

and selection procedures for future projects in this area. NSF also will use the results to satisfy requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA).

Confidentiality: No sensitive information is being requested in the collection.

Estimate of Burden: The Foundation estimates that, on average, two hours will be required to prepare the narratives, or a total of 500 hours for all 250 PIs and co-PIs. In addition, it anticipates 4 hours of interviews of an average of four people for each of 30 case studies, or 120 hours. Thus, total burden is estimated at 620 hours.

Respondents: Individuals.

Estimated Number of Responses: 370.

Estimated Total Annual Burden on Respondents: 620 hours.

Frequency of Responses: Once.

Comments

Comments are invited on (a) whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the Agency, including whether the information shall have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the Agency's estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information on respondents, including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology; and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

Dated: September 20, 1999.

Suzanne H. Plimpton,

Reports Clearance Officer.

[FR Doc. 99-24892 Filed 9-23-99; 8:45 am]

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NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Special Emphasis Panel in Design, Manufacturing, and Industrial Innovation, Notice of Meeting

In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, as amended), the National Science Foundation announces the following meeting:

Name: Special Emphasis Panel in Design, Manufacture and Industrial Innovation (1194).

Date & Time: October 6, 7, 8, 14, 15, 18, 19, and 22, 1999. 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m.

Place: Rooms 340, 360, 375 and 390, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22230.

Type of Meeting: Closed.

Contact Person: Joseph Hennessey, Program Manager, Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer Programs, Room 590, Division of Design, Manufacture and Industrial Innovation, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, VA 22230, Telephone (703) 306-1395, x 5283.

Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and recommendations concerning proposals submitted to NSF for financial support.

Agenda: To review and evaluate proposals submitted to the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) Programs as part of the selection process for awards.

Reason for Closing: The proposals being reviewed include information of a proprietary or confidential nature, including technical information; financial data, such as salaries, and personal information concerning individuals associated with the proposals. These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4) and (6) of the Government in the Sunshine Act.

Dated: September 21, 1999.

Karen J. York,

Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 99-25005 Filed 9-23-99; 8:45 am]

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Duke Energy Corporation; (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2); Exemption

[Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370]

I

Duke Energy Corporation et al. (the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17, for the McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2. The licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.

These facilities consist of two pressurized water reactors located at the licensee's site in Mecklenberg County, North Carolina.

II

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) part 50, appendix A, specifies general design criteria for nuclear power plants. General Design Criterion (GDC) 57, regarding closed system isolation valves, states:

Each line that penetrates primary reactor containment and is neither part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary nor connected directly to the containment atmosphere shall have at least one containment isolation valve which shall be either automatic, or locked closed, or capable of remote manual operation. This valve shall be outside

containment and located as close to the containment as practical. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve.

The Commission may grant an exemption from the requirements of the regulations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12 if the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. The Commission will not consider granting an exemption unless special circumstances are present. Special circumstances are considered to be present under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) where application of the regulation in the particular circumstances conflicts with other rules or requirements of the Commission or where application of the regulation would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.

III

By letter dated April 20, 1999, the licensee requested an exemption from GDC-57 for Containment Penetrations M261 and M393, which are main steam penetrations. These lines penetrate the containment and are not part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, nor are they connected directly to the containment atmosphere. Outside of the containment, these lines branch into various separate, individual lines before reaching the respective main steam isolation valves. From each of these main steam lines, one branch supplies main steam to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDCA, using the licensee's abbreviation) pump.

Valves SA-1, SA-2, SA-77, and SA-78 are manual gate valves located in the Interior Doghouse immediately downstream of the respective main steam piping, in the branch lines that supply main steam to the TDCA. These valves are locked open and can only be operated by local manual operation. These valves are required to be open by the Technical Specifications (TS) in order to supply steam to the TDCA, which is part of the engineered safety features. From a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) perspective, the TDCA is one of the most risk-significant safety system components. Adding motor operators to valves SA-1, SA-2, SA-77, and SA-78, so that they become automatic or capable of remote operation (i.e., meeting GDC-57) would degrade the reliability of the TDCA to mitigate an accident because the motor operators would introduce a new failure mode. Keeping SA-1, SA-2, SA-77, and SA-78 closed (i.e., meeting GDC-57)