[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 213 (Thursday, November 4, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60287-60291]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-28772]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration
[A-559-801]


Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Ball Bearings From 
Singapore

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce

ACTION: Notice of final Results of expedited sunset review: ball 
bearings from Singapore.

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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the Department of Commerce (``the 
Department'') initiated a sunset review of the antidumping duty order 
on ball bearings (``BBs'') from Singapore (64 FR 15727) pursuant to 
section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (``the Act''). On 
the basis of a notice of intent to participate and adequate substantive 
comments filed on behalf of domestic interested parties and inadequate 
response (in this case, no response) from respondent interested 
parties, the Department determined to conduct an expedited review. As a 
result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of the 
antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or 
recurrence of dumping at the levels indicated in the Final Results of 
Review section of this notice.

For Further Information Contact: Scott E. Smith or Melissa G. Skinner, 
Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and 
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone: (202) 482-
6397 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

    This review was conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of 
the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews 
are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'') 
Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516 
(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR Part 351 (1998) 
in general. Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to 
the Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the 
Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies Regarding the Conduct of 
Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy 
Bulletin'').

Scope

    The products covered by this order are BBs and parts thereof from 
Singapore. For a detailed description of the products covered by this 
order, including a compilation of all pertinent scope determinations, 
refer to the notice of final results of expedited sunset review on 
antifriction bearings from Japan (A-588-804), publishing concurrently 
with this notice.

History of the Order

    The Department published its less-than-fair-value (``LTFV'') 
determination of BBs from Singapore on May 3, 1989.1 In this 
determination, the Department published a weighted-average dumping 
margin of 25.08 percent for NMB/Pelmec Singapore (``NMB/Pelmec''). The 
Department also published an all others rate of 25.08. Since that time, 
the Department has conducted eight administrative reviews.2 
This sunset review covers imports from all Singaporean producers and/or 
exporters of BBs. With respect to duty absorption, the Department 
issued a duty absorption finding for NMB/Pelmec in the 1995-1996 
administrative review.3
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    \1\ See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: 
Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Singapore, 52 FR 19112 (May 3, 
1989).
    \2\ See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: 
Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Singapore, 52 FR 19112 (May 3, 
1989); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) 
and Parts Thereof From Singapore; Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review, 56 FR 31759 (July 11, 1991); Antifriction 
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From 
Germany; et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 32755 (June 17, 1997); Antifriction 
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From 
France; et al.; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Reviews, 57 FR 28360 (June 24, 1992); Antifriction Bearings (Other 
Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and the 
United Kingdom; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 32969 (July 24, 1992); Antifriction 
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From 
France, et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 8908 (February 23, 1998); Final 
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Revocation in 
Part of an Antidumping Duty Order, 58 FR 39729 (July 26, 1993); 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof From France, et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping 
Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 18877 (April 16, 1998); 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof From France, et al.; Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Reviews, Partial Termination of Administrative 
Reviews, and Revocation in Part of Antidumping Duty Orders, 60 FR 
10900 (February 28, 1995); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered 
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, et al.; Final 
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, Partial 
Termination of Administrative Reviews, and Revocation in Part of 
Antidumping Duty Orders, 61 FR 66472 (December 17, 1996); 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof From Singapore: Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review, 61 FR 68228 (December 27, 1996); Antifriction 
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom; 
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 2081 
(January 15, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller 
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and 
Singapore; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Reviews; 62 FR 14391 (March 26, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other 
Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom; Final 
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 
(October 17, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller 
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Romania, Singapore; Sweden and the United Kingdom; Amended Final 
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 61963 
(November 20, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered 
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final 
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 33320 
(June 18, 1998).
    \3\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller 
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 
1997).
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Background

    On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated a sunset review of the 
antidumping duty order on BBs from Singapore (64 FR 15727), pursuant to 
section 751(c) of the Act. The Department received Notices of Intent to 
Participate on behalf of The Torrington Company (``Torrington''), MPB 
Corp. (``MPB''), the Roller Bearing Company of America (``RBC''), NSK 
Corp. (``NSK''), New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc. (``NHBB'') and Link-
Belt Bearing Division (``Link-Belt'') on April 16, 1999, within the 
deadline specified in section 351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset 
Regulations. We received a complete substantive response from 
Torrington, MPB, RBC, and NHBB on May 3, 1999, within the 30-day 
deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations under section 
351.218(d)(3)(i). The Department received the complete substantive 
response from NSK on April 30, 1999. The Department did not receive a

[[Page 60288]]

complete substantive response from Link-Belt.
    Torrington, MPB, RBC, and NHBB claimed interested party status 
under 19 U.S.C. 1677(9)(C) as U.S. manufacturers of BBs. NSK claimed 
interested party status under 19 U.S.C. 1677(9). In addition, 
Torrington stated that it was the petitioner in the original 
investigation and has participated actively in all administrative 
reviews of this order. MPB stated that it had participated in the 
International Trade Commission's (the ``Commission'') injury 
investigation. RBC and NHBB stated that they have not participated 
previously in any segment of this proceeding before the Department. We 
did not receive a substantive response from any respondent interested 
party to this proceeding. As a result, pursuant to 19 CFR 
351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C), the Department determined to conduct an 
expedited, 120-day, review of this order.4
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    \4\ On May 21, 1999, we informed the Commission that, on the 
basis of inadequate response from respondent interested parties, we 
were conducting an expedited sunset review of this order consistent 
with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2). (See Letter to Lynn 
Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations from Jeffrey A. 
May, Director, Office of Policy.)
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    In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the 
Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a 
review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1, 
1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the 
sunset review of the antidumping duty order on BBs from Singapore is 
extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion 
of the final results of this review until not later than October 28, 
1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.5
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    \5\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan, 
et al.; Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year 
Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).
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Determination

    In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department 
conducted this review to determine whether revocation of the 
antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or 
recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in 
making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-
average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent 
reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the 
period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty 
order, and it shall provide to the Commission the magnitude of the 
margin of dumping likely to prevail if the order is revoked.
    The Department's determinations concerning continuation or 
recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin are discussed 
below. In addition, interested parties' comments with respect to 
continuation or recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin 
are addressed within the respective sections below.

Adequacy

    As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to 
conduct an expedited review of this order. On June 10, 1999, we 
received comments on behalf of MPB and Torrington supporting our 
determination to conduct an expedited review. NHBB and NSK also 
submitted comments on whether an expedited sunset review was warranted. 
In their submissions, both parties assert that most of the domestic 
interested parties that submitted substantive responses are in favor of 
revocation of the Department's various antidumping duty orders on 
antifriction bearings. These parties also offered new argument 
regarding the likely effect of revocation of these orders.
    The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of 
an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination 
of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's 
determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in its 
regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic 
interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing 
a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or 
legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic 
industry support during the course of a sunset review (other than the 
statutory provision that if there is no domestic industry interest in 
continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order 
automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at Rep. No. 103-412 at 46 
(2nd Session 1994)) makes clear that the purpose of adequacy 
determinations in sunset reviews is for the Department to determine 
whether to issue a determination based on the facts available without 
further fact-gathering. Further, the statute, at section 751(c)(1), 
specifies that the Department is to determine whether revocation of an 
order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping. 
Section 752(c) specifies that the Department is to consider the 
weighted average dumping margins determined in the investigation and 
subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports of the subject 
merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of 
the order.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

    Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history 
accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically 
the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No. 
103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1 
(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the 
Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on 
methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for 
likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the 
Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on 
an order-wide basis (see section II.A.3). In addition, the Department 
indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an 
antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence 
of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis 
after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise 
ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated 
after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject 
merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).
    In addition to considering the guidance on likelihood cited above, 
section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Act provides that the Department shall 
determine that revocation of an order is likely to lead to continuation 
or recurrence of dumping where a respondent interested party waives its 
participation in the sunset review. In the instant review, the 
Department did not receive a response from any respondent interested 
party. Pursuant to section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the Sunset 
Regulations, this constitutes a waiver of participation.
    In their substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that 
revocation of the antidumping duty order on the subject merchandise 
would be likely to lead to continuation of dumping. They base this 
conclusion on the fact that dumping continued at levels above de 
minimis after the issuance of the order. RBC also argues that, given 
that dumping margins continue to exist after the issuance of the order, 
the Department must conclude that dumping would be likely to continue 
or recur if the order were revoked. Torrington and MPB assert further 
that an examination of import

[[Page 60289]]

volumes is not necessary because dumping continued.
    Should the Department decide to consider import volumes, Torrington 
and MPB assert that the data will demonstrate that 1998 import volumes 
of the subject merchandise are more than nineteen percent below the 
1988 pre-order volumes. Using pre-and post-order statistics for 
complete unmounted BBs, which Torrington and MPB assert is the only 
category for which statistics are available on a consistent basis, they 
argue that post-order declines in import volumes provide strong 
additional support for a determination that dumping is likely to 
continue or recur were the order revoked. In conclusion, Torrington and 
MPB assert that no ``good cause'' exists to consider other factors, 
such as sales below the cost of production.
    NHBB and NSK assert that revocation of the order is not likely to 
result in continuation or recurrence of dumping. NHBB bases its 
assertion on the fact that dumping would undercut the U.S. domestic 
price structure, thus causing injury to the very industry of which 
foreign owners are a part. NSK appears to support its assertion on the 
basis that the margin of dumping has fallen during the life of the 
order.
    In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB assert that the 
Department should take into account the submitter's affiliation in its 
consideration of comments of various parties filing as domestic 
producers. Further, citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From 
Thailand; Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty 
Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800 
(May 8, 1996), they argue that the Department has recognized that 
domestic producers who are affiliated with subject foreign producers 
and exporters do not have a common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the 
maintenance of the order. Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that 
other parties' comments addressing issues other than margins and import 
volumes should not be considered unless such parties establish ``good 
cause'' to consider such additional factors, which, in these reviews, 
they have not done.
    As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the 
SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins 
after the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation 
or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the 
discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer 
that dumping would continue if the discipline of the order were 
removed. Thus, as noted above, in determining whether revocation of an 
order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping, the 
Department considers the margins determined in the investigation and 
subsequent administrative reviews and the volume of imports. Whatever 
relevance the arguments of NHBB and NSK concerning possible 
disincentives for producers and/or exporters to dump in the U.S. market 
might have had is mooted by the evidence that dumping continues and has 
continued over the life of the order.
    Dumping margins above de minimis continue to exist. Therefore, 
given that dumping has continued over the life of the order and 
respondent interested parties have waived their right to participate in 
this review before the Department, we determine that dumping is likely 
to continue if the order were revoked. Because we have based this 
determination on the fact that dumping has continued at levels above de 
minimis, we have not addressed the comments submitted by Torrington and 
MPB with respect to ``good cause,'' nor have we addressed the arguments 
of other interested parties regarding the condition of the U.S. market.

Magnitude of the Margin

    In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that it will 
normally provide to the Commission the margin that was determined in 
the final determination in the original investigation. Further, for 
companies not specifically investigated or for companies that did not 
begin shipping until after the order was issued, the Department 
normally will provide a margin based on the ``all others'' rate from 
the investigation. (See section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.) 
Exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently calculated 
margin, where appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption 
determinations. (See sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy 
Bulletin.)
    The Department, in the LTFV determination of BBs from Singapore, 
published a weighted-average dumping margin of 25.08 for NMB/Pelmec. In 
addition, the Department also published a weighted-average dumping 
margin of 25.08 percent on all other imports of the subject merchandise 
from Singapore.6 As noted above, the Department issued a 
duty absorption finding for NMB/Pelmec in the 1995-1996 administrative 
review with respect to BBs from Singapore.
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    \6\ See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: 
Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Singapore, 52 FR 19112 (May 3, 
1989).
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    In their substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that the 
margins likely to prevail are those from the Department's original 
investigation. They also note that the Department issued a duty 
absorption finding with respect to BBs from Singapore in the 1995-1996 
administrative review and should consider this in determining the 
margin likely to prevail. Specifically, Torrington and MPB argue that 
the dumping margins found for each company in the original 
investigation (as opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual 
administrative reviews) are the dumping margins likely to prevail, 
including margins based on best information available, except where the 
most current margin, increased by the Department's duty absorption 
determination, exceeds the original investigation margin. Furthermore, 
RBC states that the margins from the original investigation are most 
probative of the rates likely to prevail as they are the only 
calculated rates that reflect the behavior of exporters without the 
discipline of the order in place.
    NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the order 
were revoked would be de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it would 
be illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings investments 
to undercut that investment by dumping. In addition, NHBB argues that 
the Department should not report margins from the original 
investigation to the Commission. In support of this argument, NHBB 
notes that the SAA provides that, in certain instances, it is more 
appropriate to rely on a more recently calculated margin. NHBB asserts 
that one such instance is where, as in the antifriction bearings cases, 
dumping margins have declined over the life of the order and imports 
have remained steady or increased. Finally, NHBB argues that, in light 
of changes in the methodology used to calculate antidumping duty 
margins introduced by the Uruguay Round, use of margins calculated by 
the Department prior to the URAA would be unfair and would be contrary 
to the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
    Similarly, NSK argues that the margins likely to prevail would be 
de minimis. As support, NSK argues that, were the order not in 
existence, the Department would apply the average-to-average 
methodology used in an investigation, as opposed to the transaction-to-
average methodology common to administrative reviews, to

[[Page 60290]]

measure the extent of any dumping. In such a case, NSK states that it 
believes any margin found would be below the two percent de minimis 
level applicable in investigations. NSK argues further that, the 
Department's unorthodox approach during the original investigation, 
plus the liberal use of best information available, skewed the results 
of the original investigation seriously, rendering those results 
inappropriate indicators of the magnitude of the margin likely to 
prevail were the order revoked. Finally, NSK also argues that dumping 
margins have declined over time with respect to BBs while, at the same 
time, imports have remained at or around 20 percent of the U.S. market. 
As support, it cites to The Economic Effects of Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900, 
Inv. No. 332-334, at 14-26--14-31 (June 1995).
    In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue that other 
parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies regarding the 
selection of margins likely to prevail and ignore the Department's duty 
absorption findings. Citing to the Sunset Policy Bulletin, Torrington 
and MPB argue that the Department's policies are clear--normal reliance 
on the margins from the investigation as the only margins that reflect 
the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order and 
rejection of margins from administrative reviews in which the 
Department found duty absorption. Torrington and MPB argue that the two 
percent de minimis standard is not applicable to sunset reviews. 
Further, they contend that there is no authority which would authorize 
or justify the rejection of the investigation rate on the basis of the 
particular methodology used at the time of the investigation. 
Additionally, they argue that, with respect to claims that more recent 
margins should be used based on declining margins accompanied by steady 
or increasing imports, Torrington and MPB argue that it is the 
responsibility of such claimants to provide information regarding 
companies' relative market share. Since no such information was 
provided, they assert that the Department should not accept these 
assertions, given that, imports BBs from Singapore have actually 
declined since the imposition of the order.
    We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will 
provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the 
rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of 
the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of 
a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration 
of duty absorption determinations.
    With respect to NSK's argument concerning the magnitude of the 
margin likely to prevail, we disagree. As discussed above, we do find 
that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping. 
Furthermore, we find the level of dumping likely to prevail is best 
reflected by the Department's dumping margins we calculated in the 
original investigation. Specifically, the Department finds that there 
is no basis to reject margins calculated in an investigation because of 
subsequent changes in methodology. Such changes do not invalidate 
margins calculated under the prior methodology. Therefore, the dumping 
margins from the original investigation are the only rates which 
reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order, 
regardless of the methodology used to calculate that margin or the use 
of best information available (see section 752(c)(3) of the Act).
    With respect to NHBB's argument concerning the dumping margin 
likely to prevail, the Department disagrees. First, NHBB claims that 
dumping margins have declined over the life of the order and imports 
have remained steady or increased. However, NHBB provided no evidence 
to support these claims. Nothing submitted in the course of this sunset 
proceeding indicates that imports have remained steady or increased. In 
fact, evidence submitted by Torrington and MPB indicate that 1998 
import volumes of the subject merchandise are more than nineteen 
percent below pre-order volumes. Regardless of the level of imports, 
dumping margins above de minimis levels continue as do imports of the 
subject merchandise; dumping continues to exist.
    In the Sunset Policy Bulletin we indicated that, consistent with 
the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, we may determine, in 
cases where declining (or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady 
or increasing imports, that a more recently calculated rate reflects 
that companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the 
United States and, therefore, that dumping is less likely to continue 
or recur if the order were revoked. Alternatively, if a company chooses 
to increase dumping in order to increase or maintain market share, the 
Department may provide the Commission with a more recently calculated 
margin for that company. The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we 
will entertain such considerations in response to arguments from an 
interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more 
recently calculated margin is probative of an exporters behavior absent 
the discipline of an order, we will normally consider the company's 
relative market share, with such information to be provided by the 
parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining whether a more 
recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of exporters 
were the order revoked, the Department considers company-specific 
exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although we 
expressed a clear preference for market share information, in past 
sunset reviews where market share information was not available, we 
relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and 
after the issuance of the order. (See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited 
Sunset Review: Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December 
8, 1998), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron 
Construction Castings From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of 
China, 64 FR 30310 (June 7, 1999).)
    In sunset reviews, although we make likelihood determinations on an 
order-wide basis, we report company-specific margins to the Commission. 
Therefore, it is appropriate that we base our determinations regarding 
the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail on company-specific 
information. Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of 
the orders while, at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market 
remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular 
company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time 
maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic argument 
may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping 
coupled with increased market share. In this review, we did not receive 
any such company-specific arguments.
    As noted above, the Department determined in the final results of 
the 1995-1996 administrative review that NMB/Pelmec was absorbing 
duties.7 Consistent with the statute and the Sunset Policy 
Bulletin, the Department will notify the Commission of its findings 
regarding duty absorption when conducting a sunset review.
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    \7\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller 
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 
1997).
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    Additionally, the Sunset Policy Bulletin refers to the SAA at 885 
and the House Report at 60 and provides that,

[[Page 60291]]

where the Department has found duty absorption, the Department will 
normally provide to the Commission the higher of the margin that the 
Department otherwise would have reported or the most recent margin for 
that company, adjusted to account for our findings on duty absorption. 
In this case, the margins adjusted to account for the Department's duty 
absorption findings are less than the margins we would otherwise report 
to the Commission.
    Therefore, the Department agrees with the domestic interested 
parties concerning the margin likely to prevail if the order were to be 
revoked. We find that the dumping margins calculated in the original 
investigation are the only calculated rates that reflect the behavior 
of exporters without the discipline of the order. Consistent with the 
Sunset Policy Bulletin, we determine that the margin calculated in the 
Department's original investigation is probative of the behavior of 
Singaporean producers and exporters of BBs if the order were revoked. 
Therefore, we will report to the Commission the company-specific and 
``all others'' rates from the original investigation contained in the 
Final Results of Review section of this notice.

Final Results of Review

    As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of 
the antidumping duty order would likely lead to continuation or 
recurrence of dumping at the margin listed below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Margin
                   Manufacturer/ Exporter                     (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NMB/Pelmec.................................................        25.08
All Other Producers/Exporters..............................        25.08
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to 
administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility 
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under 
APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations. 
Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or 
conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to 
comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable 
violation.
    This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are in accordance 
with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

    Dated: October 28, 1999.
Richard W. Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 99-28772 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P