[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 213 (Thursday, November 4, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60313-60317]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-28777]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
[A-485-801]
Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Ball Bearings From
Romania
AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Ball
Bearings from Romania.
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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the U.S. Department of Commerce (``the
Department'') initiated a sunset review of the antidumping duty order
on ball bearings from Romania pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended (``the Act''). On the basis of a notice of
intent to participate and adequate response filed on behalf of a
domestic interested party and inadequate response from respondent
interested parties in this review, the Department conducted an
expedited sunset review. As a result of this review, the Department
finds that revocation of the antidumping duty order would likely lead
to recurrence of dumping at
[[Page 60314]]
the levels indicated in the Final Results of Review section of this
notice.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mark D. Young or Melissa G. Skinner,
Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone (202) 482-3207
or (202) 482-1560, respectively.
EFFECTIVE DATE: November 4, 1999.
Statute and Regulations
This review was conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of
the Act. The Department's procedures for conducting sunset reviews are
set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews
of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516 (March 20,
1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR part 351 (1999) in general.
Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to the
Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the Department's
Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies Regarding the Conduct of Five-year
(``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders;
Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy
Bulletin'').
Scope
The products covered by this order are ball bearings (``BBs'') and
parts thereof from Romania. For a detailed description of the products
covered by this order, including a compilation of all pertinent scope
determinations, refer to the notice of final results of expedited
sunset reviews on antifriction bearings from Japan, publishing
concurrently with this notice.
History of the Order
On May 3, 1989, the Department issued a final determination of
sales at less than fair value (``LTFV'') with respect to imports of BBs
from Romania.1 The antidumping duty order on BBs was issued
by the Department on May 15, 1989, and the dumping margins that were
found in the final determination of sales at LTFV were
confirmed.2 Since the imposition of this order, the
Department has conducted several administrative reviews.3
The order remains in effect for all manufacturers and exporters of the
subject merchandise.
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\1\ See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value;
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From Romania, May 3, 1989 54 FR 18992.
\2\ See Ball Bearings, Cylindrical Roller Bearings, and
Spherical Plain Bearings and Parts Thereof From Romania; Antidumping
Duty Order, May 15, 1989 54 FR 20900.
\3\ See Ball Bearings, Cylindrical Roller Bearings, and
Spherical Plain Bearings and Parts Thereof From Romania; Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 64 FR 35590 (July
1, 1999); 63 FR 33320 (June 18, 1998); 62 FR 54043 (October 17,
1997); 58 FR 39729 (July 26, 1993); 57 FR 28360 (June 24, 1992); and
56 FR 31692 (July 11, 1991).
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This review covers all producers and exporters of BBs from Romania.
Background
On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated a sunset review of the
antidumping duty order on BBs from Romania pursuant to section 751(c)
of the Act. By April 16,1999, within the deadline specified in section
351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset Regulations, we received notices of
intent to participate from The Torrington Company (``Torrington'') and
MPB Corporation (``MPB''), Roller Bearing Company of America (``RBC''),
Link-Belt Bearing Division (``Link-Belt''), New Hampshire Ball Bearing,
Inc. (``NHBB''), and NSK Corporation (``NSK''). Each of these parties
claimed status as domestic interested parties on the basis that they
are domestic producers, manufacturers, or wholesalers of BBs.
Within the deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations under
section 351.218(d)(3)(i), on May 3, 1999, the Department received
complete substantive responses from each of these domestic interested
parties. In addition, Tehnoimportexport S.A. (``TIE'') notified the
Department that it would not file a substantive response in the review
of the BBs order. We received substantive comments from Torrington and
MPB, RBC, NHBB, and NSK, on May 12, 1999, within the deadline. We did
not receive a substantive response from Link-Belt.
On May 21, 1999, we informed the International Trade Commission
(``Commission'') that, on the basis of inadequate response from
respondent interested parties, we were conducting an expedited sunset
review of this order consistent with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2).
(See Letter to Lynn Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations
from Jeffrey A. May, Director, Office of Policy.)
In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the
Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a
review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1,
1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the
sunset review of the antidumping duty order on BBs from Romania is
extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion
of the final results of this review until not later than October 28,
1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.4
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\4\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan,
et. al.: Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year
Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).
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Determination
In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department
conducted this review to determine whether revocation of the
antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in
making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-
average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent
reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the
period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty
order. Pursuant to section 752(c)(3) of the Act, the Department shall
provide to the Commission the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail
if the order is revoked.
The Department's determinations concerning continuation or
recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin are discussed
below. In addition, the parties' comments with respect to the
continuation or recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin
are addressed within the respective sections below.
Adequacy
As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to
conduct an expedited review of this order. On June 10, 1999, we
received comments on behalf of Torrington and MPB supporting our
determination to conduct an expedited review. NHBB and NSK also
submitted comments on whether an expedited sunset review was warranted.
In both submissions, both parties assert that most of the domestic
interested parties that submitted substantive responses are in favor of
revocation of the Department's various antidumping duty orders on
antifriction bearings. These parties also offered new argument
regarding the likely effect of revocation of these orders.
The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of
an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination
of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's
determination of likelihood. We made clear in our
[[Page 60315]]
regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic
interested party, which we have received in this case from Torrington
and MPB, RBC, NHBB, and NSK, would be considered adequate for purpose
of continuing a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in
the statute or legislative history is there reference to consideration
of domestic industry support during the course of a sunset review
(other than the statutory provision that if there is no domestic
industry interest in continuation of the order, the Department will
revoke the order automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at S. Rep.
No. 103-412, at 46 (1994)) makes clear that the purpose of adequacy
determinations in sunset reviews is for the Department to determine
whether to issue a determination based on the facts available without
further fact-gathering. Further, the statute, at section 751(c)(1),
specifies that the Department is to determine whether revocation of an
order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping.
Section 752(c) specifies that the Department is to consider the
weighted-average dumping margins determined in the investigation and
subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports of the subject
merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of
the order.
Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping
Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history
accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically
the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No.
103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1
(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the
Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on
methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for
likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the
Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on
an order-wide basis (see section II.A.2). In addition, the Department
indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an
antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence
of dumping when (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis
after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise
ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated
after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject
merchandise declined significantly (see Section II.A.3).
In their substantive responses, Torrington, MPB, and RBC argue that
revocation of the antidumping duty order on the subject merchandise
would likely lead to the recurrence of dumping. They base this
conclusion on the fact that imports declined significantly while
dumping margins remained at de minimis levels. Torrington and MPB argue
that the post-order volume of imports for complete unmounted BBs, which
they assert is the only category for which statistics are available on
a consistent basis, have declined significantly since the issuance of
the order. They argue further that, since the post-order import volume
was 83% lower than the pre-order volume, the Department should conclude
that dumping is likely to recur if the order were revoked. In
conclusion, Torrington and MPB assert that no ``good cause'' exists to
consider other factors, such as sales below the cost of production.
NHBB and NSK assert that revocation of the order is not likely to
result in continuation or recurrence of dumping. NHBB bases its
assertion on the fact that dumping would undercut the U.S. domestic
price structure, thus causing injury to the very industry of which
foreign owners are a part. NSK claims that the margin of dumping would
be no higher than the margin for TIE found in the most recent
administrative review (i.e., 0.02 percent).
In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB assert that the
Department should take into account the submitter's affiliation in its
consideration of comments of various parties filing as domestic
producers. Further, citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From
Thailand; Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty
Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800
(May 8, 1996), they argue that the Department has recognized that
domestic producers who are affiliated with subject foreign producers
and exporters do not have a common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the
maintenance of the order. Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that
other parties' comments addressing issues other than margins and import
volumes should not be considered unless such parties establish ``good
cause'' to consider such additional factors, which, in this review,
they have not done.
As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the
SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins
after the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation
or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the
discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer
that dumping would continue if the discipline of the order were
removed. Therefore, as noted above, in determining whether revocation
of an order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping,
the Department considers the margins determined in the investigation
and subsequent administrative reviews and the volume of imports.
Whatever relevance the arguments of NHBB and NSK concerning possible
disincentives for producers and/or exporters to dump in the U.S. market
might have had is mooted by the evidence that dumping continues and has
continued over the life of the order.
As set forth in the Sunset Policy Bulletin (section II.A.3) and
consistent with the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, where
dumping was eliminated after the issuance of the order and import
volumes from the subject merchandise declined significantly, the
Department normally will determine that revocation of the antidumping
duty order would be likely to lead to recurrence of dumping. Although
dumping has been eliminated, shipments of the subject merchandise have
declined dramatically. In addition, respondent interested parties
waived participation in this review. Therefore, we determine that,
consistent with section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, dumping
is likely to recur if the order were revoked. Because we have based
this determination on the fact that import volumes of the subject
merchandise declined significantly after the issuance of the order, we
have not addressed the comments submitted by Torrington and MPB with
respect to ``good cause'' nor have we addressed the arguments of other
interested parties regarding the condition of the U.S. market.
Magnitude of the Margin
In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that,
consistent with the SAA and House Report, the Department normally will
provide to the Commission a margin from the investigation because that
is the only calculated rate that reflects the behavior of exporters
without the discipline of an order in place. Further, for companies not
specifically investigated or for companies that did not begin shipping
until after the order was issued, the Department normally will provide
a margin based on the ``all others'' rate from the investigation. (See
section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.) Exceptions to this
policy include the
[[Page 60316]]
use of a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and
consideration of duty-absorption determinations. (See sections II.B.2
and 3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.)
In their substantive responses, Torrington, MPB, and RBC argue that
the margins that are likely to prevail should the order be revoked are
the dumping margins found for each company in the original
investigation (as opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual
administrative reviews), including margins based on best information
available, except where the most current margin, increased by the
Department's duty-absorption determination, exceeds the original
investigation margin.
NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the order
were revoked are de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it would be
illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings investments to
undercut that investment by dumping. In addition, NHBB argues that the
Department should not report margins from the original investigation.
In support of this argument, NHBB notes that the SAA provides that, in
certain instances, it is more appropriate to rely on a more recently
calculated margin. NHBB asserts that one such instance is where, as in
the bearings cases, dumping margins have declined over the life of the
order and imports have remained steady or increased. Additionally, NHBB
argues that, because the structure of the U.S. domestic industry that
exists today bears little resemblance to the industry when the
antidumping duty order was imposed in 1989, the rates from the original
investigation are inappropriate as indicators of the rates that would
be found upon revocation. Finally, NHBB argues that, in light of
changes in the methodology used to calculated antidumping duty margins
introduced by the Uruguay Round, use of margins calculated by the
Department prior to the URAA would be unfair and would be contrary to
the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
Similarly, NSK argues that the margins likely to prevail are de
minimis. As support, NSK argues that, were the order not in existence,
the Department would apply the average-to-average methodology used in
an investigation as opposed to the transaction-to-average methodology
common to administrative reviews to measure the extent of any dumping.
In such a case, NSK believes any margin found would be below the two
percent de minimis level applicable in investigations. NSK argues
further that, the Department's unorthodox approach during the original
investigation, plus the liberal use of best information available,
skewed the results of the original investigation seriously, rendering
those results inappropriate indicators of the magnitude of the margin
likely to prevail if the order were revoked. Finally, NSK also argues
that dumping margins have declined over time while, at the same time,
importations have remained at or around 20 percent of the U.S. market.
As support, it cites to The Economic Effects of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900,
Inv. No. 332-334, at 14-26--14-31 (June 1995).
In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue that other
parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies regarding the
selection of margins likely to prevail. Citing to the Sunset Policy
Bulletin, Torrington and MPB argue that the Department's policies are
clear--normal reliance on the margins from the investigation as the
only margins that reflect the behavior of exporters without the
discipline of the order. Torrington and MPB argue that the two-percent
de minimis standard is not applicable to sunset reviews. Further, there
is no authority which would authorize or justify the rejection of the
investigation rate on the basis of the particular methodology used at
the time of the investigation. Additionally, with respect to claims
that more recent margins should be used based on declining margins
accompanied by steady or increasing imports, Torrington and MPB argue
that it is the responsibility of such claimants to provide information
regarding companies' relative market share. Since no such information
was provided, Torrington and MPB argue that the Department should not
accept these assertions.
We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will
provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the
rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of
the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of
a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration
of duty-absorption determinations.
In the Sunset Policy Bulletin we indicated that, consistent with
the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, we may determine, in
cases where declining (or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady
or increasing imports, that a more recently calculated rate reflects
that companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the
United States and, therefore, that dumping is less likely to continue
or recur if the order was revoked. Alternatively, if a company chooses
to increase dumping in order to increase or maintain market share, the
Department may provide the Commission with a more recently calculated
margin for that company. The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we
will entertain such considerations in response to argument from an
interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more
recently calculated margin is probative of an exporter's behavior
absent the discipline of an order, the Department normally will
consider the company's relative market share, with such information to
be provided by the parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining
whether a more recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior
of exporters were the order revoked, the Department considers company-
specific exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although
we expressed a clear preference for market-share information, in past
sunset reviews, where market-share information was not available, we
relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and
after the issuance of the order. See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited
Sunset Review: Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December
8, 1998), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron
Construction Castings From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of
China, 64 FR 30310 (June 7, 1999).
In sunset reviews, although we make likelihood determinations on an
order-wide basis, we report company-specific margins to the Commission.
Therefore, it is appropriate that our determinations regarding the
magnitude of the margin likely to prevail be based on company-specific
information. Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of
the order while, at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market
remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular
company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time
maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic argument
may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping
coupled with increased market share.
Our review of import statistics, provided by Torrington and MPB,
covering BBs from Romania demonstrates that imports have declined
significantly since 1988, dropping from 13.5 million units to 0.7
million units. Although imports increased to 2.5 million units in 1997,
[[Page 60317]]
they remain significantly below pre-order volumes. While we acknowledge
that we may select a more recently calculated margin when declining (or
no) margins are accompanied by steady or increasing imports, we do not
agree that the facts of this case support such a determination.
Although dumping margins, in the instant case, have remained at levels
below de minimis levels from 1990 through 1998, the record reflects a
dramatic decline in import levels. As mentioned above, the Department
normally will determine that revocation of an antidumping duty order is
likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping where there is
a significant decline in import levels. Therefore, we find that the use
of a more recently calculated margin in its report to the Commission
would be inappropriate. Rather, we find that the margins from the
original investigation reflect the behavior of exporters absent the
discipline of the order. Therefore, consistent with the Sunset Policy
Bulletin, we will report to the Commission the margins indicated in the
Final Results of the Review section of this notice.
Final Results of Review
As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of
the antidumping duty order would likely lead to recurrence of dumping
at the margins indicated below:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Margin
Manufacturer/ Exporter (percent)
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Ball Bearings:
TIE.................................................... 39.61
All Others............................................. 39.61
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to
administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under
APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations.
Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or
conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to
comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable
violation.
This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are in accordance
with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.
Dated: October 28, 1999.
Richard Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 99-28777 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P