[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 244 (Tuesday, December 21, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 71514-71516]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-33023]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-400]


Carolina Power & Light Company; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power 
Plant, Unit 1, Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant 
Impact

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-63, issued to Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L, the licensee), 
for operation of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, (HNP) 
located in Wake and Chatham Counties, North Carolina.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

    The proposed action would support a modification to HNP to increase 
the spent fuel storage capacity by adding rack modules to spent fuel 
pools (SFPs) `C' and `D' and placing the pools in service. The proposed 
action consists of: (1) A revision to Technical Specification (TS) 5.6 
to identify pressurized water reactor (PWR) burnup restrictions, 
boiling water reactor (BWR) enrichment limits, pool capacities, heat 
load limitations and nominal center-to-center distances between fuel 
assemblies in the racks to be installed in SFPs `C' and `D'; (2) an 
alternative plan in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a 
to demonstrate an acceptable level of quality and safety in completion 
of the component cooling water (CCW) and SFPs `C' and `D' cooling and 
cleanup system piping; and (3) an unreviewed safety question for 
additional heat load on the CCW system.
    The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's 
application for amendment dated December 23, 1998, as supplemented by 
letters dated April 30, June 14, July 23, September 3, October 15, and 
October 29, 1999.

The Need for the Proposed Action

    The proposed action is needed for the licensee to provide spent 
fuel storage capacity for all four CP&L nuclear units (Harris, 
Brunswick 1 and 2, and Robinson) through the end of their current 
licenses.
    HNP was originally planned as a four nuclear unit site and the fuel 
handling building (FHB) was designed and constructed with four separate 
pools capable of storing spent fuel. HNP Units 3 and 4 were canceled in 
late 1981 and HNP Unit 2 was canceled in late 1983. The FHB, all four 
pools (including liners), and the cooling and cleanup system to support 
SFPs `A' and `B' were completed. However, construction on SFPs `C' and 
`D' was discontinued after Unit 2 was canceled and the system was not 
completed. HNP, Unit 1 began operation in 1987 with SFPs `A' and `B' in 
service.
    As permitted by the HNP operating license issued on January 12, 
1987, CP&L has implemented a spent fuel shipping program. Spent fuel 
from Brunswick (2 BWR units) and Robinson (1 PWR unit) is shipped to 
HNP for storage in the HNP SFPs. CP&L ships fuel to HNP in order to 
maintain full core offload capability at Brunswick and Robinson. As a 
result of the operation of HNP, shipping program requirements, and the 
unavailability of a Department of Energy (DOE) storage facility, it 
will be necessary to activate SFPs `C' and `D' and the associated 
cooling and cleanup system by early in the year 2000. Activation of 
these pools will provide spent fuel storage capacity for all four CP&L 
units through the end of their current operating licenses.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

    The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action 
and concludes there are no significant environmental impacts. The 
factors considered in this determination are discussed below.
Radioactive Waste Treatment
    HNP uses waste treatment systems designed to collect and process 
gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that might contain radioactive 
material. These radioactive waste treatment systems are discussed in 
the Final Environmental Statement (FES, NUREG-0972) dated October 1983, 
and evaluated in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER, NUREG-1083) dated 
November 1983. The proposal to increase the spent fuel storage capacity 
at HNP will not involve any change in the waste treatment systems 
described in the FES or SER.
Gaseous Radioactive Wastes
    Gaseous releases from the fuel storage area are combined with other 
plant exhausts. Normally, the contribution from the fuel storage area 
is negligible compared to the other releases and no significant 
increases are expected as a result of the expanded storage capacity. 
Storing spent fuel in four pools (instead of the previous two pools) 
will result in an increase in the SFP evaporation rate. The licensee 
has determined that the increased evaporation will increase the 
relative humidity of the fuel building atmosphere by less than 10%. 
This increase is within the capacity of both the normal and the 
Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) ventilation systems. The net result of 
the increased heat loss and water vapor emission to the environment 
will be negligible.
Solid Radioactive Wastes
    Spent resins are generated by the processing of SFP water through 
the SFP purification system. These spent resins are disposed of as 
solid radioactive waste. The necessity for pool filtration resin 
replacement is determined primarily by the requirement for water 
clarity, and the resin is normally expected to be changed about once a 
year. The licensee does not expect the resin change-out frequency of 
the SFP purification system to be permanently increased as a result of 
the expanded storage capacity. During racking operations, a small 
amount of additional resins may be generated by the pool cleanup system 
on a one-time basis.
Radiological Impact Assessment
    For this modification the licensee plans to install region 2 (non-
flux trap style) rack modules in pools `C' and `D' in incremental 
phases, on an as-needed basis. The licensee estimates that the 
collective dose associated with the proposed fuel rack installation is 
in the range of 2-3 person-rem.
    All of the operations involved in racking will use detailed 
procedures prepared with full consideration of ALARA (as low as 
reasonably achievable) principles. The HNP racking

[[Page 71515]]

project represents low radiological risk because the pools currently 
contain no spent fuel. The Radiation Protection Department will prepare 
Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) for the various jobs associated with the 
SFP rack installation operation. These RWPs will instruct the project 
personnel in the areas of protective clothing, general dose rates, 
contamination levels and dosimetry requirements. Personnel will wear 
protective clothing and will be required to wear personnel monitoring 
equipment including alarming dosimeters.
    Since the proposed license amendment does not involve the removal 
of any spent fuel racks, the licensee does not plan on using divers for 
this project. However, if it becomes necessary to use divers to remove 
any interferences which may impede the installation of the new spent 
fuel racks, the licensee will equip each diver with the appropriate 
monitoring equipment. The licensee will monitor and control work, 
personnel traffic, and equipment movement in the SFP area to minimize 
contamination and to assure that exposure is maintained ALARA.
    On the basis of its review of the HNP proposal, the staff concludes 
that the increase in spent fuel storage capacity at HNP can be 
accomplished in a manner that will ensure that doses to workers will be 
maintained ALARA.
Accident Considerations
    In its application, the licensee evaluated the possible 
consequences of fuel handling accidents to determine offsite doses. The 
proposed SFP rack installation at HNP will not affect any of the 
assumptions or inputs used in evaluating the dose consequences of a 
fuel handling accident and, therefore, will not result in an increase 
in the doses from a postulated fuel handling accident. The proposed 
action will not change the procedures or equipment used for, or the 
frequency of, fuel moves at HNP or fuel shipments from the Brunswick 
and Robinson plants. Therefore, the probability of a postulated fuel 
handling accident will not increase from that previously evaluated.
    The staff has previously considered accidents whose consequences 
might exceed a fuel handling accident; that is, beyond design basis 
events. One such accident evaluated by the staff involves a structural 
failure of the SFP, resulting in loss of all contained cooling water 
followed by heatup and a zirconium cladding fire. The details of this 
severe accident are discussed in NUREG/CR-4982, entitled ``Severe 
Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Issue 82.'' The 
staff also issued NUREG/CR-5176, entitled ``Seismic Failure and Cask 
Drop Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pools at Two Representative Nuclear 
Power Plants.'' This report considers the structural integrity of the 
SFP and the pool response to the circumstances considered. 
Subsequently, the staff issued NUREG/CR-5281, ``Value/Impact Analysis 
of Accident Preventative and Mitigative Options for Spent Fuel Pools,'' 
and NUREG-1353, ``Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic 
Issue 82: Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools.'' In 
NUREG-1353, the staff determined that no new regulatory requirements 
were warranted in relation to Generic Issue 82.
    The staff believes that the probability of severe structural damage 
occurring at HNP is extremely low. This belief is based upon the 
Commission's requirements for the design and construction of SFPs and 
their contents and on the licensee's adherence to approved industry 
codes and standards. For example, in the HNP case, the pools are an 
integral part of the fuel building. The SFPs and the spent fuel storage 
racks are Seismic Category 1, and thus, are required to remain 
functional during and after a safe shutdown earthquake. In the unlikely 
event of a total loss of the cooling system, makeup water sources are 
available to replace coolant lost through evaporation or boiling. 
Therefore, the staff concludes that the potential for environmental 
impact from severe accidents is negligible.
    The proposed action will not significantly increase the probability 
or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of 
any effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no significant 
increase in occupational or public radiation exposure. Therefore, there 
are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with 
the proposed action.
    With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed 
action does not involve any historic sites. It does not affect 
nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. 
Therefore, there are no significant nonradiological environmental 
impacts associated with the proposed action.
    Accordingly, the staff concludes that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

    A ``Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement (FGEIS) on 
Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel,'' NUREG-
0575, Volumes 1-3, was issued by the Commission in August 1979. The 
finding of the FGEIS is that the environmental costs of interim storage 
are essentially negligible, regardless of where such spent fuel is 
stored. The storage of spent fuel, as evaluated in NUREG-0575, is 
considered to be an interim action, not a final solution to permanent 
disposal. One spent fuel storage alternative considered in detail in 
the FGEIS is the expansion of the onsite fuel storage capacity by 
modification of the existing SFPs. The Commission has approved numerous 
applications for SFP expansion. The finding in each has been that the 
environmental impact of such increased storage capacity is negligible. 
However, since there are variations in storage design and limitations 
caused by spent fuel already stored in the pools, the FGEIS recommended 
that licensing reviews be done on a case-by-case basis, to resolve 
plant-specific concerns.
    Specific alternatives to the proposed action are discussed below.
Shipment of Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility
    Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility 
is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity. 
However, DOE's high-level radioactive waste repository is not expected 
to begin receiving spent fuel until approximately 2010, at the 
earliest. In October 1996, the Administration did commit DOE to begin 
storing wastes at a centralized location by January 31, 1998. However, 
no location has been identified and an interim federal storage facility 
has yet to be identified in advance of a decision on a permanent 
repository. Therefore, shipping spent fuel to the DOE repository is not 
considered an alternative to increased onsite spent fuel storage 
capacity at this time.
Shipment of Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility
    Reprocessing of spent fuel from HNP is not a viable alternative 
since there are no operating commercial reprocessing facilities in the 
United States. Therefore, spent fuel would have to be shipped to an 
overseas facility for reprocessing. However, this approach has never 
been used and it would require approval by the Department of State as 
well as other entities. Additionally, the cost of spent fuel 
reprocessing is not offset by the salvage value of the residual 
uranium; reprocessing represents an added cost. Therefore, this 
alternative is considered unacceptable.

[[Page 71516]]

Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation
    Improved usage of fuel and/or operation at a reduced power level 
would decrease the amount of fuel being stored in the pool and thus 
increase the amount of time before full core off-load capability is 
lost. With extended burnup of fuel assemblies, the fuel cycle would be 
extended and fewer offloads would be necessary. The licensee has 
already increased its fuel enrichment to 5 percent and is currently 
operating on 18-month refueling cycles. Operating the plant at a 
reduced power level would not make effective use of available 
resources, and would cause unnecessary economic hardship on CP&L and 
its customers. Therefore, reducing the amount of spent fuel generated 
by increasing burnup further or reducing power is not considered a 
practical alternative.
Alternative Creation of Additional Storage Capacity
    Alternative technologies that would create additional storage 
capacity include rod consolidation, dry cask storage, and modular vault 
dry storage. Rod consolidation involves disassembling the spent fuel 
assemblies and storing the fuel rods from two or more assemblies in a 
stainless steel canister that can be stored in the spent fuel racks. 
Industry experience with rod consolidation is currently limited, 
primarily due to concerns for potential gap activity release due to rod 
breakage, the potential for increased fuel cladding corrosion due to 
some of the protective oxide layer being scraped off, and because the 
prolonged consolidation activity could interfere with ongoing plant 
operations. Dry cask storage is a method of transferring spent fuel, 
after storage in the pool for several years, to high capacity casks 
with passive heat dissipation features. After loading, the casks are 
stored outdoors on a seismically qualified concrete pad. Concerns for 
dry cask storage include the potential for fuel or cask handling 
accidents, potential fuel clad rupture due to high temperatures, 
increased land use, construction impacts, the need for additional 
security provisions, and high costs. Vault storage consists of storing 
spent fuel in shielded stainless steel cylinders in a horizontal 
configuration in a reinforced concrete vault. The concrete vault 
provides missile and earthquake protection and radiation shielding. 
Concerns for vault dry storage include the need for additional security 
provisions, increased land use, construction impacts, eventual 
decommissioning of the new vault, the potential for fuel or clad 
rupture due to high temperatures, and high cost.
    The environmental impacts of the alternative technologies discussed 
above and the proposed action are similar.

The No-Action Alternative

    As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff also considered 
denial of the proposed action (i.e., the ``no-action'' alternative). 
Denial of the application would result in no change in current 
environmental impacts.

Alternative Use of Resources

    This action does not involve the use of any resources not 
previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for HNP.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

    In accordance with its stated policy, on December 2 and 3, 1999, 
the staff consulted with North Carolina State officials, Mr. Richard M. 
Fry and Mr. Johnny James of the North Carolina Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources, regarding the environmental impact 
of the proposed action. The State officials stated that they had no 
objection to the finding. However, they requested that the staff hold a 
public meeting in Raleigh, North Carolina to discuss the license 
amendment review process, the results of the review for HNP's proposed 
amendment, and the analysis that led to this environmental assessment 
finding.

Finding of No Significant Impact

    On the basis of the environmental assessment, the Commission 
concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission 
has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the 
proposed action.
    For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
licensee's letter dated December 23, 1998, as supplemented by letters 
dated April 30, June 14, July 23, September 3, October 15, and October 
29, 1999, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's 
Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., 
Washington, DC.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day of December 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Richard P. Correia,
Chief, Section 2, Project Directorate II, Division of Licensing Project 
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-33023 Filed 12-20-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P