[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 213 (Thursday, November 4, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60272-60275]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-28769]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration
[A-437-601]


Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Tapered Roller Bearings 
From Hungary

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of final results of expedited sunset review: Tapered 
roller rearings from Hungary.

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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the Department of Commerce (``the 
Department'') initiated a sunset review of the antidumping order on 
tapered roller bearings from Hungary (64 FR 15727) pursuant to section 
751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (``the Act''). On the 
basis of a notice of intent to participate and substantive comments 
filed on behalf of domestic interested parties and inadequate response 
(in this case, no response) from respondent interested parties, the 
Department determined to conduct an expedited review. As a result of 
this review, the Department finds that revocation of the antidumping 
order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping 
at the levels indicated in the Final Results of Review section of this 
notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Darla D. Brown or Melissa G. Skinner, 
Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and 
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482-
3207 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

    This review was conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of 
the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews 
are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'') 
Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516 
(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations'') and 19 CFR Part 351 (1998) in 
general. Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to 
the Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the 
Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies Regarding the Conduct of 
Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy 
Bulletin'').

Scope

    The products covered by this review are tapered roller bearings 
(``TRBs''), finished and unfinished, from Hungary. This merchandise 
includes tapered roller bearings and parts thereof, flange, take-up 
cartridge, and hanger units incorporating tapered roller bearings and 
tapered roller housings (excluding pillow block) incorporating tapered 
rollers, with or without spindles, whether or not for automotive use.
    The Timken Company (``Timken'') and the Torrington Company 
(``Torrington''), in their substantive response, argue that two scope 
clarifications the Department made with regard to the antidumping order 
on TRBs, over four inches, from Japan are relevant to this order (see 
May 3, 1999, Substantive Response of Timken & Torrington at 12). Timken 
and Torrington argue that since the product description for that order 
is included in the Hungarian order, the two Japanese rulings are 
relevant to the scope of the Hungarian order. In the first ruling, the

[[Page 60273]]

Department ruled that green rings which had not been heat-treated were 
within the scope of the order.1 The Department also ruled 
that unfinished green forged rings and tower forgings were within the 
scope of the order.2
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    \1\ See unpublished scope ruling dated May 16, 1989.
    \2\ See Final Affirmative Determination in Scope Inquiry on 
Antidumping Duty Order on Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof 
from Japan, 60 FR 6519 (February 2, 1995).
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    The Department makes its scope determinations on an order-specific 
basis. Therefore, we conclude that the two scope clarifications the 
Department made on the antidumping order on TRBs, over four inches, 
from Japan cannot be applied to this order.
    Tapered roller bearings are currently classified under the 
following item numbers of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (``HTS'') of 
the United States: 8482.20.00.10, 8482.20.00.20, 8482.20.00.30, 
8482.20.00.40, 8482.20.00.50, 8482.20.00.60, 8482.20.00.70, 
8482.20.00.80, 8483.20.40.80, 8483.20.80.80, 8483.30.80.20, 
8482.91.00.50, 8482.99.15.00, 8482.99.15.40, 8482.99.15.80, 
8708.99.80.15, and 8708.99.80.80.3 The HTS item numbers are 
provided for convenience and customs purposes. The written description 
remains dispositive.
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    \3\ Per phone conversation with United States Customs officials, 
the HTS numbers listed above are those that customs uses for 
official duty collection. See Memorandum to File regarding HTS 
numbers for tapered roller bearings, dated June 8, 1999.
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History of the Order

    The Department, in its final determination of sales at less than 
fair value (``LTFV''), published a country-wide weighted-average 
dumping margin for all exports from Hungary of 7.42 percent ad 
valorem.4 The antidumping duty order on TRBs was published 
in the Federal Register on June 19, 1987, and, in the order, the 
dumping margins that were found in the final determination were 
confirmed. Since the imposition of this order, the Department has 
conducted four administrative reviews.5 The order remains in 
effect for all manufacturers and exporters of the subject merchandise. 
To date, the Department has issued no duty absorption findings in this 
case.
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    \4\ See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; 
Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished or Unfinished, 
From the Hungarian People's Republic, 52 FR 17428 (May 8, 1987).
    \5\ See Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 
Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, 
From the Republic of Hungary, May 22, 1990 (55 FR 21066); Final 
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; Tapered Roller 
Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From the 
Republic of Hungary, November 19, 1990 (55 FR 48146); Final Results 
of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; Tapered Roller Bearings 
and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From the Republic of 
Hungary, August 23, 1991 (56 FR 41819); and Tapered Roller Bearings 
and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From the Republic of 
Hungary; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 
September 13, 1993 (58 FR 47861).
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    This review covers all producers and exporters of TRBs from 
Hungary.

Background

    On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated a sunset review of the 
antidumping order on TRBs from Hungary (64 FR 15727), pursuant to 
section 751(c) of the Act. The Department received a notice of intent 
to participate on behalf of Timken and Torrington (collectively ``the 
domestic parties'') on April 16, 1999, within the deadline specified in 
section 351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset Regulations. We then received a 
complete substantive response from the domestic parties on May 3, 1999, 
within the 30-day deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations under 
section 351.218(d)(3)(i). The domestic parties claimed interested party 
status under section 771(9)(C) of the Act as U.S. manufacturers of 
TRBs. Timken stated that it was the petitioner in the original LTFV 
investigation and has participated in all of the subsequent reviews of 
this order. Torrington stated that it has not participated in any of 
the proceedings before the Department regarding this order, but that it 
supports preservation of this order and will participate in this 
proceeding. We did not receive a substantive response from any 
respondent interested party to this proceeding. As a result, pursuant 
to 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C), the Department determined to conduct an 
expedited, 120-day, review of this order.
    In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the 
Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a 
review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1, 
1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the 
sunset review of the antidumping duty order on TRBs from Hungary is 
extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion 
of the final results of these reviews until not later than October 28, 
1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.6
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    \6\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan, 
et al.; Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year 
Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).
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Determination

    In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department 
conducted this review to determine whether revocation of the 
antidumping order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence 
of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in making this 
determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-average 
dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent reviews 
and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the period 
before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping order, and 
shall provide to the International Trade Commission (``the 
Commission'') the magnitude of the margin of dumping likely to prevail 
if the order is revoked.
    The Department's determinations concerning continuation or 
recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin are discussed 
below. In addition, parties' comments with respect to continuation or 
recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin are addressed 
within the respective sections below.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

    Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history 
accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically 
the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No. 
103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt. 1 
(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the 
Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on 
methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for 
likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the 
Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on 
an order-wide basis (see section II.A.2). In addition, the Department 
indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an 
antidumping order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of 
dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis after 
the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise 
ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated 
after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject 
merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).
    In addition to considering the guidance on likelihood cited above, 
section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Act provides that the Department shall 
determine that revocation of an order would be likely

[[Page 60274]]

to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping where a respondent 
interested party waives its participation in the sunset review. In this 
instant review, the Department did not receive a response from any 
respondent interested party. Pursuant to section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of 
the Sunset Regulations, this constitutes a waiver of participation.
    In their substantive response, the domestic parties argue that 
revocation of the order will likely lead to continuation or recurrence 
of dumping of TRBs from Hungary. Citing the SAA at 889, the domestic 
parties argue that the continued existence of dumping margins above de 
minimis over the life of the order is indicative of the fact that 
foreign producers would have to dump in order to compete in the U.S. 
market. The domestic parties argue that dumping margins above de 
minimis levels have been in existence throughout the entire life of the 
order on TRBs from Hungary and, therefore, dumping would likely 
continue if the order were revoked (see May 3, 1999, Substantive 
Response of the domestic parties at 7).
    With respect to whether imports of the subject merchandise declined 
significantly or ceased after the issuance of the order, the domestic 
parties maintain that imports of TRBs began to decline with the 
succession of confirmed dumping determinations in November 1990 and 
August 1991. The domestic parties assert that these determinations 
resulted in a decline in imports of TRBs from $1.8 million in 1992 to 
less than $400,000 in 1993, with import volumes falling from over 5 
million units in 1992 to less than 1 million units. Moreover, they 
argue that import volumes of TRBs from Hungary have remained at low 
levels since 1993. The domestic parties argue that, while in the years 
immediately following the imposition of the order, from 1988 to 1991, 
import volumes remained high and even increased in 1988, the year 
immediately following the order, the low level of imports that has 
existed since 1993 is probative of the fact that Hungarian producers/
exporters are unable to sell at high volumes in the U.S. without 
dumping (see id. at 8-9).
    In addition to arguments regarding dumping margins and import 
volumes, the domestic parties also argue that there are other outside 
pressures on Hungarian producers and exporters that would lead to 
continuation or recurrence of dumping of TRBs from Hungary if the order 
were revoked. Specifically, the domestic parties argue that since most 
of the TRBs produced in Hungary are exported and Hungary has limited 
export markets, it is likely that TRBs from Hungary would be dumped in 
the U.S. market. Additionally, the domestic parties assert that it is 
likely that dumping would continue or recur if the order were to be 
revoked because of the openness of the U.S. market and because the 
current low level of imports of TRBs from Hungary is due primarily to 
the existence of the antidumping duty order, rather than any changes in 
the market for this product (see id. at 9-10).
    In conclusion, the domestic parties argue that the Department 
should determine that there is a likelihood that dumping of imports of 
TRBs from Hungary would continue or recur if the antidumping duty order 
were revoked. The domestic parties argue that the continued existence 
of dumping margins above de minimis over the life of the order, the 
decline in import volumes following imposition of the order, and the 
accessibility of the U.S. market compared to other countries indicate 
that dumping of TRBs from Hungary is likely to continue or recur if the 
order were revoked.
    As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the 
SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, if companies continue 
dumping with the discipline of an order in place, the Department may 
reasonably infer that dumping would continue if the discipline were 
removed. Since the imposition of the antidumping duty order in 1987, 
dumping margins above de minimis have been in existence for all 
producers and exporters of TRBs from Hungary.
    With respect to whether imports of the subject merchandise declined 
significantly or ceased after the imposition of the order, it is 
evident from the data provided by the domestic parties, and confirmed 
by the Department using U.S. Census Bureau IM146s, that imports did not 
cease or decline significantly immediately following the imposition of 
the order. While imports of TRBs from Hungary have decreased over the 
life of the order, recently declining to minimal levels, in the years 
immediately following the order, imports remained fairly constant. The 
domestic parties recognize this fact, as stated in their response, that 
Hungarian exports did not immediately decline after the imposition of 
the order (see May 3, 1999, Substantive Response of the domestic 
parties at 8). Therefore, the Department determines that, while imports 
did not decline immediately following the imposition of the order, they 
have fallen over the life of the order.
    According to the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department will 
normally find that revocation of the antidumping duty order will likely 
lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping where dumping margins 
continued at any level after the issuance of the order or where dumping 
was eliminated after the issuance of the order and import volumes of 
the subject merchandise declined significantly. (See Sunset Policy 
Bulletin at section II.A.3.) Therefore, given the continued existence 
of dumping margins, as well as the fact that respondent parties waived 
participation, and absent argument and evidence to the contrary, the 
Department determines that dumping is likely to continue or recur if 
the order were revoked.

Magnitude of the Margin

    In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that it 
normally will provide to the Commission the margin that was determined 
in the final determination in the original investigation. Further, for 
companies not specifically investigated or for companies that did not 
begin shipping until after the order was issued, the Department 
normally will provide a margin based on the ``all others'' rate from 
the investigation. (See section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.) 
Exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently calculated 
margin, where appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption 
determinations. (See sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy 
Bulletin.)
    The Department, in its final determination of sales at LTFV, 
published a weighted-average country-wide dumping margin of 7.42 
percent for all producers/exporters of TRBs from Hungary (55 FR 21066, 
May 22, 1987). Since the original investigation, as noted above, there 
have been four administrative reviews of this order.
    The domestic parties, in their substantive response, citing the 
Sunset Policy Bulletin, argue that, absent a finding of unusual 
circumstances, the Department should suggest to the Commission the 
country-wide rate from the original investigation as the rate that is 
likely to prevail if the order were to be revoked. However, the 
domestic parties argue that the Department should find that unusual 
circumstances exist in Hungary and, on that basis, should calculate a 
new rate to provide to the Commission. The domestic parties argue that 
the economic conditions in Hungary are not ``normal'' conditions since 
the Hungarian economy is in the process of changing from a state-run 
economy to a free-market economy. Because of this change, the domestic 
parties argue that more recent information is more likely

[[Page 60275]]

to be accurate than older information based on economic conditions that 
no longer exist. Therefore, it is the opinion of the domestic parties 
that a newly calculated dumping margin based on exports of Hungarian 
TRBs to the European Union should be used to determine a new rate. 
Without explanation, the domestic parties project the new dumping 
margin to be 45.96 percent (see May 3, 1999, Substantive Response of 
the domestic parties at 11-12).
    As noted in the Sunset Regulations and Sunset Policy Bulletin, only 
under the most extraordinary circumstances will the Department rely on 
dumping margins other than those it calculated and published in its 
prior determinations. The Sunset Regulations at 19 CFR 351.218(e)(2)(i) 
explain that ``extraordinary circumstances'' may be considered by the 
Department in the context of a full sunset review, where the 
substantive response from both domestic and respondent interested 
parties are adequate. In this case, however, the Department determined 
to conduct an expedited review because respondent interested parties 
waived participation. While only in full reviews will the Department 
consider the calculation of new margins, it must be further noted that 
even if the Department had determined to conduct a full review of this 
order, we are not persuaded by the evidence presented by the domestic 
parties that such extraordinary circumstances exist in this case as to 
warrant the calculation of a new dumping margin.
    Further, we are not persuaded that calculation of a new margin is 
appropriate based on the assertions by the domestic parties concerning 
the state of the Hungarian economy, alleged changes in the Hungarian 
bearings industry, and the accessibility of the U.S. market for 
Hungarian producers/exporters.
    Therefore, consistent with the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the 
Department determines that the margin calculated in the original 
investigation is probative of the behavior of Hungarian producers/
exporters if the order were revoked as it is the only rate that 
reflects the behavior of these producers and exporters without the 
discipline of the order. As such, the Department will report to the 
Commission the country-wide rate from the original investigation as 
contained in the Final Results of Review section of this notice.

Final Results of Review

    As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of 
the antidumping order would likely lead to continuation or recurrence 
of dumping at the margins listed below.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Margin
                   Manufacturer/ Exporter                     (percent)
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Country-wide rate..........................................         7.42
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    This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to 
administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility 
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under 
APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations. 
Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or 
conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to 
comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable 
violation.
    This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are in accordance 
with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

    Dated: October 28, 1999.
Richard W. Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 99-28769 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P