainty as to whether all of the small entities would be 
able to afford the additional costs of doing business due to compliance 
with this NPRM. Because of this uncertainty, the FAA solicits comments 
from screening companies (especially from small companies with less 
than 1,500 employees) as to what extent small companies subject to this 
NPRM would be able to afford the costs of compliance. The FAA requests 
that all comments be accompanied with clear supporting data.

Disproportionality Analysis

    Due in large part to the paucity of data from which to work, the 
FAA can not draw any firm conclusions concerning any of the 38 small 
entities would be disadvantaged relative to large screening companies 
due solely to disproportionate cost impacts. The FAA compared the 
annualized costs of the 5 largest screening companies to an average of 
annualized costs of the small entities, and found them to be, on 
average, 12 times as large. This comparison was basically in line with 
the comparison of the total operating revenues of the largest screening 
companies to the average of the small entities; these average, 11 times 
as large for both 1996 and 1997. However, this comparison was double 
the comparison of current assets of the largest screening companies to 
the average of the small entities for these same 2 years; the FAA found 
them to be, on average, 6 times as large. This analysis suggests that 
large entities may be disadvantaged relative to small screening 
companies due to disproportionate cost impact. The FAA requests that 
both large and small screening companies provide additional financial 
data to assist the FAA in determining any financial disproportionality. 
As always, the FAA requests that all submitted data be accompanied with 
clear documentation.

Competitiveness Analysis

    This proposed rule would not impose significant costs on any small 
screening companies. However, due to the financial problems that 
certain air carriers are having, there may be some impact on the 
relative competitive positions of these carriers in markets served by 
them. The FAA solicits comments on this issue from all screening 
companies and small screening companies in particular. The FAA requests 
that supporting data on markets and cost be provided with the comments.

Business Closure Analysis

    The FAA is unable to determine with certainty the extent to which 
those small entities that would be significantly impacted by this 
proposed rule would have to close their operations. However, the 
profitability information and the affordability analysis can be 
indicators in business closures.
    In determining whether any of the 38 small entities would close 
business as the result of compliance with this proposed rule, one 
question must be answered: ``Would the cost of compliance be so great 
as to impair an entity's ability to remain in business?'' Of the 
information that the FAA has on 19 of these entities, 4 already are in 
serious financial difficulty. To what extent the proposed rule makes 
the difference in whether these entities remain in business is 
difficult to answer. The FAA believes that the likelihood of business 
closure for any of these small screening companies, as a result of this 
proposed rule, is low to moderate. However, since there is uncertainty 
associated with whether some of the small entities would go out of 
business as the result of the compliance costs of this proposed rule, 
the FAA solicits comments from the aviation community as to the 
likelihood

[[Page 597]]

of this occurrence. As always, the FAA requests that all comments be 
accompanied with clear supporting data.

Alternatives

    The FAA considered alternatives to the proposed rule for small 
screening companies. These alternatives have compliance costs that 
range from $12.73 million to $13.10 million.
    Alternative 1.--Status Quo. Under this alternative, the FAA would 
exempt small screening companies from all requirements of this proposed 
rule. Currently, the FAA does not regulate screening companies 
directly. Continuing with this policy would be the least costly course 
of action but also would be less safe than the proposed rule and would 
not fulfill the Congressional mandate. The FAA believes that the threat 
to civil aviation within the United States has increased and that 
further rulemaking is necessary. Thus, this alternative is not 
considered to be acceptable because it permits continuation of an 
unacceptable level of risk to U.S. airline passengers.
    Alternative 2.--The FAA considered doing away with direct air 
carrier test monitoring requirements for smaller screening companies.
    The proposal would require each screening company to ensure that 
each test is monitored by an employee of the carrier for which it 
screens. The screening company would be responsible for informing the 
applicable carrier(s) that it plans to administer a test to screener 
trainees, and the applicable carrier(s) would be responsible for 
providing test monitors upon request. Under this alternative, small 
screening companies would not have to request a testing monitor. This 
alternative would result in cost savings to all small screening 
companies. These companies would no longer need to write letters to the 
applicable direct air carrier requesting the employees to monitor the 
tests. Over 10 years, this alternative would save all small screening 
companies $357,800 (net present value, $251,300), resulting in total 
compliance costs of $12.74 million (net present value, $8.85 million).
    The FAA believes that this alternative would not enhance security. 
Because air carriers are ultimately responsible for ensuring the safe 
and proper screening of persons and property, the FAA believes that it 
is important to ensure air carrier involvement with critical aspects of 
this rulemaking. Removing this monitoring requirement would strongly 
diminish the emphasis and importance that this proposed rule places on 
air carrier oversight. In addition, retaining the monitoring 
requirement helps to support the concept of a balance of 
responsibilities between screening companies and the air carriers for 
which they screen. The FAA believes that potential cost savings would 
be outweighed by a reduction in security.
    Alternative 3.--The FAA considered not requiring that CSS's and 
shift supervisors of smaller screening companies complete leadership 
training.
    The proposal would require persons with supervisory screening 
duties to have initial and recurrent training that includes leadership 
and management subjects. All CSS's and shift supervisors would be 
required to take annual classes in leadership training, which would be 
a new requirement. Under this alternative, small screening companies 
would not be required to have their CSS's and shift supervisors take 
this training. This alternative would result in cost savings to all 
small screening companies. These companies would no longer need to pay 
to have their personnel take these classes or pay for leadership 
training instructors. Over 10 years, this alternative would save all 
small screening companies $292,900 (net present value, $205,000), 
resulting in total compliance costs of $12.80 million (net present 
value, $8.89 million).
    The FAA believes that this alternative would harm security. 
Security is best served when competent, qualified leadership exists at 
all locations, whether large or small, busy or not busy. There are 
certain core skills that CSS's and shift supervisors need in order to 
perform their responsibilities effectively. Hence, under this 
alternative, there would not be consistency of leadership at the 
different screening checkpoints. The FAA believes that potential cost 
savings would be outweighed by a reduction in security.
    Alternative 4.--The FAA considered not requiring that smaller 
screening companies obtain air carrier approval before submitting their 
security program amendments to the FAA.
    The proposal would require screening companies to include in any 
proposed amendment packages that they send to the FAA a statements that 
all carriers for which they screen have been advised of the proposed 
amendments and agree to them. Hence, each screening company would have 
to send its proposed amendment to every carrier for which it screens 
and respond to any changes that that carrier proposes. This alternative 
would result in cost savings to all small screening companies. These 
screening companies would no longer have to send copies of their 
proposed amendments to their carriers or respond to their carrier's 
modifications. Over 10 years, this alternative would save all small 
screening companies $367,200 (net present value, $258,400), resulting 
in total compliance costs of $12.73 million (net present value, $8.84 
million).
    The FAA believes that this alternative would harm security. Air 
carriers are responsible by statute for screening and would be held 
responsible along with the screening companies for complying with part 
111 and the SSSP. Under this alternative, all carriers would not be 
informed of all screening-related changes to the applicable SSSP's. The 
FAA would have a difficult time holding carriers accountable for 
changes of which they were not made aware; this alternative would 
ensure that some air carriers are not made aware of all changes. The 
FAA believes that potential cost savings would be outweighed by a 
reduction in security.
    Alternative 5.--The Proposed Rule
    This alternative represents the proposed rule for screening 
companies. Under this alternative, small screening companies would be 
subject to all aspects of this proposed rulemaking. The cost of 
compliance expected to be incurred by the 38 small entities subject to 
the requirements of the proposed rule is estimated to be $13.10 million 
(net present value, $9.10 million) over the next 10 years. This 
alternative is preferred, because the FAA believes that it has the best 
balance between costs and benefits for all screening companies while 
enhancing aviation safety and security (in the form of risk reduction) 
for the flying public.

VIII.C. International Trade Impact Statement

    In accordance with the Office of Management and Budget memorandum 
dated March 1983, Federal agencies engaged in rulemaking activities are 
required to assess the effects of regulatory changes on international 
trade. Because domestic and international air carriers use screeners, 
this proposed rule change would have an equal effect on both.

VIII.D. Unfunded Mandates

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), 
enacted as Public Law 104-4 on March 22, 1995, requires each Federal 
agency, to the extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment 
of the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency 
rule that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the

[[Page 598]]

private sector, of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for 
inflation) in any one year. Section 204(a) of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 
1534(a), requires the Federal agency to develop an effective process to 
permit timely input by elected officers (or their designees) of State, 
local, and tribal governments on a proposed ``significant 
intergovernmental mandate.'' A ``significant intergovernmental 
mandate'' under the Act is any provision in a Federal agency regulation 
that would impose an enforceable duty upon State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for 
inflation) in any 1 year. Section 203 of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which 
supplements section 204(a), provides that before establishing any 
regulatory requirements that might significantly or uniquely affect 
small governments, the agency shall have developed a plan that, among 
other things, provides for notice to potentially affected small 
governments, if any, and for a meaningful and timely opportunity to 
provide input in the development of regulatory proposals.
    This proposed rule does not contain any Federal intergovernmental 
mandates or private sector mandates.

VIII.E. Federalism Implications

    The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The FAA has determined 
that this action will not have a substantial direct effect on the 
States, on the relationship between the national Government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government. Therefore, the FAA has determined that 
this final rule does not have federalism implications.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 108

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Airports, Arms and munitions, 
Explosives, Law enforcement officers, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Security measures, X-rays.

14 CFR Part 109

    Administrative practice and procedure, Air carriers, Aircraft, 
Freight forwarders, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security 
measures.

14 CFR Part 111

    Administrative practice and procedure, Air carriers, Aircraft, 
Certification requirements, Foreign air carriers, Indirect air 
carriers, Performance standards, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Screening companies, Security measures.

14 CFR Part 129

    Administrative practice and procedure, Air carriers, Aircraft, 
Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security 
measures, Smoking.

14 CFR Part 191

    Air transportation, Security measures.

The Proposed Amendment

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Federal Aviation 
Administration proposes to amend 14 CFR chapter I as follows:

PART 108--AIRCRAFT OPERATOR SECURITY

    1. The heading for part 108, proposed at 62 FR 41749, continues to 
read as set forth above.
    1a. The authority citation for part 108, proposed at 62 FR 41749, 
continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g); 5103, 40113, 40119, 44701-44702, 
44705, 44901-44905, 44907, 44913-44914, 44932, 44935-44936, 46105.

    2. Section 108.5, proposed at 62 FR 41750, is amended by revising 
paragraphs (a) and (b) to read as follows:


Sec. 108.5  Inspection authority.

    (a) Each air carrier shall allow the Administrator, including FAA 
special agents to make any inspections or tests at any time or place to 
determine compliance of an airport operator, air carrier, foreign air 
carrier, screening company, or other airport tenant with--
    (1) This part;
    (2) Part 111 of this chapter;
    (3) The air carrier security program;
    (4) Applicable screening company security program(s);
    (5) 49 CFR part 175, which relates to the carriage of hazardous 
materials by aircraft; and
    (6) 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII, as amended.
    (b) At the request of the Administrator, each air carrier shall 
provide evidence of compliance with this part, part 111 of this 
chapter, its air carrier security program, and its screening company 
security program(s).
* * * * *
    3. Section 108.103, proposed at 62 FR 41751, is amended by adding 
new paragraphs (b)(14) and (b)(15) to read as follows:


Sec. 108.103  Form, content, and availability.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (14) A description of how the air carrier will provide oversight to 
each screening company performing screening on its behalf.
    (15) A description of how the air carrier will evaluate and test 
screening performance.
* * * * *
    4. Section 108.201, proposed at 62 FR 41752, is amended by revising 
paragraph (a); removing paragraph (g); redesignating paragraph (h) as 
new paragraph (g) and revising it; and by adding new paragraphs (h), 
(i), (j), (k), (l), (m), and (n) to read as follows:


Sec. 108.201  Screening of persons and property, and acceptance of 
cargo.

    (a) Each air carrier required to conduct screening under a security 
program shall use the procedures included and the facilities and 
equipment described in its approved security program and its screening 
company approved security program(s) to inspect each person entering a 
sterile area and to inspect each person's accessible property.
* * * * *
    (g) Each air carrier required to conduct screening under a security 
program shall use the procedures included and the facilities and 
equipment described in its approved security program and its screening 
company approved security program(s) to prevent the carriage of 
explosives or incendiaries onboard a passenger aircraft.
    (h) Except as provided in Sec. 111.109(k) of this chapter each air 
carrier required to conduct screening of persons and property at 
locations within the United States under a security program shall 
either hold a screening company certificate issued under part 111 of 
this chapter or shall use another screening company certificated under 
part 111 of this chapter to inspect persons or property for the 
presence of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or deadly or 
dangerous weapon. FAA-certified canine teams are not required to be 
operated by certificated screening companies.
    (i) Each air carrier shall ensure that each screening company 
performing screening on its behalf conducts such screening in 
accordance with part 111 of this chapter, the screening company's 
security program, and the screening company's operations 
specifications.
    (j) Each air carrier required to conduct screening under this part 
shall provide oversight to each screening company performing screening 
on its behalf as specified in the air carrier's security program.

[[Page 599]]

    (k) Each air carrier required to conduct screening under a security 
program shall:
    (1) Maintain at least one complete copy of each of its screening 
companies' security programs at its principal business office;
    (2) Have available complete copies or the pertinent portions of its 
screening companies' security programs or appropriate implementing 
instructions at each location where the screening companies conduct 
screening for the air carrier;
    (3) Make copies of its screening companies' security programs 
available for inspection by an FAA special agent upon request;
    (4) Restrict the distribution, disclosure, and availability of 
information contained in its screening companies' security programs to 
persons with a need to know as described in part 191 of this chapter; 
and
    (5) Refer requests for such information by other persons to the 
Administrator.
    (l) Each air carrier required by the Administrator to implement 
additional security measures to maintain system performance shall 
notify the public by posting signs at affected locations as specified 
in its security program.
    (m) At screening locations outside the United States at which an 
air carrier has operational control over screening, the air carrier 
shall screen as follows:
    (1) The air carrier shall carry out and comply with all relevant 
sections of part 111 of this chapter, except for those requirements 
related to screening company certification, to the extent allowable by 
local law.
    (2) The air carrier may use screeners who do not meet the 
requirements of Sec. 111.205(a)(3) of this chapter provided that at 
least one representative of the air carrier who has the ability to read 
and speak English functionally is present while the air carrier's 
passengers are undergoing security screening.
    (3) In the event that an air carrier is unable to implement any of 
the requirements for screening, the air carrier shall notify the 
Administrator of those air carrier stations or screening locations so 
affected.
    (n) The air carrier shall notify the Administrator of any screening 
locations outside the United States at which it does have operational 
control.
    5. Section 108.203, proposed at 62 FR 41752, is revised to read as 
follows:


Sec. 108.203  Use of metal detection devices.

    (a) No air carrier may use a metal detection device to inspect 
passengers, accessible property, or checked baggage unless specifically 
authorized under a security program required under this part. No air 
carrier may use such a device contrary to its approved security program 
or its screening companies' approved program(s).
    (b) Metal detection devices shall meet the calibration standards 
established by the Administrator in the screening company approved 
security program(s).
    6. Section 108.205, proposed at 62 FR 41753, is amended by revising 
paragraph (a) introductory text, removing paragraph (a)(2), 
redesignating paragraph (a)(3) as new paragraph (a)(2) and revising it, 
and revising paragraph (h) to read as follows:


Sec. 108.205  Use of X-ray systems.

    (a) No air carrier may use any X-ray system within the United 
States or under the air carrier's operational control outside the 
United States to inspect accessible property or checked articles unless 
specifically authorized under a security program required by this part. 
No air carrier may use such a system in a manner contrary to its 
approved security program or its screening company approved security 
program(s). The Administrator authorizes an air carrier to use X-ray 
systems for inspecting accessible property or checked articles under an 
approved security program if the air carrier shows that:
* * * * *
    (2) The system meets the imaging requirements set forth in the 
approved screening company's standard security program.
* * * * *
    (h) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, each air 
carrier shall ensure that each X-ray system that it uses has a 
functioning threat image projection system that meets the standards set 
forth in its security program.
    (1) Automated X-ray threat image projection data will be collected 
as specified in the air carrier's security program and in the 
responsible screening company's security program.
    (2) The air carrier shall make X-ray threat image projection data 
available to the FAA upon request and shall allow the FAA to download 
threat image projection data upon request.
    7. Section 108.207, proposed at 62 FR 41753, is revised to read as 
follows:


Sec. 108.207  Use of explosives detection systems.

    (a) When the Administrator shall require by an amendment under 
Sec. 108.105, each air carrier required to conduct screening under a 
security program shall use an explosives detection system that has been 
approved by the Administrator to screen checked baggage on each 
international flight in accordance with its security program and its 
screening companies' security programs.
    (b) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, each air 
carrier shall ensure that each explosives detection system that it uses 
has a functioning threat image projection system that meets the 
standards set forth in its security program.
    (1) Automated explosives detection system threat image projection 
data will be collected as specified in the air carrier's security 
program and in the responsible screening company's security program.
    (2) The air carrier shall make explosives detection system threat 
image projection data available to the FAA upon request and shall allow 
the FAA to download threat image projection data upon request.


Sec. 108.209  [Removed and Reserved]

    8. Section 108.209, proposed at 62 FR 41753, is removed and 
reserved.
    9. Section 108.227, proposed at 62 FR 41756, is amended by revising 
paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec. 108.227  Training and knowledge of persons with security-related 
duties.

* * * * *
    (b) Each air carrier shall ensure that individuals performing 
security-related functions for the air carrier have knowledge of the 
provisions of this part, applicable security directives and information 
circulars promulgated pursuant to Sec. 108.305, the approved airport 
security program, the air carrier's approved security program, and the 
screening company approved security program(s) to the extent that such 
individuals need to know in order to perform their duties.
* * * * *
    10. A new Sec. 108.229 is added to subpart C, proposed at 62 FR 
41752, to read as follows:


Sec. 108.229  Monitoring of screener training tests.

    Each air carrier shall monitor each screener training test required 
under Sec. 111.215(a) and (c) of this chapter for all screening 
companies that conduct screening on its behalf in accordance with its 
security program. Each test monitor shall meet the following 
qualifications:
    (a) Be an air carrier employee who is not a contractor, instructor, 
screener, screener-in-charge, checkpoint security supervisor, or other 
screening company supervisor, unless otherwise authorized by the 
Administrator.

[[Page 600]]

    (b) Be familiar with the testing and grading procedures contained 
in the screening company's security program.
    (c) Meet other qualifications set forth in the screening company's 
security program.
    11. Amend Sec. 108.301, proposed at 62 FR 41757, by revising 
paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) to read as follows:


Sec. 108.301  Security Coordinators.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) A review of all security-related functions for effectiveness 
and compliance with this part, the air carrier's approved security 
program, part 111 of this chapter, its screening company approved 
security program(s), and applicable security directives.
    (2) Immediate initiation of corrective action for each instance of 
noncompliance with this part, the air carrier's approved security 
program, part 111 of this chapter, its screening company approved 
security program(s), and applicable security directives. At foreign 
airports where such security measures are provided by agencies or 
contractors of host governments, the air carriers shall notify the 
Administrator for assistance in resolving noncompliance issues.
* * * * *
    12. Revise part 109 to read as follows:

PART 109--INDIRECT AIR CARRIER SECURITY

Subpart A--General

Sec.
109.1  Applicability.
109.3  Definitions.
109.5  Inspection authority.
109.7  Falsification.

Subpart B--Security Program

109.101  Adoption and implementation
109.103  Form, content, and availability.
109.105  Approval and amendments.

Subpart C--Screening and Operations

109.201  Screening of cargo
109.203  Screening certificate, performance, and oversight.
109.205  Monitoring of screener training tests.
109.207  Use of X-ray systems.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 5103, 40113, 40119, 44701-44702, 
44705, 44901-44905, 44907, 44913-44914, 44932, 44935-44936, 46105.

Subpart A--General


Sec. 109.1  Applicability.

    This part prescribes aviation security rules governing each 
indirect air carrier (IAC) engaged indirectly in the air transportation 
of property.


Sec. 109.3  Definitions.

    Terms defined in parts 107, 108, 111, and 129 of this chapter apply 
to this part. For purposes of this part, parts 107, 108, 111, and 129 
of this chapter, and security programs required by these parts, the 
following definition also applies:
    Indirect air carrier means any person or entity within the United 
States not in possession of an FAA air carrier operating certificate, 
that undertakes to engage indirectly in air transportation of property, 
and uses for all or any part of such transportation the services of a 
passenger air carrier. This does not include the U.S. Postal Service 
(USPS) or its representative while acting on the behalf of the USPS.


Sec. 109.5  Inspection authority.

    (a) Each indirect air carrier shall allow the Administrator, 
including FAA special agents to make any inspections or tests at any 
time or place to determine compliance of the indirect air carrier with:
    (1) This part;
    (2) Part 111 of this chapter;
    (3) The indirect air carrier security program;
    (4) Its screening companies' security programs; and
    (5) 49 CFR parts 100-199, which relate to handling and carrying 
hazardous materials.
    (b) At the request of the Administrator, each indirect air carrier 
shall provide evidence of compliance with this part, part 111 of this 
chapter, its indirect air carrier security program, and its screening 
company security program(s).


Sec. 109.7  Falsification.

    No person shall make or cause to be made any of the following:
    (a) Any fraudulent or intentionally false statement in any 
application for any security program or any amendment thereto under 
this part.
    (b) Any fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any record or 
report that is kept, made, or used to show compliance with this part or 
to exercise any privileges under this part.
    (c) Any reproduction or alteration for fraudulent purpose of any 
report, record, or security program issued under this part.

Subpart B--Security Program


Sec. 109.101  Adoption and implementation.

    Each indirect air carrier shall adopt and carry out a security 
program that meets the requirements of Sec. 109.103.


Sec. 109.103  Form, content, and availability.

    (a) The security program required under Sec. 109.101 shall--
    (1) Be designed to detect and prevent the introduction of any 
unauthorized explosive or incendiary into cargo intended for carriage 
by air;
    (2) Provide that upon receipt of an approved security program or 
security program amendment from the FAA, the indirect air carrier shall 
acknowledge receipt of the approved security program or amendment to 
the Assistant Administrator in writing and signed by the indirect air 
carrier or any person delegated authority in this matter within 72 
hours;
    (3) Include the items listed in paragraph (b) of this section as 
required by Sec. 109.101;
    (4) Be in writing and signed by the indirect air carrier or any 
person delegated authority in this matter; and
    (5) Be approved by the Administrator.
    (b) The security program shall include--
    (1) A system of security safeguards acceptable to the 
Administrator;
    (2) The procedures and descriptions of the facilities and equipment 
used to perform screening functions specified in Sec. 109.201;
    (3) The procedures and descriptions of the equipment used to comply 
with the requirements of Sec. 109.207 regarding the use of X-ray 
systems should the indirect air carrier elect to perform screening 
functions;
    (4) A description of how the indirect carrier will provide 
oversight to each screening company performing screening on its behalf 
should the indirect air carrier elect to perform screening functions; 
and
    (5) A description of how the indirect air carrier will evaluate and 
test the performance of screening should the indirect air carrier elect 
to perform screening functions.
    (c) Each indirect air carrier having an approved security program 
shall--
    (1) Maintain at least one complete copy of its security program at 
its principal business office;
    (2) Have available a complete copy or the pertinent portions of its 
approved security program or appropriate implementing instructions at 
each office where package cargo is accepted;
    (3) Make a copy of its approved security program available for 
inspection upon the request of an FAA special agent;
    (4) Restrict the distribution, disclosure, and availability of 
information contained in its security program to persons with an 
operational need to know as described in part 191 of this chapter; and

[[Page 601]]

    (5) Refer requests for such information by other persons to the 
Administrator.


Sec. 109.105  Approval and amendments.

    (a) Approval of Security Program. Unless otherwise authorized by 
the Assistant Administrator, each indirect air carrier required to have 
a security program under this part shall submit its proposed security 
program to the Assistant Administrator for approval at least 30 days 
before the date of intended operations. Such request shall be processed 
as follows:
    (1) Within 30 days after receiving the proposed indirect air 
carrier security program, the Assistant Administrator will either 
approve the program or give the indirect air carrier written notice to 
modify the program to comply with the applicable requirements of this 
part.
    (2) Within 30 days of receiving a notice to modify, the indirect 
air carrier may either submit a modified security program to the 
Assistant Administrator for approval, or petition the Administrator to 
reconsider the notice to modify. A petition for reconsideration shall 
be filed with the Assistant Administrator. Except in the case of an 
emergency requiring immediate action in the interest of safety, the 
filing of the petition stays the notice pending a decision by the 
Administrator.
    (3) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the Assistant 
Administrator will either amend or withdraw the notice or transmit the 
petition together with any pertinent information to the Administrator 
for reconsideration. The Administrator will dispose of the petition 
within 30 days of receipt by either directing the Assistant 
Administrator to withdraw or amend the notice to modify or by affirming 
the notice to modify.
    (b) Amendment requested by an indirect air carrier. An indirect air 
carrier may submit a request to the Assistant Administrator to amend 
its approved security program as follows:
    (1) The application shall be filed with the Assistant Administrator 
at least 30 days before the date that it proposes for the amendment to 
become effective unless a shorter period is allowed by the Assistant 
Administrator.
    (2) Within 15 days after receiving a proposed amendment, the 
Assistant Administrator will either approve or deny the request to 
amend in writing.
    (3) An amendment to an indirect air carrier security program may be 
approved if the Assistant Administrator determines that safety and the 
public interest will allow it and if the proposed amendment provides 
the level of security required under this part.
    (4) Within 30 days after receiving a denial, the indirect air 
carrier may petition the Administrator to reconsider the denial.
    (5) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the Assistant 
Administrator will either approve the request to amend or will transmit 
the petition together with any pertinent information to the 
Administrator for reconsideration. The Administrator will dispose of 
the petition within 30 days of receipt by either directing the 
Assistant Administrator to approve the amendment or by affirming the 
denial.
    (c) Amendment by the FAA. If safety and the public interest require 
an amendment, the Assistant Administrator may amend an approved 
security program as follows:
    (1) The Assistant Administrator will notify the indirect air 
carrier in writing of the proposed amendment, fixing a period of not 
less than 30 days within which the indirect air carrier may submit 
written information, views, and arguments on the amendment.
    (2) After considering all relevant material, the Assistant 
Administrator will notify the indirect air carrier of any amendment 
adopted or will rescind the notice. If the amendment is adopted, it 
will become effective not less than 30 days after the indirect air 
carrier receives the notice of amendment unless the indirect air 
carrier petitions the Administrator to reconsider no later than 15 days 
before the effective date of the amendment. The indirect air carrier 
shall send the petition for reconsideration to the Assistant 
Administrator. A timely petition for reconsideration will stay the 
effective date of the amendment.
    (3) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the Assistant 
Administrator will either amend or withdraw the notice or will transmit 
the petition together with any pertinent information to the 
Administrator for reconsideration. The Administrator will dispose of 
the petition within 30 days of receipt by either directing the 
Assistant Administrator to withdraw or amend the notice or by affirming 
the amendment.
    (d) Emergency amendments. If the Assistant Administrator finds that 
there is an emergency requiring immediate action with respect to safety 
in air transportation or in air commerce that makes procedures in this 
section contrary to the public interest, the Assistant Administrator 
may issue an amendment that will become effective without stay on the 
date that the indirect air carrier receives notice of it. In such a 
case, the Assistant Administrator shall incorporate in the notice a 
brief statement of the reasons and findings for the amendment to be 
adopted. The indirect air carrier may file a petition for 
reconsideration under paragraph (c) of this section; however, this will 
not stay the effectiveness of the emergency amendment.

Subpart C--Screening and Operations


Sec. 109.201  Screening of cargo.

    (a) Each indirect air carrier that elects to conduct screening 
under a security program shall use the procedures included and the 
facilities and equipment described in its approved security program and 
its screening company approved security program(s) to inspect cargo and 
prevent the carriage of explosives or incendiaries onboard any 
aircraft.
    (b) Each indirect air carrier that elects to conduct screening 
under a security program shall detect and prevent the carriage of any 
explosive or incendiary in cargo aboard aircraft and into sterile 
areas.


Sec. 109.203  Screening certificate, performance, and oversight.

    (a) Except as provided in Sec. 111.109(k) of this chapter, each 
indirect air carrier that conducts screening of cargo for locations 
within the United States under a security program shall either hold a 
screening company certificate issued under part 111 of this chapter or 
use another screening company certificated under part 111 of this 
chapter to inspect property for the presence of any unauthorized 
explosive or incendiary. FAA-certified canine teams are not required to 
be operated by certificated screening companies.
    (b) Each indirect air carrier shall ensure that each screening 
company performing screening on the indirect air carrier's behalf 
conducts such screening in accordance with part 111 of this chapter, 
the screening company's security program, and the screening company's 
operations specifications.
    (c) Each indirect air carrier that conducts screening under this 
part shall provide oversight to each screening company performing 
screening on behalf of the indirect air carrier as specified in the 
indirect air carrier's security program.
    (d) Each indirect air carrier required to conduct screening under a 
security program shall:
    (1) Maintain at least one complete copy of each of its screening 
companies' security programs at its principal business office;
    (2) Have available complete copies or the pertinent portions of its 
screening companies' security programs or

[[Page 602]]

appropriate implementing instructions at each location where the 
screening companies conduct screening for the indirect air carrier;
    (3) Make copies of its screening companies' security programs 
available for inspection by an FAA special agent upon request;
    (4) Restrict the distribution, disclosure, and availability of 
information contained in its screening companies' security programs to 
persons with a need to know as described in part 191 of this chapter; 
and
    (5) Refer requests for such information by other persons to the 
Administrator.


Sec. 109.205  Monitoring of screener training tests.

    Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, each indirect air 
carrier shall monitor each screener training test required under 
Sec. 111.215(a) and (c) of this chapter for all screening companies 
that conduct screening on its behalf in accordance with its security 
program. Each test monitor shall meet the following qualifications:
    (a) Be an indirect air carrier employee who is not a contractor, 
instructor, screener, screener-in-charge, checkpoint security 
supervisor, or other screening company supervisor, unless otherwise 
authorized by the Administrator.
    (b) Be familiar with the testing and grading procedures contained 
in the screening company's security program.
    (c) Meet other qualifications set forth in the screening company's 
security program.


Sec. 109.207  Use of X-ray systems.

    (a) No indirect air carrier may use any X-ray system to inspect 
cargo unless specifically authorized under a security program required 
by this part. No indirect air carrier may use such a system in a manner 
contrary to its screening company's approved security program. The 
Administrator authorizes an indirect air carrier to use X-ray systems 
for inspecting cargo under an approved screening security program if 
the indirect air carrier shows that--
    (1) The system meets the standards for cabinet X-ray systems 
designed primarily for the inspection of baggage issued by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) and published in 21 CFR 1020.40; and
    (2) The system meets the imaging requirements set forth in the 
approved screening security program.
    (b) No indirect air carrier may use any X-ray system unless a 
radiation survey is conducted within the preceding 12 calendar months 
which shows that the system meets the applicable performance standards 
in 21 CFR 1020.40.
    (c) No indirect air carrier may use any X-ray system after the 
system has been installed at a screening location or after the system 
has been moved unless a radiation survey is conducted which shows that 
the system meets the applicable performance standards in 21 CFR 
1020.40. A radiation survey is not required for an X-ray system that is 
designed and constructed as a mobile unit and the indirect air carrier 
shows that it can be moved without altering its performance.
    (d) No indirect air carrier may use any X-ray system that is not in 
full compliance with any defect notice or modification order issued for 
that system by the FDA unless the FDA has advised the FAA that the 
defect or failure to comply does not create a significant risk of 
injury, including genetic injury, to any person.
    (e) No indirect air carrier may use any X-ray system to inspect 
cargo unless a sign is posted in a conspicuous place at the receiving 
area or written notification is provided to inform individuals that 
items are being inspected by an X-ray and advise them to remove all X-
ray, scientific, and high-speed film from their cargo before 
inspection. This sign or written notification also shall advise 
individuals that they may request that inspections be made of their 
photographic equipment and film packages without exposure to X-ray 
systems. If an X-ray system exposes any cargo to more than 1 
milliroentgen during inspection, the indirect air carrier shall post a 
sign that advises individuals to remove film of all kinds from their 
cargo before inspection.
    (f) Each indirect air carrier shall maintain at least one copy of 
the results of the most recent radiation survey conducted under 
paragraph (b) or (c) of this section and shall make it available for 
inspection upon request by the Administrator at each of the following 
locations:
    (1) The indirect air carrier's principal business office.
    (2) The place where the X-ray system is in operation.
    (g) The American Society for Testing and Materials Standard F792-
88, ``Design and Use of Ionizing Radiation Equipment for the Detection 
of Items Prohibited in Controlled Access Areas,'' is incorporated by 
reference in this section and made a part of this section pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this section may obtain 
copies of the standard from the American Society for Testing and 
Materials, 1916 Race Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103.
    (h) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, each indirect 
air carrier shall ensure that each X-ray system that it uses has a 
functioning threat image projection system that meets the standards set 
forth in its security program.
    (1) Automated X-ray threat image projection data will be collected 
as specified in the indirect air carrier security program and in the 
responsible screening company's security program.
    (2) The indirect air carrier shall make X-ray threat image 
projection data available to the FAA upon request and shall allow the 
FAA to download threat image projection data upon request.
    13. A new part 111 is added to subchapter F to read as follows:

PART 111--SCREENING COMPANY SECURITY

Subpart A--General

Sec.
111.1  Applicability.
111.3  Definitions.
111.5  Inspection authority.
111.7  Falsification.
111.9  Prohibition against interference with screening personnel.

Subpart B--Security Program, Certificate, and Operations Specifications

111.101  Performance of screening.
111.103  Security program: Adoption and implementation.
111.105  Security program: Form, content, and availability.
111.107  Security program: Approval and amendments.
111.109  Screening company certificate.
111.111  Operations specifications: Adoption and implementation.
111.113  Operations specifications: Form, content, and availability.
111.115  Operations specifications: Approval, amendments, and 
limitations.
111.117  Oversight by air carriers, foreign air carriers, or 
indirect air carriers.
111.119  Business office.

Subpart C--Operations

111.201  Screening of persons and property and acceptance of cargo.
111.203  Use of screening equipment.
111.205  Employment standards for screening personnel.
111.207  Disclosure of sensitive security information.
111.209  Screening company management.
111.211  Screening company instructor qualifications.
111.213  Training and knowledge of persons with screening-related 
duties.
111.215  Training tests: Requirements.
111.217  Training tests: Cheating and other unauthorized conduct.
111.219  Screener letter of completion of training.
111.221  Screener and supervisor training records.
111.223  Automated performance standards.


[[Page 603]]


    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 5103, 40113, 40119, 44701-44702, 
44705, 44707, 44901-44905, 44907, 44913-44914, 44932, 44935-44936, 
46105.

Subpart A--General


Sec. 111.1  Applicability.

    This part prescribes the requirements for the certification and 
operation of screening companies. This part applies to all of the 
following:
    (a) Each screening company that screens for an air carrier under 
part 108 of this chapter, for an indirect air carrier under part 109 of 
this chapter, or for a foreign air carrier under part 129 of this 
chapter.
    (b) All persons conducting screening within the United States under 
this part, part 108, part 109, or part 129 of this chapter by 
inspecting persons or property for the presence of unauthorized 
explosives, incendiaries, or deadly or dangerous weapons.
    (c) Each air carrier, foreign air carrier, and indirect air carrier 
required to conduct screening under this chapter.
    (d) All persons who interact with screening personnel during 
screening.


Sec. 111.3  Definitions.

    Terms defined in parts 107, 108, 109, and 129 of this chapter apply 
to this part. For purposes of this part, parts 107, 108, 109, and 129 
of this chapter, and security programs under these parts, the following 
definitions also apply:
    Carrier means an air carrier under part 108 of this chapter, 
indirect air carrier under part 109 of this chapter, or foreign air 
carrier under part 129 of this chapter.
    Screening company means a carrier or other entity that inspects 
persons or property for the presence of any unauthorized explosive, 
incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon, as required under this part, 
before entry into a sterile area or carriage aboard an aircraft.
    Screening company security program means the security program 
approved by the Administrator under this part.
    Screening location means each site at which persons or property are 
inspected for the presence of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, 
or deadly or dangerous weapon.


Sec. 111.5  Inspection authority.

    (a) Each screening company shall allow the Administrator to make 
inspections or tests at any time or place to determine compliance with 
all of the following:
    (1) This part.
    (2) The screening company's security program.
    (3) The screening company's operations specifications.
    (4) Part 108, 109, or 129 of this chapter, as applicable.
    (b) At the request of the Administrator, a screening company shall 
provide evidence of compliance with this part, its security program, 
and its operations specifications.


Sec. 111.7  Falsification.

    No person may make or cause to be made any of the following:
    (a) Any fraudulent or intentionally false statement in any 
application for any security program, certificate, or operations 
specifications or any amendment thereto under this part.
    (b) Any fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any record or 
report that is kept, made, or used to show compliance with this part or 
to exercise any privileges under this part.
    (c) Any reproduction or alteration for fraudulent purpose of any 
report, record, security program, certificate, or operations 
specifications issued under this part.


Sec. 111.9  Prohibition against interference with screening personnel.

    No person may interfere with, assault, threaten, or intimidate 
screening personnel in the performance of their screening duties.

Subpart B--Security Program, Certificate, and Operations 
Specifications


Sec. 111.101  Performance of screening.

    Each screening company shall conduct screening and screener 
training required under this part in compliance with the requirements 
of this part, its approved security program, its approved operations 
specifications, and applicable portions of security directives and 
emergency amendments to security programs issued under part 108, 109, 
129 of this chapter, and this part.


Sec. 111.103  Security program: Adoption and implementation.

    Each screening company shall adopt and carry out an FAA-approved 
security program that meets the requirements of Sec. 111.105.


Sec. 111.105  Security program: Form, content, and availability.

    (a) A security program required under Sec. 111.103 shall:
    (1) Provide for the safety of persons and property traveling on 
flights provided by air carriers and/or foreign air carriers for which 
the screening company screens against acts of criminal violence and air 
piracy and the introduction of explosives, incendiaries, or deadly or 
dangerous weapons aboard aircraft.
    (2) Provide that upon receipt of an approved security program or 
security program amendment, the screening company screening performance 
coordinator shall acknowledge receipt of the approved security program 
or amendment in a signed, written statement to the FAA within 72 hours.
    (3) Include the items listed in paragraph (b) of this section as 
required by Sec. 111.103.
    (4) Be approved by the Administrator.
    (b) The security program shall include all of the following:
    (1) The procedures used to perform screening functions specified in 
Sec. 111.201.
    (2) The testing standards and training guidelines for screening 
personnel and instructors.
    (3) The performance standards and operating requirements for threat 
image projection systems.
    (c) Each screening company having an approved security program 
shall:
    (1) Maintain at least one complete copy of the security program at 
its principal business office.
    (2) Have available a complete copy of its approved security program 
at each airport served.
    (3) Make a copy of its approved security program available for 
inspection by an FAA special agent upon request.
    (4) Restrict the distribution, disclosure, and availability of 
information contained in its security program to persons with a need to 
know as described in part 191 of this chapter.
    (5) Refer requests for such information by other persons to the 
Administrator.


Sec. 111.107  Security program: Approval and amendments.

    (a) Approval of security program. Unless otherwise authorized by 
the Assistant Administrator, each screening company required to have a 
security program under this part shall within 30 days of receiving the 
screening standard security program from the FAA submit a signed, 
written statement to the Assistant Administrator indicating one of the 
following: the screening company will adopt the Screening Standard 
Security Program as is, or the screening company will adopt the 
Screening Standard Security Program after making amendments to it. FAA 
approval of a security program will be as follows:
    (1) If the screening company chooses to adopt the Screening 
Standard Security Program as is, the granting of the screening company 
certificate by the Assistant Administrator will serve as

[[Page 604]]

FAA approval of the screening company's security program.
    (2) If the screening company chooses to adopt the Screening 
Standard Security Program after making amendments to it or to submit 
its own security program that meets the requirements of Sec. 111.103 to 
the FAA, the request will be processed as follows:
    (i) Within 30 days after receiving the screening company's security 
program, the Assistant Administrator will either approve the program or 
will give the screening company written notice to modify its program to 
comply with the applicable requirements of this part.
    (ii) Within 30 days of receiving a notice to modify, the screening 
company may either submit a modified security program to the Assistant 
Administrator for approval or petition the Administrator to reconsider 
the notice to modify. A petition for reconsideration shall be filed 
with the Assistant Administrator. Except in the case of an emergency 
requiring immediate action in the interest of safety, the filing of the 
petition stays the notice pending a decision by the Administrator.
    (iii) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the Assistant 
Administrator will amend or withdraw the notice or will transmit the 
petition together with any pertinent information to the Administrator 
for reconsideration. The Administrator will dispose of the petition 
within 30 days of receipt by directing the Assistant Administrator to 
withdraw or amend the notice to modify or by affirming the notice to 
modify.
    (iv) The granting of a screening company certificate by the 
Assistant Administrator will serve as FAA approval of a screening 
company's security program.
    (b) Amendment requested by a screening company. A screening company 
may submit a request to the Assistant Administrator to amend its 
approved security program as follows:
    (1) The application shall be filed with the Assistant Administrator 
at least 45 days before the date that it proposes for the amendment to 
become effective unless a shorter period is allowed by the Assistant 
Administrator. The screening company shall include with its application 
a statement that all air carriers for which it screens have been 
advised of the proposed amendment and have no objection to the proposed 
amendment. The screening company shall include the name and phone 
number of each individual from each air carrier who was advised.
    (2) Within 30 days after receiving a proposed amendment, the 
Assistant Administrator will either approve or deny the request to 
amend in writing.
    (3) An amendment to a screening company security program may be 
approved if the Assistant Administrator determines that safety and the 
public interest will allow it and if the proposed amendment provides 
the level of security required under this part.
    (4) Within 30 days after receiving a denial, the screening company 
may petition the Administrator to reconsider the denial.
    (5) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the Assistant 
Administrator will either approve the request to amend or will transmit 
the petition together with any pertinent information to the 
Administrator for reconsideration. The Administrator will dispose of 
the petition within 30 days of receipt by either directing the 
Assistant Administrator to approve the amendment or by affirming the 
denial.
    (c) Amendment by the FAA. If safety and the public interest require 
an amendment, the Assistant Administrator may amend an approved 
security program as follows:
    (1) The Assistant Administrator will notify the screening company 
and carrier(s) in writing of the proposed amendment, fixing a period of 
not less than 30 days within which the screening company and carrier(s) 
may submit written information, views, and arguments on the amendment.
    (2) After considering all relevant material, the Assistant 
Administrator will notify the screening company and carrier(s) of any 
amendment adopted or will rescind the notice. If the amendment is 
adopted, it will become effective not less than 30 days after the 
screening company and carrier(s) receive the notice of amendment unless 
the screening company or carrier(s) petition(s) the Administrator to 
reconsider no later than 15 days before the effective date of the 
amendment. The screening company or carrier(s) shall send the petition 
for reconsideration to the Assistant Administrator. A timely petition 
for reconsideration stays the effective date of the amendment.
    (3) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the Assistant 
Administrator will either amend or withdraw the notice or will transmit 
the petition together with any pertinent information to the 
Administrator for reconsideration. The Administrator will dispose of 
the petition within 30 days of receipt by either directing the 
Assistant Administrator to withdraw or amend the notice or by affirming 
the amendment.
    (d) Emergency amendments. Notwithstanding paragraphs (a), (b), and 
(c) of this section, if the Assistant Administrator finds that there is 
an emergency requiring immediate action with respect to safety in air 
transportation or in air commerce that makes procedures in this section 
contrary to the public interest, the Assistant Administrator may issue 
an amendment that will become effective without stay on the date that 
the screening company and carrier(s) receive notice of it. In such a 
case, the Assistant Administrator shall incorporate in the notice a 
brief statement of the reasons and findings for the amendment to be 
adopted. The screening company or carrier(s) may file a petition for 
reconsideration under paragraph (c) of this section; however, this will 
not stay the effectiveness of the emergency amendment.


Sec. 111.109  Screening company certificate.

    (a) Certificate required. No person may perform any screening 
required under this part or part 108, 109 or 129 of this chapter except 
under the authority of and in accordance with the provisions of a 
screening company certificate issued under this part.
    (b) Application. An application for a provisional screening company 
certificate, a screening company certificate, or a screening company 
certificate renewal is made in a form and a manner prescribed by the 
Administrator. The application shall include at a minimum the 
information that will be placed on the certificate under paragraph (f) 
of this section and the information that will be contained in the 
operations specifications under Sec. 111.113(b).
    (c) Issuance and renewal. An applicant for a provisional screening 
company certificate, a screening company certificate, or a screening 
company certificate renewal is entitled to a certificate if the 
following are met:
    (1) The applicant applies for a certificate as provided in this 
section not less than 90 days before--
    (i) The applicant intends to begin screening; or
    (ii) The applicant's current certificate expires.
    (2) For the issuance of a provisional screening company 
certificate, the Administrator finds after investigation that the 
applicant is able to meet the requirements of this part to include 
adopting and carrying out an FAA-approved security program and approved 
operations specifications.
    (3) For the issuance or renewal of a screening company certificate, 
the Administrator determines that the

[[Page 605]]

applicant has met the requirements of this part, its screening company 
security program, and its approved operations specifications. The 
applicant's failure to meet the performance standards set forth in the 
security program is grounds for denial or withdrawal of the screening 
company certificate.
    (4) The issuance of the certificate is not contrary to the 
interests of aviation safety and security.
    (5) The applicant has not held a provisional or a screening company 
certificate that was revoked within the previous year, unless otherwise 
authorized by the Administrator.
    (d) Provisional certificate. (1) A person who does not hold a 
screening company certificate may be issued a provisional screening 
company certificate.
    (2) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, the holder of 
a provisional screening company certificate may not begin screening at 
any screening location unless it notifies the Administrator 7 days 
before beginning such screening.
    (3) The Administrator may prescribe the conditions under which a 
provisionally certificated screening company may operate while it is 
beginning screening at a new location.
    (e) Screening company certificate. (1) The holder of a provisional 
screening company certificate may be issued a screening company 
certificate.
    (2) The holder of a screening company certificate may renew its 
certificate.
    (f) Certificate contents. A screening company certificate contains 
the following information:
    (1) The name of the screening company and any names under which it 
will do business as a certificated screening company.
    (2) Certificate issuance date.
    (3) Certificate expiration date.
    (4) Certificate number.
    (5) Such other information as the Administrator determines 
necessary.
    (g) Duration. (1) Unless sooner suspended, revoked, or surrendered, 
a provisional screening company certificate will expire at the end of 
the 12th month after the month in which it was issued.
    (2) Unless sooner suspended, revoked, surrendered, or expired under 
paragraph (g)(3) of this section, a screening company certificate will 
expire at the end of the 60th month after the month in which it was 
issued or renewed.
    (3) If a screening company has not performed screening on behalf of 
a carrier during the previous 12 calendar months, its certificate will 
be deemed to have expired, and the company will no longer be authorized 
to conduct screening under this part.
    (h) Return of certificate. The holder of a screening company 
certificate that is expired, suspended, or revoked shall return it to 
the Administrator within 7 days.
    (i) Amendment of certificate. (1) A screening company shall apply 
for an amendment to its screening company certificate in a form and 
manner prescribed by the Administrator if it intends to change the name 
of its screening company, and/or any names under which it will do 
business as a certificated screening company.
    (2) The holder of a screening company certificate requiring 
amendment shall return the certificate to the Administrator within 7 
days for appropriate amendment.
    (j) Inspection. A screening company certificate shall be made 
available for inspection upon request by the Administrator.
    (k) Compliance dates. A carrier may use a company not certificated 
under this part to perform screening required under part 108, part 109, 
or part 129 of this chapter if the company performed required screening 
for a carrier at any time on or after [date 1 year before effective 
date of final rule] through [effective date of final rule] and if all 
of the following apply:
    (1) The company submits an application as required by paragraph (b) 
of this section for a provisional certificate on or before [date 60 
days after effective date of the final rule].
    (2) The FAA has not issued under this part a denial of a screening 
company certificate to the company.


Sec. 111.111  Operations specifications: Adoption and implementation.

    No screening company may perform screening under this part unless 
the company adopts and complies with operations specifications that 
meet the requirements of this part.


Sec. 111.113  Operations specifications: Form, content, and 
availability.

    (a) Operations specifications required by this part shall--
    (1) Be in writing and signed by the screening company;
    (2) Include the items listed in paragraph (b) of this section; and
    (3) Be approved by the Administrator.
    (b) Operations specifications required by this part shall include--
    (1) Locations at which the Administrator has authorized a company 
to conduct screening required under this part, part 108, part 109, or 
part 129 of this chapter;
    (2) The types of screening that the Administrator has authorized 
the company to perform which include persons, accessible property, 
checked baggage, and cargo;
    (3) The equipment and methods of screening that the Administrator 
has authorized the company to operate and carry out;
    (4) The title and name of the person required by Sec. 111.209(b);
    (5) Procedures to notify the Administrator and any carrier for 
which it is performing screening in the event that the procedures, 
facilities, or equipment that it is using are not adequate to perform 
screening under this part;
    (6) The curriculum used to train screeners;
    (7) A statement signed by the person required by Sec. 111.209(b) on 
behalf of the company confirming that the information contained in the 
operations specifications is true and correct; and
    (8) Any other subjects that the Administrator deems necessary.
    (c) Each screening company having approved operations 
specifications shall--
    (1) Maintain at least one complete copy of the operations 
specifications at its principal business office;
    (2) Maintain a complete copy or the pertinent portions of its 
approved operations specifications at each airport where it conducts 
security training;
    (3) Ensure that its operations specifications are amended so as to 
maintain current descriptions of the screening company and its 
services, procedures, and facilities;
    (4) Make its operation specifications available to the 
Administrator for inspection upon request;
    (5) Provide current operations specifications to each carrier for 
which it screens;
    (6) With the exception of information described in paragraph (b)(1) 
of this section, restrict the availability of information contained in 
the operations specifications to those persons with an operational need 
to know as provided in Sec. 191.5(b) of this chapter; and
    (7) Refer requests for such information by other persons to the 
Administrator.


Sec. 111.115  Operations specifications: Approval, amendments, and 
limitations.

    (a) Each applicant for a provisional screening company certificate 
shall submit its proposed operations specifications to the 
Administrator when applying for a provisional screening company 
certificate. After receiving the proposed operations specifications, 
the Administrator will approve the operations specifications or will 
notify the applicant to modify its operations specifications to comply

[[Page 606]]

with the applicable requirements of this part. The applicant may 
petition the Administrator to reconsider the notice to modify. A 
petition shall be submitted no later than 15 days from the date that a 
notice to modify is issued.
    (b) The Administrator may amend approved operations specifications 
if it is determined that safety and the public interest require the 
amendment as follows:
    (1) The Administrator notifies the screening company in writing of 
the proposed amendment, fixing a period of not less than 30 days within 
which it may submit written information, views, and arguments on the 
amendment.
    (2) After considering all relevant material, the Administrator 
notifies the screening company of any amendment adopted or rescinds the 
notice. The amendment will become effective not less than 30 days after 
the screening company certificate holder receives the notice unless the 
certificate holder petitions the Administrator to reconsider the 
amendment, in which case the effective date will be stayed by the 
Administrator.
    (3) If the Administrator finds that there is an emergency requiring 
immediate action with respect to safety in air transportation or in air 
commerce that makes the procedures in this paragraph impracticable or 
contrary to safety or the public interest, the Administrator may issue 
an amendment that will become effective without stay on the date that a 
screening company receives notice of it. In such a case, the 
Administrator will incorporate the findings and a brief statement of 
the reasons for it in the notice of the amendment to be adopted.
    (c) A screening company may submit a request to the Assistant 
Administrator to amend its operations specifications. The application 
shall be filed with the Assistant Administrator at least 30 days before 
the date that it proposes for the amendment to become effective unless 
a shorter period is allowed by the Assistant Administrator. The 
Assistant Administrator will approve or deny a request within 15 days 
after receiving the proposed amendment. Within 30 days after receiving 
from the Assistant Administrator a notice of refusal to approve an 
application for amendment, the applicant may petition the Administrator 
to reconsider the refusal to amend.
    (d) The FAA may limit the specific locations at which a screening 
company may operate if it determines that the company's operations are 
contrary to the interests of aviation safety and security.


Sec. 111.117  Oversight by air carriers, foreign air carriers, or 
indirect air carriers.

    (a) Each screening company shall allow any air carrier, foreign air 
carrier, or indirect air carrier for which it is performing screening 
under part 108, part 109, or part 129 of this chapter to do the 
following:
    (1) Inspect the screening company's facilities, equipment, and 
records to determine the screening company's compliance with this part, 
the screening company's security program, and the screening company's 
operations specifications.
    (2) Test the performance of the screening company using procedures 
specified in the applicable security program(s).
    (b) Each screening company holding a certificate under this part 
shall provide a copy of each letter of investigation and final 
enforcement action to each carrier using the screening location where 
the alleged violation occurred. The copy shall be provided to the 
applicable carrier's corporate security officer within 3 business days 
of receipt of the letter of investigation or final enforcement action.


Sec. 111.119  Business office.

    (a) Each screening company shall maintain a principal business 
office with a mailing address in the name shown on its certificate.
    (b) Each screening company shall notify the Administrator before 
changing the location of its business. The notice shall be submitted in 
writing at least 30 days before the change.

Subpart C--Operations


Sec. 111.201  Screening of persons and property and acceptance of 
cargo.

    (a) Each screening company shall use the procedures included in its 
approved security program to:
    (1) Inspect each person entering a sterile area;
    (2) Inspect each person's accessible property entering a sterile 
area; and
    (3) Prevent or deter the introduction into a sterile area of any 
explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon on or about each 
person or the person's accessible property.
    (b) Each screening company shall deny entry into a sterile area at 
a checkpoint to:
    (1) Any person who does not consent to a search of his or her 
person in accordance with the screening system prescribed in paragraph 
(a) of this section; and
    (2) Any property of any person who does not consent to a search or 
inspection of that property in accordance with the screening system 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this section.
    (c) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section with respect to 
firearms and weapons do not apply to the following:
    (1) Law enforcement personnel required to carry firearms or other 
weapons while in the performance of their duties at airports.
    (2) Persons authorized to carry firearms in accordance with 
Sec. 108.213, 108.215, 108.217, or 129.27 of this chapter.
    (3) Persons authorized to carry firearms in sterile areas under 
FAA-approved or FAA-accepted security programs.
    (d) Each screening company shall staff the screening locations that 
it operates with supervisory and nonsupervisory personnel in accordance 
with the standards specified in its security program.
    (e) Each screening company shall use the procedures included in its 
approved security program to:
    (1) Inspect checked baggage, or cargo presented for inspection by a 
carrier; and
    (2) Prevent or deter the carriage of explosives or incendiaries in 
checked baggage or cargo onboard passenger aircraft.


Sec. 111.203  Use of screening equipment.

    (a) Each screening company shall operate all screening equipment in 
accordance with its approved security program.
    (b) The Administrator authorizes a certificated screening company 
to use X-ray systems for inspecting property under an approved security 
program if the screening company shows that:
    (1) A program for initial and recurrent training of operators of 
the system that includes training in radiation safety, the efficient 
use of X-ray systems, and the identification of unauthorized weapons, 
explosives, incendiaries, and other dangerous articles is established.
    (2) The system meets the imaging requirements set forth in its 
approved security program.
    (c) If requested by individuals, their photographic equipment and 
film packages shall be inspected without exposure to X-ray or 
explosives detection systems.
    (d) Each screening company shall comply with the X-ray duty time 
limitations specified in its approved security program.


Sec. 111.205  Employment standards for screening personnel.

    (a) No screening company shall use any person to perform any 
screening

[[Page 607]]

function in the United States unless that person has:
    (1) A high school diploma, a General Equivalency Diploma, or a 
combination of education and experience that the screening company has 
determined to have equipped the person to perform the duties of the 
screening position.
    (2) Basic aptitudes and physical abilities including color 
perception, visual and aural acuity, physical coordination, and motor 
skills to the following standards:
    (i) Screeners shall be able to identify the components that may 
constitute an explosive or an incendiary;
    (ii) Screeners shall be able to identify objects that appear to 
match those items described in all current security directives and 
emergency amendments;
    (iii) Screeners operating X-ray and explosives detection system 
equipment shall be able to distinguish on the equipment monitors the 
appropriate imaging standards specified in the screening company's 
approved security program;
    (iv) Screeners operating any screening equipment shall be able to 
distinguish each color displayed on every type of screening equipment 
and explain what each color signifies;
    (v) Screeners shall be able to hear and respond to the spoken voice 
and to audible alarms generated by screening equipment in an active 
checkpoint or other screening environment;
    (vi) Screeners performing manual searches or other related 
operations shall be able to efficiently and thoroughly manipulate and 
handle such baggage, containers, cargo, and other objects subject to 
security processing;
    (vii) Screeners performing manual searches of cargo shall be able 
to use tools that allow for opening and closing boxes, crates, or other 
common cargo packaging;
    (viii) Screeners performing screening of cargo shall be able to 
stop the transfer of suspect cargo to passenger air carriers; and
    (ix) Screeners performing pat-down or hand-held metal detector 
searches of persons shall have sufficient dexterity and capability to 
thoroughly conduct those procedures over a person's entire body.
    (3) The ability to read, speak, write, and understand English well 
enough to:
    (i) Carry out written and oral instructions regarding the proper 
performance of screening duties;
    (ii) Read English language identification media, credentials, 
airline tickets, documents, air waybills, invoices, and labels on items 
normally encountered in the screening process;
    (iii) Provide direction to and understand and answer questions from 
English-speaking persons undergoing screening or submitting cargo for 
screening; and
    (iv) Write incident reports and statements and log entries into 
security records in the English language.
    (4) Satisfactorily completed all initial, recurrent, and 
appropriate specialized training required by the screening company's 
security program. Initial and recurrent training for all screeners 
shall include, but is not limited to, the following:
    (i) The conduct of screening of persons in a courteous and 
efficient manner.
    (ii) Compliance with the applicable civil rights laws of the United 
States.
    (5) For persons with supervisory screening duties, initial and 
recurrent training shall include leadership and management subjects as 
specified in the screening company's security program.
    (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a)(4) of this 
section, the screening company may use a person during the on-the-job 
portion of training to perform security functions provided that the 
person is closely supervised and does not make independent judgments as 
to whether persons or property may enter sterile areas or aircraft or 
whether cargo may be loaded aboard aircraft without further inspection.
    (c) No screening company shall use a person to perform a screening 
function after that person has failed an operational test related to 
that function until that person has successfully completed the remedial 
training specified in the screening company's security program.
    (d) Each air carrier with a ground security coordinator and each 
foreign air carrier and indirect air carrier with a screening 
supervisor shall ensure that that person conducts and documents an 
annual evaluation of each person assigned screening duties. The ground 
security coordinator or supervisor may continue that person's 
employment in a screening capacity only upon determining that the 
person:
    (1) Has not suffered a significant diminution of any physical 
ability required to perform a screening function since the last 
evaluation of those abilities;
    (2) Has a satisfactory record of performance and attention to duty 
based on the standards and requirements in the approved screening 
company's security program; and
    (3) Demonstrates the current knowledge and skills necessary to 
perform screening functions courteously, vigilantly, and effectively.


Sec. 111.207  Disclosure of sensitive security information.

    (a) Each screening company shall ensure that for each screener 
trainee who will be required to have an employment history 
verification, the steps in Sec. 107.207(c)(1), (2), (3), and (4), or 
Sec. 108.221(c)(1), (2), (3), and (4) of this chapter have been 
completed before the screener trainee receives sensitive security 
information as defined in part 191 of this chapter.
    (b) If the employee application, employment verification, or 
criminal history record check has disclosed that the trainee has a 
history of a disqualifying crime as provided in Sec. 107.207(b)(2) or 
Sec. 108.221(b)(2) of this chapter, no sensitive security information 
may be provided to that trainee.
    (c) If a criminal history record check has been requested under 
Sec. 108.221(c)(5) of this chapter, the trainee may receive sensitive 
security information unless and until the results of the record check 
disclose a disqualifying crime.


Sec. 111.209  Screening company management.

    (a) Each screening company shall have sufficient qualified 
management and technical personnel to ensure the highest degree of 
safety in its screening.
    (b) Each screening company shall designate a screening performance 
coordinator (SPC) as the primary point of contact for security-related 
activities and communications with the FAA and carrier.
    (1) To serve as a screening performance coordinator under this 
part, a person shall have the following:
    (i) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, at least 1 
year of supervisory or managerial experience within the last 3 years in 
a position that exercised control over any aviation security screening 
required under this part or part 108, 109, or 129 of this chapter.
    (ii) Successfully completed the initial security screener training 
course, including the end of course FAA exam.
    (2) Each screening company shall notify the Administrator within 10 
days of any screening performance coordinator change or any vacancy.
    (c) Each screening performance coordinator shall to the extent of 
his or her responsibilities have a working knowledge of the following 
with respect to the screening company's operations:
    (1) This part.
    (2) Part 108, 109, or 129 and part 191 of this chapter.

[[Page 608]]

    (3) The screening company's security program.
    (4) The screening company's operations specifications.
    (5) All relevant statutes.
    (6) All relevant technical information and manuals regarding 
screening equipment, security directives, advisory circulars, and 
information circulars on aviation security.
    (d) Before [date 3 years after effective date of final rule], the 
Administrator may authorize an individual who does not meet the 
standard required in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section to serve as 
the screening performance coordinator for screening under part 109 of 
this chapter.


Sec. 111.211  Screening company instructor qualifications.

    (a) No screening company shall use any person as a classroom 
instructor unless that person meets the requirements of this part.
    (b) To be eligible for designation as a security screening 
instructor for a course of training, a person shall have a minimum of 
40 hours of actual experience as a security screener making independent 
judgments, unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator.
    (c) An instructor shall pass the FAA screener knowledge-based and 
performance tests for each type of screening to be taught and for the 
procedures and equipment for which the instructor will provide 
training, unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator.
    (d) An instructor may not be used in an approved course of training 
until he or she has been briefed regarding the objectives and standards 
of the course.
    (e) This section does not prevent a screening company's using guest 
speakers or persons in training as instructors if they are under the 
direct supervision of a qualified security screening instructor who is 
readily available for consultation.


Sec. 111.213  Training and knowledge of persons with screening-related 
duties.

    (a) No screening company may use any screener, screener-in-charge, 
and checkpoint security supervisor unless that person has received 
initial and recurrent training as specified in the screening company's 
approved security program, including the responsibilities in 
Sec. 111.105.
    (b) Each screening company shall submit its training programs for 
screeners, screeners-in-charge, and checkpoint security supervisors for 
approval by the Administrator.
    (c) Each screening company shall ensure that individuals performing 
as screeners, screeners-in-charge, and checkpoint security supervisors 
for the screening company have knowledge of the provisions of this 
part, the screening company's security program, and applicable security 
directive, emergency amendment, and information circular information to 
the extent that such individuals need to know in order to perform their 
duties.


Sec. 111.215  Training tests: Requirements.

    (a) Each screening company shall ensure that each screener trainee 
passes an FAA screener readiness test for each type of screening to be 
performed and for the procedures and equipment to be used prior to 
beginning on-the-job training.
    (b) Each screening company shall ensure that each screener 
completes 40 hours of on-the-job training and passes an FAA on-the-job 
training test before exercising independent judgment as a screener.
    (c) Each screening company shall ensure that each screener passes 
an FAA review test at the conclusion of his or her recurrent training.
    (d) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, each 
screening company shall use computer-based testing to administer FAA 
tests for screener readiness, on-the-job training, and recurrent 
training.
    (e) Each screening company shall ensure that each test that it 
administers under paragraphs (a) and (c) of this section is monitored 
by an employee of the carrier for which it screens.


Sec. 111.217  Training tests: Cheating or other unauthorized conduct.

    Except as authorized by the Administrator, no person may:
    (a) Copy or intentionally remove a knowledge-based or performance 
test under this part;
    (b) Give to another or receive from another any part or copy of 
that test;
    (c) Give help on that test to or receive help on that test from any 
person during the period that the test is being given;
    (d) Take any part of that test on behalf of another person;
    (e) Use any material or aid during the period that the test is 
being given; or
    (f) Cause, assist, or participate intentionally in any act 
prohibited by this paragraph.


Sec. 111.219  Screener letter of completion of training.

    (a) Each screening company shall issue letters of completion of 
training to screeners, screeners-in-charge, and checkpoint security 
supervisors upon each successful completion of their approved initial, 
recurrent, and specialized courses of training.
    (b) Each letter shall contain at least the following information:
    (1) The name of the company and the number of the screening company 
certificate.
    (2) The name of the screener to whom it is issued.
    (3) The course of training for which it is issued.
    (4) The type(s) of screening the screener has been trained to 
perform, which may include persons, accessible property, checked 
baggage, and cargo.
    (5) The equipment and methods of screening that the screener has 
been trained to operate and carry out.
    (6) The date of completion.
    (7) A statement that the trainee has satisfactorily completed each 
required stage of the approved course of training, including the tests 
for those stages.
    (8) The signature of a supervisory-level individual (ground 
security coordinator, checkpoint security supervisor, or screener-in-
charge).


Sec. 111.221  Screener and supervisor training records.

    (a) Whenever a screener, screener-in-charge, or checkpoint security 
supervisor completes or terminates his or her training or transfers to 
another company, the screening company shall annotate the employee's 
record to that effect.
    (b) The screening company shall upon request of a screener, 
screener-in-charge, or checkpoint security supervisor make a copy of 
the employee's training record available to the employee within 4 days 
of his or her request.
    (c) A screener, screener-in-charge, or checkpoint security 
supervisor who has been issued a letter of completion of training may 
request in writing that the screening company provide to another 
certificated screening company or a screening company that has applied 
for a screening company certificate a complete copy of the employee's 
training and performance records. Upon receiving such a request, the 
screening company shall provide the records to the second company 
within 7 days. Any company receiving records from another company may 
use the screener, screener-in-charge, or checkpoint security supervisor 
without providing retraining if the company provides transition 
training as specified in its security program, unless an evaluation of 
the employee's training shows the results to be unsatisfactory or the 
employee has not performed screening functions for 1 year or more.
    (d) A screening company may request from another screening company 
records for a screener, screener-in-charge, or checkpoint security

[[Page 609]]

supervisor as described in paragraph (c) of this section when a signed 
consent form has been provided by the employee whose records are to be 
requested.
    (e) Upon the termination of screening services at a site, a 
screening company shall surrender all original records required under 
this part to the carrier for which it was conducting screening under 
this part.
    (f) Records of training, testing, and certification shall be made 
available promptly to FAA special agents upon request and shall be 
maintained for a period of at least 180 days following the termination 
of duty for a screener, screener-in-charge, or checkpoint security 
supervisor. Test records will include all tests to which the employee 
was subjected, not just those satisfactorily completed.


Sec. 111.223  Automated performance standards.

    (a) Each screening company shall use a threat image projection 
system for each X-ray and explosives detection system that it operates 
as specified in its security program to measure the performance of 
individual screeners, screening locations, and screening companies.
    (b) Each screening company shall meet the performance standards set 
forth in its security program.

PART 129--OPERATIONS: FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS AND FOREIGN OPERATORS OF 
U.S.-REGISTERED AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN COMMON CARRIAGE

    14. The authority citation for part 129 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40104-40105, 40113, 40119, 44701-
44702, 44712, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901-44904, 44906, 44935 note.

    15. Amend Sec. 129.25 by revising paragraph (a); by removing 
``and'' at the end of paragraph (c)(3); by removing the period at the 
end of paragraph (c)(4) and adding a semicolon in its place; by adding 
new paragraphs (c)(5) and (c)(6); by revising paragraphs (e)(2), 
(e)(3), (e)(4), and (j); and by adding new paragraphs (k), (l), (m), 
(n), (o), and (p) to read as follows:


Sec. 129.25  Airplane security.

    (a) Terms defined in parts 107, 108, 109, and 111 of this chapter 
apply to this part. For purposes of this part, parts 107, 108, 109, and 
111 of this chapter, and security programs under these parts, the 
following definitions also apply:
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (5) Include within it a description of how the foreign air carrier 
will provide oversight to each screening company performing screening 
on its behalf; and
    (6) Include within it a description of how the foreign air carrier 
will evaluate and test the performance of screening.
* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (2) A foreign air carrier may submit a request to the Assistant 
Administrator to amend its accepted security program as follows:
    (i) The application shall be filed with the Assistant Administrator 
at least 45 days before the date it proposes for the amendment to 
become effective, unless a shorter period is allowed by the Assistant 
Administrator.
    (ii) Within 30 days after receiving a proposed amendment, the 
Assistant Administrator, in writing, either approves or denies the 
request to amend.
    (iii) An amendment to a foreign air carrier security program may be 
approved if the Assistant Administrator determines that safety and the 
public interest will allow it, and the proposed amendment provides the 
level of security required under this part.
    (iv) Within 45 days after receiving a denial, the foreign air 
carrier may petition the Administrator to reconsider the denial.
    (v) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the Assistant 
Administrator either approves the request to amend or transmits the 
petition, together with any pertinent information, to the Administrator 
for reconsideration. The Administrator disposes of the petition within 
30 days of receipt by either directing the Assistant Administrator to 
approve the amendment, or affirms the denial.
    (3) If the safety and the public interest require an amendment, the 
Assistant Administrator may amend an accepted security program as 
follows:
    (i) The Assistant Administrator notifies the foreign air carrier, 
in writing, of the proposed amendment, fixing a period of not less than 
45 days within which the foreign air carrier may submit written 
information, views, and arguments on the amendment.
    (ii) After considering all relevant material, the Administrator 
notifies the foreign air carrier of any amendment adopted or rescinds 
the notice. The foreign air carrier may petition the Administrator to 
reconsider the amendment, in which case the effective date of the 
amendment is stayed until the Administrator reconsiders the matter.
    (iii) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the Assistant 
Administrator either amends or withdraws the notice or transmits the 
petition, together with any pertinent information, to the Administrator 
for reconsideration. The Administrator disposes of the petition within 
30 days of receipt by either directing the Administrator to withdraw or 
amend the amendment, or by affirming the amendment.
    (4) If the Assistant Administrator finds that there is an emergency 
requiring immediate action with respect to safety in air transportation 
or in air commerce that makes procedures in this section contrary to 
the public interest, the Assistant Administrator may issue an 
amendment, effective without stay, on the date the foreign air carrier 
receives notice of it. In such a case, the Assistant Administrator 
shall incorporate in the notice a brief statement of the reasons and 
findings for the amendment to be adopted. The foreign air carrier may 
file a petition for reconsideration under paragraph (e)(2) of this 
section; however, this does not stay the effectiveness of the emergency 
amendment.
* * * * *
    (j) The following apply to the screening of persons and property, 
and the acceptance of cargo:
    (1) Each foreign air carrier required to conduct screening under a 
security program shall use the procedures included, and the facilities 
and equipment described, in its screening company security program(s) 
to inspect each person entering a sterile area, each person's 
accessible property, and checked baggage and cargo as specified.
    (2) Each foreign air carrier required to conduct screening under a 
security program shall detect and prevent the carriage aboard aircraft 
and introduction into a sterile area of any unauthorized explosive, 
incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon on or about each person or 
the person's accessible property.
    (3) Each foreign air carrier required to conduct screening under a 
security program shall use the procedures included and the facilities 
and equipment described in its screening company security program(s) to 
prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or 
deadly or dangerous weapon aboard a passenger aircraft.
    (k) Except as provided in Sec. 111.109(k) of this chapter each 
foreign air carrier required to conduct screening of persons and 
property for locations within the United States under a

[[Page 610]]

security program shall either hold a screening company certificate 
issued under part 111 of this chapter or shall use another screening 
company certificated under part 111 of this chapter to inspect persons 
or property for the presence of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, 
or deadly or dangerous weapon. FAA-certified canine teams are not 
required to be operated by certificated screening companies.
    (l) Each foreign air carrier shall ensure that each screening 
company performing screening on its behalf conducts such screening in 
accordance with part 111 of this chapter, the screening company's 
security program, and the screening company's operations 
specifications.
    (m) Each foreign air carrier required to conduct screening under 
this part shall provide oversight to each screening company performing 
screening on its behalf as specified in the foreign air carrier's 
security program.
    (n) Each foreign air carrier required to conduct screening under a 
security program shall:
    (1) Maintain at least one complete copy of each of its screening 
companies' security programs at its principal business office.
    (2) Have available complete copies or the pertinent portions of its 
screening companies' security programs or appropriate implementing 
instructions at each location where the screening companies conduct 
screening for the foreign air carrier.
    (3) Make copies of its screening companies' security programs 
available for inspection by an FAA special agent upon request.
    (4) Restrict the distribution, disclosure, and availability of 
information contained in its screening companies' security programs to 
persons with a need to know as described in part 191 of this chapter.
    (5) Refer requests for such information by other persons to the 
Administrator.
    (o) Each foreign air carrier required by the Administrator to 
implement additional security measures to maintain system performance 
shall notify the public by posting signs at affected locations as 
specified in its security program.
    (p) Each foreign air carrier shall monitor each screener training 
test required under Sec. 111.215(a) and (c) of this chapter for all 
screening companies that conduct screening on its behalf in accordance 
with its security program. Each test monitor shall meet the following 
qualifications:
    (1) Be a foreign air carrier employee who is not a contractor, 
instructor, screener, screener-in-charge, checkpoint security 
supervisor, or other screening company supervisor, unless otherwise 
authorized by the Administrator.
    (2) Be familiar with the testing and grading procedures contained 
in the screening company's security program.
    (3) Meet other qualifications set forth in the screening company's 
security program.
    16. Amend Sec. 129.26 by removing paragraphs (a)(3) and (a)(4); 
redesignating paragraph (a)(5) as new paragraph (a)(3) and revising it; 
and adding a new paragraph (a)(4) to read as follows:


Sec. 129.26  Use of X-ray system.

    (a) * * *
    (3) The system meets the imaging requirements set forth in the 
screening standard security program using the step wedge specified in 
American Society for Testing and Materials Standard F792-82; and
    (4) It ensures that each X-ray system that it uses has a 
functioning threat image projection system installed on it that meets 
the standards set forth in its security program unless otherwise 
authorized by the Administrator.
    (i) Automated X-ray threat image projection data will be collected 
as specified in the model security program and in the responsible 
screening company's security program.
    (ii) The foreign air carrier shall make X-ray threat image 
projection data available to the FAA upon request and shall allow the 
FAA to download threat image projection data upon request.
* * * * *
    17. Add a new Sec. 129.28 to read as follows:


Sec. 129.28  Use of explosives detection systems.

    (a) When the Administrator shall require by an amendment under 
Sec. 129.25(e), each foreign air carrier required to conduct screening 
under a security program shall use an explosives detection system that 
has been approved by the Administrator to screen checked baggage on 
each international flight in accordance with its security program and 
its screening company security programs.
    (b) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, each foreign 
air carrier shall ensure that each explosives detection system that it 
uses has a functioning threat image projection system that meets the 
standards set forth in its security program.
    (1) Automated explosives detection system threat image projection 
data will be collected as specified in the foreign air carrier's 
security program and in the responsible screening company's security 
program.
    (2) The foreign air carrier shall make explosives detection system 
threat image projection data available to the FAA upon request and 
shall allow the FAA to download threat image projection data upon 
request.

PART 191--PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

    18. The authority citation for part 191 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 5103, 40113, 40119, 44701-44702, 
44705-44706, 44901-44907, 44913-44914, 44932, 44935-44936, 46105.

    19. Revise Sec. 191.1(c) to read as follows:


Sec. 191.1  Applicability and definitions.

* * * * *
    (c) The authority of the Administrator under this part also is 
exercised by the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security 
and the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and 
any other individual formally designated to act in their capacity. For 
matters involving the release or withholding of information and records 
containing information described in Sec. 191.7(a) through (g), related 
documents described in Sec. 191.7(l), and Sec. 191.7(m), the authority 
may be further delegated. For matters involving the release or 
withholding of information and records containing information described 
in Sec. 191.7(h) through (k) and related documents described in 
Sec. 191.7(l), the authority may not be further delegated.
    20. Revise Sec. 191.5 to read as follows:


Sec. 191.5  Records and information protected by others.

    (a) Each airport operator, air carrier, indirect air carrier, 
foreign air carrier, and certificated screening company, and each 
person receiving information under Sec. 191.3(b), and each individual 
employed by, contracted to, or acting for an airport operator, air 
carrier, indirect air carrier, foreign air carrier, certificated 
screening company, or person receiving information under Sec. 191.3(b) 
shall restrict disclosure of and access to sensitive security 
information described in Sec. 191.7(a) through (g), (j), (k), (m), and, 
as applicable, Sec. 191.7(l) to persons with a need to know and shall 
refer requests by other persons for such information to the 
Administrator.
    (b) A person has a need to know sensitive security information when 
the information is necessary to carry out FAA-approved or directed 
aviation security duties; when the person is in

[[Page 611]]

training for such a position; when the information is necessary to 
supervise or otherwise manage the individuals carrying out such duties; 
to advise the airport operator, air carrier, indirect air carrier, 
foreign air carrier, or certificated screening company regarding the 
specific requirements of any FAA security-related requirements; or to 
represent the airport operator, air carrier, indirect air carrier, 
foreign air carrier, certificated screening company, or person 
receiving information under Sec. 191.3(d) in connection with any 
judicial or administrative proceeding regarding those requirements. For 
some specific information, the Administrator may make a finding that 
only specific persons or classes of persons have a need to know.
    (c) When sensitive security information is released to unauthorized 
persons, any air carrier, airport operator, indirect air carrier, 
foreign air carrier, certificated screening company, or individual with 
knowledge of the release shall inform the Administrator.
    (d) Violation of this section is grounds for a civil penalty and 
other enforcement or corrective action by the FAA.
    (e) Wherever this part refers to an air carrier, airport operator, 
indirect air carrier, foreign air carrier, or certificated screening 
company, those terms also include applicants for such authority.
    (f) An individual who is in training for a position is considered 
to be employed by, contracted to, or acting for an airport operator, 
air carrier, indirect air carrier, foreign air carrier, certificated 
screening company, or person receiving information under Sec. 191.3(b).
    21. Amend Sec. 191.7 by revising the introductory text; by revising 
paragraphs (a) and (h); and by adding new paragraphs (m) and (n) to 
read as follows:


Sec. 191.7  Sensitive security information.

    Except as otherwise provided in writing by the Administrator, the 
following information and records containing such information 
constitute sensitive security information:
    (a) Any approved or standard security program for an air carrier, 
foreign air carrier, indirect air carrier, airport operator, or 
certificated screening company and any security program that relates to 
U.S. mail to be transported by air (including that of the United States 
Postal Service and of the Department of Defense); and any comments, 
instructions, or implementing guidance pertaining thereto.
* * * * *
    (h) Any information that the Administrator has determined may 
reveal a systemic vulnerability of the aviation system or a 
vulnerability of aviation facilities to attack. This includes but is 
not limited to details of inspections, investigations, and alleged 
violations and findings of violations of part 107, 108, 109, or 111 of 
this chapter or Sec. 129.25, 129.26, or 129.27 of this chapter and any 
information that could lead to the disclosure of such details, as 
follows:
    (1) For an event that occurred less than 12 months before the date 
of the release of the information, the following are not released: the 
name of an airport where a violation occurred, the regional identifier 
in the case number, a description of the violation, the regulation 
allegedly violated, and the identity of the air carrier in connection 
with specific locations or specific security procedures. The FAA may 
release summaries of an air carrier's or certificated screening 
company's total security violations in a specified time range without 
identifying specific violations. Summaries may include total 
enforcement actions, total proposed civil penalty amounts, total 
assessed civil penalty amounts, numbers of cases opened, numbers of 
cases referred by Civil Aviation Security to FAA counsel for legal 
enforcement action, and numbers of cases closed.
    (2) For an event that occurred 12 months or more before the date of 
the release of the information, the following are not released: the 
specific gate or other location on an airport where the event occurred. 
The FAA may release the following: the number of the enforcement 
investigative report; the date of the alleged violation; the name of 
the air carrier, airport, and/or certificated screening company; the 
regulation allegedly violated; the proposed enforcement action; the 
final enforcement action; and the status (open, pending, or closed).
    (3) The identity of the FAA special agent who conducted the 
investigation or inspection.
    (4) Security information or data developed during FAA evaluations 
of the air carriers, airports, indirect air carriers, and certificated 
screening companies and the implementation of the security programs, 
including air carrier, airport, and indirect air carrier inspections 
and screening location tests or methods for evaluating such tests.
* * * * *
    (m) Any approved operations specifications for a screening company 
except the following items, which are not sensitive security 
information: the name of the company, locations at which the 
Administrator has authorized the company to conduct business, the type 
of screening that the Administrator has authorized the company to 
perform, and the title and name of the person required by 
Sec. 111.209(b) of this chapter.
    (n) Any screener test used under part 111 of this chapter.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on December 15, 1999.
Quinten Johnson,
Acting Director, Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and Planning.
[FR Doc. 00-16 Filed 1-4-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-U