[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 244 (Tuesday, December 21, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 71511-71514]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-33134]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-458]
Entergy Operations, Inc.; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of
Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.
NPF-47 issued to Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee), for operation
of the River Bend Station, Unit 1 (RBS) located in West Feliciana
Parish, Louisiana.
The proposed amendment would add an exception to the RBS Technical
Requirements Manual (TRM), Section TR 3.9.14, current prohibition for
travel of loads in excess of 1200 pounds over fuel assemblies in the
spent fuel storage. The exception would allow the movement of spent
fuel pool watertight gates, which separate the spent fuel pool from the
cask and lower transfer pools. Approval of this exception would allow
the licensee to perform maintenance and repairs to the gates and
watertight seals, provided the licensee complies with the defense-in-
depth recommendations, or take alternative measures to compensate for
deficiencies in the defense-in-depth approach, addressed in NUREG-0612,
``Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants.'' Corresponding
sections of the RBS Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) would be
revised to be consistent with the exception and to state that the
provisions of NUREG-0612 will be met.
The load of the gate (approximately 1600 pounds) and rigging
(approximately 400 pounds) exceeds the load analyzed over spent fuel.
In accordance with the guidance in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Bulletin 96-02, ``Movement of Heavy Loads over Spent Fuel, over Fuel in
the Reactor Core, or over Safety-Related Equipment,'' issued April 11,
1996, and Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.59 (10
CFR 50.59), these changes have been determined to involve an unreviewed
safety question.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Involved a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The River Bend Station (RBS) fuel building fuel storage
facilities consist of three separate
[[Page 71512]]
but interconnected stainless steel-lined concrete pools. The spent
fuel storage pool is the largest of these pools. Adjacent to the
fuel storage pool are the cask pool and the lower inclined fuel
transfer (IFTS) pool. Each of these two pools is separated from the
fuel storage pool by a full-height wall broken by a watertight gate.
The watertight gates are normally open, but are closed to seal their
respective pools during cask handling and equipment maintenance
operations. It is necessary to lift the gate between the spent fuel
pool and the IFTS pool for seal replacement. The total weight of the
gate including the rigging equipment is 2000 pounds. This lift is
considered as a heavy load lift since it is higher than the current
RBS analyzed light load limit of 1200 pounds for movement of loads
over the spent fuel pool. RBS TRM 3.9.14 prohibits any load in
excess of 1200 pounds from travel over fuel assemblies in the
storage pool.
Each of the gates is designed with a pneumatic seal that, when
pressurized, seals the respective pool from the spent fuel pool,
forming a watertight barrier. No provisions for moving the gates
over spent fuel were included in the licensing basis for RBS heavy
loads. However, the qualified life for the gate seals necessitates
that they be replaced several times over the life of the plant.
Therefore, approval of an exception to the current prohibition for
loads over the spent fuel pool is required to allow for replacement
of the gate seals.
To perform the movement of the gate from its installed position
to a position where it can be accessed for seal replacement, an
engineering plan that meets the intent of NUREG-0612, ``Control of
Heavy Loads [at Nuclear Power Plants],'' has been developed. There
are numerous design features, which comply with NUREG-0612
guidelines, that will preclude the gate from dropping onto the spent
fuel assemblies during the movement activity. These features include
the design of the lifting devices, design of the cask and fuel
bridge cranes, crane operator training, and the use of written
procedures. The guidance in NUREG-0612 will be met in all respects,
except that in lieu of a single[-]failure-proof crane, the scheme
will employ redundant and diverse means to meet the intent of
single-failure[-]proof movements.
It is proposed for the subject spent fuel pool gate lift to use
one of two rigging schemes that comply with the intent of NUREG-0612
guidance. The first one will be accomplished through the use of Fuel
Building bridge crane and the cask crane at the same time to provide
the redundancy required to make the lift a single-failure-proof lift
and satisfy NUREG-0612 single-failure-proof criteria. The other
rigging scheme will involve the use of lifting lugs welded to the
overhead structural steel members and special lifting devices that
are designed in accordance with NUREG-0612 single-failure-proof
criteria.
In the first rigging scheme, the fuel building bridge crane and
the cask crane will be used to perform the gate lifting and
movement. The intent of NUREG-0612 is that in lieu of providing a
single-failure-proof crane system, the control of heavy loads
guidelines can be satisfied by establishing that the potential for a
heavy load drop is extremely small. The gate lifting using the fuel
building bridge crane and cask crane will conform with NUREG-0612
guidelines in that the probability of the gate drop over the spent
fuel assemblies is extremely small. Both cranes have a rated
capacity of fifteen (15) tons. The maximum weight of the gate and
associated lifting devices is one (1) ton. Therefore, there is ample
safety factor margin for lifting and movements of the subject spent
fuel pool gate. Special lifting devices, which have redundancy or
ultimate strength of at least 10 times the lifted load, will also be
utilized during the rigging process. Even though neither the fuel
building bridge crane or the cask crane is a single-failure-proof
crane, rigging the spent fuel pool gate using these cranes will
provide the required redundancy that meets the intent of NUREG-0612
single-failure-proof criteria.
In the second rigging scheme, the initial gate lift will be
performed through the use of structural steel lugs that are
permanently welded to the Fuel Building overhead structural steel
girder located over the centerlines of the wall openings for the two
gates that separate the spent fuel pool from the IFTS and the cask
pools. For example, the IFTS lower pool gate will be moved northward
toward the cask pool opening using the aforementioned structural
steel lugs and lifting devices such as chains, slings, and shackles.
Once the gate is through the cask pool opening, the movement path
will no longer be over irradiated spent fuel. Once through the cask
pool opening, the gate will be moved eastward toward the center of
the cask pool. The cask crane auxiliary hook will lift the gate
inside the cask pool. Finally, the gate will be placed on the Fuel
Building floor elevation 113 [feet] adjacent to the cask pool for
seal replacement. For the movement of the gate between the spent
fuel pool and the cask pool, the distance of the movement is reduced
because the gate movement would essentially entail lifting of the
gate to above the hinges, rotating it, and moving it through the
opening directly into the cask pool. Though seal replacement on the
cask pool gate is not necessary at the present time, it may be
necessary in the future. As such, the proposed changes would allow
movement of either of the two spent fuel pool gates for repair or
seal replacement.
The proposed load lift of the fuel pool gate for replacement of
the seal conforms to all of the NUREG-0612 guidelines included in
Section 5.1.5(1)(a) and 5.1.6. The design of the lifting lugs and
associated lifting devices (chains, slings, shackles, hoists, etc.)
will conform to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6,
``Single-Failure Proof Handling System.'' The auxiliary hook of the
cask crane has a rated capacity of 15 tons. The cask crane is not a
single-failure[-]proof crane. However, it meets NUREG-0612 criteria
of Section 5.1.1(6) and is designed for seismic loading. As
discussed above, the cask crane, alone, will handle the gate only
after the gate is located inside the cask pool where drop of the
gate above the spent fuel rack is no longer a concern. The cask pool
area has been evaluated for an accidental drop of the spent fuel
cask. There is no safety-related equipment inside the cask pool. The
maximum weight of the gate and associated lifting devices is 2000
pounds. Therefore, there is ample safety factor margin for lifting
the gate with the cask crane.
The probability and consequences of a seismic event are not
affected by the proposed gate lifting. The consequences of a seismic
event during the gate lifting are insignificant since both cranes,
the fuel building bridge crane and the cask crane, are seismically
qualified for the lifted load. In addition, the design of all
rigging devices conforms to NUREG-0612 guidelines, with a factor of
safety of 10 ultimate strength for the weight of the load.
Consistent with the defense-in-depth approach outlined in NUREG-
0612, the movement will be conducted according to load handling
instructions, operator training will be conducted on the activity
prior to the movement, and the equipment will be inspected and
checked before the movement will be performed. NUREG-0612 gives
guidance that when a particular heavy load must be brought over
spent fuel, alternative measures may be used. The combination of
preventative measures, as proposed, minimizes the risks inherent in
hauling large loads over spent fuel to permissible levels. With
these provisions and the guidance in NUREG-0612, the increase in
probability of a load drop is negligible.
It is therefore concluded that the proposed gate lifting and
movement does not involve a significant increase in the probability
or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
The lifting of the fuel pool gate in the spent fuel pool as
described above, minimizes the possibility of a heavy load drop onto
spent fuel assemblies as not credible in accordance with NUREG-0612
single-failure-proof criteria. In addition, movement of the gate in
the cask pool using the cask crane does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident. The cask drop accident
scenario in the current RBS licensing basis, since the cask crane is
not a single-failure-proof crane, envelops the accidental drop of
the gate in the cask pool during handling by the cask crane. That
is, the analyzed weight of a cask is 125 tons versus the weight of
the gate and the associated rigging of 1 ton.
It is therefore concluded that the proposed gate lifting does
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any previously analyzed.
3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
By following the guidance in NUREG-0612, the movement of the
spent fuel pool gates will have no impact on the analyses of
postulated design basis events for RBS. The NRC guidance provides an
acceptable means of ensuring the appropriate level of safety and
protection against load drop accidents. Therefore, there is no
reduction in the margin of safety associated with postulated design
basis events at RBS in allowing the proposed change to the RBS
licensing basis. RBS will continue to meet its commitment to comply
with NUREG-0612.
[[Page 71513]]
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public and State comments received.
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this
action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By January 28, 2000, the licensee may file a request for a hearing
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and accessible
electronically through the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room link at
the NRC Web site (http://www.nrc.gov). If a request for a hearing or
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of
hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy
the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Mark Wetterhahn, Esq., Winston &
Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005, attorney for the
licensee.
Non-timely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not
be entertained absent a determination by the
[[Page 71514]]
Commission, the presiding officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board that the petition and/or request should be granted
based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR
2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated December 16, 1999, which is available
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and accessible
electronically through the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room link at
the NRC web site (http://www.nrc.gov).
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of December 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Robert J. Fretz,
Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate IV & Decommissioning,
Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-33134 Filed 12-20-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P