[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 180 (Friday, September 17, 1999)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 50651-50667]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-23696]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 73

[MM Docket No. 91-221, 87-8; FCC 99-209]


Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television 
Broadcasting; Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This document amends the Commission's local TV multiple 
ownership rule and its radio/TV cross-ownership rule. This document 
also adopts a grandfathering policy for certain TV local marketing 
agreements and certain conditional waivers of the radio/TV cross-
ownership rule. The purpose of this action is to balance the 
Commission's competition and diversity goals with the efficiencies and 
public interest benefits that can be associated with common ownership 
of same-market broadcast stations.

DATES: Effective November 16, 1999, except for the requirements that: 
(1) radio/TV cross-ownership conditional waiver grantees file with the 
Commission showings sufficient to convert their compliance or non-
compliance with the Commission's revised radio/TV cross-ownership rule; 
and (2) holders of local marketing agreements (LMAs) that have become 
attributable under the Commission's revised rules file a copy of their 
LMA with the Commission. These requirements contain information 
collection requirements that are not effective until approved by the 
Office of Management and Budget. The FCC will publish a document in the 
Federal Register announcing the effective dates for those sections.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric Bash, (202) 418-2120, Policy and 
Rules Division, Mass Media Bureau.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report 
and Order (``R&O''), FCC 99-209, adopted August 5, 1999, and released 
August 6, 1999. The full text of the Commission's R&O is available for 
inspection and copying during normal business hours in the FCC Dockets 
Branch (Room TW-A306), 445 12 St. S.W., Washington, D.C. The complete 
text of this R&O may also be purchased from the Commission's copy 
contractor, International Transcription Services (202) 857-3800, 1231 
20th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Synopsis of Report and Order

I. Introduction

    1. In this R&O, we revise our local TV multiple ownership rule and 
the radio/TV cross-ownership rule to respond to ongoing changes in the 
broadcast television industry. The new rules we adopt today reflect a 
recognition of the growth in the number and variety of media outlets in 
local markets, as well as the significant efficiencies and public 
service benefits that can be obtained from joint ownership. At the same 
time, our decision reflects our continuing goals of ensuring diversity 
and localism and guarding against undue concentration of economic 
power. The rules we adopt today and in our related national television 
ownership and broadcast attribution proceedings, being adopted 
simultaneously with this R&O, balance these competing concerns and are 
intended to facilitate further development of competition in the video 
marketplace and to strengthen the potential of broadcasters to serve 
the public interest.

II. Background

    2. The local TV multiple ownership rule currently prohibits an 
entity from having cognizable interests in two television stations 
whose Grade B signal contours overlap. The Commission rarely grants 
permanent waivers of the duopoly rule, reserving such relief for cases 
with unique or highly unusual circumstances. Under current policy, the 
time brokerage by one television station of another television station, 
even one in the same market, pursuant to a time brokerage or ``local 
marketing'' agreement (``LMA''), is not attributable, and accordingly 
these relationships are not subject to our multiple ownership rules. 
The radio-television cross-ownership rule generally forbids joint 
ownership of a radio and a television station in the same local market. 
We have presumed it is in the public interest to waive this rule in the 
top 25 television markets if, post-merger, at least 30 independently 
owned broadcast voices remain, or if the merger involves a failed 
station. Such waivers are available to permit ownership of up to one 
television, one AM, and one FM station per market. We have evaluated 
other waiver requests case by case, based on an analysis of five 
criteria (the ``five factors'' test).
    3. This proceeding began in 1991 with the issuance of a Notice of 
Inquiry (``NOI''), 56 FR 40847, August 16, 1991, soliciting comment on 
whether existing television ownership rules and related policies should 
be revised in light of ongoing changes in the competitive market 
conditions facing broadcast licensees. After reviewing the comments 
received in response to the NOI, the Commission issued a Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making (``NPRM''), 57 FR 28163, June 24, 1992, containing 
a number of alternative proposals involving the national and local 
television ownership rules, and seeking comment on the extent and 
impact of LMAs in the broadcast television industry.
    4. In 1994, in a Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making 
(``FNPRM''), 60 FR 06490, February 2, 1995, in this docket, the 
Commission set forth a competition and diversity analysis for examining 
our ownership rules. Based

[[Page 50652]]

on this analysis, the Commission proposed changes to the national 
television ownership rule, the local television ownership rule 
(otherwise known as the ``duopoly'' rule), and the radio-television 
cross-ownership rule. In addition, the Commission solicited comment on 
whether broadcast television local marketing agreements (``LMAs'') 
should be considered attributable for purposes of applying the 
ownership rules in a manner similar to radio LMAs.
    5. On February 8, 1996, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 became 
law. Section 202 of the Act directed the Commission to make a number of 
significant revisions to its broadcast ownership rules. Section 202 
also requires us to review aspects of our local ownership rules that 
were the subject of the FNPRM. Specifically, section 202 requires the 
Commission to: (1) conduct a rulemaking proceeding concerning the 
retention, modification, or elimination of the duopoly rule; and (2) to 
extend the top 25 market/30 independent voices one-to-a-market waiver 
policy to the top 50 markets, ``consistent with the public interest, 
convenience, and necessity.'' In addition, both the Act and its 
legislative history contain language regarding the appropriate 
treatment of existing television LMAs under our ownership rules. 
Finally, section 202 directs the Commission to conduct a biennial 
review of all of its broadcast ownership rules and to repeal or modify 
any regulation it determines is no longer in the public interest.
    6. In view of the 1996 Act's directives regarding broadcast 
multiple ownership, the Commission in 1996 adopted a Second Further 
Notice of Proposed Rule Making (``2FNPRM''), 61 FR 66978, December 19, 
1996, in this proceeding inviting comment on several issues in light of 
the 1996 Act. The Commission solicited further comment in light of its 
review of comments previously filed in this proceeding, and invited 
comments on a number of specific issues pertaining to the duopoly rule, 
the radio-television cross-ownership rule, and the treatment of 
existing television LMAs in the event they are deemed attributable 
under any rules adopted in our attribution proceeding.
    7. Our ownership rules, particularly the local ownership rules at 
issue in this proceeding, serve a vital public interest by promoting 
competition and diversity in the mass media. These are bedrock goals--
reaffirmed by Congress and the Supreme Court on numerous occasions--in 
carrying out our statutory mandate of ensuring that broadcast licensees 
serve the ``public interest, convenience, and necessity.'' With these 
goals in mind, and after carefully reviewing the record in this 
proceeding, we believe we should relax to some extent our local 
television ownership restrictions where the public interest benefits 
resulting from same-market common ownership outweigh the threat to 
diversity and localism. The record reflects that there has been an 
increase in the number and types of media outlets available to local 
communities.
    8. Specifically, we have decided to modify our local television 
ownership rule as follows. First, we are relaxing our television 
duopoly rule by narrowing the geographic scope of the rule from the 
current Grade B contour approach to a ``DMA'' test. Thus, common 
ownership of two television stations will be permitted without regard 
to contour overlap if the stations are in separate Nielsen Designated 
Market Areas (``DMAs''). In addition, we will allow common ownership of 
two stations in the same DMA if their Grade B contours do not overlap 
(a continuation of our current rule), or if eight independently owned, 
full-power and operational television stations (commercial and 
noncommercial) will remain post-merger, and one of the stations is not 
among the top four-ranked stations in the market, based on audience 
share, as measured by Nielsen or by any comparable professional and 
accepted rating service, at the time the application is filed. We will 
also adopt three waiver criteria as follows. First, we will presume a 
waiver of the rule is in the public interest to permit common ownership 
of two television stations in the same market where one station is a 
``failed station,'' as supported by a showing that the station either 
has been off the air for at least four months immediately preceding the 
application for waiver, or is currently involved in involuntary 
bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings. Second, we will presume a waiver 
of the rule is in the public interest where one of the merging stations 
is a ``failing'' station, as supported by a showing that the station 
has had a low audience share and has been financially struggling during 
the previous several years, and that the merger will result in 
demonstrable public interest benefits. Third, we will presume a waiver 
is in the public interest where applicants can show that the 
combination will result in the construction and operation of an 
authorized but as yet ``unbuilt'' station, supported by a showing that 
the permittee has made reasonable efforts to construct. For all of 
these waivers, we will also require a showing that the in-market 
applicant is the only buyer ready, willing, and able to operate the 
station, and that sale to an out-of-market applicant would result in an 
artificially depressed price.
    9. With respect to the radio-television cross-ownership rule, we 
are adopting a new, three-part rule that permits some degree of same-
market radio and television joint ownership. We will permit a party to 
own a television station (or two television stations if permitted under 
our modified TV duopoly rule or television LMA grandfathering policy) 
and any of the following radio station combinations in the same market:
     Up to six radio stations (any combination of AM or FM 
stations, to the extent permitted under our local radio ownership 
rules) in any market where at least 20 independent voices would remain 
post-merger;
     Up to four radio stations (any combination of AM or FM 
stations, to the extent permitted under our local radio ownership 
rules) in any market where at least 10 independent voices would remain 
post-merger; and
     One radio station (AM or FM) notwithstanding the number of 
independent voices in the market.

In addition, in those markets where our revised rule will allow parties 
to own eight outlets in the form of two TV stations and six radio 
stations, we will permit them to own one TV station and seven radio 
stations instead.
    10. For purposes of the new radio-television cross-ownership rule, 
we will count as voices all independently owned, full-power, 
operational, commercial and noncommercial television stations licensed 
to a community in the DMA in which the TV station in question is 
located, and all independently owned and operational commercial and 
noncommercial radio stations licensed to, or with a reportable share 
in, the radio metro market where the TV station involved is located. In 
addition, we will count independently owned daily newspapers that are 
published in the DMA and have a circulation exceeding 5 percent in the 
DMA. Finally, we will count, as a single voice, wired cable service, 
provided cable service is generally available in the DMA. As with our 
revised duopoly rule, we will permit waiver of our new radio/TV cross-
ownership rule where one station is a failed station. We will not, 
however, adopt a presumptive waiver based on a showing that one station 
is a failing station or that the combination will result in the 
construction and operation of an authorized but as yet unbuilt station.

[[Page 50653]]

We will consider further relaxation of this rule and waiver policies as 
part of future biennial reviews.
    11. We have granted a number of radio-television cross-ownership 
rule waivers conditioned on the outcome of this proceeding. The 
majority of these waivers involve radio-television combinations that 
will now be permissible under the revised rule we adopt today. For 
those that are not covered by the revised rule, as well as for those 
for which an application was filed on or before July 29, 1999 (the date 
of the ``sunshine'' notice for this R&O) if such application is 
ultimately granted by the Commission, we will allow these combinations 
to continue, conditioned on the outcome of the Commission's 2004 
biennial review. Parties who wish the Commission to conduct this review 
prior to 2004 may apply for such relief, using criteria set forth 
below, beginning one year after the date this R&O is published in the 
Federal Register. Any transfer of a grandfathered combination after the 
adoption date of this R&O (whether during the initial grandfathering 
period of after a permanent grandfathering decision has been made) must 
meet the radio/TV cross-ownership rule.
    12. Finally, with respect to existing television LMAs, we have 
decided in our related attribution proceeding to attribute time 
brokerage of another television station for purposes of our multiple 
ownership rules where the brokered and brokering station are in the 
same market and the amount of time brokered is more than 15 percent of 
the brokered station's weekly broadcast hours. Once attributed, 
however, the majority of currently existing same-market television LMAs 
will not violate our new TV duopoly rule going forward, because they 
either will be in separate DMAs, or will constitute an otherwise 
permissible arrangement under the new rule or related waiver policies. 
We will permit those LMAs that do not comply with our new duopoly rule 
and waiver policies to continue in full force and effect, if entered 
into before November 5, 1996, the grandfathering cut-off date proposed 
in the 2FNPRM. LMAs entered into on that date or thereafter must come 
into compliance with our new duopoly rule and/or waiver policies or 
terminate within two years of the adoption date of this R&O. Television 
LMAs entered into before November 5, 1996 will be grandfathered, 
conditioned on the outcome of the Commission's 2004 biennial review, at 
which time the Commission will reconsider their status. Parties who 
wish the Commission to review the status of their LMAs prior to the 
2004 biennial review may apply for such relief, using the criteria 
specified below, beginning one year after the date this R&O is 
published in the Federal Register. During the initial grandfathering 
period, the parties to the LMA may renew and/or transfer the term of 
LMA that remains in the five-year period.

III. The Local Television Ownership Rule

A. Geographic Scope of the Rule

    13. Background. Our local television ownership rule presently 
prohibits common ownership of two television stations whose Grade B 
signal contours overlap. In the FNPRM, we sought comment on whether the 
geographic scope of the rule should be changed to Grade A signal 
contours or to Designated Market Areas (``DMAs''). Based on the 
comments we received, we tentatively concluded in the 2FNPRM that the 
geographic scope of the local television ownership rule should be based 
on a combination of DMAs and Grade A contours. We sought comment on 
that tentative conclusion in the 2FNPRM, as well as comment about 
possible exceptions to and waivers of the rule to permit television 
duopolies in certain circumstances where they would serve the public 
interest.
    14. Discussion. We have decided to narrow the geographic scope of 
the television duopoly rule so as to permit common ownership of two 
television stations provided they are in different DMAs without regard 
to contour overlap. We will also continue to allow common ownership of 
stations within the same DMA as long as their Grade B contours do not 
overlap. We have chosen this DMA test based on our belief that, 
compared to the current Grade B signal contour standard, DMAs are a 
better measure of actual television viewing patterns, and thus serve as 
a good measure of the economic marketplace in which broadcasters, 
program suppliers and advertisers buy and sell their services and 
products. Changing the geographic scope of the duopoly rule will 
consequently more accurately define a local television market and 
permit mergers of stations in different markets without harming local 
competition and diversity. Moreover, we believe that the mergers that 
will be allowed under our new rule can lead to improved television 
service and viewer choice.
    15. There are several benefits to defining the geographic 
dimensions of the local television market by reference to DMAs. Most 
importantly, unlike a rule relying on predicted field strength 
contours, DMAs reflect actual television viewing patterns and are 
widely used by the broadcasting and advertising industries. DMAs 
reflect the fact that a station's audience reach, and hence its ``local 
market,'' is not necessarily coextensive with the area of its broadcast 
signal coverage. For example, a station's over-the-air reach can be 
extended by carriage on cable systems and other multichannel delivery 
systems, as well as through such means as satellite and translator 
stations. In designating DMAs and compiling DMA-based ratings of 
television programs, Nielsen Media Research, a TV audience measuring 
service, collects viewing data from diaries placed in television 
households four times a year. Nielsen assigns counties to DMAs annually 
on the basis of television audience viewership as recorded in those 
diaries. Counties are assigned to a DMA if the majority or, in the 
absence of a majority, the preponderance, of viewing in the county is 
recorded for the programming of the television stations located in that 
DMA. Nielsen uses its DMA viewing data to compile DMA-based audience 
ratings for television programs. These data are used by television 
stations in deciding which programming should be aired, and by 
advertisers and stations in negotiating advertising rates.
    16. We recognize that we proposed in the 2FNPRM to supplement the 
DMA test with a Grade A contour standard to prohibit common ownership 
of stations with Grade A signal contour overlap even when they are in 
separate DMAs. However, after considering the comments in response to 
this proposal, we believe a ``DMA-only'' test is more appropriate. 
Although a station may attract some viewers who live outside its 
designated DMA, the preponderance of its audience will reside within 
its DMA. Local advertisers use DMA-based ratings to make their 
purchases of advertising time on local television stations, television 
networks generally have only one affiliate in each DMA, and stations 
target their programming to viewers inside the DMA because these are 
the viewers that advertisers pay to reach. The record also indicates 
that there are a fair number of stations that lie in different DMAs and 
serve wholly different markets even though they may have slightly 
overlapping Grade A contours. In addition, a DMA-only standard is more 
straightforward and easy to apply in terms of administering the rule. 
We consequently will not adopt a Grade A component in our new 
definition of the geographic scope of the duopoly rule.
    17. This new definition will generally be less restrictive than the 
current Grade B signal contour test. There may be

[[Page 50654]]

some situations, however, in which this is not the case, particularly 
in some geographically large DMAs west of the Mississippi River. In 
these situations, the DMA may be large enough that two stations 
situated in the DMA do not have overlapping Grade B contours. Common 
ownership of the two stations would be permitted under the existing 
rule but not under a strict application of the new DMA standard.
    18. In the 2FNPRM, we noted our belief that there are currently few 
stations within the same DMA that could be commonly owned under the 
existing Grade B signal contour standard that are not already jointly 
owned. We sought comment on whether we should, if we adopted a DMA/
Grade A rule, grandfather existing joint ownership combinations that 
conform to our current Grade B test. We also sought comment on an 
alternative approach of adopting a two-tiered rule under which we would 
permit common ownership both under the new test using DMAs and in 
situations where there is no Grade B overlap.
    19. It is our intention in this proceeding to relax the duopoly 
rule consistent with our competition and diversity objectives. It is 
not our intention to restrict combinations that would be permitted 
under our present Grade B signal contour test. To avoid this result, we 
will continue to permit common ownership of television stations in the 
same DMA where there is no Grade B overlap between those stations. 
Although such stations may compete to some extent for viewers and 
advertisers, we believe any harm to diversity and competition from 
permitting such combinations will be minimal and we wish to avoid 
instances in which application of our new rule would be more 
restrictive than our current duopoly rule. In addition, this approach 
avoids disrupting current ownership arrangements involving stations in 
the same DMA with no Grade B overlap.

B. Permitting Television Duopolies in the Same Local Market

    20. Background. In both the FNPRM and the 2FNPRM, we invited 
comment on whether, in certain situations, we should allow entities to 
acquire more than one television station in the same geographic market. 
We sought comment both on exceptions to our ``one-station'' local 
ownership rule, including the exception currently provided in our rules 
for television satellite stations, as well as on a number of possible 
waiver criteria.
    21. Costs and Benefits of Broadcast TV Station Duopolies. We 
believe that the demonstrated benefits of same-market television 
station combinations support allowing the formation of such 
combinations in certain cases where competition and diversity will not 
be unduly diminished. The record in this proceeding shows that there 
are significant efficiencies inherent in joint ownership and operation 
of television stations in the same market, including efficiencies 
related to the co-location and sharing of studio and office facilities, 
the sharing of administrative and technical staff, and efficiencies in 
advertising and news gathering. These efficiencies can contribute to 
programming and other benefits such as increased news and public 
affairs programming and improved entertainment programming, and, in 
some cases, can ensure the continued survival of a struggling station. 
In markets with many separate television licensees, the public interest 
benefits of common ownership can outweigh any cost to diversity and 
competition of permitting combinations.
    22. While we conclude that the public interest would be served by 
permitting television duopolies in certain circumstances, we are not 
eliminating or relaxing the rule to the extent a number of commenters 
advocate given the important diversity and competition issues at stake. 
Television broadcasting plays a very special role in our society. It is 
the primary source of news and information, as well as video 
entertainment to most Americans, and we must continue to ensure that 
the broadcast television industry has a diverse and competitive 
ownership structure. Moreover, as discussed above, because the 
communications industry is undergoing rapid change and increasing 
consolidation, significant yet measured relaxation of the television 
duopoly rule is appropriate to allow us to monitor the results of these 
sweeping changes.
    23. In light of these considerations, we have decided to adopt a 
modification to our duopoly rule, and three waiver tests, that are 
targeted to promote the public interest without appreciable harm to our 
competition and diversity goals. In particular, as described below, we 
will modify the TV duopoly rule to allow common ownership of two 
stations in the same DMA, if eight independently owned and operating 
commercial and noncommercial television stations will remain in the DMA 
post-merger, and at least one of the stations is not among the top 
four-ranked stations in the market, based on audience share, as 
measured by Nielsen or by any comparable professional and accepted 
rating service, at the time the application is filed. In addition, we 
will presume that a waiver of the rule is in the public interest if the 
applicant satisfies a ``failed'' or ``failing'' station test, or 
involves the construction of an ``unbuilt'' station.
1. Modification of the Rule: Eight Voice/Top Four-Ranked Station 
Standard
    24. Background. In the 2FNPRM, the Commission sought comment on 
whether we should entertain joint ownership of stations that (1) have 
very small audience or advertising market shares and (2) are located in 
a very large market where (3) a specified minimum number of 
independently owned voices remain post-merger. We stated that the 
purpose of such a standard would be to enhance competition and 
diversity in the local market by allowing small stations to share costs 
and thereby compete more effectively. We further stated that such joint 
ownership could potentially serve the public interest if such stations 
were to use their economic savings to produce new and better-quality 
programming or related enhancements. Such advantages may be 
particularly helpful to small and independent UHF stations. We invited 
comment on the circumstances under which joint ownership should be 
permitted, and on the size of the market share we might adopt, the 
number and kinds of voices we should count in any minimum voice 
criterion, and whether we should include a market rank test.
    25. Discussion. After considering the record, and our competition 
and diversity goals, we have decided to modify the duopoly rule to 
permit any two television stations in the same market to merge if:
     At least eight independently owned and operating full-
power commercial and noncommercial TV stations would remain post-merger 
in the DMA in which the communities of license of the TV stations in 
question are located, and
     The two merging stations are not both among the top four-
ranked stations in the market, as measured by audience share.

If any entity acquires a duopoly under this standard, it will not later 
be required to divest if the number of operating television voices 
within the market falls below eight or if the two merged stations 
subsequently are both ranked among the top four stations in the market; 
however, a duopoly may not automatically be transferred to a new owner 
if the market does not satisfy the eight voice/top four-ranked 
standard. In such a case, the transaction must either meet one of the 
waiver standards enunciated below, or involve a sale to separate 
parties. We will not include a market rank component in our new rule

[[Page 50655]]

because we believe such a test is unnecessary given the station rank 
and minimum number of stations criteria we are adopting. We adopt this 
``eight voice/top four-ranked station'' standard as a modification of 
the rule as opposed to the adoption of a waiver criterion in order to 
fashion a bright-line test, bring certainty to the permissibility of 
these transactions, and expedite their consummation, given that we do 
not believe as a general matter that they unduly compromise our 
competition and diversity goals. We delegate to the Mass Media Bureau 
the authority to grant any application that satisfies the eight 
station/top four ranked station standard, and presents no new or novel 
issues.
    26. This standard provides measured relaxation of the television 
duopoly rule, particularly in the larger television markets. It will 
allow weaker television stations in the market to combine, either with 
each other or with a larger station, thereby preserving and 
strengthening these stations and improving their ability to compete. 
These station combinations will allow licensees to take advantage of 
efficiencies and cost savings that can benefit the public, such as in 
allowing the stations to provide more local programming. At the same 
time, the station rank and voice criteria are designed to protect both 
our core competition and diversity concerns.
    27. The ``top four ranked station'' component of this standard is 
designed to ensure that the largest stations in the market do not 
combine and create potential competition concerns. These stations 
generally have a large share of the audience and advertising market in 
their area, and requiring them to operate independently will promote 
competition. In addition, our analysis has indicated that the top four-
ranked stations in each market generally have a local newscast, whereas 
lower-ranked stations often do not have significant local news 
programming, given the costs involved. Permitting mergers among these 
two categories of stations, but not among the top four-ranked stations, 
will consequently pose less concern over diversity of viewpoints in 
local news presentation, which is at the heart of our diversity goal.
    28. The ``eight independent voice'' component of the rule provides 
a clear benchmark for ensuring a minimum amount of diversity in a 
market. Taking into account current marketplace conditions, the eight 
voice standard we adopt today strikes what we believe to be an 
appropriate balance between permitting stations to take advantage of 
the efficiencies of television duopolies while at the same time 
ensuring a robust level of diversity. Thus, under our new rule, at 
least eight independently owned and operating full-power commercial and 
noncommercial broadcast television stations must remain in the DMA 
post-merger. We will not include in our count of independently owned 
television stations those that are brokered pursuant to an attributable 
same-market LMA because a substantial portion of the programming of 
brokered stations is furnished by the brokering station. This gives the 
brokering station a significant degree of influence over the brokered 
station's operations and programming such that it should not be counted 
as an independent source of viewpoint diversity; indeed, it is for this 
reason we have decided to attribute such TV LMAs in our attribution 
proceeding.
    29. We believe that an ``eight station'' test that focuses only on 
the number of full-power broadcast television outlets in the market is 
necessary for two reasons. First, we believe that broadcast television, 
more so than any other media, continues to have a special, pervasive 
impact in our society given its role as the preeminent source of news 
and entertainment for most Americans. As the Supreme Court recently 
stated, ``[b]roadcast television is an important source of information 
to many Americans. Though it is but one of many means for 
communication, by tradition and use for decades now it has been an 
essential part of the national discourse on subjects across the whole 
broad spectrum of speech, thought, and expression.''
    30. Second, we are unable to reach a definitive conclusion at this 
time as to the extent to which other media serve as readily available 
substitutes for broadcast television. In the FNPRM and 2FNPRM, we 
sought information about the extent to which other media serve as 
substitutes for television in the advertising and delivered video 
programming markets, and for purposes of diversity. For example, in the 
FNPRM, we stated that for the purpose of competition analysis, we would 
tentatively consider local advertising markets to include broadcast and 
cable television advertising, radio advertising, and newspaper 
advertising. For delivered video programming, we tentatively included 
commercial and noncommercial television stations and cable television. 
While we expressed our inclination to tentatively include MMDS, DBS, 
and television delivered by telephone companies, we expressed concern 
about the extent to which the latter three alternatives were actually 
available to most Americans and sought quantitative, behavioral studies 
estimating the extent to which broadcast television actually faced 
substitutes from any and all sources in the marketplace. Although we 
have received voluminous materials debating such substitutability, we 
have not received the quantitative, empirical studies that we sought in 
order to assess this issue in a complete and accurate fashion. Nor does 
there seem to be a consensus on the extent to which various media are 
substitutes for purposes of diversity. Thus, while we agree with those 
commenters who argued that different types of media, such as radio, 
cable television, VCRs, MMDS, and newspapers, may to some extent be 
substitutes for broadcast television, in the absence of the factual 
data we requested we have decided to exercise due caution by employing 
a minimum station count that includes only broadcast television 
stations.
    31. Our ``eight voice/top four ranked station'' standard provides 
significant relaxation of the television duopoly rule while at the same 
time ensures that markets remain sufficiently diverse and competitive 
at the local level so that common ownership of two television stations 
in these markets does not threaten our core diversity concerns. We 
recognize that stations in markets with less than nine independent 
voices will not be able to take advantage of this standard. But we 
believe this is appropriate given that these markets start with fewer 
broadcast television outlets, and thus a lower potential for providing 
robust diversity to viewers in such markets. While we recognize, as 
several commenters argued, that smaller markets also benefit from the 
efficiency gains and cost savings associated with joint station 
ownership, it is in these small markets that consolidation of broadcast 
television ownership could most undermine our competition and diversity 
goals. Moreover, the three waiver standards we adopt today--the failed 
and failing station criteria, and the unbuilt station test--will, 
consistent with our competition and diversity goals, provide relief in 
a more tailored fashion for stations in smaller markets that are unable 
to compete effectively.
2. Waiver Criteria
a. Failed Stations
    32. Background. We invited comment in the 2FNPRM on whether, if an 
applicant can show that it is the only viable suitor for a failed 
station, the Commission should grant the application regardless of 
contour overlap or DMA designations. We noted that for purposes of our 
one-to-a-market rule waiver standard, a ``failed'' station

[[Page 50656]]

is a station that has not been operated for a substantial period of 
time, e.g., four months, or that is involved in bankruptcy proceedings. 
We asked whether this standard should be used in evaluating a request 
to waive the television duopoly rule.
    33. Discussion. We are persuaded that the public interest would be 
served by adopting a failed station waiver standard for our revised 
television duopoly rule. A station that is off the air or in 
involuntary bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings can contribute little, 
if anything, to any type of diversity in a local market. Nor does such 
a station constitute a viable alternative in the local advertising 
market. As we concluded in adopting our current failed station waiver 
standard for the one-to-a-market rule, the benefits to the public of 
joint ownership under these circumstances outweigh the costs to 
diversity. In fact, dark or bankrupt stations actually disserve our 
goal of efficient use of the spectrum because those stations are 
holding valuable frequencies without providing service to the public. 
Permitting another local station to acquire a failed station will 
result in additional programming, perhaps an increase in diversity in 
the market, and more advertising time available for sale in larger 
quantities.
    34. We have decided to define a ``failed station'' for purposes of 
our television duopoly rule as one that has been dark for at least four 
months or is involved in court-supervised involuntary bankruptcy or 
involuntary insolvency proceedings. In addition, we will require that 
the waiver applicant demonstrate that the ``in-market'' buyer is the 
only reasonably available entity willing and able to operate the failed 
station, and that selling the station to an out-of-market buyer would 
result in an artificially depressed price for the station.
    35. This standard is stricter than the failed station standard used 
in the context of our current one-to-a-market rule. First, we are 
limiting our TV duopoly failed station waiver to stations in court-
supervised involuntary bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings. By 
excluding voluntary bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, we hope to 
avoid the issue of whether an owner has filed for bankruptcy or 
insolvency simply in order to qualify for a waiver. We will extend our 
failed station waiver here to apply to both insolvency and bankruptcy 
proceedings, as the former are a state-regulated mechanism similar to 
bankruptcy. Second, we are requiring applicants to make a serious 
attempt to sell the troubled station to an entity that would not 
require a waiver of our revised duopoly rule. Waiver applicants must 
demonstrate that the ``in-market'' buyer is the only reasonably 
available entity willing and able to operate the station, and that 
selling to another buyer would lead to an artificially depressed price 
for the station. One way to make this showing will be to provide an 
affidavit from an independent broker affirming that active and serious 
efforts have been made to sell the station, and that no reasonable 
offer from an entity outside the market has been received. We believe 
that a strict failed station waiver standard is warranted in view of 
the other steps we are taking today to relax the television duopoly 
rule. While there are now other limited criteria pursuant to which 
same-market television stations may combine, we hope to limit the 
special relief awarded to failed stations to those situations where 
this relief is clearly needed. As with our current one-to-a-market 
failed station waiver standard, we will be predisposed to grant 
applications that meet the waiver standard, but will entertain 
petitions to deny seeking to rebut the waiver request.
    36. To qualify for a waiver under the failed station standard, we 
will require the waiver applicant to provide relevant documentation, 
i.e., proof of the length of time that the station has been off the 
air, or proof that the station is involved in bankruptcy or insolvency 
proceedings. We will also require, in the case of a silent station, a 
statement that the failed station went dark due to financial distress, 
not because of other, non-financial reasons. This documentation will 
ensure that the waiver standard is applied only to stations facing 
financial difficulties. We will not require the waiver applicant to 
demonstrate that the market will contain post-merger a minimum number 
of voices. As noted above, we have concluded that the benefits to the 
public of preventing a station from going dark or bringing a dark 
station back on the air cannot harm and may help diversity and 
competition, regardless of the number of broadcast and other voices in 
the local market. Any combination formed as a result of a failed 
station waiver may be transferred together only if the combination 
meets our new duopoly rule or one of our three waiver standards at the 
time of transfer.
b. ``Failing'' Stations
    37. Background. The 2FNPRM also invited comment on whether we 
should adopt a failing station waiver criteria, and, if so, the 
appropriate definition of a failing station.
    38. Discussion. We will adopt a ``failing'' station waiver 
standard. It will permit two stations to merge where at least one of 
the stations has been struggling for an extended period of time both in 
terms of its audience share and in its financial performance. 
Permitting such stations to merge should pose minimal harm to our 
diversity and competition goals, since their financial situation 
typically hampers their ability to be a viable ``voice'' in the market. 
These stations rarely have the resources to provide local news 
programming, and often struggle to provide significant local 
programming at all. Allowing a ``failing'' station to join with a 
stronger station in the market can greatly improve its ability to 
improve its facilities and programming operations, thus benefitting the 
public interest. This waiver standard may be of particular assistance 
to struggling stations in smaller markets that are not covered by the 
eight voice/top four ranked station test.
    39. We agree with the commenters that argued that it makes little 
sense to force a station to go dark or declare bankruptcy before 
considering whether it should receive a waiver of the duopoly rule to 
permit it to merge with another station in the market. Of course, 
determining when a station is ``failed'' is a more straightforward 
task, since there are clear, objective criteria for identifying such a 
status, i.e., a station is dark or in bankruptcy. A ``failing'' station 
standard, by contrast, will involve more of an individualized, case-by-
case assessment to determine when a station is struggling to such an 
extent that permitting it to merge with another station will not 
undermine our competition and diversity goals and may in fact promote 
them.
    40. With these considerations in mind, and based on the record 
before us, we establish the following criteria for granting waivers 
under a ``failing'' station waiver standard. We will presume such a 
waiver is in the public interest if the applicant satisfies each of 
these criteria:
    (1) One of the merging stations has had low all-day audience share 
(i.e., 4% or lower).
    (2) The financial condition of one of the merging stations is poor. 
A waiver is more likely to be granted where one or both of the stations 
has had a negative cash flow for the previous three years. The 
applicant will need to submit data, such as detailed income statements 
and balance sheets, to demonstrate this. Commission staff will assess 
the reasonableness of the applicant's showing by comparing data

[[Page 50657]]

regarding the station's expenses to industry averages.
    (3) The merger will produce public interest benefits. A waiver will 
be granted where the applicant demonstrates that the tangible and 
verifiable public interest benefits of the merger outweigh any harm to 
competition and diversity. At the end of the stations' license terms, 
the owner of the merged stations must certify to the Commission that 
the public interest benefits of the merger are being fulfilled, 
including a specific, factual showing of the program-related benefits 
that have accrued to the public. Cost savings or other efficiencies, 
standing alone, will not constitute a sufficient showing.
    (4) The in-market buyer is the only reasonably available candidate 
willing and able to acquire and operate the station; selling the 
station to an out-of-market buyer would result in an artificially 
depressed price. As with the showing required of failed station waiver 
applicants, one way to satisfy this fourth criterion will be to provide 
an affidavit from an independent broker affirming that active and 
serious efforts have been made to sell the station, and that no 
reasonable offer from an entity outside the market has been received.

Any combination formed as a result of a failing station waiver may be 
transferred together only if the combination meets our new duopoly rule 
or one of our three waiver standards at the time of transfer.
c. Unbuilt Stations
    41. Background. In the 2FNPRM, we invited comment on whether we 
should entertain requests to waive the local television ownership rule 
to permit a local broadcast television licensee to apply for a 
television channel allotment that has remained vacant or unused for an 
extended period of time. We stated there that it may not be in the 
public interest to allow allotted broadcast channels to lie fallow--
particularly in markets where it might be possible to allow additional 
NTSC stations to come on the air without adversely affecting the DTV 
allotment table and the transition to digital television. Similarly, we 
asked whether, if it is possible to create new channel allotments in a 
market without interfering with nearby channels and without adversely 
affecting the DTV allotment table, the Commission should entertain 
applications by an incumbent television licensee to establish a new 
channel in its market.
    42. Discussion. Since we adopted the 2FNPRM, the rationale for a 
vacant allotment waiver policy has become less relevant. In the DTV 
Sixth Report and Order, 62 FR 26684, May 14, 1997, we eliminated vacant 
NTSC allotments in order to better achieve our DTV objectives of full 
accommodation, service replication and spectrum recovery. We further 
stated that new television stations should be operated as DTV stations, 
and that there would be no need to maintain vacant NTSC allotments that 
were not the subject of a pending application or rule making 
proceeding. Thus, with the licensing of new NTSC service coming to an 
end, we believe that the proposed rationale for a vacant allotment 
waiver policy has been largely vitiated because there would be few, if 
any, situations where that basis for a waiver would apply. As the 
development of DTV continues, it is possible that new channels may 
again become available for licensing. If so, we may reconsider this 
issue at that time or in the context of our biennial review of our 
multiple ownership rules.
    43. Although we no longer find it appropriate to adopt a vacant 
allotment waiver standard, we have concluded that the public interest 
would be served at this time by adopting a duopoly waiver standard for 
``unbuilt'' television stations. The unbuilt station waiver we adopt is 
premised on essentially the same logic as supports our failed and 
failing station waiver standards. A station that has gone unbuilt, like 
a built station that has gone dark, cannot contribute to diversity or 
competition. On the other hand, activation of a construction permit and 
construction of a station, even by the owner of another television 
station in the market if that is the only viable means to obtain 
service, increases program choice for viewers, may increase outlet 
diversity, and increases the amount of advertising time available for 
sale in the market. We believe that the benefits to the public of 
construction and operation of such a station, even if through joint 
ownership, rather than allowing the channel to remain unused, outweigh 
any costs to diversity and competition.
    44. To qualify for a duopoly waiver under this standard, we will 
require that applicants satisfy each of these criteria:
    (1) The combination will result in the construction of an 
authorized but as yet unbuilt station.
    (2) The permittee has made reasonable efforts to construct, and has 
been unable to do so.
    (3) The in-market buyer is the only reasonably available candidate 
willing and able to acquire the construction permit and build the 
station and selling the construction permit to an out-of-market buyer 
would result in an artificially depressed price. As with the showing 
required of failed and failing station waiver applicants, one way to 
satisfy this criterion will be to provide an affidavit from an 
independent broker affirming that active and serious efforts have been 
made to sell the permit, and that no reasonable offer from an entity 
outside the market has been received.

Any combination formed as a result of an unbuilt station waiver may be 
transferred together only if the combination meets our new duopoly rule 
or one of our three waiver standards at the time of transfer.
d. UHF Combinations
    45. Background. In the 2FNPRM, we invited comment on the extent to 
which the Commission should distinguish between UHF and VHF stations in 
applying our TV duopoly rule.
    46. Discussion. After careful consideration of the comments, we 
have decided not to create a UHF exception or UHF waiver policy for 
several reasons. First, a UHF exemption or waiver policy is an 
overbroad means of promoting the public interest. As we noted in our 
R&O eliminating the prime time access rule for television networks, 
many UHF stations are financially successful, are network affiliates, 
and are part of large station groups. Thus, a blanket exception or 
waiver for all UHF stations would unfairly benefit more powerful 
affiliates as well as struggling stations. Second, cable carriage 
compensates for many of the technical disadvantages faced by UHF 
stations vis-a-vis their VHF counterparts. Cable penetration is near 70 
percent nationwide. Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision upholding 
the statutory must-carry rights of television stations removes a major 
source of uncertainty among UHF stations about their ability to obtain 
cable carriage. Third, deployment of DTV should eliminate, over the 
next several years, many of the remaining disadvantages of UHF 
stations. The Commission's power limitations for DTV licensees will 
likely reduce the technical discrepancy of UHF and VHF stations, and 
the multichannel capabilities of digital transmission should enhance 
the ability of UHF stations to compete in the video marketplace. 
Fourth, licensees may continue to take advantage of the satellite 
station exception to the TV duopoly rule, which is designed to assist 
financially struggling stations that cannot operate as stand-alone 
full-service stations. Finally, we believe that the financial problems 
faced by particular UHF stations can more appropriately be addressed, 
at least to some extent, by the other duopoly waiver criteria we are 
adopting today.

[[Page 50658]]

As discussed above, these criteria are targeted to assist stations 
facing financial hardships. We therefore will not create a waiver 
policy or exception to the TV duopoly rule based on whether a station 
is in the UHF or VHF band.
3. Satellite Stations
    47. Background. Generally, television satellite stations retransmit 
all or a substantial part of the programming of a commonly-owned parent 
station. Satellite stations are generally exempt from our broadcast 
ownership restrictions. In the 2NPRM, we noted that the Commission 
first authorized TV satellite operations in small or sparsely populated 
areas with insufficient economic bases to support full-service 
operations. Later we authorized satellite stations in smaller markets 
already served by full-service operations but not reached by major 
networks. More recently, we have authorized satellite stations in 
larger markets where the applicant has demonstrated that the proposed 
satellite could not operate as a stand-alone full-service station. We 
stated in the 2FNPRM that we saw no reason to alter our policy of 
exempting satellite stations from our local ownership rules, but 
invited comment on this conclusion. All the commenters that addressed 
this issue supported continuing the exception of satellite stations 
from the duopoly rule.
    48. Discussion. We believe that continued exception of satellite 
stations from the duopoly rule is appropriate. As we stated in the 
2FNPRM, our satellite station policy rests in part on the questionable 
financial viability of the satellite as a stand-alone facility. As 
such, our policy has furthered the underlying goals of our ownership 
restrictions by adding additional stations to local television markets 
where these stations otherwise would not have been established. In 
addition, the other criteria we use to evaluate satellite operations, 
including service to underserved areas, ensure that satellite 
operations are consistent with our goals of promoting diversity and 
competition.

IV. Radio-Television Cross-Ownership Rule

    49. Background. The radio-television cross-ownership rule, or the 
``one-to-a-market'' rule, forbids joint ownership of a radio and a 
television station serving substantial areas in common. In 1989, the 
Commission amended the rule to permit, on the basis of a presumptive 
waiver, radio-television mergers involving one television and one AM 
and one FM station, in the top 25 television markets if, post-merger, 
at least 30 independently owned broadcast voices remain in the relevant 
market, or if the merger involves a failed station. Our current policy 
also permits waivers on a case-by-case basis if the merger satisfies a 
group of five separate criteria.
    50. In the FNPRM, we proposed to eliminate the cross-ownership 
restriction in its entirety or replace it with an approach under which 
cross-ownership would be permitted where a minimum number of post-
acquisition, independently owned broadcast voices remained in the 
relevant market. We tentatively concluded there were two alternative 
approaches toward modifying the rule. If radio and television stations 
do not compete in the same local advertising, program delivery, or 
diversity markets, we proposed to eliminate the rule entirely and rely 
on our radio and television local ownership rules to ensure competition 
and diversity at the local level. Under the local radio ownership rules 
in effect at that time, this would have permitted entities to own one 
AM, one FM, and one television station in even the smallest markets, 
and up to 2 AM, 2 FM, and one television station in larger markets. In 
contrast, if we concluded that radio and television did compete in some 
or all of the local markets, we proposed to modify the one-to-a-market 
rule to permit radio-television combinations in markets where there are 
a sufficient number of remaining independent voices to ensure 
sufficient diversity and competition.
    51. After adoption of the FNPRM, Congress passed the 1996 Act, 
which affects the radio-television cross-ownership rule in at least two 
ways. First, section 202(d) of the Act directs the Commission to extend 
the radio-television cross-ownership presumptive waiver policy to the 
top 50, rather than top 25, television markets ``consistent with the 
public interest, convenience and necessity.'' Second, section 202(b)(1) 
of the Act liberalized the local radio ownership rules.
    52. In our 2FNPRM, based on the statutory changes to the local 
radio ownership rules, we requested further comment on our radio-
television cross-ownership rule proposals. First, we sought further 
comment on whether the rule should be eliminated based on a finding 
that radio and television stations do not compete in the same market. 
Second, even if we consider television and radio stations to be 
competitors, we asked if the radio-television cross-ownership rule 
could be eliminated because the respective radio and television 
ownership rules alone can be relied upon to ensure sufficient diversity 
and competition in the local market. We also sought to update the 
record on a number of specific options for modifying, but not 
eliminating, the rule. In this regard, and consistent with section 
202(d) of the 1996 Act, we proposed, at a minimum, to extend the top 25 
market/30 voice waiver policy to the top 50 markets. However, we also 
invited comment on a number of options to change the rule beyond what 
was contemplated by section 202(d) of the 1996 Act. For example, we 
asked whether the presumptive waiver policy should be extended further 
to any television market where the minimum number of independent voices 
would remain after the merger. We also invited comment on whether the 
presumptive waiver policy should be extended to entities that seek to 
own more than one FM and/or AM radio station, and whether the 
Commission should reduce the number of required independently owned 
voices that must remain after a merger. Finally, we asked whether our 
``five factors'' test should be changed or refined to be more effective 
in protecting competition and diversity.

A. Modification of the Rule

    53. Discussion. We have determined that the public interest would 
be best served at this time by relaxing the radio-television cross-
ownership rule to permit same-market joint ownership of radio and 
television facilities up to a level that permits broadcasters and the 
public to realize the benefits of common ownership while not 
undermining our competition and diversity concerns. Our new rule 
consists of three parts. First, we will permit a party to own up to two 
television stations (provided this is permitted under our modified TV 
duopoly rule or TV LMA grandfathering policy) and up to six radio 
stations (any combination of AM or FM stations, to the extent permitted 
under our local radio ownership rules) in any market where at least 20 
independently owned media voices remain in the market after the 
combination is effected. In those markets where our revised rule will 
allow parties to own a total of eight outlets in the form of two TV 
stations and six radio stations, we will also permit them instead to 
own eight outlets in the form of one TV station and seven radio 
stations. Second, we will permit common ownership of up to two 
television stations and up to four radio stations (any combination of 
AM or FM stations, to the extent permitted under our local radio 
ownership rules) in any market where at least 10 independently owned 
media voices remain after the combination is effected. And, third, we 
will permit common ownership of up to two television stations and one 
radio

[[Page 50659]]

station notwithstanding the number of independent voices in the market. 
In determining which stations are subject to the new rule, we will use 
the same contour overlap standards used in our present rule. We 
delegate to the Mass Media Bureau the authority to grant any 
application that satisfies the new radio/TV cross-ownership rule, and 
presents no new or novel issues. If a voice test is required to acquire 
a given combination (i.e., any combination that includes more than one 
radio/TV combination), that combination will not later be required to 
be undone if the number of independent voices in the market later falls 
below the applicable voice test. However, a radio/TV combination may 
not be transferred to a new owner if the market does not satisfy the 
applicable voice standard at the time of sale.
    54. As described below, we will eliminate our five factor case-by-
case waiver standard. Waivers of our new three-part rule will be 
granted only in situations involving a failed station and in 
extraordinary circumstances in which the proponent of the waiver will 
face a high hurdle. We will define a failed station for purposes of our 
new radio/TV cross-ownership rule in the same manner as that term is 
defined for purposes of the failed station waiver we adopt today in 
connection with our television duopoly rule. Any combination formed as 
a result of a failed station waiver may be transferred together only if 
the combination meets our new radio/TV cross-ownership rule or our 
failed station waiver standard at the time of transfer.
    55. Rationale for Modified Rule. We relax our radio/TV cross-
ownership rule to balance our traditional diversity and competition 
concerns with our desire to permit broadcasters and the public to 
realize the benefits of radio/TV common ownership. We believe that the 
revised rule reflects the changes in the local broadcast media 
marketplace. The relaxed rule recognizes the growth in the number and 
types of media outlets, the clustering of cable systems in major 
population centers, the efficiencies inherent in joint ownership and 
operation of both television and radio stations in the same market, as 
well as the public service benefits that can be obtained from joint 
operation. At the same time, the voice test components of the revised 
rule also ensure that the local market remains sufficiently diverse and 
competitive.
    56. The new three-part rule also ensures the application of a 
clear, reasoned standard. One of our primary goals in this proceeding 
is to provide concrete guidance to applicants and the public about the 
permissibility of proposed transactions. This minimizes the burdens 
involved in complying with and enforcing our rules. It also promotes 
greater consistency in our decision-making. Since development of the 
Commission's waiver policy in 1989, the Commission has granted a 
significant number of waivers in order to provide broadcasters relief 
from the one-to-a-market rule, which prohibited any common ownership of 
television and radio stations in the same market. Indeed, some 
commenters argue that this waiver process has come to govern regulation 
of same-market radio-television cross-ownership, rather than the rule 
itself. Today, we redirect our approach by amending the rule to provide 
a greater degree of common ownership of radio and television stations 
while at the same time limiting waivers of this new rule to only 
extraordinary circumstances. In addition, the new rule will ease 
administrative burdens and will provide predictability to broadcasters 
in structuring their business transactions.
    57. A number of commenters argued that we should eliminate our 
radio-television cross-ownership rule entirely. We do not believe that 
course is appropriate at this time. We stated in the FNPRM that 
elimination of the rule might be warranted if we concluded that radio 
and television stations do not compete in the same local advertising, 
program delivery, or diversity markets. Although radio and television 
stations may or may not compete in different advertising markets, we 
believe a radio-television cross-ownership rule continues to be 
necessary to promote a diversity of viewpoints in the broadcast media. 
The public continues to rely on both radio and television for news and 
information, suggesting the two media both contribute to the 
``marketplace of ideas'' and compete in the same diversity market. As 
these two media do serve as substitutes at least to some degree for 
diversity purposes, we will retain a relaxed one-to-market rule to 
ensure that viewpoint diversity is adequately protected.
    58. Although we decline to eliminate our radio-television cross-
ownership rule, the demonstrated benefits of same-market broadcast 
combinations support relaxing the rule and allowing such combinations 
in circumstances where we find that diversity and competition remain 
adequately protected. The record in this proceeding demonstrates that 
there are significant efficiencies inherent in joint ownership and 
operation of broadcast stations in the same market, even when the 
stations are in separate services (i.e., radio-TV combinations). Among 
other benefits, these efficiencies often lead to improved programming 
and can help stations in financial difficulty remain on the air. The 
revised radio/TV cross-ownership rule we adopt today will establish 
clear guidelines that will permit common ownership of radio and 
television stations in markets where diversity and competition are 
preserved.
    59. Turning to the specifics of the first two prongs of the new 
rule, we will use a ``voice count'' approach rather than also applying 
a market rank restriction as with our current top 25 market, 30 voice 
presumptive waiver policy. In particular, the first prong of our new 
rule, which permits a party to own up to two television stations 
(provided this is permitted under our modified TV duopoly rule or TV 
LMA grandfathering policy) and up to six radio stations (any 
combination of AM or FM stations, to the extent permitted under our 
local radio ownership rules) in any market with at least twenty 
independently owned media voices, focuses on the number of independent 
voices remaining in the market post-merger, rather than market rank 
(e.g., the top 100 markets). A rule based on the number of independent 
voices more accurately reflects the actual level of diversity and 
competition in the market. As a number of commenters in this proceeding 
noted, a market-size restriction is unnecessary for purposes of 
competition and diversity as long as there are a minimum number of 
independent sources of news and information available to listeners, and 
a minimum number of alternative outlets available to advertisers. In 
addition, unlike a rule based on market rank, our revised rule will 
account for changes in the number of voices in a market resulting from 
consolidation, the addition of new voices, or the loss of any outlets. 
Mergers will be permitted only when the voice count is satisfied, 
thereby ensuring the preservation of a minimum level of diversity and 
competition in the market.
    60. The second prong of our new rule permits a party to own up to 
two television stations (provided this is permitted under our modified 
TV duopoly rule or TV LMA grandfathering policy) and up to four radio 
stations (any combination of AM or FM stations, to the extent permitted 
under our local radio ownership rules) in any market with at least ten 
independently owned media voices. This standard also focuses on the 
number of independent voices remaining in the market post-merger rather 
than market rank, and extends the benefits of common ownership to 
smaller markets. In this regard, our

[[Page 50660]]

revised rule permits broadcasters and the public in these markets to 
realize the same benefits of common ownership we have concluded are 
worthwhile for the largest markets.
    61. The third prong of our new rule will allow common ownership of 
up to two television stations (provided that is permissible under our 
rules or TV LMA grandfathering policy) and one radio station 
notwithstanding the number of independent voices in the market. Based 
on the record before us, we find that the service benefits and 
efficiencies achieved from the joint ownership and operation of a 
television/radio combination in local markets further the public 
interest and outweigh the cost to diversity in these instances.
    62. Applying the Voice Count Tests. We will apply the voice test 
under both prongs of our new radio/TV cross-ownership rule that include 
such a test as follows:
    (1) We will count all independently owned and operating full-power 
commercial and noncommercial broadcast television stations licensed to 
a community in the DMA in which the community of license of the 
television station in question is located.
    (2) We will also count all independently owned and operating 
commercial and noncommercial broadcast radio stations licensed to a 
community within the radio metro market in which the community of 
license of the television station in question is located. In addition, 
we will count broadcast radio stations outside the radio metro market 
that Arbitron or another nationally-recognized audience rating service 
lists as having a reportable share in the metro market. In areas in 
which there is no radio metro market, the party seeking the waiver may 
count the radio stations present in an area that would be the 
functional equivalent of a radio market.
    (3) We will count all independently owned daily newspapers that are 
published in the DMA at issue and that have a circulation exceeding 5% 
of the households in the DMA.
    (4) We will count cable systems provided cable service is generally 
available to television households in the DMA. For DMAs in which cable 
service is generally available, cable will count as a single voice for 
purposes of our voice analysis, regardless of the number of cable 
systems within the DMA, their ownership, and any overlap in service 
area.
    63. In counting broadcast television and radio stations as 
``voices'' we are being consistent with the voice count analysis used 
in our current ``top 25 market/30 voice'' presumptive waiver standard. 
That standard, however, counts radio stations licensed to the relevant 
television metropolitan market. Under our new rule, we will instead use 
the radio metropolitan market, and will include both radio stations 
licensed within the radio metro market and stations with a reportable 
share in that market. We believe it is important to count radio 
stations with a reportable share in the relevant market because those 
stations clearly serve as a source of information and entertainment 
programming for the relevant market. We have chosen to use the radio 
metro market rather than the television metro market for counting the 
number of independent radio voices because the former more accurately 
reflect the competitive and core signal availability realities for 
radio service in the market. All independently owned radio stations in 
the radio market can be presumed to be available to residents of that 
market because of signal reach. Radio stations outside the radio metro 
market may also be presumed to be available to all residents of the 
radio market if Arbitron, or another nationally recognized audience 
rating service, lists them as having a reportable audience share in the 
radio metro. Reportable audience share information is not generally 
available for television metro markets. Thus, use of radio markets will 
ease the burden on applicants seeking approval of assignment and 
transfer applications, and on the Commission staff reviewing such 
applications.
    64. We will also include in our voice count daily newspapers and 
cable systems because we believe that such media are an important 
source of news and information on issues of local concern and compete 
with radio and television, at least to some extent, as advertising 
outlets. Although we have not previously explicitly counted cable and 
newspapers as voices under our current top 25 market/30 voice 
presumptive waiver standard, we have counted these outlets in applying 
the case-by-case, five factor waiver standard. While we will count 
these media outlets in applying our amended rule, we will restrict the 
number of newspapers we will include and limit the weight we will 
ascribe to cable. Specifically, we will include all independently owned 
daily newspapers that are published in the DMA that have a circulation 
exceeding 5 percent of the households in the DMA. Our intent in this 
regard is to include those newspapers that are widely available 
throughout the DMA and that provide coverage of issues of interest to a 
sizeable percentage of the population. Although we recognize that other 
publications also provide a source of diversity and competition, many 
of these are only targeted to particular communities and are not 
accessible to, or relied upon by, the population throughout the local 
market. We will also include wired cable television in the DMA as one 
voice, since cable service is generally available to households 
throughout the U.S. We believe it is appropriate to include at least 
one voice for cable, where cable passes most of the homes in the 
market, because there are PEG and other channels on cable systems that 
present local informational and public affairs programming to the 
public. At this time we count cable as no more than one voice since 
most cable subscribers have only one cable system to choose from. In 
addition, despite a multiplicity of channels provided by each cable 
system, most programming is either originated or selected by the cable 
system operator, who thereby ultimately controls the content of such 
programming. As most cable programming available to a household is 
controlled by a single entity, we believe cable should be counted as a 
single voice in applying our voice test.

B. Waiver Criteria

1. Failed Stations
    65. We will continue to grant waivers of our radio-television 
cross-ownership rule, on a presumptive basis, in situations involving a 
failed station. However, we will adopt the definition of a failed 
station used in the context of our television duopoly failed station 
waiver standard. In order to qualify as ``failed'' a station must be 
dark for at least four months or involved in court-supervised 
involuntary bankruptcy or involuntary insolvency proceedings. In 
addition, we will require that the waiver applicant demonstrate that 
the ``in market'' buyer is the only reasonably available entity willing 
and able to operate the failed station and that selling the station to 
an out-of-market buyer would result in an artificially depressed price 
for the station. As in the past, we will require the applicant seeking 
the waiver to provide relevant documentation, i.e., proof of the length 
of time that the station has been off the air, or proof that the 
station is involved in bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, in the case 
of a silent station, we will require a statement that the failed 
station went dark due to financial distress, not because of other, non-
financial reasons. Any combination formed as a result of a failed 
station waiver may be transferred together only

[[Page 50661]]

if the combination meets our radio/TV cross-ownership rule, or failed 
station waiver, at the time of transfer.
    66. Our new waiver standard is significantly stricter than the 
failed station standard used in the context of our current one-to-a-
market rule. As we stated in adopting our television duopoly failed 
station waiver, we are limiting the waiver to involuntary bankruptcy 
and insolvency proceedings to avoid the risk that an owner has filed 
for bankruptcy or insolvency simply to qualify for a waiver. We will 
extend the waiver to include stations in insolvency as well as 
bankruptcy proceedings, as the former is a state-regulated mechanism 
similar to bankruptcy. Finally, we are requiring that applicants make a 
serious effort to sell the troubled station to an out-of-market buyer 
in order to limit the relief afforded by the waiver to those situations 
in which it is clearly needed. In view of the other steps we are taking 
today to relax our radio/TV cross-ownership rule, we believe that it is 
appropriate to ensure that the relief offered by our failed station 
waiver is directed to stations that are clearly facing financial 
difficulty and that cannot be sold absent a waiver of our rule.
    67. Our rationale for this waiver standard is the same as that of 
the failed station waiver standard we are adopting today for the 
television duopoly rule. We believe that the benefits to the public of 
joint ownership, namely preserving a bankrupt station or allowing a 
dark station to return to the air, do not pose costs from a diversity 
perspective. Once a station has been off the air for a substantial 
period or has become involved in involuntary bankruptcy proceedings (so 
that it is likely to go off the air), competition and diversity in a 
local market cannot be improved by forbidding joint ownership of that 
station with another station in the market. It is our view that two 
operating, commonly-owned stations serve the public better than one 
operational station and one nonoperational station that provides no 
service to the public at all. We note that Congress reached the same 
conclusion in the 1996 Act when it authorized an exception to the local 
radio ownership limits to permit an entity to exceed those limits if so 
doing would result in an increase in the number of stations in 
operation. Increasing the number of stations in a market provides 
additional voices to address community needs and issues and increases 
listeners' programming choices.
    68. This waiver will not be extended to failing or unbuilt 
stations. Thus, evidence that a station is losing money (i.e., a 
negative cash flow) is not adequate to qualify for the waiver. We do 
not believe that it is necessary at this time to permit such additional 
waivers in view of the measured liberalization of our radio/TV cross-
ownership rule and the 1996 Act's liberalization of the local radio 
ownership limits.
2. ``Five Factors'' Waiver Standard
    69. Background. We invited comment in the 2FNPRM on whether our 
``five factors'' case-by-case waiver standard should be changed or 
refined to be more effective in protecting our competition and 
diversity concerns. Under this standard, we make a public interest 
determination on a case-by-case basis currently using the following 
five criteria: (1) the potential public service benefits of common 
ownership of the facilities, such as economies of scale, cost savings, 
and programming benefits; (2) the types of facilities involved; (3) the 
number of media outlets already owned by the applicant in the relevant 
market; (4) any financial difficulties involving the station(s); and 
(5) issues pertaining to the level of diversity.
    70. Discussion. In light of the modifications we are making today 
in the radio-television cross-ownership rule and our goals of 
protecting competition and diversity, we will eliminate the case-by-
case, ``five factors'' waiver test we have previously employed. Our 
amended rule goes beyond the criteria pursuant to which we have 
delegated authority to the Commission staff to act on one-to-a-market 
waiver requests, most of which have been approved under the five 
factors standard. We have revised the rule based on our recognition 
that the benefits of joint ownership in many circumstances outweigh the 
harm to diversity, and have based that conclusion in large part on an 
assessment of the same general criteria identified in our current five 
factor waiver standard. In the event that extraordinary evidence exists 
that a waiver of our revised rule is warranted, the Commission will 
consider that evidence pursuant to our general waiver authority. Given 
the significant relaxation of our radio-TV cross-ownership rule, 
applicants seeking combinations that exceed the new rule will bear a 
substantially heavier burden than in the past in justifying joint 
ownership.
    71. We are eliminating the five-factor waiver standard because it 
has been difficult to apply. After a number of years of experience in 
applying this test, we have come to conclude that the standard does not 
sufficiently protect our competition and diversity goals. We believe 
that our new, three-part rule, along with our failed station waiver, 
will be easier to administer, better protect the Commission's 
competition and diversity goals, and therefore further the public 
interest.
3. Existing Conditional Waivers
    72. In a number of rulings since passage of the 1996 Act, the 
Commission has granted, conditioned on the outcome of this proceeding, 
applications for waiver of the radio-television cross ownership rule 
where the number of radio stations exceeded the radio limits in 
existence prior to the Act. The conditional waiver grantees are 
directed to file with the Commission within sixty days of publication 
of this R&O in the Federal Register a showing sufficient to demonstrate 
their compliance or non-compliance with our new rule. In situations 
where the revised rule is met, we delegate to the Mass Media Bureau the 
authority to replace the conditional waiver with permanent approval of 
the relevant assignment or transfer of license.
    73. A number of the conditional waivers that have been granted will 
not comply with our newly revised radio/TV cross-ownership rule. 
Although parties that received these waivers were placed on notice that 
their proposed station transactions were subject to the outcome of this 
rulemaking proceeding, we nonetheless will extend these conditional 
waivers, until the conclusion of our biennial review in 2004, during 
which we will review the radio/TV cross-ownership rule itself. We will 
also extend this grandfathering relief to any pending application for 
conditional waiver, if filed on or before July 29, 1999 (the date of 
this ``sunshine'' notice for this R&O), and ultimately granted by the 
Commission. In 2004, the Commission will review these waivers, on a 
case-by-case basis, as part of its biennial review and determine the 
appropriate treatment of them beyond that point in time. In order to 
qualify for permanent grandfathering relief after 2004, conditional 
waiver grantees will be required to demonstrate that such relief is in 
the public interest, based upon, to the extent applicable to radio/TV 
combinations, the same criteria that we will use to review the LMAs 
that we have concluded to grandfather for a similar period of time. As 
is the case with the grandfathered LMAs, if conditional waiver grantees 
wish to establish greater certainty about the status of their waiver 
prior to the 2004 biennial review, they may make a showing using the 
2004 biennial review criteria, beginning one year after the date that 
this R&O is published in the

[[Page 50662]]

Federal Register. Any transfer of a grandfathered combination after the 
adoption date of this R&O (whether during the initial grandfathering 
period or after a permanent grandfathering decision has been made) must 
meet the radio/TV cross-ownership rule or waiver policy in effect at 
the time of transfer.

V. Television Local Marketing Agreements

    74. Background. A television local marketing agreement (``LMA'') or 
time brokerage agreement is a type of contract that generally involves 
the sale by a licensee of discrete blocks of time to a broker that then 
supplies the programming to fill that time and sells the commercial 
spot announcements to support the programming. Our current data 
indicate that there are at least 70 existing LMAs where the brokering 
and brokered station are in the same DMA. Most of these LMAs are in the 
top 50 television markets.
    75. In our companion Attribution R&O, we have decided to attribute 
time brokerage of another television station in the same market for 
more than fifteen percent of the brokered station's broadcast hours per 
week and to count LMAs that fall in this category toward the brokering 
licensee's ownership limits. In the 2FNPRM, we stated that we would 
decide in this proceeding how to treat existing television LMAs under 
any new attribution rules that we might adopt in the Attribution 
proceeding. In this R&O, we adopt policies to afford ``grandfather'' 
rights to existing television LMAs according to the provisions 
discussed below.
    76. In the 2FNPRM, we stated that, in the event that we found 
television LMAs attributable, we were inclined to extend some 
grandfathering relief to all television LMAs entered into before the 
November 5, 1996 adoption date of the 2FNPRM for purposes of compliance 
with our ownership rules. We sought comment on an approach whereby such 
LMAs would not be disturbed during the pendency of the original term of 
the LMA in the event the cognizability of the LMA would result in 
violation of an ownership rule. We also tentatively concluded that 
television LMAs entered into on or after the adoption date of the 
2FNPRM, if they resulted in violation of any ownership rule, would not 
be grandfathered and would be accorded only a brief period within which 
to terminate. We also reserved the right to invalidate an otherwise 
grandfathered LMA in circumstances raising particular competition and 
diversity concerns, such as might occur in very small markets.
    77. After reviewing the comments received in response to the 2FNPRM 
in this proceeding and the FNPRM in our related attribution proceeding, 
the Commission concluded that the commenters had not provided 
sufficient information on a range of important factual issues related 
to television LMAs. To provide a more complete record, the Commission 
released a Public Notice on June 17, 1997 (62 FR 33792, June 23, 1997), 
requesting parties to any existing television LMA to provide certain 
information regarding the terms and characteristics of these agreements 
to help us determine, inter alia, the number of existing television 
LMAs, the date of origination and duration of these arrangements, and 
the efficiencies or public interest benefits that may have resulted 
from the LMA.
    78. Discussion. We adopt our proposal in the 2FNPRM to grandfather 
television LMAs entered into prior to November 5, 1996, the adoption 
date of that document, for purposes of compliance with our ownership 
rules. Television LMAs entered into on or after that date will have two 
years from the adoption date of this R&O to come into compliance with 
our rules or terminate. LMAs entered into before November 5, 1996 will 
be grandfathered until the conclusion of our 2004 biennial review, a 
period of approximately five years. As part of that review, the 
Commission will conduct a general review of the TV duopoly rule and a 
case-by-case review of grandfathered LMAs, and assess the 
appropriateness of extending the initial grandfathering period. Parties 
who wish the Commission to conduct this review prior to 2004 may apply 
for such relief, using the biennial review criteria, beginning one year 
after the date the R&O is published in the Federal Register. We now 
turn to a more detailed explanation of our decision on this issue.
    79. Section 202(g) of the 1996 Act. Some commenters argue that the 
1996 Act directs us to grandfather television LMAs permanently. Section 
202(g) of the 1996 Act addresses the construction of section 202 with 
respect to LMAs. Section 202(g) states that ``[n]othing in this section 
shall be construed to prohibit the origination, continuation, or 
renewal of any television local marketing agreement that is in 
compliance with the regulations of the Commission.'' (Emphasis added.) 
As we stated in the 2FNPRM, the plain language of this provision states 
that section 202 shall not be construed to prohibit any television LMA 
that is in compliance with the Commission's rules.
    80. We do not regard section 202(g) as limiting our ability to 
promulgate attribution rules under Title I and Title III of the 
Communications Act affecting the status of television LMAs. As a 
result, we do not see section 202(g) of the 1996 Act as posing a legal 
restraint in resolving questions raised in the FNPRM as to (1) whether 
television LMAs in which a broker obtains the ability to program 15% or 
more of a broadcast television station's weekly broadcast output should 
be deemed an attributable interest (which has been decided in our 
companion Attribution R&O); and (2) whether grandfathering existing 
television LMAs from any applicable ownership rules that would follow 
from that attribution decision is appropriate.
    81. We consequently believe that the 1996 Act left the Commission 
with the discretion to adopt a grandfathering policy with respect to 
television LMAs that appropriately addresses the equity, competition, 
and diversity issues these arrangements raise. Having said that, we 
fully recognize the need to avoid undue disruption of television LMAs 
that were entered into in good faith reliance on our previous rules at 
the time, and that these arrangements may in fact have resulted in 
significant public interest benefits. We now turn to striking the 
appropriate balance regarding these factors.
    82. Grandfathering Cut-Off Date. We will adopt our proposal in the 
2FNPRM to grandfather television LMAs entered into before the adoption 
date of that document, i.e., November 5, 1996. It was on this date that 
the Commission gave clear notice that it intended to attribute 
television LMAs in certain circumstances, and that LMAs entered into on 
or after that date that violated our local television ownership rule 
would not be grandfathered and would be accorded only a fixed period in 
which to terminate.
    83. Treatment of LMAs Entered Into on or After November 5, 1996. 
LMAs that are not eligible for grandfathering relief--i.e., those LMAs 
entered into on or after November 5, 1996, that are attributable under 
the new attribution criteria and that would violate the TV duopoly 
rule--will be given two years from the adoption date of this R&O to 
terminate. Even though the holders of such LMAs entered into after our 
grandfathering date could not have a legitimate expectation of being 
eligible for the grandfathering rights we adopt today, we believe that 
such a transition is appropriate to avoid undue disruption of existing 
arrangements and will allow the holders of LMAs to order their affairs. 
For example, the licensee

[[Page 50663]]

of a brokered station may need time to arrange for programming to 
replace that provided under the LMA; a two-year transition to do this 
will allow the licensee to avoid disruption of its service to the 
public. In addition, stations with non-grandfathered LMAs could, of 
course, apply for a TV duopoly under our new rule or waiver criteria, 
just as any other station owner in the market could. Applications based 
on a waiver may be based on circumstances as they existed at the time 
just prior to the parties entering into the LMA.
    84. Scope of Grandfathering Relief. We believe television LMAs 
entered into prior to the November 5, 1996 adoption date of the 2FNPRM 
should receive significant grandfathering relief. The parties to these 
LMAs entered into these arrangements when there was no Commission rule 
or policy prohibiting them. There consequently are strong equities 
against requiring them to divest their interests in these LMAs and 
upset the settled expectations established by these plans and 
investments. Doing so could impose an unfair hardship on these parties.
    85. In addition to these equities, the record shows that a number 
of television LMAs resulted in public interest benefits. ALTV submitted 
a study showing that LMAs helped some struggling stations complete 
construction of their facilities or upgrade them, allowed others to add 
a local newscast or other local programming to their schedule, and more 
generally permitted stations to take advantage of operating 
efficiencies to serve their viewers better. We do not wish to disrupt 
these public interest benefits.
    86. We consequently will grandfather television LMAs entered into 
prior to November 5, 1996, conditioned on the Commission's 2004 
biennial review. During this initial grandfathering period and during 
the pendency of the 2004 review, these LMAs may continue in full force 
and effect, and may also be transferred and renewed by the parties, 
though the renewing parties and/or transferees take the LMAs subject to 
the review of the status of the LMA as part of the 2004 biennial 
review. At that time, the Commission will reevaluate these 
grandfathered television LMAs, on a case-by-case basis, to examine the 
competition, diversity, equities, and public interest factors they 
raise and to determine whether these LMAs should continue to be 
grandfathered. In order to qualify for permanent grandfathering relief 
after 2004, parties to LMAs entered into before November 5, 1996 will 
be required to demonstrate that such relief is in the public interest 
based upon the biennial review factors described below.
    87. We believe that reevaluation of the LMAs is reasonable as the 
record shows that many parties entered into television LMAs, and made 
substantial investments in these arrangements, with the belief that 
they could be renewed or transferred. If any party to an LMA wishes the 
Commission to determine the status of its agreement prior to the 2004 
biennial review, it may request the Commission to do so at any time 
beginning one year after this R&O is published in the Federal Register, 
using the biennial review factors noted below, to demonstrate that 
continuation of the LMA is in the public interest. (In addition, at any 
time the parties to an LMA may seek, just as any other applicant, to 
form a duopoly or justify an LMA indefinitely under our new rule and 
waiver policies. A showing based on voice counts must meet our new rule 
at the time the showing is filed; a showing based on a waiver may be 
based on the circumstances existing just prior to the parties entering 
into the LMA.) Whether LMA holders obtain a duopoly outright or 
permanent grandfathering relief for arrangements that do not comply 
with our new TV duopoly rule and waiver policies, such relief will not 
be extended to any transfers subsequent to 2004; any transfer of 
permanently grandfathered arrangements after that time must meet our 
duopoly rule or waiver policies in effect at the time of transfer.
    88. As part of the 2004 biennial review, the Commission will 
examine the following factors to assist in its review of grandfathered 
television LMAs:
     Public Interest Factors--The FCC will assess the extent to 
which parties, by virtue of their joint operation, have achieved 
certain efficiencies allowing them, in turn, to produce specific and 
demonstrable benefits to the public. For example, the Commission may 
consider, among other things, the following: the extent to which 
broadcasters involved have fostered the regulatory goal of promoting 
localism, including locally-originated programming, such as news and 
public affairs programming; the extent to which the joint operations 
have made possible capital investments and technical improvements that 
have improved service; the extent to which the joint operations have 
increased the amount and investment in children's educational 
programming; and the extent to which the joint operations have 
otherwise produced specific and demonstrable benefits to the viewing 
public;
     DTV Conversion--The FCC will evaluate the extent to which 
the same-market joint operations are on or ahead of schedule to convert 
to DTV and digital service. We will examine the extent to which one 
station has enabled the other to convert to digital operations, and 
whether joint operation has expedited that conversion, as well as has 
produced more over-the-air programming using digital transmission.
     Marketplace Conditions--The FCC will evaluate the status 
of competition and diversity in the marketplace.
     Equities--In considering the appropriateness of 
grandfathering beyond the initial five year period, the FCC will take 
into account the capital investments the broadcasters involved have 
already made to improve the quality of the technical facilities of the 
stations involved, and weigh these equities against the competition and 
diversity issues involved.
    89. Filing Existing LMAs. Those parties with existing LMAs that are 
attributable under our new attribution rules are directed to file a 
copy of the LMA with the Commission within thirty days of the 
publication of this R&O in the Federal Register.

VI. New Applications

    90. Applications filed pursuant to this R&O will not be accepted by 
the Commission until the effective date of this R&O. We realize that 
the rules adopted in this R&O could result in two or more applications 
being filed on the same day relating to stations in the same market and 
that due to the voice count all applications might not be able to be 
granted. We will address how to resolve such conflicts in a subsequent 
action.

VII. Conclusion

    91. For the reasons discussed, we adopt this R&O revising our local 
television ownership rules. We intend by these revisions to improve the 
ability of television broadcasters to realize the efficiencies and cost 
savings of common station ownership, and to strengthen their potential 
to serve the public interest. We believe that our decision strikes the 
appropriate balance between common ownership and our fundamental 
competition and diversity concerns, and ensures that our television 
ownership restrictions appropriately reflect ongoing changes in the 
broadcast television industry.

VIII. Administrative Matters

    92. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis. This R&O has been 
analyzed with respect to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and found 
to impose new reporting requirements on

[[Page 50664]]

the public. Implementation of these new reporting requirements will be 
subject to approval by the Office of Management and Budget as 
prescribed in the Act. The new reporting requirements contained in this 
R&O have been submitted to OMB for emergency clearance.
    93. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. Pursuant to the Regulative 
Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., the 
Commission's Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis in this document.
    94. Ordering Clauses. Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to 
the authority contained in sections 4(i) & (j), 303(r), 308, 310 and 
403 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 154(i) & (j), 303(r), 
308, 310 and 403, as amended, 47 CFR Part 73 is amended as set forth in 
the Rule Changes.
    95. It is further ordered that, pursuant to the Contract with 
America Advancement Act of 1996, the amendment set forth in the Rule 
Changes shall be effective November 16, 1999.
    96. It is further ordered that the Commission's Office of Public 
Affairs, Reference Operations Division, shall send a copy of this R&O, 
including the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.
    97. It is further ordered that this proceeding is terminated.
    98. Additional Information. For addition information concerning 
this proceeding, please contact Eric Bash, Mass Media Bureau, (202) 
418-2130.

Final Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    99. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA''), 5 
U.S.C. 603, an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (``IRFA'') was 
incorporated in the 2FNPRM in this proceeding. The Commission sought 
written public comment on the proposals in this document, including 
comment on the IRFA. The comments received are discussed below. This 
present Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (``FRFA'') conforms to 
the RFA.

I. Need For, and Objectives of, Report and Order

    100. In February, 1996, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (``1996 
Act'') was signed into law. Section 202 of the 1996 Act directed the 
Commission to make a number of significant revisions to its broadcast 
media ownership rules. Section 202 also requires us to review aspects 
of our local ownership rules which were the subject of the TV Ownership 
FNPRM in this docket. Specifically, section 202 requires the Commission 
to: (1) conduct a rulemaking proceeding concerning the retention, 
modification, or elimination of the duopoly rule; and (2) extend the 
Top 25 market/30 independent voices one-to-a-market waiver policy to 
the Top 50 markets, ``consistent with the public interest, convenience, 
and necessity.'' In view of the 1996 Act's directives regarding 
broadcast multiple ownership, the Commission in 1996 adopted a 2FNPRM 
in this proceeding inviting comment on several issues prompted by the 
1996 Act. We seek to foster both competition and diversity in the 
changing video marketplace, and this R&O modifies the local ownership 
rules consistent with these goals.

II. Significant Issues Raised by the Public in Response to the Initial 
Analysis

    101. Media Access Project, et al. (``MAP et al.'') submitted the 
only set of comments that was filed directly in response to the IRFA 
contained in the 2FNPRM.

III. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which 
the Rules Will Apply

    102. The amended rules will affect commercial television and radio 
broadcast licensees, permittees, and potential licensees. MAP asserts 
that the estimate contained in the IRFA of the number of broadcast 
radio and television licensees that qualify as ``small entities'' is 
flawed.
1. Definition of a ``Small Business''
    103. Under the RFA, small entities may include small organizations, 
small businesses, and small governmental jurisdictions. 5 U.S.C. 
601(6). The RFA, 5 U.S.C. 601(3) defines the term ``small business'' as 
having the same meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under 
the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632. A small business concern is one 
which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in 
its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria 
established by the Small Business Administration (``SBA'').
    104. The Small Business Administration defines a television 
broadcasting station that has no more than $10.5 million in annual 
receipts as a small business, (13 CFR 121.201, Standard Industrial Code 
(SIC) 4833 (1996). Television broadcasting stations consist of 
establishments primarily engaged in broadcasting visual programs by 
television to the public, except cable and other pay television 
services. Included in this industry are commercial, religious, 
educational, and other television stations. Also included are 
establishments primarily engaged in television broadcasting and which 
produce taped television program materials. Separate establishments 
primarily engaged in producing taped television program materials are 
classified under another SIC number.
    105. The SBA defines a radio broadcasting station that has no more 
than $5 million in annual receipts as a small business. A radio 
broadcasting station is an establishment primarily engaged in 
broadcasting aural programs by radio to the public. Included in this 
industry are commercial religious, educational, and other radio 
stations. Radio broadcasting stations which primarily are engaged in 
radio broadcasting and which produce ratio program materials are 
similarly included. However, radio stations which are separate 
establishments and are primarily engaged in producing radio program 
material are classified under another SIC number.
    106. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 601(3), the statutory definition of a 
small business applies ``unless an agency after consultation with the 
Office of Advocacy of the SBA and after opportunity for public comment, 
establishes one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate 
to the activities of the agency and publishes such definition(s) in the 
Federal Register.''
2. Issues in Applying the Definition of a ``Small Business''
    107. As discussed below, we could not precisely apply the foregoing 
definition of ``small business'' in developing our estimates of the 
number of small entities to which the rules will apply. Our estimates 
reflect our best judgments based on the data available to us.
    108. An element of the definition of ``small business'' is that the 
entity not be dominant in its field of operation. We are unable at this 
time to define or quantify the criteria that would establish whether a 
specific radio or television station is dominant in its field of 
operation. Accordingly, the estimates that follow of small businesses 
to which the new rules will apply do not exclude any radio or 
television station from the definition of a small business on this 
basis and are therefore overinclusive to that extent. An additional 
element of the definition of ``small business'' is that the entity must 
be independently owned and operated. As discussed further below, we 
could not fully apply this criterion, and our estimates of small 
businesses to which the rules may apply

[[Page 50665]]

may be overinclusive to this extent. The SBA's general size standards 
are developed taking into account these two statutory criteria. This 
does not preclude us from taking these factors into account in making 
our estimates of the numbers of small entities.
    109. With respect to applying the revenue cap, the SBA has defined 
``annual receipts'' specifically in 13 CFR 121.104, and its 
calculations include an averaging process. We do not currently require 
submission of financial data from licensees that we could use in 
applying the SBA's definition of a small business. Thus, for purposes 
of estimating the number of small entities to which the rules apply, we 
are limited to considering the revenue data that are publicly 
available, and the revenue data on which we rely may not correspond 
completely with the SBA definition of annual receipts.
    110. Under SBA criteria for determining annual receipts, if a 
concern has acquired an affiliate or been acquired as an affiliate 
during the applicable averaging period for determining annual receipts, 
the annual receipts in determining size status include the receipts of 
both firms. 13 CFR 121.104(d)(1). The SBA defines affiliation in 13 CFR 
121.103. In this context, the SBA's definition of affiliate is 
analogous to our attribution rules. Generally, under the SBA's 
definition, concerns are affiliates of each other when one concern 
controls or has the power to control the other, or a third party or 
parties controls or has the power to control both. 13 CFR 
121.103(a)(1). The SBA considers factors such as ownership, management, 
previous relationships with or ties to another concern, and contractual 
relationships, in determining whether affiliation exists. 13 CFR 
121.103(a)(2). Instead of making an independent determination of 
whether television stations were affiliated based on SBA's definitions, 
we relied on the databases available to us to provide us with that 
information.
3. Estimates Based on Census Data
    111. The rules adopted in this R&O will apply to full service 
television and radio stations.
    112. There were 1,509 television stations operating in the nation 
in 1992. That number has remained fairly constant as indicated by the 
approximately 1,594 operating television broadcasting stations in the 
nation as of June 1999. For 1992 the number of television stations that 
produced less than $10.0 million in revenue was 1,155 establishments. 
Thus, the new rules will affect approximately 1,594 television 
stations; approximately 77%, or 1,227 of those stations are considered 
small businesses. These estimates may overstate the number of small 
entities since the revenue figures on which they are based do not 
include or aggregate revenues from non-television affiliated companies.
    113. The new rule will also affect radio stations. The 1992 Census 
indicates that 96 percent (5,861 of 6,127) of radio station 
establishments produced less than $5 million in revenue in 1992. 
Official Commission records indicate that 11,334 individual radio 
stations were operating in 1992. As of June 1999, official Commission 
records indicate that 12,560 radio stations are currently operating.

IV. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 
Compliance Requirements

    114. The R&O imposes compliance requirements. Pursuant to the R&O, 
applicants will be required to file with the Commission upon the 
effective date of the rules showings to convert conditional waivers to 
permanent license grants under the new rules or waiver standards. In 
addition, licensees with existing local marketing agreements (LMAs) 
that are attributable under the revised rules will be required to file 
a copy of the LMA with the Commission within thirty days of publication 
of the R&O in the Federal Register.

V. Steps Taken To Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities and Significant Alternatives Considered

    115. We believe that our revised TV duopoly rule, radio/TV cross-
ownership rule, and related waiver policies strike the appropriate 
balance between allowing broadcast stations to realize the efficiencies 
of combined operations, and furthering our policy goals of competition 
and diversity. Both of our revised rules and their associated waiver 
policies allow small stations to reduce expenses through shared 
operations, but at the same time protect them from acquisition that 
could eliminate their voice, and from the exercise of undue market 
power.
    116. In addition to having amended the geographic scope of our TV 
duopoly rule, we have also modified the rule to permit common ownership 
of two stations in the same DMA if at least eight independently owned 
and operated full power TV stations (commercial and noncommercial) will 
remain post-merger, and both of the stations are not in the top four-
ranked stations in the DMA. The new rule ensures that small stations 
may combine operations, reduce expenses, and perhaps diversify 
programming. At the same time, both the market rank and the voice count 
components of the rule further our competition goal and protect small 
stations from their competitors. The market rank test ensures that the 
two largest stations cannot combine to dominate and exercise market 
power in the advertising and programming markets in which TV stations 
compete; the voice count test ensures that more than eight competitors 
must exist in the market before any two of them may combine to increase 
their market share. Both components of the new rule also further our 
diversity goal and preserve small stations in markets with less than 
eight voices.
    117. We have revised our radio/TV cross-ownership rule to permit 
common ownership of one or two TV stations and up to six radio stations 
if twenty independent voices will remain post-merger; one or two TV 
stations and up to four radio stations if at least ten voices will 
remain post-merger; and one or two TV stations and one radio station 
regardless of the number of voices that will remain post-merger. As 
with our amended TV duopoly rule, the modified radio/TV cross-ownership 
rule will allow stations, including small stations, to realize 
economies of scale, but at the same time ensure that no market will 
become concentrated to such an extent that any one or series of 
combinations will dominate the markets in which broadcasters compete, 
or monopolize the media and sources of information for their audiences.
    118. Our TV duopoly waiver policies, based on a showing of a 
``failed'' station, a ``failing'' station, and the construction of an 
authorized but as yet unbuilt station, and our radio/TV cross-ownership 
waiver policies, based on a showing of a ``failed'' station, likewise 
accommodate small stations, while protecting our competition and 
diversity goals. Each of these waiver policies was designed to ensure 
that only truly financially distressed, which are typically smaller, 
stations, can benefit from them. The waiver policies also ensure that 
more financially successful in-market stations, which are typically 
larger and likely would value same-market broadcast assets more highly 
than out-of-market stations, cannot foreclose out-of-market buyers. The 
in-market buyer must demonstrate that it is the only purchaser ready, 
willing, and able to operate the station, and that sale to an out-of-
market buyer would result in an artificially depressed price.
    119. We also believe that our grandfathering policies for 
conditional

[[Page 50666]]

radio/TV cross-ownership waivers, and TV LMAs, may help small stations. 
For example, the record suggested that TV LMAs may have helped smaller, 
struggling stations to remain on or return to the air, and to diversity 
and expand their programming. The R&O grandfathers all LMAs entered 
into prior to November 5, 1996, and therefore permits them to remain in 
full force and effect, subject to further review in the Commission's 
biennial review in 2004.
    120. For the above reasons, we believe that the Commission has 
taken steps not only to reduce the economic impact on small entities, 
but also to assist them realize the benefits of common operations, and 
to protect them from undue market power.

VI. Report to Congress

    121. The Commission will send a copy of this R&O, including this 
FRFA, in a report to be sent to Congress pursuant to the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A). 
In addition, the Commission will send a copy of this R&O, including 
FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration. A copy of this R&O and FRFA (or summaries thereof) will 
also be published in the Federal Register. See 5 U.S.C. 604(b).

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 73

    Television broadcasting.

Federal Communications Commission.
Magalie Roman Salas,
Secretary.

Rule Changes

    For the reason discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communication 
Commission amends 47 CFR part 73 as follows:

PART 73--RADIO BROADCAST SERVICES

    1. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 303, 334 and 336.

    2. Section 73.3555 is amended by revising paragraphs (b) and (c) 
and Note 7 to read as follows:


Sec. 73.3555  Multiple ownership.

* * * * *
    (b) Local television multiple ownership rule. An entity may 
directly or indirectly own, operate, or control two television stations 
licensed in the same Designated Market Area (DMA) (as determined by 
Nielsen Media Research or any successor entity) only under one or more 
of the following conditions:
    (1) The Grade B contours of the stations (as determined by 
Sec. 73.684 of this part) do not overlap; or
    (2)(i) At the time the application to acquire or construct the 
station(s) is filed, at least one of the stations is not ranked among 
the top four stations in the DMA, based on the most recent all-day 
(9:00 a.m.-midnight) audience share, as measured by Nielsen Media 
Research or by any comparable professional, accepted audience ratings 
service; and
    (ii) At least 8 independently owned and operating full-power 
commercial and noncommercial TV stations would remain post-merger in 
the DMA in which the communities of license of the TV stations in 
question are located. In areas where there is no Nielsen DMA, count the 
TV stations present in an area that would be the functional equivalent 
of a TV market.
    (c) Radio-television cross ownership rule. (1) This rule is 
triggered when:
    (i) The predicted or measured 1 mV/m contour of an existing or 
proposed FM station (computed in accordance with Sec. 73.313 of this 
part) encompasses the entire community of license of an existing or 
proposed commonly owned TV broadcast station(s), or the Grade A 
contour(s) of the TV broadcast station(s) (computed in accordance with 
Sec. 73.684) encompasses the entire community of license of the FM 
station; or
    (ii) The predicted or measured 2 mV/m groundwave contour of an 
existing or proposed AM station (computed in accordance with 
Sec. 73.183 or Sec. 73.386), encompasses the entire community of 
license of an existing or proposed commonly owned TV broadcast 
station(s), or the Grade A contour(s) of the TV broadcast station(s) 
(computed in accordance with Sec. 73.684) encompass(es) the entire 
community of license of the AM station.
    (2) An entity may directly or indirectly own, operate, or control 
up to two commercial TV stations (if permitted by paragraph (b) of this 
section, the local television multiple ownership rule) and 1 commercial 
radio station situated as described above in paragraph (1) of this 
section. An entity may not exceed these numbers, except as follows:
    (i) If at least 20 independently owned media voices would remain in 
the market post-merger, an entity can directly or indirectly own, 
operate, or control up to:
    (A) Two commercial TV and six commercial radio stations (to the 
extent permitted by paragraph (a) of this section, the local radio 
multiple ownership rule); or
    (B) One commercial TV and seven commercial radio stations (to the 
extent that an entity would be permitted to own two commercial TV and 
six commercial radio stations under paragraph (c)(2)(i)(A) of this 
section, and to the extent permitted by paragraph (a) of this section, 
the local radio multiple ownership rule).
    (ii) If at least 10 independently owned media voices would remain 
in the market post-merger, an entity can directly or indirectly own, 
operate, or control up to two commercial TV and four commercial radio 
stations (to the extent permitted by paragraph (a) of this section, the 
local radio multiple ownership rule).
    (3) To determine how many media voices would remain in the market, 
count the following:
    (i) TV stations: independently owned full power operating broadcast 
TV stations within the DMA of the TV station's (or stations') community 
(or communities) of license;
    (ii) Radio stations:
    (A) (1) Independently owned operating primary broadcast radio 
stations that are in the radio metro market (as defined by Arbitron or 
another nationally recognized audience rating service) of:
    (i) The TV station's (or stations') community (or communities) of 
license; or
    (ii) The radio station's (or stations') community (or communities) 
of license; and
    (2) Independently owned out-of-market broadcast radio stations with 
a minimum share as reported by Arbitron or another nationally 
recognized audience rating service.
    (B) When a proposed combination involves stations in different 
radio markets, the voice requirement must be met in each market; the 
radio stations of different radio metro markets may not be counted 
together.
    (C) In areas where there is no radio metro market, count the radio 
stations present in an area that would be the functional equivalent of 
a radio market.
    (iii) Newspapers: English-language newspapers that are published at 
least four days a week within the TV station's DMA and that have a 
circulation exceeding 5% of the households in the DMA; and
    (iv) One cable system: if cable television is generally available 
to households in the DMA. Cable television counts as only one voice in 
the DMA, regardless of how many individual cable systems operate in the 
DMA.
* * * * *

[[Page 50667]]

    Note 7: The Commission will entertain applications to waive the 
restrictions in paragraph (b) and (c) of this section (the TV 
duopoly and TV-radio cross-ownership rules) on a case-by-case basis. 
In each case, we will require a showing that the in-market buyer is 
the only entity ready, willing, and able to operate the station, 
that sale to an out-of-market applicant would result in an 
artificially depressed price, and that the waiver applicant does not 
already directly or indirectly own, operate, or control interest in 
two television stations within the relevant DMA. One way to satisfy 
these criteria would be to provide an affidavit from an independent 
broker affirming that active and serious efforts have been made to 
sell the permit, and that no reasonable offer from an entity outside 
the market has been received. We will entertain waiver requests as 
follows:
    (1) If one of the broadcast stations involved is a ``failed'' 
station that has not been in operation due to financial distress for 
at least four consecutive months immediately prior to the 
application, or is a debtor in an involuntary bankruptcy or 
insolvency proceeding at the time of the application.
    (2) For paragraph (b) of this section only, if one of the 
television stations involved is a ``failing'' station that has an 
all-day audience share of no more than four per cent; the station 
has had negative cash flow for three consecutive years immediately 
prior to the application; and consolidation of the two stations 
would result in tangible and verifiable public interest benefits 
that outweigh any harm to competition and diversity.
    (3) For paragraph (b) of this section only, if the combination 
will result in the construction of an unbuilt station. The permittee 
of the unbuilt station must demonstrate that it has made reasonable 
efforts to construct but has been unable to do so.
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 99-23696 Filed 9-16-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P