[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 213 (Thursday, November 4, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60313-60317]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-28777]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration
[A-485-801]


Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Ball Bearings From 
Romania

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Ball 
Bearings from Romania.

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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the U.S. Department of Commerce (``the 
Department'') initiated a sunset review of the antidumping duty order 
on ball bearings from Romania pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff 
Act of 1930, as amended (``the Act''). On the basis of a notice of 
intent to participate and adequate response filed on behalf of a 
domestic interested party and inadequate response from respondent 
interested parties in this review, the Department conducted an 
expedited sunset review. As a result of this review, the Department 
finds that revocation of the antidumping duty order would likely lead 
to recurrence of dumping at

[[Page 60314]]

the levels indicated in the Final Results of Review section of this 
notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mark D. Young or Melissa G. Skinner, 
Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and 
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone (202) 482-3207 
or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

    This review was conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of 
the Act. The Department's procedures for conducting sunset reviews are 
set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews 
of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516 (March 20, 
1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR part 351 (1999) in general. 
Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to the 
Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the Department's 
Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies Regarding the Conduct of Five-year 
(``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders; 
Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy 
Bulletin'').

Scope

    The products covered by this order are ball bearings (``BBs'') and 
parts thereof from Romania. For a detailed description of the products 
covered by this order, including a compilation of all pertinent scope 
determinations, refer to the notice of final results of expedited 
sunset reviews on antifriction bearings from Japan, publishing 
concurrently with this notice.

History of the Order

    On May 3, 1989, the Department issued a final determination of 
sales at less than fair value (``LTFV'') with respect to imports of BBs 
from Romania.1 The antidumping duty order on BBs was issued 
by the Department on May 15, 1989, and the dumping margins that were 
found in the final determination of sales at LTFV were 
confirmed.2 Since the imposition of this order, the 
Department has conducted several administrative reviews.3 
The order remains in effect for all manufacturers and exporters of the 
subject merchandise.
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    \1\ See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof From Romania, May 3, 1989 54 FR 18992.
    \2\ See Ball Bearings, Cylindrical Roller Bearings, and 
Spherical Plain Bearings and Parts Thereof From Romania; Antidumping 
Duty Order, May 15, 1989 54 FR 20900.
    \3\ See Ball Bearings, Cylindrical Roller Bearings, and 
Spherical Plain Bearings and Parts Thereof From Romania; Final 
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 64 FR 35590 (July 
1, 1999); 63 FR 33320 (June 18, 1998); 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 
1997); 58 FR 39729 (July 26, 1993); 57 FR 28360 (June 24, 1992); and 
56 FR 31692 (July 11, 1991).
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    This review covers all producers and exporters of BBs from Romania.

Background

    On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated a sunset review of the 
antidumping duty order on BBs from Romania pursuant to section 751(c) 
of the Act. By April 16,1999, within the deadline specified in section 
351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset Regulations, we received notices of 
intent to participate from The Torrington Company (``Torrington'') and 
MPB Corporation (``MPB''), Roller Bearing Company of America (``RBC''), 
Link-Belt Bearing Division (``Link-Belt''), New Hampshire Ball Bearing, 
Inc. (``NHBB''), and NSK Corporation (``NSK''). Each of these parties 
claimed status as domestic interested parties on the basis that they 
are domestic producers, manufacturers, or wholesalers of BBs.
    Within the deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations under 
section 351.218(d)(3)(i), on May 3, 1999, the Department received 
complete substantive responses from each of these domestic interested 
parties. In addition, Tehnoimportexport S.A. (``TIE'') notified the 
Department that it would not file a substantive response in the review 
of the BBs order. We received substantive comments from Torrington and 
MPB, RBC, NHBB, and NSK, on May 12, 1999, within the deadline. We did 
not receive a substantive response from Link-Belt.
    On May 21, 1999, we informed the International Trade Commission 
(``Commission'') that, on the basis of inadequate response from 
respondent interested parties, we were conducting an expedited sunset 
review of this order consistent with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2). 
(See Letter to Lynn Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations 
from Jeffrey A. May, Director, Office of Policy.)
    In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the 
Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a 
review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1, 
1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the 
sunset review of the antidumping duty order on BBs from Romania is 
extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion 
of the final results of this review until not later than October 28, 
1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.4
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    \4\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan, 
et. al.: Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year 
Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).
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Determination

    In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department 
conducted this review to determine whether revocation of the 
antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or 
recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in 
making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-
average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent 
reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the 
period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty 
order. Pursuant to section 752(c)(3) of the Act, the Department shall 
provide to the Commission the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail 
if the order is revoked.
    The Department's determinations concerning continuation or 
recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin are discussed 
below. In addition, the parties' comments with respect to the 
continuation or recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin 
are addressed within the respective sections below.

Adequacy

    As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to 
conduct an expedited review of this order. On June 10, 1999, we 
received comments on behalf of Torrington and MPB supporting our 
determination to conduct an expedited review. NHBB and NSK also 
submitted comments on whether an expedited sunset review was warranted. 
In both submissions, both parties assert that most of the domestic 
interested parties that submitted substantive responses are in favor of 
revocation of the Department's various antidumping duty orders on 
antifriction bearings. These parties also offered new argument 
regarding the likely effect of revocation of these orders.
    The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of 
an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination 
of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's 
determination of likelihood. We made clear in our

[[Page 60315]]

regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic 
interested party, which we have received in this case from Torrington 
and MPB, RBC, NHBB, and NSK, would be considered adequate for purpose 
of continuing a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in 
the statute or legislative history is there reference to consideration 
of domestic industry support during the course of a sunset review 
(other than the statutory provision that if there is no domestic 
industry interest in continuation of the order, the Department will 
revoke the order automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at S. Rep. 
No. 103-412, at 46 (1994)) makes clear that the purpose of adequacy 
determinations in sunset reviews is for the Department to determine 
whether to issue a determination based on the facts available without 
further fact-gathering. Further, the statute, at section 751(c)(1), 
specifies that the Department is to determine whether revocation of an 
order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping. 
Section 752(c) specifies that the Department is to consider the 
weighted-average dumping margins determined in the investigation and 
subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports of the subject 
merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of 
the order.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

    Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history 
accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically 
the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No. 
103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1 
(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the 
Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on 
methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for 
likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the 
Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on 
an order-wide basis (see section II.A.2). In addition, the Department 
indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an 
antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence 
of dumping when (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis 
after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise 
ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated 
after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject 
merchandise declined significantly (see Section II.A.3).
    In their substantive responses, Torrington, MPB, and RBC argue that 
revocation of the antidumping duty order on the subject merchandise 
would likely lead to the recurrence of dumping. They base this 
conclusion on the fact that imports declined significantly while 
dumping margins remained at de minimis levels. Torrington and MPB argue 
that the post-order volume of imports for complete unmounted BBs, which 
they assert is the only category for which statistics are available on 
a consistent basis, have declined significantly since the issuance of 
the order. They argue further that, since the post-order import volume 
was 83% lower than the pre-order volume, the Department should conclude 
that dumping is likely to recur if the order were revoked. In 
conclusion, Torrington and MPB assert that no ``good cause'' exists to 
consider other factors, such as sales below the cost of production.
    NHBB and NSK assert that revocation of the order is not likely to 
result in continuation or recurrence of dumping. NHBB bases its 
assertion on the fact that dumping would undercut the U.S. domestic 
price structure, thus causing injury to the very industry of which 
foreign owners are a part. NSK claims that the margin of dumping would 
be no higher than the margin for TIE found in the most recent 
administrative review (i.e., 0.02 percent).
    In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB assert that the 
Department should take into account the submitter's affiliation in its 
consideration of comments of various parties filing as domestic 
producers. Further, citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From 
Thailand; Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty 
Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800 
(May 8, 1996), they argue that the Department has recognized that 
domestic producers who are affiliated with subject foreign producers 
and exporters do not have a common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the 
maintenance of the order. Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that 
other parties' comments addressing issues other than margins and import 
volumes should not be considered unless such parties establish ``good 
cause'' to consider such additional factors, which, in this review, 
they have not done.
    As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the 
SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins 
after the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation 
or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the 
discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer 
that dumping would continue if the discipline of the order were 
removed. Therefore, as noted above, in determining whether revocation 
of an order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping, 
the Department considers the margins determined in the investigation 
and subsequent administrative reviews and the volume of imports. 
Whatever relevance the arguments of NHBB and NSK concerning possible 
disincentives for producers and/or exporters to dump in the U.S. market 
might have had is mooted by the evidence that dumping continues and has 
continued over the life of the order.
    As set forth in the Sunset Policy Bulletin (section II.A.3) and 
consistent with the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, where 
dumping was eliminated after the issuance of the order and import 
volumes from the subject merchandise declined significantly, the 
Department normally will determine that revocation of the antidumping 
duty order would be likely to lead to recurrence of dumping. Although 
dumping has been eliminated, shipments of the subject merchandise have 
declined dramatically. In addition, respondent interested parties 
waived participation in this review. Therefore, we determine that, 
consistent with section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, dumping 
is likely to recur if the order were revoked. Because we have based 
this determination on the fact that import volumes of the subject 
merchandise declined significantly after the issuance of the order, we 
have not addressed the comments submitted by Torrington and MPB with 
respect to ``good cause'' nor have we addressed the arguments of other 
interested parties regarding the condition of the U.S. market.

Magnitude of the Margin

    In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that, 
consistent with the SAA and House Report, the Department normally will 
provide to the Commission a margin from the investigation because that 
is the only calculated rate that reflects the behavior of exporters 
without the discipline of an order in place. Further, for companies not 
specifically investigated or for companies that did not begin shipping 
until after the order was issued, the Department normally will provide 
a margin based on the ``all others'' rate from the investigation. (See 
section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.) Exceptions to this 
policy include the

[[Page 60316]]

use of a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and 
consideration of duty-absorption determinations. (See sections II.B.2 
and 3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.)
    In their substantive responses, Torrington, MPB, and RBC argue that 
the margins that are likely to prevail should the order be revoked are 
the dumping margins found for each company in the original 
investigation (as opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual 
administrative reviews), including margins based on best information 
available, except where the most current margin, increased by the 
Department's duty-absorption determination, exceeds the original 
investigation margin.
    NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the order 
were revoked are de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it would be 
illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings investments to 
undercut that investment by dumping. In addition, NHBB argues that the 
Department should not report margins from the original investigation. 
In support of this argument, NHBB notes that the SAA provides that, in 
certain instances, it is more appropriate to rely on a more recently 
calculated margin. NHBB asserts that one such instance is where, as in 
the bearings cases, dumping margins have declined over the life of the 
order and imports have remained steady or increased. Additionally, NHBB 
argues that, because the structure of the U.S. domestic industry that 
exists today bears little resemblance to the industry when the 
antidumping duty order was imposed in 1989, the rates from the original 
investigation are inappropriate as indicators of the rates that would 
be found upon revocation. Finally, NHBB argues that, in light of 
changes in the methodology used to calculated antidumping duty margins 
introduced by the Uruguay Round, use of margins calculated by the 
Department prior to the URAA would be unfair and would be contrary to 
the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
    Similarly, NSK argues that the margins likely to prevail are de 
minimis. As support, NSK argues that, were the order not in existence, 
the Department would apply the average-to-average methodology used in 
an investigation as opposed to the transaction-to-average methodology 
common to administrative reviews to measure the extent of any dumping. 
In such a case, NSK believes any margin found would be below the two 
percent de minimis level applicable in investigations. NSK argues 
further that, the Department's unorthodox approach during the original 
investigation, plus the liberal use of best information available, 
skewed the results of the original investigation seriously, rendering 
those results inappropriate indicators of the magnitude of the margin 
likely to prevail if the order were revoked. Finally, NSK also argues 
that dumping margins have declined over time while, at the same time, 
importations have remained at or around 20 percent of the U.S. market. 
As support, it cites to The Economic Effects of Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900, 
Inv. No. 332-334, at 14-26--14-31 (June 1995).
    In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue that other 
parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies regarding the 
selection of margins likely to prevail. Citing to the Sunset Policy 
Bulletin, Torrington and MPB argue that the Department's policies are 
clear--normal reliance on the margins from the investigation as the 
only margins that reflect the behavior of exporters without the 
discipline of the order. Torrington and MPB argue that the two-percent 
de minimis standard is not applicable to sunset reviews. Further, there 
is no authority which would authorize or justify the rejection of the 
investigation rate on the basis of the particular methodology used at 
the time of the investigation. Additionally, with respect to claims 
that more recent margins should be used based on declining margins 
accompanied by steady or increasing imports, Torrington and MPB argue 
that it is the responsibility of such claimants to provide information 
regarding companies' relative market share. Since no such information 
was provided, Torrington and MPB argue that the Department should not 
accept these assertions.
    We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will 
provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the 
rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of 
the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of 
a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration 
of duty-absorption determinations.
    In the Sunset Policy Bulletin we indicated that, consistent with 
the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, we may determine, in 
cases where declining (or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady 
or increasing imports, that a more recently calculated rate reflects 
that companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the 
United States and, therefore, that dumping is less likely to continue 
or recur if the order was revoked. Alternatively, if a company chooses 
to increase dumping in order to increase or maintain market share, the 
Department may provide the Commission with a more recently calculated 
margin for that company. The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we 
will entertain such considerations in response to argument from an 
interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more 
recently calculated margin is probative of an exporter's behavior 
absent the discipline of an order, the Department normally will 
consider the company's relative market share, with such information to 
be provided by the parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining 
whether a more recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior 
of exporters were the order revoked, the Department considers company-
specific exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although 
we expressed a clear preference for market-share information, in past 
sunset reviews, where market-share information was not available, we 
relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and 
after the issuance of the order. See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited 
Sunset Review: Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December 
8, 1998), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron 
Construction Castings From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of 
China, 64 FR 30310 (June 7, 1999).
    In sunset reviews, although we make likelihood determinations on an 
order-wide basis, we report company-specific margins to the Commission. 
Therefore, it is appropriate that our determinations regarding the 
magnitude of the margin likely to prevail be based on company-specific 
information. Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of 
the order while, at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market 
remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular 
company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time 
maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic argument 
may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping 
coupled with increased market share.
    Our review of import statistics, provided by Torrington and MPB, 
covering BBs from Romania demonstrates that imports have declined 
significantly since 1988, dropping from 13.5 million units to 0.7 
million units. Although imports increased to 2.5 million units in 1997,

[[Page 60317]]

they remain significantly below pre-order volumes. While we acknowledge 
that we may select a more recently calculated margin when declining (or 
no) margins are accompanied by steady or increasing imports, we do not 
agree that the facts of this case support such a determination. 
Although dumping margins, in the instant case, have remained at levels 
below de minimis levels from 1990 through 1998, the record reflects a 
dramatic decline in import levels. As mentioned above, the Department 
normally will determine that revocation of an antidumping duty order is 
likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping where there is 
a significant decline in import levels. Therefore, we find that the use 
of a more recently calculated margin in its report to the Commission 
would be inappropriate. Rather, we find that the margins from the 
original investigation reflect the behavior of exporters absent the 
discipline of the order. Therefore, consistent with the Sunset Policy 
Bulletin, we will report to the Commission the margins indicated in the 
Final Results of the Review section of this notice.

Final Results of Review

    As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of 
the antidumping duty order would likely lead to recurrence of dumping 
at the margins indicated below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Margin
                   Manufacturer/ Exporter                     (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ball Bearings:
    TIE....................................................        39.61
    All Others.............................................        39.61
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to 
administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility 
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under 
APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations. 
Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or 
conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to 
comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable 
violation.
    This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are in accordance 
with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

    Dated: October 28, 1999.
Richard Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 99-28777 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P