[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 173 (Wednesday, September 8, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48856-48857]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-23297]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304]


Commonwealth Edison Company; (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 
and 2); Exemption

I.

    Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd or the licensee) is the holder 
of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-39 and DPR-48, which authorize 
the licensee to possess the Zion Nuclear Power Station (ZNPS). The 
license states, among other things, that the facility is subject to all 
the rules, regulations, and orders of the US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (the Commission or NRC) now or hereafter in effect. The 
facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors located at the 
ComEd site on the west shore of Lake Michigan about 40 miles north of 
Chicago, Illinois, in the extreme eastern portion of the city of Zion, 
Illinois (Lake County). The facility is permanently shut down and 
defueled, and the licensee is no longer authorized to operate or place 
fuel in the reactor.

II.

    Section 50.12(a) of 10 CFR, ``Specific exemption,'' states that.* * 
*

The Commission may, upon application by any interested person, or upon 
its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of the 
regulations of this part, which are: (1) Authorized by law, will not 
present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and are 
consistent with the common defense and security. (2) The Commission 
will not consider granting an exemption unless special circumstances 
are present.

    Section 50.12(a)(2)(ii) of 10 CFR states that special circumstances 
are present when ``Application of the regulation in the particular 
circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is 
not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.* * *'' The 
underlying purpose of sections 50.47(b) and 50.47(c)(2) is to ensure 
that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures 
can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, to 
establish plume exposure and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones 
for nuclear power plants, and to ensure that licensees maintain 
effective offsite and onsite emergency plans.
    By letter dated April 13, 1999, ComEd requested an exemption from 
certain provisions of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) on the 
basis that the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the ZNPS 
had substantially reduced the risk to public health and safety. In 
addition, the licensee submitted a proposed Defueled Station Emergency 
Plan (DSEP) for NRC's approval. The DSEP proposed to discontinue 
offsite emergency planning activities and to reduce the scope of onsite 
emergency planning. Thus, exemptions from certain provisions of 10 CFR 
50.47(b) and 50.47(c)(2) are required to implement the proposed DSEP to 
maintain compliance with the regulation.
    By letter dated April 13, 1999, and supplemental letters dated July 
8, July 19, and August 30, 1999, the licensee also submitted an 
analysis of the radiological consequences of a postulated event, an 
analysis to determine the maximum Zircaloy cladding temperature in the 
spent fuel pool (SFP) with the fuel exposed to an air environment, and 
an analysis to determine the potential upper limit radiation fields at 
the exclusion area boundary.

III.

    The licensee stated that special circumstances exist at ZNPS 
because of the station's permanently shutdown and defueled condition. 
The standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in 10 CFR 
50.47(c)(2) were developed taking into consideration the risks 
associated with operation of a nuclear power reactor at its licensed 
full-power level. The risks include the potential for an accident with 
offsite radiological dose consequences. There are no design basis 
accidents or other credible events for ZNPS that would result in a 
radiological dose beyond the exclusion area boundary that would exceed 
the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Protective Action 
Guidelines (PAGs). Therefore, the application of all of the standards 
in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) are not 
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of those rules.
    The licensee analyzed the heatup characteristics of the spent fuel 
from a beyond design basis event that results in the complete loss of 
spent fuel pool (SFP) water, when cooling depends on the natural 
circulation of air through the spent fuel racks. The licensee presented

[[Page 48857]]

the results of an analysis showing that as of June 30, 1999, decay heat 
could not heat the spent fuel cladding above 482  deg.C in the event 
all water was drained from the SFP. The staff reviewed the licensee's 
analysis and found the licensee's value for peak fuel cladding 
temperature acceptable. On the basis of a staff determination that fuel 
cladding will remain intact at this temperature, the staff concluded 
that a complete loss of water from the ZNPS SFP would not result in a 
release off site that exceeds the early-phase EPA PAGs.
    Although a significant release of radioactive material from the 
spent fuel is no longer possible in the absence of water cooling, a 
potential exists for radiation exposure to an offsite individual in the 
event that shielding of the fuel is lost (a beyond-design-basis event). 
Water and the concrete pool structure serve as radiation shielding on 
the sides of the pool. However, water alone provides most of the 
shielding above the spent fuel. A loss of shielding above the fuel 
could increase the radiation levels off site because of the gamma rays 
streaming up out of the pool being scattered back to a receptor at the 
site boundary. The licensee calculated the offsite radiological impact 
of a postulated complete loss of SFP water and determined that the 
gamma radiation dose rate at the exclusion area boundary would be 
0.00294 rad per hour at an outside air temperature of 21  deg.C. At 
this rate, it would take 14 days for the event to exceed the EPA early-
phase PAG of 1 rem. The EPA early-phase PAG is defined as the period 
beginning at the projected or actual initiation of a release and 
extending a few days later. The PAGs were developed to respond to a 
mobile airborne plume that could transport and deposit radioactive 
material over a large area. In contrast, the radiation field formed by 
scatter from a drained SFP would be stationary rather than moving and 
would not cause transport or deposition of radioactive materials. The 
14 days available for action allow sufficient time to develop and 
implement mitigative actions and provide confidence that additional 
offsite measures could be taken without planning if efforts to 
reestablish shielding over the fuel are delayed.
    The standards and requirements that remain in effect are listed in 
Attachment 1 to the licensee's letter of April 13, 1999, and Attachment 
2 to the licensee's letter of July 8, 1999. On the basis of this 
review, the staff finds that the radiological consequences of accidents 
possible at ZNPS are substantially lower than those at an operating 
plant. The upper bound of offsite dose consequences limits the highest 
attainable emergency class to the alert level. In addition, because of 
the reduced consequences of radiological events still possible at the 
site, the scope of the onsite emergency preparedness organization may 
be reduced. Thus, the underlying purpose of the regulations will not be 
adversely affected by eliminating offsite emergency planning activities 
or reducing the scope of onsite emergency planning. Accordingly, the 
Commission has determined that special circumstances as defined in 10 
CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.

IV.

    The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the 
exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the 
public health and safety and is consistent with the common defense and 
security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the 
Commission hereby grants Commonwealth Edison Company an exemption from 
certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2).
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that 
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the 
environment (64 FR 45981).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of August 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John A. Zwolinski,
Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-23297 Filed 9-7-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P