[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 213 (Thursday, November 4, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60321-60326]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-28779]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration
[A-427-801]


Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Antifriction Bearings 
From France

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: 
Antifriction Bearings from France.

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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the U.S. Department of Commerce (``the 
Department'') initiated sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders 
on ball bearings, cylindrical roller bearings, and spherical plain 
bearings (collectively, ``antifriction bearings'') from France pursuant 
to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (``the Act''). 
On the basis of a notice of intent to participate and an adequate 
response filed on behalf of a domestic interested party and inadequate 
responses from respondent interested parties in each of these reviews, 
the Department conducted expedited sunset reviews. As a result of these 
reviews, the Department finds that revocation of the antidumping duty 
orders would likely lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at 
the levels indicated in the Final Result of Review section of this 
notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Martha V. Douthit or Melissa G. 
Skinner, Office of Policy for Import Administration, International 
Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and 
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone (202) 482-5050 
or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

    These reviews were conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of 
the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews 
are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'') 
Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516 
(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR Part 351 (1998) 
in general. Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to 
the Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the 
Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies Regarding the Conduct of 
Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy 
Bulletin'').

Scope

    The products covered by these orders are antifriction bearings 
(``AFBs'') from France, which include ball bearings (``BBs''), 
cylindrical roller bearings (``CRBs''), and spherical plain bearings 
(``SPBs'') and parts thereof from France. For a detailed description of 
the products covered by these orders,

[[Page 60322]]

including a compilation of all pertinent scope determinations, refer to 
the notice of final results of expedited sunset reviews on AFBs from 
Japan, publishing concurrently with this notice.

History of the Orders

    On May 3, 1989, the Department issued a final determination of 
sales at less than fair value on imports of AFB's from France (54 FR 
19092). On May 15, 1989, the Department published in the Federal 
Register (54 FR 20902) the antidumping duty orders on the subject 
merchandise.
    As part of these antidumping duty orders, the Department 
established a estimated weighted-average dumping margin for three 
respondents, Compagnie d'Applications Mecaniques S.A. (SKF), Societe 
Nouvelle de Roulements (SNR), and Roulements S.A. (INA), and an ``all 
others'' rate.1 There have been several administrative 
reviews of these orders.2 In the 1995-1996, 1997-1998 
administrative reviews, the Department found that antidumping duties 
were being absorbed.3
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    \1\ In the Antidumping Duty Orders of AFBs from France, dumping 
margins for French producers and exporters of BBs, CRBs, and SPBs 
ranged from 11.03 percent to 66.42 percent.
    \2\ 1. Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller 
Bearings) and Parts Thereof from France; Final Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 56 FR 31748 (July 11, 1991). 
2. Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and 
Parts Thereof from France; et al.; Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review, 57 FR 28360 (June 24, 1992). 3. Final Results 
of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Revocation in Part of 
an Antidumping Duty Order, 58 FR 39729 (July 26, 1993). 4. Final 
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, Partial 
Termination of Administrative Reviews, and Revocation in Part of 
Antidumping Duty Order, 60 FR 10900 (February 28, 1995). 5. 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Reviews and Partial Termination of Administrative Reviews, 61 FR 
66472 (December 17, 1996), as corrected, Antifriction Bearings 
(Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; 
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Partial 
Termination of Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 149 (January 2, 1997). 
6. Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and 
Parts Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and the 
United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Reviews, 62 FR 2081 (January 15, 1997). 7. Antifriction Bearings 
(Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 
62 FR 54043 (October 17, 1997). 8. Antifriction Bearings (Other Than 
Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; 
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 
33320 (June 18, 1998). 9. Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered 
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999)
    \3\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller 
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Romania, Singapore; Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 
1997), Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) 
and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, 
Singapore; Sweden and the United Kingdom; Amended Final Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 61963 (November 20, 
1997), Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) 
and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Reviews, 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).
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    The antidumping duty orders remain in effect for all French 
producers and exporters of AFBs from France.

Background

    On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated sunset reviews of the 
antidumping duty orders on AFBs from France pursuant to section 751(c) 
of the Act. By April 16, 1999, within the deadline specified in section 
351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset Regulation, we received notices of 
intent to participate from the following parties: Link-Belt Bearing 
Division (``Link-Belt''); The Torrington Company (``Torrington'') and 
MPB Corporation (``MPB''); Roller Bearing Company of America, Inc. 
(``RBC''); New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc. (``NHBB'') 4; 
and NSK Corporation (``NSK''). Each of these parties claimed status as 
domestic interested parties on the basis that they are a domestic 
producer, manufacturer, or wholesaler of one or more of the products 
subject to these orders.5
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    \4\ NHBB states that it is affliated with the following 
respondent producers, exporters, and importers: Minebea Co., Ltd., 
NMB Singapore Ltd., Pelmec Industries (Pte.) Ltd., and NMB 
Corporation.
    \5\ Torrington, RBC, and NHBB filed with respect to BBs, CRBs, 
and SPBs. Link-Belt filed with respect to BBs and CRBs. MPB filed 
with respect to BBs and CRBs. NSK filed with respect to BBs only.
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    Within the deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations under 
section 351.218(d)(3)(i), on May 3, 1999, the Department received 
complete substantive responses from each of these domestic interested 
parties, with the exception of Link-Belt. In addition, SKF France and 
Sarma (collectively ``SKF'') notified the Department that they would 
not file a substantive response in the sunset reviews of the AFB 
orders. We received rebuttal comments from Torrington, MPB, and NSK on 
May 12, 1999, within the deadline.
    On May 21, 1999, we informed the International Trade Commission 
(``Commission'') that, on the basis of inadequate responses from 
respondent interested parties, we were conducting expedited sunset 
reviews of these orders consistent with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2). 
(See Letter to Lynn Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations 
from Jeffrey A. May, Director, Office of Policy.)
    In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the 
Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a 
review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1, 
1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the 
sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders on AFBs from France are 
extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion 
of the final results of these reviews until not later than October 28, 
1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.6
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    \6\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan, 
et. al.: Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year 
Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).
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Determination

    In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department 
conducted these reviews to determine whether revocation of the 
antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to continuation or 
recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in 
making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-
average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent 
reviews and import volume of the subject merchandise for the period 
before the issuance of the antidumping duty order and the period after 
the issuance of the antidumping duty order. Pursuant to section 
752(c)(3) of the Act, the Department shall provide to the Commission 
the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail if the order is revoked.
    The Department's determinations concerning adequacy, continuation 
or recurrence of dumping, and magnitude of the margin are discussed 
below. In addition, the parties' comments with respect to adequacy, the 
continuation or recurrence of dumping, and the magnitude of the margin 
are addressed in the respective sections below.

Adequacy

    As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to 
conduct expedited reviews of these orders. On June 10, 1999, we 
received comments on behalf of MPB and Torrington, supporting our 
determination to conduct expedited

[[Page 60323]]

reviews.7 On June 10, 1999, NHBB and NSK Corporation also 
submitted comments on whether expedited sunsets review were warranted. 
In their submissions, NHBB and NSK assert that most of the domestic 
interested parties that submitted substantive responses favor 
revocation of the various orders on antifriction bearings. These 
parties also offered new argument regarding the likely effect of 
revocation of the orders.
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    \7\ These companies filed one submission providing comments on 
all ongoing sunset reviews covering bearings.
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    The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of 
an order, however, is not a consideration in the Department's 
determination of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the 
Department's determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in 
its regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic 
interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing 
a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or 
legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic 
industry support during the course of a sunset review (other than the 
statutory provision that, if there is no domestic industry interest in 
continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order 
automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at 46) makes clear that the 
purpose of adequacy determinations in sunset reviews is for the 
Department to determine whether to issue a determination based on the 
facts available without further fact-gathering. Further, the statute, 
at section 751(c)(1), specifies that the Department is to determine 
whether revocation of an order would be likely to lead to continuation 
or recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) specifies that the Department 
is to consider the weighted-average dumping margins determined in the 
investigation and subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports 
of the subject merchandise for the period before and the period after 
the issuance of the order.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

    Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history 
accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically 
the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No. 
103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1 
(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the 
Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on 
methodological and analytical issues, including the basis for 
likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the 
Department indicates that determinations of likelihood will be made on 
an order-wide basis (see section II.A.2). In addition, the Department 
indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an 
antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence 
of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis 
after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise 
ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated 
after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject 
merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).
    In addition to considering the guidance on likelihood cited above, 
section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Act provides that the Department shall 
determine that revocation of an order is likely to lead to continuation 
or recurrence of dumping where a respondent interested party waives its 
participation in the sunset review. In the instant review, the 
Department did not receive a response from any respondent interested 
party. Pursuant to section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the Sunset 
Regulations, this constitutes a waiver of participation.
    In their substantive responses, Torrington, MPB, and RBC argue that 
revocation of the antidumping duty orders on the subject merchandise 
would be likely to lead to continuation of dumping. All three point out 
that, because dumping continued at levels above de minimis after the 
issuance of the orders, therefore, a consideration of import volumes is 
not necessary.
    Nonetheless, using pre-and post-order import statistics for 
complete unmounted BBs, which Torrington and MPB assert is the only 
product category for which full time series data are available on a 
consistent basis, Torrington and MPB argue that post-order volumes are 
significantly lower than pre-order volumes. Torrington and MPB also 
assert that the same decline is evident from slightly aggregated value 
data covering CRBs. Based on the continued existence of dumping margins 
and the declining trend in imports after the imposition of the orders, 
Torrington and MPB assert that no ``good cause'' exists to consider 
other factors. However, in this regard, Torrington and MPB observe 
that, in each administrative review, the Department has found French 
producers selling below the cost of production.
    NHBB argues that, given the ``internationalization of operations'' 
and the large percentage of foreign ownership of U.S. based companies, 
dumping would not be likely if the orders were revoked because any such 
dumping would undercut the U.S. domestic price structure, thus causing 
injury to the very industry of which foreign owners are a part. In 
addition, NHBB argues that the downward trend in the margins coupled 
with the change in the Department's margin-calculation methodology, 
brought about by the URAA, results in margins that are de minimis. NHBB 
asserts that dumping margins have declined significantly and trade data 
generally show that import volumes have not declined since the time of 
the investigations. For these reasons, NHBB claims that the decline in 
dumping margins and imports show that French producers do not need to 
dump to maintain U.S. market share. Therefore, it concludes, revocation 
of the orders will not likely lead to dumping.
    NSK also argues that dumping margins have declined significantly 
and that imports have declined since the issuance of the antidumping 
duty orders. NSK explains that the fact that dumping margins have 
declined and imports remain at or around 20 percent of market share 
demonstrates that foreign companies do not have to dump if the orders 
were revoked. NSK adds that other factors for the Department's 
consideration in support of revocation of these orders include the lack 
of industry support and a change in the U.S. bearings industry.
    In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB assert that the 
Department should take into account the submitter's affiliation in its 
consideration of comments of various parties filing as domestic 
producers. Further, citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From 
Thailand; Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty 
Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800 
(May 8, 1996), they argue that the Department has recognized that 
domestic producers who are affiliated with subject foreign producers 
and exporters do not have a common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the 
maintenance of the order. Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that 
other parties' comments addressing issues other than margins and import 
volumes should not be considered unless such parties establish ``good 
cause'' to consider such additional factors, which in these reviews, 
they have not done.
    As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the 
SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins 
after the order is highly probative of the

[[Page 60324]]

likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping. If companies 
continue to dump with the discipline of an order in place, the 
Department may reasonably infer that dumping would continue if the 
discipline of the order were removed. Further, as noted above, in 
determining whether revocation of an order is likely to lead to 
continuation or recurrence of dumping, the Department considers the 
margins determined in the investigation and subsequent administrative 
reviews and the volume of imports.
    In the instant proceedings, dumping margins above de minimis 
continue to exist with respect to each of the orders. Therefore, given 
that dumping has continued over the life of the order and respondent 
interested parties waived their participation, we determine that 
dumping is likely to continue if the orders were revoked. Because we 
based this determination on the fact that dumping continued at levels 
above de minimis, we have not addressed the comments submitted by 
Torrington and MPB with respect to ``good cause'' and sales below the 
cost of production nor have we addressed the arguments of other 
interested parties regarding the condition of the U.S. market.

Magnitude of the Margin

    In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that, 
consistent with the SAA and House Report, the Department normally will 
provide to the Commission a margin from the investigation because that 
is the only calculated rate that reflects the behavior or exporters 
without the discipline of an order in place. Further, for companies not 
specifically investigated or for companies that did not begin shipping 
until after the order was issued, we normally will provide a margin 
based on the ``all others'' rate from the investigation. (See section 
II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.) Exceptions to this policy 
include the use of a more recently calculated margin, where 
appropriate, and consideration of duty-absorption determinations. (See 
sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.)
    In their substantive responses, Torrington and MPB argue that the 
margins that are likely to prevail should the orders be revoked are the 
dumping margins found for each company in the original investigations 
(as opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual administrative 
reviews), including margins based on best information available, except 
where the most current margin, increased by the Department's duty-
absorption determination, exceeds the original investigation margin. 
With respect to BBs, RBC argues that the margins from the original 
investigation are the margins likely to prevail were the order to be 
revoked.
    NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the 
orders were revoked would be de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it 
would be illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings 
investments to undercut that investment by dumping. In addition, NHBB 
argues that the Department should not report margins from the original 
investigations. In support of this argument, NHBB notes that the SAA 
provides that, in certain instances, it is more appropriate to rely on 
a more recently calculated margin. NHBB asserts that one such instance 
is where, as in the bearings cases, dumping margins have declined over 
the life of the order and imports have remained steady or increased. 
Additionally, NHBB argues that, because the structure of the U.S. 
domestic industry that exists today bears little resemblance to the 
industry when the antidumping duty orders were imposed in 1989, the 
rates from the original investigation are inappropriate as indicators 
of the rates that would be found upon revocation. Finally, NHBB argues 
that, in light of changes in the methodology used to calculate 
antidumping duty margins introduced by the Uruguay Round, use of 
margins calculated by the Department prior to the URAA would be unfair 
and contrary to the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
    Similarly, NSK Corporation argues that the margins likely to 
prevail would be de minimis. As support, NSK Corporation argues that, 
were the orders not in existence, the Department would apply the 
average-to-average methodology used in an investigation as opposed to 
the transaction-to-average methodology common to administrative reviews 
to measure the extent of any dumping. In such a case, NSK Corporation 
believes that any margin found would be below the two percent de 
minimis level applicable in investigations. NSK Corporation argues 
further that, the Department's unorthodox approach during the original 
investigation, plus the liberal use of best information available, 
skewed the results of the original investigation seriously rendering 
those results inappropriate indicators of the magnitude of the margin 
likely to prevail were the orders to be revoked.
    In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue that other 
parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies regarding the 
selection of margins likely to prevail and ignore the Department's 
duty-absorption findings. Citing to the Sunset Policy Bulletin, 
Torrington and MPB argue that the Department's policies are clear `` 
normal reliance on the margins from the investigation as the only 
margins that reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline 
of the order and rejection of margins from administrative reviews in 
which the Department found duty absorption. Torrington and MPB argue 
that the two-percent de minimis standard is not applicable to sunset 
reviews. Further, they contend that there is no authority which would 
authorize or justify the rejection of the investigation rate on the 
basis of the particular methodology used at the time of the 
investigation. Additionally, they argue that, with respect to claims 
that more recent margins should be used based on declining margins 
accompanied by steady or increasing imports, Torrington and MPB argue 
that it is the responsibility of such claimants to provide information 
regarding companies' relative market share. Since no such information 
was provided they contend, the Department should not accept these 
assertions since imports of certain BBs have actually declined since 
the imposition of the order.
    In its rebuttal comments, NSK Corporation repeats its point that 
dumping margins have declined significantly over time with respect to 
imports of BBs while, at the same time, importations have remained 
steady or around 20 percent of the U.S. market, showing that foreign 
exporters do not have to dump to maintain market share.8
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    \8\ As support, NSK Corporation cites to The Economic Effects of 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension 
Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900, Inv. No. 332-334, at 14-26--14-31 (June 
1995).
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    We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will 
provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the 
rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of 
the order. With respect to NSK's argument concerning the magnitude of 
the margin likely to prevail, we disagree. As discussed above, we do 
find that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of 
dumping. Furthermore, we find the level of dumping likely to prevail is 
best reflected by the dumping margins we calculated in the original 
investigation. Specifically, the Department finds that there is no 
basis to reject margins calculated in an investigation because of

[[Page 60325]]

subsequent changes in methodology since changes do not invalidate 
margins calculated under the prior methodology. Therefore, the dumping 
margins from the original investigation are the only rates which 
reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order, 
regardless of the methodology used to calculate that margin or the use 
of best information available (see section 752(c)(3) of the Act). As 
noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of a more 
recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration of 
duty-absorption determinations.
    With respect to NHBB's argument concerning the dumping margin 
likely to prevail, the Department disagrees. First, NHBB claims that 
dumping margins have declined over the life of the order and imports 
have remained steady or increased. However, NHBB provides no evidence 
to support these claims. Nothing submitted in the course of sunset 
proceedings indicates that imports have remained steady or increased. 
In fact, evidence submitted by Torrington and MPB indicate that 1998 
import volumes of the subject merchandise are more than 8.1 percent 
below pre-order volumes (see Torrington and MPB's Substantive Response 
at 10). Regardless of the level of imports, dumping margins at levels 
above de minimis continue, as do imports of the subject merchandise.
    In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, consistent with the SAA at 889-90 
and the House Report at 63, we indicated that in cases where declining 
(or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady or increasing 
imports, it may be more appropriate to use a more recently calculated 
rate. Such a rate would reflect the fact that companies do not have to 
dump to maintain market share in the United States and, therefore, that 
dumping is less likely to continue or recur if the order were revoked. 
Alternatively, if a company chooses to increase dumping in order to 
increase or maintain market share, the Department may provide the 
Commission with a more recently calculated margin for that company.
    The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we will entertain 
considerations of such fact patterns in response to argument from an 
interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more 
recently calculated margin is probative of an exporter behavior absent 
the discipline of an order, we normally will consider a company's 
relative market-share data with such information to be provided by the 
parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining whether a more 
recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of exporters 
were the order revoked, the Department considers company-specific 
exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although we 
expressed a clear preference for market-share information, in past 
sunset reviews where market-share information was not available, we 
relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and 
after the issuance of the order. (See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited 
Sunset Review: Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December 
8, 1998), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron 
Construction Castings From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of 
China, 64 FR 30310 (June 7, 1999).
    Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of the 
orders while, at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market 
remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular 
company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time 
maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic arguments 
may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping 
coupled with increased market share. In the instant proceedings, we did 
not receive any company-specific arguments.
    Additionally, the SAA at 885 and the House Report at 60, provide 
that duty absorption is a strong indicator that the current dumping 
margins calculated in reviews may not be indicative of the margins that 
would exist in the absence of an order. Since, once an order is 
revoked, the importer could achieve the same pre-revocation return on 
its sales by lowering its prices in the United States in the amount of 
the duty that was previously being absorbed. Therefore, in the Sunset 
Policy Bulletin we indicated that, in the case of duty absorption, we 
normally will determine that a company's current dumping margin is not 
indicative of the margin likely to prevail were the order to be 
revoked. Further, we indicated that normally we will provide to the 
Commission the higher of (1) the margin that we would otherwise have 
reported to the Commission or (2) the most recent margin for that 
company, adjusted to account for our findings on duty-absorption. For 
purposes of considering duty absorption for these sunset reviews, we 
relied on the level of duty absorption found in the administrative 
review initiated in 1998. See 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).
    In their comments, Torrington and MPB argue that the Sunset Policy 
Bulletin requires that the Department report to the Commission the 
higher of the margin from the original investigation or the margin from 
a more recent administrative review adjusted to reflect duty absorption 
findings. Although we found that duties were being absorbed during the 
1998 administrative review (64 FR 35590) for BBs and CRBs from France 
by SKF and SNR, our calculations found the adjusted margins to be less 
than the rates from the original investigation.
    As noted above, there is no evidence on the record to indicate that 
the margin of dumping for any particular producer/exporter decreased at 
the same time that it was increasing or maintaining U.S. market share 
nor is there evidence on the record to indicate corresponding increases 
in dumping margins and exports. Therefore, we are relying on the 
margins from the original investigations as probative of the behavior 
of producers/exporters without the discipline of the orders.
    Based on the above analysis, we will report to the Commission the 
margins indicated in the Final Results of the Review section of this 
notice.

Final Results of Review

    As a result of these reviews, the Department finds that revocation 
of the antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to continuation 
or recurrence of dumping at the margins listed below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Margin
                  Manufacturers/ Exporters                    (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ball Bearings:
    INA....................................................        66.18
    SKF (including all relevant affiliates)................        66.42
    SNR....................................................        56.50
    All others.............................................        65.13
Cylindrical Roller Bearings:
    INA....................................................        11.03
    SNR....................................................        18.37
    All others.............................................        17.31
Spherical Plain Bearings
    SKF....................................................        39.00
    All others.............................................        39.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to 
administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility 
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under 
APO in accordance with section 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's 
regulation. Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials 
or conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure 
to comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is sanctionable 
violation.
    These five-year (``sunset'') reviews and notice are published in 
accordance

[[Page 60326]]

with sections 751(c) and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

    Dated: October 28, 1999.
Richard W. Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 99-28779 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P