[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 209 (Friday, October 29, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58458-58460]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-28415]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316]


Indiana Michigan Power Company; Notice of Consideration of 
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a 
Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. 
DPR-58 and DPR-74 issued to Indiana Michigan Power Company (the 
licensee) for operation of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, 
Units 1 and 2, located in Berrien County, Michigan.
    The proposed amendments involve the resolution of an unreviewed 
safety question (USQ) related to certain small-break loss-of-coolant 
accident scenarios for which there may not be sufficient containment 
recirculation sump water inventory to support continued operation of 
the emergency core cooling system and containment spray system pumps 
during and following switchover to cold leg recirculation. Resolution 
of this issue consists of a combination of physical plant 
modifications, new analyses of containment recirculation sump 
inventory, and resultant changes to the accident analyses to ensure 
sufficient water inventory in the containment recirculation sump. In 
addition, the licensee proposes to change the Technical Specifications   
    (T/S) dealing with the refueling water storage tank (RWST) 
inventory and temperature, the required amount of ice in each ice 
basket in the containment, and the delay to start the containment air 
recirculation/hydrogen skimmer fans.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:

    1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the 
probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated?
    The proposed T/S changes are a result of the planned 
modifications being performed to ensure the original design basis 
functional capability of the containment recirculation sump. These 
planned modifications, and the associated changes to input 
assumptions of related safety analyses, do not result in a condition 
where the material and construction standards that were applicable 
prior to the changes are altered. The integrity of safety-related 
systems, structures, and components is maintained within the limits 
previously approved. The planned modifications to the facility do 
not create any new initiators for any accident, nor do they create 
any new credible limiting single failure, nor do they result in any 
event previously deemed incredible being made credible. The existing 
separation of the control and protection functions for the reactor 
core and fuel, reactor coolant system, and the containment and 
containment systems are not adversely affected. In addition, the 
functional requirements of safety-related systems, structures, and 
components, which are related to accident mitigation, have not been 
altered.
    The proposed T/S changes increasing the minimum RWST contained 
inventory have no impact on the initiation of an accident. The RWST 
is used to mitigate the consequences of an accident. There are no 
new failure modes involving the RWST that could differently initiate 
any of the previously evaluated accidents. This is because the RWST 
is located outside containment in an area where it is not credible 
for a failure of the RWST to affect the reactor core and fuel, 
reactor coolant system, and the containment and containment systems.
    The proposed T/S changes reflect planned modifications to the 
ESFAS [engineered safety features actuation system] actuation logic 
and to the time delay for starting of the CEQ [containment air 
recirculation/hydrogen skimmer] fans, and opening of the component 
cooling water supply and return valves and hydrogen skimmer valves 
to the CEQ fans. The proposed changes have no impact on the 
initiation of an accident. The planned modifications do not 
introduce any new failure modes for the CEQ fans or associated 
valves.
    The proposed T/S changes reflect the minimum ice weight used in 
the existing analyses of containment recirculation sump inventory 
and the associated analyses, plus an allowance for weighing 
uncertainty. The proposed changes have no impact on the initiation 
of an accident.
    Therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated 
will not be increased by these changes.
    The proposed T/S changes, and the associated modifications being 
performed, will ensure the capability of the containment 
recirculation sump, and the containment structures, systems, and 
components, to meet the original design basis requirements for the 
facility. The proposed changes will ensure that the minimum required 
water inventory is maintained in the containment recirculation sump 
at levels sufficient to prevent vortexing in the sump. Therefore, 
the original evaluation of the consequences of previously evaluated 
accidents as described in the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) 
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) will not be affected.
    The proposed T/S changes do not affect the integrity of the fuel 
assembly or reactor internals, or any fission product barrier, such 
that their function in the control of radiological consequences is 
affected. In addition, the response of safety-related systems to 
mitigate previously evaluated accidents as described in the CNP 
UFSAR, will not be adversely affected or prevented. There is no 
effect on the assumptions previously made in the radiological 
consequence evaluations, and mitigation of the radiological 
consequences of the accidents described in the CNP UFSAR is not 
affected as further described below. The accident analyses performed 
to determine the effects of a LOCA demonstrate that decay heat is 
removed, and long-term core cooling is assured with these changes. 
As a result, design basis accident analyses affected by these T/S 
changes remain valid with the incorporation of the revised accident 
analyses input assumptions. Therefore, the consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated will not be increased by these 
changes.
    The proposed T/S changes for the RWST do not increase the 
consequences of any previously evaluated accident. Increasing the 
minimum deliverable RWST volume of water provides assurance that the 
ECCS and CTS are capable of performing their design basis functions 
to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA or main steam line break 
(MSLB) by ensuring adequate containment recirculation sump 
inventory.
    The proposed T/S changes for the CEQ fans and valves do not 
increase the consequences of any previously evaluated accident. The 
design basis functions of the CEQ fans and valves in maintaining 
containment integrity following a LOCA or MSLB continue to be met. 
In addition, the proposed change provides additional assurance that 
the ECCS and CTS remain capable of performing their design basis 
functions in mitigating the consequences of a LOCA or MSLB by 
ensuring adequate containment recirculation sump inventory. The 
planned modification to shorten the time delay for the CEQ fans and 
valves will delay initiation of CTS for a small break LOCA. Delaying 
CTS initiation results in a period when any fission products 
released from the reactor core due to possible fuel damage are not 
absorbed by CTS and held in solution in the containment 
recirculation sump. However, a small break LOCA does not result in 
reactor fuel damage of the magnitude that would increase offsite 
dose because of the lack of fission product removal by CTS. For a 
large break LOCA involving the possibility of more significant fuel 
damage, there will be no discernable delay in CTS initiation because 
of the

[[Page 58459]]

proposed T/S changes. Therefore, the consequences of a LOCA will not 
be increased by the proposed T/S changes.
    The proposed T/S changes for the ice condenser ice weight do not 
increase the consequences of a LOCA or MSLB. The minimum end-of-
cycle ice weight is consistent with the assumptions in the accident 
analyses. Additional ice is loaded into the ice baskets based on 
sublimation of 10% over an eighteen-month period so that the minimum 
ice weight of 1132 pounds is available at the end of each operating 
cycle. At other times throughout the cycle, there is additional 
margin because the ice that is assumed to sublime later in the cycle 
is still in the ice basket. The 1% weighing allowance provides 
additional assurance that the actual weight of ice meets the 
analyses requirement of 1132 pounds.
    Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of 
accidents previously evaluated are not increased.
    2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Sufficient containment recirculation sump inventory is necessary 
during the mitigation of both MSLB and LOCA events. The proposed T/S 
changes do not create the possibility of any other type of accident. 
The proposed T/S changes are a result of the planned modifications 
being performed to ensure the original design basis functional 
capability of the containment recirculation sump. These planned 
modifications, and the associated changes to input assumptions of 
related safety analyses, do not result in a condition where the 
material and construction standards that were applicable prior to 
the changes are altered. The integrity of safety-related systems, 
structures, and components is maintained within the limits 
previously approved.
    The planned modifications to the facility do not create any new 
initiators for any accident, nor do they create any new credible 
limiting single failure, nor do they result in any event previously 
deemed incredible being made credible. The existing separation of 
the control and protection functions for the reactor core and fuel, 
reactor coolant system, and the containment and containment systems 
are not adversely impacted. In addition, the functional requirements 
of safety-related systems, structures, and components, which are 
related to accident mitigation, have not been altered.
    The proposed T/S changes for the RWST cannot create the 
possibility of an accident. There are no failure modes involving the 
RWST that could initiate an accident. This is because the RWST is 
located outside containment in an area where it is not credible for 
a failure of the RWST to affect the reactor core and fuel, reactor 
coolant system, and the containment and containment systems.
    The proposed T/S changes for the CEQ fans and valves cannot 
create the possibility of an accident. The changes do not introduce 
any new failure modes for the CEQ fans or associated valves. 
Operation of the CEQ fans and valves cannot initiate an accident.
    The proposed T/S changes for the ice condenser ice weight cannot 
create the possibility of an accident. The ice condenser has no 
function during normal operation. It is a passive system that 
functions after an accident has already occurred. The proposed T/S 
changes to the ice weight do not alter any other physical 
characteristics of the ice condenser, nor does it change the 
function of the ice condenser. The proposed ice weights are less 
than the maximum weight supported by the structural analyses for the 
ice baskets. No new failure mechanisms are introduced by this 
change.
    Therefore, it is concluded that the change does not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.
    3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin 
of safety?
    The margin of safety pertinent to the proposed T/S changes 
includes providing assurance that emergency core cooling, 
containment cooling and pressure suppression, and containment spray 
functional requirements will be met following a design basis 
accident, specifically for LOCA or MSLB events. Assurance of minimum 
required containment recirculation sump inventory during and 
following switchover of suction for the ECCS and CTS pumps from the 
RWST to the containment recirculation sump provides this assurance.
    The planned modifications have no adverse effect on the 
availability, operability, or functional performance of the safety-
related systems, structures, and components required for mitigating 
the effects of design basis accidents. In fact, these planned 
modifications are intended to ensure the original design basis 
functional capabilities of the containment recirculation sump, and 
other containment systems, structures, and components, to support 
ECCS, ice condenser, and CTS operation, and to ensure that the 
containment structure and systems provide an effective fission 
product barrier. However, the planned modifications do require 
changes to the T/S, but they do not prevent the performance of any 
surveillance requirement currently specified in the CNP T/S.
    The proposed T/S changes for the RWST provide assurance that 
sufficient water is available to support the ECCS and CTS in 
performance of their design basis functions to mitigate the 
consequences of a LOCA or MSLB. Therefore, the margin of safety 
provided by the ECCS and CTS associated with containment integrity 
and with assurance of post-LOCA long-term core cooling is preserved 
by these proposed changes.
    The proposed T/S changes for the CEQ fans and valves provide 
assurance that the original design basis functional capabilities of 
the containment are preserved. In addition, by increasing ice melt 
rate in the early stages of a small break LOCA, the design basis 
functions of the ECCS and CTS during and after switchover to cold 
leg recirculation are preserved. Finally, the changes to containment 
pressure response resulting from starting the CEQ fans and opening 
the associated valves earlier in a LOCA than in previous analyses do 
not result in a reduction in the capability of ECCS during the 
reactor vessel reflood period. Therefore, the margin to safety 
provided by the CEQ fans and valves associated with containment 
integrity, assurance of post-LOCA long-term core cooling, and ECCS 
performance is preserved by these proposed changes.
    The proposed T/S changes for the ice condenser ice weight 
provides assurance that the ice condenser will provide sufficient 
pressure suppression capability to limit the containment peak 
pressure transient to less than the design limit and will contain 
sufficient heat removal capability to condense the RCS volume 
released during a LOCA. The proposed T/S changes maintain the 
appropriate distribution of ice through the containment bays. The 
required concentration of sodium tetraborate in the ice bed is not 
changed. There is sufficient boron in the ice bed to ensure adequate 
boron concentration in the containment recirculation sump following 
a LOCA when combined with the water inventory from the RWST, RCS 
leakage, and safety injection accumulators. The increase in the 
allowance for ice sublimation does not reduce the margin of safety. 
The original allowance was conservatively estimated to be 10% over 
an eighteen-month period. There was no operating ice condenser plant 
data for determining actual sublimation at the time that allowance 
was made. Since that time, actual data obtained has demonstrated 
that 10% is a reasonable, bounding value. Stating the ice weight 
requirement as an end-of-cycle value does not impact the margin of 
safety because the allowance for sublimation will be verified during 
the as-found weighing of the ice baskets.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92 are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public

[[Page 58460]]

and State comments received. Should the Commission take this action, it 
will publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance and provide 
for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects 
that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of 
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By November 29, 1999, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library, 
500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085. If a request for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Jeremy J. Euto, Esquire, 500 Circle 
Drive, Buchanan, MI 49107, attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(I)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated October 1, 1999, which is available for 
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library, 
500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of October 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Carl F. Lyon,
Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate III, Division of 
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-28415 Filed 10-28-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P