[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 240 (Wednesday, December 15, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 69996-70003]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-32247]



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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Site-Wide Environmental 
Impact Statement

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of Decision.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this Record of 
Decision on the continued operation of the Sandia National 
Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) in the State of New Mexico. This 
Record of Decision is based on the information and analysis contained 
in the SNL/NM Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), DOE/EIS-
0281, and other factors, such as the mission responsibilities of DOE. 
DOE has decided to implement the Expanded Operations Alternative 
without the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications Complex, 
i.e., the Preferred Alternative in the Final Site-Wide EIS. Under the 
Expanded Operations Alternative, DOE and interagency programs and 
activities at SNL/NM could increase to the highest reasonable activity 
levels, as set forth in the Site-Wide EIS, that could be supported by 
current facilities and their potential expansion and construction of 
new facilities for future actions specifically identified in the Site-
Wide EIS through 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the Site-
Wide EIS or Record of Decision, or to receive a copy of the Site-Wide 
EIS, contact: Julianne Levings, Document Manager, U.S. Department of 
Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office, P.O. Box 5400, Albuquerque, NM 
87185, (505) 845-6201.
    For information on the DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy 
and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence 
Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at 
(800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    DOE prepared this Record of Decision pursuant to the regulations of 
the Council on Environmental Quality for implementing NEPA (40 CFR 
Parts 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 
1021). This Record of Decision is based, in part, on DOE's SNL/NM Site-
Wide EIS (DOE/EIS-0281). The U.S. Air Force participated as a 
cooperating agency in preparing the Site-Wide EIS.
    SNL/NM is located on the Kirtland Air Force Base, approximately 7 
miles southeast of downtown Albuquerque, in Bernalillo County, New 
Mexico. SNL/NM comprises approximately 8,800 acres of Federal land on 
the Kirtland Air Force Base. SNL/NM is one of several national 
laboratories that support DOE's statutory responsibilities for nuclear 
weapons research and design, development of other energy technologies, 
and basic scientific research. Sandia National Laboratories is composed 
of four geographically separate facilities: Albuquerque, New Mexico 
(SNL/NM); Tonopah, Nevada; Kauai, Hawaii; and Livermore, California. 
This Record of Decision covers the level of operation of SNL/NM only. 
DOE has assigned elements of each of its four principal missions 
(National Security, Energy Resources, Environmental Quality, and 
Science and Technology) to SNL/NM, and has established and maintains 
several capabilities in support of these mission elements, including 
applications of science and technology to the nuclear weapons program. 
These capabilities also support applications for other Federal agencies 
and other organizations in accordance with national priorities and 
policies.
    Facility operations are conducted within five Technical Areas (TAs) 
and outdoor test areas. These TAs comprise the basic geographic 
configuration of SNL/NM. TA-I is the main administration and support 
area and contains several research laboratories. TA-II consists 
primarily of support service facilities and waste management 
facilities. TA-III conducts primarily physical testing. TA-IV contains 
primarily accelerator operations. TA-V contains primarily reactor 
facilities.
    The Site-Wide EIS considers the environmental impacts of ongoing 
and proposed activities at SNL/NM through 2008. DOE expects that it 
will continue to suggest new programs, projects, and facilities for 
SNL/NM (or consider SNL/NM as an alternative site for such facilities 
or activities). Such new proposals will be considered in programmatic 
or project-specific NEPA reviews, as appropriate, as they become ripe 
for analysis. Subsequent NEPA reviews for projects or activities at 
SNL/NM will make reference to, and be tiered from, the Site-Wide EIS, 
and subsequent DOE decisions on these proposals may result in 
amendments of this Record of Decision.

Alternatives Considered

    DOE analyzed three broad alternative levels of operation at SNL/NM.

Alternative 1--No Action

    Under the No Action Alternative, ongoing DOE and interagency 
programs and activities at SNL/NM would continue the status quo, that 
is, operating at planned levels as reflected in current DOE management 
plans. In some cases, these planned levels include increases over 
today's operating levels. This alternative also includes any activities 
that have already been approved by DOE and have existing NEPA 
documentation.

Alternative 2--Expanded Operations

    Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, DOE and interagency 
programs and activities at SNL/NM would increase to the highest 
reasonable activity levels, as analyzed in the Site-Wide EIS, that 
could be supported by current facilities and their potential expansion 
as well as construction of new facilities for future actions 
specifically identified in the Site-Wide EIS.
    In the Expanded Operations Alternative in the Final Site-Wide EIS, 
DOE described two potential configurations for the Microelectronics 
Development Laboratory facility. In the first configuration, the Site-
Wide EIS analyzed the expansion of operations in the existing 
Microelectronics Development Laboratory (also analyzed in the Draft 
Site-Wide EIS). In the second configuration, the Site-Wide EIS 
presented the available information on the developing proposal for the 
Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications Complex, also known 
as MESA, including impacts from the construction and operation of 
additional buildings adjacent to the existing Microelectronics 
Development Laboratory. DOE included in the second configuration of the 
Expanded Operations Alternative all available programmatic and 
environmental information on the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences 
Applications Complex based on its approved Conceptual Design Plan.
    DOE's Preferred Alternative in the Final Site-Wide EIS was Expanded 
Operations in the first configuration (i.e., without the Microsystems 
and Engineering Sciences Applications Complex).
    The conceptual design for the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences 
Applications Complex will be finalized in the January 2000 timeframe 
with the issuance of the Conceptual Design Report currently under 
preparation. The information on the Microsystems and Engineering 
Sciences Applications Complex in the Site-Wide EIS is

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preliminary (based on the Conceptual Design Plan), and was added after 
the Draft Site-Wide EIS was issued for public review and comment. 
Therefore, DOE has determined that an additional NEPA review will be 
conducted after the conceptual design is finalized to evaluate impacts 
from the proposed construction and operation of the Microsystems and 
Engineering Sciences Applications Complex. Based on the current 
configuration for the proposed Microsystems and Engineering Sciences 
Applications Complex, DOE is preparing an Environmental Assessment to 
determine whether an EIS is required and will include an opportunity 
for public participation.

Alternative 3--Reduced Operations

    Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, DOE and interagency 
programs and activities at SNL/NM would be reduced to the minimum 
levels of operations needed to maintain SNL/NM facilities and equipment 
in an operational readiness mode.

Preferred Alternative

    DOE's Preferred Alternative is the Expanded Operations Alternative 
(exclusive of the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications 
Complex). DOE would expand operations at SNL/NM as the need arises, 
subject to the availability of Congressional appropriations, to 
increase the level of existing operations to the highest reasonable 
foreseeable activity levels as analyzed in the Site-Wide EIS. DOE would 
only implement expansion at the existing Microelectronics Development 
Laboratory, without addition of the Microsystems and Engineering 
Sciences Applications Complex.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

    The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), in its ``Forty Most 
Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's NEPA Regulations'' (46 FR 18026, 
February 23, 1981), with regard to 40 CFR 1505.2, defined the 
``environmentally preferable alternative'' as the alternative ``that 
will promote the national environmental policy as expressed in NEPA's 
Section 101. Ordinarily, this means the alternative that causes the 
least damage to the biological and physical environment; it also means 
the alternative which best protects, preserves, and enhances historic, 
cultural, and natural resources.''
    After considering impacts to each resource area by alternative, DOE 
has identified Alternative 3, the Reduced Operations Alternative, as 
the environmentally preferable alternative. DOE identified Alternative 
3 as having the fewest impacts to the physical environment and to 
worker and public health and safety because all operations would be at 
the lowest levels. Therefore, the Reduced Operations Alternative would 
have the lowest impacts, and the Expanded Operations Alternative would 
have the highest impacts among the alternatives analyzed in the Site-
Wide EIS. However, the analyses included in the Site-Wide EIS indicate 
that there would be little difference in the environmental impacts 
among the alternatives analyzed and also that any impacts would be 
small.

Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

    DOE weighed environmental impacts as one factor in its decision 
making. DOE analyzed existing environmental impacts and the potential 
impacts that might occur for each alternative, including the 
irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources.

Land Use and Visual Resources

    No adverse impacts to land resources are expected as a result of 
the No Action, Expanded Operations, or Reduced Operations Alternatives. 
There would be no adverse impacts to visual resources that change the 
overall appearance of the existing landscape, obscure views, or alter 
the visibility of SNL/NM structures under any of the alternatives 
analyzed.

Infrastructure

    Electrical consumption would range from 185,000 megawatt hours per 
year (Reduced Operations Alternative) to 198,000 megawatt hours per 
year (Preferred Alternative). Projected water usage would range from 
416 million gallons (Reduced Operations Alternative) to 495 million 
gallons per year (Preferred Alternative). Annual projected utility 
demands for all alternatives would be well within system capacities.
    Other infrastructure-related factors, including maintenance, roads, 
communications, steam, natural gas, and facility decommissioning, would 
be similar for each alternative and would not pose adverse impacts.

Geology and Soils

    Under all alternatives, impacts due to soil contamination would be 
minimal. Under the Preferred Alternative, however, there would be the 
potential for increased deposition of soil contaminants in outdoor 
testing areas. These areas are not accessible to the general public. 
Potential contaminants would include depleted uranium fragments, 
explosive residue, and metals contained in weapons that are used in the 
tests. SNL/NM performs periodic sampling and radiation surveys in these 
testing areas. Depleted uranium fragments are collected after tests and 
additional measures are taken to remove any contamination from the 
soil.
    Soil contamination from past research practices is being cleaned up 
through SNL/NM's Environmental Restoration Project, which is scheduled 
for completion by 2004. This clean-up would occur at the same rate 
under the three alternatives.

Water Resources and Hydrology

    The impact resulting from SNL/NM's contribution to drawdown in the 
aquifer derives from both past and present water usage and is 
considered to be adverse. The estimated SNL/NM portion of local (in the 
immediate vicinity of the Kirtland Air Force Base) aquifer drawdown 
from 1998 to 2008 would range from 11 percent (No Action and Reduced 
Operations Alternatives) to 12 percent (Preferred Alternative). Local 
drawdown of the aquifer would range from less than 1 to 28 feet across 
the Kirtland Air Force Base during this period. This drawdown would not 
have an immediate effect on other water users, spring flow, or land 
subsidence. Long-term effects would tend to be reduced by the city of 
Albuquerque's conversion to surface water use, scheduled to begin in 
2004. Water demand under each alternative would be within existing 
Kirtland Air Force Base water rights. As discussed above, under 
Infrastructure, water usage would range from 416 million gallons per 
year (Reduced Operations Alternative) to 495 million gallons per year 
(Preferred Alternative).
    Groundwater contamination attributable to SNL/NM activities is 
present at three sites at the Kirtland Air Force Base. The 
contamination in the aquifer is due to past waste management practices 
rather than current operations. Investigation and clean-up at locations 
with groundwater contamination would continue at the same rate under 
any of the three alternatives.

Biological and Ecological Resources

    Long-term restricted access and limited planned development have 
benefitted biological resources at the Kirtland Air Force Base. This 
benefit would continue under all alternatives. Proposed activities 
under all the alternatives could result in a local displacement of 
wildlife; however, the impact would be minimal and temporary. In 
addition, there would be slightly increased levels of noise and 
activity under the Preferred Alternative.

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However, the impacts from these increases are expected to be negligible 
to biological and ecological resources. There are no endangered and 
threatened species issues at SNL/NM.

Cultural Resources

    Cultural resources in the Region of Influence have benefitted from 
restricted access, compliance with applicable regulations, and 
established procedures for the protection and conservation of cultural 
resources. This benefit would continue under all alternatives. There 
are no known cultural resource sites at DOE-administered land at the 
Kirtland Air Force Base. For all three alternatives, there would 
continue to be a potential for impacts to prehistoric and historic 
archaeological resources located on Kirtland Air Force Base lands 
administered by other agencies and used by DOE. These impacts would 
derive from explosive testing debris and shrapnel produced as a result 
of outdoor explosions, off-road vehicle traffic, and unintended fires 
and fire suppression. However, the potential for impacts due to these 
factors would be minimal under all three alternatives.
    DOE is involved in ongoing consultation with 15 Native American 
tribes to discuss Traditional Cultural Properties at SNL/NM. To date, 
no Traditional Cultural Properties have been specifically identified at 
SNL/NM; however, several tribes have requested that they be consulted 
under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act if 
human remains are discovered within the Region of Influence. These 
consultations will continue. If specific Traditional Cultural 
Properties are identified, any impacts of SNL/NM activities on the 
Traditional Cultural Properties and any impacts of restricting access 
to the Traditional Cultural Properties would be determined in 
consultation with Native American tribes, and further NEPA review would 
be conducted, if appropriate.

Air Quality

    Chemical emissions would be highest for the Preferred Alternative, 
although emissions under all alternatives would be below levels that 
would adversely affect public health. Air concentrations of criteria 
and other chemical pollutants would be within regulatory standards and 
human health guidelines. The impact from emissions of criteria and 
other pollutants for the No Action and the Preferred alternatives would 
be essentially the same.
    The major source of criteria pollutants (other than mobile sources) 
would be the steam plant, which supplies steam to the facilities for 
heating. No increase in laboratory-wide floor space is anticipated 
under the Preferred Alternative because any added floor space is 
expected to be offset by facilities taken out of service; therefore, no 
increase in steam production would be required. Among the three 
alternatives, the Reduced Operations Alternative would require the 
least steam, resulting in the lowest emissions from the steam plant.
    Air quality impacts from mobile sources vary slightly among the 
alternatives but are not considered adverse. The analysis indicates 
carbon monoxide emissions from mobile sources as a percentage of the 
Bernalillo County total would be 4.6 percent (No Action Alternative), 
5.1 percent (Preferred Alternative), and 4.5 percent (Reduced 
Operations Alternative).
    The radiological dose impacts due to the annual air emissions from 
SNL/NM facilities during normal operations under each of the 
alternatives would be lower than the National Emissions Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants limit of 10 millirem per year to a maximally 
exposed individual. The calculated radiological dose to a maximally 
exposed individual would be 0.15 millirem per year under the No Action 
Alternative; 0.51 millirem per year under the Preferred Alternative; 
and 0.02 millirem per year under the Reduced Operations Alternative.
    The calculated collective dose to the population within a 50-mile 
radius of SNL/NM for each alternative from the annual radiological air 
emissions due to the SNL/NM operations would be 5.0 person-rem per year 
under the No Action Alternative, 15.8 person-rem per year under the 
Preferred Alternative, and 0.80 person-rem per year under the Reduced 
Operations Alternative.

Human Health

    The composite cancer health risk estimates and the cancer health 
risk estimates for specific receptor locations are below levels that 
regulators consider protective of public health. The small amounts of 
chemical carcinogens and radiation released from SNL/NM facilities 
would increase the maximally exposed individual lifetime risk of cancer 
(assuming 30 years of exposure) by less than 1 chance in 434,000 under 
the No Action Alternative and by less than a possible 1 chance in 
126,000 under the Preferred Alternative. Noncancer health effects would 
not be expected under any alternative based on hazard index values of 
less than 1. No additional nonfatal cancers, genetic disorders, or 
latent cancer fatalities would be expected in the population living 
within a 50-mile radius of SNL/NM. The lifetime risk to the population 
in the Region of Influence would be 0.012, 0.075, and 0.24 latent 
cancer fatalities for the Reduced, No Action, and Preferred 
alternatives, respectively. Thus, no adverse health effects would be 
expected from any of the three alternatives for SNL/NM.

Transportation

    The SNL/NM material and waste truck traffic offsite would be 
projected to increase from 14.5 shipments per day (1996) to 24.6 and 
34.4 shipments per day under the No Action and Preferred alternatives, 
respectively. However, the SNL/NM truck traffic would comprise less 
than 0.03 percent of the total traffic, including all types of vehicles 
entering and leaving the Albuquerque area by way of interstate 
highways. Therefore, the impact under any alternative would be minimal. 
The total local traffic on roadways from SNL/NM activities could 
increase by a maximum of 1.8 percent under the No Action Alternative 
and 3.6 percent overall under the Preferred Alternative as compared to 
1996.
    The overall maximum lifetime fatalities from SNL/NM annual 
shipments of all types of materials and wastes due to SNL/NM operations 
were estimated to be 1.7 fatalities under the Preferred Alternative. Of 
these estimates, 1.2 fatalities would be due to traffic accidents; 0.33 
fatalities would be due to incident-free transport of radiological 
materials and wastes; and 0.06 fatalities would be due to air pollution 
from truck emissions.
    The maximum latent cancer fatalities in the population within a 50-
mile radius of SNL/NM from the annual transport of radiological 
materials and wastes were estimated, based on a population dose of 4.9 
person-rem, to be 0.0025.

Waste Generation

    Operations of low-level waste and low-level mixed waste are 
expected to increase by a maximum of about 200 and 70 percent, 
respectively, under the Preferred Alternative, as compared to 1996. One 
new operation, the Medical Isotopes Production Project, would be the 
major contributor to the low-level waste increase. Approximate total 
radioactive waste generation would be up to 180 cubic meters under the 
No Action Alternative, up to 290 cubic meters under the Preferred 
Alternative, and 110 cubic meters under the Reduced Operations 
Alternative. Total chemical waste generation would be up to 
approximately 380,000 kilograms under the No Action Alternative, up to

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approximately 440,000 kilograms under the Preferred Alternative, and up 
to approximately 310,000 kilograms under the Reduced Operations 
Alternative. Capacity currently exists to manage the waste generated 
from all operations at the Preferred Alternative level.

Noise and Vibration

    Under the No Action Alternative, SNL/NM would operate at current 
planned levels, which include background noise levels and short-term 
noise impacts from SNL/NM test activities. By 2008, impulse noise-
producing test activities would increase an estimated 35 percent over 
the 1996 level of 1,059 events. The projected frequency of impulse 
noise events for the Reduced OperationsAlternative would be 65 percent 
less than the 1996 levels.
    Projections under the Preferred Alternative indicate a 250 percent 
increase in the number of impulse noise tests over 1996 levels.
    Only a small fraction of these tests would be loud enough to be 
heard or felt beyond the site boundary. The vast majority of tests 
would be below background noise levels for locations beyond the 
Kirtland Air Force Base boundary and would be unnoticed in 
neighborhoods bounding the site. Ground vibrations would remain 
confined to the immediate test area.

Socioeconomics

    Direct SNL/NM employment projections range from about 7,400 
(Reduced Operations Alternative) to about 8,400 (Preferred 
Alternative), in comparison to about 7,600 full-time SNL/NM employees 
in the 1996 base year. These employment changes would change regional 
population, employment, personal income, and other socioeconomic 
measures in the region by less than 1 percent. Accordingly, no adverse 
socioeconomic impacts would be expected to result from any of the 
alternatives.

Environmental Justice

    Based on the analyses of all resource areas and demographic 
information on low-income and minority population, DOE does not expect 
any environmental justice-related impacts from the continued operation 
of SNL/NM under any of the alternatives.

Accidents

    The accident scenarios discussed are those that bound, i.e., 
provide an upper limit to potential impacts or risks, the accidents at 
SNL/NM. At SNL/NM, accidents could occur that would affect workers and 
the public. Potential accidents with the largest impacts would involve 
radioactive materials in TA-V facilities and hazardous chemicals in TA-
I facilities. In most instances, involved workers (those individuals 
located in the immediate vicinity of an accident) would incur the 
largest risk of serious injury or fatality, because, for most 
accidents, the magnitude of the damaging effects are highest at the 
point of the accident and diminish with increasing distance. This 
result would apply, for example, to releases of radioactive and 
chemical materials, explosions, fires, airplane crashes, earthquakes, 
and similar events. In some situations, however, the mitigating effects 
of structural barriers, personal protection equipment, and engineered 
safety features could offer greater protection for close-in workers 
than for others in the general vicinity of the accident.
    In TA-I, under all three alternatives, there could be numerous 
situations in laboratory rooms where workers could be accidentally 
exposed to small amounts of potentially harmful chemicals. The 
potential also exists in TA-I for a catastrophic accident, such as an 
airplane crash into a facility or an earthquake, in which multiple 
potentially harmful chemicals could be released and expose onsite 
individuals to harmful or fatal chemical concentrations. Large 
quantities of hydrogen stored in outside areas of TA-I could also 
explode as a result of a catastrophic event and cause serious injury or 
fatality to involved workers and other nearby onsite individuals. The 
probability of a catastrophic chemical or explosive accident with 
serious consequences is low (less than once in a thousand years). 
Should such an accident occur, emergency procedures, mitigating 
features, and administrative controls would minimize its adverse 
impacts.
    Under the Preferred Alternative, the Microelectronics Development 
Laboratory and the Compound Semiconductor Research Laboratory would 
remain in their present configuration. In the event of a catastrophic 
accident, such as an airplane crash into either facility (but not 
both), the dominant chemical release would be as much as 106 pounds of 
chlorine from the Microelectronics Development Laboratory or as much as 
65 pounds of arsine from the Compound Semiconductor Research 
Laboratory. If an accident that causes chemical releases were to occur, 
about 141 persons in the vicinity of the Microelectronics Development 
Laboratory or 409 persons in the vicinity of the Compound Semiconductor 
Research Laboratory could be exposed to concentrations greater than 
Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) Level 2. The ERPG-2 level 
is the maximum airborne concentration below which individuals could be 
exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing 
irreversible or other serious health effects that could impair their 
ability to take protective action. In the event of an earthquake, 
simultaneous release of chemicals is possible, and as many as 423 
persons could be exposed in TA-I to concentrations greater than ERPG-2 
levels.
    The potential for accidents would exist in TA-V that would cause 
the release of radioactive materials, causing injury to workers, onsite 
individuals, and the public. For example, if an earthquake occurred, 
the impacts would range from a 1 in 33 increase in probability of a 
latent cancer fatality for a noninvolved worker on the site to 1 in 
120,000 for a maximally exposed member of the public. For the entire 
population residing within 50 miles of SNL/NM, one or two additional 
latent cancer fatalities would be expected. Involved workers, as in the 
case of chemical accidents, would incur the largest risk of injury or 
fatality in the event of almost any accident because of their close 
proximity to the hazardous conditions.

Comments on the Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement

    DOE distributed approximately 500 copies of the Final Site-Wide EIS 
to appropriate Congressional members and committees, the State of New 
Mexico, various American Indian Tribal governments and organizations, 
local governments, other Federal agencies, and other interested 
stakeholders. DOE did not receive any comments on the Final Site-Wide 
EIS.

Other Decision Factors

    As directed by the President and Congress, DOE has a comprehensive 
stewardship program which is maintaining the safety, security and 
reliability of the country's nuclear weapons stockpile. In addition, 
DOE has national security, energy resources, environmental quality, and 
science and technology mission lines, which it supports at a number of 
facilities across the United States. DOE directs and funds SNL/NM 
activities in support of its programs and missions. In turn, SNL/NM's 
facilities and operations are designed to meet the requirements of the 
programs, projects, and activities assigned to the Laboratory.

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    DOE needs to continue to meet its responsibilities for national 
security, energy resources, environmental quality, and science and 
technology at SNL/NM. DOE needs to continue to fulfill its 
responsibilities as mandated by statute, Presidential Decision 
Directive, and Congressional authorization and appropriation, while 
meeting this need in a manner that protects human health and the 
environment.
    As noted in the Site-Wide EIS, SNL/NM houses unique facilities and 
expertise that have been developed over the past 50 years. These 
capabilities have well served national security and other national 
needs in the past. It is expected that, for the foreseeable future, the 
U.S. will maintain a nuclear weapons stockpile and require advanced 
science and manufacturing capabilities to address issues of national 
importance for the maintenance of that stockpile and for other 
purposes, including assuring the safety and reliability of that 
stockpile. The unique facilities and expertise at SNL/NM are needed to 
assist in finding solutions to these issues. These factors were also 
considered (in addition to the human health and environmental impact 
information discussed above) in reaching this Record of Decision.

Decision

    DOE has decided to expand the scope and levels of its operations at 
SNL/NM. DOE is implementing the Preferred Alternative, that is, 
Alternative 2, Expanded Operations (exclusive of the Microsystems and 
Engineering Sciences Applications Complex). This alternative reflects a 
broad expansion of science and technology research and applications of 
this research to a variety of issues of national importance. This 
alternative also includes the continued maintenance of existing and 
expanded capabilities, and continued support and infrastructure 
activities. The following discussion describes the major actions to be 
taken, with an emphasis on those areas that have had the most extensive 
programmatic or public interest.
    The decisions in this Record of Decision will be reflected in DOE 
budget requests and management practices, consistent with mission 
needs. However, implementation of these decisions depends on 
Congressional funding levels.

Selected Facilities in Technical Areas I and II

    The Neutron Generator Facility will continue to fabricate neutron 
generators and neutron tubes. Support activities will include a wide 
variety of manufacturing, testing, and product development techniques 
and processes. The Neutron Generator Facility will increase 
manufacturing to approximately 2,000 neutron generators per year and 
associated neutron and switch tubes. An addition to an existing 
building will be constructed to meet increased production needs. Also, 
Building 870 will undergo extensive renovations.
    The Microelectronic Development Laboratory will continue to conduct 
research and development activities on microelectronic devices for 
nuclear weapons. A broad range of microtechnology development and 
engineering activities, including integrated circuit and wafer 
production will continue. The Microelectronic Development Laboratory 
will be expanded to operate in support of research and development and 
production of silicon-based microelectronic devices; it will produce up 
to 7,500 wafers per year. DOE anticipates that new technologies and 
manufacturing processes will be required to meet expanded activities. 
There will be no construction of new facilities to meet this expanded 
wafer production, and the Compound Semiconductor Research Laboratory 
(Building 893) will remain in operation in its present location. This 
Record of Decision only extends to the existing Microelectronic 
Development Laboratory, without addition of the Microsystems and 
Engineering Sciences Applications Complex. As discussed in the 
Alternatives section of this Record of Decision, DOE is currently 
preparing an Environmental Assessment for the proposed construction and 
operation of the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications 
Complex.
    Advanced manufacturing techniques will continue to be developed and 
applied at the Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory. These 
activities include hardware manufacturing, emergency and prototype 
manufacturing, development of manufacturing processes, and design and 
fabrication of production equipment. Operations at the Advanced 
Manufacturing Processes Laboratory will increase up to a maximum of 
347,000 hours per year.
    Research on materials and advanced components will continue at the 
Integrated Materials Research Laboratory. These activities will include 
basic research in chemistry, physics, and energy technologies. 
Operations at the Integrated Materials Research Laboratory will 
continue at its current capacity of approximately 395,000 hours per 
year.
    The Explosive Components Facility will continue to support the work 
performed at the Neutron Generator Facility and the research and 
development performed on a variety of energetic components. Activities 
include research, testing, development, and quality control activities 
for neutron generators, explosives, chemicals, and batteries. 
Operations at the Explosive Components Facility will be expanded to 
complete up to 500 neutron generator tests, 900 explosive tests, 1,250 
chemical analyses, and 100 battery tests annually.

Physical Testing and Simulation Facilities

    Ballistic studies and solid-fuel rocket motor tests will continue 
at the Terminal Ballistics Complex. Testing capabilities will include 
research in areas of armor penetration, vulnerability, acceleration, 
flight dynamics, and accuracy. Projectile impact tests will include all 
calibers of projectiles. The operating level at the Terminal Ballistics 
Complex will be increased up to a maximum of 350 projectile impact 
tests and 100 propellant tests per year.
    Tests designed for the validation of analytical modeling and 
weapons system certification will continue at the Drop/Impact Complex. 
Test activities will focus on water and underwater tests, design 
verification, and performance assessments. The Drop/Impact Complex 
tests will be expanded up to a maximum of 50 drop tests, 20 water 
impact tests, 5 submersion tests, and 10 underwater blast tests per 
year.
    Tests that simulate high-speed impacts of weapon shapes, 
substructures, and components to verify design integrity, performance, 
and fusing functions will continue at the Sled Track Complex. These 
capabilities will include testing of parachute systems, transportation 
equipment, and reactor safety. Operating levels at the Sled Track 
Complex will be increased up to a maximum of 80 rocket sled tests, 239 
explosive tests, 24 rocket launches, and 150 free-flight launches per 
year.
    The Centrifuge Complex will continue to test objects weighing 
several tons at over 100 times the force of gravity. The number of 
tests for the Centrifuge Complex will increase up to a maximum of 120 
centrifuge tests and 100 impact tests per year.

Accelerator Facilities

    The SATURN accelerator will continue to produce X-rays to simulate 
the radiation effect of nuclear bursts on electronic and material 
components. Tests will include satellite systems,

[[Page 70001]]

weapons materials and components, and reentry vehicle and missile 
subsystems. The accelerator output for SATURN will increase up to a 
maximum of 500 shots annually.
    The High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source III will 
continue to provide gamma ray effects testing capabilities. Tests will 
include electronic components and weapon systems and high-fidelity 
simulation over large areas in near nuclear-explosion radiation 
environments. The High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source III 
operations will increase up to a maximum number of 1,450 shots per 
year.
    The Sandia Accelerator and Beam Research Experiment will continue 
to provide X-ray and gamma ray effects testing capabilities. 
Capabilities will include testing of pulsed-power technologies, fusion 
systems, weapons systems, computer science, flight dynamics, satellite 
systems, and robotics. Testing at the Sandia Accelerator and Beam 
Research Experiment will increase up to a maximum of 400 shots per 
year.
    The Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-Radiator will continue 
to produce high-voltage accelerations to measure X-ray-induced currents 
in integrated circuits and detect response in materials. Testing will 
include activities in radiation measurements for a variety of weapons 
components. Operations at the Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-
Radiator will increase up to a maximum of 6,000 shots per year.
    The Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power I will continue the 
development of pulsed-power technology, including high-power energy 
tests. Activities will include basic scientific research, development, 
and testing. The Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power I operations will 
increase to support up to a maximum of 10,000 tests per year in either 
the single or repetitive pulse modes.
    The Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power II will continue to develop 
radiation processing applications using powerful electron or X-ray 
beams. Activities will include testing of high power magnetic switches 
and specialty transmission lines. The Repetitive High Energy Pulsed 
Power II capacity will be expanded up to a maximum of 20 tests per week 
for 40 weeks per year (800 tests).
    The Z-Machine will continue to produce extremely short and powerful 
pulses at various targets to simulate special atmospheric conditions 
and fusion reaction conditions. The Z-Machine capability will be 
expanded up to a maximum of 350 firings per year. Approximately 78 
percent could involve nuclear materials.
    The Tera-Electron Volt Energy Superconductor Linear Accelerator 
will continue to test plasma opening switches for pulsed-power drivers. 
Other activities include basic research in science, material 
development, and material testing. The operating levels at the Tera-
Electron Volt Energy Superconductor Linear Accelerator will be 
increased up to a maximum of 1,300 shots per year.
    The Advanced Pulsed Power Research Module will continue to evaluate 
the performance and reliability of components including next-generation 
accelerators. Activities will include research and development in 
pulsed-power technologies such as power storage, high-voltage 
switching, and power flow. The Advanced Pulsed Power Research Module 
operations will increase up to a maximum of 2,000 shots per year.
    The Radiographic Integrated Test Stand accelerator will continue to 
develop and demonstrate capabilities for future accelerator facility 
design. Capabilities will focus on demonstrating inductive voltage 
technology. The Radiographic Integrated Test Stand will increase 
operations up to a maximum of 800 tests per year.

Reactor Facilities

    The New Gamma Irradiation Facility will perform a wide variety of 
gamma irradiation experiments under both dry and water-pool conditions. 
Capabilities will include studies in thermal and radiation effects, 
weapons component degradation, nuclear reactor material and components, 
and other nonweapon applications. The New Gamma Irradiation Facility 
will increase operations to irradiate test packages for a maximum of up 
to 24,000 test hours per year.
    The Gamma Irradiation Facility will supplement the capabilities of 
the New Gamma Irradiation Facility. The Gamma Irradiation Facility will 
continue to perform gamma irradiation experiments, and its operations 
will be expanded to complete tests in two available cells. 
Approximately 8,000 test hours will be performed.
    The Sandia Pulsed Reactor will continue to provide multiple fast-
burst reactor, near-fusion spectrum radiation environments. Testing 
activities will include a wide variety of technologies that support 
both defense and nondefense projects. Modifications will be completed 
to enhance and expand current capabilities. Operating levels at the 
Sandia Pulsed Reactor will increase up to a maximum of 200 tests per 
year.
    DOE considered two possible configurations for use of a pulsed-
power reactor, the existing Annular Core Research Reactor reconfigured 
for Defense Programs use, and a possible second reactor referred to as 
the Annular Core Pulse Reactor II. However, a second reactor is not 
ripe for decision at this time, and if this additional reactor facility 
is proposed in the future, DOE will prepare a separate project-specific 
NEPA review.
    The existing Annular Core Research Reactor can be operated in two 
ways: to produce medical isotopes or to support Defense Programs 
activities. Under the Annular Core Research Reactor Defense Programs 
configuration, the reactor will be reconfigured to pulse-mode operation 
to conduct a short-term test series (i.e., up to about 18 months) 
related to the certification of some weapons components. Once the 
short-term testing is completed, the Annular Core Research Reactor will 
be converted back to medical isotope production.
    Under the medical isotopes production configuration, the Annular 
Core Research Reactor will produce medical and research radioactive 
isotopes. Under the medical isotopes production configuration, the 
Annular Core Research Reactor will be operated for 24 hours per day, 7 
days per week, at a maximum power level of 4 Megawatt (approximately 
35,000 Megawatt-hours per year) to meet the entire U.S. demand for 
molybdenum-99 and other isotopes such as iodine-131, xenon-133, and 
iodine-125. This would require the irradiation of about 25 highly 
enriched uranium targets per week (1,300 per year).
    The Hot Cell Facility will primarily support medical isotopes, 
including isotope extraction, isotope production purification, product 
packaging, and quality control. Support to Defense Programs activities 
will be provided as necessary for its short-term testing. The Hot Cell 
Facility will continuously process 100 percent of the U.S. demand for 
molybdenum-99 and other isotopes such as iodine-131, xenon-133, and 
iodine-125. This will require the processing of about 25 irradiated, 
highly enriched uranium targets per week (1,300 per year).

Outdoor Test Facilities

    The Aerial Cable Facility will conduct a variety of impact tests 
involving weapon systems and aircraft components. Capabilities include 
free-fall drop, rocket pull-down, and captive flight tests, data 
recording, and simulation technologies. The Aerial

[[Page 70002]]

Cable Facility will be expanded to include drop tests of joint test 
assemblies that contain depleted uranium, enriched uranium, and 
insensitive high explosives. These test articles will contain up to a 
maximum of 45 pounds of depleted uranium, 120 pounds of enriched 
uranium, and 104 pounds of insensitive high explosives (plastic-bonded 
explosive [PBX]-9502 or press-moldable explosive [LX]-17). The number 
of tests using this kind of test article (containing depleted uranium, 
enriched uranium, and insensitive high explosives) will not exceed five 
per year. The total number of drop/pull-down tests will increase up to 
a maximum of 100 experiments per year. Aerial target tests will 
increase up to a maximum of 30 tests per year. Up to two series of 
scoring system tests will be conducted each year.
    The Lurance Canyon Burn Site will continue to test, certify, and 
validate material and system tolerances. Test objects will be burned 
for short periods of time under controlled conditions. Up to a maximum 
number of approximately 55 certification tests per year will be 
conducted at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site. Model validation tests and 
user tests will increase up to a maximum of 100 and 50 per year, 
respectively.
    The Containment Technology Test Facility--West will continue to 
conduct a series of successive events leading up to ultimate failure of 
test vessels. The Containment Technology Test Facility--West will 
perform up to two survivability tests per year.
    The Explosives Applications Laboratory will continue to design, 
assemble, and test explosive materials, components, and equipment. Work 
will involve arming, fusing, and firing of explosives and testing of 
components. The number of explosive tests at the Explosives 
Applications Laboratory will increase up to a maximum of 360 tests per 
year.
    The Thunder Range Complex will continue its activities ranging from 
disassembly and evaluation to calibration and verification testing of 
special nuclear and nonnuclear systems. Examination and testing of 
objects will involve cleaning, physical examination, disassembly, 
measurement, sampling, photography, and data collection. Operations at 
the Thunder Range Complex will increase up to a maximum of 10 test 
series per year in 2008. Equipment disassembly would increase up to 144 
days per year.

Infrastructure Facilities

    The Steam Plant will continue to produce and distribute steam to 
SNL/NM and Kirtland Air Force Base facilities. Steam production will 
remain at approximately 550 million pounds per year. The Steam Plant 
will require upgrades of several boilers, steam distributors, and 
natural gas supply systems. The boiler upgrade could include a 
technology change to cogeneration units.
    The Hazardous Waste Management Facility will continue to handle, 
package, store, and ship hazardous, toxic, and nonhazardous chemical 
wastes. The Hazardous Waste Management Facility will continue to 
prepare wastes for offsite transportation for recycling, treatment, or 
disposal at licensed facilities. Operations at the Hazardous Waste 
Management Facility will increase from one to three shifts. Quantities 
of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act hazardous waste managed will 
be about 92,000 kilograms each year (well within the permitted 
capacity).
    The Radioactive Mixed Waste Management Facility will continue to 
serve as a centralized facility for receipt, characterization, 
compaction, treatment, repackaging, certification, and storage of low-
level waste, transuranic waste, low-level mixed waste, and mixed 
transuranic waste. The Radioactive Mixed Waste Management Facility will 
continue to prepare wastes for offsite treatment and disposal at 
licensed facilities. Operations at the Radioactive Mixed Waste 
Management Facility will be increased from one to two shifts. Annual 
quantities of radioactive waste managed (including newly generated and 
legacy waste) will be about 19,600 cubic feet for low-level waste. 
Annually, for low-level mixed waste, transuranic waste, and mixed 
transuranic waste, the quantities to be generated and managed are 
approximately as follows: 260 cubic feet low-level mixed waste 
generated, and 8,800 cubic feet managed; 26 cubic feet transuranic 
generated, and 350 cubic feet managed; 37 cubic feet mixed transuranic 
waste generated and managed. The infrastructure processing rate is 2.7 
million pounds per year. A new prefabricated waste storage building 
would be constructed to replace an existing building to improve 
flexibility and operational efficiencies.
    The Thermal Treatment Facility will continue to burn small 
quantities of explosive materials and explosives-contaminated water. 
The quantities of wastes treated at the Thermal Treatment Facility will 
increase. Approximately 1,200 pounds of waste per year would be 
thermally treated. This rate assumes that 60 burns are performed at 20 
pounds of waste per burn. This rate will be implemented only if the 
regulatory authority approves the changes required to the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act permit for the Thermal Treatment 
Facility.

Mitigation Measures

    The Site-Wide EIS included a discussion of existing programs, 
plans, and controls for operations at SNL/NM, including operating 
within applicable regulations, DOE Orders, contractual requirements and 
approved policies and procedures. No new mitigation measures were 
identified. It is unnecessary to prepare a Mitigation Action Plan under 
10 CFR 1021.331.

Conclusion

    DOE has considered environmental impacts, stakeholder concerns, and 
national policy in its decisions regarding the management and use of 
SNL/NM. The analysis contained in the Site-Wide EIS is both 
programmatic and site specific in detail. It is programmatic from the 
perspective of broad, multi-use facility management and site-specific 
in that it analyzes detailed project and program activity. The impacts 
identified in the Site-Wide EIS were based on conservative estimates 
and assumptions. In this regard, the analyses bound the impacts of the 
alternatives evaluated in the Site-Wide EIS.
    DOE has decided to implement the Expanded Operations Alternative 
without the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications Complex, 
i.e., the Preferred Alternative in the Final Site-Wide EIS. Thus, DOE 
and interagency programs and activities could increase to the highest 
reasonable activity levels, subject to mission need and Congressional 
funding and as set forth in the Site-Wide EIS, that could be supported 
by current facilities and their potential expansion and construction of 
new facilities for future actions identified in the Site-Wide EIS.
    In accordance with the provisions of NEPA, its implementing 
procedures and regulations, and DOE's NEPA regulations, I have 
considered the information contained within the Site-Wide EIS, public 
comments received in response to the Site-Wide EIS, and other factors. 
Being fully apprised of the environmental consequences of the 
alternatives and other decision factors described above, I have decided 
to expand, as the need arises, the use of SNL/NM and its resources as 
described. This will enhance DOE's ability to meet its primary national 
security mission responsibility and create an environment that fosters 
technological innovation in both the public and private sectors.


[[Page 70003]]


    Issued at Washington, DC, December 6, 1999.
Thomas F. Gioconda,
Brigadier General, USAF, Acting Assistant Secretary for Defense 
Programs.
[FR Doc. 99-32247 Filed 12-14-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P