[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 132 (Monday, July 12, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 37574-37577]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-17615]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316]
Indiana Michigan Power Company; Notice of Consideration of
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a
Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos.
DPR-58 and DPR-74 issued to Indiana Michigan Power Company (the
licensee) for operation of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant,
Units 1 and 2, located in Berrien County, Michigan.
The proposed amendments would change the Technical Specifications
(T/S) to allow reactor coolant system temperature changes in certain
Mode 5 and 6 action statements if the shutdown margin is sufficient to
accommodate the expected temperature change. In addition, footnotes
regarding additions of water from the refueling water storage tank to
the reactor coolant system are clarified and relocated to action
statements. Additional actions are added in Table 3.3-1, ``Reactor Trip
System Instrumentation,'' when the required source range neutron flux
channel is inoperable. Corresponding changes are proposed for the bases
for T/S 3/4.1.1, ``Boration Control,'' and
T/S 3/4.1.2, ``Boration Systems.'' Administrative changes are proposed
to improve clarity. Finally, additions are made to shutdown margin T/S
surveillance requirements to address use of a boron penalty
(requirement for additional boron) during residual heat removal system
operation in Modes 4 and 5.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the
probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
No. I&M [IM] [Indiana Michigan Power Company] proposes to permit
operators to make RCS [reactor coolant system] temperature changes
under conditions not previously allowed. RCS temperature changes may
add positive reactivity to the reactor core that could reduce the
SDM [shutdown margin] necessary to maintain subcritical conditions.
Acceptable consequences for an inadvertent criticality rely on
prevention. Maintaining an adequate SDM is an essential means to
prevent an inadvertent criticality.
When equipment that is relied upon to prevent, detect, correct,
or mitigate an unintentional approach to a critical condition is
unavailable or degraded, activities that may reduce the SDM must be
precluded or adequately controlled. This amendment request is based
on maintaining adequate control of positive reactivity additions as
a result of RCS temperature changes in Modes 5 and 6. The control is
provided by requirements to confirm that the SDM required by the T/S
is available to accommodate the expected RCS temperature change.
This preserves the validity of accident analyses that assume the T/S
SDM requirements are met when the accident is initiated.
The following accidents of potential applicability in Modes 5
and 6 are described in Section 14.2, ``Standby Safeguards Analysis''
of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
1. Fuel handling accident
2. Waste liquid release
3. Waste gas release
4. Steam generator tube rupture
5. Steam pipe rupture
6. Rupture of control rod mechanism housing--rod cluster control
assembly (RCCA) ejection
7. Environmental consequences following secondary system accidents
8. Rupture of a feedline (Unit 2 only)
The UFSAR also describes these events:
9. Uncontrolled RCCA withdrawal from a subcritical condition
(Section 14.1.1)
10. Uncontrolled boron dilution (Section 14.1.5)
Accidents 4 through 8, above, are not credible in Modes 5 and 6
due to negligible stored energy (temperature and pressure) in the
primary and secondary systems below the Mode 5 RCS temperature limit
of 200 deg.F. Therefore, they are not analyzed in Mode 5 and 6 and
are not considered further.
Remaining accidents 1, 2, 3, 9, and 10 are discussed below:
1. Fuel Handling Accident
The only time a fuel handling accident could occur is during the
handling of a fuel assembly. The required action to suspend core
alterations is not changed. Changing RCS temperature in Modes 5 and
6 would not initiate this accident. SDM is not a factor or
[[Page 37575]]
initial condition assumed in the analysis of a fuel handling
accident. Therefore, since the requirements that would preclude this
accident are not affected, the probability of the accident is not
changed. Similarly, a potential reduction in SDM does not increase
the consequences of this accident.
2. Waste Liquid Release
The inadvertent release of radioactive liquid wastes to the
environment was evaluated for the waste evaporator condensate and
monitor tanks, condensate storage tank, primary water storage tank,
RWST [refueling water storage tank], auxiliary building storage
tanks, and chemical and volume control system (CVCS) holdup tanks.
It was concluded in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Chapter
14 evaluation that loss of liquid from these tanks to the
environment is not a credible accident. This conclusion is not
impacted by the thermal effects or reactivity changes due to RCS
temperature while in Modes 5 and 6.
3. Waste Gas Release
Radioactive gases would be introduced into the RCS by the escape
of fission products if defects existed in the fuel cladding. The
processing of the reactor coolant by auxiliary systems results in
the accumulation of radioactive gases in various tanks. The two main
sources of any significant gaseous radioactivity that could occur
would be the volume control tank and the gas decay tanks. It is
assumed that a tank ruptures by an unspecified mechanism after the
reactor has been operating for one core cycle with 1% defects in the
fuel cladding. The integrity of these tanks is not affected by
changes in RCS temperature and SDM is not a factor in the
consequences of these events. Therefore, it is concluded that the
probability of occurrence of a tank rupture and the consequences of
a tank rupture are not significantly increased by this change.
9. Uncontrolled RCCA Withdrawal From a Subcritical Condition
The proposed changes specifically permit positive reactivity
additions due to temperature changes. However, all other positive
reactivity changes are suspended when the action applies. Therefore,
intentional rod withdrawal would not be permitted.
Additionally, this event could occur only when the reactor trip
breakers are closed and the control rod drive mechanisms are
energized. With the exception of testing or special maintenance, the
rod drive motor generator set remains tagged out (de-energized with
administrative cards to alert operators) in Modes 4 and 5. This
alone would preclude rod movement. If the physical conditions for
rod withdrawal were intentionally met, T/S require that two source
range neutron flux instruments, two reactor trip instrumentation
channels, and associated reactor trip breakers must be operable to
automatically terminate the event. RCS temperature changes in Mode 5
and 6 are sufficiently below the normal operating and designed
temperature of the drive mechanisms. The thermal effects of the
proposed RCS temperature changes are not a significant contributor
to the possibility of a drive mechanism failure. Acceptable
consequences for the rod withdrawal event rely on termination by an
automatic reactor trip prior to criticality, and no assumptions are
made in the analysis about the SDM existing at the start of rod
withdrawal. Therefore, it is concluded that this proposed license
amendment would have no impact on the probability or consequences of
an uncontrolled rod withdrawal event.
10. Uncontrolled Boron Dilution
Uncontrolled boron dilution is analyzed for refueling, startup,
and power operation described in UFSAR section 14.1.5 for Unit 1 and
Unit 2. The source of water for this event is primary grade water
from the reactor makeup portion of the CVCS. The CVCS is designed to
limit, even under various postulated failure modes, the potential
rate of dilution to a value that provides the operator sufficient
time to correct the situation in a safe and orderly manner.
Acceptable consequences for this event rely on preventing an
uncontrolled dilution.
The proposed change to allow RCS temperature changes below
200 deg.F do not involve changes to the operating methods for the
CVCS or modifications to the CVCS. Additionally, the CVCS pumps and
valves required to add water to the RCS are not affected by the RCS
temperature changes themselves. Any such effects in the range of
68 deg.F to 200 deg.F that would be permitted would be small
compared to changes between 200 deg.F to normal RCS operating
temperature. Therefore, the thermal effects are significantly less
than those that occur during normal operation. It is concluded that
the probability and consequences of an uncontrolled boron dilution
event are not significantly increased by the proposed license
amendment.
The initiators and precursors for the accidents described above
are not changed. Therefore, the probability of their occurrence is
not changed and the consequences are bounded by the current
analyses. Therefore, there is no increase in the types or amounts of
effluents released offsite.
The proposed additions to action 5 of T/S Table 3.3-1 are
conservative. They provide additional assurance that instrumentation
would be available to alert operators to a dilution event. The
requirement to isolate sources of dilution water removes potential
initiators for an inadvertent dilution. The RWST would be considered
a dilution source if the RWST boron concentration is less than the
RCS boron concentration and less than the minimum boron
concentration in T/S limiting condition for operation 3.1.2.7.b.2.
Isolating the RWST in this case is appropriate because it eliminates
a potential accident initiator. The borated water concentration and
volume in Mode 5 are established to provide the required SDM after
xenon decay and cooldown from 200 deg.F to 140 deg.F. The accidents
described above do not require a minimum volume for reasons other
than boration control.
The addition to T/S SRs 4.1.1.1.e and 4.1.1.2.b, which requires
application of a boron penalty, is an additional restriction that is
imposed administratively already. The remaining changes are
administrative. They correct typographical errors or change format,
and are not intended to change the meaning. They do not affect
accident initiators or precursors.
In summary, based on the above, the probability of occurrence or
the consequences of accidents previously evaluated are not
increased.
2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
No. The proposed changes permit RCS temperature changes under
conditions that were previously prohibited. However, no new methods
of changing RCS temperature are involved, and the T/S limits on the
permissible rates of RCS temperature changes are not altered.
Therefore, the integrity of the reactor vessel when subject to RCS
temperature changes is not affected.
The accident of concern for the proposed amendment is an
unintentional reduction in SDM leading to an inadvertent
criticality. This is not a new or different kind of accident,
although the causal mechanism adding the positive reactivity is an
RCS temperature change instead of a dilution event.
As discussed in question 1, the requirement to maintain SDM
during RCS temperature changes provides assurance that the
probability of the SDM reduction is not increased. However, as an
additional conservative measure, a maximum RCS heatup and cooldown
rate of 50 deg.F in any one-hour period is imposed when the action
applies. This increases the time necessary for a RCS temperature
change to reduce the SDM by an unacceptable amount. Thus, if a
heatup or cooldown was initiated at 50 deg.F/hr, and inadvertently
continued beyond the intended temperature, sufficient time would be
available for the operators to detect the SDM reduction with the
source range nuclear instruments and secure the temperature change.
The rate of 50 deg.F in any one-hour period was estimated to provide
at least as much time as was considered adequate for detecting and
correcting a dilution event. The acceptable time for a dilution
event is described in UFSAR Section 14.1.5. Conservative assumptions
of the maximum positive or negative moderator temperature
coefficient were used for the estimate.
It should be noted that compliance with the current T/S action
statements prohibit deliberate heatup and cooldown. However, it does
not prevent use of the equipment involved in removing decay heat to
maintain plant temperature (for example residual heat removal system
pumps, valves, and heat exchangers). Therefore, the probability of a
malfunction of this equipment during deliberate heatup and cooldown
is not significantly greater than it is when the equipment is
operated, as necessary, to maintain steady-state temperatures for
decay heat removal.
The addition to T/S SRs 4.1.1.1.e and 4.1.1.2.b, which requires
application of a boron penalty, is an additional restriction that is
imposed administratively already. The proposed additions to the T/S
action statements for the source range neutron flux instrumentation
provide additional controls to prevent an unmonitored positive
reactivity
[[Page 37576]]
addition. The remaining changes are administrative. They correct
typographical errors or change format, and are not intended to
change the meaning.
Isolating the RWST when it is a potential dilution source and
when there are no source range neutron flux instrument channels
operable in Mode 5 is not an accident initiator. Borated makeup to
the RCS can be accomplished with the boric acid storage tank.
Based on the above, it is concluded that the change does not
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated.
3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin
of safety?
No. The margin of safety pertinent to the proposed changes is
the T/S-required SDM. The additions to T/S SRs 4.1.1.1.e and
4.1.1.2.b require application of a boron penalty. Because this
penalty is controlled administratively already and there are no
other changes to the SDM requirements, the margin of safety is
maintained. Additionally, the proposed change to isolate the RWST
when it is a potential dilution source does not impact the ability
of the boric acid storage tank to supply the boron required for SDM
during cooldown from 200 deg.F to 140 deg.F including xenon decay.
The minimum time available to the operators to detect and
terminate an unintentional addition of positive reactivity could
also be considered a margin of safety. The proposed changes limit
temperature changes to 50 deg.F in a one-hour period so as not to
reduce this time. Compliance with the proposed changes would
continue to provide assurance that there is no significant reduction
in these margins of safety.
The remaining changes are administrative. They correct
typographical errors or change format, and are not intended to
change the meaning.
Based on the above, the proposed changes do not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92 are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public and State comments received.
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this
action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By August 11, 1999, the licensee may file a request for a hearing
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library,
500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085. If a request for a hearing or
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of
hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy
the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to
[[Page 37577]]
present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Jeremy J. Euto, Esquire, 500 Circle
Drive, Buchanan, MI 49107, attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(I)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated May 21, 1999, which is available for
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library,
500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of July 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John F. Stang, Sr.,
Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate III, Division of
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-17615 Filed 7-9-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P