[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 172 (Tuesday, September 7, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48675-48678]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-23158]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-423]


Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), et al., Millstone 
Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3; Environmental Assessment and Finding 
of No Significant Impact

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-49, issued to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the 
licensee), for operation of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 
No. 3 (MP3) located in New London County, Connecticut.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

    The proposed action is in response to the licensee's application 
dated March 19, 1999, requesting an amendment to the operating license 
for MP3 to support the rerack of its spent fuel pool to maintain the 
capability to fully offload the core from the reactor as the unit 
approaches the end of its operating license. To achieve this goal, the 
licensee plans to install two types of additional higher density spent 
fuel racks into the spent fuel pool. Existing spent fuel racks will 
remain in the pool in their current configuration, but are reanalyzed 
to only accept fuel lower in reactivity than they are presently 
licensed to accept. The proposed additional racks will have a closer 
assembly to assembly spacing to increase fuel storage capacity. The 
number of fuel assemblies that can be stored in the spent fuel pool 
would be increased from 756 assemblies to 1,860 assemblies (an increase 
of 1,104).

The Need for the Proposed Action

    An increase in spent fuel storage capacity is needed to maintain 
the capability for a full core off-load. Loss of full core off-load 
capability will occur as a result of refueling outage 6 (RFO 6), that 
started on May 1, 1999. The licensee plans to install an additional 15 
high density storage racks (with the capacity to store 1,104 fuel 
assemblies) following RFO 6 (14 will be installed between RFO 6 and RFO 
7, with the last one to be installed later if it is necessary), while 
keeping the existing racks in place. The additional capacity will 
ensure the capability for a full core off-load as the unit approaches 
the end of its operating license (November 25, 2025).

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

Radioactive Waste Treatment
    MP3 uses waste treatment systems designed to collect and process 
gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that might contain radioactive 
material. These radioactive waste treatment systems were evaluated in 
the Final Environmental Statement (FES) dated December 1984. The 
proposed spent fuel pool expansion will not involve any change in the 
radioactive waste treatment systems described in the FES.

[[Page 48676]]

Gaseous Radioactive Wastes
    Gaseous releases from the fuel storage area are combined with other 
plant exhausts. Normally, the contribution from the fuel storage area 
is negligible compared to the other releases and no significant 
increases are expected as a result of the expanded storage capacity.
Solid Radioactive Wastes
    No significant increase in the volume of solid radioactive waste is 
expected from operating with the expanded storage capacity. The 
necessity for pool filtration resin replacement is determined primarily 
by the requirements for water clarity, and the resin is normally 
changed about once a year. During reracking operations, a small amount 
of additional resins may be generated by the pool cleanup system on a 
one-time basis.
Personnel Doses
    During normal operations, personnel working in the fuel storage 
area are exposed to radiation from the spent fuel pool. Radiological 
conditions are dominated by the most recent batch of discharged spent 
fuel. The radioactive inventory of the older fuel is insignificant 
compared to that from the recent offload. Analysis shows that the 
rerack will not significantly change radiological conditions. 
Therefore, the rack expansion project falls within the existing design 
basis of MP3's Spent Fuel Pool.
    All of the operations involved in reracking will utilize detailed 
procedures prepared with full consideration of ALARA [as low as is 
reasonably achievable] principles. Similar operations have been 
performed in a number of facilities in the past, and there is every 
reason to believe that reracking can be safely and efficiently 
accomplished at MP3, with low radiation exposure to personnel. Total 
dose for the reracking operation is estimated to be between 2 and 5 
person-rem. While individual task efforts and doses may differ from 
those estimated, the total is believed to be a reasonable estimate for 
planning purposes. Divers will be used where necessary, and the 
estimated person-rem burden includes an estimate for their possible 
dose. The existing radiation protection program at MP3 is adequate for 
the reracking operations. Where there is a potential for significant 
airborne activity, continuous air monitors will be in operation. 
Personnel will wear protective clothing as required and, if necessary, 
respiratory protective equipment. Activities will be governed by a 
Radiation Work Permit, and personnel monitoring equipment will be 
issued to each individual. As a minimum, this will include 
thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and self-reading dosimeters. 
Additional personnel monitoring equipment (i.e., extremity TLDs or 
multiple TLDs) may be utilized as required. Work, personnel traffic, 
and the movement of equipment will be monitored and controlled to 
minimize contamination and to assure that dose is maintained ALARA.
    On the basis of its review of the licensee's proposal, the NRC 
staff concludes that the MP3 spent fuel pool reracking operation can be 
performed in a manner that will ensure that doses to workers will be 
maintained ALARA. The estimated dose of 2 to 5 person-rem to perform 
the proposed spent fuel pool reracking operation is a small fraction of 
the annual collective dose accrued at MP3.
Accident Considerations
    The licensee has evaluated the consequences of an accidental drop 
of a fuel assembly in the spent fuel pool and the consequences of an 
accidental drop of a fuel pool gate onto racks. The results show that 
such accidents will not distort the racks sufficiently to impair their 
functionality. The analysis indicates no radiological consequences from 
these postulated accidents. The consequences of a design basis seismic 
event have been evaluated and found acceptable. The proposed additional 
racks and existing racks have been analyzed in their new configuration 
and found safe and impact-free during seismic motion, save for the 
baseplate-to-baseplate impacts of the proposed additional racks that 
are shown to cause no damage to the racks' cells or Boral (used for 
criticality control). The structural capability of the pool walls and 
basemat will not be exceeded under the loads. Thus, the consequences of 
a seismic event are not significantly increased. The criticality 
consequences of a misloading/drop of a fuel assembly during fuel 
movement have been evaluated. The minimum subcriticality margin, 
keff less than or equal to 0.95, will continue to be 
maintained because of the proposed pool water soluble boron related 
requirements. The consequences of an accidental drop of a rack module 
into the pool during placement have been evaluated. The analysis 
confirmed that very limited damage to the liner could occur. Expected 
damage from this accident is repairable. Any small seepage occurring is 
well within makeup capability, and is mitigated by emergency operating 
procedures. The consequences of a spent fuel cask drop into the pool 
have not been considered in this submittal since the licensee is not 
currently licensed to move a fuel cask into the MP3 cask pit area.
    Radiological concerns due to fuel damage are not an issue, since 
the fuel handling design basis accident considers the worst case 
condition of a falling assembly (a fuel assembly falling onto another 
fuel assembly). This design basis accident remains unchanged. Fuel 
assembly damage subsequent to a fuel assembly drop is primarily 
influenced by the weight and design of the fuel assembly, the drop 
height (determines the kinetic energy upon impact), and the orientation 
of the falling assembly. Since none of these parameters are changed 
under the proposed modification, the results of the previously analyzed 
and NRC-accepted design basis accident bound the radiological 
consequences of accidents analyzed for the spent fuel pool rerack.
    In summary, the proposed action will not increase the probability 
or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made to radioactive 
waste treatment systems or in the types of any radioactive effluents 
that may be released offsite, and the proposed action will not result 
in a significant increase in occupational or offsite radiation 
exposure. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no 
significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the 
proposed action.
    With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed 
action does not involve any historic sites. The proposed action does 
not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other 
nonradiological environmental impacts. Therefore, there are no 
significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the 
proposed action.
    Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with this action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Shipping Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility
    Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility 
is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity. 
However, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) high-level radioactive 
waste repository is not expected to begin receiving spent fuel until 
approximately 2010, at the earliest. In October 1996, the 
Administration did commit DOE to begin storing waste at a centralized 
location by January 31, 1998. However, no location has been identified 
and an interim federal storage

[[Page 48677]]

facility has yet to be identified in advance of a decision on a 
permanent repository. Therefore, shipping spent fuel to the DOE 
repository is not considered an alternative to increased onsite spent 
fuel storage capacity at this time.
Shipping Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility
    Reprocessing of spent fuel from the MP3 is not a viable alternative 
since there are no operating commercial reprocessing facilities in the 
United States. Therefore, spent fuel would have to be shipped to an 
overseas facility for reprocessing. However, this approach has never 
been used and it would require approval by the Department of State as 
well as other entities. Additionally, the cost of spent fuel 
reprocessing is not offset by the salvage value of the residual 
uranium; reprocessing represents an added cost.
Shipping Fuel to Another Utility, Site, or the Millstone Units 1 or 2 
Spent Fuel Pool for Storage
    The shipment of fuel to another utility or transferring MP3 spent 
fuel to the Millstone Units 1 or 2 spent fuel pool for storage could 
provide short-term relief from the storage problem at MP3. The Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act of 1982 and 10 CFR part 53, however, clearly place the 
responsibility for the interim storage of spent fuel with each owner or 
operator of a nuclear plant. The Millstone Units 1 and 2 spent fuel 
pools have been designed with the capacity to accommodate each of those 
units and, therefore, transferring spent fuel from MP3 to either of 
these pools would create fuel storage capacity problems with those 
units. The shipment of fuel to another site or transferring it to 
Millstone Units 1 or 2 is not an acceptable alternative because of 
increased fuel handling risks and additional occupational radiation 
exposure, as well as the fact that no additional storage capacity would 
be created.
Alternative Creation of Additional Storage Capacity
    Alternative technologies that would create additional storage 
capacity include rod consolidation, dry cask storage, modular vault dry 
storage, and constructing a new pool. Rod consolidation involves 
disassembling the spent fuel assemblies and storing the fuel rods from 
two or more assemblies in a stainless steel canister that can be stored 
in the spent fuel racks. Industry experience with rod consolidation is 
currently limited, primarily due to concerns for potential gap activity 
release due to rod breakage, the potential for increased fuel cladding 
corrosion due to some of the protective oxide layer being scraped off, 
and because the prolonged consolidation activity could interfere with 
ongoing plant operations. Dry cask storage is a method of transferring 
spent fuel, after storage in the pool for several years, to high 
capacity casks with passive heat dissipation features. After loading, 
the casks are stored outdoors on a seismically qualified concrete pad. 
Concerns for dry cask storage include the potential for fuel or cask 
handling accidents, potential fuel clad rupture due to high 
temperatures, the need for special security provisions, and high costs. 
Vault storage consists of storing spent fuel in shielded stainless 
steel cylinders in a horizontal configuration in a reinforced concrete 
vault. The concrete vault provides missile and earthquake protection 
and radiation shielding. Due to large space requirements, a vault 
secured area for MP3 would likely have to be located outside the 
secured perimeter of the plant site. Concerns for vault dry storage 
include security, land consumption, eventual decommissioning of the new 
vault, the potential for fuel or clad rupture due to high temperatures, 
and high cost. The alternative of constructing and licensing a new fuel 
pool is not practical for MP3 because such an effort would require many 
years (i.e., 10 years) to complete and would be the most expensive 
alternative.
    The alternative technologies that could create additional storage 
capacity involve additional fuel handling with attendant opportunity 
for a fuel handling accident, involve higher cumulative dose to workers 
effecting the fuel transfers, require additional security measures, are 
significantly more expensive, and would not result in a significant 
improvement in environmental impacts compared to the proposed reracking 
modifications.
Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation
    Generally, improved usage of the fuel and/or operation at a reduced 
power level would be an alternative that would decrease the amount of 
fuel being stored in the pool and thus increase the amount of time 
before full core off-load capacity is lost. With extended burnup of 
fuel assemblies, the fuel cycle would be extended and fewer offloads 
would be necessary. This is not an alternative for resolving the loss 
of full-core offload capability that occurred as a result of MP3 
refueling outage that began on May 1, 1999, because the spent fuel 
transferred to the pool for storage during this outage eliminated the 
licensee's ability to conduct a full core offload. Operating the plant 
at a reduced power level would not make effective use of available 
resources, and would cause unnecessary economic hardship on the 
licensee and its customers. Therefore, reducing the amount of spent 
fuel generated by increasing burnup further or reducing power is not 
considered a practical alternative.
The No-Action Alternative
    As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered 
denial of the proposed action. Denial of the exemption would result in 
no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts 
of the proposed exemption and this alternative are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

    This action does not involve the use of any resources not 
previously considered in the ``Final Environmental Statement Related to 
the Operation of Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3,'' dated 
December 1984 (NUREG-1064).

Agencies and Persons Contacted

    In accordance with its stated policy, on June 21, 1999, the staff 
consulted with the Connecticut State official, Mr. Gary McCahill of the 
Department of Environmental Protection, regarding the environmental 
impact of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

    On the basis of the environmental assessment, the Commission 
concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission 
has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the 
proposed action.

    For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
licensee's letter dated March 19, 1999, which is available for public 
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document rooms located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers 
Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, 
Connecticut, and the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope 
Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.


[[Page 48678]]


    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of August, 1999.
James W. Clifford,
Chief, Section 2, Project Directorate I, Division of Licensing Project 
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-23158 Filed 9-3-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P