[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 171 (Friday, September 3, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48362-48367]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-23039]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
[A-122-085]
Final Results of Full Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups From Canada
AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of Final Results of Full Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups
from Canada.
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SUMMARY: On April 26, 1999, the Department of Commerce (``the
Department'') published a notice of preliminary results of the full
sunset review of the antidumping duty order on sugar and syrups from
Canada (64 FR 20253) pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended (``the Act''). We provided interested parties an
opportunity to comment on our preliminary results. We received comments
from both domestic and respondent interested parties. As a result of
this review, the Department finds that revocation of this order would
be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at the
levels indicated in the Final Results of Review section of this notice.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott E. Smith or Melissa G. Skinner,
Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone: (202) 482-
6397 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.
EFFECTIVE DATE: September 3, 1999.
Statute and Regulations
This review was conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of
the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews
are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'')
Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516
(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations''). Guidance on methodological
or analytical issues relevant to the Department's conduct of sunset
reviews is set forth in the Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies
Regarding the Conduct of Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16,
1998) (``Sunset Policy Bulletin'').
Scope
The merchandise subject to the antidumping duty order is sugar and
syrups from Canada produced from sugar cane and sugar beets. The sugar
is refined into granulated or powdered sugar, icing, or liquid
sugar.1 The subject merchandise is currently classified
under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (``HTSUS'') item
numbers 1701.99.0500, 1701.99.1000, 1701.99.5000, 1702.90.1000, and
1702.90.2000. Although the subheadings are provided for convenience and
customs purposes, the written description remains dispositive.
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\1\ This order excludes icing sugar decorations as determined in
the U.S. Customs Classification of January 31, 1983 (CLA-2
CO:R:CV:G).
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On March 24, 1987, the Department revoked the order, in part, with
respect to Redpath Sugar Ltd. (``Redpath'') (52 FR 9322). On January 7,
1988, the Department revoked the order, in part, with respect to Lantic
Sugar, Ltd. (``Lantic'') (53 FR 434). In 1996, the Department
determined that Rogers Sugar, Ltd. (``Rogers''), was the successor in
interest to British Columbia Sugar Refining Company, Ltd. (``BC
[[Page 48363]]
Sugar'').2 In its November 2, 1998, substantive response,
the United States Beet Sugar Association and its individual members
(collectively, the ``USBSA'') stated that three companies in Canada
constitute the Canadian domestic industry: Lantic, Redpath, and Rogers.
Because the order was revoked with respect to Lantic and Redpath, only
Rogers is currently subject to the order.
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\2\ See Sugar and Syrups from Canada; Final Results of Changed
Circumstances Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 61 FR 51275
(October 1, 1996).
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Background
On April 26, 1999, the Department issued the Preliminary Results of
Full Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups from Canada (64 FR 20253). Based
on the continued absence of a dumping margin for Rogers, the sole
producer/exporter subject to the order, and the continued existence of
imports from Rogers in substantial quantities, in our preliminary
results we found that revocation of the order is not likely to lead to
continuation or recurrence of dumping.
We conducted verification in Taber, Alberta, of Rogers' response on
May 12, 1999, and issued our verification report on May 19, 1999. On
June 8, 1999, within the deadline specified in 19 CFR 351.309(c)(1)(i),
we received comments on behalf of the USBSA and on behalf of Rogers. On
June 15, 1999, within the deadline specified in 19 CFR 351.309(d), the
Department received rebuttal comments from both the USBSA and Rogers.
The Department held a public hearing on June 18, 1999.
As a result of the comments, we have changed our determination. We
have addressed the comments received below.
Likelihood of Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping
Comment 1: The USBSA asserts that sugar produced at Rogers' Taber
facility will have to be sold below constructed value (``CV'') and
therefore will be dumped when it enters the U.S. market. The USBSA
asserts that, despite repeated requests, the Department did not conduct
a CV analysis in which an accurate calculation of CV could be compared
to Rogers' selling price on current U.S. sales. Relying on the 1998
cost of production (``COP'') contained in the verification report,
which the USBSA asserts does not include all costs, the USBSA states
that it calculated a CV. The USBSA asserts that this and evidence of
Rogers' pricing in 1996, which is on the record, demonstrates that
Rogers sold sugar in the United States at prices below CV.
Additionally, the USBSA argues, the recent improvements made at Rogers'
Taber facility will increase its COP and force Rogers to sell sugar at
below cost prices. Asserting that the recent downward spiral in world
prices makes dumping by Rogers more pervasive, the USBSA requests that
the Department revisit the CV analysis and conclude that dumping is
likely to continue or recur if the order is revoked.
In its rebuttal brief Rogers cites to the Department's Policy
Bulletin 94-1 regarding COP and asserts that the Department found
USBSA's allegations of below-cost sales speculative correctly, thereby
falling short of the standard for providing reasonable grounds for
suspecting that Rogers made sales at below cost prices. Further, Rogers
argues, the Department is not required to do a COP investigation in
reviews when there is no earlier determination of below-cost sales and
there has been no reasonable evidence submitted which suggests that
sales at prices less than COP were made.
Rogers notes that the Department looked correctly at the cost basis
for sugar beet production and at the audited financial statements of
Rogers during verification. Rogers asserts that the verified
information confirmed its submissions showing sales in Canada and the
United States at prices significantly above the COP. Additionally,
Rogers asserts that the verified information shows that profits were
made and distributed by Rogers in every year of the period covered by
the Department's sunset review. With respect to the Taber facility
expansion, Rogers argues that the consolidation and expansion of its
facilities has only increased its cost efficiencies. Rogers provided
information from an independent audit of the expansion in support of
this assertion. Further, Rogers argues that the wholly speculative CV
constructed by USBSA does not reflect actual numbers provided to, and
verified by, the Department. In conclusion Rogers asserts that there is
no credible evidence on the record that would lead to a decision by the
Department to conduct a CV analysis.
Department's Position: The Department's Sunset Policy Bulletin
notes that the Department will consider other factors (such as prices
and costs) in full sunset reviews where an interested party identifies
good cause through the provision of information or evidence that would
warrant consideration of such factors. In our preliminary results, we
determined that the USBSA did not provide evidence of good cause to
support our consideration of other factors.
Rogers, in its November 3, 1998, substantive response, provided
information to the Department concerning its COP for processed beets to
support its argument that prices were above cost. Although we had not
requested the information and had determined for the preliminary
results that there was no basis to consider such additional
information, because Rogers had presented the information in its
substantive and rebuttal responses, we conducted an on-site
verification of this information on May 12, 1999 (see Memorandum to
Jeffrey May, Re: Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups from Canada, dated May
19, 1999). Therefore, we agree with both parties that verified
information related to Rogers' 1998 COP is now on the record in this
review. In addition, verified information on Rogers' Canadian and U.S.
sales prices for the years 1993 through 1997 is on the record.
As noted above, the USBSA's pre-hearing brief contained an
allegation of sales below cost, based on verified information already
on the record. Rogers did not rebut this allegation; rather, Rogers
claimed that its verified submissions show sales in Canada and the
United States at prices significantly above COP. For the purpose of our
final results we considered this allegation.
We have analyzed the verified information and find that it provides
sufficient support for a determination that dumping is likely to
continue or recur if the order were revoked. The Department normally
will not, and has no reason to, conduct a cost investigation in the
context of a sunset review. However, both USBSA and Rogers' arguments
concerning likelihood of continuation of dumping revolve around whether
or not pricing and cost data indicate that dumping has been taking
place. The Department, therefore, has conducted a sort of abbreviated
cost test with the limited data on the record.
Specifically, using the verified information, the Department
constructed a COP and CV (per metric ton) of processed sugar (see
Memorandum to File, Re: Cost of Production, dated August 20, 1999).
Section 773(b)(1) of the Act provides that the Department will
disregard below cost sales made within an extended period of time in
substantial quantities and which were not made at prices which permit
recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time. We compared
Rogers' verified weighted-average home market price to the COP and
found that it was below the COP.
[[Page 48364]]
Specifically, we compared a weighted-average home market price, based
on 1997 price data supplied by Rogers, with a COP based on 1998 costs
derived from Rogers' data. We found the weighted-average price to be
below the COP. Based on this limited data, we determine, therefore,
that Rogers made below cost sales within an extended period of time in
substantial quantities at prices which did not permit recovery of all
costs within a reasonable period of time. Because there are, in
essence, no remaining above cost sales, we compared Rogers' verified
average U.S. export selling price to the CV. We found that this average
price was below CV. Based on this comparison, we conclude that at least
some of Rogers sales to the United States are at prices below
CV.3 These calculations, using verified information,
therefore, provide a sufficient basis for determining that dumping is
likely to continue or recur if the order were revoked.
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\3\ Absent specific information, we did not make any adjustments
to U.S. prices, as we would in an investigation or administrative
review conducted for the purpose of measuring dumping. Such
adjustments typically would result in a reduction of U.S. price and,
therefore, an increase in the magnitude of the dumping margin.
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Comment 2: The USBSA disagrees with the Department's preliminary
decision that revocation of the order would not be likely to lead to
continuation or recurrence of dumping. The USBSA argues that the
Department incorrectly and unlawfully equated the domestic industry's
decision not to request an administrative review of this order over the
past 16 years as a lack of interest in the order. Furthermore, the
USBSA argues that its decision not to request an administrative review
does not indicate an absence of dumping by Rogers.
Rogers, in its rebuttal comments, argues that the USBSA admits that
it was satisfied with the status quo and the status quo, with respect
to this order, was a deposit rate of zero. If the USBSA was satisfied
with this zero deposit rate, according to Rogers, it must have believed
that no dumping was occurring. Rogers argues further that it has been
the Department's practice to revoke orders where there have been
several years of zero margins. With respect to this sunset review,
Rogers argues that the burden is on the domestic industry to
demonstrate why the existence of a zero percent deposit rate for 16
years coupled with exports of the subject merchandise in substantial
quantities is not sufficient to determine that revocation of the order
would not be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping.
Department's Position: We disagree with the USBSA's assertion that
we equated the domestic industry's decision not to request an
administrative review with a lack of interest in the order. Nowhere in
our preliminary results did we state that the domestic industry's
decision not to request an administrative review over the last 16 years
was tantamount to having no interest in the continuation of this order.
In our preliminary results we attempted to ascertain the likelihood of
continuation or recurrence of dumping. In doing so, the Department
examined the deposit rates over the life of the order for Rogers, the
only producer/exporter of Canadian sugar still subject to the order.
The deposit rate for Rogers has been zero percent for the past 16
years. Because there has been no request by the domestic industry for
an administrative review of this order for the past 16 years, we had no
reason to believe that Rogers had dumped sugar in the United States
during any part of this time period.
Furthermore, the preamble to the Department's regulations
concerning revocation of orders states that ``it is reasonable to
presume that if subject merchandise, shipped in commercial quantities,
is being dumped or subsidized, domestic interested parties will react
by requesting an administrative review to ensure that duties are
assessed and that cash deposit rates are revised upward from zero. If
domestic interested parties do not request a review, presumably it is
because they acknowledge that subject merchandise continues to be
fairly traded'' (Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties; Final Rule,
62 FR 27296, 27326 (May 19, 1997)).
Therefore, this factor points to a finding of no dumping since the
issuance of the zero deposit rate. This would generally be our
conclusion, except where, as here, information on the record is
sufficient to determine dumping is likely to continue or recur.
Comment 3: The USBSA argues that the Department erred by making its
likelihood determination on an order-wide basis. It argues that,
although the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''
)4 at 879 states expressly that the Department will make its
sunset determinations on an order-wide basis, the Department improperly
compared recent import data for only one respondent (Rogers) to data
following the issuance of the order for one respondent (BC Sugar). If
the Department had made the proper comparison of total pre-order
imports to total post-order imports, according to the USBSA, the
Department would have no alternative but to conclude that import
volumes have declined significantly during the life of the order.
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\4\ H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1 (1994).
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Rogers did not address this comment.
Department's Position: The Department disagrees with the USBSA.
Prior to the issuance of the order, Rogers was not the only exporter of
subject merchandise. Other Canadian producers and exporters were
subject to the original investigation and subsequent order. In its
November 2, 1998, substantive response, however, the USBSA acknowledges
that only Rogers is currently subject to this antidumping duty order
(November 2, 1998, Substantive Response from the USBSA at 9).
Therefore, comparison of Rogers' pre-and post-order import volumes was
approriate.
On October 1, 1996, the Department determined that Rogers was the
successor in interest to BC Sugar. In this determination, the
Department found that BC Sugar changed its name legally to Rogers
Sugar, Ltd. Because the structure and organization of the company did
not change and Rogers was, for all intents and purposes, BC Sugar, the
Department also determined that the deposit rate assigned to BC Sugar
was applicable to Rogers. Therefore, the Department determined that,
for the purposes of this antidumping duty order, BC Sugar and Rogers
were predecessor and successor companies, respectively, of the same
entity.
Because Rogers (formerly BC Sugar) is the only producer/exporter of
sugar and syrups from Canada still subject to the order, the Department
finds that it would be unreasonable to compare the present import
volumes of Rogers with the pre-order import volumes of the four (or
more) producers/exporters which were subject to the order in 1980. If
it made this comparison, the Department would almost certainly find
that total imports had decreased over the life of the order not only
because there are fewer producers/exporters which are currently subject
to the order but also because the tariff rate quota (TRQ) currently in
effect restricts imports. Generally speaking, the purpose of the
Department's comparison of current and pre-order import volumes is to
determine whether companies (or the company) have been able to
consistently and continually sell subject merchandise in the United
States without dumping. Here, we compared the volume of BC Sugar's 1979
exports to the volume of Rogers' recent exports. Current imports of
subject merchandise from Rogers (formerly BC Sugar) are
[[Page 48365]]
substantially greater than the pre-order levels of BC Sugar (now
Rogers). Therefore, our examination of import levels of BC Sugar/Rogers
over the life of the order was appropriate.
Comment 4: The USBSA argues that the Department should have
confirmed whether Canadian producers and refiners of subject
merchandise have imported at dumped prices since the discipline of the
order went into effect. The USBSA asserts that the Department's
comparison should have included imports of refined cane and beet sugar
from all Canadian exporters, except Lantic and Redpath, for which the
order has been revoked. Furthermore, the USBSA argues that the
Department never attempted to verify whether new Canadian sugar
refiners have entered the market and instead limited its review to
those producers previously involved in the initial investigation.
Department's Position: In its November 2, 1998, substantive
response, the USBSA itself stated that only Rogers was subject to this
antidumping duty order (November 2, 1998, Substantive Response from the
USBSA at 9). There is no evidence on the record in this case of any
other Canadian producer/exporter of cane or beet sugar which is
currently subject to the order. Therefore, because we had no reason to
doubt the USBSA's claim that Rogers is the only producer/exporter of
subject merchandise still subject to this antidumping duty order, we
have not investigated whether other Canadian producers exported subject
merchandise to the United States.
Comment 5: The USBSA argues that the Department included non-
subject merchandise in its examination of imports of sugar and syrups
from Canada. The USBSA states further that increases in the imports of
non-subject merchandise are irrelevant to this sunset review and their
inclusion in the Department's examination is misrepresentation of the
true amount of imports of subject merchandise.
Department's Position: Increases or decreases in non-subject
merchandise are irrelevant to our sunset determination. For this
reason, the Department has endeavored to determine an accurate amount
of import volumes of the subject merchandise.
In the instant case, however, there are limitations to the data
which do not make an exact accounting of the import volumes possible.
The HTS item numbers used by the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S.
Customs Service with respect to imports of sugar and syrups from Canada
include some non-subject merchandise. Furthermore, the age of this
information in question and changes in the HTS system over the life of
this order make estimation of imports of subject merchandise necessary.
As noted above, the Department recognizes that there are data
limitations. The Department has, nevertheless, attempted to compile the
most accurate calculation of import volumes of subject merchandise over
the life of the order.
Comment 6: The USBSA argues that the TRQ is no longer an effective
means of preventing surges in dumped sugar from entering the U.S.
market. The USBSA argues further that the U.S. Sugar Program is under
assault in an attempt to expand access to the U.S. market
significantly.
Department's Position: We agree with the USBSA that the TRQ has
been effective in the past at limiting all imports of sugar. The TRQ,
as part of the U.S. Sugar program, was designed to provide protection
from imports of foreign sugar. However, the USBSA misunderstands the
intent behind the creation and implementation of an antidumping duty
order. The purpose behind this order is not to provide blanket
protection from all imports of Canadian sugar; rather, its purpose is
to counteract the effects of unfairly traded imports. This is evidenced
by the fact that this order has been revoked with respect to Redpath
and Lantic because the Department determined that these companies were
not selling sugar in the United States at less than fair value. In the
same vein, the TRQ was not created to be a substitute for an
antidumping duty order, nor should it be viewed as such. The TRQ
provides the U.S. industry protection from all imported sugar. It was
not intended to act as an antidumping duty order on sugar from all of
the world's sugar producers, whether their sugar was being sold at
dumped prices or not.
The only issue in this sunset review is whether Canadian sugar and
syrups are likely to be dumped in the United States in the foreseeable
future. Whether the TRQ is no longer effective in limiting imports,
dumped or not, is irrelevant to this sunset review.
Comment 7: The USBSA argues that the sugar market has fallen to
unprecedented levels and shows no signs of recovery in the foreseeable
future. The USBSA argues further that the Department, in its
preliminary results, quickly dismissed the USBSA's argument as
speculative when the conduct of sunset reviews is inherently
speculative.
Rogers rebuts that an analysis of long-term trends in the history
of the international sugar market shows that price peaks and troughs
are characteristically short-lived. It states that the most recent
severe price trough was in 1985 when the annual average price for raw
sugar was $0.04/lb. Furthermore, Rogers argues that the current price
trough appears to have bottomed out in April 1999 at about $0.04/lb.
for raw sugar.
Rogers continues by reiterating that the USBSA's arguments
concerning the declining world price for sugar are speculative and
subjective which, Rogers notes the USBSA admits, may change depending
on unpredictable events and changes in circumstances in producing and
importing countries.
Department's Position: Sunset determinations are inherently
speculative and predictive and, in our preliminary results, we stated
that the USBSA's arguments concerning the decreases in world sugar
prices were speculative. We also believe that, since sunset reviews are
inherently predictive, the best predictor of future behavior is past
behavior. In examining the world sugar prices over the life of the
order, we find that, although prices in early 1999 are at their lowest
point in 12 years, generally prices have fluctuated over this time,
with prices in fiscal year 1998 being only marginally below fiscal year
1993 prices. We also find that the current prices for refined sugar are
not unprecedented, as Rogers' information concerning 1985 raw sugar
prices demonstrates.
Comment 8: The USBSA argues that the recent downward spiral of the
world refined-sugar price has a direct impact on Canadian prices and
incentives to export to the United States. According to the USBSA, with
a world price standing near $0.09/lb. and a Canadian price that Rogers
argues mimics the world price, it is inescapable that Rogers' home
market sales in Canada are today priced at less than cost and will be
so priced in the future. As the record in this proceeding shows, the
USBSA contends, not even the most efficient sugar producers can produce
sugar for around $0.09/lb.
Rogers argues that it has had a zero margin through 16 years of
world price fluctuations, including times of prices lower than at
present, while maintaining a dumping margin of zero. It states that the
Department verified its information and that the verification
demonstrated that sales in Canada and the United States are at prices
significantly above cost of production.
Furthermore, Rogers states that, since prices in the United States
were verified as higher than prices in Canada, there is no credible way
Rogers could have been selling below the COP.
[[Page 48366]]
Department's Position: The recent decreases in the world refined-
sugar price undoubtedly affected the Canadian price of refined sugar
because the Canadian price parallels the world price. Although the
Canadian price parallels the world price, it is not the same as the
world price. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to assume, given Rogers'
costs of manufacturing and the transportation costs associated with the
location of its sales within Canada, that the selling price of its
product could be above its cost of manufacturing and still be
competitive with other producers/exporters.
The world price of refined sugar obviously affects the selling
price of sugar in Canada and, thus, indirectly, may affect Rogers'
selling price. Nevertheless, the salient issue for this sunset review
is not the world price of refined sugar but, rather, Rogers' costs and
prices. Thus, we have limited our examination to Rogers' costs and
prices.
Comment 9: The USBSA states that, as the United States slowly
reduces the Canadian tier-2 tariff rate through 2008, the U.S. market
will become increasingly vulnerable to imports of Canadian sugar if the
world price of sugar falls below certain levels. Specifically, the
USBSA argues that, given the world refined price of $0.0913/lb., the
ability of Canadian producers to export refined sugar to the United
States profitably while paying the tier-2 tariff is already becoming a
reality.
Rogers argues that, given the current U.S. selling price of $0.28/
lb., with the addition of the tier-2 duty of $0.1621/lb., Rogers would
be required to sell in the United States at prices significantly below
the lowest price it now receives for the same product in Canada.
Furthermore, Rogers asserts, its production is not in excess of market
demand in Western Canada. Finally, according to Rogers, the refusal of
sugar beet growers to participate and support prices low enough to take
account of the tier-2 level (which would be necessary to sell any
product in the United States) would make such sales prohibitive.
Department's Position: The Department finds no evidence to suggest
that Rogers would sell sugar in the United States above the country-
specific quota established for Canada (i.e., paying the tier-2 tariff
rate).5 In order for Rogers to sell sugar in the United
States and pay the tier-2 tariff rate, Rogers would have to sell its
product (1) at prices substantially less than the lowest price it
receives for a similar product sold in Canada, (2) at prices far below
its costs of production, and (3) at prices far below the current world
price of refined sugar. The Department finds it extremely unlikely that
Canadian producers could export refined sugar to the United States
profitably while paying the tier-2 tariff.
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\5\ The Department notes that the USBSA has examined the effects
of the Canadian tier-2 tariff rate on the possibility of increased
imports from Canada through the year 2008. However, the USBSA has
stringently argued that the TRQ will be phased out by the year 2002.
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Magnitude of the Margin
Neither party addressed this issue in its case or rebuttal briefs.
Therefore, we have relied on the arguments submitted prior to the
preliminary results.
Comment 1: In its substantive response, the USBSA argued that the
dumping margin likely to prevail is at least as large as the margin
that prevailed at the time of the original investigation; the highest
dumping margin established in the original investigation was US$0.0237/
lb.6 Further, based on current U.S. and Canadian pricing,
the USBSA estimated dumping margins ranging from 9.3 percent to 409.0
percent. As noted above, the USBSA did not comment on the margin likely
to prevail in either its case or rebuttal brief.
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\6\ See Antidumping Duty Order; Sugar and Syrups from Canada, 45
FR 24128 (April 9, 1980).
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In its substantive response, Rogers argued that, given the price
spread between the U.S. supply-managed sugar market and the Canadian
market based on world pricing, the dumping margin likely to prevail if
the order were to be revoked is zero. Rogers argued that, because of
its limited access to the U.S. market, it is motivated to sell subject
merchandise at U.S. refined-sugar prices to maximize returns. Rogers
provided a chart depicting sugar prices in the Canadian and U.S.
markets and its price into the United States for the past eight years,
as well as a calculation for producing processed beet sugar at its
facility in Canada. Rogers contended that the chart indicates that
Rogers' price into the United States has been above its prices in
Western Canada. In its case and rebuttal briefs, Rogers also asserted
that there is no likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping if
the order were to be revoked.
Department's Position: The Department disagrees with Rogers. As
discussed in detail above, evidence placed on the record of this sunset
review by Rogers, and verified by the Department, indicates that there
is a likelihood that dumping would continue or recur if the order were
to be revoked.
In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that it will
normally provide to the International Trade Commission (the
``Commission'') the margin that was determined in the final
determination in the original investigation because that is the only
calculated rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the
discipline of the order. (See section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy
Bulletin.) Exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently
calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration of duty
absorption determinations. (See sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset
Policy Bulletin.)
In our preliminary results, we determined that the use of a more
recently calculated rate was appropriate and that such rate reflected
an absence of dumping. However, as noted above, for our final results,
we find that verified information demonstrates the likelihood of
dumping. Therefore, we conclude that the more recently calculated rate
from an administrative review can no longer be considered the magnitude
of the margin likely to prevail if the order were revoked.
We agree with the USBSA that the dumping margin likely to prevail
if the order were to be revoked is at least as high as the dumping
margin determined in the original investigation for BC Sugar. We
recognize that our dumping calculation for purposes of determining
likelihood of future dumping is not as accurate as a determination
which would reflect the adjustments typically made in an investigation
or administrative review. Therefore, the Department finds that the
margins calculated in the original investigation (45 FR 24126, April 9,
1980)7 are probative of the behavior of Canadian producers/
exporters of the subject merchandise. As such, the Department will
report to the Commission the company-specific and all others rates from
the original investigation as the magnitude of the margin likely to
prevail if the order were revoked.
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\7\ As the Department noted in its preliminary results (see
Preliminary Results of Full Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups from
Canada, 64 FR 20253 (April 26, 1999)) and above, Rogers (formerly BC
Sugar) is the only known producer/exporter of the subject
merchandise currently subject to the order.
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Final Results of Review
As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of
the antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping at the margins listed below:
[[Page 48367]]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer/exporter Margin
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rogers (B.C. Sugar)..................................... $0.010105/lb.
All Others.............................................. 0.023700/lb.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to
administrative protective order (APO) of their responsibility
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under
APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations.
Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or
conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to
comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable
violation.
This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are in accordance
with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.
Dated: August 27, 1999.
Bernard T. Carreau,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 99-23039 Filed 9-2-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P