[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 213 (Thursday, November 4, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60309-60313]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-28776]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration
[A-428-801]


Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Antifriction Bearings 
From Germany

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of final results of expedited sunset reviews: 
antifriction bearings from Germany.

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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the Department of Commerce (``the 
Department'') initiated sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders 
on ball bearings, cylindrical roller bearings, and spherical plain 
bearings (collectively, ``antifriction bearings'') from Germany 
pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (``the 
Act''). On the basis of a notice of intent to participate and an 
adequate response filed on behalf of a domestic interested party and an 
inadequate response from respondent interested parties in each of these 
reviews, the Department decided to conduct expedited reviews. As a 
result of these reviews, the Department finds that revocation of the 
antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to the continuation or 
recurrence of dumping at the levels indicated in the Final Results of 
Review section of this notice.

For Further Information Contact: Mark D. Young or Melissa G. Skinner, 
Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and 
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482-
3207 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

Effective Date: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

    These reviews were conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of 
the Act. The Department's procedures for conducting sunset reviews are 
set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews 
of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516 (March 20, 
1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR part 351 (1999) in general. 
Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to the 
Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the Department's 
Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies Regarding the Conduct of Five-year 
(``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders; 
Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy 
Bulletin'').

Scope

    The products covered by these reviews are antifriction bearings 
(``AFBs'') from Germany, which include ball bearings (``BBs''), 
cylindrical roller bearings (``CRBs''), and spherical plain bearings 
(``SPBs'') and parts thereof. For a detailed description of the 
products covered by these orders, including a compilation of all 
pertinent scope determinations, refer to the notice of final results of 
expedited sunset reviews on AFBs from Japan, published concurrently 
with this notice.

History of the Orders

    On May 3, 1989, the Department issued final determinations of sales 
at less than fair value (``LTFV'') with respect to imports of AFBs from 
Germany.1 The antidumping duty orders on AFBs were issued by 
the Department on May 15, 1989, and the dumping margins that were found 
in the final determinations of sales at LTFV were affirmed.2 
Since the imposition of these orders, the Department has conducted nine 
administrative reviews.3 The orders remain in effect for all 
manufacturers and exporters of the subject merchandise. In the final 
results of the 1995-1996 and 1997-1998 administrative reviews of these 
antidumping duty orders, the Department found that antidumping duties 
were being absorbed by German producers of AFBs.4 This 
review covers all producers and exporters of AFBs from Germany.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof From the Federal Republic of Germany, May 3, 1989, 54 FR 
18992.
    \2\ See Ball Bearings, Cylindrical Roller Bearings, and 
Spherical Plain Bearings and Parts Thereof From the Federal Republic 
of Germany; Antidumping Duty Order, May 15, 1989 54 FR 20900.
    \3\ See Ball Bearings, Cylindrical Roller Bearings, and 
Spherical Plain Bearings and Parts Thereof From the Federal Republic 
of Germany; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 
64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999); 63 FR 33320 (June 18, 1998); 62 FR 54043 
(October 17, 1997); 62 FR 2081(January 15, 1997); 61 FR 66472 
(December 17, 1996); 60 FR 10900 (February 28, 1995); 58 FR 39729 
(July 26, 1993); 57 FR 28360 (June 24, 1992); and 56 FR 31692 (July 
11, 1991).
    \4\ See Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 1997) (1995-96); and Final Results 
of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64 Fed. Reg. 35590 (July 
1, 1999) (1997-98).
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Background

    On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated sunset reviews of the 
antidumping duty orders on AFBs from Germany, pursuant to section 
751(c) of the Act. By April 16,1999, within the deadline specified in 
section 351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset Regulation, we received notices 
of intent to participate from the following parties: Link-Belt Bearing 
Division (``Link-Belt''); The Torrington Company (``Torrington''); MPB 
Corporation (``MPB''); Roller Bering Company of America (``RBC''); New 
Hampshire Ball Bearing, Inc. (``NHBB''); and NSK Corporation (``NSK 
Corporation''). Each of these parties claimed status as domestic 
interested parties on the basis that they are a domestic producer, 
manufacturer, or wholesaler of one or more of the products subject to 
these orders.5
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    \5\ Torrington, RBC, and NHBB filed with respect to BBs, CRBs, 
and SPBs. Link-Belt and MPB filed with respect to BBs and CRBs. NSK 
Corporation filed with respect to BBs only.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Within the deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations under 
section 351.218(d)(3)(i), on May 3, 1999, the Department received 
complete substantive responses from each of these domestic interested 
parties with the exception of Link-Belt. In addition, SKF USA and SKF 
GmbH (collectively ``SKF'') notified the Department that they would not 
file a substantive response in the sunset reviews of the AFBs orders. 
Finally, we received a complete substantive response on behalf of FAG 
Kugelfischer Georg Schafer AG and FAG Bearings Corporation 
(collectively ``FAG''). FAG asserts that it is a foreign manufacturer 
and exporter of BBs and CRBs and is, therefore, an interested party 
within the meaning of section 771(9)(A) of the Act. We received 
rebuttal comments from Torrington and MPB, RBC, NHBB, NSK Corporation, 
and FAG on May 12, 1999, within the deadline. On May 21 and May 24, 
1999, we informed the International Trade Commission (``Commission'') 
that, on the basis of inadequate response from respondent interested 
parties, we were conducting expedited sunset reviews of these orders

[[Page 60310]]

consistent with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2). (See Letters to Lynn 
Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations, USITC, from Jeffrey 
A. May, Director, Office of Policy.)
    In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the 
Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a 
review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1, 
1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the 
sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders on AFBs from Germany are 
extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion 
of the final results of these reviews until not later than October 28, 
1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.6
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    \6\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan, 
et al.: Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year 
Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).
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Determination

    In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department 
conducted these reviews to determine whether revocation of the 
antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to continuation or 
recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in 
making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-
average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent 
reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the 
period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty 
order. Pursuant to section 752(c)(3) of the Act, the Department shall 
provide to the Commission the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail 
if the order is revoked.
    The Department's determinations concerning adequacy, continuation 
or recurrence of dumping, and the magnitude of the margin are discussed 
below. In addition, the parties' comments with respect to adequacy, the 
continuation or recurrence of dumping, and the magnitude of the margin 
are addressed within the respective sections below.

Adequacy

    As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to 
conduct expedited reviews of these orders. On June 10, 1999, we 
received comments on behalf of Torrington and MPB supporting our 
determination to conduct expedited reviews. NHBB and NSK Corporation 
also submitted comments on whether expedited sunsets review were 
warranted. In their submissions, both parties assert that most of the 
domestic interested parties that submitted substantive responses are in 
favor of revocation of the various orders on antifriction bearings. 
These parties also offered new argument regarding the likely effect of 
revocation of the orders.
    The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of 
an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination 
of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's 
determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in its 
regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic 
interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing 
a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or 
legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic 
industry support during the course of a sunset review (other than the 
statutory provision that, if there is no domestic industry interest in 
continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order 
automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at 46) makes clear that the 
purpose of adequacy determinations in sunset reviews is for the 
Department to determine whether to issue a determination based on the 
facts available without further fact-gathering. Further, the statute, 
at section 751(c)(1), specifies that the Department is to determine 
whether revocation of an order would be likely to lead to continuation 
or recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) specifies that the Department 
is to consider the weighted-average dumping margins determined in the 
investigation and subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports 
of the subject merchandise for the period before and the period after 
the issuance of the order.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

    Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history 
accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically 
the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No. 
103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1 
(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the 
Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on 
methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for 
likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the 
Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on 
an order-wide basis (see section II.A.2). In addition, the Department 
indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an 
antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence 
of dumping when (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis 
after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise 
ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated 
after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject 
merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).
    In their joint substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that 
revocation of the antidumping duty orders on the subject merchandise 
would be likely to lead to continuation of dumping. They base this 
conclusion on the fact that dumping continued at levels above de 
minimis levels after the issuance of the orders. RBC also argues that, 
given that dumping margins continued to exist after the issuance of the 
orders, the Department must conclude that dumping would be likely to 
continue or recur if the orders were revoked. Torrington and MPB also 
assert that an examination of import volumes is not necessary because 
dumping continued. Using pre- and post-order statistics for complete 
unmounted BBs, which Torrington and MPB assert is the only category for 
which statistics are available on a consistent basis, they argue that 
post-order declines in import volumes provide strong additional support 
for a determination that dumping is likely to continue or recur were 
the orders revoked. In conclusion, Torrington and MPB assert that no 
``good cause'' exists to consider other factors. However, if the 
Department were to consider other factors, they contend, it should 
acknowledge that, in each review period, it has found that home market 
sales by German producers were below the cost of production requiring 
that such sales be disregarded for purposes of determining formal 
market value or normal value.
    NHBB and NSK Corporation assert that revocation of the orders is 
not likely to result in continuation or recurrence of dumping. NHBB 
bases its assertion on the fact that dumping would undercut the U.S. 
domestic price structure, thus causing injury to the very industry of 
which foreign owners are a part. NSK Corporation supports its assertion 
on the basis that the margin of dumping would be de minimis. In 
addition, the respondent interested party in these sunset reviews of 
BBs and CRBs, FAG, asserts that revocation of the order would lead to a 
continued decrease in dumping, as evidenced by the decline in the level 
of dumping in recent years. FAG bases its conclusion

[[Page 60311]]

on the following factors: the decrease in value and volume of exports 
of the subject merchandise; its significant reduction of its U.S. 
resales of subject merchandise; its shift in production to its U.S. 
facilities and its ability to source product from third countries that 
are not covered by the antidumping duty orders; and decreasing dumping 
margins.
    Furthermore, the respondent argues that the range of subject 
merchandise sold by FAG and other large bearing companies consists of 
thousands of different models, sold in differing quantities and into 
many different market sectors, tends to breed a certain percentage of 
``random dumping.'' FAG uses charts to support its argument that the 
analysis of the top ten sales for BBs and CRBs in the 1994-1995 and 
1995-1996 reviews alone account for nearly 50 percent of the dumping 
margins in each case.7 They argue that these sales were only 
ten of tens of thousands of sales made during a full review period and 
this would tend to negate any argument that there was chronic pattern 
of dumping by FAG. Therefore, it asserts that these dumped sales were 
extrapolated onto the wider selling and pricing patterns of the company 
as a whole, which led to arbitrary and unfair results. FAG notes 
further that the ``random dumping'' can explain the inevitable 
percentage of dumping that recurs from year to year, as evidenced by 
the fact that none of the large bearing manufacturers/exporters have 
achieved a de minimis margin in the past nine reviews.
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    \7\ See May 3, 1999, Substantive Response of the Respondent at 
Appendix 5 Chart 3.
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    In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB assert that the 
Department should take into account the submitter's affiliation in its 
consideration of comments of various parties filing as domestic 
producers. Further, citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From 
Thailand; Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty 
Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800 
(May 8, 1996), they argue that the Department has recognized that 
domestic producers who are affiliated with subject foreign producers 
and exporters do not have a common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the 
maintenance of the orders. Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that 
other parties' comments addressing issues other than margins and import 
volumes should not be considered unless such parties establish ``good 
cause'' to consider such additional factors, which, in these reviews, 
they have not done.
    Torrington and MPB argue further that FAG's admission that its 
imports and sales have decreased strongly supports a determination that 
FAG cannot resume selling at pre-order volumes without resorting to 
dumping. Torrington and MPB also note that FAG's reliance on current 
margins to predict likely post-revocation margins ignores the fact that 
the investigation margins are the only margins which reflect the 
exporter's behavior without the discipline of the orders. Finally, 
Torrington and MPB note that if FAG's ``random dumping'' is in fact 
``inevitable,'' then under FAG's own argument dumping will continue.
    In its rebuttal comments, FAG concurs with the substantive response 
of NSK Corporation which pointed out that the Department's methodology 
for calculating dumping margins in an investigation has fundamentally 
changed since the original LTFV investigation in AFBs ten years ago. 
FAG argues further that Torrington, MPB, and RBC erred in their 
reasoning to use the original investigation margins for purposes of 
these sunset reviews. According to FAG, the analyses presented by these 
domestic parties were not supported by empirical data, and that they 
erroneously presumed that even if dumping continued at levels above de 
minimis, and import volume decreased, there is a prima facie assumption 
of continued dumping at investigation levels and a mandatory 
requirement that these original margins be adopted.
    FAG maintains that import levels for the subject merchandise 
increased 40 percent between fiscal years 1993 and 1997, and that 
dumping margins have decreased. Where margins have not declined over 
time, FAG contends, an explanation exists insofar as the Department 
changed its methodologies during the 1994-1995 administrative review. 
In light of the above, FAG argues, the Department should calculate 
projected dumping rates based on more recent reviews.
    As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the 
SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins 
after the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation 
or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the 
discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer 
that dumping would continue if the discipline of the order were 
removed. Further, as noted above, in determining whether revocation of 
an order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping, 
the Department considers the margins determined in the investigation 
and subsequent administrative reviews and the volume of imports. 
Whatever relevance the arguments of NHBB and NSK concerning possible 
disincentives for producers and/or exporters to dump in the U.S. market 
might have had is mooted by the evidence that dumping continues and has 
continued over the life of the orders.
    In the instant proceedings, dumping margins above de minimis 
continue to exist with respect to each of the orders. Therefore, given 
that dumping has continued over the life of the orders, the Department 
determines that dumping is likely to continue if the orders were 
revoked. Because we have based this determination on the fact that 
dumping continued at levels above de minimis, we have not addressed the 
comments submitted by Torrington and MPB with respect to ``good cause'' 
and sales below the cost of production, nor have we addressed the 
arguments of other interested parties regarding the condition of the 
U.S. market.

Magnitude of the Margin

    In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that, 
consistent with the SAA and House Report, the Department will normally 
provide to the Commission a margin from the investigation because that 
is the only calculated rate that reflects the behavior of exporters 
without the discipline of an order in place. Further, for companies not 
specifically investigated or for companies that did not begin shipping 
until after the order was issued, the Department will normally provide 
a margin based on the ``all others'' rate from the investigation. (See 
section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.) Exceptions to this 
policy include the use of a more recently calculated margin, where 
appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption determinations. (See 
sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.)
    In their joint substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that 
the margins that are likely to prevail should the orders be revoked are 
the dumping margins found for each company in the original 
investigations (as opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual 
administrative reviews), including margins based on best information 
available, except where the most current margin, increased by the 
Department's duty absorption determination, exceeds the original 
investigation margin. With respect to BBs, RBC argues that the margins 
from the original investigation are the margins likely to prevail were 
the order revoked.

[[Page 60312]]

    NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the 
orders were revoked are de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it would 
be illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings investments 
to undercut that investment by dumping. In addition, NHBB argues that 
the Department should not report margins from the original 
investigation, asserting that the SAA provides that, in certain 
instances, it is more appropriate to rely on a more recently calculated 
margin. NHBB also asserts that one such instance is where, as in the 
AFBs cases, dumping margins have declined over the life of the orders 
and imports have remained steady or increased. Additionally, NHBB 
argues that, because the structure of the U.S. domestic industry that 
exists today bears little resemblance to the industry when the 
antidumping duty orders were imposed in 1989, the rates from the 
original investigation are inappropriate as indicators of the rates 
that would be found upon revocation. Finally, NHBB argues that, in 
light of changes in the methodology used to calculated antidumping duty 
margins introduced by the Uruguay Round, use of margins calculated by 
the Department prior to the URAA would be unfair and would be contrary 
to the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
    Similarly, NSK Corporation and FAG argue that the margins likely to 
prevail are de minimis. As support, NSK Corporation argues that, were 
the orders not in existence, the Department would apply the average-to-
average methodology used in an investigation as opposed to the 
transaction-to-average methodology common to administrative reviews to 
measure the extent of any dumping. In such a case, NSK Corporation 
states that it believes any margin found would be below the two-percent 
de minimis level applicable in investigations. NSK Corporation argues 
further that the Department's unorthodox approach during the original 
investigation, plus the liberal use of best information available, 
skewed the results of the original investigation seriously, rendering 
those results inappropriate indicators of the magnitude of the margin 
likely to prevail were the orders revoked. Finally, NSK Corporation 
also argues that dumping margins have declined over time with respect 
to importations of BBs while, at the same time, importations have 
remained at or around 20 percent of the U.S. market. As support, it 
cites to The Economic Effects of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Orders and Suspension Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900, Inv. No. 332-334, at 
14-26--14-31 (June 1995).
    FAG points out that 751(a)(4) of the Act permits the Department to 
conduct a duty absorption inquiry during any administrative review 
initiated two years or four years after the publication of an 
antidumping duty order. Notwithstanding this provision, FAG notes that 
the Department conducted duty absorption inquiries in the 1995-1996 and 
1997-1998 administrative reviews, and, therefore, its duty absorption 
inquiry is unlawful and cannot be used.
    In addition to the aforementioned argument, FAG challenges the 
methodology chosen by the Department to calculate duty absorption 
rates, stating that it was arbitrary and capricious, as well as 
contrary to language found in 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(4). FAG asserts that 
the Department has merely calculated the percentage of FAG's U.S. 
affiliate's sales with dumping margins versus total sales and concluded 
that this figure demonstrates duty absorption within the meaning of the 
statute. FAG claims that there is no connection between the percentage 
of sales of a U.S. importer with dumping margins and any alleged duty 
absorption by the affiliated foreign producer or exporter.
    In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue that other 
parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies regarding the 
selection of margins likely to prevail and ignore the Department's duty 
absorption findings. Citing to the Sunset Policy Bulletin, Torrington 
and MPB argue that the Department's policies are clear `` normal 
reliance on the margins from the investigation as the only margins that 
reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order 
and rejection of margins from administrative reviews in which the 
Department found duty absorption. Torrington and MPB argue that the 
two-percent de minimis standard is not applicable to sunset reviews. 
Further, they contend that there is no authority which would authorize 
or justify the rejection of the investigation rates on the basis of the 
particular methodology used at the time of the investigations. 
Additionally, they argue that, with respect to claims that more recent 
margins should be used based on declining margins accompanied by steady 
or increasing imports, it is the responsibility of such claimants to 
provide information regarding companies' relative market share. Since 
no such information was provided, the Department should not accept 
these assertions since imports of certain BBs have actually declined 
since the imposition of the order.
    In its rebuttal comments, FAG notes that Torrington erred in 
relying on the highest dumping margins calculated in each review period 
rather than the average. Furthermore, FAG argues that Torrington relied 
upon margins calculated using facts available. FAG asserts that, if the 
Department assesses margin levels based on actual calculated dumping 
rates, taken as averages for each review period, it will determine 
that, but for changes in calculation methodologies, margins have 
decreased over time.
    We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will 
provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the 
rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of 
the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of 
a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration 
of duty absorption determinations.
    In the Sunset Policy Bulletin we indicated that, consistent with 
the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, we may determine, in 
cases where declining (or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady 
or increasing imports, that a more recently calculated rate reflects 
that companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the 
United States and, therefore, that dumping is less likely to continue 
or recur if the order were revoked. Alternatively, if a company chooses 
to increase dumping in order to increase or maintain market share, the 
Department may provide the Commission with a more recently calculated 
margin for that company. The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we 
will entertain such considerations in response to argument from an 
interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more 
recently calculated margin is probative of an exporters behavior absent 
the discipline of an order, we will normally consider the company's 
relative market share, with such information to be provided by the 
parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining whether a more 
recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of exporters 
were the order revoked, the Department considers company-specific 
exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although we 
expressed a clear preference for market share information, in past 
sunset reviews where market share information was not available, we 
relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and 
after the issuance of the

[[Page 60313]]

order. See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Stainless 
Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December 8, 1998), and Final 
Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron Construction Castings 
From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of China, 64 FR 30310 
(June 7, 1999).
    In sunset reviews, although we make likelihood determinations on an 
order-wide basis, we report company-specific margins to the Commission. 
Therefore, it is appropriate that our determinations regarding the 
magnitude of the margin likely to prevail be based on company-specific 
information. Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of 
the orders while at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market 
remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular 
company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time 
maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic argument 
may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping 
coupled with increased market share.
    FAG provided company-specific value and volume information 
concerning its exports of BBs and CRBs, and it argued that exports of 
the subject merchandise have generally decreased since the inception of 
this case in 1987. The Department can confirm that current exports of 
the subject merchandise are indeed lower than pre-order exports. FAG's 
decrease in exports of the subject merchandise to the United States 
over the life of the orders indicate that FAG is unable to sell subject 
merchandise in the United States at pre-order volumes without dumping. 
Therefore, absent such evidence, we find no reason to deviate from our 
standard practice of using the margin we calculated in the original 
investigation.
    In the final results of the 1995/96 8 and 1997/98 
administrative reviews of these orders, the Department found that 
antidumping duties have been absorbed by foreign producers. With 
respect to the 1997/98 administrative reviews we made the following 
determinations 9:
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    \8\ See Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 1997) (1995-96).
    \9\ See Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Reviews, 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999) (1997-98).

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Ball bearings                       Percent of sales
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  SKF                       3.17
                                  FAG                      10.31
                                  INA                       9.14
Cylindrical Roller Bearings:
                                  SKF                      33.52
                                  FAG                      24.59
                 Torrington Nadellage                       0.26
                                  INA                       9.24
Spherical Plain Bearings:
                                  INA                       3.53
                                  SKF                      20.31
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the statute and the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the 
Department will notify the Commission of its findings regarding such 
duty absorption for the Commission to consider in conducting a sunset 
review.
    Additionally, the Sunset Policy Bulletin refers to the SAA at 885 
and the House Report at 60 and provides that, where the Department has 
found duty absorption, the Department normally will provide to the 
Commission the higher of the margin that the Department otherwise would 
have reported or the most recent margin for that company, adjusted to 
account for the Department's findings on duty absorption. In this case, 
the margins adjusted to account for our duty absorption findings are 
less than the margins we would otherwise report to the Commission.
    Therefore, the Department agrees with Torrington, MPB, and RBC 
concerning the margin likely to prevail if the order were to be 
revoked. We find that the dumping margins calculated in the original 
investigation are the only calculated rates that reflect the behavior 
of exporters without the discipline of the orders. Consistent with the 
Sunset Policy Bulletin, we determine that the margins we calculated in 
the original investigation are probative of the behavior of German 
producers and exporters of BBs, CRBs, and SPBs if the order were 
revoked. Therefore, we will report to the Commission the company-
specific and ``all others'' rates from the original investigation 
contained in the Final Results of Review section of this notice.

Final Results of Review

    As a result of these reviews, the Department finds that revocation 
of the antidumping duty orders would likely lead to continuation or 
recurrence of dumping at the margins indicated below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Margin
                   Manufacturer/ Exporter                     (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ball Bearings:
    SKF....................................................       132.25
    FAG....................................................        70.41
    INA....................................................        31.29
    GMN....................................................        35.43
    All Others.............................................        68.89
Cylindrical Roller Bearings:
    SKF....................................................        76.27
    FAG....................................................        52.43
    INA....................................................        52.43
    All Others.............................................        55.65
Spherical Plain Bearings:
    SKF....................................................       118.98
    FAG....................................................        74.88
    All Others.............................................       114.52
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to 
administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility 
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under 
APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations. 
Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or 
conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to 
comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable 
violation.
    These five-year (``sunset'') reviews and notice are in accordance 
with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

    Dated: October 28, 1999.
Richard W. Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 99-28776 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P