[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 192 (Tuesday, October 5, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 54066-54067]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-25843]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs Administration
[Docket No. RSPA-97-2879]


Pipeline Safety: Rapid Isolation of Ruptured Sections of Gas 
Transmission Pipelines

AGENCY: Office of Pipeline Safety, Research and Special Programs 
Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of public meeting and request for comments.

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SUMMARY: This notice announces a public meeting to consider the need 
for a rulemaking to establish time limits for isolating ruptured 
sections of gas transmission pipelines. The meeting agenda will include 
presentation of findings from a recent Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) 
study on remote control valves (RCV) and opportunity for public 
comments and suggestions.

DATES: The public meeting will be on November 4, 1999, from 1:00 pm to 
5:00 pm in Room 8236 of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW, 
Washington, DC. We encourage the public to present oral remarks at the 
public meeting. If you want to make an oral presentation at the 
meeting, please notify Jenny Donohue no later than October 28, 1999, by 
telephone at 202-366-4046 or by e-mail at [email protected]. 
Please indicate the approximate length of your presentation.

ADDRESSES: You may submit written comments no later than December 6, 
1999, by mail or hand delivery to the Dockets Facility, U.S. Department 
of Transportation, Room PL-401, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC 
20590-0001. Comments should identify the docket number RSPA-97-2879. 
Persons should submit the original comment document and one (1) copy. 
Anyone who wants confirmation of mailed comments must include a self-
addressed stamped postcard. You also may submit written comments to the 
docket electronically. To do so, log on to the following Internet Web 
address: http://dms.dot.gov. Click on ``Help & Information'' for 
instructions on how to file a document electronically. Late-filed 
comments will be considered so far as practicable.

Information on Services for Individuals With Disabilities

    For information on facilities or services for individuals with 
disabilities or to request special assistance at the meeting, contact 
Peggy Thompson at (202) 366-1933.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lloyd Ulrich, OPS, (202) 366-4556, 
regarding the subject matter of this notice. Contact the Dockets Unit, 
(202) 366-5046, for docket material. Comments may also be reviewed 
online at the DOT Docket Management System website at http://
dms.dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Since the March 23, 1994, Edison, New 
Jersey, pipeline failure in which two-and-one-half hours elapsed before 
the operator could locate and close functional valves, OPS has been 
exploring means of limiting the time for isolating ruptured sections of 
gas transmission pipelines. In 1995, NTSB recommended that RSPA 
expedite requirements for installing automatic-or remote-operated 
mainline valves on high-pressure pipelines in urban and environmentally 
sensitive areas to provide for rapid shutdown of failed pipeline 
segments. In the Federal pipeline safety law (49 U.S.C. 60102 (j)), 
Congress directed DOT to prescribe standards for the use of remote 
control valves (RCV), if a study showed that they reduced risk and were 
technically and economically feasible.
    OPS has completed a study on RCVs titled ``Remotely Controlled 
Valves on Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines,'' which

[[Page 54067]]

is available in this Docket (RSPA-97-2879) and on the OPS website at 
http://ops.dot.gov. The study shows that installing and using RCVs can 
effectively limit the time required to isolate ruptured pipe sections 
when manual valve operation is not feasible, thereby minimizing the 
consequences of certain gas pipeline ruptures. The study supports RCVs' 
effectiveness, technical feasibility, and potential for reducing risk. 
We base these conclusions on an October 30, 1997, public meeting in 
Houston, Texas, a field evaluation of RCVs conducted by the Texas 
Eastern Transmission Corporation (TETCO), comments from the Technical 
Pipeline Safety Standards Committee (TPSSC), and a review of technical 
studies of RCVs and other valves.
    Several factors must be considered in determining whether to 
establish a standard. Our study shows that the most significant 
consequences, including injuries, fatalities, and the majority of 
property and environmental damage, occur within the first few minutes 
of a rupture, before any valves (including RCVs) can be operated. Also, 
once valves have closed, a fire burning the residual gas in the 
isolated section could continue for the better part of an hour, 
depending on variables such as the section's length, pipe diameter, and 
operating pressure. Our study indicates that the quantifiable costs of 
RCV installations would almost always exceed the benefits.
    However, we believe that significant risk exists at many locations 
as long as gas is being supplied to a rupture site, and operators lack 
the ability to quickly close existing manual valves. Any fire would be 
of greater intensity, and would have greater potential for damaging 
surrounding infrastructure, if the fire were constantly replenished 
with gas. Our data show that as much as 45% of gas transmission 
pipelines traverse commercial areas (including highways, railroads, 
other pipelines, airports, and businesses) and 6% are located within 
U.S. Census Bureau defined urban areas. The degree of disruption in 
these areas would be in direct proportion to the duration of the fire. 
Although we lack data to quantify the potential consequences, we 
believe considering a new standard limiting the time to isolate failed 
pipe in these areas merits further exploration. Under certain 
circumstances, we believe it may be appropriate to require RCVs or 
other measures to promptly isolate a failed pipeline section.
    Also, setting a time limit for isolating a line following a rupture 
would determine when a fire could be extinguished. This knowledge 
provides a basis for risk assessment and response planning, important 
considerations in heavily populated or commercial areas, and important 
factors in maintaining public confidence in the safety of natural gas 
transmission pipelines.
    Although it may be appropriate to issue a standard limiting the 
time to isolate failed pipe sections, we need additional information. 
At the November 4 public meeting we will present findings from our 
study on RCVs and solicit public comments and suggestions. To focus on 
the issue of establishing a time limit for isolating a ruptured 
pipeline section, we request that oral comments at the public meeting 
and written comments submitted to Docket No. RSPA-97-2879 include 
responses to the following six questions--
    (1) What are the variables that should be considered in 
establishing a time-to-isolate standard? As an example, one variable 
could be the time for gas contained in the ruptured section to burn, if 
there is a fire, after the section is isolated by closing valves on 
each side of the rupture.
    (2) Should an operator's time to isolate a ruptured pipeline 
section be the same in each class location? If not, what difference 
should there be in the time to isolate for each of the four class 
locations?
    (3) Should the definitions for class location in 49 CFR 192.5 be 
revised to provide for more stringent requirements in areas where there 
would be more significant consequences from a ruptured transmission 
pipeline where the escaping gas caught fire? Examples of areas of more 
significant consequences are commercial areas and apartment buildings 
with high population concentrations.
    (3)a. What are other examples of areas subject to more significant 
consequences in case of a transmission pipeline rupture where the 
escaping gas catches fire?
    (3)b. Should areas of more significant consequences be included in 
the definitions for Class 3 and 4 locations or should separate sub-
class locations be established for these areas?
    (4) Should the transmission line valve spacing requirement in 49 
CFR 192.179 be reduced for Class 3 and 4 locations in order to reduce 
the risk in locations of highest consequences? If not, why not?
    (5) What should be the maximum time for closing valves to isolate a 
ruptured valve section? Should RCVs be installed to assure the closing 
time is not exceeded?
    (6) Should there be a tiered approach to establishing a time-to-
isolate standard, e.g., less time in Class 4 than in Class 3 locations?

    Issued in Washington, DC, on September 30, 1999.
Richard B. Felder,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 99-25843 Filed 10-4-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P