[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 209 (Friday, October 29, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58458-58460]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-28415]
[[Page 58458]]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316]
Indiana Michigan Power Company; Notice of Consideration of
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a
Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos.
DPR-58 and DPR-74 issued to Indiana Michigan Power Company (the
licensee) for operation of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant,
Units 1 and 2, located in Berrien County, Michigan.
The proposed amendments involve the resolution of an unreviewed
safety question (USQ) related to certain small-break loss-of-coolant
accident scenarios for which there may not be sufficient containment
recirculation sump water inventory to support continued operation of
the emergency core cooling system and containment spray system pumps
during and following switchover to cold leg recirculation. Resolution
of this issue consists of a combination of physical plant
modifications, new analyses of containment recirculation sump
inventory, and resultant changes to the accident analyses to ensure
sufficient water inventory in the containment recirculation sump. In
addition, the licensee proposes to change the Technical Specifications
(T/S) dealing with the refueling water storage tank (RWST)
inventory and temperature, the required amount of ice in each ice
basket in the containment, and the delay to start the containment air
recirculation/hydrogen skimmer fans.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the
probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
The proposed T/S changes are a result of the planned
modifications being performed to ensure the original design basis
functional capability of the containment recirculation sump. These
planned modifications, and the associated changes to input
assumptions of related safety analyses, do not result in a condition
where the material and construction standards that were applicable
prior to the changes are altered. The integrity of safety-related
systems, structures, and components is maintained within the limits
previously approved. The planned modifications to the facility do
not create any new initiators for any accident, nor do they create
any new credible limiting single failure, nor do they result in any
event previously deemed incredible being made credible. The existing
separation of the control and protection functions for the reactor
core and fuel, reactor coolant system, and the containment and
containment systems are not adversely affected. In addition, the
functional requirements of safety-related systems, structures, and
components, which are related to accident mitigation, have not been
altered.
The proposed T/S changes increasing the minimum RWST contained
inventory have no impact on the initiation of an accident. The RWST
is used to mitigate the consequences of an accident. There are no
new failure modes involving the RWST that could differently initiate
any of the previously evaluated accidents. This is because the RWST
is located outside containment in an area where it is not credible
for a failure of the RWST to affect the reactor core and fuel,
reactor coolant system, and the containment and containment systems.
The proposed T/S changes reflect planned modifications to the
ESFAS [engineered safety features actuation system] actuation logic
and to the time delay for starting of the CEQ [containment air
recirculation/hydrogen skimmer] fans, and opening of the component
cooling water supply and return valves and hydrogen skimmer valves
to the CEQ fans. The proposed changes have no impact on the
initiation of an accident. The planned modifications do not
introduce any new failure modes for the CEQ fans or associated
valves.
The proposed T/S changes reflect the minimum ice weight used in
the existing analyses of containment recirculation sump inventory
and the associated analyses, plus an allowance for weighing
uncertainty. The proposed changes have no impact on the initiation
of an accident.
Therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated
will not be increased by these changes.
The proposed T/S changes, and the associated modifications being
performed, will ensure the capability of the containment
recirculation sump, and the containment structures, systems, and
components, to meet the original design basis requirements for the
facility. The proposed changes will ensure that the minimum required
water inventory is maintained in the containment recirculation sump
at levels sufficient to prevent vortexing in the sump. Therefore,
the original evaluation of the consequences of previously evaluated
accidents as described in the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP)
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) will not be affected.
The proposed T/S changes do not affect the integrity of the fuel
assembly or reactor internals, or any fission product barrier, such
that their function in the control of radiological consequences is
affected. In addition, the response of safety-related systems to
mitigate previously evaluated accidents as described in the CNP
UFSAR, will not be adversely affected or prevented. There is no
effect on the assumptions previously made in the radiological
consequence evaluations, and mitigation of the radiological
consequences of the accidents described in the CNP UFSAR is not
affected as further described below. The accident analyses performed
to determine the effects of a LOCA demonstrate that decay heat is
removed, and long-term core cooling is assured with these changes.
As a result, design basis accident analyses affected by these T/S
changes remain valid with the incorporation of the revised accident
analyses input assumptions. Therefore, the consequences of an
accident previously evaluated will not be increased by these
changes.
The proposed T/S changes for the RWST do not increase the
consequences of any previously evaluated accident. Increasing the
minimum deliverable RWST volume of water provides assurance that the
ECCS and CTS are capable of performing their design basis functions
to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA or main steam line break
(MSLB) by ensuring adequate containment recirculation sump
inventory.
The proposed T/S changes for the CEQ fans and valves do not
increase the consequences of any previously evaluated accident. The
design basis functions of the CEQ fans and valves in maintaining
containment integrity following a LOCA or MSLB continue to be met.
In addition, the proposed change provides additional assurance that
the ECCS and CTS remain capable of performing their design basis
functions in mitigating the consequences of a LOCA or MSLB by
ensuring adequate containment recirculation sump inventory. The
planned modification to shorten the time delay for the CEQ fans and
valves will delay initiation of CTS for a small break LOCA. Delaying
CTS initiation results in a period when any fission products
released from the reactor core due to possible fuel damage are not
absorbed by CTS and held in solution in the containment
recirculation sump. However, a small break LOCA does not result in
reactor fuel damage of the magnitude that would increase offsite
dose because of the lack of fission product removal by CTS. For a
large break LOCA involving the possibility of more significant fuel
damage, there will be no discernable delay in CTS initiation because
of the
[[Page 58459]]
proposed T/S changes. Therefore, the consequences of a LOCA will not
be increased by the proposed T/S changes.
The proposed T/S changes for the ice condenser ice weight do not
increase the consequences of a LOCA or MSLB. The minimum end-of-
cycle ice weight is consistent with the assumptions in the accident
analyses. Additional ice is loaded into the ice baskets based on
sublimation of 10% over an eighteen-month period so that the minimum
ice weight of 1132 pounds is available at the end of each operating
cycle. At other times throughout the cycle, there is additional
margin because the ice that is assumed to sublime later in the cycle
is still in the ice basket. The 1% weighing allowance provides
additional assurance that the actual weight of ice meets the
analyses requirement of 1132 pounds.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of
accidents previously evaluated are not increased.
2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Sufficient containment recirculation sump inventory is necessary
during the mitigation of both MSLB and LOCA events. The proposed T/S
changes do not create the possibility of any other type of accident.
The proposed T/S changes are a result of the planned modifications
being performed to ensure the original design basis functional
capability of the containment recirculation sump. These planned
modifications, and the associated changes to input assumptions of
related safety analyses, do not result in a condition where the
material and construction standards that were applicable prior to
the changes are altered. The integrity of safety-related systems,
structures, and components is maintained within the limits
previously approved.
The planned modifications to the facility do not create any new
initiators for any accident, nor do they create any new credible
limiting single failure, nor do they result in any event previously
deemed incredible being made credible. The existing separation of
the control and protection functions for the reactor core and fuel,
reactor coolant system, and the containment and containment systems
are not adversely impacted. In addition, the functional requirements
of safety-related systems, structures, and components, which are
related to accident mitigation, have not been altered.
The proposed T/S changes for the RWST cannot create the
possibility of an accident. There are no failure modes involving the
RWST that could initiate an accident. This is because the RWST is
located outside containment in an area where it is not credible for
a failure of the RWST to affect the reactor core and fuel, reactor
coolant system, and the containment and containment systems.
The proposed T/S changes for the CEQ fans and valves cannot
create the possibility of an accident. The changes do not introduce
any new failure modes for the CEQ fans or associated valves.
Operation of the CEQ fans and valves cannot initiate an accident.
The proposed T/S changes for the ice condenser ice weight cannot
create the possibility of an accident. The ice condenser has no
function during normal operation. It is a passive system that
functions after an accident has already occurred. The proposed T/S
changes to the ice weight do not alter any other physical
characteristics of the ice condenser, nor does it change the
function of the ice condenser. The proposed ice weights are less
than the maximum weight supported by the structural analyses for the
ice baskets. No new failure mechanisms are introduced by this
change.
Therefore, it is concluded that the change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin
of safety?
The margin of safety pertinent to the proposed T/S changes
includes providing assurance that emergency core cooling,
containment cooling and pressure suppression, and containment spray
functional requirements will be met following a design basis
accident, specifically for LOCA or MSLB events. Assurance of minimum
required containment recirculation sump inventory during and
following switchover of suction for the ECCS and CTS pumps from the
RWST to the containment recirculation sump provides this assurance.
The planned modifications have no adverse effect on the
availability, operability, or functional performance of the safety-
related systems, structures, and components required for mitigating
the effects of design basis accidents. In fact, these planned
modifications are intended to ensure the original design basis
functional capabilities of the containment recirculation sump, and
other containment systems, structures, and components, to support
ECCS, ice condenser, and CTS operation, and to ensure that the
containment structure and systems provide an effective fission
product barrier. However, the planned modifications do require
changes to the T/S, but they do not prevent the performance of any
surveillance requirement currently specified in the CNP T/S.
The proposed T/S changes for the RWST provide assurance that
sufficient water is available to support the ECCS and CTS in
performance of their design basis functions to mitigate the
consequences of a LOCA or MSLB. Therefore, the margin of safety
provided by the ECCS and CTS associated with containment integrity
and with assurance of post-LOCA long-term core cooling is preserved
by these proposed changes.
The proposed T/S changes for the CEQ fans and valves provide
assurance that the original design basis functional capabilities of
the containment are preserved. In addition, by increasing ice melt
rate in the early stages of a small break LOCA, the design basis
functions of the ECCS and CTS during and after switchover to cold
leg recirculation are preserved. Finally, the changes to containment
pressure response resulting from starting the CEQ fans and opening
the associated valves earlier in a LOCA than in previous analyses do
not result in a reduction in the capability of ECCS during the
reactor vessel reflood period. Therefore, the margin to safety
provided by the CEQ fans and valves associated with containment
integrity, assurance of post-LOCA long-term core cooling, and ECCS
performance is preserved by these proposed changes.
The proposed T/S changes for the ice condenser ice weight
provides assurance that the ice condenser will provide sufficient
pressure suppression capability to limit the containment peak
pressure transient to less than the design limit and will contain
sufficient heat removal capability to condense the RCS volume
released during a LOCA. The proposed T/S changes maintain the
appropriate distribution of ice through the containment bays. The
required concentration of sodium tetraborate in the ice bed is not
changed. There is sufficient boron in the ice bed to ensure adequate
boron concentration in the containment recirculation sump following
a LOCA when combined with the water inventory from the RWST, RCS
leakage, and safety injection accumulators. The increase in the
allowance for ice sublimation does not reduce the margin of safety.
The original allowance was conservatively estimated to be 10% over
an eighteen-month period. There was no operating ice condenser plant
data for determining actual sublimation at the time that allowance
was made. Since that time, actual data obtained has demonstrated
that 10% is a reasonable, bounding value. Stating the ice weight
requirement as an end-of-cycle value does not impact the margin of
safety because the allowance for sublimation will be verified during
the as-found weighing of the ice baskets.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92 are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public
[[Page 58460]]
and State comments received. Should the Commission take this action, it
will publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance and provide
for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects
that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By November 29, 1999, the licensee may file a request for a hearing
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library,
500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085. If a request for a hearing or
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of
hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy
the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Jeremy J. Euto, Esquire, 500 Circle
Drive, Buchanan, MI 49107, attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(I)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated October 1, 1999, which is available for
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library,
500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of October 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Carl F. Lyon,
Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate III, Division of
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-28415 Filed 10-28-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P