[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 203 (Thursday, October 21, 1999)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 56725-56731]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-27281]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs Administration

49 CFR Parts 192 and 195

[Docket No. RSPA-99-6355; Notice 1]


Pipeline Safety: Enhanced Safety and Environmental Protection for 
Gas Transmission and Hazardous Liquid Pipelines in High Consequence 
Areas

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.


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ACTION: Notice of public meeting and request for comments.

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SUMMARY: This notice announces a public meeting to consider the need 
for additional safety and environmental regulations for gas 
transmission lines and hazardous liquid pipelines in high-density 
population areas, waters where a substantial likelihood of commercial 
navigation exists, and areas unusually sensitive to environmental 
damage. RSPA's Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) intends to incorporate a 
process into its regulations to validate pipe integrity in these high 
consequence areas. The purpose of the meeting is to determine the 
extent to which operators now have integrity management programs, to 
explore effective ways to promote their development and implementation 
by all operators, and to discuss mechanisms by which OPS could confirm 
the existence and adequacy of such operator-developed programs. The 
meeting will discuss a practical definition of high consequence areas, 
as well as the need, if any, for increased inspection, enhanced damage 
prevention, improved emergency response, and other measures to prevent 
and mitigate pipeline leaks and ruptures in these areas.

DATES: The public meeting will be on November 18, 1999, from 9 a.m. to 
4 p.m., through November 19, 1999, from 9 a.m. to 12 noon, at the Hyatt 
Dulles Hotel, 23 Dulles Corner Boulevard, Herndon, VA 20171, (703) 713-
1234. If you want to make an oral presentation at the meeting, please 
notify Jenny Donohue no later than November 12, 1999, by phone (202-
366-4046) or by Internet e-mail ([email protected]). In addition, 
no later than December 20, 1999, you may submit written comments as 
described in the ADDRESSES section.

ADDRESSES: Submit written comments by mail or delivery to the Dockets 
Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room PL-401, 400 Seventh 
Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590-0001. You also may submit written 
comments to the docket electronically. To do so, log on to the 
following Internet Web address: http://dms.dot.gov. Click on ``Help & 
Information'' for instructions on how to file a document 
electronically. All written comments should identify the docket and 
notice numbers stated in the heading of this notice. Anyone desiring 
confirmation of mailed comments must include a self-addressed stamped 
postcard.
    The Dockets Facility is located on the plaza level, Room PL-401, of 
the US Department of Transportation, 400 7th St., SW, Washington, DC. 
It is open from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 
federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Beth Callsen (tel: 202-366-4572; E-
mail: [email protected]). You can read comments and other 
material in the docket on the Internet at: http://dms.dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) and National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) investigations and analyses of major pipeline incidents 
have underscored the importance of ensuring safety and environmental 
protection in areas of high population density and in areas unusually 
sensitive to environmental damage. Congress has also directed OPS to 
undertake a variety of activities concerning areas where the risk of a 
pipeline spill could have significant impact (what we call high 
consequence areas). For example, Congress directed OPS to prescribe, if 
necessary, additional standards requiring the periodic inspection of 
each pipeline in high population density areas or in areas unusually 
sensitive to environmental damage (49 U.S.C. 60108 (b)).
    In response to the Congressional directive, OPS created the Risk 
Management Demonstration Program, the Systems Integrity Inspection 
(SII) Program, and other initiatives. These programs encourage and 
evaluate operator-developed safety and environmental management 
processes that incorporate operator- and pipeline-specific information 
and data to identify, assess, and address pipeline risks. These 
programs, along with the Oil Spill Response Plan Review and Exercise 
Program, have helped OPS refine regulatory oversight processes. These 
processes help to ensure that pipeline operators have effective 
processes in place to identify the most important risks to the public 
and the environment, and to develop and implement cost-effective 
preventive and mitigative actions to manage these risks. Many of these 
initiatives have validated the importance of focusing resources and 
establishing higher levels of protection in areas where a pipeline 
spill could have significant consequences.
    Through its various programs and initiatives, OPS has observed and 
become familiar with the wide array of existing operator safety 
programs that identify, assess, and address all significant risks to 
the pipeline in an integrated manner. These operator-developed programs 
closely examine internal inspection data, surveillance and operating 
information such as expected population growth, land use, and 
construction activity along the pipeline, and other information 
relevant to assuring the pipeline's integrity in high population areas 
and in environmentally sensitive areas. OPS believes the next step is 
to determine the extent to which such programs exist, to develop 
effective ways to encourage their development and implementation by all 
operators, and to establish mechanisms by which OPS can confirm the 
existence and adequacy of such operator-developed programs.
    OPS believes that current pipeline safety regulations address the 
most important risks to the nation's pipelines, and have served the 
industry well, resulting in a good safety record compared to 
competitive modes of transportation. However, safety programs based on 
strict compliance with the regulations can often result in a piece-meal 
approach to identifying and controlling risks, sometimes neglecting the 
interrelationships among failure causes and the benefits of coordinated 
risk control activities.
    OPS is considering ways to further enhance safety and environmental 
protection in areas where a pipeline failure could have serious 
consequences for the public or the environment, i.e., high consequence 
areas, through a more integrated approach to identifying and addressing 
risks. A conceptual approach is described below. OPS believes that many 
operators already have processes in place that are consistent with this 
approach. Through this Notice and the November 18-19, 1999, public 
meeting, OPS is soliciting input on this or other approaches to 
improved protection for high consequence areas.

Key Elements

    OPS envisions a process that places stronger regulator and operator 
emphasis on high consequence areas in the vicinity of pipeline 
facilities. The following key elements should be reflected in such a 
process:

1. The need for pipeline-specific assessments in determining the need 
for additional preventive and mitigative activities.

    OPS recognizes that industry-wide requirements for specific 
additional preventive or mitigative actions might not be the most 
effective way of reducing risk. Companies must have the responsibility 
and the necessary flexibility to consider geographic- and segment-
specific conditions in assessing the need for additional safety and

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environmental protection programs and in developing effective programs.

2. The need to assess all risk factors and risk reduction activities in 
an integrated manner.

    Analyses of major pipeline incidents show that combinations of 
design, operation, maintenance, and environmental factors are usually 
involved, rather than a single cause. Accordingly, OPS envisions 
assessment and decision processes that examine causes for pipeline 
failure in a comprehensive and integrated manner. For example, data 
from internal in-line inspections must be combined with other 
information related to the condition of the pipe (e.g., results of 
close internal surveys and patrols) to determine appropriate evaluation 
and remediation activities.

3. The need for increased assurance that high consequence areas are 
being protected.

    OPS recognizes that existing regulations and industry practices 
already focus on some high consequence areas. For example, the class 
location scheme embedded in the gas pipeline regulations imposes more 
stringent requirements in areas with higher population. Many liquid 
pipeline operators already have formalized environmental, safety, and 
health programs that focus attention and resources on areas of highest 
risk. However, OPS also recognizes the need to assure the public that 
the condition of the pipelines in high consequence areas is adequately 
known, that current regulations and industry practices are adequate, 
and that the need for additional protection has been explicitly and 
responsibly considered.

OPS's Approach to Improved Protection

    OPS envisions a process that would include, at the least, the 
following steps:
     Defining and Locating High Consequence Areas
     Identifying Affected Pipeline Segments
     Inspecting and Assessing the Condition of the Affected 
Segments
     Assessing the Need for Additional Preventive or Mitigative 
Actions
     Remediating and Repairing the Affected Segments as 
Necessary
     Implementing and Monitoring Other Cost-Effective Risk 
Control Activities
     Documenting Inspections, Assessments, and Actions
     Reviewing and Ensuring Compliance
(See the Flowchart included in this Notice.)
    Each of these steps is briefly discussed below, including key 
questions for discussion.

 Identifying and Locating High Consequence Areas

    The first step in the process is to identify and locate the areas 
where a pipeline failure could pose serious safety and environmental 
consequences to the public or environment. This first step is intended 
as a filtering step, focusing attention on those areas of possible high 
consequence. Subsequent steps address the likelihood of such 
consequences actually occurring, and the need for any action to reduce 
the likelihood or consequences of a pipeline incident in these areas.
    There are relevant past and current efforts to define or identify 
these areas.
     Class locations for gas pipelines (49 CFR 192.5) are based 
on habitable structures within a 220 yard corridor on either side of 
the pipeline.
     Many companies have developed Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) that can provide accurate, more detailed information 
concerning the proximity of population and buildings to the pipeline.
     OPS, other federal agencies, and the hazardous liquid 
pipeline industry are working together to develop a definition for 
Unusually Environmentally Sensitive Areas (USAs), focusing on areas in 
which a pipeline spill could threaten local water supplies, threatened 
and endangered species, and other environmental resources (Docket No. 
RSPA-99-5455; 64 FR 38173; July 15,1999). OPS is currently pilot 
testing a model for defining USAs.
    In high consequence areas, OPS believes that an operator should be 
required to explicitly assess each area, determine the condition of the 
pipeline that could affect these areas, understand the potential causes 
of failure of these pipelines, and ascertain the need, through a 
structured and documented process, for additional preventive or 
mitigative actions.
    Key questions that OPS would like to discuss at the meeting 
include:

a. How should ``high consequence'' areas be defined?

    1. What is the status of OPS's definition of USAs?
    2. What should be the definition of ``high population density'' 
area for a natural gas pipeline?
    3. Can operator GIS systems be used to identify high population 
areas with greater precision than current class location schemes?
    4. What should be the definition of ``high population density'' 
area for a hazardous liquid pipeline?
    5. Should ``high property damage,'' ``significant disruption in 
service,'' ``significant disruption in commerce,'' ``waters where a 
substantial likelihood of commercial navigation exists,'' or the 
potential for other significant consequences be included in the 
definition of high consequence areas?

b. Should the operator or OPS be responsible for identifying the 
location of high consequence areas?

c. What percentage of natural gas pipelines might be expected to 
intersect high consequence areas (e.g., what percentage currently are 
in Class 3 or Class 4 locations?)

d. What percentage of hazardous liquid pipelines might be expected to 
intersect high consequence areas (e.g., what percentage currently are 
in non-rural areas or intersect USAs).

e. What process should OPS or the industry use to ensure that the 
identified high consequence areas continue to reflect current 
conditions along the pipeline (e.g., population expansion, new 
information on environmental resources)?

2. Identifying Affected Pipeline Segments

    In this step, the specific pipeline segments whose failure could 
have serious safety or environmental consequences are identified. Once 
the high consequence areas are located on a map, the existing pipelines 
must be overlaid to identify the segments in or in close proximity to 
these areas. The physical ability of the overlaid pipeline segments to 
affect the environmental resources in the area or to impact the 
surrounding population must then be examined. The fact that a pipeline 
is within a high consequence area (defined in the first step) does not 
necessarily mean that a pipeline leak or rupture can result in 
environmental damage or impact public safety. For example, the 
population in a ``high population density'' area might be physically 
located sufficiently far from the pipeline to preclude safety impact. 
There may also be topographical barriers between the environmental 
resource and the pipeline that would preclude migration of any spill 
from the pipeline to the resource. This step, in conjunction with the 
first screening step, allows the pipeline operator to take into account 
pipeline-specific information to identify those segments of pipe that 
could result in environmental damage or public safety consequences.

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    Key questions that OPS would like to discuss at the meeting 
include:
     Does adequate data exist for operators to reliably 
ascertain the specific pipeline segments that could affect ``high 
consequence'' areas?
     Should pipeline segments near, but not within, high 
consequence areas also be examined for possible impact? If yes, what 
kinds of assumptions should be used to determine whether or not an 
impact occurs (e.g., use of ``worst case discharge'' from spill 
response plans)?
     What would be the expected cost to an operator to perform 
this step?

3. Inspecting and Assessing the Condition of the Affected Segments

    The next step in the process is for the operator to understand and 
assess the condition of the pipeline segments identified in Step 2. 
This step, in conjunction with the following step, is intended to 
ensure that the likelihood of pipeline failure due to internal or 
external corrosion, construction damage, previous excavation damage, or 
other mechanical damage is very low.
    Undetected defects introduced by corrosion or by outside force 
damage have caused major pipeline accidents. Some of the major pipeline 
incidents over the last decade involved degradation of wall thickness 
from dents or gouges caused by outside force or third party damage. In 
some instances these dents and gouges had been in the pipe for a period 
of time before failure, and the line had not been inspected using 
internal inspection tools capable of detecting wall thinning or 
geometric defects in the pipe. OPS is especially interested in methods 
to detect and repair such defects before they lead to leaks or ruptures 
in high consequence areas.
    One acceptable way of performing this step would be the use of an 
intelligent in-line inspection device (smart pig) appropriate to the 
type of pipeline being inspected. An operator can also use alternative, 
equivalent means to assess the condition of the affected segments. If 
the line has recently been pigged, the operator could review the 
available pig data in conjunction with other current data (e.g., from 
close interval surveys) to assess the condition of the line. This step 
results in an operator identifying anomalies (areas of potential loss 
of wall thickness or pipe damage) that should be investigated further.
    The hazardous liquid pipeline industry has developed recommended 
practices for monitoring, testing, and inspection methods that go 
beyond the requirements of 49 CFR part 195 (API Recommended Practices 
1129, Assurance of Hazardous Liquid Pipeline System Integrity). This 
document comprises a range of best practices--including design and 
construction; monitoring and controls; inspections, reviews and audits; 
and damage prevention--to assist pipeline operators in improving the 
integrity of their pipeline systems.
    Key questions that OPS would like to discuss at the meeting 
include:
     Are current industry standards sufficient for pipelines in 
high consequence areas? For example, is the ASME B.31 standard, used by 
operators to determine acceptable pipe wall loss, appropriate in high 
consequence areas? Or should more conservative standards apply in these 
areas?
     What is the current capability of smart pigs to find prior 
mechanical damage and other defects?
     What alternatives to internal inspection can provide 
equivalent information on pipeline condition?
     How recently should a line have been pigged to provide 
reliable data for this step? What factors should be considered in 
making this determination (e.g., recent construction activity, cathodic 
protection system performance, interference from foreign line 
crossings, etc.)?
     What percentage of natural gas pipelines in Class 3 or 
Class 4 areas have been smart pigged in the last 5-10 years?
     What percentage of hazardous liquid pipelines intersecting 
non-rural or environmentally vulnerable areas might be expected to have 
been smart pigged in the last 5-10 years?
     What is the expected cost to an operator to pig (or 
equivalent) pipeline segments that would impact high consequence areas?
     How soon should the condition of the a line be assessed 
after determining that it could impact a high consequence area?
     What criteria should be used to identify anomalies that 
require further investigation?
     What is the appropriate period between pig runs for high 
consequence areas? (Should this period be based on pipeline-specific 
conditions impacting the likelihood of corrosion or mechanical damage?)
     Should OPS specify minimum performance criteria for 
internal inspection tools? If so, what should those criteria be?

4. Assessing the Need for Preventive or Mitigative Actions

    In this step, the operator would determine the most likely causes 
of failure in the identified high consequence areas, and determine if 
any additional preventive or mitigative actions, beyond those the 
regulations require or the operator performs, are needed. In addition 
to assessing the need for repairs to lower the likelihood of leaks or 
ruptures due to corrosion or past mechanical damage (in Step 3), the 
operator should also assess the need for additional preventive actions 
to lower the likelihood of failure from all potential causes (e.g., 
third party damage, geological hazards, operation and control center 
malfunctions, etc.) or additional mitigative actions to reduce the 
consequences should the pipeline leak or rupture.
    This assessment should be performed as part of an integrated, 
segment-specific assessment of the possible causes of pipeline failure, 
and cost-effective actions to reduce the specific risks identified on 
these segments.
    Although internal inspection and remediation of the lines can help 
ensure the condition of the lines, inspection and remediation does not 
address many important causes of pipeline failure. For example, OPS 
data show that in 1998, 37 percent of reported gas pipeline incidents 
were due to outside force damage. Similarly, on hazardous liquid 
pipelines, outside forces caused 26 percent of reportable events. 
Additional preventive measures may be needed to reduce the likelihood 
of these reported incidents, or to reduce the expected level of 
consequences should an incident occur. Accordingly, in addition to 
internal inspection of pipeline segments in high consequence areas, OPS 
is also interested in comment on the need for additional assessments 
and analyses of other preventive and mitigative measures to reduce risk 
in these areas.
    For example, additional preventive measures might include the 
development of enhanced damage prevention programs. Recently, OPS 
sponsored a multi-industry effort to define best practices in damage 
prevention. Although OPS is not considering translating these best 
practices into regulations, it is interested in comments on how to 
otherwise promote the adoption of damage prevention best practices to 
reduce the likelihood of pipeline incidents. Additional mitigative 
actions might include developing enhanced emergency response plans in 
high consequence areas, or using emergency flow restricting devices or 
remotely controlled valves to limit the amount of product loss 
following a line failure.
    Key questions that OPS would like to discuss at the meeting 
include:

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     What structured assessment and decision processes could 
operators use to perform this step?
     What percentage of the natural gas industry already has 
structured processes in place to perform such assessments?
     What percentage of the hazardous liquid industry already 
has structured processes in place to perform such assessments?
     What should be the criteria for deciding whether 
additional actions by the operator are required?
     What would be the expected cost of performing such an 
assessment?

5. Repairing the Affected Segments as Necessary

    In this step, the operator would determine which anomalies require 
remediation, and the appropriate means of repair. This step, in 
conjunction with the previous step, is intended to ensure that the 
likelihood of pipeline failure due to internal or external corrosion, 
construction damage, previous excavation damage, or other mechanical 
damage is very low.
    Key questions that OPS would like to discuss at the meeting 
include:
     Should current industry standards (e.g., ASME B.31G) be 
used as the repair criteria, or do other methodologies exist or need to 
be developed for pipelines in high consequence areas?
     What is the status of the current rulemaking to allow 
alternative repair techniques?
     After an operator identifies anomalies requiring repair, 
how much time should be allowed in which to complete the repair work?
     What would be the expected additional cost to the 
operators of more stringent inspection and repair criteria?

6. Implementing and Monitoring Other Cost-Effective Risk Control 
Activities

    The operator would then be expected to implement the additional 
preventive and mitigative actions, and monitor their effectiveness over 
time to ensure that they are producing the risk reductions envisioned. 
The operator would be expected to implement the activities in a timely 
manner, consistent and integrated with internal budget processes that 
establish priorities and allocate resources based on risk significance 
of the planned activities.
    Key questions that OPS would like to discuss at the meeting 
include:
     How can operators monitor the effectiveness of risk 
control activities?
     How would integrating an implementation schedule into 
normal operator maintenance schedules or budget cycles affect the cost 
of implementing these activities?

7. Documenting Inspections, Assessments, and Actions

    An operator would maintain records establishing compliance with any 
new requirements addressing high consequence areas, including records 
identifying pipe segments capable of affecting high consequence areas, 
the schedule of inspections, the findings of the inspections and 
assessments, and the preventive and mitigative actions taken.
    A key question that OPS would like to discuss at the meeting:
     What would be the expected costs and labor burdens of 
these documentation requirements?

8. OPS Reviews Operator Compliance

    OPS will examine the operator's records to ensure compliance. OPS 
currently envisions an on-site review of the company's program 
documentation and records, as well as interviews with key management 
personnel responsible for implementing the process. The specific review 
activities will be tailored for the company's management system and 
assessment processes. Major review activities are expected to include:
     Reviewing the policies, procedures, guidelines, and 
manuals that describe how the company identifies the pipeline segments 
that could impact high consequence areas and assesses the need for 
additional protection on these segments.
     Reviewing the company's assessment and decision making 
processes.
     Reviewing in-line inspection data and the criteria to 
determine if further evaluation and repair is required.
     Reviewing the status of remediation and other preventive 
or mitigation actions.
     Reviewing performance measures to understand, evaluate, 
and demonstrate the effectiveness of the company's decisions.
     Meeting with company management to understand the level of 
management support and awareness of the program to protect high 
consequence areas.
    After the review of the operator's internal processes and 
documentation, OPS will conduct field validation checks. These 
validation checks will confirm that the operator has implemented the 
additional preventive and mitigative activities.
    The selection of field inspection sites will consider the 
operator's assessment and results. Where possible, the OPS team will 
perform an integrated review of information from a variety of sources 
(e.g., internal inspection results, close interval surveys, leak 
history, and other observed conditions) in selecting field validation 
check sites.
    After the OPS inspection team has completed its review and field 
validation checks, the team will prepare a summary report. This summary 
report will contain observations on the operator's program and 
processes, as well as on the effectiveness of this program in enhancing 
protection for high consequence areas. The report will document the 
positive features of the company's program and any areas that need 
improvement. The report will include any process improvements that OPS 
has determined are necessary, and the operator's work plan for 
addressing them. If compliance issues are discovered during the review, 
OPS will determine the appropriate resolution of these issues through 
its normal enforcement processes, and the resolution of those issues 
will be included in this report.
    Key questions that OPS would like to discuss at the meeting 
include:
     How can OPS ensure consistency of review across all 
companies?
     What review protocols or criteria will OPS use to evaluate 
the effectiveness of an operator's assessment and decision-making 
processes?
     What is the appropriate avenue for public input into the 
decision-making process to protect high consequence areas?
     What qualifications or training should OPS inspectors have 
to perform this verification?

Information Requested

    Consistent with the President's regulatory policy (E.O. 12866), OPS 
wants to carry out the mandate to consider additional inspections, and 
other preventive and mitigative measures at the least cost to society. 
Toward this end, interested persons are urged to present views on 
whether additional inspection requirements or other preventive and 
mitigative actions are needed to ensure adequate protection of high 
consequence areas. The questions listed above provide more specific 
guidance on the information being solicited for each step in the 
process. In addition, and applicable to all steps in the envisioned 
process, OPS is also interested in comments on the expected cumulative 
costs and benefits associated with implementing the described process, 
any comment on whether any of these measures would have a 
disproportionate impact on small operators, and any concerns on the 
information collection, recordkeeping, or reporting requirements of any 
of these initiatives under the Paperwork

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Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3057(d)).

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601 and 49 CFR 1.53.

    Issued in Washington, DC on October 14, 1999.
Richard B. Felder,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.

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[FR Doc. 99-27281 Filed 10-20-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-C