[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 183 (Wednesday, September 22, 1999)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 51236-51240]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-24675]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

19 CFR Part 351

[Docket No. 990521142-9252-02]
RIN 0625-AA54


Amended Regulation Concerning the Revocation of Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Orders

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Commerce.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce (the ``Department'' or ``DOC'') is 
amending its regulation, which governs the revocation of antidumping 
and countervailing duty orders, in whole or in part, and the 
termination of suspended antidumping and countervailing duty 
investigations, based upon an absence of dumping or subsidization, 
respectively. The amended regulation conforms the existing regulation 
to the United States' obligations under Article 11 of the Agreement on 
the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994 (``Antidumping Agreement'') and Article 21 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (``SCM Agreement''). 
The amended paragraph relating to revocation or termination based on 
absence of dumping provides that the Secretary, upon considering 
whether producers or exporters have sold subject merchandise at not 
less than normal value for at least three consecutive years, and 
whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order is 
otherwise necessary to offset dumping, will revoke an antidumping duty 
order if warranted. The amended paragraph relating to revocation or 
termination based on absence of countervailable subsidy provides that 
the Secretary, upon considering whether the government of the affected 
country has eliminated all countervailable subsidy programs covering 
the subject merchandise for at least three consecutive years, or 
exporters or producers have not applied for or received countervailable 
subsidies for at least five consecutive years, and whether the 
continued application of the countervailing duty order is otherwise 
necessary to offset subsidization, will revoke a countervailing duty 
order if warranted.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 1, 1999.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Melissa G. Skinner, Office of Policy, 
Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, at (202) 482-1560, 
or Myles S. Getlan, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, at (202) 482-5052.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On June 3, 1999, the Department published a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking which proposed to amend 19 CFR 351.222(b).1 See 
64 FR 29818 (the ``Proposed Rule''). The Department explained that the 
process of amending this regulation arose from the findings of a 
dispute settlement panel convened under the auspices of the World Trade 
Organization (``WTO'') that considered various aspects of the 
Department's final results of administrative review in Dynamic Random 
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMs) Of One Megabit Or Above From Korea 
(62 FR 39809, July 24, 1997) (``DRAMs From Korea'').
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    \1\ This amendment does not affect the Department's regulations 
at 19 CFR 351.218, which implements the statutory provision at 19 
U.S.C. 1675(c) and governs the Department's five-year sunset 
reviews, in which the Department determines whether revocation of an 
order ``would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of 
dumping or a countervailable subsidy (as the case may be) and of 
material injury.''
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    On January 29, 1999, the Panel determined that the Department's 
standard for revoking an antidumping duty order contained in 19 CFR 
353.25(a)(2) (the precursor to 19 CFR 351.222(b)) was inconsistent with 
the United States' obligations under Article 11.2 of the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement. See United States--Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic 
Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above 
From Korea, WT/DS99/R (``Panel Report''). Specifically, the Panel 
determined that requiring the Secretary

[[Page 51237]]

to conclude that ``it is not likely'' that the persons requesting 
revocation will dump merchandise subject to an antidumping duty order 
in the future did not implement properly Article 11.2 of the 
Antidumping Agreement. This provision requires an administering 
authority to consider whether ``the continued imposition of [an 
antidumping] duty is necessary to offset dumping'' in determining 
whether to revoke an antidumping duty order. Thus, the Panel 
recommended that the United States ``bring section 353.25(a)(2)(ii) of 
the DOC regulations * * * into conformity with its obligations under 
Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement.'' The Dispute Settlement Body 
(``DSB'') adopted the Panel Report on March 19, 1999. On April 15, 
1999, the United States announced its intention to implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Consistent with section 123(g) 
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), which governs the 
Department's implementation of adverse panel reports, the Department is 
revising 19 CFR 351.222(b) and (c).

Explanation of the Final Rule

    The proposed amendment to the Department's revocation regulation 
concerned only antidumping proceedings, as the Department focused upon 
implementing the specific findings contained in the Panel Report. 
Consequently, at that time, the Department did not propose amending the 
companion revocation provision applicable to countervailing duty 
proceedings. However, we believe that a decision not to amend the 
countervailing duty provision would render the revocation standards in 
antidumping and countervailing duty cases inconsistent with each other. 
The ``not likely'' standard in 19 CFR 351.222(b), which governs the 
revocation of antidumping duty orders, is identical to the standard in 
19 CFR 351.222(c), which governs revocation in countervailing duty 
cases. In addition, the ``necessary'' standard in Article 11 of the 
Antidumping Agreement, to which we have conformed the antidumping 
regulation, is identical to the standard in Article 21 of the SCM 
Agreement which regulates the duration of countervailing duties. Since 
the revocation standards in the two WTO agreements are identical, and 
since at least one party commented on this issue during the public 
comment period, we conclude that the public was on notice that the 
countervailing duty regulation could similarly be revised. Therefore, 
we are making conforming amendments to the countervailing duty 
provision as well in order to maintain consistency between the 
Department's procedures governing revocation in both antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases and the standards in both the Antidumping 
Agreement and SCM Agreement.
    In addition, in response to comments, the final rule incorporates 
several changes to the Proposed Rule. First, the language which read 
``[t]he Secretary may revoke an antidumping order * * *'' has been 
altered to read ``[t]he Secretary will revoke the antidumping duty 
order.'' Second, the final rule no longer states that the Secretary 
will consider whether the continued application of the order is ``no 
longer necessary to offset dumping.'' Instead, the final rule provides 
that, inter alia, the Secretary will consider ``whether the continued 
application of the antidumping duty order is otherwise necessary to 
offset dumping.'' These changes are discussed in more detail below.
    We received comments concerning the Proposed Rule from various 
parties. One commenter believes that the proposed revision to the 
Department's regulation, which incorporates the standard set forth in 
Article 11.2 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement, responds appropriately 
to the concerns articulated by the WTO panel decision and represents a 
fair implementation of the panel's recommendation. Moreover, this 
commenter states that the proposed revision should not negatively 
affect the protection afforded U.S. industries against unfairly traded 
imports.
    Several commenters insist that the revised ``necessity'' standard 
is ``effectively not a standard at all.'' In this respect, these 
commenters note the Panel's finding that there must be a demonstrable 
basis for consistently and reliably determining that the maintenance of 
an order is necessary to offset injurious dumping. These commenters 
contend that the Proposed Rule contains no guidelines or definitions of 
the ``evidence'' that would be relevant to the continued necessity of 
an order. Consequently, these commenters argue that the Proposed Rule 
will not improve the demonstrability, consistency, and reliability of 
revocation decisions or ensure that decisions to maintain antidumping 
or countervailing duty orders are based upon positive evidence 
demonstrating the continued need for the order. One commenter suggests 
that using a ``likely to recur'' standard ``would have been the most 
logical, direct means to meet the WTO requirement that a positive 
finding is necessary to support continuation of an [antidumping duty] 
order.''
    However, another commenter noted that the amended regulation 
establishes a ``necessity'' standard which reflects the same standard 
established in the Antidumping Agreement. Thus, this commenter believes 
the revised standard does in fact provide the ``demonstrable basis upon 
which to reliably conclude that the continued imposition of the duty is 
necessary to offset dumping.''
    We disagree with those commenters who state that the revised 
``necessity'' standard is ``effectively not a standard at all.'' 
Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement allows interested parties to 
request authorities to examine whether the continued imposition of the 
duty is ``necessary'' to offset dumping. To say that the ``necessity'' 
standard contained in the Department's revised regulation is 
effectively no standard at all is to say that Article 11.2 contains no 
standard. This is illogical given that this process of revising the 
revocation regulation stems from a panel finding that the Department's 
existing regulation did not properly implement the ``necessary'' 
standard contained in Article 11.2. On the other hand, we agree that 
each determination made pursuant to this new regulation will need to be 
supported by positive evidence. Moreover, we are confident that the 
revised standard, along with our established practice of considering 
evidence relating to the likelihood of future dumping, will provide for 
consistent and reliable decisions regarding revocation.
    One commenter urges the Department to discontinue its practice of 
applying a presumption in favor of revocation in the absence of dumping 
for three consecutive years. As support, this commenter refers to the 
Court of International Trade's (``CIT'') characterization of the 
Department's regulation as a three-part test for revocation and states 
that the ``not likely'' (or the revised ``necessary'') prong 
constitutes an independent criterion that must be established to attain 
revocation. See Hyundai Electronics Co., Ltd. v. United States, Slip. 
Op. 99-44 (Ct. Int'l Trade, May 19, 1999). This commenter believes that 
the presumption nullifies the satisfaction of the second 
(``necessary'') prong.
    In this regard, two commenters assert that a presumption favoring 
revocation unfairly and improperly shifts the burden to petitioners to 
come forward with affirmative evidence. Since respondents are in 
possession of information relevant to revocation, as argued by these 
commenters, the burden

[[Page 51238]]

of producing such evidence should rest with the respondents. One 
commenter requested that the Department include in its initial 
questionnaire a solicitation of data and other information from the 
respondent seeking revocation on why the antidumping duty order in the 
respondent's opinion is no longer needed to offset dumping. While this 
commenter conceded that this procedural element could be implemented 
without regulatory modification, the commenter contended that there was 
no reason that such a provision could not be incorporated in the 
regulations.
    By contrast, several commenters stated that the revised regulation 
continues to place a burden on respondents to prove eligibility for 
revocation, rather than placing the burden on the Department to find 
positive evidence establishing that the maintenance of the order is 
necessary. These commenters contend that placing the burden on the 
Department necessitates a reformulation of the regulation, such that 
the revised regulation should not treat maintaining the order as the 
norm. Thus, these commenters suggested that the new regulation require 
the Secretary to revoke if the respondent has not dumped for three 
consecutive years and has furnished the required reinstatement 
agreement, ``unless the Secretary reliably demonstrates on the basis of 
a foundation of positive evidence that the continued application of the 
antidumping duty order as to the exporter or producer is necessary to 
offset dumping.''
    However, one commenter welcomed the Department's confirmation that 
the regulation reflects a rebuttable presumption that favors revoking 
an order when there is an absence of dumping for three or more years. 
In this regard, this commenter states that the initial burden should 
clearly rest on the petitioners, as the beneficiaries of the 
continuation of the order, to provide evidence that the order is still 
necessary. Thus, this commenter states that the Department should not 
request information from a respondent until petitioners make 
allegations supported by tangible evidence that the order is still 
necessary.
    As discussed in the Proposed Rule, in situations where there is an 
absence of dumping (or subsidization) for three (or five) consecutive 
years, the Department intends to presume that an order is not necessary 
in the absence of additional evidence. We believe that such a 
presumption is consistent with prior Department practice as well as 
U.S. obligations under Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement and 
Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement. As the Panel recognized, a decision 
to maintain an order must be substantiated by positive evidence. If the 
only evidence on record is a respondent's ability to sell subject 
merchandise at not less than normal value for three consecutive years, 
the record would not support a decision to maintain the order in light 
of the requirement in Article 11.2, as interpreted by the Panel, that 
there be positive evidence reflecting the continued necessity of the 
order.
    We decline at this time to adopt the commenter's suggestion that we 
solicit information from respondents at the outset of an administrative 
review. The absence of dumping for three consecutive years,2 
while satisfying the first prong of the regulatory standard, is also 
sufficient evidence relevant to the continued necessity of the order to 
shift the burden of production to the petitioners. However, if a party 
raises an issue relating to the necessity of an order, the Department 
may seek additional information relevant to that issue. Nonetheless, 
since the manner in which we collect evidence is not necessarily a 
regulatory matter, we may revisit this issue at a later time in the 
development of our practice in applying the revised regulation.
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    \2\  In accordance with 19 CFR 351.222(e)(ii), to be considered 
for revocation, the producers and exporters must have sold the 
subject merchandise in commercial quantities in each of the three 
years.
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    We disagree with those commenters who suggest that the revised 
regulation continues to place a burden on respondents, rather than the 
Department, to prove eligibility for revocation. The threshold 
requirement for revocation continues to be that respondents not sell at 
less than normal value for at least three consecutive years and that, 
during each of those years, respondents exported subject merchandise to 
the United States in commercial quantities. See 19 CFR 351.222(d)(1). 
The Panel did not disturb this aspect of the Department's revocation 
practice. Moreover, we re-emphasize our statement in the Proposed Rule 
that ``the absence of dumping for three consecutive years served as a 
presumption in favor of revoking the order, which could be rebutted by 
positive evidence indicating that dumping may recur if the order were 
revoked.'' Thus, we disagree that an impermissible burden is placed on 
respondents. Instead, a thorough analysis of all relevant information 
requires a system in which there is a shifting burden of production 
such that the parties in the best position to provide relevant 
information are compelled to do so. All parties may be in a position to 
provide information concerning trends in prices and costs, currency 
movements, and other market and economic factors that may be relevant 
to the likelihood of future dumping. If no party provides information 
addressing these issues, we rest with the presumption that an order is 
not necessary in the absence of dumping. If the petitioner comes 
forward with information demonstrating that the maintenance of the 
order is necessary, that initial presumption is rebutted, and the 
burden of production shifts to respondents. While the burden of 
producing evidence shifts among the parties, we emphasize that the 
Department does not impose a burden of proof on any party. The 
Department must weigh all of the evidence on the record and determine 
whether the continued application of the order is necessary to offset 
dumping (or subsidization). Each revocation determination must be based 
upon substantial, positive evidence and be otherwise in accordance with 
law.
    One commenter stated that, unlike the ``not likely'' standard, 
``necessity'' is a minimum standard that has no shades or degrees 
within it. Stated differently, something that is not ``no longer 
necessary'' is necessary.
    However, another commenter claimed that the Department's revised 
standard retains the negative and passive elements which rendered the 
prior regulatory standard inconsistent with the Antidumping Agreement. 
This commenter noted the Panel's distinction between failing to 
establish something as a negative finding and establishing something as 
a positive finding in the context of the ``not likely'' criterion and 
concluded that this same principle applies to the proposed regulation.
    We have formulated the final rule in a way that clarifies that the 
Secretary must make an affirmative finding of necessity in order to 
retain an antidumping or countervailing duty order. While this 
reformulation does not affect the process by which the Department 
considers revocation, the reformulated regulation more closely tracks 
the wording of Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article 
21.2 of the SCM Agreement.
    Several commenters argue that the continued use of the 
discretionary term ``may'' in the Proposed Rule conflicts with the 
mandatory term ``shall'' contained in Article 11.2 of the Antidumping 
Agreement. These commenters suggest that the Panel rejected the 
existing regulation, in part, because the regulation allows the

[[Page 51239]]

Department to maintain an order where Article 11.2 of the Antidumping 
Agreement requires revocation. Thus, these commenters believe that the 
Proposed Rule, which contains the permissive ``may'' and not the 
mandatory ``shall'' or ``must,'' is inconsistent with the Panel's 
findings.
    In the final rule, we have substituted the term ``will'' for 
``may.'' We do not agree that the use of the term ``may'' imbued the 
Department with unbridled discretion in making revocation 
determinations, as argued by these commenters. The Department's 
determinations are constrained by general legal principles. Every 
decision must be based upon substantial evidence and otherwise in 
accordance with law. In addition, each decision must be consistent with 
prior practice unless we reasonably explain the departure from prior 
practice. However, by adopting the ``necessary'' standard contained in 
the Antidumping and SCM Agreements, we are persuaded that it is more 
appropriate to use the term ``will'' instead of the term ``may'' in the 
amended regulation. The ``necessary'' standard represents the full 
spectrum of circumstances under which the Department could maintain an 
order and be consistent with the United States' WTO obligations under 
Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article 21.2 of the SCM 
Agreement. In other words, considering the comprehensive nature of the 
new standard, the Secretary can only retain an antidumping or 
countervailing duty order if there is positive evidence on the record 
indicating the continued necessity of such order to offset dumping or 
subsidization. Thus, in accordance with Article 11.2 of the Antidumping 
Agreement and Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement, we are substituting 
the term ``will'' for ``may'' in the amended regulation.
    Several commenters took issue with the Department's claim in the 
Proposed Rule that the ``Panel's ruling was not based upon the 
Department's application of the standard in DRAMs from Korea.'' These 
commenters note that the Panel specifically found that the regulation 
and the third review final results in DRAMs were inconsistent with 
Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement.
    While we accept that, based upon the inconsistency of the 
revocation regulation applied in DRAMs from Korea with the Antidumping 
Agreement, the Panel invalidated the third review final results, we 
maintain that several aspects of our practice were not invalidated by 
the Panel and, thus, do not require revision. As discussed above and in 
the preamble to the Proposed Rule, we continue to believe that, while 
an absence of dumping for three years is evidence that the antidumping 
duty order is no longer necessary, it is not conclusive in all cases. 
Evidence relating to the likelihood of future dumping will still be 
considered under the revised regulation because such evidence relates 
to the necessity of the order. Thus, while the Panel decision 
necessitated revising the standard by which the Department considers 
revocation, it did not necessitate changes to these specific aspects of 
our practice.
    One commenter, citing Hyundai Electronics, in which the CIT 
affirmed the Department's final results of administrative review in 
DRAMs from Korea, argued that it is unnecessary to amend the regulation 
because the CIT determined that the ``not likely'' standard is 
consistent with U.S. international obligations and with U.S. 
obligations under Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement.
    The CIT decision in Hyundai does not preclude amending the 
regulation in question. While the Court stated that the Panel Report 
was not binding precedential authority on the Court, it recognized that 
``Congress provided that the response to an adverse WTO panel report is 
the province of the executive branch and, more particularly, the Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative.'' The United States Trade 
Representative and the DOC have decided to respond to the Panel Report 
by amending the regulation in question, and we are confident that the 
amended regulation, if challenged, will be found to be consistent with 
the statute as well as U.S. obligations under the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement.
    Another commenter expressed concern with the Department's practice 
of relating an absence of dumping to declining imports following the 
imposition of an order. This commenter asserts that numerous factors, 
including changes in the strengths of alternative markets, exchange 
rates, changes in production capacity, changes in marketing strategies, 
and changes in the technology of production, may contribute to the 
decline in imports rather than the exporter's inability to sell in the 
U.S. market without dumping.
    This matter is appropriate for consideration on a case-by-case 
basis, rather than in a rulemaking proceeding because, as the commenter 
suggests, numerous factors underlying an absence of dumping may be 
considered when evidence relating to those factors is developed on the 
record of each proceeding.

Classification

Executive Order 12866

    This rule has been determined to be not significant under Executive 
Order 12866.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This rule contains no new collection of information subject to the 
Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35.

Executive Order 12612

    This rule does not contain federalism implications warranting the 
preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    In issuing the proposed regulation, the Chief Counsel for 
Regulation of the Department of Commerce certified to the Chief Counsel 
for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration that this rule would 
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. The Department's existing regulations provide a procedural 
and substantive process by which the Secretary considers whether to 
revoke an antidumping duty order. The rule retains the current 
procedural process and revises the substantive standard used by the 
Secretary to make the appropriate revocation determination. As 
discussed above, the regulation would not significantly change the 
Department's practice in determining whether to maintain an antidumping 
duty order. Moreover, as the revised regulation only changes the 
standard by which the Department considers whether to revoke an 
antidumping duty order, this action, in and of itself, will not have a 
significant economic impact. Therefore, the Chief Counsel concluded 
that the rule would not have a significant impact on a substantial 
number of small business entities, and a regulatory flexibility 
analysis was not prepared. We received no comments concerning this 
conclusion.

List of Subjects in 19 CFR Part 351

    Administrative practice and procedure, Antidumping duties, Business 
and industry, Cheese, Confidential business information, Countervailing 
duties, Investigations, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.


[[Page 51240]]


    Dated: September 16, 1999.
Richard W. Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
    For the reasons stated, 19 CFR part 351 is amended to read as 
follows:

PART 351--ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES

    1. The authority citation for part 351 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301, 19 U.S.C. 1202 note; 19 U.S.C. 1303 
note; 19 U.S.C. 1671 et seq.; and 19 U.S.C. 3538.

Subpart B--Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Procedures

    2. Section 351.222 is amended by revising paragraphs (b) and (c) to 
read as follows:


Sec. 351.222  Revocation of orders; termination of suspended 
investigations.

* * * * *
    (b) Revocation or termination based on absence of dumping. (1)(i) 
In determining whether to revoke an antidumping duty order or terminate 
a suspended antidumping investigation, the Secretary will consider:
    (A) Whether all exporters and producers covered at the time of 
revocation by the order or the suspension agreement have sold the 
subject merchandise at not less than normal value for a period of at 
least three consecutive years; and
    (B) Whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order 
is otherwise necessary to offset dumping.
    (ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in 
paragraphs (b)(1)(i)(A) and (B) of this section, that the antidumping 
duty order or suspension of the antidumping duty investigation is no 
longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the order or terminate the 
investigation.
    (2)(i) In determining whether to revoke an antidumping duty order 
in part, the Secretary will consider:
    (A) Whether one or more exporters or producers covered by the order 
have sold the merchandise at not less than normal value for a period of 
at least three consecutive years;
    (B) Whether, for any exporter or producer that the Secretary 
previously has determined to have sold the subject merchandise at less 
than normal value, the exporter or producer agrees in writing to its 
immediate reinstatement in the order, as long as any exporter or 
producer is subject to the order, if the Secretary concludes that the 
exporter or producer, subsequent to the revocation, sold the subject 
merchandise at less than normal value; and
    (C) Whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order 
is otherwise necessary to offset dumping.
    (ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in 
paragraphs (b)(2)(i)(A) through (C) of this section, that the 
antidumping duty order as to those producers or exporters is no longer 
warranted, the Secretary will revoke the order as to those producers or 
exporters.
    (3) Revocation of nonproducing exporter. In the case of an exporter 
that is not the producer of subject merchandise, the Secretary normally 
will revoke an order in part under paragraph (b)(2) of this section 
only with respect to subject merchandise produced or supplied by those 
companies that supplied the exporter during the time period that formed 
the basis for the revocation.
    (c) Revocation or termination based on absence of countervailable 
subsidy. (1)(i) In determining whether to revoke a countervailing duty 
order or terminate a suspended countervailing duty investigation, the 
Secretary will consider:
    (A) Whether the government of the affected country has eliminated 
all countervailable subsidies on the subject merchandise by abolishing 
for the subject merchandise, for a period of at least three consecutive 
years, all programs that the Secretary has found countervailable;
    (B) Whether exporters and producers of the subject merchandise are 
continuing to receive any net countervailable subsidy from an abolished 
program referred to in paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A) of this section; and
    (C) Whether the continued application of the countervailing duty 
order or suspension of countervailing duty investigation is otherwise 
necessary to offset subsidization.
    (ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in 
paragraphs (c)(1)(i)(A) through (C) of this section, that the 
countervailing duty order or suspension of the countervailing duty 
investigation is no longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the 
order or terminate the suspended investigation.
    (2)(i) In determining whether to revoke a countervailing duty order 
or terminate a suspended countervailing duty investigation, the 
Secretary will consider:
    (A) Whether all exporters and producers covered at the time of 
revocation by the order or the suspension agreement have not applied 
for or received any net countervailable subsidy on the subject 
merchandise for a period of at least five consecutive years; and
    (B) Whether the continued application of the countervailing duty 
order or suspension of the countervailing duty investigation is 
otherwise necessary to offset subsidization.
    (ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in 
paragraphs (c)(2)(i)(A) and (B) of this section, that the 
countervailing duty order or the suspension of the countervailing duty 
investigation is no longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the 
order or terminate the suspended investigation.
    (3)(i) In determining whether to revoke a countervailing duty order 
in part, the Secretary will consider:
    (A) Whether one or more exporters or producers covered by the order 
have not applied for or received any net countervailable subsidy on the 
subject merchandise for a period of at least five consecutive years;
    (B) Whether, for any exporter or producer that the Secretary 
previously has determined to have received any net countervailable 
subsidy on the subject merchandise, the exporter or producer agrees in 
writing to their immediate reinstatement in the order, as long as any 
exporter or producer is subject to the order, if the Secretary 
concludes that the exporter or producer, subsequent to the revocation, 
has received any net countervailable subsidy on the subject 
merchandise; and
    (C) Whether the continued application of the countervailing duty 
order is otherwise necessary to offset subsidization.
    (ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in 
paragraphs (c)(3)(i)(A) through (C) of this section, that the 
countervailing duty order as to those exporters or producers is no 
longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the order as to those 
exporters or producers.
    (4) Revocation of nonproducing exporter. In the case of an exporter 
that is not the producer of subject merchandise, the Secretary normally 
will revoke an order in part under paragraph (c)(3) of this section 
only with respect to subject merchandise produced or supplied by those 
companies that supplied the exporter during the time period that formed 
the basis for the revocation.
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 99-24675 Filed 9-21-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P