[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 244 (Tuesday, December 21, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 71511-71514]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-33134]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-458]


Entergy Operations, Inc.; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of 
Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-47 issued to Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee), for operation 
of the River Bend Station, Unit 1 (RBS) located in West Feliciana 
Parish, Louisiana.
    The proposed amendment would add an exception to the RBS Technical 
Requirements Manual (TRM), Section TR 3.9.14, current prohibition for 
travel of loads in excess of 1200 pounds over fuel assemblies in the 
spent fuel storage. The exception would allow the movement of spent 
fuel pool watertight gates, which separate the spent fuel pool from the 
cask and lower transfer pools. Approval of this exception would allow 
the licensee to perform maintenance and repairs to the gates and 
watertight seals, provided the licensee complies with the defense-in-
depth recommendations, or take alternative measures to compensate for 
deficiencies in the defense-in-depth approach, addressed in NUREG-0612, 
``Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants.'' Corresponding 
sections of the RBS Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) would be 
revised to be consistent with the exception and to state that the 
provisions of NUREG-0612 will be met.
    The load of the gate (approximately 1600 pounds) and rigging 
(approximately 400 pounds) exceeds the load analyzed over spent fuel. 
In accordance with the guidance in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
Bulletin 96-02, ``Movement of Heavy Loads over Spent Fuel, over Fuel in 
the Reactor Core, or over Safety-Related Equipment,'' issued April 11, 
1996, and Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.59 (10 
CFR 50.59), these changes have been determined to involve an unreviewed 
safety question.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:

    1. Involved a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    The River Bend Station (RBS) fuel building fuel storage 
facilities consist of three separate

[[Page 71512]]

but interconnected stainless steel-lined concrete pools. The spent 
fuel storage pool is the largest of these pools. Adjacent to the 
fuel storage pool are the cask pool and the lower inclined fuel 
transfer (IFTS) pool. Each of these two pools is separated from the 
fuel storage pool by a full-height wall broken by a watertight gate. 
The watertight gates are normally open, but are closed to seal their 
respective pools during cask handling and equipment maintenance 
operations. It is necessary to lift the gate between the spent fuel 
pool and the IFTS pool for seal replacement. The total weight of the 
gate including the rigging equipment is 2000 pounds. This lift is 
considered as a heavy load lift since it is higher than the current 
RBS analyzed light load limit of 1200 pounds for movement of loads 
over the spent fuel pool. RBS TRM 3.9.14 prohibits any load in 
excess of 1200 pounds from travel over fuel assemblies in the 
storage pool.
    Each of the gates is designed with a pneumatic seal that, when 
pressurized, seals the respective pool from the spent fuel pool, 
forming a watertight barrier. No provisions for moving the gates 
over spent fuel were included in the licensing basis for RBS heavy 
loads. However, the qualified life for the gate seals necessitates 
that they be replaced several times over the life of the plant. 
Therefore, approval of an exception to the current prohibition for 
loads over the spent fuel pool is required to allow for replacement 
of the gate seals.
    To perform the movement of the gate from its installed position 
to a position where it can be accessed for seal replacement, an 
engineering plan that meets the intent of NUREG-0612, ``Control of 
Heavy Loads [at Nuclear Power Plants],'' has been developed. There 
are numerous design features, which comply with NUREG-0612 
guidelines, that will preclude the gate from dropping onto the spent 
fuel assemblies during the movement activity. These features include 
the design of the lifting devices, design of the cask and fuel 
bridge cranes, crane operator training, and the use of written 
procedures. The guidance in NUREG-0612 will be met in all respects, 
except that in lieu of a single[-]failure-proof crane, the scheme 
will employ redundant and diverse means to meet the intent of 
single-failure[-]proof movements.
    It is proposed for the subject spent fuel pool gate lift to use 
one of two rigging schemes that comply with the intent of NUREG-0612 
guidance. The first one will be accomplished through the use of Fuel 
Building bridge crane and the cask crane at the same time to provide 
the redundancy required to make the lift a single-failure-proof lift 
and satisfy NUREG-0612 single-failure-proof criteria. The other 
rigging scheme will involve the use of lifting lugs welded to the 
overhead structural steel members and special lifting devices that 
are designed in accordance with NUREG-0612 single-failure-proof 
criteria.
    In the first rigging scheme, the fuel building bridge crane and 
the cask crane will be used to perform the gate lifting and 
movement. The intent of NUREG-0612 is that in lieu of providing a 
single-failure-proof crane system, the control of heavy loads 
guidelines can be satisfied by establishing that the potential for a 
heavy load drop is extremely small. The gate lifting using the fuel 
building bridge crane and cask crane will conform with NUREG-0612 
guidelines in that the probability of the gate drop over the spent 
fuel assemblies is extremely small. Both cranes have a rated 
capacity of fifteen (15) tons. The maximum weight of the gate and 
associated lifting devices is one (1) ton. Therefore, there is ample 
safety factor margin for lifting and movements of the subject spent 
fuel pool gate. Special lifting devices, which have redundancy or 
ultimate strength of at least 10 times the lifted load, will also be 
utilized during the rigging process. Even though neither the fuel 
building bridge crane or the cask crane is a single-failure-proof 
crane, rigging the spent fuel pool gate using these cranes will 
provide the required redundancy that meets the intent of NUREG-0612 
single-failure-proof criteria.
    In the second rigging scheme, the initial gate lift will be 
performed through the use of structural steel lugs that are 
permanently welded to the Fuel Building overhead structural steel 
girder located over the centerlines of the wall openings for the two 
gates that separate the spent fuel pool from the IFTS and the cask 
pools. For example, the IFTS lower pool gate will be moved northward 
toward the cask pool opening using the aforementioned structural 
steel lugs and lifting devices such as chains, slings, and shackles. 
Once the gate is through the cask pool opening, the movement path 
will no longer be over irradiated spent fuel. Once through the cask 
pool opening, the gate will be moved eastward toward the center of 
the cask pool. The cask crane auxiliary hook will lift the gate 
inside the cask pool. Finally, the gate will be placed on the Fuel 
Building floor elevation 113 [feet] adjacent to the cask pool for 
seal replacement. For the movement of the gate between the spent 
fuel pool and the cask pool, the distance of the movement is reduced 
because the gate movement would essentially entail lifting of the 
gate to above the hinges, rotating it, and moving it through the 
opening directly into the cask pool. Though seal replacement on the 
cask pool gate is not necessary at the present time, it may be 
necessary in the future. As such, the proposed changes would allow 
movement of either of the two spent fuel pool gates for repair or 
seal replacement.
    The proposed load lift of the fuel pool gate for replacement of 
the seal conforms to all of the NUREG-0612 guidelines included in 
Section 5.1.5(1)(a) and 5.1.6. The design of the lifting lugs and 
associated lifting devices (chains, slings, shackles, hoists, etc.) 
will conform to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, 
``Single-Failure Proof Handling System.'' The auxiliary hook of the 
cask crane has a rated capacity of 15 tons. The cask crane is not a 
single-failure[-]proof crane. However, it meets NUREG-0612 criteria 
of Section 5.1.1(6) and is designed for seismic loading. As 
discussed above, the cask crane, alone, will handle the gate only 
after the gate is located inside the cask pool where drop of the 
gate above the spent fuel rack is no longer a concern. The cask pool 
area has been evaluated for an accidental drop of the spent fuel 
cask. There is no safety-related equipment inside the cask pool. The 
maximum weight of the gate and associated lifting devices is 2000 
pounds. Therefore, there is ample safety factor margin for lifting 
the gate with the cask crane.
    The probability and consequences of a seismic event are not 
affected by the proposed gate lifting. The consequences of a seismic 
event during the gate lifting are insignificant since both cranes, 
the fuel building bridge crane and the cask crane, are seismically 
qualified for the lifted load. In addition, the design of all 
rigging devices conforms to NUREG-0612 guidelines, with a factor of 
safety of 10 ultimate strength for the weight of the load.
    Consistent with the defense-in-depth approach outlined in NUREG-
0612, the movement will be conducted according to load handling 
instructions, operator training will be conducted on the activity 
prior to the movement, and the equipment will be inspected and 
checked before the movement will be performed. NUREG-0612 gives 
guidance that when a particular heavy load must be brought over 
spent fuel, alternative measures may be used. The combination of 
preventative measures, as proposed, minimizes the risks inherent in 
hauling large loads over spent fuel to permissible levels. With 
these provisions and the guidance in NUREG-0612, the increase in 
probability of a load drop is negligible.
    It is therefore concluded that the proposed gate lifting and 
movement does not involve a significant increase in the probability 
or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from any accident previously evaluated.
    The lifting of the fuel pool gate in the spent fuel pool as 
described above, minimizes the possibility of a heavy load drop onto 
spent fuel assemblies as not credible in accordance with NUREG-0612 
single-failure-proof criteria. In addition, movement of the gate in 
the cask pool using the cask crane does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident. The cask drop accident 
scenario in the current RBS licensing basis, since the cask crane is 
not a single-failure-proof crane, envelops the accidental drop of 
the gate in the cask pool during handling by the cask crane. That 
is, the analyzed weight of a cask is 125 tons versus the weight of 
the gate and the associated rigging of 1 ton.
    It is therefore concluded that the proposed gate lifting does 
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from any previously analyzed.
    3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    By following the guidance in NUREG-0612, the movement of the 
spent fuel pool gates will have no impact on the analyses of 
postulated design basis events for RBS. The NRC guidance provides an 
acceptable means of ensuring the appropriate level of safety and 
protection against load drop accidents. Therefore, there is no 
reduction in the margin of safety associated with postulated design 
basis events at RBS in allowing the proposed change to the RBS 
licensing basis. RBS will continue to meet its commitment to comply 
with NUREG-0612.


[[Page 71513]]


    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of 
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By January 28, 2000, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and accessible 
electronically through the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room link at 
the NRC Web site (http://www.nrc.gov). If a request for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Mark Wetterhahn, Esq., Winston & 
Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005, attorney for the 
licensee.
    Non-timely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the

[[Page 71514]]

Commission, the presiding officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Board that the petition and/or request should be granted 
based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 
2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated December 16, 1999, which is available 
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the 
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and accessible 
electronically through the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room link at 
the NRC web site (http://www.nrc.gov).

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of December 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Robert J. Fretz,
Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate IV & Decommissioning, 
Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-33134 Filed 12-20-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P