[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 213 (Thursday, November 4, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60287-60291]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-28772]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
[A-559-801]
Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Ball Bearings From
Singapore
AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce
ACTION: Notice of final Results of expedited sunset review: ball
bearings from Singapore.
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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the Department of Commerce (``the
Department'') initiated a sunset review of the antidumping duty order
on ball bearings (``BBs'') from Singapore (64 FR 15727) pursuant to
section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (``the Act''). On
the basis of a notice of intent to participate and adequate substantive
comments filed on behalf of domestic interested parties and inadequate
response (in this case, no response) from respondent interested
parties, the Department determined to conduct an expedited review. As a
result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of the
antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping at the levels indicated in the Final Results of
Review section of this notice.
For Further Information Contact: Scott E. Smith or Melissa G. Skinner,
Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone: (202) 482-
6397 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.
EFFECTIVE DATE: November 4, 1999.
Statute and Regulations
This review was conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of
the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews
are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'')
Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516
(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR Part 351 (1998)
in general. Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to
the Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the
Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies Regarding the Conduct of
Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy
Bulletin'').
Scope
The products covered by this order are BBs and parts thereof from
Singapore. For a detailed description of the products covered by this
order, including a compilation of all pertinent scope determinations,
refer to the notice of final results of expedited sunset review on
antifriction bearings from Japan (A-588-804), publishing concurrently
with this notice.
History of the Order
The Department published its less-than-fair-value (``LTFV'')
determination of BBs from Singapore on May 3, 1989.1 In this
determination, the Department published a weighted-average dumping
margin of 25.08 percent for NMB/Pelmec Singapore (``NMB/Pelmec''). The
Department also published an all others rate of 25.08. Since that time,
the Department has conducted eight administrative reviews.2
This sunset review covers imports from all Singaporean producers and/or
exporters of BBs. With respect to duty absorption, the Department
issued a duty absorption finding for NMB/Pelmec in the 1995-1996
administrative review.3
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\1\ See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:
Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Singapore, 52 FR 19112 (May 3,
1989).
\2\ See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:
Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Singapore, 52 FR 19112 (May 3,
1989); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)
and Parts Thereof From Singapore; Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review, 56 FR 31759 (July 11, 1991); Antifriction
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From
Germany; et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 32755 (June 17, 1997); Antifriction
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From
France; et al.; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews, 57 FR 28360 (June 24, 1992); Antifriction Bearings (Other
Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and the
United Kingdom; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 32969 (July 24, 1992); Antifriction
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From
France, et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 8908 (February 23, 1998); Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Revocation in
Part of an Antidumping Duty Order, 58 FR 39729 (July 26, 1993);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From France, et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 18877 (April 16, 1998);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From France, et al.; Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews, Partial Termination of Administrative
Reviews, and Revocation in Part of Antidumping Duty Orders, 60 FR
10900 (February 28, 1995); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, et al.; Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, Partial
Termination of Administrative Reviews, and Revocation in Part of
Antidumping Duty Orders, 61 FR 66472 (December 17, 1996);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From Singapore: Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review, 61 FR 68228 (December 27, 1996); Antifriction
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom;
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 2081
(January 15, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and
Singapore; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews; 62 FR 14391 (March 26, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other
Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom; Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043
(October 17, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Romania, Singapore; Sweden and the United Kingdom; Amended Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 61963
(November 20, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 33320
(June 18, 1998).
\3\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17,
1997).
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Background
On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated a sunset review of the
antidumping duty order on BBs from Singapore (64 FR 15727), pursuant to
section 751(c) of the Act. The Department received Notices of Intent to
Participate on behalf of The Torrington Company (``Torrington''), MPB
Corp. (``MPB''), the Roller Bearing Company of America (``RBC''), NSK
Corp. (``NSK''), New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc. (``NHBB'') and Link-
Belt Bearing Division (``Link-Belt'') on April 16, 1999, within the
deadline specified in section 351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset
Regulations. We received a complete substantive response from
Torrington, MPB, RBC, and NHBB on May 3, 1999, within the 30-day
deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations under section
351.218(d)(3)(i). The Department received the complete substantive
response from NSK on April 30, 1999. The Department did not receive a
[[Page 60288]]
complete substantive response from Link-Belt.
Torrington, MPB, RBC, and NHBB claimed interested party status
under 19 U.S.C. 1677(9)(C) as U.S. manufacturers of BBs. NSK claimed
interested party status under 19 U.S.C. 1677(9). In addition,
Torrington stated that it was the petitioner in the original
investigation and has participated actively in all administrative
reviews of this order. MPB stated that it had participated in the
International Trade Commission's (the ``Commission'') injury
investigation. RBC and NHBB stated that they have not participated
previously in any segment of this proceeding before the Department. We
did not receive a substantive response from any respondent interested
party to this proceeding. As a result, pursuant to 19 CFR
351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C), the Department determined to conduct an
expedited, 120-day, review of this order.4
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\4\ On May 21, 1999, we informed the Commission that, on the
basis of inadequate response from respondent interested parties, we
were conducting an expedited sunset review of this order consistent
with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2). (See Letter to Lynn
Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations from Jeffrey A.
May, Director, Office of Policy.)
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In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the
Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a
review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1,
1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the
sunset review of the antidumping duty order on BBs from Singapore is
extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion
of the final results of this review until not later than October 28,
1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.5
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\5\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan,
et al.; Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year
Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).
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Determination
In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department
conducted this review to determine whether revocation of the
antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in
making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-
average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent
reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the
period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty
order, and it shall provide to the Commission the magnitude of the
margin of dumping likely to prevail if the order is revoked.
The Department's determinations concerning continuation or
recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin are discussed
below. In addition, interested parties' comments with respect to
continuation or recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin
are addressed within the respective sections below.
Adequacy
As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to
conduct an expedited review of this order. On June 10, 1999, we
received comments on behalf of MPB and Torrington supporting our
determination to conduct an expedited review. NHBB and NSK also
submitted comments on whether an expedited sunset review was warranted.
In their submissions, both parties assert that most of the domestic
interested parties that submitted substantive responses are in favor of
revocation of the Department's various antidumping duty orders on
antifriction bearings. These parties also offered new argument
regarding the likely effect of revocation of these orders.
The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of
an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination
of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's
determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in its
regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic
interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing
a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or
legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic
industry support during the course of a sunset review (other than the
statutory provision that if there is no domestic industry interest in
continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order
automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at Rep. No. 103-412 at 46
(2nd Session 1994)) makes clear that the purpose of adequacy
determinations in sunset reviews is for the Department to determine
whether to issue a determination based on the facts available without
further fact-gathering. Further, the statute, at section 751(c)(1),
specifies that the Department is to determine whether revocation of an
order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping.
Section 752(c) specifies that the Department is to consider the
weighted average dumping margins determined in the investigation and
subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports of the subject
merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of
the order.
Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping
Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history
accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically
the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No.
103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1
(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the
Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on
methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for
likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the
Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on
an order-wide basis (see section II.A.3). In addition, the Department
indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an
antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence
of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis
after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise
ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated
after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject
merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).
In addition to considering the guidance on likelihood cited above,
section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Act provides that the Department shall
determine that revocation of an order is likely to lead to continuation
or recurrence of dumping where a respondent interested party waives its
participation in the sunset review. In the instant review, the
Department did not receive a response from any respondent interested
party. Pursuant to section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the Sunset
Regulations, this constitutes a waiver of participation.
In their substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that
revocation of the antidumping duty order on the subject merchandise
would be likely to lead to continuation of dumping. They base this
conclusion on the fact that dumping continued at levels above de
minimis after the issuance of the order. RBC also argues that, given
that dumping margins continue to exist after the issuance of the order,
the Department must conclude that dumping would be likely to continue
or recur if the order were revoked. Torrington and MPB assert further
that an examination of import
[[Page 60289]]
volumes is not necessary because dumping continued.
Should the Department decide to consider import volumes, Torrington
and MPB assert that the data will demonstrate that 1998 import volumes
of the subject merchandise are more than nineteen percent below the
1988 pre-order volumes. Using pre-and post-order statistics for
complete unmounted BBs, which Torrington and MPB assert is the only
category for which statistics are available on a consistent basis, they
argue that post-order declines in import volumes provide strong
additional support for a determination that dumping is likely to
continue or recur were the order revoked. In conclusion, Torrington and
MPB assert that no ``good cause'' exists to consider other factors,
such as sales below the cost of production.
NHBB and NSK assert that revocation of the order is not likely to
result in continuation or recurrence of dumping. NHBB bases its
assertion on the fact that dumping would undercut the U.S. domestic
price structure, thus causing injury to the very industry of which
foreign owners are a part. NSK appears to support its assertion on the
basis that the margin of dumping has fallen during the life of the
order.
In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB assert that the
Department should take into account the submitter's affiliation in its
consideration of comments of various parties filing as domestic
producers. Further, citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From
Thailand; Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty
Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800
(May 8, 1996), they argue that the Department has recognized that
domestic producers who are affiliated with subject foreign producers
and exporters do not have a common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the
maintenance of the order. Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that
other parties' comments addressing issues other than margins and import
volumes should not be considered unless such parties establish ``good
cause'' to consider such additional factors, which, in these reviews,
they have not done.
As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the
SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins
after the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation
or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the
discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer
that dumping would continue if the discipline of the order were
removed. Thus, as noted above, in determining whether revocation of an
order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping, the
Department considers the margins determined in the investigation and
subsequent administrative reviews and the volume of imports. Whatever
relevance the arguments of NHBB and NSK concerning possible
disincentives for producers and/or exporters to dump in the U.S. market
might have had is mooted by the evidence that dumping continues and has
continued over the life of the order.
Dumping margins above de minimis continue to exist. Therefore,
given that dumping has continued over the life of the order and
respondent interested parties have waived their right to participate in
this review before the Department, we determine that dumping is likely
to continue if the order were revoked. Because we have based this
determination on the fact that dumping has continued at levels above de
minimis, we have not addressed the comments submitted by Torrington and
MPB with respect to ``good cause,'' nor have we addressed the arguments
of other interested parties regarding the condition of the U.S. market.
Magnitude of the Margin
In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that it will
normally provide to the Commission the margin that was determined in
the final determination in the original investigation. Further, for
companies not specifically investigated or for companies that did not
begin shipping until after the order was issued, the Department
normally will provide a margin based on the ``all others'' rate from
the investigation. (See section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.)
Exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently calculated
margin, where appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption
determinations. (See sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy
Bulletin.)
The Department, in the LTFV determination of BBs from Singapore,
published a weighted-average dumping margin of 25.08 for NMB/Pelmec. In
addition, the Department also published a weighted-average dumping
margin of 25.08 percent on all other imports of the subject merchandise
from Singapore.6 As noted above, the Department issued a
duty absorption finding for NMB/Pelmec in the 1995-1996 administrative
review with respect to BBs from Singapore.
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\6\ See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:
Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Singapore, 52 FR 19112 (May 3,
1989).
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In their substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that the
margins likely to prevail are those from the Department's original
investigation. They also note that the Department issued a duty
absorption finding with respect to BBs from Singapore in the 1995-1996
administrative review and should consider this in determining the
margin likely to prevail. Specifically, Torrington and MPB argue that
the dumping margins found for each company in the original
investigation (as opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual
administrative reviews) are the dumping margins likely to prevail,
including margins based on best information available, except where the
most current margin, increased by the Department's duty absorption
determination, exceeds the original investigation margin. Furthermore,
RBC states that the margins from the original investigation are most
probative of the rates likely to prevail as they are the only
calculated rates that reflect the behavior of exporters without the
discipline of the order in place.
NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the order
were revoked would be de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it would
be illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings investments
to undercut that investment by dumping. In addition, NHBB argues that
the Department should not report margins from the original
investigation to the Commission. In support of this argument, NHBB
notes that the SAA provides that, in certain instances, it is more
appropriate to rely on a more recently calculated margin. NHBB asserts
that one such instance is where, as in the antifriction bearings cases,
dumping margins have declined over the life of the order and imports
have remained steady or increased. Finally, NHBB argues that, in light
of changes in the methodology used to calculate antidumping duty
margins introduced by the Uruguay Round, use of margins calculated by
the Department prior to the URAA would be unfair and would be contrary
to the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
Similarly, NSK argues that the margins likely to prevail would be
de minimis. As support, NSK argues that, were the order not in
existence, the Department would apply the average-to-average
methodology used in an investigation, as opposed to the transaction-to-
average methodology common to administrative reviews, to
[[Page 60290]]
measure the extent of any dumping. In such a case, NSK states that it
believes any margin found would be below the two percent de minimis
level applicable in investigations. NSK argues further that, the
Department's unorthodox approach during the original investigation,
plus the liberal use of best information available, skewed the results
of the original investigation seriously, rendering those results
inappropriate indicators of the magnitude of the margin likely to
prevail were the order revoked. Finally, NSK also argues that dumping
margins have declined over time with respect to BBs while, at the same
time, imports have remained at or around 20 percent of the U.S. market.
As support, it cites to The Economic Effects of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900,
Inv. No. 332-334, at 14-26--14-31 (June 1995).
In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue that other
parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies regarding the
selection of margins likely to prevail and ignore the Department's duty
absorption findings. Citing to the Sunset Policy Bulletin, Torrington
and MPB argue that the Department's policies are clear--normal reliance
on the margins from the investigation as the only margins that reflect
the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order and
rejection of margins from administrative reviews in which the
Department found duty absorption. Torrington and MPB argue that the two
percent de minimis standard is not applicable to sunset reviews.
Further, they contend that there is no authority which would authorize
or justify the rejection of the investigation rate on the basis of the
particular methodology used at the time of the investigation.
Additionally, they argue that, with respect to claims that more recent
margins should be used based on declining margins accompanied by steady
or increasing imports, Torrington and MPB argue that it is the
responsibility of such claimants to provide information regarding
companies' relative market share. Since no such information was
provided, they assert that the Department should not accept these
assertions, given that, imports BBs from Singapore have actually
declined since the imposition of the order.
We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will
provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the
rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of
the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of
a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration
of duty absorption determinations.
With respect to NSK's argument concerning the magnitude of the
margin likely to prevail, we disagree. As discussed above, we do find
that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping.
Furthermore, we find the level of dumping likely to prevail is best
reflected by the Department's dumping margins we calculated in the
original investigation. Specifically, the Department finds that there
is no basis to reject margins calculated in an investigation because of
subsequent changes in methodology. Such changes do not invalidate
margins calculated under the prior methodology. Therefore, the dumping
margins from the original investigation are the only rates which
reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order,
regardless of the methodology used to calculate that margin or the use
of best information available (see section 752(c)(3) of the Act).
With respect to NHBB's argument concerning the dumping margin
likely to prevail, the Department disagrees. First, NHBB claims that
dumping margins have declined over the life of the order and imports
have remained steady or increased. However, NHBB provided no evidence
to support these claims. Nothing submitted in the course of this sunset
proceeding indicates that imports have remained steady or increased. In
fact, evidence submitted by Torrington and MPB indicate that 1998
import volumes of the subject merchandise are more than nineteen
percent below pre-order volumes. Regardless of the level of imports,
dumping margins above de minimis levels continue as do imports of the
subject merchandise; dumping continues to exist.
In the Sunset Policy Bulletin we indicated that, consistent with
the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, we may determine, in
cases where declining (or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady
or increasing imports, that a more recently calculated rate reflects
that companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the
United States and, therefore, that dumping is less likely to continue
or recur if the order were revoked. Alternatively, if a company chooses
to increase dumping in order to increase or maintain market share, the
Department may provide the Commission with a more recently calculated
margin for that company. The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we
will entertain such considerations in response to arguments from an
interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more
recently calculated margin is probative of an exporters behavior absent
the discipline of an order, we will normally consider the company's
relative market share, with such information to be provided by the
parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining whether a more
recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of exporters
were the order revoked, the Department considers company-specific
exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although we
expressed a clear preference for market share information, in past
sunset reviews where market share information was not available, we
relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and
after the issuance of the order. (See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited
Sunset Review: Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December
8, 1998), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron
Construction Castings From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of
China, 64 FR 30310 (June 7, 1999).)
In sunset reviews, although we make likelihood determinations on an
order-wide basis, we report company-specific margins to the Commission.
Therefore, it is appropriate that we base our determinations regarding
the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail on company-specific
information. Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of
the orders while, at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market
remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular
company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time
maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic argument
may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping
coupled with increased market share. In this review, we did not receive
any such company-specific arguments.
As noted above, the Department determined in the final results of
the 1995-1996 administrative review that NMB/Pelmec was absorbing
duties.7 Consistent with the statute and the Sunset Policy
Bulletin, the Department will notify the Commission of its findings
regarding duty absorption when conducting a sunset review.
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\7\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17,
1997).
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Additionally, the Sunset Policy Bulletin refers to the SAA at 885
and the House Report at 60 and provides that,
[[Page 60291]]
where the Department has found duty absorption, the Department will
normally provide to the Commission the higher of the margin that the
Department otherwise would have reported or the most recent margin for
that company, adjusted to account for our findings on duty absorption.
In this case, the margins adjusted to account for the Department's duty
absorption findings are less than the margins we would otherwise report
to the Commission.
Therefore, the Department agrees with the domestic interested
parties concerning the margin likely to prevail if the order were to be
revoked. We find that the dumping margins calculated in the original
investigation are the only calculated rates that reflect the behavior
of exporters without the discipline of the order. Consistent with the
Sunset Policy Bulletin, we determine that the margin calculated in the
Department's original investigation is probative of the behavior of
Singaporean producers and exporters of BBs if the order were revoked.
Therefore, we will report to the Commission the company-specific and
``all others'' rates from the original investigation contained in the
Final Results of Review section of this notice.
Final Results of Review
As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of
the antidumping duty order would likely lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping at the margin listed below:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Margin
Manufacturer/ Exporter (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NMB/Pelmec................................................. 25.08
All Other Producers/Exporters.............................. 25.08
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to
administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under
APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations.
Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or
conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to
comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable
violation.
This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are in accordance
with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.
Dated: October 28, 1999.
Richard W. Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 99-28772 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P