[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 171 (Friday, September 3, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48362-48367]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-23039]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration
[A-122-085]


Final Results of Full Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups From Canada

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of Final Results of Full Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups 
from Canada.

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SUMMARY: On April 26, 1999, the Department of Commerce (``the 
Department'') published a notice of preliminary results of the full 
sunset review of the antidumping duty order on sugar and syrups from 
Canada (64 FR 20253) pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 
1930, as amended (``the Act''). We provided interested parties an 
opportunity to comment on our preliminary results. We received comments 
from both domestic and respondent interested parties. As a result of 
this review, the Department finds that revocation of this order would 
be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at the 
levels indicated in the Final Results of Review section of this notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott E. Smith or Melissa G. Skinner, 
Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and 
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone: (202) 482-
6397 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 3, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

    This review was conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of 
the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews 
are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'') 
Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516 
(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations''). Guidance on methodological 
or analytical issues relevant to the Department's conduct of sunset 
reviews is set forth in the Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies 
Regarding the Conduct of Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping 
and Countervailing Duty Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 
1998) (``Sunset Policy Bulletin'').

Scope

    The merchandise subject to the antidumping duty order is sugar and 
syrups from Canada produced from sugar cane and sugar beets. The sugar 
is refined into granulated or powdered sugar, icing, or liquid 
sugar.1 The subject merchandise is currently classified 
under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (``HTSUS'') item 
numbers 1701.99.0500, 1701.99.1000, 1701.99.5000, 1702.90.1000, and 
1702.90.2000. Although the subheadings are provided for convenience and 
customs purposes, the written description remains dispositive.
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    \1\ This order excludes icing sugar decorations as determined in 
the U.S. Customs Classification of January 31, 1983 (CLA-2 
CO:R:CV:G).
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    On March 24, 1987, the Department revoked the order, in part, with 
respect to Redpath Sugar Ltd. (``Redpath'') (52 FR 9322). On January 7, 
1988, the Department revoked the order, in part, with respect to Lantic 
Sugar, Ltd. (``Lantic'') (53 FR 434). In 1996, the Department 
determined that Rogers Sugar, Ltd. (``Rogers''), was the successor in 
interest to British Columbia Sugar Refining Company, Ltd. (``BC

[[Page 48363]]

Sugar'').2 In its November 2, 1998, substantive response, 
the United States Beet Sugar Association and its individual members 
(collectively, the ``USBSA'') stated that three companies in Canada 
constitute the Canadian domestic industry: Lantic, Redpath, and Rogers. 
Because the order was revoked with respect to Lantic and Redpath, only 
Rogers is currently subject to the order.
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    \2\ See Sugar and Syrups from Canada; Final Results of Changed 
Circumstances Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 61 FR 51275 
(October 1, 1996).
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Background

    On April 26, 1999, the Department issued the Preliminary Results of 
Full Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups from Canada (64 FR 20253). Based 
on the continued absence of a dumping margin for Rogers, the sole 
producer/exporter subject to the order, and the continued existence of 
imports from Rogers in substantial quantities, in our preliminary 
results we found that revocation of the order is not likely to lead to 
continuation or recurrence of dumping.
    We conducted verification in Taber, Alberta, of Rogers' response on 
May 12, 1999, and issued our verification report on May 19, 1999. On 
June 8, 1999, within the deadline specified in 19 CFR 351.309(c)(1)(i), 
we received comments on behalf of the USBSA and on behalf of Rogers. On 
June 15, 1999, within the deadline specified in 19 CFR 351.309(d), the 
Department received rebuttal comments from both the USBSA and Rogers. 
The Department held a public hearing on June 18, 1999.
    As a result of the comments, we have changed our determination. We 
have addressed the comments received below.

Likelihood of Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

    Comment 1: The USBSA asserts that sugar produced at Rogers' Taber 
facility will have to be sold below constructed value (``CV'') and 
therefore will be dumped when it enters the U.S. market. The USBSA 
asserts that, despite repeated requests, the Department did not conduct 
a CV analysis in which an accurate calculation of CV could be compared 
to Rogers' selling price on current U.S. sales. Relying on the 1998 
cost of production (``COP'') contained in the verification report, 
which the USBSA asserts does not include all costs, the USBSA states 
that it calculated a CV. The USBSA asserts that this and evidence of 
Rogers' pricing in 1996, which is on the record, demonstrates that 
Rogers sold sugar in the United States at prices below CV. 
Additionally, the USBSA argues, the recent improvements made at Rogers' 
Taber facility will increase its COP and force Rogers to sell sugar at 
below cost prices. Asserting that the recent downward spiral in world 
prices makes dumping by Rogers more pervasive, the USBSA requests that 
the Department revisit the CV analysis and conclude that dumping is 
likely to continue or recur if the order is revoked.
    In its rebuttal brief Rogers cites to the Department's Policy 
Bulletin 94-1 regarding COP and asserts that the Department found 
USBSA's allegations of below-cost sales speculative correctly, thereby 
falling short of the standard for providing reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that Rogers made sales at below cost prices. Further, Rogers 
argues, the Department is not required to do a COP investigation in 
reviews when there is no earlier determination of below-cost sales and 
there has been no reasonable evidence submitted which suggests that 
sales at prices less than COP were made.
    Rogers notes that the Department looked correctly at the cost basis 
for sugar beet production and at the audited financial statements of 
Rogers during verification. Rogers asserts that the verified 
information confirmed its submissions showing sales in Canada and the 
United States at prices significantly above the COP. Additionally, 
Rogers asserts that the verified information shows that profits were 
made and distributed by Rogers in every year of the period covered by 
the Department's sunset review. With respect to the Taber facility 
expansion, Rogers argues that the consolidation and expansion of its 
facilities has only increased its cost efficiencies. Rogers provided 
information from an independent audit of the expansion in support of 
this assertion. Further, Rogers argues that the wholly speculative CV 
constructed by USBSA does not reflect actual numbers provided to, and 
verified by, the Department. In conclusion Rogers asserts that there is 
no credible evidence on the record that would lead to a decision by the 
Department to conduct a CV analysis.
    Department's Position: The Department's Sunset Policy Bulletin 
notes that the Department will consider other factors (such as prices 
and costs) in full sunset reviews where an interested party identifies 
good cause through the provision of information or evidence that would 
warrant consideration of such factors. In our preliminary results, we 
determined that the USBSA did not provide evidence of good cause to 
support our consideration of other factors.
    Rogers, in its November 3, 1998, substantive response, provided 
information to the Department concerning its COP for processed beets to 
support its argument that prices were above cost. Although we had not 
requested the information and had determined for the preliminary 
results that there was no basis to consider such additional 
information, because Rogers had presented the information in its 
substantive and rebuttal responses, we conducted an on-site 
verification of this information on May 12, 1999 (see Memorandum to 
Jeffrey May, Re: Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups from Canada, dated May 
19, 1999). Therefore, we agree with both parties that verified 
information related to Rogers' 1998 COP is now on the record in this 
review. In addition, verified information on Rogers' Canadian and U.S. 
sales prices for the years 1993 through 1997 is on the record.
    As noted above, the USBSA's pre-hearing brief contained an 
allegation of sales below cost, based on verified information already 
on the record. Rogers did not rebut this allegation; rather, Rogers 
claimed that its verified submissions show sales in Canada and the 
United States at prices significantly above COP. For the purpose of our 
final results we considered this allegation.
    We have analyzed the verified information and find that it provides 
sufficient support for a determination that dumping is likely to 
continue or recur if the order were revoked. The Department normally 
will not, and has no reason to, conduct a cost investigation in the 
context of a sunset review. However, both USBSA and Rogers' arguments 
concerning likelihood of continuation of dumping revolve around whether 
or not pricing and cost data indicate that dumping has been taking 
place. The Department, therefore, has conducted a sort of abbreviated 
cost test with the limited data on the record.
    Specifically, using the verified information, the Department 
constructed a COP and CV (per metric ton) of processed sugar (see 
Memorandum to File, Re: Cost of Production, dated August 20, 1999). 
Section 773(b)(1) of the Act provides that the Department will 
disregard below cost sales made within an extended period of time in 
substantial quantities and which were not made at prices which permit 
recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time. We compared 
Rogers' verified weighted-average home market price to the COP and 
found that it was below the COP.

[[Page 48364]]

Specifically, we compared a weighted-average home market price, based 
on 1997 price data supplied by Rogers, with a COP based on 1998 costs 
derived from Rogers' data. We found the weighted-average price to be 
below the COP. Based on this limited data, we determine, therefore, 
that Rogers made below cost sales within an extended period of time in 
substantial quantities at prices which did not permit recovery of all 
costs within a reasonable period of time. Because there are, in 
essence, no remaining above cost sales, we compared Rogers' verified 
average U.S. export selling price to the CV. We found that this average 
price was below CV. Based on this comparison, we conclude that at least 
some of Rogers sales to the United States are at prices below 
CV.3 These calculations, using verified information, 
therefore, provide a sufficient basis for determining that dumping is 
likely to continue or recur if the order were revoked.
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    \3\ Absent specific information, we did not make any adjustments 
to U.S. prices, as we would in an investigation or administrative 
review conducted for the purpose of measuring dumping. Such 
adjustments typically would result in a reduction of U.S. price and, 
therefore, an increase in the magnitude of the dumping margin.
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    Comment 2: The USBSA disagrees with the Department's preliminary 
decision that revocation of the order would not be likely to lead to 
continuation or recurrence of dumping. The USBSA argues that the 
Department incorrectly and unlawfully equated the domestic industry's 
decision not to request an administrative review of this order over the 
past 16 years as a lack of interest in the order. Furthermore, the 
USBSA argues that its decision not to request an administrative review 
does not indicate an absence of dumping by Rogers.
    Rogers, in its rebuttal comments, argues that the USBSA admits that 
it was satisfied with the status quo and the status quo, with respect 
to this order, was a deposit rate of zero. If the USBSA was satisfied 
with this zero deposit rate, according to Rogers, it must have believed 
that no dumping was occurring. Rogers argues further that it has been 
the Department's practice to revoke orders where there have been 
several years of zero margins. With respect to this sunset review, 
Rogers argues that the burden is on the domestic industry to 
demonstrate why the existence of a zero percent deposit rate for 16 
years coupled with exports of the subject merchandise in substantial 
quantities is not sufficient to determine that revocation of the order 
would not be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping.
    Department's Position: We disagree with the USBSA's assertion that 
we equated the domestic industry's decision not to request an 
administrative review with a lack of interest in the order. Nowhere in 
our preliminary results did we state that the domestic industry's 
decision not to request an administrative review over the last 16 years 
was tantamount to having no interest in the continuation of this order. 
In our preliminary results we attempted to ascertain the likelihood of 
continuation or recurrence of dumping. In doing so, the Department 
examined the deposit rates over the life of the order for Rogers, the 
only producer/exporter of Canadian sugar still subject to the order. 
The deposit rate for Rogers has been zero percent for the past 16 
years. Because there has been no request by the domestic industry for 
an administrative review of this order for the past 16 years, we had no 
reason to believe that Rogers had dumped sugar in the United States 
during any part of this time period.
    Furthermore, the preamble to the Department's regulations 
concerning revocation of orders states that ``it is reasonable to 
presume that if subject merchandise, shipped in commercial quantities, 
is being dumped or subsidized, domestic interested parties will react 
by requesting an administrative review to ensure that duties are 
assessed and that cash deposit rates are revised upward from zero. If 
domestic interested parties do not request a review, presumably it is 
because they acknowledge that subject merchandise continues to be 
fairly traded'' (Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties; Final Rule, 
62 FR 27296, 27326 (May 19, 1997)).
    Therefore, this factor points to a finding of no dumping since the 
issuance of the zero deposit rate. This would generally be our 
conclusion, except where, as here, information on the record is 
sufficient to determine dumping is likely to continue or recur.
    Comment 3: The USBSA argues that the Department erred by making its 
likelihood determination on an order-wide basis. It argues that, 
although the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA'' 
)4 at 879 states expressly that the Department will make its 
sunset determinations on an order-wide basis, the Department improperly 
compared recent import data for only one respondent (Rogers) to data 
following the issuance of the order for one respondent (BC Sugar). If 
the Department had made the proper comparison of total pre-order 
imports to total post-order imports, according to the USBSA, the 
Department would have no alternative but to conclude that import 
volumes have declined significantly during the life of the order.
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    \4\ H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1 (1994).
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    Rogers did not address this comment.
    Department's Position: The Department disagrees with the USBSA. 
Prior to the issuance of the order, Rogers was not the only exporter of 
subject merchandise. Other Canadian producers and exporters were 
subject to the original investigation and subsequent order. In its 
November 2, 1998, substantive response, however, the USBSA acknowledges 
that only Rogers is currently subject to this antidumping duty order 
(November 2, 1998, Substantive Response from the USBSA at 9). 
Therefore, comparison of Rogers' pre-and post-order import volumes was 
approriate.
    On October 1, 1996, the Department determined that Rogers was the 
successor in interest to BC Sugar. In this determination, the 
Department found that BC Sugar changed its name legally to Rogers 
Sugar, Ltd. Because the structure and organization of the company did 
not change and Rogers was, for all intents and purposes, BC Sugar, the 
Department also determined that the deposit rate assigned to BC Sugar 
was applicable to Rogers. Therefore, the Department determined that, 
for the purposes of this antidumping duty order, BC Sugar and Rogers 
were predecessor and successor companies, respectively, of the same 
entity.
    Because Rogers (formerly BC Sugar) is the only producer/exporter of 
sugar and syrups from Canada still subject to the order, the Department 
finds that it would be unreasonable to compare the present import 
volumes of Rogers with the pre-order import volumes of the four (or 
more) producers/exporters which were subject to the order in 1980. If 
it made this comparison, the Department would almost certainly find 
that total imports had decreased over the life of the order not only 
because there are fewer producers/exporters which are currently subject 
to the order but also because the tariff rate quota (TRQ) currently in 
effect restricts imports. Generally speaking, the purpose of the 
Department's comparison of current and pre-order import volumes is to 
determine whether companies (or the company) have been able to 
consistently and continually sell subject merchandise in the United 
States without dumping. Here, we compared the volume of BC Sugar's 1979 
exports to the volume of Rogers' recent exports. Current imports of 
subject merchandise from Rogers (formerly BC Sugar) are

[[Page 48365]]

substantially greater than the pre-order levels of BC Sugar (now 
Rogers). Therefore, our examination of import levels of BC Sugar/Rogers 
over the life of the order was appropriate.
    Comment 4: The USBSA argues that the Department should have 
confirmed whether Canadian producers and refiners of subject 
merchandise have imported at dumped prices since the discipline of the 
order went into effect. The USBSA asserts that the Department's 
comparison should have included imports of refined cane and beet sugar 
from all Canadian exporters, except Lantic and Redpath, for which the 
order has been revoked. Furthermore, the USBSA argues that the 
Department never attempted to verify whether new Canadian sugar 
refiners have entered the market and instead limited its review to 
those producers previously involved in the initial investigation.
    Department's Position: In its November 2, 1998, substantive 
response, the USBSA itself stated that only Rogers was subject to this 
antidumping duty order (November 2, 1998, Substantive Response from the 
USBSA at 9). There is no evidence on the record in this case of any 
other Canadian producer/exporter of cane or beet sugar which is 
currently subject to the order. Therefore, because we had no reason to 
doubt the USBSA's claim that Rogers is the only producer/exporter of 
subject merchandise still subject to this antidumping duty order, we 
have not investigated whether other Canadian producers exported subject 
merchandise to the United States.
    Comment 5: The USBSA argues that the Department included non-
subject merchandise in its examination of imports of sugar and syrups 
from Canada. The USBSA states further that increases in the imports of 
non-subject merchandise are irrelevant to this sunset review and their 
inclusion in the Department's examination is misrepresentation of the 
true amount of imports of subject merchandise.
    Department's Position: Increases or decreases in non-subject 
merchandise are irrelevant to our sunset determination. For this 
reason, the Department has endeavored to determine an accurate amount 
of import volumes of the subject merchandise.
    In the instant case, however, there are limitations to the data 
which do not make an exact accounting of the import volumes possible. 
The HTS item numbers used by the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. 
Customs Service with respect to imports of sugar and syrups from Canada 
include some non-subject merchandise. Furthermore, the age of this 
information in question and changes in the HTS system over the life of 
this order make estimation of imports of subject merchandise necessary. 
As noted above, the Department recognizes that there are data 
limitations. The Department has, nevertheless, attempted to compile the 
most accurate calculation of import volumes of subject merchandise over 
the life of the order.
    Comment 6: The USBSA argues that the TRQ is no longer an effective 
means of preventing surges in dumped sugar from entering the U.S. 
market. The USBSA argues further that the U.S. Sugar Program is under 
assault in an attempt to expand access to the U.S. market 
significantly.
    Department's Position: We agree with the USBSA that the TRQ has 
been effective in the past at limiting all imports of sugar. The TRQ, 
as part of the U.S. Sugar program, was designed to provide protection 
from imports of foreign sugar. However, the USBSA misunderstands the 
intent behind the creation and implementation of an antidumping duty 
order. The purpose behind this order is not to provide blanket 
protection from all imports of Canadian sugar; rather, its purpose is 
to counteract the effects of unfairly traded imports. This is evidenced 
by the fact that this order has been revoked with respect to Redpath 
and Lantic because the Department determined that these companies were 
not selling sugar in the United States at less than fair value. In the 
same vein, the TRQ was not created to be a substitute for an 
antidumping duty order, nor should it be viewed as such. The TRQ 
provides the U.S. industry protection from all imported sugar. It was 
not intended to act as an antidumping duty order on sugar from all of 
the world's sugar producers, whether their sugar was being sold at 
dumped prices or not.
    The only issue in this sunset review is whether Canadian sugar and 
syrups are likely to be dumped in the United States in the foreseeable 
future. Whether the TRQ is no longer effective in limiting imports, 
dumped or not, is irrelevant to this sunset review.
    Comment 7: The USBSA argues that the sugar market has fallen to 
unprecedented levels and shows no signs of recovery in the foreseeable 
future. The USBSA argues further that the Department, in its 
preliminary results, quickly dismissed the USBSA's argument as 
speculative when the conduct of sunset reviews is inherently 
speculative.
    Rogers rebuts that an analysis of long-term trends in the history 
of the international sugar market shows that price peaks and troughs 
are characteristically short-lived. It states that the most recent 
severe price trough was in 1985 when the annual average price for raw 
sugar was $0.04/lb. Furthermore, Rogers argues that the current price 
trough appears to have bottomed out in April 1999 at about $0.04/lb. 
for raw sugar.
    Rogers continues by reiterating that the USBSA's arguments 
concerning the declining world price for sugar are speculative and 
subjective which, Rogers notes the USBSA admits, may change depending 
on unpredictable events and changes in circumstances in producing and 
importing countries.
    Department's Position: Sunset determinations are inherently 
speculative and predictive and, in our preliminary results, we stated 
that the USBSA's arguments concerning the decreases in world sugar 
prices were speculative. We also believe that, since sunset reviews are 
inherently predictive, the best predictor of future behavior is past 
behavior. In examining the world sugar prices over the life of the 
order, we find that, although prices in early 1999 are at their lowest 
point in 12 years, generally prices have fluctuated over this time, 
with prices in fiscal year 1998 being only marginally below fiscal year 
1993 prices. We also find that the current prices for refined sugar are 
not unprecedented, as Rogers' information concerning 1985 raw sugar 
prices demonstrates.
    Comment 8: The USBSA argues that the recent downward spiral of the 
world refined-sugar price has a direct impact on Canadian prices and 
incentives to export to the United States. According to the USBSA, with 
a world price standing near $0.09/lb. and a Canadian price that Rogers 
argues mimics the world price, it is inescapable that Rogers' home 
market sales in Canada are today priced at less than cost and will be 
so priced in the future. As the record in this proceeding shows, the 
USBSA contends, not even the most efficient sugar producers can produce 
sugar for around $0.09/lb.
    Rogers argues that it has had a zero margin through 16 years of 
world price fluctuations, including times of prices lower than at 
present, while maintaining a dumping margin of zero. It states that the 
Department verified its information and that the verification 
demonstrated that sales in Canada and the United States are at prices 
significantly above cost of production.
    Furthermore, Rogers states that, since prices in the United States 
were verified as higher than prices in Canada, there is no credible way 
Rogers could have been selling below the COP.

[[Page 48366]]

    Department's Position: The recent decreases in the world refined-
sugar price undoubtedly affected the Canadian price of refined sugar 
because the Canadian price parallels the world price. Although the 
Canadian price parallels the world price, it is not the same as the 
world price. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to assume, given Rogers' 
costs of manufacturing and the transportation costs associated with the 
location of its sales within Canada, that the selling price of its 
product could be above its cost of manufacturing and still be 
competitive with other producers/exporters.
    The world price of refined sugar obviously affects the selling 
price of sugar in Canada and, thus, indirectly, may affect Rogers' 
selling price. Nevertheless, the salient issue for this sunset review 
is not the world price of refined sugar but, rather, Rogers' costs and 
prices. Thus, we have limited our examination to Rogers' costs and 
prices.
    Comment 9: The USBSA states that, as the United States slowly 
reduces the Canadian tier-2 tariff rate through 2008, the U.S. market 
will become increasingly vulnerable to imports of Canadian sugar if the 
world price of sugar falls below certain levels. Specifically, the 
USBSA argues that, given the world refined price of $0.0913/lb., the 
ability of Canadian producers to export refined sugar to the United 
States profitably while paying the tier-2 tariff is already becoming a 
reality.
    Rogers argues that, given the current U.S. selling price of $0.28/
lb., with the addition of the tier-2 duty of $0.1621/lb., Rogers would 
be required to sell in the United States at prices significantly below 
the lowest price it now receives for the same product in Canada. 
Furthermore, Rogers asserts, its production is not in excess of market 
demand in Western Canada. Finally, according to Rogers, the refusal of 
sugar beet growers to participate and support prices low enough to take 
account of the tier-2 level (which would be necessary to sell any 
product in the United States) would make such sales prohibitive.
    Department's Position: The Department finds no evidence to suggest 
that Rogers would sell sugar in the United States above the country-
specific quota established for Canada (i.e., paying the tier-2 tariff 
rate).5 In order for Rogers to sell sugar in the United 
States and pay the tier-2 tariff rate, Rogers would have to sell its 
product (1) at prices substantially less than the lowest price it 
receives for a similar product sold in Canada, (2) at prices far below 
its costs of production, and (3) at prices far below the current world 
price of refined sugar. The Department finds it extremely unlikely that 
Canadian producers could export refined sugar to the United States 
profitably while paying the tier-2 tariff.
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    \5\ The Department notes that the USBSA has examined the effects 
of the Canadian tier-2 tariff rate on the possibility of increased 
imports from Canada through the year 2008. However, the USBSA has 
stringently argued that the TRQ will be phased out by the year 2002.
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Magnitude of the Margin

    Neither party addressed this issue in its case or rebuttal briefs. 
Therefore, we have relied on the arguments submitted prior to the 
preliminary results.
    Comment 1: In its substantive response, the USBSA argued that the 
dumping margin likely to prevail is at least as large as the margin 
that prevailed at the time of the original investigation; the highest 
dumping margin established in the original investigation was US$0.0237/
lb.6 Further, based on current U.S. and Canadian pricing, 
the USBSA estimated dumping margins ranging from 9.3 percent to 409.0 
percent. As noted above, the USBSA did not comment on the margin likely 
to prevail in either its case or rebuttal brief.
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    \6\ See Antidumping Duty Order; Sugar and Syrups from Canada, 45 
FR 24128 (April 9, 1980).
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    In its substantive response, Rogers argued that, given the price 
spread between the U.S. supply-managed sugar market and the Canadian 
market based on world pricing, the dumping margin likely to prevail if 
the order were to be revoked is zero. Rogers argued that, because of 
its limited access to the U.S. market, it is motivated to sell subject 
merchandise at U.S. refined-sugar prices to maximize returns. Rogers 
provided a chart depicting sugar prices in the Canadian and U.S. 
markets and its price into the United States for the past eight years, 
as well as a calculation for producing processed beet sugar at its 
facility in Canada. Rogers contended that the chart indicates that 
Rogers' price into the United States has been above its prices in 
Western Canada. In its case and rebuttal briefs, Rogers also asserted 
that there is no likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping if 
the order were to be revoked.
    Department's Position: The Department disagrees with Rogers. As 
discussed in detail above, evidence placed on the record of this sunset 
review by Rogers, and verified by the Department, indicates that there 
is a likelihood that dumping would continue or recur if the order were 
to be revoked.
    In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that it will 
normally provide to the International Trade Commission (the 
``Commission'') the margin that was determined in the final 
determination in the original investigation because that is the only 
calculated rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the 
discipline of the order. (See section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy 
Bulletin.) Exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently 
calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration of duty 
absorption determinations. (See sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset 
Policy Bulletin.)
    In our preliminary results, we determined that the use of a more 
recently calculated rate was appropriate and that such rate reflected 
an absence of dumping. However, as noted above, for our final results, 
we find that verified information demonstrates the likelihood of 
dumping. Therefore, we conclude that the more recently calculated rate 
from an administrative review can no longer be considered the magnitude 
of the margin likely to prevail if the order were revoked.
    We agree with the USBSA that the dumping margin likely to prevail 
if the order were to be revoked is at least as high as the dumping 
margin determined in the original investigation for BC Sugar. We 
recognize that our dumping calculation for purposes of determining 
likelihood of future dumping is not as accurate as a determination 
which would reflect the adjustments typically made in an investigation 
or administrative review. Therefore, the Department finds that the 
margins calculated in the original investigation (45 FR 24126, April 9, 
1980)7 are probative of the behavior of Canadian producers/
exporters of the subject merchandise. As such, the Department will 
report to the Commission the company-specific and all others rates from 
the original investigation as the magnitude of the margin likely to 
prevail if the order were revoked.
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    \7\ As the Department noted in its preliminary results (see 
Preliminary Results of Full Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups from 
Canada, 64 FR 20253 (April 26, 1999)) and above, Rogers (formerly BC 
Sugar) is the only known producer/exporter of the subject 
merchandise currently subject to the order.
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Final Results of Review

    As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of 
the antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or 
recurrence of dumping at the margins listed below:

[[Page 48367]]



------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Manufacturer/exporter                       Margin
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rogers (B.C. Sugar).....................................   $0.010105/lb.
All Others..............................................    0.023700/lb.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to 
administrative protective order (APO) of their responsibility 
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under 
APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations. 
Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or 
conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to 
comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable 
violation.
    This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are in accordance 
with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

    Dated: August 27, 1999.
Bernard T. Carreau,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 99-23039 Filed 9-2-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P