[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 132 (Monday, July 12, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 37574-37577]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-17615]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316]


Indiana Michigan Power Company; Notice of Consideration of 
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a 
Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. 
DPR-58 and DPR-74 issued to Indiana Michigan Power Company (the 
licensee) for operation of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, 
Units 1 and 2, located in Berrien County, Michigan.
    The proposed amendments would change the Technical Specifications 
(T/S) to allow reactor coolant system temperature changes in certain 
Mode 5 and 6 action statements if the shutdown margin is sufficient to 
accommodate the expected temperature change. In addition, footnotes 
regarding additions of water from the refueling water storage tank to 
the reactor coolant system are clarified and relocated to action 
statements. Additional actions are added in Table 3.3-1, ``Reactor Trip 
System Instrumentation,'' when the required source range neutron flux 
channel is inoperable. Corresponding changes are proposed for the bases 
for T/S 3/4.1.1, ``Boration Control,'' and 
T/S 3/4.1.2, ``Boration Systems.'' Administrative changes are proposed 
to improve clarity. Finally, additions are made to shutdown margin T/S 
surveillance requirements to address use of a boron penalty 
(requirement for additional boron) during residual heat removal system 
operation in Modes 4 and 5.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:

    1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the 
probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated?
    No. I&M [IM] [Indiana Michigan Power Company] proposes to permit 
operators to make RCS [reactor coolant system] temperature changes 
under conditions not previously allowed. RCS temperature changes may 
add positive reactivity to the reactor core that could reduce the 
SDM [shutdown margin] necessary to maintain subcritical conditions. 
Acceptable consequences for an inadvertent criticality rely on 
prevention. Maintaining an adequate SDM is an essential means to 
prevent an inadvertent criticality.
    When equipment that is relied upon to prevent, detect, correct, 
or mitigate an unintentional approach to a critical condition is 
unavailable or degraded, activities that may reduce the SDM must be 
precluded or adequately controlled. This amendment request is based 
on maintaining adequate control of positive reactivity additions as 
a result of RCS temperature changes in Modes 5 and 6. The control is 
provided by requirements to confirm that the SDM required by the T/S 
is available to accommodate the expected RCS temperature change. 
This preserves the validity of accident analyses that assume the T/S 
SDM requirements are met when the accident is initiated.
    The following accidents of potential applicability in Modes 5 
and 6 are described in Section 14.2, ``Standby Safeguards Analysis'' 
of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

1. Fuel handling accident
2. Waste liquid release
3. Waste gas release
4. Steam generator tube rupture
5. Steam pipe rupture
6. Rupture of control rod mechanism housing--rod cluster control 
assembly (RCCA) ejection
7. Environmental consequences following secondary system accidents
8. Rupture of a feedline (Unit 2 only)

    The UFSAR also describes these events:

9. Uncontrolled RCCA withdrawal from a subcritical condition 
(Section 14.1.1)
10. Uncontrolled boron dilution (Section 14.1.5)

    Accidents 4 through 8, above, are not credible in Modes 5 and 6 
due to negligible stored energy (temperature and pressure) in the 
primary and secondary systems below the Mode 5 RCS temperature limit 
of 200 deg.F. Therefore, they are not analyzed in Mode 5 and 6 and 
are not considered further.
    Remaining accidents 1, 2, 3, 9, and 10 are discussed below:

1. Fuel Handling Accident

    The only time a fuel handling accident could occur is during the 
handling of a fuel assembly. The required action to suspend core 
alterations is not changed. Changing RCS temperature in Modes 5 and 
6 would not initiate this accident. SDM is not a factor or

[[Page 37575]]

initial condition assumed in the analysis of a fuel handling 
accident. Therefore, since the requirements that would preclude this 
accident are not affected, the probability of the accident is not 
changed. Similarly, a potential reduction in SDM does not increase 
the consequences of this accident.

2. Waste Liquid Release

    The inadvertent release of radioactive liquid wastes to the 
environment was evaluated for the waste evaporator condensate and 
monitor tanks, condensate storage tank, primary water storage tank, 
RWST [refueling water storage tank], auxiliary building storage 
tanks, and chemical and volume control system (CVCS) holdup tanks. 
It was concluded in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Chapter 
14 evaluation that loss of liquid from these tanks to the 
environment is not a credible accident. This conclusion is not 
impacted by the thermal effects or reactivity changes due to RCS 
temperature while in Modes 5 and 6.

3. Waste Gas Release

    Radioactive gases would be introduced into the RCS by the escape 
of fission products if defects existed in the fuel cladding. The 
processing of the reactor coolant by auxiliary systems results in 
the accumulation of radioactive gases in various tanks. The two main 
sources of any significant gaseous radioactivity that could occur 
would be the volume control tank and the gas decay tanks. It is 
assumed that a tank ruptures by an unspecified mechanism after the 
reactor has been operating for one core cycle with 1% defects in the 
fuel cladding. The integrity of these tanks is not affected by 
changes in RCS temperature and SDM is not a factor in the 
consequences of these events. Therefore, it is concluded that the 
probability of occurrence of a tank rupture and the consequences of 
a tank rupture are not significantly increased by this change.

9. Uncontrolled RCCA Withdrawal From a Subcritical Condition

    The proposed changes specifically permit positive reactivity 
additions due to temperature changes. However, all other positive 
reactivity changes are suspended when the action applies. Therefore, 
intentional rod withdrawal would not be permitted.
    Additionally, this event could occur only when the reactor trip 
breakers are closed and the control rod drive mechanisms are 
energized. With the exception of testing or special maintenance, the 
rod drive motor generator set remains tagged out (de-energized with 
administrative cards to alert operators) in Modes 4 and 5. This 
alone would preclude rod movement. If the physical conditions for 
rod withdrawal were intentionally met, T/S require that two source 
range neutron flux instruments, two reactor trip instrumentation 
channels, and associated reactor trip breakers must be operable to 
automatically terminate the event. RCS temperature changes in Mode 5 
and 6 are sufficiently below the normal operating and designed 
temperature of the drive mechanisms. The thermal effects of the 
proposed RCS temperature changes are not a significant contributor 
to the possibility of a drive mechanism failure. Acceptable 
consequences for the rod withdrawal event rely on termination by an 
automatic reactor trip prior to criticality, and no assumptions are 
made in the analysis about the SDM existing at the start of rod 
withdrawal. Therefore, it is concluded that this proposed license 
amendment would have no impact on the probability or consequences of 
an uncontrolled rod withdrawal event.

10. Uncontrolled Boron Dilution

    Uncontrolled boron dilution is analyzed for refueling, startup, 
and power operation described in UFSAR section 14.1.5 for Unit 1 and 
Unit 2. The source of water for this event is primary grade water 
from the reactor makeup portion of the CVCS. The CVCS is designed to 
limit, even under various postulated failure modes, the potential 
rate of dilution to a value that provides the operator sufficient 
time to correct the situation in a safe and orderly manner. 
Acceptable consequences for this event rely on preventing an 
uncontrolled dilution.
    The proposed change to allow RCS temperature changes below 
200 deg.F do not involve changes to the operating methods for the 
CVCS or modifications to the CVCS. Additionally, the CVCS pumps and 
valves required to add water to the RCS are not affected by the RCS 
temperature changes themselves. Any such effects in the range of 
68 deg.F to 200 deg.F that would be permitted would be small 
compared to changes between 200 deg.F to normal RCS operating 
temperature. Therefore, the thermal effects are significantly less 
than those that occur during normal operation. It is concluded that 
the probability and consequences of an uncontrolled boron dilution 
event are not significantly increased by the proposed license 
amendment.
    The initiators and precursors for the accidents described above 
are not changed. Therefore, the probability of their occurrence is 
not changed and the consequences are bounded by the current 
analyses. Therefore, there is no increase in the types or amounts of 
effluents released offsite.
    The proposed additions to action 5 of T/S Table 3.3-1 are 
conservative. They provide additional assurance that instrumentation 
would be available to alert operators to a dilution event. The 
requirement to isolate sources of dilution water removes potential 
initiators for an inadvertent dilution. The RWST would be considered 
a dilution source if the RWST boron concentration is less than the 
RCS boron concentration and less than the minimum boron 
concentration in T/S limiting condition for operation 3.1.2.7.b.2. 
Isolating the RWST in this case is appropriate because it eliminates 
a potential accident initiator. The borated water concentration and 
volume in Mode 5 are established to provide the required SDM after 
xenon decay and cooldown from 200 deg.F to 140 deg.F. The accidents 
described above do not require a minimum volume for reasons other 
than boration control.
    The addition to T/S SRs 4.1.1.1.e and 4.1.1.2.b, which requires 
application of a boron penalty, is an additional restriction that is 
imposed administratively already. The remaining changes are 
administrative. They correct typographical errors or change format, 
and are not intended to change the meaning. They do not affect 
accident initiators or precursors.
    In summary, based on the above, the probability of occurrence or 
the consequences of accidents previously evaluated are not 
increased.
    2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    No. The proposed changes permit RCS temperature changes under 
conditions that were previously prohibited. However, no new methods 
of changing RCS temperature are involved, and the T/S limits on the 
permissible rates of RCS temperature changes are not altered. 
Therefore, the integrity of the reactor vessel when subject to RCS 
temperature changes is not affected.
    The accident of concern for the proposed amendment is an 
unintentional reduction in SDM leading to an inadvertent 
criticality. This is not a new or different kind of accident, 
although the causal mechanism adding the positive reactivity is an 
RCS temperature change instead of a dilution event.
    As discussed in question 1, the requirement to maintain SDM 
during RCS temperature changes provides assurance that the 
probability of the SDM reduction is not increased. However, as an 
additional conservative measure, a maximum RCS heatup and cooldown 
rate of 50 deg.F in any one-hour period is imposed when the action 
applies. This increases the time necessary for a RCS temperature 
change to reduce the SDM by an unacceptable amount. Thus, if a 
heatup or cooldown was initiated at 50 deg.F/hr, and inadvertently 
continued beyond the intended temperature, sufficient time would be 
available for the operators to detect the SDM reduction with the 
source range nuclear instruments and secure the temperature change. 
The rate of 50 deg.F in any one-hour period was estimated to provide 
at least as much time as was considered adequate for detecting and 
correcting a dilution event. The acceptable time for a dilution 
event is described in UFSAR Section 14.1.5. Conservative assumptions 
of the maximum positive or negative moderator temperature 
coefficient were used for the estimate.
    It should be noted that compliance with the current T/S action 
statements prohibit deliberate heatup and cooldown. However, it does 
not prevent use of the equipment involved in removing decay heat to 
maintain plant temperature (for example residual heat removal system 
pumps, valves, and heat exchangers). Therefore, the probability of a 
malfunction of this equipment during deliberate heatup and cooldown 
is not significantly greater than it is when the equipment is 
operated, as necessary, to maintain steady-state temperatures for 
decay heat removal.
    The addition to T/S SRs 4.1.1.1.e and 4.1.1.2.b, which requires 
application of a boron penalty, is an additional restriction that is 
imposed administratively already. The proposed additions to the T/S 
action statements for the source range neutron flux instrumentation 
provide additional controls to prevent an unmonitored positive 
reactivity

[[Page 37576]]

addition. The remaining changes are administrative. They correct 
typographical errors or change format, and are not intended to 
change the meaning.
    Isolating the RWST when it is a potential dilution source and 
when there are no source range neutron flux instrument channels 
operable in Mode 5 is not an accident initiator. Borated makeup to 
the RCS can be accomplished with the boric acid storage tank.
    Based on the above, it is concluded that the change does not 
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from 
any accident previously evaluated.
    3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin 
of safety?
    No. The margin of safety pertinent to the proposed changes is 
the T/S-required SDM. The additions to T/S SRs 4.1.1.1.e and 
4.1.1.2.b require application of a boron penalty. Because this 
penalty is controlled administratively already and there are no 
other changes to the SDM requirements, the margin of safety is 
maintained. Additionally, the proposed change to isolate the RWST 
when it is a potential dilution source does not impact the ability 
of the boric acid storage tank to supply the boron required for SDM 
during cooldown from 200 deg.F to 140 deg.F including xenon decay.
    The minimum time available to the operators to detect and 
terminate an unintentional addition of positive reactivity could 
also be considered a margin of safety. The proposed changes limit 
temperature changes to 50 deg.F in a one-hour period so as not to 
reduce this time. Compliance with the proposed changes would 
continue to provide assurance that there is no significant reduction 
in these margins of safety.
    The remaining changes are administrative. They correct 
typographical errors or change format, and are not intended to 
change the meaning.
    Based on the above, the proposed changes do not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92 are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of 
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By August 11, 1999, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library, 
500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085. If a request for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to

[[Page 37577]]

present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Jeremy J. Euto, Esquire, 500 Circle 
Drive, Buchanan, MI 49107, attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(I)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated May 21, 1999, which is available for 
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library, 
500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of July 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John F. Stang, Sr.,
Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate III, Division of 
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-17615 Filed 7-9-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P