[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 189 (Thursday, September 30, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 52804-52805]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-25468]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-368]


Entergy Operations, Inc.; Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2 
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an exemption from certain requirements of its 
regulations for Facility Operating License No. NPF-6 issued to Entergy 
Operations, Inc. (the licensee), for operation of Arkansas Nuclear One, 
Unit 2 (ANO-2), located in Pope County, Arkansas.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of Proposed Action

    The proposed action would exempt the licensee from the requirements 
of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 (10 CFR part 
50), appendix R, Section III.G.2.c, regarding the fire protection of 
the safe shutdown capability for equipment located below the 354 foot 
elevation of the ANO-2 intake structure. The licensee is requesting an 
exemption from the specific requirement to provide fire detectors and 
an automatic fire suppression system to protect redundant trains of 
safe shutdown equipment that are located in the same fire zone.
    The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's 
application for exemption dated October 8, 1997, as supplemented by 
letter dated February 25, 1999.
    The purpose of 10 CFR part 50, appendix R, Section III.G.2, is to 
ensure that adequate fire protection features are provided for 
redundant cables or equipment located in the same fire area outside of 
primary containment such that at least one of the redundant trains of 
safe shutdown equipment will remain available during and after any 
postulated fire in the plant to achieve and maintain safe shutdown 
conditions. Section III.G.2.c requires the following means of 
assurance:

    Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety 
circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour 
rating. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire 
suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.

    The ANO-2 intake structure below the 354 foot elevation consists of 
three service water intake bays, which contain service water (SW) 
piping and conduits. The bays are approximately 7 feet by 32 feet and 
are separated from one another by 2-foot thick, non-rated concrete 
walls. The bays are separated from the ground level by an 18-inch 
thick, non-rated concrete slab on metal decking. The floor of the bays 
is typically covered with water 16 feet deep. The ceiling height is 
approximately 14 feet above the normal pool level. Of the three bays, 
only the ``A'' SW intake bay contains redundant cables. The licensee 
stated that the total in-situ combustible loading is 3,469,060 BTUs, 
which is equivalent to a fire severity to a standard fire duration of 
less than 4 minutes. Each bay is administratively controlled as a 
``confined space,'' thus limiting access by personnel during routine 
operations and precluding the accumulation of combustibles. In 
addition, the licensee's administrative procedures limit the transient 
combustibles to 5 pounds unless personnel are continuously present in 
the area. In such cases, the personnel could be either the craft 
personnel responsible for using the combustible materials or a 
continuous fire watch. Water to the bay is normally provided

[[Page 52805]]

through a sluice gate for the bays where the circulating pumps take 
suction.
    Service water is required to be available to supply cooling water 
for various safe shutdown components including the diesel generators 
and the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. Additionally, SW can be 
aligned to the emergency feedwater system in the event that the desired 
condensate source is depleted. The time critical function is to supply 
cooling for the diesel generators. The licensee stated that, on the 
basis of its calculations, the diesel generators (and therefore the SW 
system components) are not required to be operated during the first 30 
minutes of a postulated fire event. The licensee allows the operators 
to manually align the SW system because the diesel generators are not 
required during the first 30 minutes of a fire event and sufficient 
time is available to complete the alignment.
    The SW system consists of two independent seismic category 1 flow 
paths that furnish cooling water to two independent trains of 100 
percent capacity engineered safety feature equipment, and two non-
seismic category 1 flow paths. The SW system has three 100 percent 
capacity pumps. One pump is dedicated to each of the two SW trains 
while the third pump is designated as a swing pump and can be aligned 
to either train. The two loops of the SW system are also electrically 
independent with two separate divisions of electrical power designated 
as the red and green train. The red train power for SW is aligned to 
either SW pump 2P4A or SW pump 2P4B, while the green train power is 
aligned to either SW pump 2P4C or SW pump 2P4B.
    The four power cables associated with the 2P4A, 2P4B, and 2P4C SW 
pumps interface with the ``A'' SW intake bay challenging the protection 
criteria specified in Section III.G.2 of Appendix R. The red train 
power to 2P4A is provided with a fire wrap rated as a 1-hour rated 
barrier. The red train power to 2P4B is embedded in the concrete wall 
of the ``A'' SW intake bay, which provides an equivalent 1-hour rated 
fire barrier. The green train power to 2P4B is provided with a fire 
wrap rated for a 1-hour barrier. The cables for the red train power to 
2P4A and the green train power to 2P4B are routed together inside of a 
protective moisture barrier. The green train power to 2P4C is routed 
independently and is approximately 6 feet (horizontally) from the 
protective moisture barrier providing some physical separation. 
Therefore, based on the preceding discussion, this area would require 
the addition of fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system 
in order to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix R, 
Section III.G.2.c.
    Power and control cables for the sluice gates are also located in 
the SW intake bays. Sluice gate valves 2CV1470-1, 2CV1472-5, and 
2CV1474-2 are normally open, which corresponds to the safe shutdown 
position. The redundant control cables are separated horizontally by 
approximately 8 feet. As stated previously, the time critical function 
of the SW system is to provide cooling to the diesel generators. The 
licensee stated that if a fire were to cause the sluice gates to 
spuriously close, adequate time would be available before service water 
was required to manually realign any affected component.

The Need for the Proposed Action

    The proposed action is needed because the addition of fire 
detectors and an automatic fire suppression system to the SW intake 
bays is considered infeasible due to the construction of the intake 
structure and the fact that the room is partially water-filled during 
normal conditions.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

    The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action 
and concludes that there is no significant environmental impact if the 
exemption is granted.
    The proposed action will not increase the probability or 
consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of 
any effluents that may be released off site, and there is no 
significant increase in occupational or public radiation exposure. 
Therefore, there are no significant radiological environmental impacts 
associated with the proposed action.
    With regards to potential nonradioactive impacts, the proposed 
action does not involve any historic sites. It does not affect 
nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impacts. 
Therefore, there are no significant nonradiological environmental 
impacts associated with the proposed action.
    Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

    As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered 
denial of the requested action (i.e., the ``no-action'' alternative). 
Based on the physical characteristics of the SW intake bays, the NRC 
staff has determined that there is a low probability of occurrence for 
a fire event in the ANO-2 intake structure below the 354 foot 
elevation. This low probability of occurrence combined with the lack of 
combustible material, administrative controls, and the fire protection 
features provided is sufficient to show adequate protection for 
redundant equipment in the SW system. Therefore, the features 
associated with the ANO-2 Intake Structure below the 354 foot elevation 
are sufficient to achieve the underlying purpose of Appendix R, Section 
III.G.2.c. Therefore, denial of the application would result in no 
change in the current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts 
of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

    This action does not involve the use of any resources not 
previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for Arkansas 
Nuclear One, Unit 2.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

    In accordance with its stated policy, on June 24, 1999, the staff 
consulted with the Arkansas State official, Mr. Bernie Bevill, 
Supervisor, Quality and Evaluation Section, Division of Radiation 
Control and Emergency Management, regarding the environmental impact of 
the proposed action. The State official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

    On the basis of the environmental assessment, the Commission 
concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission 
has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the 
proposed action.
    For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
licensee's letter dated October 8, 1997, as supplemented by letter 
dated February 25, 1999. These letters are available for public 
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room at the Tomlinson Library, Arkansas Tech University, 
Russellville, Arkansas.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Robert A. Gramm,
Chief, Section 1, Project Directorate IV & Decommissioning, Division of 
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-25468 Filed 9-29-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P