[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 122 (Friday, June 25, 1999)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 34316-34396]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-15384]



[[Page 34315]]

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Part II





Department of Transportation





_______________________________________________________________________



Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Parts 417 and 420



Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site; 
Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 64, No. 122 / Friday, June 25, 1999 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 34316]]



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 417, 420

[Docket No. FAA-1999-5833; Notice No. 99-07]
RIN 2120-AG15


Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation's (DOT or the Department) 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing to amend its 
commercial space transportation licensing regulations to add licensing 
and safety requirements for the operation of a launch site. To date, 
commercial launches have occurred principally at federal launch ranges 
under safety procedures developed by federal launch range operators. To 
enable the development and use of launch sites that are not operated by 
a federal launch range, rules are needed to establish specific 
licensing and safety requirements for operating a launch site, whether 
that site located on or off of a federal launch range. These proposed 
rules would provide licensed launch site operators with licensing and 
safety requirements to protect the public from the risks associated 
with activities at a launch site.
    A separate rulemaking will address licensing and safety 
requirements for operation of a reentry site.

DATES: Comments on the proposed regulations must be submitted on or 
before September 23, 1999.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this proposed rulemaking should be mailed or 
delivered, in duplicate, to: U.S. Department of Transportation Dockets, 
Docket No. FAA-1999-5833, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Room Plaza 401, 
Washington, DC 20590. Comments may also be sent electronically to the 
following Internet address: [email protected]. Comments may be filed 
and/or examined in Room Plaza 401 between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays 
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: J. Randall Repcheck, Licensing and 
Safety Division (AST-200), Commercial Space Transportation, Federal 
Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone (202) 267-8602; or Laura Montgomery, Office of the Chief 
Counsel (AGC-250), FAA, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone (202) 267-3150.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited

    Interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by 
submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. 
Comments relating to the environmental, energy, federalism, or economic 
impact that might result from adopting the proposals in this notice are 
also invited. Substantive comments should be accompanied by cost 
estimates. Comments must identify the regulatory docket or notice 
number and be submitted in triplicate to the Rules Docket address 
specified above.
    All comments received, as well as a report summarizing each 
substantive public contact with FAA personnel on this rulemaking, will 
be filed in the docket. The docket is available for public inspection 
before and after the comment closing date.
    All comments received on or before the closing date will be 
considered by the FAA before taking action on this proposed rulemaking. 
Late-filed comments will be considered to the extent practicable, and 
consistent with statutory deadlines. The proposals contained in this 
Notice may be changed in light of the comments received.
    Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments 
submitted in response to this notice must include a pre-addressed, 
stamped postcard with those comments on which the following statement 
is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-1999-5833.'' The postcard will be 
date stamped and mailed to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

    An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem 
and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section 
of the Fedworld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 703-321-
3339), the Government Printing Office's electronic bulletin board 
service (telephone: 202-512-1661), or the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking 
Advisory Committee Bulletin Board service (telephone: (800) 322-2722 or 
(202) 267-5948). Internet users may reach the FAA's web page at http://
www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the Government Printing Office's 
webpage at http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara for access to recently 
published rulemaking documents.
    Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request 
to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 
800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 
267-9680. Communications must identify the notice number or docket 
number of this NPRM.
    Persons interested in being placed on the mailing list for future 
NPRM's should request from the above office a copy of Advisory Circular 
No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution System, that 
describes the application procedure.

Outline of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking:

I. Background
    A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role
    B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry
    C. Current Practices
II. Discussion of Proposed Regulations
    A. License and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch 
Site
    B. Explosive Site Plan Review
    C. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures
    D. Launch Site Location Review
    E. License Conditions
    F. Operational Responsibilities
III. Part Analysis
IV. Required Analyses

I. Background

    The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as codified at 49 U.S.C. 
Subtitle IX--Commercial Space Transportation, ch. 701, Commercial Space 
Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121 (the Act), authorizes the 
Secretary of Transportation to license a launch or the operation of a 
lunch site carried out by a U.S. citizen or within the United States. 
49 U.S.C. 70104, 70105. The Act directs the Secretary to exercise this 
responsibility in the interests of public health and safety, safety of 
property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the 
United States 49 U.S.C. 70105. On August 4, 1994, a National Space 
Transportation Policy reaffirmed the government's commitment to the 
commercial space transportation industry and the critical role of the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) in encouraging and facilitating 
private sector launch activities. A National Space Policy released on 
September 19, 1996, notes and reaffirms that DOT is responsible as the 
lead agency for regulatory guidance pertaining to commercial space 
transportation activities.

A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role

    On November 15, 1995, the Secretary of Transportation delegated 
commercial space licensing authority to the Federal

[[Page 34317]]

Aviation Administration. The FAA licenses commercial launches and the 
operation of launch sites pursuant to the Act and implementing 
regulations at 14 CFR Ch. III. The commercial launch licensing 
regulations were issued in April 1988, when no commercial launches had 
yet taken place. Accordingly, DOT established a flexible licensing 
process intended to be responsive to an emerging industry while 
ensuring public safety. The Department noted that it would ``continue 
to evaluate and, when necessary, reshape its program in response to 
growth, innovation, and diversity in this critically important 
industry.'' ``Commercial Space Transportation; Licensing Regulations,'' 
53 FR 11,004, 11,006 (Apr. 4, 1988).
    Under the 1988 regulations, DOT implemented a case-by-case approach 
to evaluating launch and launch site operator license applications. At 
the time, it was envisioned that most commercial launches would take 
place from federal launch ranges, which imposed extensive ground and 
flight safety requirements on launch operators, pending the development 
of commercial launch sites. The Federal launch ranges provided 
commercial launch operators with facilities and launch support, 
including flight safety services.
    Since 1988, DOT and now the FAA have taken steps designed to 
simplify further the licensing process for launch operators. The 
regulatory and licensing emphasis during the past decade has been on 
launch operators. The emergence of a commercial launch site sector has 
only become a reality during the past few years.

B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry

    The commercial space transportation industry continues to grow and 
diversify. Between the first licensed commercial launch in August 1989, 
and June 1999, 113 licensed launches have taken place from five 
different federal launch ranges, one from a launch site operated by a 
licensed launch site operator and one has taken place from Spain. The 
vehicles have included traditional orbital expendable launch vehicles, 
such as the Atlas, Titan, and Delta, sub-orbital launch vehicles such 
as the Starfire, new expendable launch vehicles using traditional 
launch techniques, such as Athena and Conestoga, and unique vehicles, 
such as the air-borne Pegasus. In a notice of proposed rulemaking 
issued on March 19, 1997, 62 FR 13216, the FAA discussed how the 
commercial launch industry has evolved from one relying on traditional 
orbital and suborbital launch vehicles to one with a diverse mix of 
vehicles using new technology and new concepts. A number of 
international ventures involving U.S. companies have also formed, 
further adding to this diversity.
    Development in cost savings and innovation are not confined to the 
launch industry. The launch site industry, the focus of this NPRM, has 
also made progress. Commercial launch site operations are coming on 
line with the stated goal of providing flexible and cost-effective 
facilities both for existing launch vehicles and for new vehicles. When 
the commercial launch industry began, commercial launch companies based 
their launch operations chiefly at federal launch ranges operated by 
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). Federal launch ranges that have supported 
licensed launches include the Eastern Range, located at Cape Canaveral 
Air Station in Florida (CCAS), and the Western Range located at 
Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), in California, both operated by the 
U.S. Air Force; Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia, operated by NASA; 
White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico, operated by the U.S. 
Army; and the Kauai Test Facility in Hawaii, operated by the U.S. Navy. 
Federal launch ranges provide the advantage of existing launch 
infrastructure and range safety services. Launch companies are able to 
obtain a number of services from a federal launch range, including 
radar, tracking and telemetry, flight termination and other launch 
services.
    Today, most commercial launches still take place from federal 
launch ranges; however, this pattern may change as other launch sites 
become more prevalent. On September 19, 1996, the FAA granted the first 
license to operate a launch site to Spaceport Systems International to 
operate California Spaceport. That launch site is located within VAFB. 
Three other launch site operators have received licenses. Spaceport 
Florida Authority (SEA) received an FAA license to operate Launch 
Complex 46 at CCAS as a launch site. Virginia Commercial Space Flight 
Authority (VCSFA) received a license to operate Virginia Spaceflight 
Center (VSC) within NASA's Wallops Flight Facility. Most recently, 
Alaska Aerospace Development Corporation (AADC) received a license to 
operate Kodiak Launch Complex (KLC) as a launch site on Kodiak Island, 
Alaska. The New Mexico Office of Space Commercialization (NMOSC) 
proposes to operate Southwest Regional Spaceport (SRS) adjacent to the 
White Sands Missile Range as a site for reusable launch vehicles. It is 
evident from this list that federal launch ranges still play a role in 
the licensed operation of a number of launch sites. California 
Spaceport, Spaceport Florida and VSC are located on federal launch 
range property.
    Whether launching from a federal launch range, a launch site 
located on a federal launch range, or a non-federal launch site, a 
launch operator is responsible for ground and flight safety under its 
FAA license. At a federal launch range a launch operator must comply 
with the rules and procedures of the federal launch range. The safety 
rules, procedures and practice, in concert with the safety functions of 
the federal launch ranges, have been assessed by the FAA, and found to 
satisfy the majority of the FAA's safety concerns. In contrast, when 
launching from a non-federal launch site, a launch operator's 
responsibility for ground and flight safety takes on added importance. 
In the absence of federal launch range oversight, it will be incumbent 
upon each launch operator to demonstrate the adequacy of its ground and 
flight safety to the FAA.

C. Current Practices

    Because of the time and investment involved in bringing a 
commercial launch facility into being, several entities that have been 
planning to establish these facilities asked the DOT for guidance 
concerning the information that might be requested as part of an 
application for a license to operate a launch site. In response to 
these requests. DOT's then Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
(Office) published ``Site Operators License, Guidelines for 
Applicants,'' on August 8, 1995, as guidance for potential launch site 
operators. The guidelines describe the information that DOT, and now 
the FAA, expects from an applicant for a license to operate a 
commercial launch site. This information includes launch site location 
information, a hazard analysis, and a launch site safety operations 
document that governs how the facility should be operated to ensure 
public safety and the safety of property. The Office intended that the 
guidelines would assist an applicant with the parts of the application 
that are critical to assuring the suitability of the launch site 
location, the applicant's organization, and the facility for providing 
safe operations.
    The Office issued the guidelines as an interim measure for 
potential developers of launch sites pending this

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rulemaking, and the guidelines describe the information that the FAA 
requests of an applicant as part of its application for a license to 
operate a launch site. The pace of development of the launch site 
industry has resulted in the FAA describing the process and 
requirements for applications for launch site operator licenses under 
the guidelines. As noted above, the FAA issued its first license to 
operate a launch site to Spaceport Systems International for the 
operation of California Spaceport. The FAA issued this license under 
its general authority under 49 U.S.C. 70104 and 70105 and 14 CFR Ch. 
III to license the operation of a launch site. Because the operation of 
California Spaceport as a launch site occurs at a federal launch range, 
the U.S. Air Force is expected to play a significant role in California 
Spaceports's safety process. In fact, the FAA was able to review the 
Spaceport Systems International application expeditiously because the 
applicant certified its intention to observe the safety requirements 
currently applied by the Western Range and contained in ``Eastern and 
Western Range 127-1. Range Safety Requirements (EWR 127-1),'' (Mar. 
1995).\1\ The FAA determined that applicant compliance with EWR 127-1, 
together with Air Force approval of other important elements of the 
operation of a launch site protected public health and safety and the 
safety of property. In general, the FAA deems the compliance by a 
licensed launch site operator with these requirements in combination 
with other safety practices imposed by a federal launch range as 
acceptable for purposes of protecting the public and property from 
hazards associated with launch site activities at a licensed launch 
site operator's facilities. In 1997, the FAA entered into a Memorandum 
of Agreement with Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration regarding safety oversight of licensed launch site 
operators located on federal launch ranges.
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    \1\ EWR 127-1 is updated on an ongoing basis. The latest version 
of these requirements may be found at http://www.pafb.af.mil/45SW/.
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    Until these proposed rules become final, the guidelines provide the 
only published criteria for guiding a prospective license applicant and 
in identifying the criteria that the FAA uses in determining whether a 
proposed commercial launch site is acceptable.
Comparison of the Guidelines and the Proposed Regulations
    The existing guidelines will no longer be in effect once the 
proposed regulations are issued as final rules. A comparison of some of 
the similarities and differences may therefore prove of assistance. The 
FAA will issue a license to operate a launch site under either the 
guidelines or the proposed rules only if the operation of the launch 
site will not jeopardize the public health and safety, the safety of 
property, or national security or foreign policy interests of the 
United States. The guidelines are flexible and are intended to identify 
the major elements of an application and lead the applicant through the 
application process with the FAA. The proposed rules would codify the 
requirements that must be met before a license will be issued.
    The guidelines and the proposed rules share some common elements, 
namely, the need for the applicant to supply information to support the 
FAA's environmental determination under the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) and the FAA's policy review that addresses national 
security and foreign policy issues. These requirements are discussed in 
detail below, in the description of the proposed regulations. Under the 
proposed regulations, the information requirements for these reviews 
remain for the most part unchanged from the guidelines.
    A review of the suitability of the proposed location of the launch 
site is an important component of both the guidelines and the proposed 
regulations. Although both approaches call for a site location review, 
the reviews differ in breadth and specificity. The guidelines request 
an applicant to provide information regarding geographic 
characteristics, flight paths and impact areas and the meteorological 
environment. To describe a launch site's geographic characteristics, an 
applicant is requested to provide information regarding the launch site 
location, size, and shape, its topographic and geological 
characteristics, its proximity to populated areas, and any local 
commercial and recreational activities that may be affected by launches 
such as air traffic, shipping, hunting, and offshore fishing. An 
applicant also provides planned possible flight paths and general 
impact areas designated for launch. If planned flight corridors overfly 
land, the guidelines request that an applicant provide flight safety 
analyses for generic sets of launch vehicles and describe, where 
applicable, any arrangements made to clear the land of people prior to 
launch vehicle flight. With respect to the meteorological environment, 
the guidelines request an applicant to provide data regarding 
temperature, surface and upper wind direction and velocity, temperature 
inversions, and extreme conditions that may affect the safety of launch 
site operations. Under the guidelines, an application should include 
the frequency (average number of days for each month) of extremes in 
wind or temperature inversion that could have an impact on launch.
    In contrast, the proposed rules would require an applicant to use 
specified methods to demonstrate the suitability of the launch site 
location for launching at least one type of launch vehicle, including 
orbital, guided sub-orbital, or unguided sub-orbital expendable launch 
vehicles, and reusable launch vehicles. Each proposed launch point on 
the launch site must be evaluated for each type of launch vehicle that 
the applicant wishes to have launched from the launch point. An 
applicant would be provided with a choice of methods to develop a 
flight corridor for a representative launch of an orbital or guided 
sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, or to develop a set of impact 
dispersion areas for a representative launch of an unguided sub-orbital 
expendable launch vehicle. If a flight corridor or set of impact 
dispersion areas exists that does not encompass populated areas, no 
additional analysis would be required. Otherwise, an applicant would be 
required to conduct a risk analysis to demonstrate that the risk to the 
public from a representative launch would not exceed a casualty 
expectation (Ec) of 30  x  10-6. The FAA would 
review the applicant's analyses to ensure the applicant's process was 
correct, and would approve the launch site location if the 
Ec risk criteria were met.
    Under either the guidelines or the proposed regulations, little or 
no launch site location review would be needed if the applicant 
proposed to locate a launch site at a federal launch range. The 
fundamental purpose of the FAA's proposed launch site location review--
to assure that a launch may potentially take place safely from the 
proposed launch site--has been amply demonstrated at each of the 
ranges. Exceptions may occur if a prospective launch site operator 
plans to use a launch site at a federal launch range for launches 
markedly different from past federal launch range launches, or if an 
applicant proposes a new launch point from which no launch has taken 
place.
    The guidelines and proposed regulations differ markedly in their 
approach to ground and flight safety. For ground safety under the 
guidelines, applicants perform a hazard analysis and develop a 
comprehensive ground safety plan and a safety organization. Explosive 
safety is part of the analysis

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and safety plan. In contrast, the proposed regulations require the 
submission of an explosive site plan, but impose fewer operational 
ground safety responsibilities on a launch site operator. For flight 
safety, under the guidelines and proposed rules, a launch site operator 
license contains minimal flight safety responsibilities. The FAA 
assigns almost all responsibility for flight safety and significant 
ground safety responsibility to a licensed launch operator. Extensive 
ground and flight safety requirements will accompany a launch license. 
This does not mean a launch site operator cannot offer flight safety 
services or equipment to its customers. However, the adequacy of such 
service and equipment typically will be assessed in the FAA's review of 
a launch license application.

II. Discussion of Proposed Regulations

    The proposed regulations specify who must obtain a license to 
operate a launch site, application requirements and licensee 
responsibilities. Because a launch licensee's license covers ground 
operations as well as the flight of a launch vehicle, a launch operator 
is not required to obtain a license to operate a launch site. The FAA 
is aware that a launch operator may select a launch site for its own 
launches. In that event, a launch operator requires a license to 
launch. Only if a prospective launch site operator proposes to offer 
its launch site to others, need that person obtain a license to operate 
a launch site.
    By means of operational, location, and site layout constraints, the 
FAA intends its regulations to ensure that the public is not harmed by 
launches that take place from a launch site whose operation the FAA has 
licensed. Additionally, in the course of a license review, the FAA will 
ensure that environmental and international obligations are addressed, 
and that national security interests are reviewed by the appropriate 
agencies. To further these objectives, the FAA proposes to create in 14 
CFR Chapter III a new part 420 to contain the requirements for 
obtaining and possessing a license to operate a launch site. The FAA's 
proposed part 420 would require an applicant to obtain certain FAA 
approvals in order to receive a license to operate a launch site. These 
required approvals consist of policy, explosive site plan, and location 
approvals. Environmental review may precede or be concurrent with the 
licensing process.
    The grant of a license to operate a launch site will not guarantee 
that a launch license will be granted for any particular launch 
proposed for the site. All launches will be subject to separate FAA 
review and licensing.

A. Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site

    The FAA's proposed approach to licensing the operation of a launch 
site would focus on four areas of concern critical to ensuring that 
operation of a launch site would not jeopardize public health and 
safety, the safety of property or foreign policy and other U.S. 
interests. These reviews would encompass the environment, policy, 
siting of explosives, and site location. Under the proposed 
regulations, an applicant would be required to provide the FAA with 
information sufficient to conduct environmental and policy reviews and 
determinations. An applicant would also be required to submit an 
explosive site plan that shows the location of all explosive hazard 
facilities and distances between them, and the distances to public 
areas.
    In the case of launch site location approval, the proposed 
regulations would provide an applicant options for proving to the FAA 
that a launch could be conducted from the site without jeopardizing 
public health and safety. The requirement for a launch site location 
approval would not normally apply to an applicant who proposes to 
operate an existing launch point at a federal launch range, unless the 
applicant plans to use a launch point different than used previously by 
the federal launch range, or to use an existing launch point for a 
different type or larger launch vehicle than used in the past. The fact 
that launches have taken place safely from any particular launch point 
at a federal launch range may provide the same demonstration that would 
be accomplished by the FAA's proposed location review: Namely, a 
showing that launch may occur safely from the site.
    The FAA is proposing to impose specific ground safety 
responsibilities on a licensed launch site operator, and will require 
that an applicant demonstrate how those requirements will be met. A 
launch site operator licensee's responsibilities would include: 
Preventing unauthorized public access to the site; properly preparing 
the public and customers to visit the site; informing customers of 
limitations on use of the site; scheduling and coordinating hazardous 
activities conducted by customers; and arranging for the clearing of 
air and sea routes and notifying adjacent property owners and local 
jurisdictions of the pending flight of a launch vehicle. Part 420 would 
also contain launch site operator responsibilities with regard to 
recordkeeping, license transfer, compliance monitoring, accident 
investigation and explosives. Other federal government agencies have 
jurisdiction over a number of ground safety issues, and the FAA does 
not intend to duplicate their efforts.\2\ \3\ The FAA will revisit 
ground safety issues in its development of rules for launches from non-
federal launch sites.
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    \2\ The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) play a 
role in regulating ground activities at a launch site. OSHA 
regulations cover worker safety issues, and may, as a by-product, 
help protect public safety as well. One provision of particular note 
is 29 CFR 1910.119, process safety management of highly hazardous 
chemicals (PSM). The requirements of the PSM standard are intended 
to eliminate or mitigate the consequences of releases of highly 
hazardous chemicals that may be toxic, reactive, flammable, or 
explosive. Management controls are emphasized to address the risks 
associated with handling or working near hazardous chemicals. These 
requirements may apply to some launch site and launch operators. EPA 
regulations are designed to protect the public health and safety 
from releases of chemicals. One regulation of note is 40 CFR part 
68, Accidental release prevention provisions. It applies to an owner 
or operator of a stationary source that has more than a threshold 
quantity of a regulated substance in a process, and requires the 
owner or operator to develop and implement a risk management program 
to prevent accidents and limit the severity of any accidents that 
occur. The EPA rule further requires sources to conduct an offsite 
consequence analysis to define the potential impacts of worst-case 
releases and other release scenarios. For any process whose worst-
case release would reach the public, the source must develop and 
implement a prevention program and an emergency response program. 
Both the EPA and OSHA prevention rules require regulated entities to 
conduct formal analyses of the risks involved in the use and storage 
of covered substances and consider all possible ways in which 
existing systems could fail and result in accidental release.
    \3\ ATF regulations cover the long-term storage of explosives.
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Environmental
    Licensing the operation of a launch site is a major federal action 
for purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 
et seq. As a result, the FAA is required to assess the environmental 
impacts of constructing and operating a proposed launch site to 
determine whether these activities will significantly affect the 
quality of the environment. Although the FAA is responsible under NEPA 
regulations for preparing an environmental assessment or environmental 
impact statement, the proposed rules continue to require a license 
applicant to provide the FAA with sufficient information to conduct an 
analysis in accordance with the requirements of the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) Regulations Implementing the Procedural 
Provisions of NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500-1508, and the FAA's Procedures 
for Considering Environmental Impacts, FAA Order

[[Page 34320]]

1050.1D. An applicant will typically engage a contractor with 
specialized experience in the NEPA process to conduct the study 
underpinning the FAA's environmental analysis. This rulemaking marks no 
change in the environmental requirements attendant to obtaining a 
license to operate a launch site.
    The FAA encourages an applicant to begin the environmental review, 
including the gathering of pertinent information to perform the 
assessment, early in the planning process, but after the applicant has 
defined its proposed action and considered feasible alternatives. The 
FAA will determine whether a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) 
may be issued after an environmental assessment, or whether an 
environmental impact statement followed by a record of decision is 
necessary. An applicant may be subject to restrictions on activities at 
a proposed launch site. An applicant may acquire property for future 
use as a launch site; however, absent a FONSI, the FAA must prepare an 
environmental review that includes consideration of reasonable 
alternatives to the site. According to the CEQ regulations as 
interpreted by the courts, an applicant may not use the purchase of a 
site or construction at the site to limit the array of reasonable 
alternatives. As a result, an applicant must complete the environmental 
process before construction or improvement of the site. The FAA will 
not issue a license if an environmental review in accordance with all 
applicable regulations and guidelines is not concluded.
Policy
    Under current practice, the FAA conducts a policy review of an 
application for a license to operate a launch site to determine whether 
operation of the proposed launch site would jeopardize national 
security, foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the 
United States. The FAA conducts the policy review in coordination with 
other federal agencies that have responsibility for national and 
international interests. The Department of Defense is consulted to 
determine whether a license application presents any issues affecting 
national security. The Department of State reviews an application for 
issues affecting foreign policy or international obligations. Other 
agencies, such as NASA, are consulted as appropriate. By this 
rulemaking, the regulations would require an applicant to supply 
information relevant to the FAA's policy approval, including, for 
example, identification of foreign ownership of the applicant. The FAA 
will obtain other information required for a policy review from 
information submitted by an applicant in other parts of the 
application. During a policy review, the FAA would consult with an 
applicant regarding any question or issues before making a final 
determination. An applicant would have the opportunity to address any 
questions before completion of the review.

B. Explosive Site Plan Review

    Proposed subpart B would establish criteria and procedures for the 
siting of facilities at a launch site where solid and liquid 
propellants are to be located to prepare launch vehicles and payloads 
for flight. Subpart B also would establish application procedures for 
an applicant to demonstrate compliance with the siting criteria. The 
requirements in subpart B are commonly referred to as quantity-distance 
(Q-D) requirements because they provide minimum separation distances 
between explosive hazard facilities, surrounding facilities and 
locations where the public may be present on the basis of the type and 
quantity of explosive material to be located within the area. Minimum 
prescribed separation distances are necessary to protect the public 
from explosive hazards on a launch site so that the effects of an 
explosion does not reach the public.
    An applicant would provide the FAA an explosive site plan that 
demonstrates compliance with the proposed Q-D requirements. the FAA 
must approve this plan, so applicants are cautioned not to begin 
construction of facilities requiring an explosives site plan until 
obtaining FAA approval. Note also that the proposed Q-D requirements do 
not address any toxic hazards. Toxic hazards may be mitigated through 
procedural means, and the FAA will address toxic hazards in a separate 
rulemaking. If a toxic hazard is a controlling factor in siting, it 
should be considered along with the explosives hazards when the site 
plan is prepared.
    The FAA proposes to adopt the explosive safety practice in use at 
federal launch ranges today, namely, the application of quantity-
distance criteria. Prescribed distances provide for a separation of an 
explosive source from people and property that may otherwise be exposed 
to explosive events. These criteria have long been used to mitigate 
explosive hazards to an acceptable level. Q-D criteria address only the 
consequences. The underlying assumption of quantity-distance criteria 
is that an accidental explosion will occur for any explosive material 
operation.
    The quantity-distance criteria in the proposed regulations are a 
critical mitigation measure required in a launch site operator 
application to provide the public protection from ground operations at 
a launch site. The proposed rules have other mitigation measures, 
including launch site operator responsibilities that address accident 
prevention measures, and procedural requirements to protect visitors 
and other launch site customers on the launch site. Any other 
procedural requirements necessary to protect the public from explosive 
hazards will be the responsibility of a launch operator under a launch 
license. The scope of a launch license encompasses ground activities, 
including the explosive operations involved with the handling and 
assembly of launch vehicles at a launch site.
    The requirement to submit an explosive site plan to the FAA would 
not apply to an applicant applying for a license to operate a launch 
site at a federal launch range. Federal launch ranges have separate 
rules which are either identical or similar to the rules proposed, or 
permit mitigation measures which otherwise ensure safety.
    What follows is a discussion of launch site explosive hazards, the 
reason the FAA is proposing explosive siting criteria, current Q-D 
standards, the FAA's proposed use of NASA and DOD Q-D standards, other 
approaches to explosive safety, application of ATF, DOD or NASA 
standards, future changes in liquid propellant requirements, and solid 
and liquid bi-propellants at launch pads.
Explosive Hazards on a Launch Site
    The hazards associated with launch vehicle pre-flight operations 
involving large quantities of propellants may typically be broken down 
into phases, including storage, handling, assembly, checkout, ordnance 
installation, propellant loading, and final launch preparations. Each 
of these are covered below, for liquid and solid propellants.
    During storage, liquid propellant hazards include leaking or 
ruptured propellant tanks causes by loss of pressure or mechanical 
failure. If fuels and oxidizers are stored separately any potentially 
harmful event would be limited to fire or tank pressure rupture. Solid 
propellant hazards include accidental ordnance initiation caused by 
stray electrical energy or dropping a motor with sufficient impact 
force to initiate the propellant. Long term storage of solid rocket 
motors, although not within the scope of this

[[Page 34321]]

rulemaking,\3\ presents its own unique hazards. As solid rocket motors 
age, chemical changes in the binder within the motor cause ammonium 
perchlorate to form on the outside of the motor. This is a hazardous 
condition. The shelf life of solid rocket motors can be extended by a 
carefully controlled environment in the storage facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ ATF regulations cover the long-term storage of explosives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The handling phase may include the transfer of liquid propellants 
from one holding tank to another. Explosive reactions may occur if 
fuels and oxidizers mix due to under or overpressurization, or if 
improper connections cause propellant tanks, transfer lines, or 
fittings to leak or rupture. If fuels and oxidizers are handled 
separately no explosive reactions should occur. Hazardous handling 
operations of solid rocket motors includes transporting and lifting 
with cranes at the launch pad or other facility. Any impact during 
these activities could cause propellant ignition.
    During assembly, liquid propellant operations include the assembly 
and encapsulation of spacecraft and upper stages. Assembly and 
encapsulation may involve loading hypergolic propellants such as 
nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4) and hydrazine. Tank 
punctures, impacts caused by lifting, and over- or under-pressurization 
could cause fuels and oxidizers to come in contact with one another, 
causing fire and fragmentation hazards. This phase includes the final 
assembly of solid rocket motors at a launch pad or other facility. Any 
motor impact on the ground during these activities could cause 
propellant ignition.
    Checkout at a launch pad may involve a number of hazards due to the 
presence of solid propellant and hypergolic propellant stages. Any 
accident causing interaction between hypergolic and solid propellants 
can result in fires, pressure ruptures, and propulsive flight.
    During ordnance installation, inadvertent initiation of electro-
explosive devices (EEDs) is possible. This does not pose a threat to 
the public (although it does to the vehicle and personnel) because EEDs 
have a small quantity of explosive and are not, by design, capable of 
detonating propellants.
    The main hazard during propellant loading is over or under-
pressurization of liquid propellant tanks, which may cause major spills 
of fuels and oxidizers. These events could lead to significant 
explosive yield, which is the energy released by an explosion.
    Final launch preparations, which begin just prior to flight, 
involve a fully fueled launch vehicle. Systems are switched to internal 
power, and liquid propellant systems are brought to flight pressure. A 
mishap here could lead to significant explosive yield. The explosive 
yield of a launch vehicle exploding on a launch pad is based on shock 
impact for solid propellants, and non-dynamic mixing of liquid 
propellants by, for example, the failure or interior bulkheads in the 
launch vehicle.
Reason for Proposing Explosive Siting Criteria
    After careful consideration, the FAA decided it had to propose 
explosive siting criteria to protect the public from explosive hazards 
associated with the operation of a launch site. Although the FAA places 
much of the responsibility for safety of hazardous ground operations on 
the launch operator, the FAA believes that the siting requirements 
would be better addressed by a launch site operator. This is because 
the siting requirements will more efficiently be satisfied prior to 
construction of launch site facilities rather than afterwards. The FAA 
does not intend to duplicate or supercede existing regulatory 
frameworks. Although both the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
(ATF) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have 
regulations on explosives, neither provides all the quantity-distance 
criteria applicable to launch site necessary to protect the public.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Another agency, the Research and Special Programs 
Administration (RSPA), DOT, has regulations for the commercial 
shipment of explosives (and other hazardous material) by rail, motor 
vehicle, cargo aircraft and ship within the United States. The 
regulations are found in Title 49 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ATF has jurisdiction over the storage of commercial explosives in 
order to provide for public safety. The storage requirements in 27 CFR 
part 55, Commerce in Explosives, include construction, separation 
distances, and some storage compatibility provisions. They also cover 
items such as licensing, records, and other administrative procedures.
    Two gaps in coverage require FAA involvement, namely, the handling 
of explosives and the treatment of liquid bi-propellants. In the first 
instance, ATF regulations are limited to storage, not the use or 
handling of an explosive. Many of the activities that occur on a launch 
site will not constitute storage. These activities include moving or 
handling solid rocket motors and other ordnance for the purpose of 
preparing a launch vehicle for flight, and the build-up and checkout of 
a launch vehicle on a launch pad. The FAA's proposed regulations are 
required to ensure the safety of the public from these activities. 
Additionally, ATF regulations only address solid explosives and liquid 
mono-propellants. Large quantities of liquid by-propellants are often 
used on existing launch sites, and many of these bi-propellants pose an 
explosive hazard to the public. The FAA is proposing rules to ensure 
the safe use and storage of liquid bi-propellants.
    OSHA explosives requirements are contained in 29 CFR 1910.109, 
Explosives and Blasting Agents. These requirements apply to the 
manufacture, keeping, having, storage, sale, transportation, and use of 
explosives, blasting agents and pyrotechnics. OSHA regulations do not 
address public safety. For example, 29 CFR 1910.109 only includes Q-D 
requirements for the separation of magazines from each other. OSHA 
requirements do not address public areas such as inhabited buildings, 
passenger railways, and public highways. The FAA believes Q-D 
requirements that adequately separate the public from the effects of an 
explosion are necessary to protect the public.
    The FAA recognizes that procedural measures may also be employed to 
achieve explosive safety. For example, if two customers of a launch 
site operator intend to conduct explosive handling operations in 
adjacent facilities that are not sited for public area distances, a 
launch site operator may schedule their operations at different times 
and keep one facility vacant to maintain safety. A licensee who 
proposed such measures as a substitute for the siting criteria proposed 
in this rulemaking would have to anticipate license terms and 
conditions that achieve an equivalent level for safety.
Current Q-D Standards
    Current standards effectively mitigate explosive hazards on federal 
launch ranges. The FAA, therefore, studied these standards in order to 
adopt the most relevant parts in its proposed Q-D standards. DOD, NASA, 
and, for storage, AFT, have explosive standards designed to protect the 
public.
    The DOD standard, ``DOD STD 6055.9, DOD Ammunition and Explosives 
Safety Standards,'' (Aug. 1997), is the standard used for explosive 
siting on DOD launch sites and for commercial launch sites located on 
DOD property. DOD 6055.9-STD defines general explosive safety criteria 
for use throughout the DOD, and

[[Page 34322]]

establishes protection criteria for personnel and assets such as 
facilities, equipment, and munitions. The DOD standard provides 
quantity-distance criteria to protect against overpressure and 
fragments, and permissible exposure levels to protect against thermal 
hazards.
    The Q-D criteria in DOD STD 6055.90 constitute a refinement of the 
American Table of Distances (ATD), originally published in 1910 by the 
Institute of Makers of Explosives. Authors of the ATD criteria 
acknowledged very early that listed separation distances do not provide 
absolute safety. The magnitude of the hazard is simply mitigated to a 
level the ATD authors deemed to be acceptable. Because of this, the FAA 
encourages license applicants to use greater distances where 
practicable.
    DOD STD 6055.9 also provides information relating to the 
construction and siting of facilities that are potential explosive 
sites or that may be exposed to the damaging effects of explosions. The 
effects of potential explosions may be altered significantly by 
construction features that limit the amount of explosives involved, 
attenuate resultant blast overpressure or thermal radiation, and reduce 
the quantity and range of hazardous fragments and debris. DOD also 
includes additional criteria for electrical safety and lightning.
    ATF also adopted the ATD in its approach to facility siting. ATF 
regulations provide procedural and substantive requirements regarding, 
in relevant part, the issuance of user permits and the storage of 
explosive materials. AFT specifies tables of distances for high 
explosives, low explosives, and blasting agents. The tables governing 
high explosives and low explosives are very pertinent to launch site 
operations.
    As noted, the scope of operations within a launch site goes beyond 
the on-site receipt, transfer and storage of explosives within ATF 
jurisdiction. A launch site may have a number of launch vehicle and 
payload customers on site who posses liquid and solid propellants that 
are being used for incorporation into a launch vehicle or payload.
    NASA's safety standards and policy for operations involving 
explosives are contained in ``Safety Standard for Explosives, 
Propellants, and Pyrotechnics,'' NSS 1740.12 (Aug. 12, 1993) (NASA 
Standard). This document contains a uniform set of standards for all 
NASA facilities engaged in the development, manufacture, handling, 
storage, transportation, processing, or testing of explosives. Like the 
DOD standard, the NASA standard contains guidelines and standards for 
explosives operations in order to safeguard not only the public, but 
personnel and property. It covers not only Q-D criteria, but personnel 
training, operating procedures, and other policies such as the use of 
all available advances in protective construction to provide the safety 
work environment to prevent or minimize the exposure of personnel and 
facilities to explosives hazards when performing NASA program 
activities.
FAA's Proposed Use of NASA and DOD Q-D Standards for Licensed Operation 
of a Launch Site
    Because the NASA and DOD standards are similar, and because both 
the NASA and DOD standards comprehensively cover explosive hazards at a 
launch site, the FAA has used both as a guide in proposing the rules in 
subpart B. However, the FAA proposes to employ the tables and many of 
the definitions of the NASA standard specifically.
    The relevant differences for solid explosives between NASA, DOD, 
and ATF are not significant. The NASA and ATF table for division 1.3 
explosives (discussed below) are identical except that ATF requirements 
stop at 300,000 pounds. The NASA division 1.3 table is also the same as 
the DOD standard except that the DOD standard has more increments.
    The relevant differences for liquid propellants between the NASA 
and DOD standards are also minor.\5\ The hazard groups that liquid 
propellants fall into, discussed below, are identical in the two 
standards. The values in the table used for explosive equivalents are 
also identical for quantities greater than 35,000 pounds. A discrepancy 
exists under 35,000 pounds because the DOD requirement is based on a 
table used for division 1.1 solid explosives.\6\ The distance specified 
below 35,000 pounds in the DOD table is based on the ranges of 
hazardous fragments and firebrands from an explosion. This is 
appropriate for solid explosives but is not necessary for liquid 
propellant explosive equivalents. The NASA standard, on the other hand, 
has separate tables for division 1.1 solid explosives and liquid 
propellant explosive equivalents. The NASA table for division 1.1 solid 
explosives takes fragments and firebrands into account, as appropriate. 
NASA's table for liquid propellants does not take fragmentation into 
account.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ ATF does not regulate liquid propellants, other than mono-
propellants.
    \6\ Solid explosives, like liquid explosives, may be measured in 
terms of explosive equivalency. The explosive equivalency of a 
certain weight of solid explosive is the weight of trinitrotoluene 
that would provide an equivalent blast effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Other Approaches to Explosive Safety
    The FAA has taken a number of measures in order to simplify the 
proposed Q-D standards. The proposed requirements do not account for 
the use of hardening or barricades, or for any other solid propellant 
other than division 1.3. The proposed rules also reflect that only two 
liquid propellant compatibility groups are necessary. These are 
discussed below.
    The proposed requirements do not account for hardening. Both NASA 
and DOD have standards for using protective construction to harden an 
explosive hazard facility to suppress explosion effects, and to harden 
an area potentially exposed to explosive hazards. In the NASA and DOD 
standards, the use of hardening may reduce the required distance 
between an explosive hazard facility and a public area. The proposed 
rules do not explicitly address hardening. The distances required 
between explosive hazard facilities and public areas assume that 
neither the explosive hazard facilities nor the public areas are 
hardened. Because of the complexity of hardening standards, the FAA 
believes hardening is better left to case-by-case approval. If an 
applicant plans to use hardening, the applicant should plan on 
demonstrating an equivalent level of safety to justify a reduction in 
applicable Q-D requirements.
    Similarly, the proposed requirements do not account for the use of 
barricades and other protective measures to mitigate the effect of an 
explosion on exposed areas. An applicant proposing to use such measures 
in order to deviate from the proposed siting rules may apply for a 
waiver to the FAA, accompanied with a demonstration that the applicant 
achieves an equivalent level of safety.
    The proposed requirements govern only one type of solid explosive, 
division 1.3. To classify solid propellants, the FAA is proposing to 
adopt the United Nations Organization (UNO) classification system for 
transport of dangerous goods. This classification system is reflected 
in DOD and NASA standards, and standards of the Department of 
Transportation's Research and Special Programs Administration. 
Propellants will be assigned the appropriate DOT class in accordance 
with 49 CFR part 173. The hazard classification system used by all 
three agencies consists of nine classes for dangerous goods with 
ammunition and explosives included in UNO ``Class 1, Explosives.'' 
Class 1 explosives are

[[Page 34323]]

further subdivided into ``divisions'' based on the character and 
predominance of the associated hazards and on the potential for causing 
casualties or property damage. As defined in 49 CFR 173.50:
      Division 1.1--consists of explosives that have a mass 
explosion hazard. A mass explosion is one which affects almost the 
entire load instantaneously.
      Division 1.2--consists of explosives that have a 
projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard.
      Division 1.3--consists of explosives that have a fire 
hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or 
both, but not a mass explosion hazard.
      Division 1.4--consists of explosives that present a minor 
explosion hazard.
      Division 1.5--consists of very insensitive explosives.
     Division 1.6--consists of extremely insensitive articles 
which do not have a mass explosion hazard.
    The FAA proposes criteria only for division 1.3. The only solid 
explosives for commercial launches that will likely affect separation 
distances on a launch site are division 1.3 propellants. Although 
launch vehicles frequently have components incorporating division 1.1 
explosives, such as those used to initiate flight termination systems, 
the quantity is small. Division 1.1 explosives will not likely be 
present in sufficient quantities to affect the application of Q-D 
criteria. The only division 1.1 solid rocket motors existing today are 
from old military missiles which are not likely to be used at a 
commercial launch site. When liquid fuels and oxidizers are located 
together, as they would be during a fueling test, the combination has 
an explosive potential equal to a percentage of division 1.1 
explosives. The proposed rules take such activities into account, but 
address liquid propellants separately from solid propellants.
    The proposed regulations would not assign compatibility groups for 
solid propellants. The NASA and DOD standards assign solid explosives 
to compatibility groups. Explosives are assigned to the same group when 
they can be stored together without significantly increasing either the 
probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of 
the effects of such an accident. Because division 1.3 solid propellants 
are all compatible, the proposed regulations do not incorporate 
compatibility groups for solid propellants.
    Like the DOD and NASA standards, the proposed rules classify each 
liquid propellant into one hazard group and one compatibility group. 
Classifying each liquid propellant into a hazard group is necessary 
because the hazards associated with different liquid propellants vary 
widely, and the quantity-distance relationship varies accordingly. 
Hazard group 1 individually represents a fire hazard, hazard group 2 
individually represents a more serious fire hazard, and hazard group 3 
individually represents a fragmentation hazard because propellants in 
this category can cause rupture of a storage container.
    The proposed rules classify current launch vehicle liquid 
propellants, namely, liquid hydrogen (LH2), RP-1, hydrazine (N2H4) and 
its variants (e.g. UDMH and Aerozine-50), hydrogen peroxide, liquid 
oxygen (LO2), and nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4). RP-1 and N2O4 fall into 
hazard group 1, hydrogen peroxide and LO2 fall into hazard group 2, and 
LH2 and N2H4 fall into hazard group 3. Other propellants will be 
classified on a case-by-case basis.
    Like the NASA and DOD standards, the proposed rules also assign 
each liquid propellant into a compatibility group. However, unlike 
those standards which cover many different types of propellants, only 
two compatibility groups are represented in the proposed rules, group A 
and group C. Group A represents oxidizers, such as LO2, N2O4, and 
hydrogen peroxide, and group C represents fuels. Whenever propellants 
of different compatibility groups are not separated by the minimum 
distance requirements, that is, when fuels and oxidizers are close 
enough to each other to potentially mix and explode, the explosive 
equivalency of the explosive mixture must be calculated.
Application of ATF, DOD, or NASA Standards
    The storage of solid propellant and liquid mono-propellant on a 
launch site is covered by ATF regulations, and therefore not addressed 
in the FAA's proposed requirements. ATF has a permit process for the 
storage of solid propellants and liquid mono-propellants. The FAA's 
proposed rules, therefore, do not cover the separation distance between 
magazines, or between magazines and public areas. However, an applicant 
must show any magazines in its explosive site plan and their location 
in relation to other explosive hazard facilities. Applicants should 
note that on federal launch ranges DOD or NASA standards apply. These 
launch sites may have Q-D requirements that are different than the 
FAA's proposed rules.
Future Change in Liquid Propellant Requirements
    The DOD Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) has initiated a DOD 
Explosive Safety Standard for Energetic Liquids Program, and has 
established an interagency advisory board called the Liquid Propellants 
Working Group (LPWG). The FAA is a member of this group. A number of 
possible inconsistencies and irregularities have been identified in the 
current approach to siting liquid propellants. These include Q-D 
criteria for most liquid propellants, possible inconsistencies in 
hazard group and compatibility group definitions, and possible 
inaccurate characterization of blast over pressure hazards of liquid 
propellant explosions. The purpose of the LPWG is to address issues of 
explosive equivalence, compatibility mixing, and quantity-distance 
criteria, and to develop recommended revisions to DOD STD 6055.9 
addressing liquid propellants and other liquid energetic materials. The 
LPWG is currently consolidating all available test and accident data, 
and non-DOD regulatory information to provide a basis for the 
revisions.
    Because the DDESB is possibly the best equipped group in the 
country to address these issues, the FAA will carefully consider its 
recommendations. The basic approach outlined in the proposed rule 
should not change. However, the DDESB is likely to specify new hazard 
and compatibility groups, distance values, and equivalency values, and 
the public may anticipate their eventual consideration and possible 
adoption by the FAA.
Solid and Liquid Bi-propellants at Launch Pads
    The FAA is proposing a special requirement at launch pads for 
launch vehicles that use liquid bi-propellant and solid propellant 
components. The required separation distance shall be the greater of 
the distance determined by the explosive equivalent of the liquid 
propellant alone or the solid propellant alone. An applicant does not 
have to add the separation distances of both. This notice assumes that 
generally, no credible scenario exists that could produce a 
simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks and 
solid propellant motors. Although not reflected in the published DOD 
and NASA standards, the proposed requirement constitutes current 
practice at federal launch ranges. The FAA is interested in the 
public's view on this approach.

[[Page 34324]]

C. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures

    Application of the proposed quantity-distance rules alone will not 
prevent mishaps from occurring on a launch site. The proposed Q-D rules 
merely reduce the risk to the public to an acceptable level if a mishap 
occurs, and if the public is kept away from the mishap by a distance 
that is at least as great as the public area distance. Safe facility 
design and prudent procedural measure are critical to preventing a 
mishap from occurring in the first place. Because visitors to a launch 
site cannot be protected by prudent site planning alone, the FAA has 
proposed launch site operator responsibilities to prevent mishaps 
involving propellants.
    The FAA considered measures taken at federal launch ranges to 
prevent inadvertent initiation of propellants. For this notice the FAA 
focused on those measures that are appropriate to be taken by a launch 
site operator. For the most part, the FAA considers it prudent to place 
the responsibility on a launch site operator for those measures that 
must be built into facilities. Requirements of a more operational 
nature will be covered in another rulemaking.
    The FAA focused on construction measures intended to prevent 
inadvertent initiation of propellant from electricity. These are 
particularly important for electro-explosive devices. Electric hazards 
include electrostatic discharge such as lightning, static electricity, 
electric supply systems, and electromagnetic radiation. As discussed 
below, the FAA is proposing launch site operator requirements for two 
of these electric hazards: Lightning and electric supply systems. Other 
measures were considered but rejected because the FAA's planned 
rulemaking on launches from non-federal launch sites will cover other 
procedural measures to guard against inadvertent initiation of 
propellants from electricity. Moreover, the FAA believes launch and 
launch site operators will implement prudent design and construction 
measures to comply with local, state, and other federal law, such as 
OSHA requirements. The FAA is interested in public views on this 
approach and any need to address other facility requirements.
Lighting Protection
    Rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels by lightning. 
The primary method of protecting against damage from lightning is to 
provide a means to direct a lightning discharge directly to the earth 
without causing harm to people or property. A lightning protection 
system consists of a system of air terminals such as lightning rods, a 
system of ground terminals, and a conductor system connecting the air 
terminals to the ground terminals. These systems are typically 
installed during construction.
    The FAA proposes to impose certain requirements on launch site 
operators involving lightning protection. The requirements are based on 
current industry practice, namely, DOD STD 6055.9, chapter 7, and the 
NASA standard's chapter 5. Each of those standards define, in detail, 
minimum explosives safety criteria for the design, maintenance, testing 
and inspection of lightning protection systems. The FAA's proposed 
rules are not as detailed as those standards so that an applicant may 
have more flexibility in meeting performance standards. The FAA expects 
applicants to achieve the level of safety represented by the DOD and 
NASA standard.
    The FAA's proposed rules were derived from the DOD and NASA 
standards, which are similar to each other. Like NASA and DOD, the 
proposed rules require lightning protection for all explosives hazard 
facilities. The design of lightning protection systems includes air 
terminals, low impedance paths to the ground, referred to as down 
conductors, and earth electrode systems. An air terminal is a component 
of a lightning protection system that is able to safely intercept 
lightning strikes. Air terminals may include overhead wires or grids, 
vertical spikes, or a building's grounded structural elements. Air 
terminals must be capable of safely conducting a lighting strike. Down 
conductors, such as wires or structural elements having high current 
capacity, provide low impedance paths from the air terminals described 
above to an earth ground system. Earth electrode systems dissipate the 
current from a lightning strike to ground.
    Bonding and surge protection are other important considerations for 
lightning protection systems. Metallic bodies, such as fences and 
railroad tracks near an explosive hazard facility, should be bonded to 
ensure that voltage potentials due to lightning are equal everywhere in 
the explosive hazard facility. Lightning protection systems should also 
include surge protection for all incoming conductors, such as metallic 
power, communication, and instrumentation lines coming into an 
explosive hazard facility, so as to reduce transient voltages due to 
lightning to a harmless level.
    The FAA proposes to adopt a provision of DOD STD 6055.9 that 
exempts the need for a lightning protection system when a local 
lightning warning system is used to permit operations to be terminated 
before the incidence of an electrical storm, if all personnel can and 
will be provided with protection equivalent to a public traffic route 
distance, which is equivalent to the FAA's proposed public area 
distance. The FAA is interested in views on this exception, and whether 
it is sensible in light of the small chance that lightning may cause 
inadvertent solid rocket motor flight. The FAA is also interested in 
views on whether other exceptions should be added.
    The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Batterymarch Park, 
Quincy, Massachusetts, has published a Lightning Protection Code, NFPA 
780 (1995). The FAA is interested in the public's views on the use and 
applicability of this code.
Static Electricity
    Rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels by extraneous 
electricity such as static electricity, fields around electric supply 
lines, and radio frequency emissions from radio, radar, and television 
transmitters.
    Static electricity is generally created by a transfer of electrons 
from one substance to another caused by friction or rubbing. The 
generation of static electricity is not in itself a hazard. The hazard 
arises when static electricity is allowed to accumulate, subsequently 
discharging as a spark across an air gap in the presence of highly 
flammable materials or energetic materials such as propellants. The 
NASA standard states that:

    In order for static to be a source of ignition, five conditions 
must be fulfilled: (1) A mechanism for generating static electricity 
must be present, (2) a means of accumulating or storing the charge 
so generated must exist, (3) a suitable gap across which the spark 
can develop must be present, (4) a voltage difference sufficient to 
cause electrical breakdown or dielectric breakdown must develop 
across the gap, and (5) a sufficient amount of energy must be 
present in the spark to exceed the minimum ignition energy 
requirements of the flammable mixture.\7\

    \7\ NASA Standard at 5-29.

    Electro-explosive devices are particularly susceptible to static 
discharge. The primary method used to neutralize static potential is to 
create an electrical path between the objects so that the potential 
charges will be equalized. This path can be generated by bonding 
potential charged objects to each other and humidifying or ionizing

[[Page 34325]]

the air to create a path for the charge to bleed off.
    Both NASA and DOD have standards to control static electricity. For 
example, they have standards \8\ to prevent static electricity 
accumulations that are capable of initiating combustible dusts, gases, 
flammable vapors, or exposed electroexplosive devices. The standards 
build on the National Electrical Code, published by the National Fire 
Protection Association as NFPA 70, which establishes standards for the 
design and installation of electrical equipment and wiring in hazardous 
locations containing combustible dusts, flammable vapors and gases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ DOD Standard, chapter 6, NASA Standard, chapter 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These standards require personnel and equipment in hazardous 
locations and locations where static sensitive EEDs are exposed to be 
grounded in a manner to effectively discharge static electricity. For 
example, the NASA standard requires personnel to wear static 
dissipation devices such as legstats and wriststats. Conductive shoes 
are required when handling, installing, or connecting or disconnecting 
EEDs.
    Solid rocket motors may also be initiated by static electricity. 
Material contact, specifically, the rubbing or removing of one material 
from another, such as removing tooling from a motor, can produce a 
static charge buildup in solid rocket motors. This energy, when 
released under appropriate conditions, may lead to a cascade discharge 
and propellant ignition. A number of incidents have occurred due to 
static electricity, including a Pershing II missile burn in West 
Germany, a Stage I Peacekeeper missile initiation at a manufacturing 
facility (due to the pulling of a tool), and a Minuteman State II 
missile ignition on the rapid pulling of the core.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ ``JANNAF Propulsion Systems Hazards Subcommittee 
Electrostatic Discharge Panel Report,'' CPIA Publication 510 (Mar. 
1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the control of static electricity is important for public 
safety, the FAA is not proposing any requirements in this rulemaking. 
The FAA believes that the control of static electricity in launch 
operations is primarily procedural in nature, and is best covered by 
the FAA in a future rulemaking on launches. The FAA is interested in 
the public's view on whether requirements should be placed on launch 
site operators.
Electric Supply Systems
    As noted above, rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels 
by extraneous electricity such as fields around high tension wires. 
Both the NASA standard, chapter 5, and DOD STD 6055.9, chapter 6, have 
similar standards to address the hazards from fields around high 
tension wires.
    The FAA proposes rules that are similar to both the NASA and DOD 
standard. As in those standards, the proposed rules require electric 
power lines to be no closer to an explosive hazard facility than the 
length of the lines between the poles or towers that support the lines, 
unless effective means is provided to ensure that energized lines 
cannot, on breaking, come in contact with the explosive hazard 
facility. The proposed rules also require towers or poles supporting 
electric distribution lines that carry between 15 and 69 KV, or 
electrical transmission lines that carry 69 KV or more, to be no closer 
to an explosive hazard facility than the public area distance for that 
explosive hazard facility.
Electromagnetic Radiation
    Rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels by extraneous 
electricity such as radio frequency emissions from radio, radar, and 
television transmitters. Radio frequency (RF) emitters may present a 
hazard to the public by direct exposure to high levels of RF energy. 
The levels of RF energy that are hazardous are dependent on frequency. 
For instance, ``ANSI C95.1-1991 Electromagnetic Fields, Safety Levels 
With Respect to Human Exposure to Radio Frequency'' defines the maximum 
safe level for personnel for frequencies between 0.003 and 0.1 MHz at 
100mWcm \2\, and a level of 180 mW/Cm \2\ for frequencies between 1.34 
and 3.0 MHz. More importantly for this proposal, RF emitters may 
present hazard to ordnance. At launch sites today, design and 
procedural methods are used to mitigate risks to personnel and 
ordnance. Separation distances are also used to ensure personnel and 
ordancne are not exposed to hazardous levels.
    One hazard of particular importance on a launch site is the 
accidental firing of electroexplosvie devices by stray electromagnetic 
energy. A large number of these devices are initiated by low levels of 
electrical energy and are susceptible to unintentional ignition by many 
forms of direct or induced stray electrical energy, such as from 
lightning discharges, static electricity, and radio frequency due to 
ground and airborne emitters.
    One federal launch site operator, the U.S. Air Force, defines its 
RF requirements in ``Air Force Manual (AFM) 91-201, Explosives Safety 
Standards,'' (Jan. 1998). Safe separation distance criteria are 
contained in section 2.58. A table is provided that gives minimum 
separation distances between EEDs (within explosive hazard facilities) 
and the transmitting antenna of all RF emitters. The distances are 
based on the frequency, transmitter power, and power ratio of the 
transmitting antenna. For worst-case situations, safe separation 
distances are based on frequency and effective radiated power. ``Worst-
case'' is defined as EEDs that are the most sensitive in the Air Force 
inventory, unshielded, having leads or circuitry which could 
inadvertently be formed into a resonant dipole, loop or other antenna. 
Where EEDs are in less hazardous configurations, the standard allows 
for shorter distances. The standard also allows for the conduct of 
power density surveys to ensure safety, in lieu of using the minimum 
safe separation distances defined from the table and figure. Power 
density surveys measure the actual conditions in an area here EEDs may 
be located, and are appropriate when the minimum distances cannot be 
complied with, for whatever reason, and when more than one transmitter 
is operating in a certain area at different frequencies.
    The FAA has not chosen to specifically address RF hazards in this 
proposal. OSHA covers direct exposure of personnel to RF.\10\ Although 
the FAA is not aware of any other federal regulations that specifically 
protect the public from the accidental firing of electroexplosive 
devices by stray electromagnetic energy, the FAA with this proposal is 
focussing on those measures that a launch site operator must build into 
its facilities. The distance requirements discussed above were 
considered by the FAA but other procedural means exist to mitigate RF 
hazards, including the FAA's proposed scheduling and coordination 
requirement for launch site operators. The procedural requirements of 
launch operators, covered in a separate rulemaking, in conjunction with 
the requirement in proposed Sec. 420.5 for a licensee to develop and 
implement procedures to coordinate operations carried out by launch 
site customers and their contractors, should prove adequate to address 
RF hazards. The FAA is interested in the public's view on whether other 
requirements, such as distance requirements, should be placed on launch 
site operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ 29 CFR 1910.97.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Launch Site Location Review

    The FAA intends a launch site location review to determine whether 
the location of a proposed launch site

[[Page 34326]]

would jeopardize public health and safety. To that end, the FAA 
proposes to determine whether at least one hypothetical launch could 
take place safely from a launch point at the proposed site. The FAA 
does not intend to license the operation of a launch site from which a 
launch could never safely take place. An applicant should, however, 
bear in mind that an FAA license to operate a launch site does not 
guarantee that a launch license would be issued for any particular 
launch proposed from that site. Accordingly, much of the decision 
making with respect to whether a particular site will be economically 
successful will rest, as it should, with a launch site operator, who 
will have to determine whether the site possesses sufficient flight 
corridors for economic viability. The FAA seeks through a location 
review only to ensure that at least one flight corridor exists that may 
be used safely for a hypothetical launch.
    Accordingly, prior to issuing a license to operate a launch site at 
the proposed location, the FAA will ascertain whether it is possible to 
launch at least one type of launch vehicle on at least one trajectory 
from each launch point at the proposed site while meeting the FAA's 
collective risk criteria. The FAA wants to ensure that there exists at 
least one flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas from a 
proposed launch site that would contain debris away from population. 
Launch is a dangerous activity that the FAA will allow to occur only 
when the risk to people is below an expected casualty (Ec) 
of 30  x  10-6. In other words, if there are too many people 
around a launch site or in a flight corridor the FAA will not license 
the site. The FAA's proposed methods for determining flight corridors 
and impact dispersion areas and estimating Ec are designed 
to ascertain whether a hypothetical flight corridor would avoid 
creating too much risk.
    All this is not to say that the FAA proposed to require an 
applicant for a license to operate a launch site to perform a complete 
flight safety analysis for a particular launch. The FAA recognizes that 
an applicant may or may not yet have customers or a particular launch 
vehicle in mind. Accordingly, the FAA's proposed launch site location 
review methods only approximate, on the basis of certain assumptions 
and recognizing that not all factors need to be taken into account, a 
full flight safety analysis that would be normally be performed for an 
actual launch. Of course, if an applicant does have a customer who 
satisfies the FAA's flight safety criteria for launch and obtains a 
license for launch from the site, that showing would also demonstrate 
to the FAA that a launch may occur safely from the proposed site, and 
the FAA could issue a license to operate the launch site on the basis 
of the actual launch proposed.
    Bear in mind also that the focus of FAA's proposed launch site 
location review methods is on expendable launch vehicles with a flight 
history. The reusable launch vehicles (RLV) currently proposed by 
industry vary quite a bit. Accordingly, the FAA considered it unwise to 
define a detailed analytical method for determining the suitability of 
a launch site location for RLVs. An applicant proposed a launch site 
limited to the launch of reusable launch vehicles would still need to 
define a flight corridor and conduct a risk analysis if population were 
present within the flight corridor, but the FAA will review such an 
analysis on a case-by-case basis consistent with the principles 
discussed in this rulemaking.
    Similarly, the FAA has chosen not to define a detailed analytical 
method for determining the suitability of a launch site location for 
unproven launch vehicles. An applicant proposing a launch site limited 
to the launch of unproven launch vehicles would have to demonstrate to 
the FAA that the launch site is safe for the activity planned.
    A launch site location review would provide an applicant with 
alternative methods for demonstrating that a proposed launch site 
satisfies FAA safety requirements. Specifically, the applicant must 
demonstrate that a flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas 
exist that do not encompass populated areas or that do not give rise to 
an Ec risk of greater than 30  x  10-6. Each 
proposed launch point must be evaluated for each type of launch 
vehicle, whether expendable orbital, guided sub-orbital or unguided 
sub-orbital, or reusable, that an applicant proposes would be launched 
from each point.
    Each of the three methods the FAA proposes for evaluating the 
acceptability of a launch site's location require an applicant to 
identify an area, whether a flight corridor or a set of impact 
dispersion areas, emanating from a proposed launch site. That area 
identifies the public that the applicant must analyze for risk of 
impact and harm. The FAA proposes to have an applicant who anticipates 
customers who use guided orbital launch vehicles define a flight 
corridor for a class of vehicles launched from a specific point along a 
specified trajectory, that extends 5,000 nautical miles from the launch 
point or until the launch vehicle's instantaneous impact point leaves 
the earth's surface, whichever is sooner. For guided sub-orbital launch 
vehicles, the flight corridor would end at an impact dispersion area of 
a final stage. An applicant would have to demonstrate either that there 
are no populated areas within the flight corridor or that the risk to 
any population in the corridor does not exceed the FAA's risk criteria. 
Similarly, for the sub-orbital launch of an unguided vehicle, an 
applicant would analyze the risks associated with a series of impact 
dispersion areas around the impact points for spent stages. If there 
are people in the dispersion areas, the applicant must demonstrate that 
the expected casualties from stage impacts do not exceed the FAA's risk 
criteria.
    Ec, or casualty expectancy, represents the FAA's measure 
of the collective risk to a population exposed to the launch of a 
launch vehicle. The measure represents the expected average number of 
casualties for a specific launch mission. In other words, if there were 
thousands of the same mission conducted and all the casualties were 
added up and the sum divided by the number of missions, the answer and 
the mission's expected casualty should statistically be the same. This 
Ec value defines the acceptable collective risk associated 
with a hypothetical launch from a launch point at a launch site, and, 
as prescribed by the proposed regulations, shall not exceed an expected 
average number of casualties of 0.00003 (30  x  10-6) for 
each launch point at an applicant's proposed launch site. This 
Ec value defines acceptable collective risk. In contrast to 
individual risk, which describes the probability of serious injury or 
death to a single person, the launch industry's common measure of risk 
is collective risk. The Ec value proposed originated with 
the Air Force's measure of acceptable risk. ``EWR 127-1,'' Sec. 1.4, 1-
12. Relying on the Air Force measure, the FAA proposed the adoption of 
collective risk and a risk level of 30  x  10-6 for licensed 
launches in an earlier proceeding. ``Commercial Space Transportation 
Licensing Regulations,'' (62 FR 13216, 13229-30 (Mar. 19, 1997). The 
FAA now proposes to use the same measure for evaluating the suitability 
of a proposed launch site location.
    Collective risk reflects the probability of injury or death to all 
members of a defined population set--in this case, those located within 
the flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas being analyzed--
placed at risk by a launch event. Collective risk constitutes the sum 
total launch related risk, that is, the

[[Page 34327]]

probability of injury or death, to that part of the public exposed to a 
launch. Collective risk is analogous to an estimate of the average 
number of people hit by lightning each year, while individual annual 
risk would be an individual's likelihood of being hit by lightning in 
any given year. Collective risk may be expressed in terms of individual 
risk if certain factors associated with any given launch are taken into 
account. Collective risk may be expressed in terms of individual risk 
when the exposed population consists of one person. Also, individual 
risk may be--and will be, in most instances--less than collective risk, 
depending on the size of the population exposed. For example, a 
collective Ec risk of 30  x  10-6 for a defined 
population of one hundred thousand people exposed to a particular 
launch results (assuming the risk is spread equally throughout the 
defined population) in a probability of injury or death to any one 
exposed individual of 3  x  10-10 (three per ten billion).
    The FAA's proposed methods for identifying a flight corridor or 
impact dispersion areas distinguish between guided orbital launch 
vehicles with a flight termination system (FTS), guided sub-orbital 
launch vehicles with an FTS, and unguided sub-orbital launch vehicles 
without an FTS.\11\ For purposes of this proposal, references to a 
guided launch vehicle, whether orbital or sub-orbital, may be taken to 
mean that the vehicle has an FTS. References to an unguided sub-orbital 
may be understood to mean that the vehicle does not possess an FTS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ This proposal does not propose a means for analyzing risks 
posed by a launch site for the launch of unguided suborbital launch 
vehicles that employ FTS. Historically, few of these vehicles have 
been launched. In the event an applicant for a license to operate a 
launch site wishes to operate a launch site only for such vehicles, 
the FAA will handle the request on a case by case basis. The FAA 
does note, however, that unguided suborbital launch vehicles that in 
the past have been launched with an FTS were usually launched with 
the FTS because the launch was otherwise too close to populated 
areas for the type of vehicle and trajectory flown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA's proposed regulations divide guided orbital launch 
vehicles into four classes, with each class defined by its payload 
weight capability, as shown in table 1. Sub-orbital launch vehicles are 
not divided into classes by payload weight, but are categorized as 
either guided or unguided. Table 2 shows the payload weight and 
corresponding classes of existing orbital launch vehicles. For a launch 
site intended for the use of orbital launch vehicles, an applicant 
would define a hypothetical flight corridor from a launch point at the 
proposed launch site for the largest launch vehicle class anticipated--
which the FAA anticipates would be based on expected customers.

                                                  Table 1.--Class of Launch Vehicles by Payload Weight
                                                                          [LBS]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Orbital launch vehicles
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          100 nm orbit                       Small                             Medium                            Medium large                  Large
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 deg. inc.\1\................  4,400               >4,400 to 11,100          >11,100 to <18,500                          >18,500
90 deg. inc.\2\................  3,300               >3,330 to 8,400           >8,400 to 15,000                 >15,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 28 deg. inclination orbit from a launch point at 28 deg. latitude.
\1\ 90 deg. inclination orbit.


                  Table 2.--Classification of Common Guided Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Payload weight  Payload weight
                                                  (lbs)           (lbs)
                  Vehicle                   --------------------------------                Class
                                              100 nm Orbit    100 nm Orbit
                                              29 deg. inc.    90 deg. inc.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conestoga 1229.............................             600             450  Small.
Conestoga 1620.............................           2,250           1,750  Small.
LML V-1....................................           1,755           1,140  Small.
LML V-2....................................           4,390           3,290  Small.
Pegasus....................................             700             N/A  Small.
Pegasus XL.................................           1,015             769  Small.
Scout......................................             560             460  Small.
Taurus.....................................           3,100           2,340  Small.
Atlas II...................................          14,500          12,150  Medium.
Atlas 2A...................................          16,050          13,600  Medium.
Delta 6920.................................           8,780           6,490  Medium.
Delta 7920.................................          11,220           8,575  Medium.
Titan II...................................             N/A           4,200  Medium.
Atlas 2AS..................................          19,050          16,100  Medium/Large.
Titan III..................................          31,200             N/A  Medium/Large.
Titan IV...................................          47,400          41,000  Large.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Methods for estimating the risk posed by the operation of a launch 
site for guided orbital and sub-orbital launch vehicles are presented 
in proposed appendices A, B and C. Appendix A contains instructions for 
creating a flight corridor for guided orbital and sub-orbital launch 
vehicles. Appendix B provides an alternative method to appendix A. 
Appendix B also instructs an applicant how to create a flight corridor 
for guided launch vehicles, but provides more detailed calculations to 
employ so that, although an appendix B flight corridor is typically 
less conservative than that of appendix A, it should provide more 
representative of actual vehicle behavior. Appendix C

[[Page 34328]]

contains the FAA's proposed method for applicants to analyze the risk 
posed by guided launch vehicles within a flight corridor created under 
appendix A or B. Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicles are presented in 
appendix D, which describes how an applicant should estimate impact 
dispersion areas and analyze the risk in those areas.
    Appendix A is less complex, but generates a larger flight corridor, 
than the methodology of appendix B. No local meteorological or vehicle 
trajectory data are required to estimate a flight corridor under 
appendix A. Because it is a simpler methodology, an applicant may want 
to use it as a screening tool. If an applicant can define a flight 
corridor for a single trajectory, using appendix A, that does not 
overfly populated areas, the applicant may satisfy the launch site 
location review requirements with the least effort. If, however, the 
corridor includes populated areas, the applicant has the choice of 
creating an appendix B flight corridor, which may be more narrow, or 
conducting a casualty expectancy analysis. An applicant is not required 
to try appendix A before employing appendix B.
    The FAA's proposed location review reflects a number of assumptions 
designed to keep the review general rather than oriented toward or 
addressing a particular launch. These assumptions are discussed more 
fully below, but may be summarized briefly. The location reviews for 
appendices A and B flight corridors reflect an attempt to ensure that 
launch failure debris would be contained within a safe area. Successful 
containment must assume a perfectly functioning flight termination 
system. A perfectly functioning flight termination system would ensure 
that any debris created by a launch failure would be contained within a 
flight corridor. When the high risk event is not launch failure but 
launch success, as tends to be the case with an unguided sub-orbital 
launch vehicle that does not employ an FTS, the FAA still proposes a 
location review based on an assumption of containment.
    The approaches provided in the four proposed location review 
appendices are based on some comment assumptions that reflect 
limitations of the launch site location review analysis. The FAA is not 
requiring an application to analyze the risks posed to the public by 
toxic materials that might be handled at the proposed site, nor the 
risk to ships or aircraft from launch debris or planned jettisoning of 
stages. The FAA recognizes that these assumptions represent a 
limitation in the launch site location review. The FAA intends that 
these three risks will be dealt with through pre-launch operational 
controls and launch commit criteria which will be better identified as 
part of a launch license review. All launches that take place from an 
approved U.S. launch site will either be regulated by the FAA through a 
launch license or will be U.S. government launches that the government 
carries out for the government.
    The two methods for creating guided launch vehicle flight corridors 
are intended to account for launch vehicle failure rate, malfunction 
turn capability, and the launch vehicle guidance accuracy as defined by 
the impact dispersions of these vehicles. The premise undergirding each 
of these proposed methods is that debris would be contained within the 
defined flight corridor or impact dispersion areas. Accordingly, for 
purposes of a launch site location review, only the populations within 
the defined areas need to be analyzed for risk. The FAA recognizes that 
were a flight termination system fail to destroy a vehicle as intended, 
a launch vehicle could stray outside its planned flight corridor. That 
concern will be better accommodated through another forum, namely, the 
licensing of a launch operator and the review of that launch operator's 
flight safety system. Because a containment analysis only looks at how 
far debris would travel in the event an errant vehicle were destroyed, 
the containment analysis has to assume a perfectly functioning flight 
termination system. In other words, for purposes of analyzing the 
acceptability of a launch site's location for launching guided 
expendable launch vehicles, the FAA will assume that a malfunctioning 
vehicle will be destroyed and debris will always impact within 
acceptable boundaries. Accordingly, the FAA does not propose to 
explore, for purposes of determining the acceptability of a launch 
site's location, the possibility that a vehicle's flight termination 
system may fail and that the vehicle could continue to travel toward 
populated areas. Any proposed site may present such risks--indeed, any 
proposed launch presents such risks--but they are best addressed in the 
context of individual launch systems. This working assumption of a 
perfectly reliable flight termination system will not, of course, apply 
to the licensing of a launch of a launch vehicle. The FAA will consider 
the reliability of any particular launch vehicle's FTS in the course of 
a launch license review. From a practical standpoint, this means that 
for the launch site location review, both nominal and failure-produced 
debris would be contained within a flight corridor, obviating the need 
for risk analyses that address risk outside of a defined flight 
corridor or set of impact dispersion areas.
    Additionally, the FAA does not propose to require an applicant to 
analyze separately the risks posed by the planned impact of normally 
jettisoned stages from a guided expendable launch vehicle, except for 
the final stage of a guided sub-orbital launch vehicle. The FAA does 
not consider intermediate stage impact analysis necessary to assess the 
general suitability of a launch point for guided expendable launch 
vehicles because the impact location of stages is inherently launch 
vehicle-specific, and the trajectory and timing for a guided launch 
vehicle can normally be designed so that the risks from nominally 
jettisoned stages will be kept to acceptable levels. A launch license 
review will have to ensure that vehicle stages are not going to impact 
in densely populated areas. Risk calculations performed for launches 
from federal launch ranges demonstrate a relatively low risk posed by 
controlled disposition of stages in comparison to the risk posed by 
wide-spread dispersion of debris due to vehicle failure.
    Each of the FAA's proposed approaches to defining flight corridors 
or impact dispersion areas is designed to analyze the highest risk 
launch event associated with a particular vehicle technology. This is 
not meant to imply that lower risk launch events are necessarily 
acceptable; only that they will not be considered in the course of this 
review. For a guided orbital launch vehicle, that event is vehicle 
failure. For an unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle, the launch event 
of highest risk is vehicle success, namely, the predicted impact of 
stages. For a guided launch vehicle the overflight risk, which results 
from a vehicle failure followed by its destruction (assuming no FTS 
failure), is the dominant risk. Risks from nominally jettisoned debris 
are subsumed in the overflight risk assessment. For an unguided sub-
orbital launch vehicle, the FAA proposes that risk due to stage impact 
be analyzed instead of the overflight risk. This distinction is 
necessitated by the fact that the failure rate during thrust is 
historically significantly lower for unguided vehicles than for guided 
vehicles. Current unguided launch vehicles with many years of use are 
highly reliable. They do not employ an FTS; therefore, debris pieces 
usually consist of vehicle components that are not broken up. Another 
reason for the

[[Page 34329]]

difference between analyses is that unguided vehicle stage impact 
dispersions are significantly larger than guided vehicle impact 
dispersions. These differences add up to greater risk within an 
unguided launch vehicle stage impact dispersion area than the areas 
outside the dispersion areas. Therefore, a risk assessment is only 
performed on those populations within an unguided launch vehicle stage 
impact dispersion area.
    An applicant must define an area called an overflight exclusion 
zone (OEZ) around each launch point, and the applicant must demonstrate 
that the OEZ can be clear of the public during a launch. An OEZ defines 
the area where the public risk criteria of 30 x 10-6 would 
be exceeded if one person were present in the open. The overflight 
exclusion zone was estimated from risk computations for each launch 
vehicle type and class. An applicant must define an OEZ because launch 
vehicle range rates are slow in the launch area, launch vehicle 
effective casualty areas, the area within which all casualties are 
assumed to occur through exposure to debris, are large, and impact 
dispersion areas are dense with debris so that the presence of one 
person inside this hazardous area is expected to produce Ec 
values exceeding the public risk criteria. Accordingly, an applicant 
would either have to own the property, demonstrate to the FAA that 
there are times when people are not present, or that it could clear the 
public from the overflight exclusion zone prior to a launch. Evacuating 
an overflight exclusion zone for an inland site, might, for example, 
require an applicant to demonstrate that agreements have been reached 
with local officials to close any public roads during a launch. The FAA 
seeks comments on the feasibility of evacuating areas inland and on the 
impact of the OEZ requirement on the ability to gain a license for an 
inland site.

E. License Conditions

    A license may contain conditions flowing from the various reviews 
conducted during the application process. For example, a license 
granted following approval of a launch site location would be limited 
to the launch points analyzed, and the type and class of vehicle used 
in the demonstration of site location safety. An applicant may choose 
to analyze all three types of launch vehicles in its application. An 
FAA launch site operator license authorizing the operation of a launch 
site for launch of an orbital expendable launch vehicle would allow the 
launch of vehicles from the site that were less than or equal to the 
class of launch vehicle, based on payload weight, used to demonstrate 
the safety of the site location. If a licensee later wanted to offer 
the launch site for the launch of a larger class of vehicles or a 
different type of launch vehicle, such as an unguided sub-orbital 
launch vehicle, the licensee would be required to request a license 
modification and demonstrate that the larger vehicle or different type 
of vehicle could be safely launched from the launch site. Likewise, the 
addition of a new launch point would require a license modification. 
The demonstration would be based on the same kinds of analyses used for 
the original license. In some cases, a licensee might be able to use 
the safety analyses performed by a launch operator to meet location 
review requirements.
    Although the authority granted by the launch site operator license 
would be limited to certain types or classes of vehicles, the license 
would not represent a guarantee that the FAA would necessarily license 
any particular launch from an approved launch site. The demonstration 
is intended to ensure that the location of the launch site can safely 
support at least some type of vehicle, launched on a specific 
trajectory. The planned launch of an actual vehicle may differ from the 
hypothetical trajectory or vehicle characteristics used for the launch 
site location demonstration, potentially posing different risks to the 
public than those used in the site location demonstration. In addition 
to the protection provided by a safe launch site location, the safety 
of any actual flight of a launch vehicle will be dependent on the 
safety procedures, personnel qualifications, safety systems, and other 
elements of the proposed launch. Consequently, each launch operator, 
other than the U.S. Government, must obtain a launch license for its 
specific operations.

F. Operational Responsibilities

    The FAA is proposing to impose certain operational responsibilities 
on an operator of a launch site. In addition, the FAA proposes to 
distinguish between activities covered by a license to operate a launch 
site and those covered by a launch license. Any activity that will be 
approved as part of a launch license will not be covered in a launch 
site operator license even if the launch site operator provides the 
service. For example, because a launch licensee will need to assure the 
adequacy of ground tracking, approval of ground tracking systems will 
be handled in the launch license process even if a launch site operator 
provides the service. Similarly, in the case of ground safety, a launch 
site operator may provide fueling for a launch licensee, but safe 
procedures for fueling will be addressed in the launch license.
    The operational requirements being proposed for the operator of a 
launch site addresses control of public access, scheduling of 
operations at the site, notifications, recordkeeping, launch site 
accident response and investigation, and explosive safety. A launch 
site operator licensee would be required to control access to the site. 
Security guards, fences, or other physical barriers may be used. Anyone 
entering the site must, on first entry, be informed of the site's 
safety and emergency response procedures. Alarms or other warning 
signals would be required to alert persons on the launch site of any 
emergency that might occur when they are on site. If a launch site 
licensee has multiple launch customers on site at one time, the 
licensee must have procedures for scheduling their operations so that 
the activities of one customer do not create hazards for others.
    Because it is more efficient to have a single point of contact for 
launches conducted at a site, the FAA is proposing that the launch site 
operator be responsible for all initial coordination with the 
appropriate FAA regional office having jurisdiction over the airspace 
where launches will take place and the U.S. Coast Guard (where 
applicable) through a written agreement. The FAA's Air Traffic Service 
and the Coast Guard issues Notice to Airmen and Mariners, respectively, 
to ensure that they avoid hazardous areas. An FAA Air Route Traffic 
Control Center also closes airways during a launch window, if 
necessary. A launch site operator would be required to obtain an 
agreement regarding procedures for coordinating contacts with these 
agencies for launches from the site. The requirement for coordinating 
with the Coast Guard might not, of course, always be applicable, for 
example, for an inland launch site. A launch site operator licensee 
would also have to notify local officials with an interest in the 
launch. These would include officials with responsibilities that might 
be called into play by a launch mishap, such as fire and emergency 
response personnel.
    Another operational requirement being proposed is for the operator 
of a launch site to develop and implement a launch site accident 
investigation plan containing procedures for investigating and 
reporting a launch site accident. This would extend similar reporting, 
investigation and response procedures

[[Page 34330]]

currently applicable to launch related accidents and incidents to 
accidents occurring during ground activities at a launch site. Lastly, 
an operator of a launch site would have responsibilities regarding 
explosives, specifically, those dealing with lightning and electric 
power lines. This has been discussed above.

III. Part Analysis

Part 417--License to Operate a Launch Site

    The FAA removes and reserves part 417 and creates part 420 to 
address licensing and operation of a launch site.

Part 420--License to Operate a Launch Site

    Proposed Sec. 420.1 would describe the scope of proposed part 420. 
Part 420 would encompass the requirements for obtaining a license to 
operate a launch site and with which a licensee must comply.
    Proposed Sec. 420.3 would specify the person who must apply for a 
license to operate a launch site, and the person who must comply with 
regulations that apply to a licensed launch site operator. Because a 
launch site operator is someone who offers a launch site to others for 
launch, only someone proposing such an offer need obtain a license to 
operate a launch site. A launch operator proposing to launch from its 
own launch site need only obtain a launch license because a launch 
license will address safety issues related to a specific launch and 
because a launch license encompasses ground operations.
    Proposed Sec. 420.5 would add terms that have not been previously 
defined by the FAA. These definitions would apply in the context of 
part 420, which governs the licensing and safety requirements for 
operation of a launch site. These terms do not apply outside part 420. 
Specifically, the following terms would be defined:
    Ballistic Coefficient () means the weight (W) of an object 
divided by the quantity product of the coefficient of drag 
(Cd) of the object and the area (A) of the object.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.000

A ballistic coefficient is a parameter used to describe flight 
characteristics of an object.
    Compatibility means the chemical property of materials that may be 
located together without adverse reaction. Compatibility in storage 
exists when storing materials together does not increase the 
probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of 
the effects of such an accident. Compatibility determines whether 
materials require segregation. The FAA derived this definition from a 
NASA definition, which states that compatibility is ``the chemical 
property of materials to coexist without adverse reaction for an 
acceptable period of time. Compatibility in storage exists when storing 
materials together does not increase the probability of an accident or, 
for a given quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an accident. 
Storage compatibility groups are assigned to provide for segregated 
storage.'' \12\ The FAA proposes to adapt the NASA definition in order 
to describe coexistence with greater specificity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ NASA Standard at A-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Debris dispersion radius (Dmax) means the estimated 
maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels given a worst-
case launch vehicle failure and flight termination at 10 seconds into 
flight. If a launch vehicle failure occurs shortly after ignition, and 
a flight termination system is employed, the FAA expects the debris to 
be contained within an area described by Dmax.
    Division 1.3 explosive means an explosive as defined in 49 CFR 
173.50. That provision is part of the hazardous materials regulations 
of the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) of the 
Department of Transportation. Section 173.50 defines a division 1.3 
explosive as ``. . . consist(ing) of explosives that have a fire hazard 
and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both, 
but not a mass explosion hazard.'' This classification is identical to 
the United Nations Organization classification, and is also used by 
NASA and the Department of Defense.
    Downrange area means a portion of a flight corridor beginning where 
a launch area ends and ending 5,000 nautical miles (nm) from the launch 
point for an orbital launch vehicle, and ending with an impact 
dispersion area for a guided sub-orbital launch vehicle.
    E,F,G coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
geocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system is 
at the center of an ellipsoidal Earth model. The E-axis is positive 
directed through the Greenwich meridian. The F-axis is positive 
directed through 90 degrees east longitude. The EF-plane is coincident 
with the ellipsoidal Earth model's equatorial plane. The G-axis is 
normal to the EF-plane and positive directed through the north pole.
    E,N,U coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system 
is at a launch point. The E-axis is positive directed east. The N-axis 
is positive directed north. The En-plane is tangent to an ellipsoidal 
Earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to the geodetic 
vertical. The U-axis is normal to the EN-plane and positive directed 
away from the Earth.
    Effective casualty area (Ac) means the aggregate 
casualty area of each piece of debris created by a launch vehicle 
failure at a particular point on its trajectory. The effective casualty 
area for each piece of debris is the area within which 100 percent of 
the unprotected population on the ground are assumed to be a casualty, 
and outside of which 100 percent of the population are assumed not to 
be a casualty. This area is based on the characteristics of the debris 
piece including its size, the path angle of its trajectory, impact 
explosions, and debris skip, splatter, and bounce.
    Explosive means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that, 
when subjected to heat, impact, friction, detonation or other suitable 
initiation, undergoes a rapid chemical change that releases large 
volumes of highly heated gases that exert pressure in the surrounding 
medium. The term applies to materials that either detonate or 
deflagrate. With the exception of a minor editorial change, this 
proposed definition is identical to that of NASA.\13\ For comparison, 
49 CFR 173.50 of RSPA's regulations defines an explosive as, ``. . . 
any substance or article . . . which is designed to function by 
explosion . . . or which, by chemical reaction within itself, is able 
to function in a similar manner even if not designed to function by 
explosion. . . .'' Both definitions are consistent with each other, and 
the FAA proposes to use the NASA definition because it is more 
descriptive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ NASA Standard at A-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Explosive equivalent means a measure of the blast effects from 
explosion of a given quantity of material expressed in terms of the 
weight of trinitrotoluene (TNT) that would produce the same blast 
effects when detonated. This proposed definition is identical to the 
NASA definition for ``TNT equivalent,'' and similar to the DOD 
definition of ``explosive equivalent'' which defines the term, in 
relevant part, as ``(t)he amount of a standard explosive that, when 
detonated, will produce a blast effect comparable to that which results 
at the same distances from the

[[Page 34331]]

detonation or explosion of a given amount of the material for which 
performance is being evaluated.'' \14\ DOD uses TNT as the standard 
explosive, thus rendering the NASA and DOD terms interchangeable. FAA 
proposes to use the more general term ``explosive equivalent'' instead 
of ``TNT equivalent.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ DOD Standard at A-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Explosive hazard facility means a facility at a launch site where 
solid or liquid propellant is stored or handled. The FAA proposes to 
define this term for the purpose of identifying specific hazard 
facilities on a launch site that present potential explosive hazards. 
NASA and DOD use the more general term ``potential explosive site,'' 
which is defined, in part, as ``the location of a quantity of 
explosives that will create a blast fragment, thermal, or debris hazard 
in the event of an accidental explosion of its contents. . . .'' \15\ 
As proposed, an explosive hazard facility may include a location where 
explosives are either handled or stored.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ DOD Standard at A-7; NASA Standard at A-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Flight azimuth means the initial direction in which a launch 
vehicle flies relative to true north expressed in degrees-decimal-
degrees. For example, due east is 90 degrees.
    Flight corridor means an area on the earth's surface estimated to 
contain the majority of hazardous debris from nominal and non-nominal 
flight of an orbital or guided sub-orbital launch vehicle.
    Guided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub: orbital rocket that 
employs an active guidance system.
    Impact dispersion area means an area representing an estimated five 
standard deviation dispersion about a nominal impact point of an 
intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch vehicle. The 
definition is confined to proposed part 420, and should not be confused 
with other impact dispersion areas that may be defined by the federal 
launch ranges for their particular launch safety programs.
    Impact dispersion factor means a constant used to estimate, using a 
stage apogee, a five standard deviation dispersion about a nominal 
impact point of an intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch 
vehicle. Intermediate stages include all stages up to the final stage.
    Impact dispersion radius (R) means a radius that defines an impact 
dispersion area. It applies to all launch vehicle stages.
    Impact range means the distance between a launch point and the 
impact point of a sub-orbital launch vehicle stage.
    Impact range factor means a constant used to estimate, with the use 
of a launch vehicle stage apogee, the nominal impact point of an 
intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch vehicle.
    Instantaneous impact point (IIP) means an impact point, following 
thrust termination of a launch vehicle, calculated in the absence of 
atmospheric drag effects, that is, a vacuum. This shows the point at 
which launch vehicle debris would land in the event thrust was 
terminated. In this proposal, the IIP calculations would assume a 
vacuum.
    Instantaneous impact point (IIP) range rate means a launch 
vehicle's estimated IIP velocity along the Earth's surface. It is 
typically abbreviated as R, or R-dot.
    Intraline distance means the minimum distance permitted between any 
two explosive hazard facilities in the ownership, possession or control 
of one launch site customer. Intraline distance prevents the 
propagation of an explosion. In other words, with an appropriate 
intraline distance, an explosive mishap at one explosive hazard 
facility would not cause an explosive event at another explosive hazard 
facility. The FAA anticipates that worker safety requirements will 
dictate protection of employees and anticipates that all licensees will 
familiarize themselves with those requirements and conform to them in 
accordance with the law. Unlike distances used to protect the public, 
intraline distance will not protect workers with the same level of 
protection as the public. NASA defines intraline distance as ``(t)he 
distance to be maintained between any two operating buildings and sites 
within an operating line, of which at least one contains or is designed 
to contain explosives, . . .''.\16\ Thus, for NASA, the criteria for 
using intraline distance is whether the areas are within an operating 
line. An operating line is a ``group of buildings used to perform the 
consecutive steps in the loading, assembling, modification, normal 
maintenance, renovation, or salvaging of an item or in the manufacture 
of an explosive or explosive device.'' \17\ The FAA's proposed 
definition is more suitable to its statutory obligation to protect 
public safety because public safety dictates only that explosive hazard 
facilities of one launch operator be sited in a manner to prevent the 
propagation of an explosion. If intraline distances are not maintained 
between two explosive hazard facilities, then the larger area 
encompassing both quantities must be used for Q-D purposes when 
determining prescribed distances to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ NASA Standard at A-7.
    \17\ NASA Standard at A-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Launch area means, for a flight corridor defined using appendix A, 
the portion of a flight corridor from the launch point to a point 100 
nm in the direction of the flight azimuth. For a flight corridor 
defined using appendix B, a launch site is the portion of a flight 
corridor from the launch point to the enveloping line enclosing the 
outer boundary of the last Di dispersion circle.
    Launch point means a point on the earth from which the flight of a 
launch vehicle begins, and is defined by the point's geodetic latitude, 
longitude and height on an ellipsoidal Earth model.
    Launch site accident means an unplanned event occurring during a 
ground activity at a launch site resulting in a fatality or serious 
injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who is not associated 
with the activity, or any damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to 
property not associated with the activity. The FAA considers any 
licensee or its employees, or any licensee customer, contractor, or 
subcontractor or the employees of any of these persons to be associated 
with a ground activity. Property not associated with the activity will 
typically include any property belonging to members of the public or 
personal property of employees. Property associated with the activity 
includes the property of a launch site operator or launch licensee, or 
either licensee's customers, contractors or subcontractors.
    Net explosive weight (NEW) means the total weight, expressed in 
pounds, of explosive material or explosive equivalency contained in an 
item. This term is used for applying Q-D criteria to solid propellants, 
and for liquid propellants when explosive equivalency applies. 
Explosive equivalency applies to liquid propellants when a liquid fuel 
and a liquid oxidizer are close enough together that their explosive 
potential combined must be used when determining prescribed distances 
to the public.
    Nominal means, in reference to launch vehicle performance, 
trajectory, or stage impact point, a launch vehicle flight where all 
launch vehicle aerodynamic parameters are as expected, all vehicle 
internal and external systems perform exactly as planned, and there are 
no external perturbing influences (e.g., winds) other than atmospheric 
drag and gravity.
    Nominal trajectory means the position and velocity components of a 
nominally

[[Page 34332]]

performing launch vehicle relative to an x,y,z, coordinate system, 
expressed in x,y,z,x,y,z. The x,y,z coordinates describe the position 
of the vehicle both for projecting the proposed flight path and during 
actual flight. The x,y,z variables describe the velocity of the 
vehicle.
    Overflight dwell time means the period of time it takes for a 
launch vehicle's IIP to move past a populated area. For a given 
populated area, the overflight dwell time is the time period measure 
along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace from the time point whose 
normal with the trajectory intersects the most uprange part of the 
populated area to the time point whose normal with the trajectory 
intersects the most downrange part of the populated area.
    Overflight exclusion zone means a portion of a flight corridor 
which must remain clear of the public during the flight of a launch 
vehicle.
    Populated area means a land area with population. For a part 420 
site location risk analysis of a populated area within the first 100 nm 
of a launch point, a populated area is no greater than a census block 
group in the U.S., and an equivalent size outside the U.S. For analysis 
of a part 420 flight corridor more than 100 nm downrange from the 
launch point, a populated area is no greater than a 1 deg. X 1 deg. 
latitude/longitude grid, whether in the United States or not.
    Population density means the number of people per unit area in a 
populated area.
    Position data means data referring to the current position of a 
launch vehicle with respect to time using the X, Y, Z coordinate 
system.
    Public area means any area outside an explosive hazard facility and 
is an area that is not in the possession, ownership or other control of 
a launch site operator or of a launch site customer who possesses, owns 
or otherwise controls that explosive hazard facility. For purposes of 
Q-D criteria, the proposed rules treat any location outside a launch 
site boundary as a public area for any activity at a launch site. 
Certain areas within a launch site are also considered public areas for 
purposes of applying Q-D criteria. With respect to any given launch 
operator, areas where other launch operators are located, or where the 
launch site operator Commission is located, are public areas.
    Public area distance means the minimum separation distance 
permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard facility. 
Although NASA and DoD differentiate between areas that contain 
inhabited buildings and areas that contain public traffic routes, with 
inhabited buildings requiring greater separation distances, the FAA's 
proposed requirements does not make the same differentiation.\18\ The 
FAA proposes to use NASA's and DoD's more conservative inhabited 
building distance as the required distance between an explosive hazard 
facility and all public areas. This is because a public area is not in 
the control of the applicant, and can, therefore, contain anything from 
open land to groups of office buildings. This is consistent with the 
approach taken by NASA and DoD for areas outside a launch site. For 
example, NASA defines inhabited building distance as ``(t)he minimum 
allowable distance between an inhabited building and an explosive area. 
Inhabited building distances are used between explosives areas and 
administrative areas, also between operating lines with dissimilar 
hazards and between explosive locations and other exposures. Inhabited 
building distances will also be provided between explosive areas and 
Center boundaries.''\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ Nor does the FAA attempt to protect inhabited buildings 
that are not considered property of the public.
    \19\ NASA Standard at A-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub-orbital rocket that 
does not have a guidance system.
    X,Y,Z coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system 
is at a launch point. The X-axis coincides with the initial launch 
azimuth and is positive in the downrange direction. The Y-axis is 
positive to the left looking downrange. The XY-plane is tangent to the 
ellipsoidal earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to 
the geodetic vertical. The Z-axis is normal to the XY-plane and 
positive directed away from the earth.
    0, 0, 0 
means a latitude, longitude, height system where 0 
is the geodetic latitude of a launch point, 0 is 
the east longitude of the launch point, and h is the height of the 
launch point above a reference ellipsoid. 0 and 
0 are expressed in degrees decimal degrees, which 
is abbreviated as DDD.
    Proposed subpart B would contain the criteria and information 
requirements for obtaining a license to operate a launch site. Section 
420.15 would specify the information that an applicant for a launch 
site license would have to submit as part of its license application. 
The FAA requires this information to evaluate environmental impacts, 
whether the launch site location could safely be used to conduct 
launches, issues affecting national security and foreign policy, 
explosive site safety, and whether the applicant will operate safely.
    Proposed Sec. 420.15(a) contains the environmental review 
requirements currently located at Sec. 417.105-107.
    Proposed Sec. 420.15(b) would provide the information necessary for 
a location review. It would also require foreign ownership information 
and an explosive site plan.
    Proposed Sec. 420.15(c) requires an applicant to demonstrate how it 
will satisfy its subpart D responsibilities. Specifically, a license 
applicant must show how the applicant proposes to control public access 
pursuant to Sec. 420.53, how it proposes to comply with the scheduling 
requirements of Sec. 420.55, and how it proposes to satisfy the 
notification obligations of Sec. 420.57. The FAA requires this 
information to ascertain whether an applicant will be able to satisfy 
the subpart D performance requirements and for compliance monitoring 
purposes. With regard to the notification obligations of Sec. 420.57, 
an applicant must submit its agreements with the U.S. Coast Guard 
district and the FAA regional office for air traffic services to 
demonstrate satisfaction of the requirements of Sec. 420.57(b) and (c). 
A license applicant must also show how it proposes to comply with the 
accident investigation requirements in Sec. 420.59 and requirements on 
explosives in Sec. 420.63.
    Proposed Sec. 420.15(d) provides that an applicant who is proposing 
to locate a launch site at an existing launch point at a federal launch 
range is not required to perform a location review if a launch vehicle 
of the same type and class as proposed for the launch point has been 
safely launched from the launch point. An applicant who is proposing to 
locate at a federal launch range is not required to submit an explosive 
site plan.
    Section 420.17 would establish the bases upon which the FAA will 
make its license determination. This includes the FAA's determination 
of the adequacy of information provided by the applicant, the 
conclusions of the environmental and policy reviews, the adequacy of 
the explosive site plan, and satisfaction of site location 
requirements. The FAA will notify the applicant of, and allow the 
applicant to address, any deficiencies in the application.
    Section 420.19 would require an applicant to demonstrate that its 
proposed launch site location will allow for the safe launch of at 
least one type of launch vehicle by defining flight corridors or impact 
dispersion areas and estimating casualty expectancy.

[[Page 34333]]

    Section 420.21 would require an applicant to specify which launch 
vehicle type and class would be launched from each launch point at the 
proposed launch site. This section also proposes to define the minimum 
distance from each launch point to a launch site boundary.\20\ The 
three types of expendable launch vehicle proposed account for the 
critical distinctions between launch vehicles designed for orbital or 
sub-orbital flight, and between those with and without guidance 
systems. Guided orbital expendable launch vehicles typically require an 
FTS, which means that the greatest risk to the public stems from debris 
caused by destruction of a vehicle. Guided sub-orbital launch vehicles 
will be treated similarly to orbital launch vehicles, except for the 
nominal impact of the final stage. In contrast, unguided sub-orbital 
launch vehicles generally have high reliability levels, and therefore 
crate the greatest public risk through nominal stage impact. The 
methods proposed in the appendices are designed to account for these 
differences in public risk. Orbital expendable launch vehicles are also 
sorted by class, which is determined by payload weight capacity. 
Minimum distances are based on actual computations for each of the 
launch vehicle types and classes. The safety of launch points for 
reusable launch vehicles will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in a 
manner consistent with the principles expressed here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ The FAA also proposed minimum distances between a launch 
point and a launch site boundary in its explosive site plan 
requirements in subpart B. Because both requirements apply, an 
applicant must apply the greater of the Dmax or Q-D 
distance to accommodate the greater of the hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 420.23 would state that the FAA will evaluate the adequacy 
of a launch site location for unproven launch vehicles on a case-by-
case basis.
    Subpart B also contains the FAA's proposed explosive facility 
siting standards for the protection of the public from launch site 
explosive hazards created by liquid and solid propellants. These 
standards would be used by an applicant to site facilities that support 
activities involving liquid and solid propellants, or facilities 
potentially exposed to such activities, and to document the layout of 
these facilities.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ An analysis may include evaluations of blast hazards; 
fragment hazards; protective construction; grounding, bounding and 
lighting protection systems; electrical installations; natural or 
man-made terrain features; or other mission or local requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to comply with proposed subpart B, an applicant would 
first determine those areas at its proposed launch site where solid or 
liquid propellant would be stored or handled, and which the FAA 
proposes to designate as explosive hazard facilities. They may include 
payload processing facilities, launch pads, propellant storage or 
transfer tanks, and solid rocket motor assembly buildings. An applicant 
must then determine the types and maximum quantity of propellants to be 
located at each explosive hazard facility. For solid propellants, the 
applicant would determine the total weight, expressed in pounds, of 
division 1.3 explosive material to be contained in the items that will 
be located at each explosive hazard facility. For liquid propellants, 
the applicant would determine either the explosive equivalency of a 
fuel and oxidizer combination if fuels and oxidizers would be located 
together at, what is referred to as, incompatible distances; or, if 
fuels and oxidizers would not be located together, an applicant would 
determine the net weight in pounds of liquid propellant in each 
explosive hazard facility.
    The next step for an applicant would be to determine the minimum 
allowable separation distance between each explosive hazard facility 
and all other explosive hazard facilities, the launch site boundary, 
and other public areas such as the launch complex of another launch 
operator, public railways and highways running through the launch site, 
and any visitor centers. The distances between explosive hazard 
facilities are important to ensure that an explosive event in one 
explosive hazard facility would not cause an explosive event in another 
explosive hazard facility. The distances between explosive hazard 
facilities and public areas are important to ensure that the public is 
protected from blast, debris, and thermal hazards. Exact distances must 
be given between the wall or corner of the facility closest to the 
closest wall or corner of other explosive hazard facilities and public 
areas. Minimum allowable distances based on the type and quantity of 
propellant to be located within an explosive hazard facility. 
Determining the minimum allowable distance between two explosive hazard 
facilities is accomplished by applying the applicable criteria to each 
and then separating them by at least the greater distance prescribed 
for each explosive hazard facility. For example, if a certain amount of 
division 1.3 solid propellant would be located at explosive hazard 
facility A, and twice as much division 1.3 solid propellant would be 
located at explosive hazard facility B, the prescribed distance 
generated by explosive hazard facility B would serve as the minimum 
distance permitted between explosive hazard facility A and explosive 
hazard facility B.
    Proposed Sec. 420.31(a) would require an applicant to provide the 
FAA an explosive site plan that establishes that the applicant's 
proposed distances satisfy the explosive siting criteria. The explosive 
site plan must include a scaled map or maps that show the location of 
all proposed explosive hazard facilities where solid and liquid 
propellants would be stored or handled.\22\ An applicant must include 
the class and division for each solid propellant and the hazard and 
compatibility group for each liquid propellant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Areas where solid propellants would be stored would be 
included in the plan even though ATF requirements apply. Applicants 
with magazines where solid propellants are to be stored must obtain 
an ATF permit and meet ATF quantity-distance requirements. The FAA 
will use the information to ensure that those of its requirements 
unrelated to storage are satisfied and to coordinate with ATF when 
necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the location of explosive hazard facilities, the map 
or maps would indicate actual and minimum allowable distances between 
each explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard facilities 
and each public area, including the launch site boundary. One means by 
which an applicant could show that the distances are at least the 
minimum required in the proposed rules would be by drawing a circle or 
arc with a radius equal to the minimum allowed distance centered on 
each explosive hazard facility.
    Unlike the DOD and NASA standards, which both define numerous 
separation distances, the proposed rules define only two distances for 
solid propellants, namely, a public area distance and an intraline 
distance. Public area distance would serve as the minimum distance 
permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard facility. 
Facilities and other infrastructure such as roads, railways, and 
inhabited buildings may or may not be public areas, depending on 
whether the public has access at the time explosives are present in the 
explosive hazard facility. Examples include a public road or railroad 
running through a launch site, and a visitor center where members of 
the public would be located.\23\ Likewise,

[[Page 34334]]

different launch site customers are also considered the public with 
respect to each other. Intraline distance would provide the minimum 
distance permitted between any two explosive hazard facilities used by 
one launch site customer. In this regard, for planning purposes, an 
applicant should bear in mind that using the greater public area 
distance would avoid later operational constraints when different 
customers wanted to use facilities sited at intraline distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ A launch site operator who does not wish to employ the 
appropriate public area distance between an explosive hazard 
facility and public areas such as, for example, a visitor center, 
must propose operational limitations in its application. These would 
consist of such strictures as not allowing members of the public in 
the visitor center while explosives are present in the explosive 
hazard facility not sited according to the proposed requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to containing maps, an explosive site plan would also 
describe, through tables or lists, the maximum quantities of liquid and 
solid propellants to be located at each explosive hazard facility, and 
the activities to be conducted within each explosive hazard facility.
    Pursuant to proposed Sec. 420.31(b), the requirement to submit an 
explosive site plan to the FAA would not apply to an applicant applying 
for a license to operate a launch site at a federal launch range. 
Federal launch ranges have separate rules which are either identical or 
similar to the rules proposed, or require mitigation measures which 
otherwise ensure safety.
    The criteria for determining the minimum required distances between 
each explosive hazard facility and all other explosive hazard 
facilities and each public area, including the launch site boundary, 
are proposed in Sec. 420.33 for solid propellants and Sec. 420.35 for 
liquid propellants. Proposed Sec. 420.37 includes rules for when liquid 
and solid propellants are located together.
    Proposed Sec. 420.33 covers quantity determinations and minimum 
required distances for explosive hazard facilities where solid 
propellants would be handled. Under proposed Sec. 420.33(a), an 
applicant would first determine the maximum total quantity of explosive 
in each explosive hazard facility where solid propellants would be 
handled. The total quantity of explosives in an explosive hazard 
facility shall be the maximum total weight, expressed in pounds, of 
division 1.3 explosive material in the contents of the explosive hazard 
facility. For example, if a facility could hold up to ten solid rocket 
motors of a particular type, even though it might only rarely hold that 
many motors, the applicant would calculate the total weight of division 
1.3 explosive material in the ten motors.
    The proposed rules are based on an assumption that only division 
1.3 solid propellant will be located at a launch site in sufficient 
quantities to affect facility location. The FAA is aware that the 
launch vehicle used for the first launch from Kodiak Launch Complex, a 
launch site operated by the recently licensed Alaska Aerospace 
Development Corporation (AADC), had a second stage motor with division 
1.1 propellant. The FAA believes this will be a rare occurrence in the 
future. The FAA realizes that 1.1 explosives, such as those used in 
launch operator's flight termination system, will also likely be 
located at a launch site. However, current practice is to design such 
components so as not to be able to initiate division 1.3 components 
when installed on a vehicle. The FAA anticipates that it will require 
any licensed launch operator to demonstrate that its 1.1 devices do not 
initiate 1.3 components as is the current practice at federal launch 
ranges. Therefore, the amount of such ordnance used with division 1.3 
explosives may be disregarded for Q-D purposes. The total quantity of 
explosives shall be the NEW of the division 1.3 components.
    Once an applicant has determined the total quantity of solid 
propellants in each explosive hazard facility, proposed Sec. 420.33(b) 
would require an applicant to separate each explosive hazard facility 
where solid propellants will be handled from all other explosive hazard 
facilities and each public area, including the launch site boundary, in 
accordance with the minimum separation distances contained in proposed 
table E-1 in appendix E. Table E-1 provides two distances for each 
quantity level. The first, a public area distance, is the minimum 
distance permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard 
facility. The second, an intraline distance, is the minimum distance 
permitted between any two explosive hazard facilities used by one 
launch site customer. Other explosive hazard facilities may constitute 
public areas, because the definition of public area includes any area 
in the possession or ownership, or otherwise under the control of a 
launch site operator's other customers. Distance calculations would be 
made accordingly. Table E-1 contains the same distances as the NASA and 
DOD standards, except that the DOD standard has more increments. An 
applicant may use linear interpolation for quantity values between 
those provided in the table. Additionally, because table E-1 does not 
include quantities greater than 1,000,000 pounds, an applicant with an 
explosive hazard facility where solid propellants in quantities greater 
than 1,000,000 pounds would be handled would use the equations proposed 
in Sec. 420.33(b) to obtain separation distances.
    An applicant would measure a separation distance from the closest 
source of debris or hazard under proposed Sec. 420.33(c). For example, 
for a building, an applicant would use for measurement the wall or 
corner of the facility closet to the closest wall or corner of other 
explosive hazard facilities and public areas. When solid rocket motors 
or motor segments are freestanding, an applicant would measure from the 
closest motor or motor segment. An acceptable way to demonstrate that 
minimum distance requirements are met is to draw a circle or arc 
centered on the closest source of debris or hazard showing that no 
other explosive hazard facility or public area is within the distance 
permitted.
    Note that Q-D requirements address siting of facilities, not 
operational control of hazard areas. During actual operations, the 
existence and size of a hazard area is dependent on the actual amount 
of explosive material in an explosive hazard facility.
    Proposed Sec. 420.35 covers quantity determinations and distance 
requirements for explosive hazard facilities that support the storage 
or handling of liquid propellants. In addition to applying to distances 
between an explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard 
facilities and public areas, distance requirements may apply within an 
explosive hazard facility as well.
    Liquid propellants are classified and separated differently than 
solid propellants. Where solid propellants are classified by class and 
division, each liquid propellant is assigned to one of three hazard 
groups and one of two compatibility groups. A hazard group categorizes 
liquid propellants according to the hazards they cause. Hazard group 1 
represents a fire hazard, hazard group 2 represents a more serious fire 
hazard, and, because a liquid propellant in hazard group 3 can rupture 
a storage container, it represents a fragmentation hazard. Each liquid 
propellant also falls into one of two compatibility groups. Liquid 
propellants are compatible when storing them together does not increase 
the probability of an accident or, for a given quantity of propellant, 
the magnitude of the effects of such an accident. Propellants in the 
same compatibility group do not increase the probability or magnitude 
of an accident. The two proposed compatibility groups consist of fuels 
and oxidizers, and are what the NASA and DOD standards label A and C. 
The FAA proposes to use the same labeling to provide continuity. 
Proposed group A represents oxidizers

[[Page 34335]]

such as LO2 and N2O4, and proposed group C represents fuels such as RP-
1 and LH2. Proposed appendix E provides the hazard and compatibility 
groups for current launch vehicle liquid propellants in table E-3.
    Explosive equivalency serves as another source of difference 
between the treatment of solid and liquid propellants. Only if fuels 
and oxidizers are to be located within certain distances of each other 
would the separation requirements designed to account for the hazardous 
consequences of their potential combination apply. That combination is 
measured in terms of explosive equivalency. Explosive equivalency for 
liquid propellants is a measure of the blast effects from explosion of 
a given quantity of fuel and oxidizer mixture expressed in terms of the 
weight of TNT that would produce the same blast effects when detonated. 
Fuels should not be located near oxidizers if possible. The 
significance of the hazard groups and compatibility groups is that if 
fuels are located far enough from oxidizers, the minimum distance 
requirements to public areas and other explosive hazard facilities 
depend only on the quantity and hazard group of the individual liquid 
propellants. If operational requirements require fuels and oxidizers to 
be located near each other, that is, at less than the minimum public 
area and incompatible distances proposed in tables E-4, E-5 and E-6, 
the explosive equivalency of the incompatible propellants must be 
calculated and used to determine the distances proposed in table E-7 to 
other explosive hazard facilities and public areas.
    Appendix E contains four distance tables with separation 
requirements for liquid propellants. Tables E-4, E-5 and E-6 contain 
separation distances for hazard group 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Table 
E-7 contains separation distances for when fuels and oxidizers are 
located less than prescribed distances apart so that explosive 
equivalency applies. Table E-7 contains distances similar to those for 
1.1 solid explosives. This is because the ``explosive equivalency'' of 
a fuel and oxidizer mixture is measured in terms of its equivalent 
explosive blast effect to TNT, which is a class 1.1 explosive. Table E-
7 also prescribes public area and intraline distances.
    Tables E-4, E-5, and E-6 have two distances listed for each 
quantity of liquid propellant by hazard group. The first, a ``public 
area and incompatible'' distance, is the minimum distance permitted 
between a given quantity of liquid propellant and a public area. The 
distance is also the same distance by which incompatible propellants 
must be separated (e.g. the minimum distance between a fuel and an 
oxidizer) for explosive equivalency and Table E-7 not to apply to the 
distance calculations. The second, an ``intragroup and compatible'' 
distance, is the distance by which propellants in the same hazard 
group, or propellants in the same compatibility group must be separated 
(e.g. the minimum distance between two fuels) to avoid adding the 
quantity of each propellant container being separated in calculating 
distances. This is simply because if two propellant tanks are far 
enough apart, they cannot react with one another, even were a mishap to 
occur. This introduces the third difference between liquid propellant 
separation requirements and the requirements for solid propellants.
    The third area where liquid propellant separation requirements are 
different than those for solid propellants may be found in calculations 
of the quantity of liquid propellant that determines the distance 
relationship with other explosive hazard facilities and public areas. 
Quantity calculations may depend on distance. As an example, suppose 
one was determining the minimum distance required between a tank farm 
having many containers of fuel, and a launch site boundary. If the 
containers were all close together the applicant would simply take the 
total amount of fuel, look up the ``public area and incompatible'' 
distance in the table that corresponded to the hazard group of the 
fuel, and ensure that the distance between the closest wall or corner 
of the explosive hazard facility and the launch site boundary was at 
least the distance listed in the table. However, if the containers were 
separated from each other so that the distance between each container 
met the minimum ``intragroup and compatible'' \24\ distance in the 
table, the total quantity of propellant to be used for the ``public 
area'' distance determination is only the quantity in each container. 
Therefore, as discussed below, although quantity determination 
requirements may be found in proposed Sec. 420.35(a) and proposed 
Sec. 420.35(b) contains distance determination requirements, quantity 
determinations for liquid propellants may depend on distances between 
containers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ The category is called ``intragroup and compatible'' to 
cover propellants that are in different hazard groups but are still 
compatible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Like the procedure for solid propellant quantity and distance 
determinations, an applicant's first step in siting liquid propellants 
would be to determine the quantity of liquid propellant or, if 
applicable, the explosive equivalent of the liquid propellant to be 
located in each explosive hazard facility. An applicant determines this 
through three steps specified in proposed Sec. 420.35(a). First, 
proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(1) states that the quantity of propellant in a 
tank, drum, cylinder, or other container is the net weight in pounds of 
the propellant in that container. The weight of liquid propellant in 
associated piping must be included in the determination of quantity to 
any point where positive means, such as shutoff valves, are provided 
for interrupting the flow through the pipe, or for interrupting a 
reaction in the pipe in the event of a mishap.
    Next, proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(2) applies when two or more 
containers of compatible propellants are stored together in an 
explosive hazard facility. When liquid propellants are compatible, the 
quantity of propellant used to determine the minimum separation 
distance between the explosive hazard facility and other explosive 
hazard facilities and public areas shall be the total quantity of 
liquid propellant in all containers unless either the containers are 
separated one from the other by the ``intragroup and compatible'' 
distance contained in appendix E, table E-4, E-5 or E-6, depending on 
the hazard group, or the containers are subdivided by intervening 
barriers to prevent their mixing. In those two cases, the quantity of 
propellant in the explosive hazard facility requiring the greatest 
separation distance must be used to determine the minimum separation 
distance between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive 
hazard facilities and public areas.
    Finally, proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(3) applies to quantity 
determinations when two or more containers of incompatible liquid 
propellants are stored together in an explosive hazard facility. If 
each container is not separated from every other container by the 
``public area and incompatible'' distances identified in appendix E, 
tables E-4, E-5 and E-6, an applicant must determine the total quantity 
of explosives by calculating the explosive equivalent in pounds of the 
combined liquids, using NASA formulas contained in table E-2, to 
determine the minimum separation distance between the explosive hazard 
facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas. If the 
containers are, in fact, to be separated one from the other by the 
appropriate ``incompatible'' distance, an applicant would determine the 
minimum separation distance to another explosive hazard facility or 
public area using the quantity of propellant within the explosive 
hazard facility requiring the greatest separation distance. For

[[Page 34336]]

example, if 50 pounds of hazard group 1 fuel were 31 feet from 150 
pounds of hazard group 1 fuel, the minimum required distance to a 
public area would be 35 feet, reflecting the public area distance 
required by the greater quantity of fuel.
    Proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(4) requires an applicant to convert liquid 
propellant quantities from gallons to pounds using conversion factors 
in table E-3, and the equation provided. The proposed requirement 
reflects a NASA standard.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ NASA Standard at 7-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After an applicant has determined the quantity of liquid propellant 
or, if applicable, the explosive equivalent of the liquid propellants 
to be located in each explosive hazard facility, an applicant must then 
determine the separation distances between each explosive hazard 
facility and public areas. Proposed Sec. 420.35(b) specifies the rules 
by which an applicant determines the separation distances between 
propellants within explosive hazard facilities, and between explosive 
hazard facilities and public areas. An applicant would first use table 
E-3 to determine hazard and compatibility groups. An applicant would 
then separate propellants from each other and from each public area 
using at least the distances provided in tables E-4 through E-7. With 
one exception, as discussed below, tables E-1 and E-7 reflect the NASA 
standard.
    Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(1) would require that an applicant measure 
minimum separation distances from the container, building, or positive 
cutoff point in piping which is closet to each public area or explosive 
hazard facility requiring separation.
    Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(2) would impose a minimum separation 
distance between compatible propellants. An applicant would measure the 
separation distance between compatible propellants using the 
``intragroup and compatible'' distance for the propellant quantity and 
group that requires the greater distance prescribed in tables E-4, E-5, 
and E-6. The distance between any two propellants is computed by first 
determining what the minimum required distances is for each propellant 
based on the quantity and hazard group of that propellant. The one 
requiring the greater distance is controlling for the pair.
    Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(3) would apply to the minimum separation 
distance between incompatible propellants. An applicant would have to 
measure the separation distance between propellants of different 
compatibility groups using the ``public area and incompatible'' 
distance from the propellant quantity and group that requires the 
greater distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6, unless the 
propellants of different compatibility groups are subdivided by 
intervening barriers to prevent their mixing. If intervening barriers 
are to be present, the minimum separation distance shall then be the 
``intragroup and compatible'' distance for the propellant quantity and 
group that requires the greater distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, 
and E-6.
    Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(4) would apply to the separation of liquid 
propellants from public areas. An applicant shall separate these 
propellants from public areas using no less than the ``public area'' 
distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.
    Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(5) would apply to propellants where 
explosive equivalents apply prescribed by subparagraph (a)(3). An 
applicant shall separate each explosive hazard facility that will 
contain propellants where explosive equivalents apply from all other 
explosive hazard facilities that are under the control of the same 
customer public areas is the public area distance in table E-7. Table 
E-7 is a revised form of the NASA standard.
    Proposed Sec. 420.37 would specify the rules to be used when solid 
and liquid propellants are located together, such as at launch pads and 
test stands. For applicants proposing an explosive hazard facility 
where solid and liquid propellants are to be located together, 
Sec. 420.37 provides three steps that an applicant should use to 
determine the minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard 
facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas. An 
applicant would first determine the minimum separation distances 
between the explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard 
facilities and public areas required for the solid propellants alone, 
in accordance with proposed Sec. 420.33. An applicant would then 
determine the minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard 
facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas 
required for the liquid propellants alone, in accordance with 
Sec. 420.35. If explosive equivalents apply, an applicant would 
determine the minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard 
facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas 
required for the liquid propellants using appendix E, table E-7F, in 
accordance with Sec. 420.35. An applicant would then apply the greater 
of the distances determined by the liquid propellant alone or the solid 
propellant alone.
    Subpart C contains license term and conditions. Section 420.41 
would specify the authority granted to a launch site operator by a 
license and the licensee's obligation to comply with representations 
contained in the license application as well as the FAA's license terms 
and conditions. The provision limits a licensee's authority to the 
launch points on the launch site and to the types of launch vehicles 
used to demonstrate the safety of the launch site location, and, for 
orbital launch vehicles, to vehicles no larger than the class analyzed. 
The provision would also clarify the licensee's obligation to comply 
with any other laws or regulations applicable to its licensed 
activities and identifies certain rights that are not conveyed by a 
launch site operator license.
    Section 420.43 would specify the duration of a license to operate a 
launch site, the grounds for shortening the term, and that a license 
may be renewed.
    Section 420.45 would provide the procedures that an applicant must 
follow to obtain FAA approval for the transfer of an existing license 
to operate a launch site.
    Section 420.47 would specify the procedures that the FAA would 
allow to modify a license through a license order or written approval, 
and the procedures that a launch site operator licensee must follow to 
obtain an FAA license modification. A licensee must obtain a license 
modification if the licensee proposes to operate the launch site in a 
manner not authorized by its license. This means, among other things, 
that if a representation in the license application regarding an issue 
material to public safety is no longer accurate or does not describe 
the licensee's operation or intended operation of the site, a licensee 
must obtain a license modification. This is because the representations 
a licensee makes in its application become part of the terms and 
conditions of its license.
    A licensee must obtain FAA approval prior to modifying its 
operations. For example, a licensee whose application stated that it 
would prevent unauthorized access to its launch site through the use of 
security personnel might decide, in the course of its operation, that 
physical barriers might better serve to accomplish this goal. The FAA 
considered that, on the one hand, the ability to immediately institute 
a change might best control public access because if a licensee has to 
wait for its license to be modified prior to instituting a change, 
needed safety improvements might be unnecessarily delayed. On the other 
hand, the FAA's

[[Page 34337]]

mandate requires that it first ascertain whether the proposed change is 
indeed acceptable. Accordingly, the FAA decided that it must first be 
advised of a proposed change and must approve its implementation. In 
the event of special circumstances and where safety warrants, the FAA 
will work with a licensee to accommodate any timing problems.
    Proposed Sec. 420.47 also specifies the procedures for a licensee 
to obtain and the FAA to issue a license modification. The FAA could 
modify a license using a written approval rather than a license order 
in cases where the change addresses an activity or condition that was 
represented in the license application but not spelled out in a license 
order.
    Section 420.49 would impose an obligation on a launch site operator 
licensee, its customers, and its contractors to cooperate with the FAA 
in compliance monitoring of licensed activities. This requirement 
recognizes an FAA compliance monitor's need to observe operations 
conducted by all parties at the site and to have access to records and 
personnel if the FAA is to be assured that public safety is being 
protected.
    Subpart D contains the responsibilities of a licensee. Section 
420.51 would describe a licensee's obligation to operate its launch 
site in accordance with the representations in its license application, 
49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, ch. 701 and the FAA's regulations.
    Section 420.53 would require a launch site operator licensee to 
control public access to the launch site and to protect the public 
present at the launch site. The proposed regulation seeks to protect 
the public from the consequences of flight and pre-flight activities by 
separating the public from hazardous launch procedures. The public 
could also be at risk if allowed to enter the launch site or move about 
without adequate safeguards. This provision would require the licensee 
to prevent the public from gaining unauthorized access to the launch 
site. The applicant would be given broad discretion in selecting the 
method for controlling access. The provision would also hold the 
licensee responsible for informing members of the public of safety 
precautions before entry and for warning of emergencies on-site. A 
licensee would also be responsible for escorting the public between 
harzard areas not otherwise controlled by a launch operator at the 
launch site, and employing warning signals or alarms to notify persons 
on the launch site of any emergency.
    Section 420.55 would require a licensee to develop and implement 
procedures to coordinate operations carried out by launch site 
customers, including launch operators, and their contractors. This 
requirement is necessary to ensure that the operations of one launch 
site customer do not interact with the operations of another customer 
to create a public safety hazard at the launch site or beyond. For 
example, the testing of equipment using radio frequency transmissions 
could trigger ordnance used by someone elsewhere on the site, if the 
two launch preparation activities are not coordinated or warnings 
issued. Likewise, hazardous operations by one customer with the 
potential to reach another customer must be coordinated by the launch 
site operator. A launch site licensee would be required to ensure that 
all customers at the site are informed of procedures and adhere to 
scheduling requirements before commencing operations at the launch 
site.
    Section 420.57 would establish notification requirements for a 
licensee. The licensee would be responsible for notifying customers of 
any limitations on use of the site. This provision would ensure that 
customer activities re compatible with other activities at the launch 
site. It would also ensure that limitations on the use of facilities 
provided to customers by a launch site operator are communicated to the 
customer. The licensee will be responsible for possessing agreements 
with the Coast Guard to arrange for issuance of Notices to Mariners 
during launches and with the regional FAA office for Notice to Airmen 
and closure of air routes. In addition, the licensee will notify local 
officials and landowners adjacent to the launch site of the flight 
schedule. This provision places an on-going responsibility on the site 
operator licensee for establishing notification procedures, rather than 
on the numerous launch licensees whose involvement with the launch site 
may be more sporadic and temporary. The proposed requirement would, 
however, leave open the option of a launch licensee implementing the 
procedures established by the launch site operator.
    Section 420.59 would require a licensee to development and 
implement a launch site accident investigation plan containing 
procedures for reporting, investigating and responding to a launch site 
accident. The provision would extend reporting, investigation and 
response procedures currently applicable to launch related accidents 
and incidents to accidents occurring during round activities at a 
launch site. The proposed rule allows launch site operators to satisfy 
the requirements of Sec. 420.59 by using accident investigation 
procedures developed in accordance with the requirements of the U.S. 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) at 29 CFR 1910.119 
and 120, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at 40 CFR 
part 68, to the extent that the procedures include the elements 
provided Sec. 420.59.\26\ The FAA wishes to ease the regulatory burden 
here and in other parts of the proposed rules where other federal 
regulatory agencies impose requirements on launch site operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ The EPA's requirements in 40 CFR part 68 apply to 
``incidents which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in 
a catastrophic release.'' 40 CFR 68.60(a). OSHA's requirements in 29 
CFR 1910.119 are similar, applying to ``each incident which resulted 
in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release of a 
highly hazardous chemical in the workplace.'' 29 CFR 1910.119(m)(l).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA's standard at 29 CFR 1910.119 includes provisions for 
investigating incidents and emergency response. See 29 CFR 1910.119(m) 
and (n). In addition, 29 CFR 1910.120, hazardous waste operations and 
emergency response (HAZWOPER), provides for emergency response planning 
for operations involving hazardous materials, including those listed by 
the Department of Transportation under 49 CFR 172.101.\27\ Launch 
operators and launch site operator in compliance with these 
requirements will be taking steps to protect the public as well as 
their workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Hazardous materials in AST regulations, Sec. 401.5, are 
defined as hazardous materials as defined in 49 CFR 172.101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA's requirements at 40 CFR part 68 also include standards for 
incident investigation and emergency response. See 40 CFR 68.60, 68.81, 
68.90, and 68.180. for both the OSHA and EPA requirements, compliance 
with 42 U.S.C. 11003, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know, 
satisfies many of the emergency response provisions.
    The FAA is interested in the public's view of proposed Sec. 420.59, 
particularly the extent to which other regulatory agency requirements 
such as OSHA and EPA help to ensure launch site operators respond to an 
investigate launch site accidents.
    Section 420.61 would provide the requirements for launch site 
operator retention or records, data, and other material needed to 
verify that launch site operator operations are conducted in accordance 
with representations contained in the licensee, and for recorded 
production in the event of

[[Page 34338]]

launch site accident investigation, or compliance monitoring.
    Section 420.63 would provide responsibilities of a launch site 
operator regarding explosives. Section 420.63(a) would require a launch 
site operator to ensure that the configuration of the launch site is in 
accordance with the licensee's explosive site plan, and that its 
explosive site plan is in compliance with the requirements in 
Secs. 420.31-420.37.
    Section 420.63(b) would require a launch site operator to ensure 
that the public is not exposed to hazards due to the initiation of 
explosives by lightning. Unless an explosive hazard facility has a 
lightning warning system to permit termination of operations and 
withdrawal of the public to public area distance prior to the incidence 
of an electrical storm, or the explosive hazard facility is to contain 
explosives that cannot be initiated by lightning, it must have a 
lightning protection system to ensure explosives are not initiated by 
lightning. A lightning protection system shall include an air terminal 
to intentionally attract a lightning strike, a low impedance path--
called a down conductor--connecting an air terminal to an earth 
electrode system, and an earth electrode system to dissipate the 
current from a lightning strike to ground.
    Because no lightning protection system is necessary if a launch 
site operator has a lightning warning system to permit termination of 
operations and withdrawal of the public to public area distance prior 
to the incidence of an electrical storm, proposed Sec. 420.63 does not 
explicitly protect the public from the inadvertent flight of a solid 
rocket motor. The FAA is interested in public views on this point.
    A lightning protection system shall also include measures for 
bonding and surge protection. For bonding, all metallic bodies shall be 
bonded to ensure that voltage potentials due to lightning are equal 
everywhere in the explosive hazard facility. Fences within six feet of 
the lightning protection system shall have bonds across gates and other 
discontinuations and shall be bonded to the lightning protection 
system. Railroad tracks that run within six feet of the lightning 
protection system shall be bonded to the lightning protection system. 
For surge protection, a lightning protection system shall include surge 
protection for all metallic power, communication, and instrumentation 
lines coming into an explosive hazard facility to reduce transient 
voltages due to lightning to a harmless level.
    Lightning protection systems shall be visually inspected 
semiannually and shall be tested once each year for electrical 
continuity and adequacy of grounding. A record of results obtained from 
the tests, including action taken to correct deficiencies noted, must 
be maintained at the explosive hazard facility.
    Section 420.63(c) would require a launch site operator to ensure 
that electric power lines on the launch site meet the distance 
requirements provided. A full discussion of explosive hazard mitigation 
measures is provided in the general preamble above.

Appendix A

    Of the two methods the FAA proposes for allowing an applicant to 
demonstrate the existence of a guided launch vehicle flight corridor 
that satisfies the FAA's risk criteria, appendix A typically offers the 
more conservative approach in that it produces a larger area as well as 
the more simple of the options available for guided orbital and 
suborbital launch vehicles. In order to achieve the simplicity this 
approach offers, the FAA based certain decisions regarding the 
methodology on a series of what it intends as conservative assumptions 
and on hazard areas previously developed by the federal launch ranges 
for the guided launch vehicles listed in table 1 of Sec. 420.21.
    The greater simplicity of the approach derives from the fact that, 
unlike the method of appendix B, an applicant need obtain no 
meteorological data and need not plot the trajectory of a particular 
launch vehicle. Instead, recognizing that a typical flight corridor 
consists of a series of fans of decreasing angle extending out from a 
launch point, the FAA proposes, with certain modifications, to employ a 
variation on that typical corridor for its proposed appendix A 
analysis.
    The FAA's proposed appendix A flight corridor estimation contains a 
number of elements, each of which an applicant must define for each of 
its proposed launch points. An appendix A flight corridor consists of a 
circular area around a selected launch point, an overflight exclusion 
zone, a launch area and a downrange area. A flight corridor for a 
guided orbital launch vehicle ends 5,000 nautical miles from the launch 
point, and, for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, the flight corridor 
ends with the impact dispersion area of the launch vehicle's final 
stage.
    Once an applicant has produced an appendix A flight corridor, the 
applicant must ascertain whether the flight corridor contains 
population, and, if so, whether the use of the corridor would present 
unacceptable risk to that population. If so, whether the use of the 
corridor would present unacceptable risk to that population. If no 
members of the public reside within the corridor, the FAA would approve 
the proposed location of the site.\28\ If the flight corridor is 
populated, the FAA proposes to require an applicant to perform a risk 
analysis as set forth in appendix C. If the proposed corridor satisfies 
the FAA's risk criteria, the FAA will approve the location of the site. 
If, however, the proposed corridor fails to satisfy the FAA's risk 
criteria, an applicant has certain options. The applicant may attempt 
another appendix A flight corridor by selecting a different flight 
azimuth or by selecting a different launch point at the proposed launch 
site, or by selecting a different launch vehicle type or class. Or, the 
applicant may, using the more accurate but more complicated 
calculations of appendix B, narrow its flight corridor and determine 
whether that flight corridor satisfies the FAA's risk criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ An applicant must still obtain written agreements with the 
FAA regional office having jurisdiction over the airspace where 
launches will take place and, if appropriate, with the U.S. Coast 
guard regarding procedures for coordinating launches from the launch 
site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To create a hypothetical flight corridor under proposed appendix A 
an applicant must first determine from where on the launch site a 
guided launch vehicle would take flight. That position is defined as a 
launch point. An applicant must determine the geodetic latitude and 
longitude of each launch point that it proposes to offer for launch, 
and select a flight azimuth for each launch point. An applicant should 
know whether it plans to offer the site for the launch of guided 
orbital or sub-orbital launch vehicles. If planning for the launch of 
guided orbital launch vehicles, the applicant must decide what launch 
vehicle class, as described by payload weight in proposed Sec. 420.21, 
table 1, best represents the largest launch vehicle class the launch 
site would support.
    Once an applicant has made the necessary decisions regarding 
location and vehicle class, the next step in creating an appendix A 
flight corridor is to look up the maximum distance (Dmax) 
that debris is expected to travel from a launch point if a worst-case 
launch vehicle failure were to occur and flight termination action 
destroyed the launch vehicle at 10 seconds into flight. Dmax 
serves as a radius that defines a circular area around the launch 
point. The FAA has estimated, on the basis of federal launch range 
experience, the Dmax for a guided suborbital launch vehicle 
and for

[[Page 34339]]

each guided orbital launch vehicle class and provided the results that 
an applicant should employ in table A-1, appendix A.
    The circular area, defined by Dmax, is part of an 
overflight exclusion zone. An overflight exclusion zone in an appendix 
A flight corridor consists of a rectangular area of the length 
prescribed by table A-2, capped up-range by a semi-circle with radius 
Dmax, centered on the launch point. Its downrange boundary 
is defined by an identical semi-circular arc with a radium 
Dmax, centered on the endpoint prescribed by table A-2. The 
cross-range boundaries consist of two lines parallel to and to either 
side of the flight azimuth. Each line is tangent to the upgrade and 
downgrade Dmax, circles as shown in appendix A, figure A-1.
    An appendix A flight corridor also contains a launch area. The 
launch area extends from the uprange boundary, which is coextensive 
with the circle created by the radius Dmax, to a line drawn 
perpendicular to the flight azimuth one hundred nautical miles down 
range of the launch point. The launch area's cross-range boundaries are 
a function of the lengths of two lines perpendicular to the flight 
azimuth: one drawn ten nautical miles down range from the launch point 
and the other line drawn one hundred nautical miles down range from the 
launch point. Table A-3 provides the lengths of the line segments.
    Adjacent to the launch area is the downrange area. For purposes of 
appendix A, a corridor's downrange area extends from the one hundred 
nautical miles line to a line, perpendicular to the flight azimuth, 
that is 5,000 nautical miles downrange from the launch point for the 
guided orbital launch vehicle classes, and to an impact dispersion area 
for a guided suborbital launch vehicle corridor. The down range area's 
cross-range boundaries connect the prescribed endpoints of the 
perpendicular lines at one hundred nautical miles and 5,000 nautical 
miles. Table A-3 provides the lengths of the line segments.
    All applicants must determine whether the public resides within 
this flight corridor. If no populated areas exist, an applicant may 
submit its analysis for the FAA's launch site location review. If there 
is population located within the flight corridor, the applicant must 
calculate the risk to the public following the criteria provided in 
appendix C. The expected casualty (Ec) result for the flight 
corridor must not exceed 30  x  10-6 for the applicant to 
satisfy the proposed location requirements.

Map Requirements and Plotting Methods

    To describe a flight corridor and any populated areas within that 
corridor, an applicant must observe data and methodology requirements 
for mapping a flight corridor and analyzing populations. These 
requirements apply to all appendices.
    The FAA proposes to require certain geographical data for use in 
describing flight corridors for each appendix. The geographical data 
must include the latitude and longitude of each proposed launch point 
at a launch site, and all populated areas in a flight corridor. The 
accuracy requirement for the launch area portion of the analyses calls 
for map scales of no smaller than 1:250,000 inches per inch. The actual 
map scale will depend on the smallest census block group size in a 
launch area. The FAA bases its proposed scale requirement on average 
range rates in the launch area, because range rates have a direct 
impact on dwell times over populated areas. While in the launch area of 
a flight corridor, the instantaneous impact point (IIP) ground trace 
would tend to linger over any populated areas, which increases the 
Ec for an individual populated area. The map scale required 
by the FAA is large enough to allow an applicant to determine the dwell 
time and size for each applicable populated area.
    Using a similar approach, the FAA proposes to establish an accuracy 
requirement for the downrange area of a flight corridor. A map scale 
may be no smaller than 1:20,000,000 inches per inch. The scale would be 
smaller than that required for the launch area because the dwell times 
over downrange populated areas is small and the map scale must only be 
large enough to allow an applicant to determine the dwell time and the 
size of each populated area downrange. Maps satisfying these accuracy 
requirements are readily available. For example, civil aeronautical 
charts are published and distributed by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and 
are also published by the Defense Mapping Agency and distributed by 
NOAA.
    Besides scale, the FAA has proposed requirements for projections, 
depending on the plotting method used. Proposed appendices A, B, C and 
D would require an applicant to use cylindrical, conic, and plane map 
projections. The FAA proposes these map projections for the analyses 
because they produce only small error with straight line measurements. 
Maps may be produced using several different map projections depending 
on the map scale, geographic region being depicted, and the 
application. A map projection, according to the U.S. Geological 
Survey,\29\ is a device for producing all or part of a round body on a 
flat sheet. All map projections have inherent distortions. The 
distortions are virtually unavoidable and are directly, related to the 
techniques for displaying latitude and longitude lines on a flat 
surface area. Therefore, many maps are developed for specific 
applications requiring that some map characteristics be shown more 
accurately at the expense of others. The flight corridor methods are 
primarily sensitive to azimuthal direction and geodetic length of the 
flight corridor line segments. Therefore, it is important to use map 
projections that preserve scale and direction accuracy. Cylindrical, 
conic, and plane map projections have been reviewed by the FAA and are 
most appropriate types for the launch site application analyses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Map Projections used by the ``U.S. Geological Survey,'' 
U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin 1532, 1982.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The regular cylindrical projections consist of meridians, which are 
equidistant parallel straight lines, crossed at right angles by 
straight parallel lines of latitude, generally not equidistant. 
Geometrically, cylindrical projections can be partially developed by 
unrolling a cylinder which has been wrapped around a globe representing 
the Earth, with the inside of the cylinder touching at the equator, and 
on which meridians have been projected from the center of the globe. 
When the cylinder is wrapped around the globe in a different direction, 
so that it is no longer tangent along the equator, an oblique or 
transverse projection results, and neither the meridians nor the 
parallels will generally be straight lines.
    Normal conic projections are distinguished by the use of arcs of 
concentric circles for parallels of latitude and equally spaced 
straight radii of those circles for meridians. The angles between the 
meridians on the map are smaller than the actual differences in 
longitude. The circular arcs may or may not be equally spaced, 
depending on the projection. The name ``conic'' originatd from the fact 
that the more elementary conic projections may be derived by placing a 
cone on the top of a globe representing the Earth, the apex or tip in 
line with the axis of the globe, and the sides of the cone touching or 
tangent to the globe along a specified ``standard'' latitude which is 
true to scale and without distortion.

[[Page 34340]]

Meridians are drawn on the cone from the apex to the points at which 
the corresponding meridians on the globe cross the standard parallel. 
Other parallels are then drawn as arcs centered on the apex in a manner 
depending on the projection. If the cone is cut along one meridian and 
unrolled, a conic projection results.
    The azimuthal projections are formed onto a plane which is usually 
tangent to the globe at either pole, the equator, or any intermediate 
point. These variations are called the polar, equatorial (or meridian 
or meridional), and oblique (or horizon) aspects, respectively. Some 
azimuthals are true perspective projections. Azimuthal projections are 
characterized by the fact that the direction, or azimuth, from the 
center of the projection to every other point on the map is shown 
correctly. The simplest forms of the azimuthal projections are the 
polar aspects, in which all meridians are shown as straight lines 
radiating at their true angles from the center, while parallels of 
latitude are circles concentric about the pole. Most azimuthal maps do 
not have standard parallels or standard meridians. Each map has only 
one standard point, the center. Thus, the azimuthals are suitable for 
minimizing distortion in a somewhat circular region such as Antarctica, 
but not for an era with predominant length in one direction.
    Scale requirements, geographic location of the launch site, and 
plotting method are the main considerations for choosing a map 
projection. Of these considerations, the plotting method selected for 
development and depiction of the flight corridor line segments is the 
most important. Three plotting methods are provided in appendix A.
    The ``mechanical method'' is the least complex, least costly, but 
also the least accurate of the methods suggested here. Selecting an 
appropriate map scale and using a map projection that minimizes 
inherent scale and direction distortions can minimize coordinate 
plotting errors. The ``Lambert-Conformal'' conic projection is 
acceptable because it has characteristics that preserve angles and 
scales from any point on the map.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ The projections suggested below for the semi-automated 
method are accurate in scale and direction only from a point of 
tangency or the standard parallels. These limitations would produce 
additional errors when the using mechanical method.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ``semi-automated method'' provides more accurate techniques for 
determining the endpoint coordinates of each flight corridor line 
segment. Errors associated with measuring devices and the mapping 
medium tend to be the same as those associated with the mechanical 
method. Engineering judgment and some map errors are reduced through 
the use of range and bearing equations. These equations also allow the 
applicant to choose from a wider variety of map projections. The 
``Mercator'' and ``Oblique Mercator'' are adequate cylindrical 
projections. ``Lambert-Conformal'' and ``Albers Equal-Area'' are 
adequate conic projections. The ``Lambert Azimuthal Equal-Area'' and 
``Azimuthal Equidistant'' are adequate plane projections. An applicant 
may use other maps in support of its application, but the applicant 
would be required to demonstrate an equivalent level of accuracy over 
the required distances, and would have to describe the consequences of 
any mapping errors associated with the proposed map projection.
    Each of these projections possesses a number of attributes, which 
make some better suited for some parts of the global than others. 
Typically, most projections preserve scale and direction when measured 
from a point of tangency or along a standard parallel or meridian. A 
Mercator projection is cylindrical and conformal, that is, all angles 
presented correctly , and for small areas, true shape of features is 
maintained. In a Mercator projection, meridians are equally spaced 
straight lines and parallels are unequally spaced straight lines, 
closest near the equator, cutting meridians at right angles. Scale is 
true along the equator, or along two parallels equidistant from the 
equator. The Mercator projection may produce great distortion of area 
in polar regions.
    The Oblique Mercator is cylindrical (oblique) and conformal. It 
contains two meridians, 180 deg. apart, which are straight lines. Other 
meridians and parallels are complex curves. Scale on the spherical form 
is true along a chosen central line, a great circle at an oblique 
angle, or along two straight lines parallel to central line. The scale 
on the ellipsoidal form is similar, but varies slightly from this 
pattern. Scale becomes infinite 90 deg. from the central line.
    The Lambert Conformal is conic and conformal. Its parallels are 
unequally spaced arcs of concentric circles, more closely spaced near 
the center of the map. Meridians are equally spaced radii of the same 
circles, and consequently cut parallels at right angles. Scale is true 
along two standard parallels normally, or along just one. A pole in the 
same hemisphere as standard parallels is a point. The other pole is at 
infinity.
    The Albers Equal-Area is conic. Parallels are unequally spaced arcs 
of concentric circles, more closely spaced at the north and south edges 
of the map. Meridians are equally spaced radii of the same circles, 
cutting parallels at right angles. There is no distortion in scale or 
shape along two standard parallels normally, or along just one. Poles 
are arcs of circles.
    The Lambert Azimuthal Equal-Area is azimuthal. All meridian in the 
polar aspect, the central meridian in other aspects, and the equator in 
the equatorial aspect are straight lines. The outer meridian of the 
hemisphere in the equatorial aspect, for the sphere, and the parallels 
in the polar aspect for sphere or ellipsoid are circles. All other 
meridians and parallels are complex curves. Scale decreases radially as 
the distance increases from the center, the only point without 
distortion.
    The Azimuthal Equidistant is azimuthal. Distances measured from the 
center are true. Distances not measured along radii from the center are 
not correct. The center of projection is the only point without 
distortion. Directions from the center are true except on some oblique 
and equatorial ellipsoidal forms. All meridians on the polar aspect, 
the central meridian on the other aspects, and the equator on the 
equatorial aspect are straight lines. Parallels on the polar projection 
are circles spaced at true intervals equidistant for the sphere. The 
outer meridian of the hemisphere on the equatorial aspect for the 
sphere is a circle. All other meridians and parallels are complex 
curves.
    All of these map projections, with the exception of the ``Lambert-
Conformal'' conic, preserve scale and direction when measured along a 
standard parallel or meridian. Because range and bearing computations 
are relative to a particular ellipsoid of revolution--a geoid, not the 
projection of the geoid, the computed latitude and longitude placement 
will be correct for any projection assuming the map datum and the range 
and bearing datum are the same.
    The FAA will not accept straight lines of long distances that 
result in significant distortions of the flight corridor. Attempting to 
draw straight lines for distances greater than 7.5 times the map scale 
on map scales greater than or equal to 1:1,000,000 will result in 
unacceptable errors. The distance factor of 7.5 was determined by 
plotting several hundred trajectory IIP points and finding equi-distant 
straight line segments that adequately represent the trajectory curve 
over a 5,000 nm range.
    Appendix A provides an applicant with the equations the FAA 
proposes to require to perform range and bearing computations for the 
purpose of plotting

[[Page 34341]]

a flight corridor on a map. The range and bearing from a launch point 
are used to determine the latitude and longitude coordinates of a point 
on the flight corridor. Range and bearing equations are standard 
geodesic computations which can be found in most geodesy text books. A 
geodesic is a curve describing the minimum length between two points on 
the surface of an ellipsoid such as the WGS-84 ellipsoid discussed 
below. The range and bearing computations are sometimes referred to as 
great circle math routines. Sodano's direct geodetic method is proposed 
here. The algorithm was developed in 1963 by Emanuel M. Sodano for the 
U.S. Army. The computations provide accuracy to less than a foot for 
ranges up to 6,000 nm and less than 1/100th of a second (0.000002778 
degrees) for all azimuth angles.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ The FAA developed a software tool to perform the appendix A 
calculations for guided orbital launch vehicles. This software tool 
has been developed in the FORTRAN computer language using 
Microsoft's Fortran Powerstation. All of the assumptions and 
equations explained here and contained in appendix A are implemented 
in the program. The applicant must provide the geodetic latitude, 
longitude, launch azimuth, and Dmax from table A-1 as 
input to the program. The software outputs an ASCII text file of 
geodetic latitude and longitudes that describe the fight corridor 
boundary. The FORTRAN code listing and example intput/output may be 
obtained from the FAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An applicant may create line segments to describe a flight corridor 
by using range and bearings from the launch point along various 
azimuths. Appendix A provides equations to calculate geodetic latitude 
(+N) and longitude (+E) given the launch point geodetic latitude (+N), 
longitude (+E), range (nm), and bearing (degrees, positive clockwise 
from North). The same equations may also be used to calculate an impact 
dispersion area by substituting a final stage impact point for the 
launch point. Appendix A also provides equations to calculate the 
distance of a geodesic between two points.
    An alternative to range and bearing computations is to use 
geographic information system (GIS) software with global mapping data. 
GIS software is an effective tool for constructing and evaluating a 
flight corridor, and has the advantage of allowing an applicant to 
create maps of varying scales in the launch and downrange areas. 
Commercially available GIS products are acceptable to the FAA for use 
in Appendices A, B, C and D if they meet the map and plotting method 
requirements in paragraph (b) of appendix A. An applicant should note, 
however, that maps of different scales in GIS software may not match 
each other. For instance, the coastline of Florida on a U.S. map may 
not match the coastline on a world map. Applicants shall resolve such 
contradictions by referring to more accurate maps such as NOAA maps.
    Once an applicant has selected a map for displaying a flight 
corridor's launch area, the line segment lengths may be scaled to the 
chosen map. Map scale units are actual distance units measured along 
the Earth's surface per unit of map distance. Most map scale units are 
given in terms of inches per inch (in/in). An applicant converts 
appendix A flight corridor line segment distances to the map scale 
distance by dividing the launch area flight corridor line segment 
length (inches) by the map scale (in/in). If, for example, an applicant 
selected a map scale of 250,000 in/in and the line segment for the 
launch area flight corridor was 1677008 inches, the equivalent scaled 
length of the line segment for constructing an appendix A launch area 
is (1677008/250,000)=6.7 inches of map distance. An applicant would 
then plot the line segment on the map for display purposes using the 
scaled line segment length of 6.7 inches. If an applicant were to 
choose a map with scale units other than inches per inch, the FAA would 
require a description of the conversion algorithm to inches per inch 
and sample computations. Also note that the FAA proposes to accept 
straight lines for distances less than or equal to 7.5 times the map 
scale on map scales greater than or equal to 1:1,000,000 inches per 
inch; or straight lines representing 100 nm or less on map scales less 
than 1:1,000,000in/in.

Weight Classes for Guided Orbital Launch Vehicles

    Proposed appendix A distinguishes between the guided orbital launch 
vehicles represented in the appendix on the basis of weight class. The 
FAA does not propose to distinguish among guided suborbital launch 
vehicles on the basis of weight class for purposes of appendix A. For 
guided orbital launch vehicles, the FAA proposes to create four 
separate weight classes. These are used to determine the size of the 
debris dispersion radius around a launch point, and the size of an 
Appendix A flight corridor. The FAA selected the four launch vehicle 
classes based on the size and characteristics of launch vehicles that 
currently exist in the U.S. commercial inventory and that should 
approximate any proposed new launch vehicle as well. An applicant 
planning to support the launch of guided orbital launch vehicles should 
choose the largest launch vehicle class anticipated for launch from the 
chosen launch point. This maximizes the area of the flight corridor. 
Also, selection of the largest class anticipated lessens the 
possibility of having to obtain a license modification to accommodate a 
larger customer than an application may have originally encompassed.
    The FAA proposes to rely on a 100-nm orbit as the standard for 
inter-class launch vehicle comparison purposes. It is a standard 
reference orbit used by launch vehicle manufacturers for descriptive 
purposes and allows the uniform comparison of launch vehicle throw 
weight capability. The FAA obtained the payload weights for the 28 deg. 
and 90 deg. orbital inclinations from the ``International Reference 
Guide to Space Launch Systems,'' S.J. Isakowitz, 2d Ed. (1995). They 
represent capabilities from CCAS and VAFB, respectively.

Dmax Circle

    A radius, maximum distance (Dmax), is employed to define 
a circular area about a launch point. The circular area indicates the 
limits for both flight control and explosive containment following a 
worst-case launch vehicle failure and flight termination system 
activation at 10 seconds into flight. The worst-case failure represents 
a failure response, immediately following first motion, which causes 
the launch vehicle to fly in the up-range direction on a trajectory 
that maximizes the impact range. The ten second flight time represents 
a conservative estimate of the earliest elapsed time after launch that 
a flight safety officer would be able to detect the malfunction, 
initiate flight termination action, and actuate the flight termination 
system on the launch vehicle. The radius is the estimate Dmax 
from the launch point that inert debris is expected to travel and 
beyond which the overpressure from explosive debris is not expected to 
exceed 0.5 pounds per square inch (psi). Dmax accounts for 
the public risk posed by the greater of the wind-induced impact 
distance of a hazardous piece of inert debris, or the sum of the wind-
induced impact distance of an explosive piece of debris and the debris 
0.5 psi overpressure radius from the explosion. The values for 
DGmax in table A-1 appendix A, were derived from guided 
suborbital launch vehicles and guided orbital launch vehicles of the 
classes identified in table 1, Sec. 420.21.

Overflight Exclusion Zone

    Table A-2 and figure A-1 define an overflight exclusion zone. 
Because of the risks the early stages of flight create, the FAA 
proposes to require an applicant to demonstrate that the public

[[Page 34342]]

will not be present in this area during a launch. An overflight 
exclusion zone is an area in close promimity to a launch point where 
the mission risk is greater than an Ec of 
30 x 10-6 if one member of the public is present in the 
open. The FAA derived the data for table A-2 using high fidelity risk 
assessment computer models to estimate the Ec for the 
different vehicle classes in table 1, Sec. 420.21.
    Early in the flight phase launch vehicles have large explosive 
potential, a low IIP range rate, and an historically higher probability 
of failure relative to the rest of preorbital flight. The relatively 
simple risk estimation analysis defined in appendix C does not 
adequately model the true risk during this stage of flight, and does 
not serve as the basis for determining that the overflight exclusion 
zone represents an area where the FAA's risk threshold is not 
satisfied. Instead, the FAA derived the overflight exclusion zone using 
a high fidelity risk assessment computer program is use by the national 
ranges. The program is a launch area risk analysis program called DAMP 
(facility DAMage and Personal injury). DAMP relies on information about 
a launch vehicle, its trajectory and failure responses, and facilities 
and populations in the launch area to estimate hit probabilities and 
casualty expectation. The hazards analyzed by DAMP include impacting 
inert debris, and blast overpressures and debris projected from impact 
explosions.
    For the purpose of the FAA's site location assessment, the proposed 
overflight exclusion zone downrange distances (DOEZ) in 
table A-2 were derived by computing the downrange drag impact point 
distance for a ballisitic coefficient of 3 lbs/ft2 at the 
first major staging event time for each of the expendable launch 
vehicle classes in table 1, Sec. 420.21. The effective casually area 
used in the analysis was the average effective casualty area for the 
period of flight up to the first major staging event time. See table C-
3. The DAMP risk assessment results showed that Ec values 
exceeded 30 x 10-6 for the time up to the first major 
staging event for each of the launch vehicle classes in table 1, 
Sec. 420.21.
    Risk assessments were also conducted for the time of flight 
immediately after the first major staging event. The results showed a 
significant decrease in the Ec estimates, and those 
estimates were within the Ec criteria of 
30 x 10-6. The decrease results from a combination of 
decreasing dwell times and a signficant reduction in the size of an 
effective casualty area following a major staging event.
    The FAA compared the results obtained using the high fidelity risk 
models to the estimated casualty expectancy calculated using the risk 
analysis method from appendix C. The results from the appendix C method 
also show unacceptable risk inside the overflight exclusion zone, as 
shown in table ``3'' and ``4'' below. An appendix A flight corridor was 
applied to an appendix C risk analysis and the following variables were 
input as constants for the guided launch vehicle classes:

Pf=0.10
C=643 seconds
R-dot=.91 nm/s (from table C-2)
Nk=0.5 persons

    As described in appendix C, when a populated area is split by a 
trajectory ground trace, each part of the populated area is evaluated 
separately and the Ec results of each part are summed to 
estimate the total Ec for the whole populated area. Hence, 
for this comparison a value of Nk=0.5 was used in each of 
the OEZ sections so the total Ec after summation would 
represent the risk for one person. Tables 3 and 4 show that the 
Ec inside the OEZ does not meet FAA criteria and does meet 
those criteria outside the OEZ.

                                                      Table 3.--Prior to First Major Staging Event
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                    Sigma
                          Class                            X1 (mi)   X2(nm)    Y1(nm)    Y2(nm)     (nm)     Ac(nm2)   Ak(nm2)       Pi           Ec
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small...................................................      0.00      3.70      0.00      1.20      1.62      0.32      6.70     1.71E-04     40.9E-06
Medium..................................................      0.00      4.58      0.00      1.53      1.82      0.40      8.98     2.35E-04     52.3E-06
Med-Lrg.................................................      0.00      9.67      0.00      1.83      3.56      0.54     12.23     3.25E-04     71.7E-06
Large...................................................      0.00     14.76      0.00      2.14      5.31      1.46     34.66     3.95E-04     83.2E-06
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                         Med-Lrg values for table ``3'' and ``4'' were interpolated from the bounding
                                                                                                          classes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                        Ac=average value up to first major staging
                                                                                         event.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                                        Table 4.--After First Major Staging Event
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                     Sigma
                        Class                           X1 (mi)    X2 (nm)    Y1 (nm)    Y2 (nm)      (nm)     Ac (nm2)   Ak (nm2)      Pi         Ec
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small................................................       0.00       3.70       0.00       1.20       1.62     0.0982       6.70   1.71E-04   12.5E-06
Medium...............................................       0.00       4.58       0.00       1.53       1.82     0.0017       8.98   2.35E-04   22.2E-06
Med-Lrg..............................................       0.00       9.67       0.00       1.83       3.56     0.0831      12.23   3.25E-04   11.0E-06
Large................................................       0.00      14.76       0.00       2.14       5.31     0.4682      34.66   3.95E-04   26.7E-06
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Med-Lrg values for tables ``3'' and ``4'' were interpolated from the bounding
                                                                                                         classes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                        Ac = value after first major staging event.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA believes that it is efficient to address keeping an 
overflight exclusion zone clear of the public through a license to 
operate a launch site so that the licensee better able to address the 
issue does so. Moreover, although the FAA is willing to license the 
operation of a launch site from which a limited number or kind of 
launches may take place, the FAA does not want to license the operation 
of a launch site from which launch may never occur. The FAA proposes, 
therefore, to require that an applicant demonstrate either that the 
overflight exclusion zone is

[[Page 34343]]

unpopulated, that there are times when no one is present, or that the 
public can be excluded from this area during launch. Although a 
determination of this nature encompasses issues that will be addressed 
in a launch license, a launch site cannot support safe launches unless 
overflight of the highest risk area in close proximity to a launch 
point takes place without the public present. The FAA considered as an 
alternative permitting a prospective launch site operator to show that 
it would be able to clear resident population for one launch. For 
example, a prospective launch site operator might have a potential 
customer who has made arrangements for evacuation for a single launch. 
The FAA, however, wants to be assured that an OEZ would be clear for 
any launch that takes place from that site, and would, accordingly, 
require that, if the public does reside in an OEZ, or have other means 
of access to the OEZ, an applicant show that it has made arrangements 
for their absence during a launch.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ The FAA recognizes that this requirement would protect 
persons within an OEZ during a launch but not their property. For 
the time being, the FAA would not address risks to the property of 
the public in an OEZ but leave the matter to be accommodated through 
private financial arrangements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An applicant must display an overflight exclusion zone on maps 
using the requirements described in paragraph (b) of appendix A.

Launch Area

    As noted at the beginning of this discussion, the FAA proposes to 
employ a series of fans as the shape of the foundation of its appendix 
A flight corridor. The FAA proposes the flight corridor fans to account 
for the turning capabilities and wind dispersed debris of a guided 
launch vehicle. The launch area fans have been divided into two 
regions, of 60 and 30 degrees, representing the malfunction turn 
capability of the launch vehicle relative to its velocity in the 
downtown direction. Each region is represented by the estimated maximum 
turning capability over a ground-range interval. These angles are the 
FAA's estimates for the maximum angles that the launch vehicle velocity 
vector may turn within a five second time period. The initial fan area 
is described by a 60 deg. half angle extending ten nautical miles 
downrange from a launch point. The ten nautical mile threshold 
represents the FAA's estimate of where a vehicle's maximum turning rate 
capability is reduced to approximately 30 degrees due to increasing 
velocity in the downrange direction. The FAA obtained these estimates 
on the basis of a Delta II launch vehicle trajectory, and by employing 
an annualized wind speed within one standard deviation\33\ and a debris 
ballistic coefficient of three. The FAA employed a Delta in its 
analysis because its thrust profile fell between Atlas and Titan and 
thus provided a representation of the mean performance parameters of 
launch vehicles at Cape Canaveral Air Station. This data and use of the 
appendix B methodology corroborated the selection of 60 and 30 degree 
half angles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ The FAA employed the wind speeds from the Global Gridded 
Upper Air Statistics database for grid point 27.5 North geodetic 
latitude and 280.0 East longitude. The database covers the period 
1980 through 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the early stages of flight, but past the 100 nautical mile 
range, a guided launch vehicle is capable of malfunction turns up to 
30 deg.. Therefore, a 30 deg. half angle was used to define the 
secondary fan area beginning 10 nautical mile downrange and ending 100 
nautical mile downrange. Once a launch vehicle has reached the 100 
nautical mile downrange point, the increasing velocity in the downrange 
direction continues to reduce the launch vehicle's ability to maneuver 
through a large malfunction turn.
    The FAA proposes a 100 nautical mile distance as a delimiter 
between the launch area and the downrange area. From the launch point 
out to approximately the point where the IIP is 100 nautical miles 
downrange, most launch vehicles will be subjected to the aerodynamic 
forces of wind and drag. Once a launch vehicle's IIP has cleared the 
100 nm limit, the FAA is willing to assume for purposes of appendix A 
that most launch vehicles are outside the atmosphere.
    Figure 1 in appendix A depicts the launch area of a flight 
corridor. Figure 1 shows the relative placement of the line segments 
comprising the launch area of a flight corridor. The left and right 
sides of the flight corridor are mirror images, with the flight azimuth 
serving as the line between the two sides. Table A-3 in appendix A 
tabulates the lengths of the perpendicular line segments comprising the 
launch area. 

[[Page 34344]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.066



BILLING CODE 4910-13-C

[[Page 34345]]

Downrange Area

    The FAA derived the proposed appendix A flight corridor's downrange 
area from hazard areas previously developed by federal launch ranges 
for the classes of launch vehicles defined in table 1 of Sec. 420.21. 
The downrange fan area of the flight corridor, as shown in figure 2, is 
based on turning capabilities and impact dispersions of guided 
expendable launch vehicles. The size of the fan area is necessary for 
containing launch vehicle debris in the event that a launch vehicle 
failure initiates a maximum-rate malfunction turn and the flight 
termination system must be activated. In the later stages of flight a 
guided launch vehicle's capability to turn is reduced due to increasing 
velocities in the downrange direction. Therefore, a 10 deg. half angle 
was used to define the downrange area, which reflects a combination of 
normal vehicle dispersions and malfunction turns.
    The downrange area of a flight corridor begins 100 nm from a launch 
point and, for the guided orbital launch vehicle classes, extends 5,000 
nm downrange from the launch point. The FAA proposes 5,000 nm as the 
end of an appendix A flight corridor because overflight dwell times for 
the remaining flight time result in an insignificant risk to the 
public. In general, after an orbital launch vehicle IIP has passed the 
5,000 nm point its IIP range rates increase very rapidly as the launch 
vehicle approaches orbital insertion. As a result, the dwell times 
decrease significantly, reducing the overflight risk to insignificant 
levels. For an applicant employing a guided suborbital launch vehicle, 
a flight corridor would end with the impact dispersion area of a final 
stage.
    Figure 2 depicts the downrange area of a flight corridor. The 
figure depicts the relative placement of the line segments comprising 
the downrange area of a flight corridor. The left and right sides of a 
flight corridor are mirror images, with the flight azimuth serving as 
the line between the two sides. Table A-3 in appendix A provides the 
lengths of the line segments comprising the downrange area. The scaling 
information discussed above with respect to the launch area applies to 
the downrange area as well. If an applicant chooses a map with scale 
units other than inches per inch the FAA will require the applicant to 
describe the conversion algorithm to inches per inch and to provide 
example computations.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.067

Appendix B

    Appendix B provides another means for creating a hypothetical 
flight corridor from an applicant's proposed launch site. As with a 
flight corridor created pursuant to appendix A, an appendix B corridor 
would identify the populations, those within the defined flight 
corridor, that must be analyzed for risk. An appendix B analysis offers 
an applicant a means to demonstrate whether a flight corridor from its 
launch site satisfies the FAA's risk criteria for a guided orbital or 
suborbital launch vehicle. Appendix B allows an applicant to perform a 
more individualized containment analysis rather than relying on the 
more conservative estimates the FAA derived for appendix A. Because an 
appendix B analysis uses actual meteorological data and a trajectory, 
whether actual or computer simulated, of a real launch vehicle, it 
produces a flight corridor of greater accuracy than one created under 
appendix A. The FAA derived the methodology from techniques developed 
for federal launch ranges to calculate the distance that debris would 
travel as a function of perturbing forces. The FAA's derived the 
assumptions and simplifications in the appendix B analysis from launch 
vehicle data

[[Page 34346]]

representing historical launch vehicle malfunction behavior.
    A flight corridor created using appendix B contains, on its face, 
the same elements as an appendix A flight corridor, including a 
circular area around a launch point with a radius of Dmax, 
an overflight exclusion zone, a launch area and a downrange area. 
Appendix B, however, produces and configures the last two elements 
differently than appendix A. The launch area of an appendix B flight 
corridor shows where launch vehicle debris would impact in the event of 
a vehicle failure, and takes into account local meteorological 
conditions. The downrange area of a flight corridor also shows where 
launch vehicle debris would impact given a vehicle failure, but takes 
into account vehicle imparted velocity, malfunctions turns, and vehicle 
guidance and performance dispersions. Also, like an appendix A flight 
corridor, the uprange portion of the flight corridor is described by a 
semi-circle arc that is a portion of either the most uprange dispersion 
circle, or the overflight exclusion zone, whichever is further uprange.
    The FAA's proposed appendix B launch area analysis assumes a 
vehicle failure and destruction at one second intervals along a 
trajectory z value, which denotes height as measured from the launch 
point, up to 50,000 feet. An applicant must determine the maximum 
distance a hazardous piece of debris would travel under local 
meteorological conditions. The distances that the debris travels 
provide the boundaries of an appendix B flight corridor's launch area. 
After a height of 50,000 feet, which is where the FAA estimates, for 
purposes of this analysis, that debris created by a launch vehicle's 
destruction has less exposure to atmospheric forces, an applicant shall 
determine how far harmful debris created by destruction of a launch 
vehicle would travel based only on malfunction imparted velocity and 
vehicle dispersion in order to create a downrange area. Although the 
effects of wind above 50,000 feet are not, in reality, non-existent, 
they are sufficiently diminished when compared to the effects of 
malfunction imparted velocity and launch vehicle dispersion for 
purposes of this estimation.

Dmax Circle

    As with an appendix A flight corridor, an applicant must select 
each launch point at its proposed launch site from which it expects a 
guided expendable launch vehicle to take flight. An applicant must 
obtain the latitude and longitude of the launch point to four decimal 
places. If relying on a guided orbital launch vehicle, the applicant 
must also select a launch vehicle class from Sec. 420.21, table 1, that 
best represents the largest class each proposed launch point would 
support. With the information, the applicant then ascertains the 
Dmax that debris is expected to travel from a launch point 
if a mishap were to occur in the first 10 seconds of flight by 
employing table A-1, appendix A. Table A-1 also provides a maximum 
distance for sub-orbital launch vehicles. The Dmax distance 
provided by table A-1 defines a circular area around the launch point.

Overflight Exclusion Zone

    That circular area is part of an overflight exclusion zone. Again, 
an applicant uses information from appendix A to create an overflight 
exclusion zone, although an appendix B flight corridor's uprange 
boundary may extend further than its overflight exclusion zone. An 
overflight exclusion zone consists of the circular area defined by the 
radius Dmax at the launch point and a corridor of the length 
prescribed by table A-2. Its downrange boundary is defined by an arc 
with a radius Dmax centered on the endpoint prescribed by 
table A-2. The cross-range boundaries consist of two lines parallel to 
and to either side of the flight azimuth. Each line is tangent to the 
upgrade and downrange Dmax circles as shown in appendix A, 
figure A-1. Creation of an overflight exclusion zone is predetermined 
by the requirements of appendix A and does not require a trajectory for 
an actual launch vehicle. As with an appendix A overflight exclusion 
zone, and for the reasons described in this notice's discussion of 
appendix A, the FAA proposes to require that the public be excluded 
from this area during launch.

Launch Vehicle Trajectory

    An applicant must also obtain or generate a launch vehicle 
trajectory. The applicant may use either commercially available 
software or a trajectory provided by the launch vehicle's manufacturer. 
Because appendix B is based on equations of motion in three dimensions, 
the appendix B analysis requires that the trajectory be described using 
a three axis coordinate system. The FAA recommends that an applicant 
used a WGS-84 ellipsoidal earth model \34\ as the trajectory coordinate 
system reference ellipsoid in the appendices, because of its general 
applicability to the analyses that the FAA proposes in appendices B, C 
and D, the model's wide availability and its development in accordance 
with military standards and requirements. The WGS-84 model reflects the 
most current and the most accurate Department of Defense standards for 
earth models. WGS-84 provides a basic reference frame and geometric 
figure for the Earth and provides a means for relating positions on 
various local geodetic coordinate systems, including XYZ, to an Earth-
centered, Earth-fixed coordinate system such as the EFG system employed 
in the appendix B analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Department of Defense World Geodetic System, Military 
Standard 2401 (Jan. 11, 1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA proposes to require time intervals used in the trajectory 
analysis of no greater than one second for both launch and downrange 
areas. Data frequency of one second is a compromise a between the low 
data frequency requirements of the launch area, where dwell times are 
relatively long, and the high frequency requirements of the downrange 
area, where dwell times are correspondingly shorter. Accordingly, one 
second time intervals are sufficient to accommodate linear 
interpolation between trajectory time points, in the launch and 
downrange areas, and not degrade the accuracy requirements of the 
analysis.
    In the launch area, an applicant's trajectory must include position 
data in terms of time after liftoff in right-handed XYZ coordinates 
centered on the proposed launch point, with the X-axis aligned with the 
flight azimuth. In the downrange area, the applicant's trajectory must 
show state vector data in terms of time after liftoff in right-handed 
x, y, z, x, y, z coordinates, centered on the proposed launch point, 
with the X-axis aligned with the flight azimuth.
    The FAA proposes to require certain technical information to be 
used to compute an appendix B trajectory. The proposed appendix B 
parameters comprise the minimum information needed to create a three 
axis trajectory with 3-degrees-of-freedom (DOF). The 3-DOF are the 
trajectory positions in each of the three axes of the XYZ coordinate 
system and it is impossible to adequately describe the launch vehicle 
position with less than 3-DOF. Any software used to compute a 
trajectory must incorporate the data required by appendix B, paragraph 
(b)(1)(ii)(A)-(I).\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Software for creating a 3-DOF trajectory with the accuracy 
required for an appendix B analysis is commercially available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Launch Area

    A launch area contains a launch point and an overflight exclusion 
zone, and constitutes the part of the flight corridor calculated using 
the effects of

[[Page 34347]]

atmospheric drag forces on debris produced by a series of hypothetical 
destructions of a launch vehicle at one second intervals along that 
trajectory. For purposes of an appendix B analysis, a launch area 
extends from the further uprange of an OEZ arc or dispersion circle arc 
downrange to a point on the surface of the earth that corresponds to 
the debris impact locations, assuming a failure of the vehicle in 
flight at a height of 50,000 feet. Typically, federal launch ranges 
account for five major parameters to estimate the size of a flight 
corridor. These include the effects of vehicle-imparted velocity on 
debris, the change in launch vehicle position and velocity due to a 
malfunction turn, guidance errors, the ballistic coefficient of debris, 
and wind. However, imparted velocity, malfunction turn, and trajectory 
dispersion, although not insignificant, do not play as great a role 
early in flight as the wind effects on debris. The wind effect on 
debris, in turn, depends on the ballistic coefficient of the debris. 
The FAA determined that for purposes of the launch area, of these 
parameters, launch vehicle debris and meteorological conditions 
constitute the most significant, and the FAA therefore proposes to 
focus on these two factors in the launch area.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ Note that the determination of the size of Dmax 
included considerations of malfunction turns as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA proposes to require an applicant to calculate circles that 
approximate the debris dispersion for each one second time point on a 
launch vehicle trajectory. The cross-range lines tangent to those 
circles provide the borders of a launch area. Calculating the circles 
consists, in general terms, of a two step process. An applicant must 
first define 15 mean geometric height intervals along the proposed 
trajectory in order to obtain data, in accordance with subparagraph 
(c)(4) of appendix B, regarding the mean atmospheric density, maximum 
wind speed, fall times and debris dispersions in each of those height 
intervals. An applicant must then use that data in the calculations 
proposed in subparagraphs (c)(5) to derive the radius applicable to 
each height interval (Zi). Having obtained that radius, an 
applicant uses it to describe, pursuant to subparagraph (c)(6), a 
circle referred to as a debris dispersion circle (Di), 
around each one second time interval along the vehicle's trajectory, 
starting at the launch point. An applicant will then ascertain the 
cross-range boundaries of a flight corridor's launch area by drawing 
lines that are tangent to all dispersion circles. The final 
Di dispersion circle forms the downrange boundary of a 
flight corridor's launch area.
    The launch area represents the effects of meteorological conditions 
on how far inert debris with a ballistic coefficient of 3 lb/ft.\2\ 
would travel. Debris comes in many sizes and shapes, but the FAA does 
not propose to require an applicant's location review analysis to take 
all such possibilities into account. A complete analysis for an actual 
launch would entail the determination of the type and size of debris 
created by each credible failure mode, and the velocity imparted to 
each piece of debris due to the failure. Instead, for purposes of the 
appendix B analysis, the FAA proposes to categorize launch vehicle 
debris by a ballistic coefficient that accounts for the smallest inert 
debris that may cause harm and that also accounts for the debris most 
sensitive to wind. A ballistic coefficient reflects the sensitivity of 
weight and area ratios to drag forces, such as wind dispersion effect. 
The FAA evaluated wind drift effects on a piece of debris with the 
smallest hazardous ballistic coefficient. A debris piece with the 
smallest hazardous ballistic coefficient will play the largest role in 
ascertaining the total debris dispersion in a launch area. Low beta 
debris, namely, debris with a ballistic coefficient less than or equal 
to three pounds per square foot, will have a lower terminal velocity 
than high ballistic coefficient debris and will spend more time being 
dispersed by wind forces on descent. Therefore, low ballistic 
coefficient debris will disperse farther than high ballistic 
coefficient debris. The FAA proposes a debris piece with a ballistic 
coefficient of three pounds per square foot for launch area 
calculations because it is the most wind sensitive debris piece with a 
potential for harm of reasonable significance. Experience at federal 
launch ranges has shown that, on average, a debris piece that has a 
ballistic coefficient of less than three pounds per square foot is not 
significant in terms of its potential to harm a person in the open.
    Although the FAA proposes to assume a ballistic coefficient of 
three as the smallest piece of wind sensitive debris hazardous to the 
public, ballistic coefficient is not directly related to fatality 
criteria based on the kinetic energy of debris. The ballistic 
coefficient of three is related to a kinetic energy of 58 ft/lbs which 
represents a probability of fatality of 50 percent for a standing 
person. It is therefore possible that fatalities could occur for a 
lower ballistic coefficient and that no fatalities may occur for a 
higher ballistic coefficient. The FAA proposes to incorporate neither 
of these conditions into this analysis, and invites comment.
    In addition to knowing what debris is of concern, an applicant must 
know the local meteorological conditions. The FAA proposes that an 
applicant obtain meteorological data for 15 height intervals in a 
launch area up to 50,000 feet. The FAA proposes an upper limit of 
50,000 feet in the launch area containment analysis of debris because 
winds above this altitude contribute little to drift distance. Also, 
once a launch vehicle reaches an altitude of 50,000 feet its velocity 
vector has pitched down range so that a malfunction turn and explosion 
velocity, rather than atmospheric drag and wind effects, play the 
dominant role in determining the dispersion of debris as the debris 
falls to the surface. The combination of these two factors 
significantly reduces the effect of winds on uprange and crossrange 
dispersion after a launch vehicle reaches 50,000 feet. For altitudes 
less than 50,000 feet, at the same time as low ballistic coefficient 
debris pieces are highly sensitive to drag forces, the velocity of an 
explosion caused by destroying a launch vehicle contributes relatively 
little to the dispersion effect because the drag produced on these 
light weight pieces results in a high deceleration so they achieve 
terminal velocity almost instantaneously and drift with the wind. 
Therefore, launch vehicle induced explosion-velocities are not 
considered for the launch area of an appendix B containment analysis. 
Instead, the FAA proposes to require an applicant to use local 
statistical wind data by altitude for fifteen height intervals. The 
data must include altitude, atmospheric density, mean East/West 
meridianal (u) and North/South zonal wind (v), the standard deviation 
of u and v wind, a correlation coefficient, the number of observations 
and the wind percentile.
    Data acceptable to the FAA is available from NOAA's National 
Climatic Data Center (NCDC). NOAA Data Centers, of which the NCDC is 
the largest, provide long-term preservation of, management, and ready 
accessibility to environmental data. The Centers are part of the 
National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service. The 
NCDC data set acceptable to the FAA is the ``Global Gridded Upper Air 
Statistics, 1980-1995, CV1.1, March 1996 (CD-ROM).'' The Global Gridded 
Upper Air Statistics (GGUAS) CD-ROM data set describes the atmosphere 
for each month of the represented year on a 2.5 degree global grid at 
15 standard pressure levels. NCDC provides compiled mean and standard 
deviation values for sea level pressure, wind

[[Page 34348]]

speed, air temperature, dew point, height and density. GGUAS also 
complies eight-point wind roses. The spatial resolution is a 73 x 144 
grid spaced at 2.5 degrees and the temporal resolution is one month. 
Monthly data have been statistically combined for the period of record 
1980-1995.
    To simplify the containment analysis, the FAA proposes to allow an 
applicant to use a mean wind (50%). The FAA proposes to further 
simplify the analysis by assuming that an applicant's launch pad height 
is equal to the surface level of the wind measurements provided by the 
NCDC data base. The actual pad height could be lower or higher than the 
surface level wind measurement height. The difference between the 
actual pad height and the surface level measurement height is 
considered insignificant in terms of its effect on the impact 
dispersion radius.
    The FAA notes that the NCDC database will not necessarily contain 
measurements of winds for any particular launch site proposed. If a 
launch point is located in the center of a 2.5 degree NCDC weather grid 
cell, the farthest distance to a grid cell corner would be along a 
diagonal from the center of the grid cell to a corner of the grid cell. 
The wind measurements will be no more than approximately 106 nm from 
the launch point. This distance is close enough for purposes of a 
location review containment analysis, and occurs only for a grid 
located on the equator. In general, the topography within approximately 
106 nm of a launch point is assumed to be relatively similar with 
respect to height above mean-sea-level. As the launch point latitude 
increases the distance from the wind measurement grid point will 
decrease, which will reduce errors introduced by this assumption.
    Having obtained the necessary meteorological data, an applicant 
would use data from the GGUAS CD-ROM to estimate the mean atmospheric 
density, maximum wind speed, height interval fall times, and height 
interval debris dispersions for 15 mean geometric height intervals. 
Altitude intervals are denoted by the subscript ``j''. An applicant 
would then calculate the debris dispersion radius (Di) for 
each trajectory position whose ``Z'' values, are less than 50,000 ft. 
Each trajectory time considered is denoted by the variable subscript 
``i''. The initial value of ``i'' is one and the value is increased by 
increments of one for each subsequent ``Z'' value evaluated. The major 
dispersion factors are a combination of wind velocity and debris fall 
time. Because the atmospheric density is a function of altitude and 
effects the resultant fall time, Di is estimated by summing 
the radial dispersions computed for each altitude interval the debris 
intersects on its descent trajectory. Once all the debris dispersion 
radii have been calculated, the flight corridor's launch area is 
produced by plotting each debris dispersion circle on a map, and 
drawing enveloping lines that enclose the outer boundary of the debris 
dispersion circles. The uprange portion of the flight corridor is 
described by a semi-circle arc that is a portion of either the most 
uprange Di dispersion circle, or the overflight exclusion 
zone, whichever is further uprange. The enveloping lines that enclose 
the final Di dispersion circle forms the downrange boundary 
of a flight corridor's launch area.

Downrange Area Containment Analysis

    A containment analysis also describes the dimensions of a flight 
corridor's downrange area. The FAA designed the downrange area analysis 
to accommodate launch vehicle imparted velocity, malfunction turns, and 
vehicle guidance and performance dispersions. The analysis to obtain 
the downrange area of a flight corridor for guided orbital and 
suborbital launch vehicle trajectories starts with trajectory positions 
with heights greater than 50,000 feet, that is, the point where the 
launch area analysis ends. A downrange area for a guided orbital launch 
vehicle ends 5,000 nautical miles from the launch point. If an 
applicant has chosen a guided suborbital launch vehicle for the 
analysis, the analysis must define the impact dispersion area for the 
final stage, and that impact dispersion area marks the end of a 
downrange area.
    An applicant computes the cross-range boundaries of the downrange 
area of a flight corridor by calculating the launch vehicle position 
after a simulated worst-case four second turn, rotating the launch 
vehicle state vector to account for vehicle guidance and performance 
dispersions, and then computing an instantaneous impact point. The 
locus of IIPs describes the impact boundary.
    As a first step, an applicant computes a reduction ratio factor 
that decreases with increasing launch vehicle range. Secondly, an 
applicant computes the launch vehicle position after a simulated worst-
case four-second malfunction turn for each altitude interval along a 
trajectory. For purposes of the launch site location review, the FAA 
proposes to rely on a velocity vector malfunction turn angle set at 
45 deg. and to decrease this turn angle using the reduction ratio 
factor, as a function of downrange distance to simulate the 
constraining effects of increasing velocity in the downrange direction 
on malfunction turn capability. See figure B-2. The FAA assumes this 
worst-case delay result in order to account for the maximum dispersion 
of the vehicle during the time necessary for a person in charge of 
destroying a launch vehicle to detect a vehicle failure and cause the 
vehicle's destruction. Figure B-2 in appendix B depicts the velocity 
vector movement in the yaw plane of the vehicle body axis coordinate 
system. The figure below depicts the state vector axes and impact 
locations for a malfunction turn failure and for an on-trajectory 
failure.

[[Page 34349]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.068


    The second step described above assumes perfect performance of the 
launch vehicle up until the beginning of the malfunction turn. In 
order, however, to account for normal five sigma (5) 
performance and guidance dispersions of the launch vehicle prior to the 
malfunction turn, the applicant next rotates the trajectory state 
vector. The trajectory state-vector rotation is accomplished in 
conjunction with a XYZ to ENU coordinate system transformation. This 
transformation rotates the X and Y axes about the Z axis. The Z and U 
axes are coincident. Both position and velocity components are rotated. 
The FAA intends the trajectory azimuth rotation to account for the 
normal 5-sigma launch vehicle performance and guidance dispersions that 
may exist at the beginning of a malfunction turn. The rotation angle 
decreases from three degrees to one degree as the vehicle proceeds 
downrange, and the rate of decrease is a function of distance from the 
launch point. This is done because the trajectory azimuth of a launch 
vehicle with 5-sigma performance and guidance dispersions early in 
flight could be approximately 3 degrees from the nominal 
flight azimuth. Since this azimuth offset is not considered a failure 
response, the guidance, navigation, and control system is expected to 
achieve steering corrections. These corrections will eventually reduce 
the angular offset later in flight as the launch vehicle targets the 
mission objectives for orbital insertion. If a launch vehicle has 5-
sigma performance and guidance dispersions later in flight, the effects 
of increasing velocity in the downrange direction limits a launch 
vehicle's capability to alter the trajectory's azimuth. Launch vehicles 
in the four launch vehicle classes were reviewed to determine the 
typical range of malfunction-turning rates in the downrange area. The 
FAA found these rates to be relatively small compared to launch area 
rates. The FAA proposes the three and one degree turn rates because 
they encompass the turn rates found during the review process.
    Before initiating the IIP computations, an applicant must transform 
the ENU coordinate system to an EFG coordinate system. This EFG 
coordinate transformation is employed to simplify the IIP computation.
    The IIP computation proposed in appendix B are used for demanding 
the IIPs to either side of a trajectory by creating latitude and 
longitude pairs for the left and right flight corridor boundaries. 
Connecting the latitude and longitude pairs describes the boundary of 
the downrange area of a flight corridor. The launch site location 
review IIP calculations assume the absence of atmospheric drag effects. 
Equations B46-B69 implement an iterative solution to the problem of 
determining an impact point. This iterative technique includes checks 
for conditions that will not result in impact point solutions. The 
conditions prohibiting impact solutions are: (1) An initial launch 
vehicle position below the earth's surface, (2) a trajectory orbit that 
is not elliptical, but, parabolic or hyperbolic, (3) a positive perigee 
height, where the trajectory orbit does not intersect the earth, and 
(4) the iterative solution does not converge. Any one of the conditions 
given above will prohibit the computation of an impact point. The 
iterative approach in equations B46-B69 solves these problems.

Software

    The FAA has developed a software tool that performs the flight 
corridor calculations required by appendix B for a guided orbital 
launch vehicle. The

[[Page 34350]]

software was developed in FORTRAN. All of the assumptions and equations 
contained in appendix B are implemented in the program. An applicant 
must provide the geodetic latitude, longitude, launch azimuth, desired 
wind percentile, Dmax from table A-1 and Doez 
from table A-2 as input to the program. The software outputs an ASCII 
text file of geodetic latitudes and longitudes that describe a flight 
corridor boundary.

Estimating Public Risk

    Upon completing a flight corridor, an applicant must estimate the 
risk to the public within the flight corridor to determine whether that 
risk falls within acceptable levels. If an applicant demonstrates that 
no part of the flight corridor is over a populated area, the flight 
corridor satisfies the FAA's risk thresholds, and an applicant's 
application may rely on its appendix B analysis. If a flight corridor 
includes a populated area, an applicant has the option of rotating an 
appendix B flight corridor using a different launch point or azimuth to 
avoid population, or of conducting an overflight risk analysis as 
provided in appendix C.

Appendix C

    Under a launch site location review, once an applicant has created 
a flight corridor employing either appendix A or B, the applicant must 
ascertain whether there is population within the flight corridor. If 
there is no population, the FAA will approve the location of the 
proposed launch point for the type and class of launch vehicle 
analyzed. If there is population, an applicant must employ appendix C 
to perform an overflight risk analysis for the corridor. An appendix C 
risk analysis determines whether or not the risk to the public from a 
hypothetical launch exceeds the FAA's risk threshold of an estimated 
expected casualty (Ec) of no more than 30 x 10-6 
per launch. An appendix C risk analysis estimates the Ec 
overflight contribution from a single hypothetical launch whose flight 
termination system is assumed to work perfectly. The analysis takes 
into account the probability of a vehicle failing throughout its 
trajectory, dwell times \37\ over individual populated areas, and the 
probability of impact within those areas. The analysis also takes into 
account the effective casualty area of a vehicle class, the size of the 
populated area, and the population density of the exposed population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Although an applicant who calculates an appendix B flight 
corridor will know actual dwell times for its Ec 
analysis, the FAA proposes to supply a constant to approximate dwell 
time for an applicant who relies on an appendix A flight corridor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Estimating Ec for an actual launch takes a large number 
of variables and considerations into account. The risk analysis 
provided in appendix C provides a somewhat simpler approach to 
estimating Ec within the boundaries of a flight corridor 
than might be necessary in performing a risk analysis for an actual 
launch. The FAA proposes, for purposes of determining the acceptability 
of a launch site's location, to rely only on variables relevant to 
ensuring that the site itself offers at least one flight corridor 
sufficiently isolated from population for safety. Accordingly, many of 
the factors that a launch operator will take into account will not be 
reflected here.
    In brief, in order for an applicant to perform an appendix C risk 
analysis, the applicant must first determine whether any populated 
areas are present within an appendix A or B flight corridor. If so, the 
applicant must obtain area and population data. At this point an 
applicant has a choice. Appendix C requires that an applicant calculate 
the probability of impact for each populated area, and then determine 
an Ec value for each populated area. To obtain the estimated 
Ec for an entire flight corridor, the applicant adds--or 
sums--the Ec results for each populated area. If the 
population within the flight corridor is relatively small, an applicant 
may wish to conduct a less rigorous analysis by making conservative 
assumptions. Appendix C also offers the option of analyzing a worst-
case flight corridor for those flight corridors where such an approach 
might save time and analysis. Examples of such simplifications are 
provided.

Identification and Location of Population

    In order to perform an Ec analysis, an applicant must 
first identify the populated areas within a flight corridor. For the 
first 100 nautical miles from a launch point downrange a U.S. census 
block group serves as the maximum size of an individual populated areas 
permitted under an appendix C analysis. The proposed maximum permitted 
size of an individual populated area beyond 100 nautical mile downrange 
is a 1 degree latitude x 1 degree longitude grid. The size of that area 
analyzed will play out differently depending on the location of the 
proposed launch site. For example, if an applicant proposed a coastal 
site, the applicant would presumably present the FAA with a flight 
corridor mostly over water. Population may be limited to that of a few 
islands, minimizing the amount of data and analysis necessary. If an 
applicant proposes a launch site located further inland, the applicant 
would need to obtain the area and population of each census block group 
in the first 100 nm of the flight corridor. This may prove time 
consuming, although the FAA has proposed alternative approach that may 
simplify the process for such applicants. An applicant may also propose 
to operate a launch site on foreign territory, where U.S. census data 
would not apply. In that event, the FAA would apply the principles 
underlying a launch site location review to the available data on a 
case-by-case basis.
    The proposed regulations require the analysis of populations at the 
census block group level for the first 100 nm from the launch point in 
the flight corridor. An applicant shall employ data from the latest 
census.\38\ An applicant must also include population that may not be 
included in the U.S. census, such as military base personnel. The FAA 
recognizes a census block group to be a reasonable populated area for 
analysis because the risk early in flight is greatest due to long dwell 
times. IIP range rates in a launch area are relatively show, which 
exposes the launch area populations to launch vehicle risks for a 
longer period of time when compared to similar populations in the 
downrange area. Depending on the launch site and launch vehicle, a 
census block group could be exposed to launch vehicle risks for tens of 
seconds. In contrast to the size of a populated area in the downrange 
area, the increased risk due to longer dwell times requires a more 
detailed evaluation of the launch area for Ec purposes. A 
census block group is an appropriate size for analysis because it is 
small enough to accommodate the assumption that a populated area 
contains homogeneously distributed population without grossly 
distorting the outcome of the Ec estimates, and because the 
data is readily available for populations in the United States. 
Although a census block is smaller and therefore even more accurate, 
only census block centroids, rather than the more useful geographic 
area, are available from the U.S. Census Bureau. The FAA also proposes 
to allow the census block group to serve as the smallest unit addressed 
because electronic data is available at the census block group level, 
which will allow for more efficient execution of the computations. 
Although not as accurate as a census block, a census block group is 
also sufficiently accurate to serve as

[[Page 34351]]

the smallest populated area for a launch site location review because 
the launch licensing process will mandate the more thorough risk 
analysis necessary for a particular launch. An applicant may find the 
need to use only a portion of a census block group, such as when a 
populated area is divided by a flight corridor boundary. In that case 
an applicant should use the population density of the block group to 
reflect the population in that portion of the census block group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ Some geographic information software has the capacity to 
import U.S. Census Bureau demographic and geographic data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FAA proposes to allow an applicant to evaluate the presence of 
people in larger increments of area in the downrange area of a flight 
corridor than in the launch area of a flight corridor. Populations in 
the downrange area of a flight corridor must be analyzed in area no 
greater than 1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude and longitude grid coordinates. 
Because dwell times downrange are shorter, the risk to the individual 
populated areas is less and, therefore, the FAA is willing to accept a 
different degree of accuracy. IIP range rates in the downrange area can 
achieve speeds of 500 nm/second. Because the longest distance in a grid 
space would be approximately 85 nm for a grid on the equator, which is 
where the largest grid area will be found, the launch vehicle IIP dwell 
time would be less than 0.20 seconds over the grid. This reduces the 
risk to population in that grid significantly compared with population 
in the launch area.
    The data needed for a downrange area analysis is also readily 
available. One source for population data in an area no greater than 
1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude and longitude grid coordinates in a database 
of the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory. The CDIAC database is ``Global Population 
Distribution (1990), Terrestrial Area and Country Name Information on a 
One by One Degree Grid Cell Basis.'' This database contains one degree 
by one degree grid information on the world-wide distribution of 
population for 1990 and country specific information on the percentage 
of a country's population present to each grid cell.
    The CDIAC obtained its population estimates from the United Nations 
FAO Yearbook,\39\ the Guinness World Data Book,\40\ and the Rand 
McNally World Atlas \41\ for approximately 6,000 cities with 
populations greater than 50,000 inhabitants. The population data was 
updated by CDIAC to 1990 values with available census data. For the 
rural population allocation, the CDIAC developed global rural 
population distribution factors based on national population data, data 
on approximately 90,000 cities and towns, and the assumption that rural 
population is proportional to the number of cities and towns within 
each grid cell for each country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ United Nations FAO Yearbook, Vol. 47, Rome, 1993.
    \40\ The Guinness World Data Book, Guinness Pub. Ltd., 
Middlesex, England, 1993.
    \41\ Rand McNally World Atlas, Rand McNally, New York, 1991.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Probability of Impact

    The next step in the process would be to ascertain the probability 
of impact for each populated area. In other words, an applicant must 
find the probability that debris will land in each populated area 
within the flight corridor under analysis. For this, the applicant must 
find the probability of impact in both the cross-range and downrange 
directions, by employing equation C1 for an appendix A flight corridor 
for an orbital launch or equations C2 through C4 for an appendix A 
corridor that describes a suborbital launch. For an analysis based on 
an appendix B flight corridor, an applicant will employ equation C5 for 
an orbital launch or equations C6 and C8 for a suborbital launch. For 
both appendix A and B corridors, the probability of impact 
(Pi) within a particular populated area is equal to the 
product of the probability of impact in the downrange (Px) 
and cross range (Py) directions, and the probability of 
vehicle failure (Pr).

Pi = Py * Px * Pf

The analysis applicable to both appendix A and B flight corridors is 
the same for the cross-range direction,\42\ but employs a different 
equation to determine the probability of impact in the downrange 
direction. For an appendix A corridor, the FAA proposes to specify a 
constant in equation C1 to approximate dwell time for the downrange 
direction. In equation C5 an applicant will employ actual dwell times 
obtained from the trajectory generated pursuant to appendix B.

    \42\ See above text for footnote 42
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ For Equations C-1, C-3, C-5 and C-7 the FAA approximated 
the probability of impact in the cross-range direction 
(Py) by applying Simpson's Normal Probability Function. 
The FAA employed Simpson's rule to derive the following equation:

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.013

Simpson's approximation of the Elliptical Normal Probability 
Function is described in General Motors Corporation Defense System 
Division's Elliptical Normal Probability Function, (Apr. 6, 1960).
    An applicant who relies on an appendix A flight corridor will use 
equation C1 to determine the probability of impact for a particular 
populated area in the downrange direction by finding the range rate and 
assuming a total thrusting time of 643 seconds. Equation C1 reflects 
the fact that appendix A does not employ trajectory data, and 
therefore, employs a technique for estimating dwell times as a function 
of range and range rate to determine the probability of impact in the 
downrange direction. Proposed table C-2 provides the appendix A flight 
corridor IIP range intervals and corresponding IIP range rates for use 
in Equation C1.
    To create proposed table C-2, the FAA employed actual trajectory 
data to determine individual range rates for Atlas, Delta and Titan 
launch vehicles. The FAA computed the IIP for each trajectory time 
point, and the range rates were determined by subtracting IIP ranges 
(RIIP) over one-second intervals. This provided a per second range 
rate, referred to below at R-dot. The average range rates over the 
range intervals, shown in the table below, were estimated by dividing 
the difference of

[[Page 34352]]

the upper value of adjacent IIP ranges by the elapsed trajectory time 
over the range interval. For example, the following Delta launch 
vehicle data was used to determine the IIP range rate from 101 through 
500 nm:

RIIP1 = 100 nm
TALO1 (time after lift-off 1) = 97 sec
RIIP2 = 500 nm
TALO2 = 217 sec
(RIIP2-RIIP1) (TALO2-TALO1) = 3.33 nm/s

    The FAA derived the total average thrusting time of 643 seconds 
from the data in table 5 by dividing the difference of the upper value 
of adjacent IIP ranges by the average IIP range rate corresponding to 
the largest IIP range and summing the results over the set of IIP 
ranges. The following computations are given as examples of how the FAA 
reached this determination.

Let:
    RIIP1 = 100 nm
    RIIP2 = 500 nm
    R-dot = 3.00 nm/s
(RIIP2-RIIP1)/R-dot = 133.33 sec

                                  Table 5.--Data To Derive Total Thrusting Time
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       IIP range rate (nm/s)
         IIP range (nm)          ----------------------------------------------------------------  t(s)
                                       Delta           Atlas           Titan           Avg.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-100...........................            1.03             085            0.96            0.91          110.50
100-500.........................            3.33            3.77            2.23            3.00          133.33
500-1500........................            4.27            3.66            2.73            3.20          312.99
1500-2500.......................            9.01           21.74           12.99           17.37           57.59
2501-3000.......................           33.33           50.00           41.67           45.84           10.91
3001-4000.......................           66.67           90.91           83.33           87.12           11.48
4001-5000.......................          166.67          142.86          166.67          154.77            6.46
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total-t............  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............          643.26
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ``X'' distances were measured directly off the mapping 
information source.
    An applicant who relies on an appendix B flight corridor will 
employ proposed equation C5 or equations C6 through C8 depending on 
whether the flight corridor culminates in an impact dispersion area or 
not. Equation C5 reflects the fact that, unlike an appendix A flight 
corridor, the trajectory data used to create an appendix B flight 
corridor provides downrange instantaneous impact points (IIPs). 
Accordingly, the dwell time associated with a populated area may be 
ascertained for the difference between the closest and furthest 
downrange distances of the populated area. See figure C-2.
    An applicant may find the following six step procedure helpful in 
determining the dwell time for individual populated areas that equation 
C5 calls for. The subscripts to not correspond to subscripts in the 
appendix.
    Step 1: Determine the trajectory time (t1) associated 
with the trajectory IIP position (x1), that immediately 
precedes the uprange point on the populated area boundary. This is a 
accomplished by locating the IIP points in the vicinity of the 
populated area, drawing lines normal to the trajectory IIP ground 
trace, and choosing the trajectory time for the IIP point whose normal 
is closest to the uprange boundary of the populated area but does not 
intersect it. The distance from the launch point to x1 may 
be determined using the range and bearing equations in appendix A, 
paragraph (b).
    Step 2: Determine the trajectory time (t2) associated 
with the trajectory IIP position (x2) that just exceeds the 
downrange point on the populated area boundary. This is accomplished by 
locating the IIP point in the vicinity of the populated area, drawing 
lines normal to the trajectory IIP ground trace, and choosing the 
trajectory time for the IIP point whose normal is closest to the 
downrange boundary of the populated area but does not intersect it. The 
distance from the launch point to x2 may be determined using 
the range and bearing equations in Appendix A, section (b).
    Step 3: Determines the average IIP range rate (R) for the flight 
period determined in Steps 1 and 2 above.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.014

    Step 4: Determine the distance along the nominal trajectory to the 
uprange point (x3) on the populated area boundary. This is 
accomplished by drawing a line normal to the trajectory IIP ground 
trace and tangent to the uprange boundary of the populated area, and 
determining the distance along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace 
from the launch point to the intersection of the normal and the ground 
trace.
    Step 5: Determine the distance along the nominal trajectory to the 
downrange point (x4) on the populated area boundary. This is 
accomplished by drawing a line normal to the trajectory IIP ground 
trace and tangent to the downrange boundary of the populated area, and 
determining the distance along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace 
from the launch point to the intersection of the normal and the ground 
trace.
    Step 6: The dwell time (td) is estimated by the 
following equation.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.015

    For either type of flight corridor, an applicant determines the 
probability of impact in the cross range direction, (Py), 
through a series of steps, of which the first is measuring the distance 
from the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace to the closest and 
furthest points in the cross range direction of the area that contains 
population. The populated area may consist of a census block group or a 
1 degree latitude by 1 degree longitude grid. See figure C-1. To 
determine the distribution of the debris pattern in that populated 
area, the applicant needs to estimate the standard deviation of debris 
impacts. The FAA proposes that, for purposes of an appendix C analysis, 
that the cross-range boundaries of a flight corridor represent five 
standard deviations 5 of all debris impacts form normal and 
malfunction trajectories.\43\ To apply this to a populated area, an 
applicant must first find the distance

[[Page 34353]]

from the nominal trajectory to the cross-range boundary, measured on a 
line normal to the trajectory through the geographic center of the 
populated area, and then divide that distance by five.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ Five sigma should represent 99.9999426% of all debris 
impacts from normal and malfunction trajectories assuming a 
functioning FTS. The one-sided-tail percentage area under the 
Gaussian Normal Probability curve beyond five-sigma is approximately 
0.000000287%. Since the normal curve is symmetric this value can be 
doubled and subtracted from one (1) to determine the percentage area 
between the plus-and-minus five sigma limits. This results in the 
99.9999426% value. See, Frederick E. Croxton, Elementary Statistics 
with Applications in Medicine, 323 (1953).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the probability of failure is also an element in 
calculating the probability of impact. The FAA proposes for the launch 
site location analysis to assign a failure probability (Pf) 
constant of Pf=0.10 for guided launch vehicles. This 
represents a conservative estimate of the failure percentage of current 
launch vehicles, since many current launch vehicles are more reliable. 
The appendix C process assumes that the probability of impacting within 
the corridor is one, and the probability of impacting outside the 
corridor is zero. The flight termination system is assumed to function 
perfectly in all failure scenarios.
    A final variation on computing the probability of impact for a 
particular populated area is used when computing the probability of 
impact (Pi) within the impact dispersion area of a guided 
suborbital launch vehicle. In this case, the probability of success 
(Ps) is substituted for the probability of failure 
(Pf), and an applicant shall employ a method similar to that 
used in appendix D to calculate the probability of impact for any 
populated areas inside the impact dispersion area. This divergence, the 
use of probability of success rather than probability of failure, from 
the variable used for an orbital launch vehicle arises out of the 
relative risk associated with an impact dispersion area of a guided 
suborbital launch vehicle. The same risks associated with a guided 
orbital launch are also associated with a guided sub-orbital launch 
except for the final stage of the guided suborbital mission, which is 
intended to return to earth rather than to enter orbit. On the basis of 
past history, the FAA has concluded that the final stage has a high 
reliability and will impact in the designated impact dispersion area, 
as intended from a successful mission. The FAA intends through its 
proposed launch site location review to analyze high risk events, and 
because the risk due to a planned impact in the dispersion area would 
be much higher than an unplanned impact, the FAA proposes to use 
Ps inside the impact dispersion area rather the 
Pf for determining the probability of impact in a guided 
suborbital launch vehicle's impact dispersion area.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ The actual probability used in the analysis is 0.98.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Totaling Risk of All Populated Areas in Flight Corridor

    The Ec estimate for a flight corridor is a summation of 
the risk to each populated area and results in an estimate of 
Ec inside the corridor, Ec (Corridor). This means 
that an applicant would estimate Ec for each individual 
populated area within a flight corridor, using the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.016

Pi is the probability of hitting the populated area. 
AC is the effective casualty area of the vehicle and may be 
obtained from table C-3. Ak is the area of the populated 
area. Nk is the population in Ak, and is obtained 
from census data. The label ``k'' is used to identify the individual 
populated area. The summed Ec for all populated areas added 
together is the Ec (Corridor).
    The FAA proposes to require an applicant to use an effective 
casualty area specific to a launch vehicle class and range when 
performing the Ec calculation. An effective casualty area 
(Ac) means the aggregate casualty area of each piece of 
debris created by a launch vehicle failure at a particular points on 
its trajectory. The casualty area for each piece of debris is the area 
within which 100 percent of the unprotected population on the ground is 
assumed to be a casualty. This area is based on the characteristics of 
the debris piece including its size, the path angle of its trajectory, 
impact explosions, and debris skip, splatter, and bounce. In each of 
the vehicle classes, the Ac decreases, resulting in a 
smaller casualty area, as a function of distance downrange because 
vehicle size and explosive potential decreases as explosive propellant 
is consumed and expended stages are ejected during vehicle flight.
    An effective casualty area is a function of time-after-liftoff is 
proposed in table C-3 for launch vehicle classes listed in table 1 of 
Sec. 420.21. The FAA derived the effective casualty areas in table C-3 
from DAMP, a series of risk estimation computer programs used at 
federal launch ranges, to evaluate the vehicle classes described in 
table 1, Sec. 420.21. DAMP considers other factors besides debris 
characteristics, such as the size of a standing person, which increases 
the casualty area, and sheltering, which would tend to decrease the 
casualty area. Because considering sheltering has a greater effect than 
considering the size of a standing person, and was not assumed in table 
C-3, the effective casualty areas in table C-3 are conservative.
    An applicant calculates casualty expectancy for each populated area 
within a flight corridor. After the casualty expectancies have been 
estimated for all populated areas, the Ec values are summed 
to obtain the total corridor risk. The total is multiplied by two to 
estimate the final value for Ec(Corridor). The FAA is 
proposing this multiplier to account for the error introduced by the 
risk estimation approach of the launch site location review. Both the 
method used to construct a flight corridor and the method used to 
analyze risk contributes error. For example, an appendix A flight 
corridor is not based on actual wind data, and even though its size is 
conservative in nature, this size alone can cause the risk to be 
underestimated in appendix C. In other words, what the analysis gains 
in conservatism with the greater size of an appendix A corridor it may, 
on occasion, lose in conservatism due to the corresponding decrease in 
population density relative to an appendix B corridor. Conversely, an 
appendix B corridor, which may result in a higher Ec total 
due to the greater density attributable to the smaller corridor, may 
not encompass a populated area that would otherwise be analyzed for 
risk as part of an appendix A corridor. In addition, these calculations 
do not account for any secondary effects such as fire and collapsing 
structures that may result from impacting debris. Accordingly, to 
compensate for these inherent discrepancies, a safety factor is 
advisable in order to guard against licensing the operation of a launch 
site which may never be able to support a licensed launch. Also, an 
appendix B flight corridor is based on a number of approximations, 
including the descent rate of a piece of debris, the variability of a 
nominal launch vehicle trajectory prior to a failure, and a malfunction 
turn. Both the appendix A and B flight corridors for orbital launch 
vehicles end at 5,000 am, leaving out a large area of overflight, 
albeit with an IIP with very high velocity and extremely small dwell 
times. Additionally, the Ec analysis in appendix C itself 
can underestimate risk to the population within a flight corridor due 
to certain approximations, including the probability of impact in the 
cross-range direction (Py), which uses Simpson's 
approximation of the Elliptical Normal Probability Function, and the 
determination that the width of a flight corridor is assumed to 
represent a 5-sigma normal distribution. Cities present in a flight 
corridor can also cause the risk to be underestimated because the 
appendix C method

[[Page 34354]]

averages population over areas that may be as large as a 1 deg.  x  
1 deg. grid. Perhaps the most important factor in contributing to 
possible error is the fact that the proposed location review assumes a 
perfectly functioning flight termination system. Accordingly, the FAA 
has chosen a multiplier of two to balance its intent to only approve 
launch sites that are safe for the launches intended to be launched 
from the launch site, and to minimize the burden on applicants.
    The FAA will not approve the proposed launch site location if the 
estimated expected casualty exceeds 30  x  10-6. An 
applicant may either modify its proposal, or if the flight corridor 
used was generated by the method proposed in appendix A, use the 
typically less conservative but more accurate method proposed in 
appendix B to narrow the flight corridor and perform another appendix C 
overflight risk analysis. An applicant may employ specified variations 
to the analysis described above. Six variations are identified in 
appendix C. The first four variations permit an application to make 
conservative assumptions that would lead to an overestimation of the 
corridor Ec compared with the more detailed process 
described. Although appendix C's approach simplifies a typical launch 
safety analysis somewhat by providing conservative default parameters 
to use, it may also prove unnecessarily complex for applicants 
proposing launch sites with launch corridors encompassing extremely few 
people. For those situations, appendix C provides the option for an 
applicant to further simplify the estimation of casualty expectancy by 
making worst-case assumptions that would produce a higher value of the 
corridor Ec compared with the analysis defined in appendix 
C, subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8). This may be particularly useful when an 
applicant believes Ec is well below the acceptable 
value.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ The purpose of the Ec analysis as part of the 
launch site location review is not to determine a value of 
Ec but rather to confidently demonstrate that 
Ec is less than the acceptable threshold value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These variations would allow an applicant to assume that 
Px and Py have a value of 1.0 for all populated 
areas, or combine populated areas into one or more larger populated 
areas and use the greatest population density of the component 
populated areas for the combined area or areas. An applicant may also 
assume Py has a value of one for any given populated area, 
or, for any given Px sector, assume Py has a 
value of one and use a worst case population density for the sector. A 
Px sector is an area spanning the width of a flight corridor 
and bounded by two time points on the trajectory IIP ground trace. All 
four of these reduce the number of calculations required for applicants 
with little population within a flight corridor.
    Another option, permitted in appendix C, is for an applicant who 
would otherwise fail the baseline analysis to perform a more refined 
Ec analysis by negating the baseline approach's 
overestimation of the probability of impact in each populated area. If 
the flight corridor includes populated areas that are irregular in 
shape, the equations for probability of impact in appendix C may cause 
Ec to be overestimated. This is because the result of the 
Pi computation for each populated area represents the 
probability of impacting within a rectangular area that bounds the 
populated area. As shown in figure C-1 in appendix C, the length of two 
sides of the rectangle would be x2-x1, and the 
length of the other two sides would be y2-y1. 
Populated areas used to support the appendix C analysis must be no 
bigger than a U.S. census block group for the first 100 nautical miles 
from a launch point and no bigger than a 1 degree latitude  x  1 degree 
longitude grid (1 deg.  x  1 deg. grid) beyond 100 nautical miles 
downrange. Whether the populated area is a census block group, a 1 deg. 
 x  1 deg. grid, or a land mass such as a small island, it will not 
likely be a rectangle. Even a 1 deg.  x  1 deg. grid near the equator, 
which approximates a rectangle, will not line up with the trajectory 
ground trace. Thus, a portion of the Pi rectangle includes 
area outside the populated area being evaluated. The probability of 
impacting in the rectangle is higher than impacting just in the 
populated area being evaluated. The value of the probability of impact 
calculated in accordance with appendix C will thus likely be 
overestimated.
    One approach permitted in appendix C is to divide any given 
populated area into smaller rectangles, determine Pi for 
each individual rectangle, and sum the individual impact probabilities 
to determine Pi for the entire populated area. A second 
approach permitted in appendix C is, for a given populated area, to use 
the ratio of the populated area to the area of the original 
Pi rectangle.
    If the estimated expected casualty still exceeds 
30 x 10-6, the FAA will not approve the proposed launch site 
location. In that event, the only remaining options for an applicant 
would be to rely on one of its potential customers obtaining a launch 
license for launch from the proposed site.
    The FAA considered the option of increasing the accuracy of 
appendix C by employing a procedure that ensures individual populated 
areas have homogeneous population densities. The FAA considered this 
because the probability of impact equations in appendix C can cause the 
Ec for an individual populated area to be underestimated 
when unequal population densities occur within the area. This can 
occur, for example, when a populated area contains one or more densely 
populated cities interspersed with large land mass areas with rural 
population. The proposed Ec equation distributes the 
population evenly throughout the populated area. Accordingly, the 
Ec may be somewhat underestimated or over-estimated for 
portions of the populated area. The FAA considered requiring applicants 
to use smaller areas with homogeneous population densities in order to 
more accurately estimate the Ec, but chose not to because 
any error should be accounted for with the multiplier of two discussed 
above.

Appendix D

    Appendix D contains the FAA's proposed method for determining the 
acceptability of the location of a launch site for launching unguided 
suborbital launch vehicles. Appendix D describes how to define an 
overflight exclusion zone and each impact dispersion area to be 
analyzed for risk for a representative launch vehicle. Proposed 
appendix D also describes how to estimate whether risk to the public, 
measured by expected casualty, falls within the FAA's threshold of 
acceptable risk. In short, the proposed approach requires an applicant 
to define an overflight exclusion zone around a launch point, determine 
the impact point for each spent stage and then define an impact 
dispersion area around each impact point. If populated areas are 
located in the impact dispersion areas and cannot be excluded by 
altering the launch azimuth, the FAA would require a risk analysis that 
demonstrates that risk to the public remains within acceptable levels.
    As a first step, an applicant would select which launch points at 
the proposed launch site would be used for the launch of unguided 
suborbital launch vehicles. An applicant must also then select an 
existing launch vehicle, for which apogee data is available, whose 
final stage apogee represents the maximum altitude of any intended 
unguided suborbital launch vehicle intended for launch from that launch 
point. The applicant would then plot the distance, which is referred to 
as the

[[Page 34355]]

impact range, from the launch point to the nominal impact point on the 
azimuth for each stage. Employing the impact dispersion radius of each 
stage, the applicant would define an impact dispersion area around each 
nominal impact point.
    The FAA's proposed methodology for its proposed impact dispersion 
area requirements is grounded in three assumptions which reflect 
current practice. For purposes of this location review, the FAA assumes 
that unguided suborbital launch vehicles are not equipped with a flight 
termination system, and that public risk criteria are accordingly met 
through the implementation of a wind weighting system, launch 
procedures and restrictions, and the proper selection of a launch 
azimuth and elevation angles.\46\ These aspects are currently reflected 
in FAA guidelines and will be addressed in its regulations for launches 
from non-federal launch sites. The cumulative launch experience in 
unguided suborbital launch vehicles demonstrates that risk to the 
public from launches of these vehicles is attributable to planned stage 
impact during a successful flight. Controlling these risks solely 
through measures implemented prior to flight rather than relying on 
active measures during flight, as is the case for a vehicle equipped 
with an FTS, has proved historically an acceptable approach to assuring 
protection of the public. Accordingly, the appendix D analysis should 
adequately address the general suitability of each launch point for 
unguided suborbital launch vehicle launches up to the altitude 
proposed. Operational requirements imposed on a launch licensee through 
license conditions should adequately address risks posed by the actual 
launch of unguided suborbital launch vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ The flight safety program of an unguided suborbital launch 
vehicle without a flight termination system typically takes place 
and is concluded prior to flight. A launch operator achieves flight 
safety by implementing a flight based on launch vehicle performance 
parameters, launch vehicle dispersion parameters and other sources 
of error, such as wind measurement errors. A launch operator will 
offset the effects of winds measured on the day of launch by 
adjusting the azimuth and elevation of the launch vehicle's launcher 
accordingly. The methodology for correcting for actual wind 
conditions on the day of launch is called wind weighting. The 
products of a wind weighting analysis determine launcher azimuth and 
elevation settings that correct for wind effects on an unguided 
launch vehicle.
    During preflight planning a launch operator determines launch 
vehicle dispersion, which is the potential change in the location of 
impact, by modeling the known causes of systematic errors. 
Variations in thrust, stage weight, payload weight and stage 
ignition time may produce errors, and will typically be included in 
any error model. Thrust misalignment, and the misalignment of 
nozzles or fins must also be modeled because of their capacity to 
contribute to error. A model also incorporates the error created by 
separation of the launch vehicle from the launcher, and accounts for 
any errors in motor impulse, drag estimate and launcher setting. 
Most significantly, a model analyzes wind error. Wind error modeling 
accounts for the measurement errors in the measuring system employed 
and the time elapsed between the time of measurement and the time of 
launch. Once these elements have been determined, wind error will be 
incorporated into the model to obtain the predicted impact points 
and total launch vehicle dispersion.
    Historically, one of three methods have been used to correct for 
actual wind conditions on the day of launch. Both NASA at Wallops 
Flight Facility and the US Army at White Sands Missile Range have 
developed and improved methods of predicting the wind effects over 
the years. The three wind weighting methods that have evolved 
include: (1) The manual method, (2) the Lewis method, and (3) the 5-
Degree-Of-Freedom (DOF) method. The difference between the methods 
is one of complexity and accuracy. The manual method is the least 
complex, but produces the largest error. The 5-DOF method is the 
most complex, produces the least error, and is currently employed by 
safety offices at Wallops Flight Facility and White Sands Missile 
Range.
    Each of the wind weighting methods produce launch vehicle 
elevation and azimuth settings. Other launch factors that play a 
role, however, may be necessary to ensure the wind weighting 
solutions are within the assumptions made in the pre-flight 
dispersion analysis. These factors may include the required height 
and period of wind measurements, limitations on the maximum 
ballistic wind and wind variability at which launch would be 
permitted, and a determination regarding maximum launcher setting 
angles.
    The FAA derived the methods for defining an impact dispersion 
area proposed in appendix D by assuming that a launch operator would 
use a 5-DOF method of wind weighting. This does not preclude an 
applicant for a launch license from using another wind weighting 
method to develop impact dispersion areas, but the FAA proposes to 
address such issues in a rulemaking concerning launch licensing 
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed location review for a launch point that will support 
unguided suborbital launch vehicles also assume that intermediate and 
final stages impact the earth within five standard deviations 
5 of each nominal, no wind, impact point. This means that an 
appendix D analysis does not account for failures outside of five 
standard deviations from each intended impact point.
    It also means that an appendix D analysis does not simulate an 
actual launch in actual wind conditions. For actual launches, wind 
weighting can be used to obtain the nominal, no wind, impact point for 
the final stage only. In order to ensure that the launch meets 
Ec, ship hit, and aircraft hit probabilities, launch 
operators compute the wind drifted impact points of all stages using 
the launcher settings determined through wind weighting so that 
intermediate stage impacts are determined prior to launch. Although 
appendix D does not address this fact directly, it does show that at 
least some launches can be conducted depending on the wind conditions.

Defining an Overflight Exclusion Zone and Impact Dispersion Areas

    The areas an applicant will analyze for risk to the public posed by 
the launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle consist of an 
overflight exclusion zone and state impact dispersion areas. Having 
selected a launch point and a launch vehicle for which empirical data 
is available, an applicant defines each zone and area using the 
methodology provided. An overflight exclusion zone shall consist of a 
circle with a radius of 1600 feet centered on a launch point. An 
overflight exclusion zone is the area which must be free of the public 
during a launch. Creation of each impact dispersion area involves 
several more steps. For each stage of the analyzed vehicle an applicant 
must identify the nominal stage impact point on the azimuth where the 
stage is supposed to land, and draw a circle around that point, using 
the range and bearing equations of appendix A or GIS software. That 
circle describes the impact dispersion area, and an applicant defines 
an impact dispersion area for each stage.
    An applicant must at the outset provide the geodetic latitude and 
longitude of a launch point that is proposes to offer for launch, and 
select a flight azimuth. Once an applicant has selected a launch point 
location and azimuth, the next step is to determine a 1600 foot radius 
overflight exclusion zone for that launch point. As with an overflight 
exclusion zone created pursuant to appendices A and B, an applicant 
must show that the public would be cleared from its overflight 
exclusion zone prior to launch. Although suborbital vehicles have a 
very low likelihood of failure, failure is more likely to occur in the 
early stages of the launch. Consequently, the FAA proposes to guard 
against that risk through requiring an applicant to show the ability to 
evacuate an overflight exclusion zone. As with the flight corridors of 
appendices A and B, the FAA proposes to base the size of the overflight 
exclusion zone on the maximum distance that debris is expected to 
travel from a launch point if a mishap were to occur very early in 
flight. The FAA has estimated the Dmax for an unguided 
suborbital launch vehicle, and the result is 1600 feet. Accordingly, an 
applicant would define an appendix D overflight exclusion zone as a 
circle with a radius of 1600 feet.
    Because an applicant must choose the maximum latitude anticipated 
of a

[[Page 34356]]

suborbital launch vehicle for launch from its site, an applicant needs 
to acquire the apogee of each stage of a representative vehicle. An 
applicant need not possess full information regarding a specific 
representative launch vehicle. All that is necessary is the apogee of 
each stage. The apogee height must be obtained from an actual launch 
conducted at an 84 deg. elevation angle. If needed, data is available 
from the FAA. The FAA has compiled apogee data from past launches from 
Wallops Flight Facility for a range of launch vehicles and payloads. 
This data will be provided to an applicant upon request and may be used 
to perform the analysis.
    An applicant then defines impact dispersion areas for each stage's 
nominal impact point. Having selected a launch vehicle most 
representative of what the applicant intends for launch from the 
proposed launch point, an applicant will use either its own empirical 
apogee data or data from one of the vehicles in the FAA's data base. 
Whether an applicant uses vehicle apogee data obtained from the FAA or 
from elsewhere, the applicant must employ the FAA's proposed range and 
dispersion factors to determine the location of each nominal impact 
point and the size of each impact dispersion area.
    The FAA proposes a means of estimating the distances of both an 
impact range and an impact dispersion radius. Under proposed appendix 
D, an applicant would estimate the impact range and dispersion 
parameters by multiplying the apogee of a launch vehicle intended for 
the prospective launch site by the FAA's proposed factors. The FAA 
proposes impact range and impact dispersion factors, which it derived 
from launch vehicle pedigrees of sounding rockets used by NASA Wallops 
Flight Facility in its sounding rocket program.\47\ The proposed 
factors provide estimators of staging data for an unguided vehicle 
launched at a standard launcher elevation, which is the angle between 
the launch vehicle's major axis (x) and the ground, of 84 deg.. the 
appendix defines the relationship between the apogee of a launch 
vehicle stage, an impact range and a 5 dispersion radius of a 
stage. This relationship is expressed as two constants, which vary with 
the altitude of the apogee, an impact range factor and an impact 
dispersion factor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ These vehicles include Nike Orion, Black Brant IX, Black 
Brant XI, and Black Brant XII. They are representative of the 
current launch vehicle inventory and should approximate any proposed 
new launch vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To locate each nominal impact point, an applicant will calculate 
the impact range for the final stage and each intermediate state. An 
impact range describes the distance between an applicant's proposed 
launch point and the nominal impact point of a stage, or, in other 
words, its estimated landing spot along the azimuth selected for 
analysis. For this estimation, an applicant would employ the FAA's 
proposed impact range factors of 0.4 or 0.7 as multipliers for the 
apogee of the stage. If an apogee is less than 100 kilometers, the 
applicant shall employ 0.4 as the impact range factor for that stage. 
If the apogee of a stage is 100 kilometers or more, the applicant shall 
use 0.7 as a multiplier. In plotting the impact points on a map, an 
applicant shall employ the methods provided in appendix A.
    An impact dispersion radius descries the impact dispersion area of 
a stage. The FAA proposes to rely on an estimated impact dispersion 
radius of five standard deviations 5 because significant 
population, such as a densely populated city, in areas within distances 
up to 5 of the impact point could cause significant public 
risk. An applicant shall obtain the radius of the impact dispersion 
area by multiplying the stage apogee by the FAA's proposed impact 
dispersion factor of 0.4 for an apogee less than 100 kilometers and of 
0.7 for an apogee of 100 kilometers or more. The final stage would 
typically produce the largest impact dispersion area.
    Once an applicant determines the impact dispersion radii, the 
applicant must plot each impact dispersion area on a map in accordance 
with the requirements of paragraph (b). This is shown in figure D-1. An 
applicant may then determine if flight azimuths exist which do not 
affect populated areas. If all potential flight azimuths contain impact 
dispersion areas which encompass populated areas, then the FAA would 
require an Ec estimation of risk.

Public Risk Ec Estimation

    The FAA will approve a launch point for suborbital launch vehicles 
if there exists a set of impact dispersion areas for a representative 
launch vehicle in which the sum of risk to the public does not exceed 
the FAA's acceptable risk threshold. An overflight exclusion zone must 
contain no people. If a populated area is present within the impact 
dispersion areas, the proposed rules require an applicant to estimate 
the risk to the public posed by possible stage impact. An applicant 
must then determine whether its estimated risk satisfies the FAA 
requirement of an Ec of no more than 30  x  10-6. 
The Ec estimation is performed by computing the sum of the 
risk for the impact of each stage and accounting for each populated 
area located within a 5 dispersion of an impact point. The 
equation used to accomplish this is the same as that used in the impact 
probability computation in appendix C. Unlike, however, the method in 
appendix C, which accounts for an impact due to a failure, the 
probability of a stage impact occurring is Ps = 1-
Pf, where Ps is the probability of success, and 
Pf is the probability of failure. The FAA proposes, for the 
purposes of the launch site location review, a constant of 0.98 for the 
probability of success for unguided suborbital launch vehicles. The 
probability of success is used in place of Pf in calculating 
both the cross-range and downrange probability of impact.
    The proposed location review for launch points intended for the 
launch of unguided suborbital launch vehicles differs from the approach 
proposed for reviewing the location of launch points intended for the 
launch of guided orbital and suborbital launch vehicles. In analyzing 
whether risk remains at acceptable levels, Ec equations in 
appendix D rely on the probability of success rather than the 
probability of failure. The use of stage impact probability, typified 
as the probability of success (Ps), for suborbital launch 
vehicles is necessary because stage impacts are high probability events 
which occur near the launch point with dispersions which may overlap or 
be adjacent to the launch point. The difference between the methods of 
appendices A, B and C and that proposed in appendix D reflects the 
fundamental differences between the likely dominant source of risk to 
the public guided and unguided vehicles and the methods that have been 
developed for guarding public safety against the risks created by each 
type of vehicle. In other words, the methods for defining impact 
dispersion areas and for conducting an impact risk assessment for an 
unguided vehicle are premised on the risks posed by a successful 
flight, that is, the planned deposition of stages and debris. In 
contrast, the methodology for developing a flight corridor and 
associated risk methodology for guided vehicles assumes that the likely 
major source of risk to the public arises out of a failure of a mission 
and the ensuing destruction of the vehicle. Failures are less probable 
and debris impacts are spread throughout a flight trajectory.
    The high degree of success recorded for unguided launch vehicles 
renders

[[Page 34357]]

the probability of success the greater source of risk. Because of their 
relative simplicity of operation, the failure rate, over time, for 
unguided launch vehicles is between one and two percent. At this level 
of reliability, the FAA believes that its primary focus of concern for 
assessing the safety of a launch site should be the more likely event, 
namely, the public's exposure to the planned impact of vehicle stages 
and other vehicle components, such as fairings, rather than the risk 
posed by exposure to debris resulting from a failure. Success is the 
high risk event. Although failure rates are low for unguided launch 
vehicles, their spent stages have large impact dispersions. Moreover, 
the FAA's proposed impact dispersion area estimations generally produce 
impact dispersion areas large enough to encompass most of the 
populations exposed to a possible failure as well as to a nominal 
flight, thus ensuring the inclusion of any large, densely populated 
area in the analysis. Thus, all but a small percentage of populated 
area will be analyzed to some extent, albeit using impact probabilities 
based on success. This fact plus a multiplier of five should provide a 
reasonable, conservative estimation of the risks associated with the 
launch point.
    This is true of unguided sub-orbital launch vehicles because their 
impact dispersions are much larger than those for guided vehicles and 
they occur closer to the launch point.
    In appendix D, the FAA assumes that the stage impact dispersion in 
both the downrange and cross range directions are equal. This is a 
valid assumption for suborbital launch vehicle rockets because their 
trajectories produce near circular dispersions. NASA data on sounding 
rocket impact dispersion supports this conclusion.
    The impact dispersion area is based on a 5  dispersion. 
Appendix D uses the effective casualty area data, the table D-1, which 
contains information similar to appendix C, table C-3. This data 
represents the estimation of the area produced by both suborbital 
launch vehicle inert pieces. The baseline risk estimation approach in 
appendix D has the applicant calculate the probability of impact for 
each populated area, and then determining an Ec value for 
each populated area. To obtain the estimated Ec for an 
entire impact dispersion area, the applicant adds the Ec 
results for each populated area. If the population within the impact 
dispersion area is relatively small, an applicant may wish to conduct a 
less rigorous analysis by making conservative assumptions. Appendix D 
offers the option of analyzing a worst-case impact dispersion area for 
those where such an approach might save time and analysis, similar to 
the approach in appendix C.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This proposal contains information collection requirements. As 
required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. section 
3507(d)), the Department of Transportation has submitted the 
information collection requirements associated with this proposal to 
the Office of Management and Budget for its review.
    Title: Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch 
Site.
    The FAA is proposing to amend its commercial space transportation 
licensing regulations to add licensing and safety requirements for the 
operation of a launch site. In the past, commercial launches have 
occurred principally at federal launch ranges under safety procedures 
developed by federal launch range operators. To enable the development 
and use of launch sites that are not operated by a federal launch 
ranges, rules are needed to establish specific licensing and safety 
requirements for operating a launch site, whether that site is located 
on or off of a federal launch range. These proposed rules would provide 
licensed launch site operators with licensing and safety requirements 
to protect the public from the risks associated with activities at 
launch site.
    The required information will be used to determine whether 
applicants satisfy requirements for obtaining a license to protect the 
public from risks associated with operations at a launch site. The 
information to be collected includes data required for performing 
launch site location analyses. A launch site license is valid for a 
period of five years, and it is assumed that all licenses would be 
renewed after five years. The frequency of required submissions, 
therefore, will depend upon the number of prospective launch site 
operators seeking a license and the renewal of site licenses.
    The respondents are all licensees authorized to conduct licensed 
launch site activities. It is estimated that there will be two 
respondents annually at 796 hours per respondent for an estimated 
annual burden hours of 1592 hours.
    The agency is soliciting comments to (1) evaluate whether the 
proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper 
performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the 
information will be practical utility; (2) evaluate the accuracy of the 
agency's estimate of the burden; (3) enhance the quality, utility, and, 
clarity of the information to be collected; and (4) minimize the burden 
of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including 
through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or 
other technological collection techniques or other forms of information 
technology (for example, permitting electronic submission of 
responses).
    Individuals and organizations may submit comments on the 
information collection requirement by August 24, 1999, and should 
direct them to the address listed in the ADDRESSES section of this 
document.
    According to the regulations implementing the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1995, (5 CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not conduct or 
sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to a collection of 
informaiton unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. 
The OMB control number for this information collection will be 
published in the Federal Register after it is approved by the Office of 
Management and Budget.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary

    This section summarizes the full regulatory evaluation prepared by 
the FAA that provides more detailed estimates of the economic 
consequences of this regulatory action. This summary and the full 
evaluation quantify, to the extent practicable, estimated costs to the 
private sector, consumers, Federal, State and local governments, as 
well as anticipated benefits. This evaluation was conducted in 
accordance with Executive Order 12866, which directs that each Federal 
agency can propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify the 
costs. This document also includes an initial regulatory flexibility 
determination required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, and 
an international trade impact assessment, required by the Office of 
Management and Budget. This proposal is not considered a significant 
regulatory action under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866. In 
addition, under Regulatory Policies and Procedures of the Department of 
Transportation (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979), this proposal is 
considered significant because there is substantial public interest in 
the rulemaking.
    The Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend its 
commercial space licensing regulations to add licensing requirements 
for the operation of a launch site. The proposal would provide launch 
site operators with licensing and operating requirements to protect the 
public from the risks

[[Page 34358]]

associated with operations at a launch site. The FAA currently issues 
licenses to launch site operators on a case-by case-approach. Elements 
of that approach are reflected in the guidelines, ``Site Operators 
License Guidelines for Applicants,'' which describe the information 
that applicants provide the FAA for a license to operate a launch site. 
The FAA's interpretation and implementation of the guidelines 
constitute another element of the case-by-case approach and additional 
elements, such as policy review, not reflected in the guidelines.
    The proposal represents quantifiable changes in costs compared to 
the guidelines (current practice) in the following two areas. They are 
the launch site location review and approval and the launch site 
operations review and approval. The FAA has estimated the costs and 
cost savings of these changes under two different cost scenarios over a 
10-year period discounted at 7 percent in 1997 dollars. The total 10-
year undiscounted cost savings is estimated to be between $84,000 and 
$160,000 (or between $53,000 and $105,000, discounted). The most 
burdensome cost scenario (where net cost savings is the least) to the 
industry would result in the costs to the launch site operators of 
$3,000 (or $2,000, discounted) for the launch site location reviews and 
approval provisions and a cost savings of $11,000 (or $8,000, 
discounted) for the launch site operations review and approval 
provisions. Although there would be no cost impact to the FAA, there 
would be a cost savings to the FAA from the most burdensome cost 
scenario of $104,000 or $70,000 discounted.
    There are significant nonquantifiable benefits in two areas. First, 
the proposal eliminates overlapping responsibilities. Second, the 
proposal provides increased details and specificity, which are not 
present in the guidelines.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 establishes ``as a principle 
of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, consistent with 
the objective of the rule and of applicable statues, to fit regulatory 
and informational requirements to the scale of the business, 
organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to regulation.'' 
To achieve that principal, the Act requires agencies to solicit and 
consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the rational for 
their actions. The Act covers a wide-range of small entities, including 
small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and small governmental 
jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. If the determination is that it will, the 
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis (RFA) as 
described in the Act. However, if an agency determines that a proposed 
or final rule is not expected to have a significant economic impact on 
a substantial number of small entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 act 
provides that the head of the agency must so certify and an RFA is not 
required. The certification must include a statement providing the 
factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be 
clear.
    The FAA conducted the required review of this proposal and 
determined that it would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, pursuant to the 
regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Federal Aviation 
Administration certifies that this rule will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

Potentially Affected Entities

    Entities who are licensed, or have begun the licensing process, 
were contacted to determine their size and to gain insight into the 
impacts of the proposed regulations on the licensing process. Spaceport 
Florida Authority (SFA), Spaceport Systems International, L.P. (SSI), 
the Virginia Commonwealth Space Flight Authority (VCSFA) and the Alaska 
Aerospace Development Corporation (AADC) are all licensed to operate 
launch sites. The New Mexico Office of Space Commercialization (NMOSC) 
is mentioned briefly below although it is only in the pre-application 
consultation phase.
    The Virginia Commonwealth Space Flight Authority (VCSFA) is a not-
for-profit subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia, responsible for 
oversight of the activities of the Virginia Commercial Space Flight 
Center (VCSFC). The VCSFC is located within the boundaries of the 
Wallops Flight Facility (WFF). As a subdivision of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, the VCSFA is empowered by the Acts of the General Assembly to 
do all things necessary to carry out its mission of stimulating 
economic growth and education through commercial aerospace activities.
    The Spaceport Florida Authority (SFA) was created by Florida's 
Governor and Legislature as the nation's first state government space 
agency. The authority was established to develop space-related 
enterprise, including launch activities, industrial development and 
education-related projects. SFA operate Spaceport Florida (SPF), 
located on Cape Canaveral Air Station.
    Launch site operator California Spaceport is located on Vandenberg 
Air Force Base. The launch site is operated and managed by Spaceport 
Systems International, L.P. who is in partnership with ITT Federal 
Services Corporation (ITT FSC). ITT FSC is one of the largest U.S.-
based technical and support services contractors in the world.
    The Kodiak Launch Complex is being built by the Alaska Aerospace 
Development Corporation. AADC is a public corporation created by the 
State of Alaska to develop aerospace related economic and technical 
opportunities for the state.
    The Southwest Regional Spaceport (SRS) is to be operated by the New 
Mexico Office of Space Commercialization (NMOSC). The NMOSC is a 
division of the State's New Mexico Economic Development Department. 
Commencement of space flight operations is not expected until early the 
next decade.

Definition of Small Entities

    The Small Business Administration has defined small business 
entities relating to space vehicles (SIC codes 3761, 3764 and 3769) as 
entities comprising fewer than 1000 employees. Although the above 
mentioned entities have fewer than 1000 employees in their immediate 
segment of the business, they are affiliated with/or funded by state 
governments and large parent companies. The VCSFA is a not-for-profit 
subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia; the SFA is a government 
space agency; the SSI is affiliated with ITT FSC; and AADC is a 
government sponsored corporation.
    Under 5 U.S.C. 605, the FAA concludes that this proposal would 
impose little or no additional cost on this industry and certifies that 
it will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities. The FAA nevertheless requests comments on any 
potential impacts associated with this proposal.

International Trade Impact Assessment

    Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site 
(14 CFR part 420) would not constitute a barrier to international 
trade, including the export of U.S. goods and services out of the 
United States. The proposal affects operation of launch sites that are 
currently located or being proposed within the United States or 
operated by U.S. citizens.

[[Page 34359]]

    The proposal is not expected to affect the trade opportunities for 
U.S. firms doing business overseas or for foreign firms doing business 
in the United States. The FAA requests information on the effect that 
this proposal would have on international trade.

Federalism Implications

    The regulations proposed herein will not have substantial direct 
effects on the states, on the relationship between the national 
government and the states, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in 
accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this 
proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant 
the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), 
enacted as Pub. L. 104-4 on March 22, 1995, requires each Federal 
agency, to the extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment 
of the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency 
rule that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. 
Section 204(a) of the UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal 
agency to develop an effective process to permit timely input by 
elected officers (or their designees) of State, local, and tribal 
governments on a proposed ``significant intergovernmental mandate.'' A 
``significant intergovernmental mandate'' under the UMRA is any 
provision in a Federal agency regulation that will impose an 
enforceable duty upon State, local, and tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one 
year. Section 203 of the UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which supplements section 
204(a), provides that before establishing any regulatory requirements 
that might significantly or uniquely affect small governments, the 
agency shall have developed a plan that, among other things, provides 
for notice to potentially affected small governments, if any, and for a 
meaningful and timely opportunity to provide input in the development 
of regulatory proposals.
    This proposed does not meet the cost thresholds described above. 
Furthermore, this proposal would not impose a significant cost or 
uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, the requirements of Title 
II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply.

Environmental Assessment

    FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically 
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). 
In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, appendix 4, paragraph 4(i), 
regulatory documents which cover administrative or procedural 
requirements qualify for a categorical exclusion. Proposed sections in 
subpart B of part 420 would require an applicant to submit sufficient 
environmental information for the FAA to comply with NEPA and other 
applicable environmental laws and regulations during the processing of 
each license application. Accordingly, the FAA proposes that this rule 
qualifies for a categorical exclusion because no significant impacts to 
the environment are expected to result from the finalization or 
implementation of its administrative provisions for licensing.

Energy Impact

    The energy impact of the rulemaking action has been assessed in 
accordance with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) and Pub. 
L. 94-163, as amended (42 U.S.C. 6362). It has been determined that it 
is not a major regulatory action under the provisions of the EPCA.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR 417 and 420

    Confidential business information. Environmental protection, 
Organization and functions, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Rockets, Space transportation and exploration.

The Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration amends Chapter III of Title 14 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations to read as follows:

PART 417--[REMOVED AND RESERVED]

    1. Part 417 is removed and reserved.
    2. Subchapter C of Chapter III, title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations, is amended by adding a new part 420 to read as follows:

PART 420--LICENSE TO OPERATE A LAUNCH SITE

Subpart A--General

Sec.
420.1  Scope.
420.3  Applicability.
420.5  Definitions.
420.6-420.14  [Reserved]

Subpart B--Criteria and Information Requirements for Obtaining a 
License

420.15  Information requirements.
420.17  Bases for issuance of a license.
420.19  Launch site location review.
420.21  Launch site criteria for expendable launch vehicles.
420.23  Launch site location review for unproven launch vehicles.
420.31  Explosive site plan.
420.33  Handling of solid propellants.
420.35  Storage or handling of liquid propellants.
420.37  Solid and liquid propellants located together.
420.38-420.40  [Reserved]

Subpart C--License Terms and Conditions

420.41  License to operate a launch site-general.
420.43  Duration.
420.45  Transfer of a license to operate a launch site.
420.47  License modification.
420.49  Compliance monitoring.

Subpart D--Responsibilities of a Licensee

420.51  Responsibilities--general.
420.53  Control of public access.
420.55  Scheduling of launch site operations.
420.57  Notifications.
420.59  Launch site accident investigation plan.
420.61  Records.
420.63  Explosives.
Appendix A to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor
Appendix B to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor
Appendix C to Part 420--Risk Analysis
Appendix D to Part 420--Impact Dispersion Areas and Casualty 
Expectancy Estimate for Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicles
Appendix E to Part 420--Tables for Explosive Site Plan

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.

Subpart A--General


Sec. 420.1  Scope.

    This part prescribes the information and demonstrations that must 
be submitted as part of a license application, the bases for license 
approval, license terms and conditions, and post-licensing requirements 
with which a licensee shall comply to remain licensed. Requirements for 
preparing a license application are also contained in part 413 of this 
subchapter.


Sec. 420.3  Applicability.

    This part applies to any person seeking a license to operate a 
launch site or to a person licensed under this part.


Sec. 420.5  Definitions.

    For the purpose of this part,
    Ballistic coefficient means the weight of an object divided by the 
quantity product of the coefficient of drag of the object and the area 
of the object.

[[Page 34360]]

    Compatibility means the chemical property of materials that may be 
located together without increasing the probability of an accident or, 
for a given quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an accident.
    Debris dispersion radius (Dmax) means the estimated 
maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels given a worst-
case launch vehicle failure and flight termination at 10 seconds into 
flight.
    Divison 1.3 explosive means an explosive as defined in 49 CFR 
173.50.
    Downrange area means a portion of a flight corridor beginning where 
a launch area ends and ending 5,000 nautical miles from the launch 
point for an orbital launch vehicle, and ending with an impact 
dispersion area for a guided sub-orbital launch vehicle.
    E,F,G coordinate system means an orthgonal, Earth-fixed, 
geocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system is 
at the center of an ellipsoidal earth model. The E-axis is positive 
directed through the Greenwich meridian. The F-axis is positive 
directed through 90 degrees east longitude. The EF-plane is coincident 
with the ellipsoidal Earth model's equatorial plane. The G-axis is 
normal to the EF-plane and positive directed through the north pole.
    E,N,U. coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system 
is at a launch point. The E-axis is positive directed east. The N-axis 
is positive directed north. The EN-plane is tangent to an ellipsoidal 
Earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to the geodetic 
vertical. The U-axis is normal to the EN-plane and positive directed 
away from the Earth.
    Effective casualty area (Ac) means the aggregate 
casualty area of each piece of debris created by a launch vehicle 
failure at a particular point on its trajectory. The effective casualty 
area for each piece of debris is the area within which 100 percent of 
the unprotected population on the ground are assumed to be a casualty, 
and outside of which 100 percent of the population are assumed not to 
be a casualty. This area is based on the characteristics of the debris 
piece including its size, the path angle of its trajectory, impact 
explosions, the size of a person, and debris skip, splatter, and 
bounce.
    Explosive means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that, 
when subjected to heat, impact, friction, detonation or other suitable 
initiation, undergoes a rapid chemical change that releases large 
volumes of highly heated gases that exert pressure in the surrounding 
medium. The term applies to materials that either detonate or 
deflagrate.
    Explosive equivalent means a measure of the blast effects from 
explosion of a given quantity of material expressed in terms of the 
weight of trinitrotoluene (TNT) that would produce the same blast 
effects when detonated.
    Explosive hazard facility means a facility at a launch site where 
solid or liquid propellant is stored or handled.
    Flight azimuth means the initial direction in which a launch 
vehicle flies relative to true north expressed in degrees-decimal-
degrees.
    Flight corridor means an area on the earth's surface estimated to 
contain the majority of hazardous debris from nominal and non-nominal 
flight of an orbital or guided suborbital launch vehicle.
    Guided suborbital launch vehicle means a suborbital rocket that 
employs an active guidance system.
    Impact dispersion area means an area representing and estimated 
five standard deviation dispersion about a nominal impact point of an 
intermediate or final stage of a suborbital launch vehicle.
    Impact dispersion factor means a constant used to estimate, using a 
stage apogee, a five standard deviation dispersion about a nominal 
impact point of an intermediate or final stage of a suborbital launch 
vehicle.
    Impact dispersion radius (Ri) means a radius that 
defines an impact dispersion area.
    Impact range means the distance between a launch point and the 
impact point of a suborbital launch vehicle stage.
    Impact range factor means a constant used to estimate, using the 
stage apogee, the nominal impact point of an intermediate or final 
stage of a suborbital launch vehicle.
    Instantaneous impact point (IIP means an impact point, following 
thrust termination of a launch vehicle, calculated in the absence of 
atmospheric drag effects.
    Instantaneous impact point (IIP) range rate means a launch 
vehicle's estimated IIP velocity along the Earth's surface.
    Intraline distance means the minimum distance permitted between any 
two explosive hazard facilities in the ownership, possession or control 
of one launch site customer.
    Launch area means, for a flight corridor defined using appendix A 
to this part, the portion of a flight corridor from the launch point to 
a point 100 nautical miles in the direction of the flight azimuth. For 
a flight corridor defined using appendix B to this part, a launch area 
is the portion of a flight corridor from the launch point to the 
enveloping line enclosing the outer boundary of he last debris 
dispersion circle.
    Launch point means a point on the Earth from which the flight of a 
launch vehicle begins, and is defined by its geodetic latitude, 
longitude and height on an ellipsoidal Earth model.
    Launch site accident means an unplanned event occurring during a 
ground activity at a launch site resulting in a fatality or serious 
injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who is not associated 
with the activity, or any damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to 
property not associated with the activity.
    Net explosive weight (NEW) means the total weight, expressed in 
pounds, of explosive material or explosive equivalency contained in an 
item.
    Nominal means, in reference to launch vehicle performance, 
trajectory, or stage impact point, a launch vehicle flight where all 
launch vehicle aerodynamic parameters are as expected, all vehicle 
internal and external systems perform as planned, and there are no 
external perturbing influences (e.g., winds) other than atmospheric 
drag and gravity.
    Nominal trajectory means the position and velocity components of a 
nominally performing launch vehicle relative to an x, y, z coordinate 
system, expressed in x, y, z, xo, yo, zo.
    Overflight dwell time means the period of time it takes for a 
launch vehicle's IIP to move past a populated area. For a given 
populated area, the overflight dwell time is the time period measured 
along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace from the time point whose 
normal with the trajectory intersects the most uprange part of the 
populated area to the time point whose normal with the trajectory 
intersects the most downrange part of the populated area.
    Overflight exclusion zone means a portion of a flight corridor 
which must remain clear of the public during the flight of a launch 
vehicle.
    Populated area means a land area with population.
    Population density means the number of people per unit area in a 
populated area.
    Position data means data referring to the current position of a 
launch vehicle with respect to flight time expressed through the x, y, 
z coordinate system.
    Public area means any area outside a hazard area and is an area 
that is not in the possession, ownership or other control of a launch 
site operator or of a

[[Page 34361]]

launch site customer who possess, owns or otherwise controls that 
hazard area.
    Public area distance means the minimum distance permitted between a 
public area and an explosive hazard facility.
    Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub-orbital rocket that 
does not have a guidance system.
    x,y,z coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
topocentric, right-handed system. This origin of the coordinate system 
is at a launch point. The x-axis coincides with the initial launch 
azimuth and is positive in the downrange direction. The y-axis is 
positive to the left looking downrange. The xy-plane is tangent to the 
ellipsoidal earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to 
the geodetic vertical. The z-axis is normal to the xy-plane and 
positive directed away from the earth.
    0,0,h0 means a 
latitude, longitude, height system where 0 is the 
geodetic latitude of a launch point, 0 is the east 
longitude of the launch point, and h0 is the height of the 
launch point above the reference ellipsoid. 0 and 
0 are expressed in degrees-decimal-degrees.


Secs. 420.6-420.14  [Reserved]

Subpart B--Criteria and Information Requirements for Obtaining a 
License


Sec. 420.15  Information requirements.

    (a) An applicant shall provide the FAA with information for the FAA 
to analyze the environmental impacts associated with operation of a 
proposed launch site. The information provided by an applicant must be 
sufficient to enable the FAA to comply with the requirements of the 
National Environment Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (NEPA), the 
Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the 
Procedural Provisions of NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500-1508, and the FAA's 
Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts, FAA Order 1050.1D. An 
applicant shall submit environmental information concerning a proposed 
launch site not covered by existing environmental documentation and 
other factors as determined by the FAA.
    (b) An applicant shall:
    (1) Provide the information necessary to demonstrate compliance 
with Secs. 420.19, 420.21, and 420.23. For launch sites analyzed for 
expendable launch vehicles, an applicant shall provide the following 
information:
    (i) A map or maps showing the location of each launch point 
proposed, and the flight azimuth, overflight exclusion zone, flight 
corridor, and each impact dispersion area for each launch point;
    (ii) Each launch vehicle type and any launch vehicle class proposed 
for each launch point;
    (iii) Each month and any percent wind data used in the analysis;
    (iv) Any launch vehicle apogee used in the analysis;
    (v) If populated areas are located within an overflight exclusion 
zone, a demonstration that there are times when the public is not 
present or that the applicant has an agreement in place to evacuate the 
public from the overflight exclusion zone during a launch;
    (vi) Each populated area located within a flight corridor or impact 
dispersion area;
    (vii) The estimated casualty expectancy calculated for each 
populated area within a flight corridor or impact dispersion area; and
    (vii) The estimated casualty expectancy for each flight corridor or 
set of impact dispersion areas.
    (2) Identify foreign ownership of the applicant, as follows:
    (i) For a sole proprietorship or partnership, all foreign owners or 
partners;
    (ii) For a corporation, any foreign ownership interest of 10 
percent or more; and
    (iii) For a joint venture, association, or other entity, any 
foreign entities participating in the entity.
    (3) Provide an explosive site plan in accordance with Secs. 420.31, 
420.33, 420.35 and 420.37.
    (c) An applicant shall provide the information necessary to 
demonstrate compliance with the requirements of Secs. 420.53, 420.55, 
420.57, 420.59 and 420.63.
    (d) An applicant who is proposing to locate a launch site at an 
existing launch point at a federal launch range is not required to 
comply with paragraph (b)(1) of this section if a launch vehicle of the 
same type and class as proposed for the launch point has been safely 
launched from the launch point. An applicant who is proposing to locate 
a launch site at a federal launch range is not required to comply with 
paragraph (b)(3) of this section.


Sec. 420.17  Bases for issuance of a license.

    (a) The FAA will issue a license under this part when the FAA 
determines that:
    (1) The application provides the information required under 
Sec. 420.15;
    (2) The National Environmental Policy Act review is completed;
    (3) The launch site location meets the criteria provided in 
Secs. 420.19, 420.21, and 420.23;
    (4) The explosive site plan meets the criteria provided in 
Secs. 420.31, 420.33, 420.35 and 420.37;
    (5) The application demonstrates that the applicant shall satisfy 
the requirements of subpart D of this part; and
    (6) Issuing a license would not jeopardize foreign policy or 
national security interests of the United States.
    (b) The FAA advises an applicant, in writing, of any issue arising 
during an application review that would lead to denial. The applicant 
may respond in writing, submit additional information, or revise its 
license application.


Sec. 420.19  Launch site location review.

    (a) To gain approval for a launch site location, an applicant shall 
demonstrate that for at least one type of expendable launch vehicle--
orbital, guided sub-orbital or unguided sub-orbital--or a reusable 
launch vehicle, a flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas 
exists that does not exceed an estimated expected average number of 
0.00003 casualties (Ec) to the collective member of the 
public exposed to hazards from any one flight 
(Ec:30 x 10-6). For an orbital 
expendable launch vehicle, an applicant shall choose a weight class as 
defined in table 1.
    (b) For a guided orbital or guided sub-orbital expendable launch 
vehicle, an applicant shall define a flight corridor using one of the 
methodologies provided in appendices A or B to this part. If a defined 
flight corridor contains a populated area, the applicant shall use 
appendix C to this part to estimate the casualty expectation associated 
with the flight corridor.
    (c) For an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, an 
applicant shall define impact dispersion areas as provided by appendix 
D to this part. If a defined impact dispersion area contains any 
populated areas, the applicant shall use appendix D to this part to 
estimate the casualty expectation associated with the set of impact 
dispersion areas.
    (d) For a reusable launch vehicle, an applicant shall define a 
flight corridor that the applicant estimates to contain the hazardous 
debris from nominal and non-nominal flight of a reusable launch 
vehicle. If the defined flight corridor contains a populated area, the 
applicant shall estimate the casualty expectation associated with a 
reusable launch vehicle mission. An applicant shall demonstrate that 
the estimated expected average number of casualties (Ec) to 
the collective member of the public exposed to hazards from any one 
mission is less than 0.00003. The FAA will evaluate the adequacy of the 
flight corridor and

[[Page 34362]]

casualty expectancy analysis on a case-by-case basis.


Sec. 420.21  Launch site criteria for expendable launch vehicles.

    (a) For each launch point proposed for expendable launch vehicles, 
an applicant shall use each type of expendable launch vehicle proposed 
to be launched from that launch point as the basis of its demonstration 
of compliance with the criteria provided in paragraph (b) of this 
section and for the analyses provided in appendices A through D to this 
part.
    (b) For each type of expendable launch vehicle selected under 
paragraph (a) of this section, the distance from the proposed launch 
point to the launch site boundary must be at least as great as the 
minimum distance listed in table 2 for that type and any class of 
launch vehicle.


Sec. 420.23  Launch site location review for unproven launch vehicles.

    The FA will evaluate the adequacy of a launch site location for 
unproven launch vehicles including all new launch vehicles, whether 
expendable or reusable, on a case-by-case basis.

                                    Table 1 to Sec.  420.21.--Orbital Launch Vehicle Classes by Payload Weight (lbs)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Orbital Launch Vehicles
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          100 nm orbit                      Small                           Medium                             Medium large                   Large
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 degrees inclination \1\......  440            >4400 to 11100              >11100 to 18500            >18500
90 degrees inclination \2\......  3300           >3300 to 8400               >8400 to 15000             >15000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 28 degrees inclination orbit from a launch point at 28 degrees latitude.
\2\ 90 degrees inclination orbit.


           Table 2 to Sec.  420.21.--Minimum Distance From Launch Point to Launch Site Boundary (Feet)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Orbital launch vehicles                                Suborbital launch vehicles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                    Unguided
      Small              Medium          Medium large          Large        Guided suborbital  suborbital launch
                                                                              launch vehicle        vehicle
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           7300               9300              10600              13000               8000               1600
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 420.13  Explosvie site plan.

    (a) An applicant shall submit an explosive site plan that 
establishes compliance with Secs. 420.33, 420.35, and 420.37. The 
explosive site plan shall include:
    (1) A scaled map that shows the location of all proposed explosive 
hazard facilities at the proposed launch site and that shows actual and 
minimal allowable distances between each explosive hazard facility and 
all other explosive hazard facilities and each public area, including 
the launch site boundary.
    (2) A listing of the maximum quantities of liquid and solid 
propellants to be located at each explosive hazard facility, including 
the class and division for each solid propellant and the hazard and 
compatibility group for each liquid propellant; and
    (3) A description of each activity to be conducted in each 
explosive hazard facility.
    (b) An applicant applying for a license to operate a launch site at 
a federal launch range need not submit an explosive site plan to the 
FAA.


Sec. 420.33  Handling of solid propellants.

    (a) An applicant shall determine the total quantity of solid 
propellant explosives by class and division in each explosive hazard 
facility where solid propellants will be handled. The total quantity of 
explosives in an explosive hazard facility shall be measured as the net 
explosive weight (NEW) of the solid propellants. When division 1.1 
explosives, designed to be installed on launch vehicles and designed 
not to detonate division 1.3 components, are located with division 1.3 
explosives, that total quantity of explosives shall be the NEW of the 
division 1.3 components.
    (b) An applicant shall separate each explosive hazard facility 
where solid propellants will be handled from all other explosive hazard 
facilities, each public area and the launch site boundary by a distance 
no less than those provided for each quantity in appendix E, table E-1. 
An applicant shall employ no less than the applicable public area 
distance to separate an explosive hazard facility from each public area 
and from the launch site boundary. An applicant shall employ no less 
than an intraline distance to separate an explosive hazard facility 
from all other explosive hazard facilities that will be used by a 
single customer. An applicant may use linear interpolation for NEW 
quantities between table entries. For every explosive hazard facility 
where solid propellants in quantities greater than 1,000,000 pounds 
will be handled, an applicant shall separate the explosive hazard 
facility from all other explosive hazard facilities, each public area 
and the launch site boundary in accordance with the minimum separation 
distances derived from the following relationships:
    (1) For a public area distance:

D = 8W1/3
where ``D'' equals the minimum separation distance in feet and ``W'' 
equals the NEW of propellant.

    (2) For an intraline distance:

D = 5W1/3
where ``D'' equals the minimum separation distance in feet and ``W'' 
equals the NEW of propellant.

    (c) An applicant shall measure separation distance from the closest 
debris or explosive hazard source in an explosive hazard facility.


Sec. 420.35  Storage or handling of liquid propellants.

    (a) For an explosive hazard facility where liquid propellants are 
handled or stored, an applicant shall determine the total quantity of 
liquid propellant and, if applicable pursuant to paragraph (a)(3) of 
this section, the explosive equivalent of liquid propellant in each 
explosive hazard facility in accordance with the following:
    (1) The quantity of liquid propellant in a tank, drum, cylinder, or 
other container is the net weight in pounds of the propellant in the 
container. The determination of quantity shall include any liquid 
propellant in associated piping to any point where positive

[[Page 34363]]

means are provided for interrupting the flow through the pipe, or 
interrupting a reaction in the pipe in the event of a mishap.
    (2) Where two or more containers of compatible liquid propellants 
will be handled or stored together in an explosive hazard facility, the 
total quantity of propellant to determine the minimum separation 
distance between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive 
hazard facilities and each public area shall be the total quantity of 
liquid propellant in all containers, unless:
    (i) The containers are separated one from the other by the 
appropriate distance as provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this section; 
or
    (ii) The containers are subdivided by intervening barriers, such as 
diking, that prevent mixing.
    (iii) If paragraph (a)(2) (i) or (ii) of this section apply, an 
applicant shall use the quantity of propellant requiring the greatest 
separation distance pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section to 
determine the minimum separation distance between the explosive hazard 
facility and all other explosive hazard facilities and each public 
area.
    (3) Where two or more containers of incompatible liquid propellants 
will be handled or stored together in an explosive hazard facility, an 
applicant shall determine the explosive equivalent in pounds of the 
combined liquids, using the formulas provided in appendix E, table E-2, 
to determine the minimum separation distance between the explosive 
hazard facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas 
unless the containers are separated one from the other by the 
appropriate distance as determined in paragraph (b)(3) of this section. 
An applicant shall then use the quantity of liquid propellant requiring 
the greatest separation distance to determine the minimum separation 
distance between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive 
hazard facilities and each public area.
    (4) An applicant shall convert quantities of liquid propellants 
from gallons to pounds using the conversion factors provided in 
appendix E, table E-3 and the following equation:

Pounds of propellant = gallons  x  density of propellant (pounds per 
gallon).

    (b) An applicant shall use appendix E, table E-3 to determine 
hazard and compatibility groups and shall separate liquid propellants 
from each other and from each public area using distances no less than 
those provided in appendix E, tables E-4 through E-7 in accordance with 
the following:
    (1) An applicant shall measure minimum separation distances from 
the hazard source in an explosive hazard facility, such as a container, 
building, segment, or positive cutoff point in piping, closest to each 
explosive hazard facility.
    (2) An applicant shall measure the minimum separation distance 
between compatible liquid propellants using the ``intragroup and 
compatible'' distance for the propellant quantity and hazard group that 
requires the greater distance prescribed by appendix E, tables E-4, E-
5, and E-6.
    (3) An applicant shall measure the minimum separation distance 
between liquid propellants of different compatibility groups using the 
``public area and incompatible'' distance for the propellant quantity 
and hazard group that requires the greater distance provided in 
appendix E, tables E-4, E-5, and E-6, unless the propellants of 
different compatibility groups are subdivided by intervening barriers 
that prevent mixing. If such barriers are present, the minimum 
separation distance shall be the ``intragroup and compatible'' distance 
for the propellant quantity and group that requires the greater 
distance provided in appendix E, tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.
    (4) An applicant shall separate liquid propellants from each public 
area using a distance no less than the ``public area and incompatible'' 
distance provided in appendix E, tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.
    (5) An applicant shall separate each explosive hazard facility that 
will contain liquid propellants where explosive equivalents apply 
pursuant to paragraph (a)(3) of this section from all other explosive 
hazard facilities of a single customer using the intraline distance 
provided in appendix E, table E-7, and from each public area using the 
public area distance provided in appendix E, table E-7.


Sec. 420.37  Solid and liquid propellants located together.

    An applicant proposing an explosive hazard facility where solid and 
liquid propellants are to be located together shall determine the 
minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard facility and 
other explosive hazard facilities and public areas in accordance with 
the following. An applicant shall determine the minimum separation 
distances between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive 
hazard facilities and public areas required for the solid propellants 
in accordnace with Sec. 420.33. An applicant shall then apply the 
greater of the separation distances determined by the liquid propellant 
alone or the solid propellant alone.


Secs. 420.38-420.40  [Reserved]

Subpart C--License Terms and Conditions


 Sec. 420.41  License to operate a launch site--general.

    (a) A license to operate a launch site authorizes a licensee to 
operate a launch site in accordance with the representations contained 
in the licensee's application, with terms and conditions contained in 
any license order accompanying the license, subject to the licensee's 
compliance with 49 U.S.C. subtitle IX, ch. 701 and this chapter.
    (b) A license to operate a launch site authorizes a licensee to 
offer its launch site to a launch operator for each launch point for 
the type and any class of launch vehicle identified in the license 
application and upon which the licensing determination is based.
    (c) Issuance of a license to operate a launch site does not relieve 
a licensee of its obligation to compy with any other laws or 
regulations, nor does it confer any proprietary, property, or exclusive 
right in the use of airspace or outer space.


 Sec. 420.43  Duration.

    A license to operate a launch site remains in effect for five years 
from the date of issuance unless surrendered, suspended, or revoked 
before the expiration of the term and is renewable upon application by 
the licensee.


 Sec. 420.45  Transfer of a license to operate a launch site.

    (a) Only the FAA may transfer a license to operate a launch site.
    (b) The FAA will transfer a license to an applicant who has 
submitted an application in accordance with 14 CFR part 413, satisfied 
the requirements of Sec. 420.15, and obtained each approval required 
under Sec. 420.17 for a license.
    (c) The FAA may incorporate by reference any findings made part of 
the record to support a prior related licensing determination.


Sec. 420.47  License modification.

    (a) Upon application or upon its own initiative, the FAA may modify 
a license to operate a launch site at any time by issuing a license 
order that adds, removes, or modifies a license term or condition to 
ensure compliance with the Act and the requirements of this chapter.
    (b) After a license to operate a launch site has been issued, a 
licensee shall apply to the FAA for modification of its license if:

[[Page 34364]]

    (1) The licensee proposes to operate the launch site in a manner 
that is not authorized by the license; or
    (2) Any representation contained in the license application that is 
material to public health and safety or safety of property is no longer 
accurate and complete or does not reflect the licensee's actual 
operation of the launch site.
    (c) An application to modify a license must meet the requirements 
of part 413 of this chapter. The licensee shall indicate any part of 
its license or license application that would be changed or affected by 
the proposed modification.
    (d) The FAA will approve a request for modification that satisfies 
the requirements set forth in this part.
    (e) Upon approval of a request for modification, the FAA will issue 
either a written approval to the licensee or a license order modifying 
the license if a term or condition of the license is changed, added, or 
deleted. A written approval has the full force and effect of a license 
order and is part of the licensing record.


Sec. 420.49  Compliance monitoring.

    A licensee shall allow access by and cooperate with federal 
officers or employees or other individuals authorized by the FAA to 
observe any activities of the licensee, its customers, its contractors, 
or subcontractors, associated with licensed operation of the licensee's 
launch site.

Subpart D--Responsibilities of a Licensee


Sec. 420.51  Responsibilities--general.

    (a) A licensee shall operate its launch site in accordance with the 
representations in the application upon which the licensing 
determination is based.
    (b) A licensee is responsible for compliance with 49 U.S.C. 
Subtitle IX, ch. 701 and for meeting the requirements of this chapter.


Sec. 420.53  Control of public access.

    (a) A licensee shall prevent unauthorized access to the launch 
site, and unauthorized, unescorted access to explosive hazard 
facilities or other hazard areas not otherwise controlled by a launch 
operator, through the use of security personnel, surveillance systems, 
physical barriers, or other means approved as part of the licensing 
process.
    (b) A licensee shall notify anyone entering the launch site of 
safety rules and emergency and evacuation procedures prior to that 
person's entry unless that person has received a briefing on those 
rules and procedures within the previous year.
    (c) A licensee shall employ warning signals or alarms to notify any 
persons at the launch site of any emergency.


Sec. 420.55  Scheduling of launch site operations.

    (a) A licensee shall develop and implement procedures to schedule 
operations to ensure that each operation carried out by a customer, 
including a launch operator, at the launch site does not create the 
potential for a mishap that could result in harm to the public because 
of the proximity of the operations, in time or place, to operations of 
any other customer at the launch site.
    (b) A licensee shall provide its launch site scheduling 
requirements to each customer before the customer begins operations at 
the launch site.


Sec. 420.57  Notifications.

    (a) A licensee shall notify a launch operator of any limitations on 
the operations conducted at the launch site that arise out of its 
license to operate a launch site.
    (b) A licensee shall complete an agreement with the local U.S. 
Coast Guard district to establish procedures for the issuance of a 
Notice to Mariners prior to launch and other such measures as the Coast 
Guard deems necessary to protect public health and safety.
    (c) A licensee shall complete an agreement with the FAA regional 
office having jurisdiction over the airspace through which launches 
will take place, to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice 
to Airmen prior to a launch and for closing of air routes during the 
launch window and other such measures as the FAA regional office deems 
necessary to protect public health and safety.
    (d) At least two days prior to flight of a launch vehicle, the 
licensee shall notify local officials and all owners of land adjacent 
to the launch site of the schedule.


Sec. 420.59  Launch site accident investigation plan.

    (a) General. A licensee shall develop and implement a launch site 
accident investigation plan that contains the licensee's procedures for 
reporting, responding to, and investigating launch site accidents, as 
defined in Sec. 420.5. The launch site accident investigation plan must 
be signed by an individual authorized to sign and certify the 
application in accordance with Sec. 413.7(c) of this chapter.
    (b) Reporting requirements. A launch site accident investigation 
plan shall provide for--
    (1) Immediate notification to the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) Washington Operations Center in the event of a launch site 
accident.
    (2) Submission of a written preliminary report to the FAA, 
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, within 
five days of any launch site accident. The report must include the 
following information:
    (i) Date and time of occurrence;
    (ii) Location of the event;
    (iii) Description of the event;
    (iv) Number of injuries, if any, and general description of types 
of injury suffered;
    (v) Property damage, if any, and an estimate of its value;
    (vi) Identification of hazardous materials, as defined in 
Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, involved in the event;
    (vii) Any action taken to contain the consequences of the event; 
and
    (viii) Weather conditions at the time of the event.
    (c) Response plan. A launch site accident investigation plan shall 
contain procedures that--
    (1) Ensure the consequences of a launch site accident are contained 
and minimized;
    (2) Ensure data and physical evidence are preserved;
    ((3) Require the licensee to report to and cooperate with FAA or 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations and 
designate one or more points of contact for the FAA or NTSB; and
    (4) Require the licensee to identify and adopt preventive measures 
for avoiding recurrence of the event.
    (d) Investigation plan. A launch site accident investigation plan 
shall contain--
    (1) Procedures for investigating the cause of a launch site 
accident, and participating in an investigation of a launch accident 
for launches launched from the launch site;
    (2) Procedures for reporting launch site accident investigation 
results to the FAA; and
    (3) Delineated responsibilities, including responsibilities for 
personnel assigned to conduct investigations and for any one retained 
by the licensee to conduct or participate in investigations.
    (e) Applicability of other accident investigation procedures. 
Accident investigation procedures developed under 29 CFR 1910.119 and 
40 CFR part 68 will satisfy the requirements of paragraphs (c) and (d) 
of this section to the extent that they include the elements provided 
in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section.

[[Page 34365]]

Sec. 420.61  Records.

    (a) A licensee shall maintain all records, data, and other material 
needed to verify that its operations are conducted in accordance with 
representation contained in the licensee's application. A licensee 
shall retain records for three years.
    (b) In the event of a launch site accident, a licensee shall 
preserve all records related to the event. Records shall be retained 
until completion of any federal investigation and the FAA advises the 
licensee that the records need not be retained.
    (c) A licensee shall make available to federal officials for 
inspection and copying all records required to be maintained under the 
regulations.


Sec. 420.63  Explosives.

    (a) Explosive siting. A licensee shall ensure that the 
configuration of the launch-site is in acccordance with the licensee's 
explosive site plan, and that the licensee's explosive site plan is in 
compliance with the requirements in Secs. 420.31-420.37.
    (b) Lightning protection. A licensee shall ensure that the public 
is not exposed to hazards due to the initiation of explosives by 
lightning.
    (1) Elements of a lighting protection system. Unless an explosive 
hazard facility meets the conditions of paragraph (b)(3) of this 
section, all explosive hazard facilities shall have a lightning 
protection system to ensure explosives are not initiated by lightning. 
A lightning protection system shall meet the requirements of paragraph 
(b)(2) of this section and include the following:
    (i) Air terminal. An air terminal to intentionally attract a 
lightning strike.
    (ii) Down conductor. A low impedance path connecting an air 
terminal to an earth electrode system.
    (ii) Earth electrode system. An earth electrode system to dissipate 
the current from a lightning strike to ground.
    (2) Bonding and surge protection.--(i) Bonding. All metallic bodies 
shall be bonded to ensure that voltage potentials due to lightning are 
equal everywhere in the explosive hazard facility. Any fence within six 
feet of a lightning protection system shall have a bond across each 
gate and other discontinuations and shall be bonded to the lightning 
protection system. Railroad tracks that run within six feet of the 
lightning protection system shall be bonded to the lighting protection 
system.
    (ii) Surge protection. A lightning protection system shall include 
surge protection to reduce transient voltages due to lightning to a 
harmless level for all metallic power, communication, and 
instrumentation lines coming into an explosive hazard facility.
    (3) Circumtances where no lightning protection system is required. 
No lightning protection system is required for an explosive hazard 
facility when a lightning warning system is available to permit 
termination of operations and withdrawal of the public to public area 
distance prior to an electrical storm, or for an explosive hazard 
facility containing explosives that cannot be initiated by lightning. 
If no lightning protection system is required, a licensee must ensure 
the withdrawal of the public to a public area distance prior to an 
electrical storm.
    (4) Testing and inspection. Lightning protection systems shall be 
visually inspected semiannually and shall be tested once each year for 
electrical continuity and adequacy of grounding. A licensee shall 
maintain at the explosive hazard facility a record of results obtained 
from the tests, including any action taken to correct deficiencies 
noted.
    (c) Electrical Power Lines. A licensee shall ensure that electric 
power lines at its launch site meet the following requirements:
    (1) Electric power lines shall be no closer to an explosive hazard 
facility than the length of the lines between the poles or towers than 
support the lines unless an effective means is provided to ensure that 
energized lines cannot, on breaking, come in contact with the explosive 
hazard facility.
    (2) Towers or poles supporting electrical distribution lines that 
carry between 15 and 69 KV, and unmanned electrical substations shall 
be no closer to an explosive hazard facility than the public area 
distance for that explosive hazard facility.
    (3) Towers or poles supporting electrical transmission lines that 
carry 69 KV or more, shall be no closer to an explosive hazard facility 
than the public area distance for that explosive hazard facility.

    Issued in Washington, DC on June 10, 1999.
Patricia G. Smith,
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation.

Appendix A to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor

(a) Introduction

    (1) This appendix provides a method to construct a flight 
corridor from a launch point for a guided suborbital launch vehicle 
or any one of the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles 
from table 1, Sec. 420.21, without the use of local meteorological 
data or a launch vehicle trajectory.
    (2) A flight corridor includes an overflight exclusion zone in a 
launch area and, for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an impact 
dispersion area in a downrange area. A flight corridor for a guided 
suborbital launch vehicle ends with the impact dispersion area, and, 
for the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles, 5,000 
nautical miles from the launch point.

(b) Data Requirements

    (1) Maps. An applicant shall use any map for the launch site 
region with a scale not less than 1:250,000 inches per inch in the 
launch area and 1:20,000,000 inches per inch in the downrange area. 
As described in paragraph (b)(2), an applicant shall use a 
mechanical method, a semi-automated method, or a fully-automated 
method to plot a flight corridor on maps. A source for paper maps 
acceptable to the FAA is the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Ocean Service.
    (i) Projections for mechanical plotting method. An applicant 
shall use a conic projection. The FAA will accept a ``Lambert-
Conformal'' conic projection. A polar aspect of a plane-azimuthal 
projection may also be used for far northern launch sites.
    (ii) Projections for semi-automated plotting method. An 
applicant shall use cylindrical, conic, or plane projections for 
semi-automated plotting. The FAA will accept ``Mercator'' and 
``Oblique Mercator'' cylindrical projections. The FAA will accept 
``Lambert-Conformal'' and ``Albers Equal-Area'' conic projections. 
The FAA will accept ``Lambert Azimuthal Equal-Area'' and ``Azimuthal 
Equidistant'' plane projections.
    (iii) Projections for fully-automated plotting method. The FAA 
will accept map projections used by geographical information system 
software scaleable pursuant to the requirements of paragraph (b)(1).
    (2) Plotting Methods.
    (i) Mechanical method. An applicant may use mechanical drafting 
equipment such as pencil, straight edge, ruler, protractor, and 
compass to plot the location of a flight corridor on a map. The FAA 
will accept straight lines for distances less than or equal to 7.5 
times the map scale on map scales greater than or equal to 
1:1,000,000 inches per inch (in/in); or straight lines representing 
100 nm or less on map scales less than 1:1,000,000 in/in.
    (ii) Semi-Automated method. An applicant may employ the range 
and bearing techniques in paragraph (b)(3) to create latitude and 
longitude points on a map. The FAA will accept straight lines for 
distances less than or equal to 7.5 times the map scale on map 
scales greater than or equal to 1:1,000,000 inches per inch (in/in); 
or straight lines representing 100 nm or less on map scales less 
than 1:1,000,000 in/in.
    (iii) Fully-Automated method. An applicant may use geographical 
information system software with global mapping data scaleable in 
accordance with paragraph (b)(1).
    (3) Range and bearing computations on an ellipsoidal earth 
model.
    (i) To create latitude and longitude pairs on an ellipsoidal 
earth model, an applicant shall use the following equations to 
calculate geodetic latitude (+N) and longitude (+E) given the launch 
point geodetic latitude (+N),

[[Page 34366]]

longitude (+E) range (nm), and bearing (degrees, positive clockwise 
from North).
    (A) Input. An applicant shall use the following input in making 
range and bearing computations:

1 = Geodetic latitude of launch point (DDD)
1 = Longitude of launch point (DDD)
S = Range from launch point (nm)
12 = Azimuth bearing from launch point (deg)

    (B) Computations. An applicant shall use the following equations 
to determine the latitude (2) and longitude 
(2) of a target point situated ``S'' nm from the 
launch point on an azimuth bearing 12 degrees.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.017

Where:

a = WGS-84 semi-major axis (3443.91846652 nmi)
b = WGS-84 semi-minor axis (3432.37165994 nmi)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.018

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.019

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.020

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.021

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.022

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.023

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.024

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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.038

    (ii) To create latitude and longitude pairs on an ellipsoidal 
earth model, an applicant shall use the following equations to 
calculate the distance (S) of the geodesic between two points 
P1 and P2), the forward azimuth 
(12) of the geodesic at P1, and the 
back azimuth (21) of the geodesic at 
P2, given the geodetic latitude (+N), longitude (+E) of 
P1 and P2. Azimuth is measured positively 
clockwise form the North.
    (A) Input. An applicant shall use the following input:

1 = Geodetic latitude of point P1 
(DDD)
1 = Longitude of point P1 (DDD)
2 = Geodetic latitude of point P2 
(DDD)
2 = Longitude of point P2 (DDD)

    (B) Computations. An applicant shall use the following equations 
to determine the distance (S), the forward azimuth 
(12) of the geodesic at P1, and the 
back azimuth (21) of the geodesic at 
P2,
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.039

Where:

a = WGS-84 semi-major axis (3443.91846652 nmi)
b = WGS-84 semi-minor axis (3432.37165994 nmi)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.040

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(c) Creation of a Flight Corridor

    (1) To define a flight corridor, an applicant shall:
    (i) Select a guided suborbital or orbital launch vehicle, and, 
for an orbital launch vehicle, select from table 1 in Sec. 420.21 a 
launch vehicle class that best represents the type of launch vehicle 
the applicant plans to support at its launch point:
    (ii) Select a debris dispersion radius (Dmax) from 
table A-1 corresponding to the guided suborbital launch vehicle or 
orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph (c)(1)(i);
    (iii) Select a launch point geodetic latitude and longitude; and
    (iv) Select a flight azimuth.
    (2) An applicant shall define and map an overflight exclusion 
zone using the following method:
    (i) Select a debris dispersion radius (Dmax) from 
table A-1 and a downrange distance (Doez) from table A-2 
to define an overflight exclusion zone for the guided suborbital 
launch vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph 
(c)(1)(i).
    (ii) An overflight exclusion zone is described by the 
intersection of the following boundaries, which are depicted in 
figure A1:
    (A) An applicant shall define an uprange boundary with a half-
circle arc of radius Dmax and a chord of length twice 
Dmax connecting the half-circle arc endpoints. the 
uprange boundary placement on a map has the chord midpoint 
positioned on the launch point with the chord oriented along an 
azimuth 90 deg. from the launch azimuth and the half-
circle arc located uprange from the launch point.
    (B) An applicant shall define the downrange boundary with a 
half-circle arc of radius Dmax and a chord of length 
twice Dmax connecting the half-circle arc endpoints. The 
downrange boundary placement on a map has the chord midpoint 
intersecting the nominal flight azimuth line at a distance DOEZ 
inches downrange with the chord oriented along an azimuth 
90 deg. from the launch azimuth and the half-circle arc 
located downrange from the intersection of the chord and the flight 
azimuth line.
    (C) Crossrange boundaries of an overflight exclusion zone are 
defined by two lines segments. Each is parallel to the flight 
azimuth with one to the left side and one to the right side of the 
flight azimuth line. Each line connects an uprange half-circle arc 
endpoint to a downrange half-circle arc endpoint as shown in figure 
A-1.
    (iii) An applicant shall identify the overflight exclusion zone 
on a map meeting the requirements specified in paragraph (b).
    (3) An applicant shall define and map a flight corridor using 
the following method:
    (i) In accordance with paragraph (b), an applicant shall draw a 
flight corridor on a map(s) with the Dmax origin centered 
on the intended launch point and the flight corridor centerline (in 
the downrange direction) aligned with the initial flight azimuth. 
The flight corridor is depicted in figure A-2 and its line segment 
lengths are tabulated in table A-3.
    (ii) An applicant shall define the flight corridor using the 
following boundary definitions:
    (A) An applicant shall draw an uprange boundary, which is 
defined by an arc-line GB (figure A-2), directly uprange from and 
centered on the intended launch point with radius Dmax.
    (B) An applicant shall draw line CF perpendicular to and 
centered on the flight azimuth line, and positioned 10 nm downrange 
from the launch point. The applicant shall use the length of line CF 
provided in table A-3 corresponding to the guided suborbital launch 
vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph 
(d)(1)(i).
    (C) An applicant shall draw line DE perpendicular to and 
centered on the flight azimuth line, and positioned 100 nm downrange 
from the launch point. The applicant shall use the length of line DE 
provided in table A-3 corresponding to the guided suborbital launch 
vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph 
(c)(1)(i).
    (D) Except for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an applicant 
shall draw a downrange boundary, which is defined by line HI and is 
drawn perpendicular to and centered on the flight azimuth line, and 
positioned 5,000 nm downrange from the launch point. The

[[Page 34369]]

applicant shall use the length of line HI provided in table A-3 
corresponding to the orbital launch vehicle class selected in 
paragraph (c)(1)(i).
    (E) An applicant shall draw crossrange boundaries, which are 
defined by three lines on the left side and three lines on the right 
side of the flight azimuth. An applicant shall construct the left 
flight corridor boundary according to the following, and as depicted 
in figure A-3:
    (1) The first line (line BC in figure A-3) is tangent to the 
uprange boundary arc, and ends at endpoint C of line CF, as depicted 
in figure A-3;
    (2) The second line (line CD in figure A-3) begins at endpoint C 
of line BC and ends at endpoint D of line DH, as depicted in figure 
A-3;
    (3) For all orbital launch vehicles, the third line (line DH in 
figure A-3) begins at endpoint D of line CD and ends at endpoint H 
of line HI, as depicted in figure A-3; and
    (4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, the line DH begins 
at endpoint D of line CD and ends at a point tangent to the impact 
dispersion area drawn in accordance with paragraph (c)(4) and as 
depicted in figure A-4.
    (F) An applicant shall repeat the procedure in paragraph 
(c)(3)(ii)(E) for the right side boundary.
    (iii) An applicant shall identify the flight corridor on a map 
meeting the requirements specified in paragraph (b).
    (4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an applicant shall 
define a final stage impact dispersion area as part of the flight 
corridor and show the impact dispersion area on a map, as depicted 
in figure A-3, in accordance with the following:
    (i) An applicant shall select an apogee altitude 
(Hap) for the launch vehicle final stage. The apogee 
altitude should equal the highest altitude intended to be reached by 
a guided suborbital launch vehicle launched from the launch point.
    (ii) An applicant shall define the impact dispersion area by 
using an impact range factor [IP(Hap)] and a dispersion 
factor [DISP(Hap)] as shown below:
    (A) An applicant shall calculate the impact range (D) for the 
final launch vehicle stage. An applicant shall set D equal to the 
maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by the impact 
range factor as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.056

Where:

IP(Hap) = 0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km; and
ip(Hap) = 0.7 for an apogee 100 km or greater.

    (B) An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius 
(R) for the final launch vehicle stage. An applicant shall set R 
equal to the maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by 
the dispersion factor as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.057

Where:

DISPH(Hap) = 0.05

    (iii) An applicant shall draw the impact dispersion area on a 
map with its center on the predicted impact point. An applicant 
shall then draw line DH in accordance with paragraph 
(c)(3)(ii)(E)(4).

(d) Evaluate the Flight Corridor

    (1) An applicant shall evaluate the flight corridor for the 
presence of any populated areas. If an applicant determines that no 
populated area is located within the flight corridor, then no 
additional steps are necessary.
    (2) If a populated area is located in an overflight exclusion 
zone, an applicant may modify its proposal or demonstrate that there 
are times when no people are present or that the applicant has an 
agreement in place to evacuate the public from the overflight 
exclusion zone during a launch.
    (3) If a populated area is located within the flight corridor, 
an applicant may modify its proposal and create another flight 
corridor pursuant to appendix A, use appendix B to narrow the flight 
corridor, or complete a risk analysis as provided in appendix C.

BILLING CODE 4910-13-M

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BILLING CODE 4910-13-C

[[Page 34374]]

Appendix B to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor

(a) Introduction

    (1) This appendix provides a method to construct a flight 
corridor from a launch point for a guided suborbital launch vehicle 
or any one of the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles 
from table 1, Sec. 420.21, using local meteorological data and a 
launch vehicle trajectory.
    (2) A flight corridor is constructed in two sections--one 
section comprising a launch area and one section comprising a 
downrange area. The launch area of a flight corridor reflects the 
extent of launch vehicle debris impacts in the event of a launch 
vehicle failure and applying local meteorological conditions. The 
downrange area reflects the extent of launch vehicle debris impacts 
in the event of a launch vehicle failure and applying vehicle 
imparted velocity, malfunctions turns, and vehicle guidance and 
performance dispersions.
    (3) A flight corridor includes an overflight exclusion zone in 
the launch area and, for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an 
impact dispersion area in the downrange area. A flight corridor for 
a guided suborbital launch vehicle ends with an impact dispersion 
area and, for the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles, 
5,000 nautical miles (nm) from the launch point.

(b) Data Requirements

    (1) Launch area data requirements. An applicant shall satisfy 
the following data requirements to perform the launch area analysis 
of this appendix. The data requirements are identified in table B-1 
along with sources where data acceptable to the FAA may be obtained.
    (i) An applicant must select meteorological data for the 
proposed launch site that meet the specifications in table B-1.

                                    Table B-1.--Launch Area Data Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Data category                         Data item                                Data source
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meteorological Data.........  Local statistical wind data versus        These data may be obtained from: Global
                               altitude up to 50,000 feet. Required      Gridded Upper Air Statistics, Climate
                               data are: altitude (ft), atmospheric      Applications Branch, National Climatic
                               density (slugs/ft3), mean East/West       Data Center.
                               meridianal (u) and North/South zonal
                               (v) wind (ft/sec), standard deviation
                               of u and v wind (ft/sec), correlation
                               coefficient, number of observations and
                               wind percentile (%)
Nominal Trajectory Data.....  State vector data versus time after       Actual launch vehicle trajectory data;
                               liftoff in topocentric launch point       or trajectory generation software
                               centered X,Y,Z,X,Y,Z coordinates with     meeting requirements in paragraph
                               the X-axis aligned with the flight        (b)(1)(ii).
                               azimuth. Trajectory time intervals
                               shall not be greater than one second.
                               XYZ units are in feet and X,Y,Z units
                               are in ft/sec
Debris Data.................  A fixed ballistic coefficient equal to 3  N/A.
                               lbs/ft2 is used for the launch area
Geographical Data...........  Launch point geodetic latitude on the     Geographical surveys or Global
                               WGS-84 ellipsoidal earth model            Positioning System.
                              Launch point longitude on an ellipsoidal
                               earth model
                              Maps using scales of not less than        Map types with scale and projection
                               1:250,000 inches per inch within 100 nm   information are listed in the Defense
                               of a launch point and 1:20,000,000        Mapping Agency, Public Sale,
                               inches per inch for distances greater     Aeronautical Charts and Publications
                               than 100 nm from a launch point           Catalog. The catalog and maps may be
                                                                         ordered through the U.S. Dept. of
                                                                         Commerce, National Oceanic and
                                                                         Atmospheric Administration, National
                                                                         Ocean Service.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) For a guided orbital launch vehicle, an applicant shall 
obtain or create a launch vehicle nominal trajectory. An applicant 
may use trajectory data from a launch vehicle manufacturer or 
generate a trajectory using trajectory simulation software. 
Trajectory time intervals shall be no greater than one second. If an 
applicant uses a trajectory computed with commercially available 
software products, the software must calculate the trajectory using 
the following parameters, or demonstrated equivalents:
    (A) Launch location:
    (1) Launch point, using geodetic latitude and longitude to four 
decimal places; and
    (2) Launch point height above sea level.
    (B) Ellipsoidal earth:
    (1) Mass of earth;
    (2) Radius of earth;
    (3) Earth flattening factor; and
    (4) Gravitational harmonic constants (J2, J3, J4).
    (C) Vehicle characteristics:
    (1) Mass, as a function of time;
    (2) Thrust, as a function of time;
    (3) Specific impulse (ISP), as a function of time; 
and
    (4) Stage dimensions.
    (D) Launch events:
    (1) Stage burn times; and
    (2) Stage drop-off times.
    (E) Atmosphere:
    (1) Density vs. altitude;
    (2) Pressure vs. altitude;
    (3) Speed of sound vs. altitude; and
    (4) Temperature vs. altitude.
    (F) Winds:
    (1) Wind direction vs. altitude; and
    (2) Wind magnitude vs. altitude.
    (I) Aerodynamics; drag coefficient vs. mach number for each 
stage of flight showing subsonic, transonic and supersonic mach 
regions for each stage.
    (iii) An applicant shall use a ballistic coefficient () 
of 3 lbs/ft2 for debris impact computations.
    (iv) An applicant shall satisfy the map and plotting 
requirements for a launch area in appendix A, paragraph (b).
    (2) Downrange area data requirements. An applicant shall satisfy 
the following data requirements to perform the downrange area 
analysis of this appendix.
    (i) The launch vehicle class and method of generating a 
trajectory used in the launch area shall be used by an applicant in 
the downrange area as well. Trajectory time intervals must not be 
greater than one second.
    (ii) An applicant shall satisfy the map and plotting data 
requirements for a downrange area in appendix A, paragraph (b).

(c) Construction of a Launch Area of a Flight Corridor

    (1) An applicant shall construct a launch area of a flight 
corridor using the processes and equations of this paragraph for a 
single trajectory position. An applicant shall repeat these 
processes at time points on the launch vehicle trajectory in time 
intervals no greater than one second. When choosing wind data, an 
applicant shall select a time period between one and 12 months.
    (2) A launch area analysis must include all trajectory positions 
whose Z-values are less than or equal to 50,000 ft.
    (3) Each trajectory time is denoted by the subscript ``i''. 
Height intervals for a given atmospheric pressure level are denoted 
by the subscript ``j''.
    (4) Using data from the GGUAS CD-ROM, an applicant shall 
estimate the mean atmospheric density, maximum wind speed, height 
interval fall times and height interval debris dispersions for 15 
mean geometric height intervals.
    (i) The height intervals in the GGUAS source data vary as a 
function of the following 15 atmospheric pressure levels (milibars): 
Surface, 1000, 850, 700, 500, 400, 300, 250, 200, 150, 100, 70, 50, 
30, 10. The actual geometric height associated with each pressure 
level varies depending on the time

[[Page 34375]]

of year. An applicant shall estimate the mean geometric height over 
the period of months selected in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph 
for each of the 15 pressure levels as shown in equation B1.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.058

Where:

Hj=mean geometric height
hm=geometric height for a given month
nm=number of observations for a given month
k=number of wind months of interest

    (ii) The atmospheric densities in the source data also vary as a 
function of the 15 atmospheric pressure levels. The actual 
atmospheric density associated with each pressure level varies 
depending on the time of year. An applicant shall estimate the mean 
atmospheric density over the period of months selected in 
subparagraph (1) of this paragraph for each of the 15 pressure 
levels as shown in equation B2.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.059

Where:

pj=mean atmospheric density
m=atmospheric density for a given month
nm=number of observation for a given month
k=number of wind months of interest

    (iii) An applicant shall estimate the algebraic maximum wind 
speed at a given pressure level as follows and shall repeat the 
process for each pressure level.
    (A) For each month, an applicant shall calculate the monthly 
mean wind speed (Waz) for 360 azimuths using equation B3;
    (B) An applicant shall select the maximum monthly mean wind 
speed from the 360 azimuths;
    (C) An applicant shall repeat subparagraphs (c)(4)(iii)(A) and 
(B) for each month of interest; and
    (D) An applicant shall select the maximum mean wind speed from 
the range of months. The absolute value of this wind is designated 
Wmax for the current pressure level.
    (iv) An applicant shall calculate speed using the means for 
winds from the West (u) and winds from the North (v). An applicant 
shall use equation B3 to resolve the winds to a specific azimuth 
bearing.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.135

Where:

az=wind azimuth
u=West zonal wind component
v=North zonal wind component
Waz=mean wind speed at azimuth for each month

    (v) An applicant shall estimate the interval fall time over a 
height interval assuming the initial descent velocity is equal to 
the terminal velocity (VT). An applicant shall use 
equations B4 through B6 to estimate the fall time over a given 
height interval.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.060

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.061

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.062

Where:

=height difference between 
two mean geometric heights
=ballistic coefficient
px=mean atmospheric density for the corresponding mean 
geometric heights
vTj=terminal velocity

    (vi) An applicant shall estimate the interval debris dispersion 
(Dj) by multiplying the interval fall time by the 
algebraic maximum mean wind speed (Wmax) as shown in 
equation B7.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.063

    (5) Once the Dj are estimated for each height 
interval, an applicant shall determine the total debris dispersion 
(Di) for each Zi using a linear interpolation 
and summation exercise. An applicant shall use a launch point height 
of zero equal to the surface level of the nearest GGUAS grid 
location and is shown below in equation B8.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.064

Where:

n=number of height intervals below jth height interval

    (6) Once all the Di radii have been calculated, an 
applicant shall produce a launch area flight corridor according to 
instructions in subparagraphs (c)(6)(i)-(iv).
    (i) On a map meeting the requirements of appendix A, paragraph 
(b), an applicant shall plot the Xi position location on 
the flight azimuth for the corresponding Zi position;
    (ii) An applicant shall draw a circle of radius Di 
centered on the corresponding Xi position; and
    (iii) An applicant shall repeat the instructions in 
subparagraphs (c)(6)(i)-(ii) for each Di radius.
    (iv) The launch area of a flight corridor is the enveloping line 
that encloses the outer boundary of the Di circles as 
shown in Fig. B-1. The uprange portion of a flight corridor is 
described by a semi-circle arc that is a portion of either the most 
uprange Di dispersion circle, or the overflight exclusion 
zone (defined in subparagraph (c)(7)), whichever is further uprange.
    (7) An applicant shall define an overflight exclusion zone in 
the launch area pursuant to the instructions provided in appendix A, 
subparagraph (c)(2).
    (8) An applicant shall draw the launch area flight corridor and 
overflight exclusion zone on a map(s) meeting the requirements of 
table B-1.

[[Page 34376]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.073


    (1) The downrange area analysis estimates the debris dispersion 
for the downrange time points on a launch vehicle trajectory. An 
applicant shall perform the downrange area analysis using the 
processes and equations of this paragraph.
    (2) The downrange area analysis shall include trajectory 
positions at a height (the Zi-values) greater than 50,000 
feet and nominal trajectory IIP values less than or equal to 5,000 
nm. For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, the final IIP value that 
an applicant must consider is the launch vehicle final stage impact 
point. Each trajectory time shall be one second or less and is 
denoted by the subscript ``i''.
    (3) An applicant shall compute the downrange area of a flight 
corridor boundary in four steps, from each trajectory time 
increment: Determine a reduction ratio factor; calculate the launch 
vehicle position after simulating a malfunction turn; rotate the 
state vector after the malfunction turn in the range of three 
degrees to one degree as a function of Xi distance 
downrange; and compute the IIP of the resulting trajectory. The 
locus of IIPs describes the boundary of the downrange area of a 
flight corridor. An applicant shall use the following subparagraphs, 
(d)(3)(i)-(v), to compute the downrange area of the flight corridor 
boundary:
    (i) Compute the downrange distance to the final IIP position for 
a nominal trajectory as follows:
    (A) Using equations B30 through B69, determine the IIP 
coordinates (max, max) for 
the nominal state vector before the launch vehicle enters orbit 
where  in equation B30 is the nominal flight azimuth angle 
measured from True North.
    (B) Using the range and bearing equations in appendix A, 
paragraph (b)(3), determine the distance (Smax) from the 
launch point coordinates (lp 
lp) to the IIP coordinates 
(max, max) computed in 
(3)(i)(A) of this paragraph.
    (C) The distance for Smax may not exceed 5000 mm. In 
cases when the actual value exceeds 5000 nm the applicant shall use 
5000 nm for Smax.
    (ii) Compute the reduction ratio factor (Fri) for 
each trajectory time increment as follows:
    (A) Using equations B30 through B69, determine the IIP 
coordinates (i, i) for the 
nominal state vector where  in equation B30 is the nominal 
flight azimuth angle measured from True North.
    (B) Using the range and bearing equations in appendix A, 
paragraph (b)(3), determine the distance (Si) from the 
launch point coordinates (lp 
lp) to the IIP coordinates 
(i, i) computed in 
(3)(ii)(A) of this paragraph.
    (C) The reduction ratio factor is:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.065
    
    (iii) An applicant shall compute the launch vehicle position and 
velocity components after a simulated malfunction turn for each 
i, using the following method.
    (A) Turn duration (t)= 4 sec.
    (B) Turn angle ().

=(Fri) * 45 degrees.

    The turn angle equations perform a turn in the launch vehicle's 
yaw plane, as depicted in figure B-2.

[[Page 34377]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.074


    (C) Launch vehicle velocity magnitude at the beginning of the 
turn (Vb) and velocity magnitude at the end of the turn 
(Ve).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.081

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.082

    (D) Average velocity magnitude over the turn duration (V).
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.084
    
    (E) Velocity vector path angle (i) at turn 
epoch.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.085

    (F) Launch vehicle position components at the end of turn 
duration.

[[Page 34378]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.086


Where:

gi=32.17405 ft/sec.2

    (G) Launch vehicle velocity components at the end of turn 
duration.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.087

    (iv) An applicant shall rotate the trajectory state vector at 
the end of the turn duration to the right and left to define the 
right-lateral flight corridor boundary and the left-lateral flight 
corridor boundary, respectively. An applicant shall perform perform 
the trajectory rotation in conjunction with a trajectory 
transformation from the X90, Y90, 
Z90, X90, Y90, Z90 
components to E,N,U,E,N,U. The trajectory subscripts ``R'' and ``L'' 
from equations B15 and B26 have been discarded to reduce the number 
of equations. An applicant shall transform from E,N,U,E,N,U to 
E,F,G,E,F,G. An applicant shall use the equations of paragraph 
(d)(3)(iv)(A)-(F) to produce the EFG components necessary to 
estimate each instantaneous impact point.
    (A) An applicant must calculate the flight angle ().
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.088
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.089
    
        or
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.090
    
    (B) An applicant shall transform X90, Y90, 
Z90 to E,N,U.

[[Page 34379]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.091


    (C) An applicant shall transform X90, Y90, 
Z90 to E90 to E,N,U.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.092

    (D) An applicant shall transform the launch point coordinates 
(o, o, ho) to 
Eo, Fo, Go.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.093

    (E) An applicant shall transform E,N,U to E90, 
F90, G90.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.094

    (F) An applicant shall transform E,N,U to E,F,G.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.095
    
    (v) The IIP computation implements an iterative solution to the 
impact point problem. An applicant shall solve Equations B46 to B69, 
with the appropriate substitutions, up to a maximum of five times. 
Each repetition of the equations provides a more accurate prediction 
of the IIP. The required IIP computations are shown in subsection 
(d)(3)(v)(A)-(W) below. An applicant shall use this computation for 
both the left- and right-lateral offsets. The IIP computations will 
result in latitude and longitude pairs for the left-lateral flight 
corridor boundary and the right-lateral flight corridor boundary. An 
applicant shall use the lines connecting the latitude and longitude 
pairs to describe the entire downrange area boundary of the flight 
corridor up to 5000 nm or a final stage impact dispersion area.
    (A) An applicant shall approximate the radial distance 
(k,l) from the geocenter to the IIP. The 
distance from the center of the earth ellipsoid to the launch point 
shall be used for the initial approximation of rk,l as 
shown in equation B46.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.096

    (B) An applicant shall compute the radial distance (r) from the 
geocenter to the launch vehicle position.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.097

    If rk,l then the launch vehicle position is below 
the Earth's surface and an impact point cannot be computed. An 
applicant

[[Page 34380]]

must restart the calcuations with the next trajectory state vector.
    (C) An applicant shall compute the inertial velocity components.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.098
    

Where:

 = 4.178074 x 10-3 deg/sec

    (D) An applicant shall compute the magnitude of the inertial 
velocity vector.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.099

    (E) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the 
trajectory ellipse multiplied by the cosine of the eccentric anomaly 
at epoch. (c).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.100

Where:

K=1.407644 x 1016 ft3/sec2

    (F) An applicant shall compute the semi-major axis of the 
trajectory ellipse (at).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.101

    If at <0 or at>  then the 
trajectory orbit is not elliptical, but is hyperbolic or parabolic, 
and an impact point cannot be computed. The launch vehicle has 
achieved escape velocity and the applicant may terminate 
computations.
    (G) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the 
trajectory ellipse multipled by the sine of the eccentric anomaly at 
epoch (s).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.102

    (H) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the 
trajectory ellipse squared (\2\).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.103

    If [a(1-)-a]>0 and 
0 then the trajectory perigee height is positive 
and an impact point cannot be computed. The launch vehicle has 
achieved earth orbit and the applicant may terminate computations.
    (I) An applicant shall computer the eccentricity of the 
trajectory ellipse multiplied by the cosine of the eccentric anomaly 
at impact (ck).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.104

    (J) An applicant shall compute the eccentrity of the trajectory 
ellipse multiplied by the sine of the eccentric anomaly at impact 
(sk).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.105

    If sk <0 then the trajectory orbit does not 
intersect the Earth's surface and an impact point cannot be 
computed. The launch vehicle has achieved earth orbit and the 
applicant may terminate computations.
    (K) An applicant shall compute the cosine of the difference 
between the eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly at 
epoch (ck).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.106

    (L) An applicant shall compute the sine of the difference 
between the eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly at 
epoch sk).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.107

    (M) An applicant shall compute the f-series expansion of 
Kepler's equations.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.108

    (N) An applicant shall compute the g-series expansion of 
Kepler's equations.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.109

    (O) An applicant shall compute the E,F,G coordinates at impact 
(Ei,Fi,Gi).

[[Page 34381]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.110


    (P) An applicant shall approximate the distance from the 
geocenter to the launch vehicle position at impact 
(rk,2).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.111

Where:

aE=20925646.3255 ft
e2=0.00669437999013

    (Q) An applicant shall let rk+1,1=rk,2, 
substitute rk+1,1 for rk,1in equation B55 and 
repeat equations B55-B64 up to four more times incrementing ``k'' by 
one on each loop (e.g. {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}). If 
|r5,1-r5,2|>1 then the iterative solution does 
not converge and an impact point does not meet the accuracy 
tolerance of plus or minus one foot. An applicant must try more 
iterations, or restart the calculations with the next trajectory 
state vector.
    (R) An applicant shall compute the difference between the 
eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly at epoch 
().
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.112

    (S) An applicant shall compute the time of flight from epoch to 
impact (t).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.113

    (T) An applicant shall compute the geocentric latitude at impact 
(').
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.114

Where:

+90 deg. 'oi  
-90 deg.

    (U) An applicant shall compute the deodetic latitude at impact ( 
 ).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.115

Where:

+90 deg. 'oi  
-90 deg.

    (V) An applicant shall compute the East longitude at impact 
().
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.116

    (W) If the range from the launch point to the impact point is 
equal to or greater than 5000nm, an applicant shall terminate IIP 
computations.
    (4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an applicant shall 
define a final stage impact dispersion area as part of the flight 
corridor and show the area on a map using the following procedure:
    (i) For equation B70 below, an applicant shall use an apogee 
altitude (Hap) corresponding to the highest altitude 
reached by the launch vehicle final stage in the applicant's launch 
vehicle trajectory analysis done in accordance with paragraph 
(b)(1)(ii).
    (ii) An applicant shall define the final stage impact dispersion 
area by using a dispersion factor [DISP(Hap)] as shown 
below. An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius (R) 
for the final launch vehicle stage. An applicant shall set R equal 
to the maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by the 
dispersion factor as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.117

Where:

DISP(Hap) =0.05

    (5) An applicant shall combine the launch area and downrange 
area flight corridor and any final stage impact dispersion area for 
a guided suborbital launch vehicle.
    (i) On the same map with the launch area flight corridor, an 
applicant shall plot the latitude and longitude positions of the 
left and right sides of the downrange area of the flight corridor 
calculated in subparagraph (d)(3).
    (ii) An applicant shall connect the latitude and longitude 
positions of the left side of the downrange area of the flight 
corridor sequentially starting with the last IIP calculated on the 
left side and ending with the first IIP calculated on the left side. 
An applicant shall repeat this procedure for the right side.
    (iii) An applicant shall connect the left sides of the launch 
area and downrange portions of the flight corridor. An applicant 
shall repeat this procedure for the right side.
    (iv) An applicant shall plot the overflight exclusion zone 
defined in subparagraph (c)(7).
    (v) An applicant shall draw any impact dispersion area on the 
downrange map with the center of the impact dispersion area on the 
launch vehicle final stage point obtained from the applicant's 
launch vehicle trajectory analysis done in accordance with 
subparagraph (b)(1)(ii).

(e) Evaluate the Launch Site

    (1) An applicant shall evaluate the flight corridor for the 
presence of populated areas. If no populated area is located within 
the flight corridor, then no additional steps are necessary.
    (2) If a populated area is located in an overflight exclusion 
zone, an applicant may modify its proposal or demonstrate that there 
are times when no people are present or that the applicant has an 
agreement in place to evacuate the public from the overflight 
exclusion zone during a launch.
    (3) If a populated area is located within the flight corridor, 
an applicant may modify its proposal or complete an overflight risk 
analysis as provided in appendix C.

Appendix C to Part 420--Risk Analysis

(a) Introduction

    (1) This appendix provides a method for an applicant to estimate 
the expected casualty (Ec) for a launch of a guided 
launch vehicle using a flight corridor generated either by appendix 
A or appendix B. This appendix also provides an applicant options to 
simplify the method where population at risk is minimal.
    (2) An applicant shall perform a risk analysis when a populated 
area is located within a flight corridor defined by either

[[Page 34382]]

appendix A or appendix B. If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 
30 x 10-6, an applicant may either modify its proposal, 
or if the flight corridor used was generated by the appendix A 
method, use the appendix B method to narrow the flight corridor and 
then redo the overflight risk analysis pursuant to this appendix C. 
If the estimated expected casualty still exceeds 
30 x 10-6, the FAA will not approve the location of the 
proposed launch point.

(b) Data Requirements

    (1) An applicant shall obtain the data specified in 
subparagraphs (b)(2) and (3) and summarized in table C-1, Table C-1 
provides sources where an applicant may obtain data acceptable to 
the FAA. An applicant will also employ the flight corridor 
information from appendix A or B, including flight azimuth and, for 
an appendix B flight corridor, trajectory information.
    (2) Population Data. Total population (N) and the total landmass 
area within a populated area (A) are required. Population data up to 
and including 100 nm from the launch point are required at the U.S. 
census block group level. Population data downrange from 100 nm are 
required at no greater than 1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude/longitude grid 
coordinates.
    (3) Launch Vehicle Data. These data consist of the launch 
vehicle failure probability (Pf), the launch vehicle 
effective casualty area (Ac), trajectory position data, 
and the overflight dwell time (td). The failure 
probability is a constant (Pf=0.10) for a guided orbital 
or suborbital launch vehicle. Table C-3 provides effective casualty 
area data based on IIP range. Trajectory position information is 
provided from distance computations given in this appendix for an 
appendix A flight corridor, or trajectory data used in appendix B 
for an appendix B flight corridor. The dwell time (td) 
may be determined from trajectory data produced when creating an 
appendix B flight corridor.

                                Table C-1.--Overflight Analysis Data Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Data category                      Data item                             Data source
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Population Data....................  Total population within a    Within 100 nm of the launch point: U.S. census
                                      populated area (N).          data at the census block-group level.
                                                                   Downrange from 100 nm beyond the launch
                                                                   point, world population data are available
                                                                   from:
                                     Total landmass area within   Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center
                                      the populated area (A).      (CDIAC).
                                                                  Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
                                                                  Database--Global Population Distribution
                                                                   (1990), Terrestrial Area and Country Name
                                                                   Information on a One by One Degree Grid Cell
                                                                   Basis (DB1016 (8-1996)).
Launch Vehicle Data................  Failure probability--        N/A.
                                      Pf=0.10.
                                     Effective casualty area      See table C-3.
                                      (Ac).
                                     Overflight dwell time......  Determined by range from the launch point or
                                                                   trajectory used by applicant.
                                     Nominal Trajectory Data      See appendix B, table B-1.
                                      (for an appendix B flight
                                      corridor only).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(c) Estimating Corridor Casualty Expectation

    (1) A corridor casualty expectation [E(Corridor)] 
estimate is the sum of the expected casualty measurement of each 
populated area inside a flight corridor.
    (2) An applicant shall identify and locate each populated area 
in the proposed flight corridor.
    (3) An applicant shall determine the probability of impact in 
each populated area using the procedures in subparagraphs (5) or (6) 
of this paragraph. Figures C-1 and C-2 show an area considered for 
probability of impact (Pi) computations by the dashed-
lined box around the populated area within a flight corridor, and 
figure C-3 shows a populated area in a final stage impact dispersion 
area. An applicant shall then estimate the Ec for each 
populated area using the procedures in subparagraphs (7) and (8) of 
this paragraph.
    (4) The Pi computations do not directly account for 
populated areas whose areas are bisected by an appendix A flight 
corridor centerline or an appendix B nominal trajectory ground 
trace. Accordingly, an applicant must evaluate Pi for 
each of the bi-sections as two separate populated area, as shown in 
figure C-4, which shows one bi-section to the left of an appendix A 
flight corridor's centerline and one on its right.
    (5) Probability of Impact (Pi) Computations for a 
Populated Area in an appendix A Flight Corridor. An applicant shall 
computer Pi. for each populated area using the following 
method:
    (i) For the launch and downrange areas, but not a final stage 
impact dispersion area for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an 
applicant shall compute Pi, for each populated area using 
the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.118

Where:

x1, x2 = closest and farthest downrange 
distance (nm) along the flight corridor centerline to the populated 
area (see figure C-1)
y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range 
distance (nm) to the populated area measured from the flight 
corridor centerline (see figure C-1)
 = one-fifth of the cross range 
distance from the centerline to the flight corridor boundary (see 
figure C-1)
exp = exponential function (ex)
Pf = probability of failure = 0.10
R = IIP range rate (nm/sec) (see table C-2)
C = 643 seconds (constant)

                Table C-2.--IIP Range Rate vs. IIP Range
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              IIP range
                       IIP range (nm)                        rate (nm/s)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-75.......................................................         0.75
76-300.....................................................         1.73
301-900....................................................         4.25
901-1700...................................................         8.85
1701-2600..................................................        19.75

[[Page 34383]]

 
2601-3500..................................................        42.45
3500-4500..................................................        84.85
4501-5250..................................................       154.95
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) For each populated area within a final stage impact 
dispersion area, an applicant shall compute Pi using the 
following method:
    (A) An applicant shall estimate the probability of final stage 
impact in the x and y sectors of each populated area within the 
final stage impact dispersion area using equations C2 and C3:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.119

Where:

x1, x2 = closest and farthest downrange 
distance, measured along the flight corridor centerline, measured 
from the nominal impact point to the populated area (see figure C-3)
 = one-fifth of the impact dispersion 
radius (see figure C-3)
exp = exponential function (ex)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.120

Where:

y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range 
distance to the populated area measured from the flight corridor 
centerline (see figure C-3)
y = one-fifth of the impact dispersion radius 
(see figure C-3)
exp = exponential function (ex)

    (B) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area 
boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would 
otherwise extend outside the impact dispersion area, the 
x2 or y2 distance should be set equal to the 
impact dispersion area radius. The x2 distance for 
populated area A in figure C-3 is an example, If a populated area 
intersects the flight azimuth, an applicant shall solve equation C3 
by obtaining the solution in two parts. An applicant shall 
determine, first, the probability between y1 = 0 and 
y2 = a and, second, the probability between y1 
= 0 and y2 = b, as depicted in figure C-4. The 
probability Py is then equal to the sum of the 
probabilities of the two parts. If a populated area interests the 
line that is normal to the flight azimuth on the impact point, an 
applicant shall solve equation C2 by obtaining the solution in two 
parts in a similar manner with the values of x.
    (C) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact for 
each populated area using equation C4 below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.121

Where:

Ps = 1 - Pf = 0.90

[[Page 34384]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.075


    (6) Probability of Impact Computations for a Populated Area in 
an appendix B Flight Corridor. An applicant shall compute 
Pi using the following method:
    (i) For the launch and downrange areas, but not a final stage 
impact dispersion area for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an 
applicant shall compute Pi for each populated area using 
the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.122

Where:

y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range 
distance (nm) to a populated area measured from the nominal 
trajectory IIP ground trace (see figure C-2)
 = one-fifth of the cross range 
distance (nm) from nominal trajectory to the flight corridor 
boundary (see figure C-2)
exp = exponential function (ex)
Pf = probability of failure = 0.10
t  = flight time from lift-off to orbital insertion (seconds)
td = overflight dwell time (seconds)

    (ii) For each populated area within a final stage impact 
dispersion area, an applicant shall compute Pi using the 
following method:
    (A) An applicant shall estimate the probability of final stage 
impact in the x and y sectors of each populated area within the 
final stage impact dispersion area using equations C6 and C7:

[[Page 34385]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.123


Where:

x1, x2 = closest and farthest downrange 
distance, measured along nominal trajectory IIP ground trace, 
measured from the nominal impact point to the populated area (see 
figure C-3)
 = one-fifth of the impact dispersion 
radius (see figure C-3)
exp  = exponential function (ex)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.124

Where:

y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range 
distance to the populated area measured form the nominal trajectory 
IIP ground trace (see figure C-3)
 = one-fifth of the impact dispersion 
radius (see figure C-3)
exp = exponential function (ex)

    (B) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area 
boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would 
otherwise extend outside the impact dispersion area, the 
x2  or y2 distance should be set equal to the 
impact dispersion area radius. The x2 distance for 
populated area A in figure C-3 is an example. If a populated area 
intersects the flight azimuth, an applicant shall solve equation C7 
by obtaining the solution in two parts. An applicant shall 
determine, first, the probability between y1 = 0 and 
y2 = a and, second, the probability between y1 
= 0 and y2 = b, as depicted in figure C-4. The 
probability Py is then equal to the sum of the 
probabilities of the two parts. If a populated area interests the 
line that is normal to the flight azimuth on the impact point, an 
applicant shall solve equation C6 by obtaining the solution in two 
parts in a similar manner with the values of x.
    (C) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact for 
each populated area using equation C8 below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.125

Where:

Ps = 1 - Pf = 0.90

BILLING CODE 4910-13-M

[[Page 34386]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.076



[[Page 34387]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.077



BILLING CODE 4910-13-C

[[Page 34388]]

    (7) Using the Pi calculated in either subparagraph 
(c)(5) or (6) of this paragraph, an applicant shall calculate the 
casualty expectancy for each populated area within the flight 
corridor. Eck is the casualty expectancy for a given 
populated area as shown in equation C9, where individual populated 
areas are designated with the subscript ``k''.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.126

Where:
Ac = casualty area (from table C-3)
Ak = populated area
Nk = population in Ak

                                             Table C-3--Effective Casualty Area (miles2) vs. IIP Range (nm)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Orbital launch vehicles                                                         Suborbital launch
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        vehicles
                                                                                                                                 -----------------------
        IIP Range (nmi)                   Small                   Medium               Medium  large               Large                  Guided
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-49...........................  0.43...................  0.53..................  0.71..................  1.94..................  0.43
50-1749........................  0.13...................  0.0022................  0.11..................  0.62..................  0.13
1750-5000......................  3.59  x  10-6..........  8.3  x  10-4..........  1.08  x  10-1.........  7.17  x  10-1.........  3.59  x  10-6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (8) An applicant shall estimate the total corridor risk using 
the following summation of risk, including a multiplier of two, as 
shown in equation C10.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.127

    (9) Alternative Casualty Expectancy (Ec) Analyses. An 
applicant may employ specified variations to the analysis defined in 
subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8). Those variations are identified in 
subparagraphs (9)(i) through (vi) of this paragraph. Subparagraphs 
(i) through (iv) permits an applicant to make conservative 
assumptions that would lead to an overestimation of the corridor 
Ec compared with the analysis defined in subparagraphs 
(c)(1)-(8). In subparagraphs (v) and (vi), an applicant that would 
otherwise fail the analysis prescribed by subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8) 
may avoid (c)(1)-(8)'s overestimation of the probability of impact 
in each populated area. An applicant employing a variation shall 
identify the variation used, show and discuss the specific 
assumptions made to a modify the analysis defined in subparagraphs 
(c)(1)-(8), and demonstrate how each assumption leads to 
overestimation of the corridor Ec compared with the 
analysis defined in subparagraphs (c)(1)-(c)(8).
    (i) Assume that Px and Py have a value of 
1.0 for all populated areas.
    (ii) Combine populated areas into one or more larger populated 
areas, and use a population density for the combined area or areas 
equal to the most dense populated area.
    (iii) for any given populated area, assume Py has a 
value of one.
    (iv) For any given Px sector (an area spanning the 
width of a flight corridor and bounded by two time points on the 
trajectory IIP ground trace) Py has a value of one and 
use a population density for the sector equal to the most dense 
populated area.
    (v) For a given populated area, divided the populated area into 
smaller rectangles, determined Pi for each individual 
rectangle, and sum the individual impact probabilities to determine 
Pi for thee entire populated area.
    (vi) For a given populated area, use the ratio of the populated 
area to the area of the Pi rectangle from the 
subparagraph (c)(1)-(8) analysis.

(d) Evaluation of Results

    (1) If the estimated expected casualty does not exceed 30  
x 10-6, the FAA will approve the launch site location.
    (2) If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 30  
x 10-6, then an applicant may either modify its proposal, 
or, if the flight corridor used was generated by the appendix A 
method, use the appendix B method to narrow the flight corridor and 
then perform another appendix C risk analysis.

Appendix D to Part 420--Impact Dispersion Area and Casualty Expectancy 
Estimate for an Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle

(a) Introduction

    (1) This appendix provides an method for determining the 
acceptability of the location of a launch point from which an 
unguided suborbital launch vehicle would be launched. The appendix 
describes how to define an overflight exclusion zone and impact 
dispersion areas, and how to evaluate whether the public risk 
presented by the launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle 
remains at acceptable levels.
    (2) An applicant shall base its analysis on an unguided 
suborbital launch vehicle whose final launch vehicle stage apogee 
represents the intended use of the launch point.
    (3) An applicant shall use the apogee of each stage of an 
existing unguided suborbital launch vehicle with a final launch 
vehicle stage apogee equal to the one proposed, and calculate each 
impact range and dispersion area using the equations provided.
    (4) This appendix also provides a method of performing an impact 
risk analysis that estimates the expected casualty (Ec) 
within each impact dispersion area. This appendix provides an 
applicant options to simplify the method where population at risk is 
minimal.
    (5) If the Ec is less than or equal to 30  
x 10-6, the FAA will approve the launch point for 
unguided suborbital launch vehicles. If the Ec exceeds 30 
 x 10-6, the proposed launch point will fail the launch 
site location review.

(b) Data Requirements

    (1) An applicant shall employ the apogee of each stage of an 
existing unguided suborbital launch vehicle whose final stage apogee 
represents the maximum altitude to be reached by unguided suborbital 
launch vehicles launched from the launch point. The apogee shall be 
obtained from one or more actual flights of an unguided suborbital 
launch vehicle launched at an 84 degree elevation.
    (2) An applicant shall satisfy the map and plotting data 
requirements in appendix A, paragraph (b).
    (3) Population Data. An applicant shall use total population (N) 
and the total landmass are within a populated area (A) for all 
populated areas within an impact dispersion area. Population data up 
to and including 100 nm from the launch point are required at the 
U.S. census block group level. Population data downrange from 100 nm 
are required at no greater than 1 deg.  x  1 deg. latitude/longitude 
grid coordinates.

(c) Overflight Exclusion Zone and Impact Dispersion Area

    (1) An applicant shall choose a flight azimuth from a launch 
point.
    (2) An applicant shall define an overflight exclusion zone as a 
circle with a radius of 1600 feet centered on the launch point.
    (3) An applicant shall define an impact dispersion area for each 
stage of the suborbital launch vehicle chosen in subparagraph (b)(1) 
as provided below:
    (i) An applicant shall calculate the impact range for the final 
launch vehicle stage (Dn). An applicant shall set 
Dn equal to the last

[[Page 34389]]

stage apogee altitude (Hn) multiplied by an impact range 
factor [IP(Hn)] as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.128

Where:

IP(Hn)=0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km, and
IP(Hn)=0.7 for an apogee 100 km or greater.
    (ii) An applicant shall calculate the impact range for each 
intermediate stage (Di), where i{1, 2, 3, . . . 
(n-1)}, and where n is the total number of launch vehicle stages. 
Using the apogee altitude (Hi) of each intermediate 
stage, an applicant shall used equation D1 to compute the impact 
range of each stage by substituting Hi for Hn. 
An applicant shall use the impact range factors provided in equation 
D1.
    (iii) An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius 
for the final launch vehicle stage (Rn). An applicant 
shall set Rn equal to the last stage apogee altitude 
(Hn) multiplied by an impact dispersion factor 
[DISP(Hn)] as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.129

Where:

DISP(Hn)=0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km, and
DISP(Hn)=0.7 for an apogee 100 km or greater
    (iv) An applicant shall calculate the impact range for each 
intermediate stage (Ri), where i{1,2,3, . . . 
(n-1)}. and where n is the total number of launch vehicle stages. 
Using the apogee altitude (Hi) of each intermediate 
stage, an applicant shall used equation D2 to compute impact 
dispression radius of each stage by substituting Hi for 
Hn. An applicant shall use the dispersion factors 
provided in equation D2.
    (4) An applicant shall display an oversflight exclusion zone, 
each intermediate and final stage impact point (Di 
through Dn), and each impact dispersion area for the 
intermediate and final launch vehicle stages on maps in accordance 
with paragraph (b)(2).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.078

(d) Evaluate the Overflight Exclusion Zone and Impact Dispersion 
Areas

    (1) An applicant shall evaluate the overflight exclusion zone 
and each impact dispersion area for the presence of any populated 
areas. If an applicant determines that no populated area is located 
within the overflight exclusion zone or any impact dispersion area, 
then no additional steps are necessary.
    (2) If a populated area is located in an overflight exclusion 
zone, an applicant may modify its proposal or demonstrate that there 
are times when no people are present or that the applicant has an 
agreement in place to evacuate the public from the overflight 
exclusion zone during a launch.
    (3) If a populated area is located within any impact dispersion 
area, an applicant may modify its proposal and defined a new 
exclusion zone and new impact dispersion areas, or perform an impact 
risk analysis as provided in paragraph (e).

(e) Impact Risk Analysis

    (1) An applicant shall estimate the expected average number of 
casualties, EC, within the impact dispersion areas 
according to the following method:
    (i) An applicant shall calculate the Ec by summing 
the impact risk for the impact dispersion areas of the final launch 
vehicle stage and all intermediate stages. An applicant shall 
estimate Ec for the impact dispersion area of each stage 
by using equation D3 through D7 for each of the populated areas 
located within the impact dispersion areas.
    (ii) An applicant shall estimate the probability of impacting 
inside the X and Y sectors of each populated area within each impact 
dispersion area using equations D3 and D4 below:

[[Page 34390]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.130


Where:

x1, x2=closest and farthest downrange distance 
to populated area (see figure D-2)
x=one-fifth of the impact dispersion radius (see 
figure D-2)
exp=exponential function (ex)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.131

Where:

y1, y2=closest and farthest cross range 
distance to the populated area (see figure D-2)
y=one-fifth of the impact dispersion radius (see 
figure D-2)
exp=exponential function (ex)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.079

    (iii) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area 
boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would 
otherwise extend outside the impact dispersion area, the 
x2 or y2 distance should be set equal to the 
impact dispersion area radius. The x2 distance for 
populated area A in figure D-2 is an example.
    (iv) If a populated area intersects the flight azimuth, an 
applicant shall solve equation D4 by obtaining the solution in two 
parts. An applicant shall determine, first, the probability between 
y1=0 and y2=a and, second, the probability 
between y1=0 and y2=b, as depicted in figure 
D-3. The probability Py is then equal to the sum of the 
probabilities of the two parts. If a populated area intersects the 
line that is normal to the flight azimuth on the impact point, an 
applicant shall solve equation D3 by obtaining the solution in two 
parts in the same manner as with the values of x.

[[Page 34391]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.080


    (v) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact 
(Pi) for each populated area using the following 
equation;
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.132

Where:

Ps=probability of success=0.98

    (vi) An applicant shall calculate the casualty expectancy for 
each populated area. Eck is the casualty expectancy for a 
given populated area as shown in equation D6, where individual 
populated areas are designated with the subscript ``k''.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.133

Where   {1, 2, 3, . . . n}
Ac=casualty area (from table D-1)
Ak=populated area
Nk=population in Ak

        Table D-1.--Effective Casualty Area (Ac) vs. Impact Range
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Effective casualty area
             Impact range (nm)                        (miles2)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-4.......................................  9 x 10-3
5-49......................................  9 x 10-3
50-1,749..................................  1.1 x 10-3
1,750-4,999...............................  3.6 x 10-6
5,000-more................................  3.6 x 10-6
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (vii) An applicant shall estimate the total risk using the 
following summation of risk, including a multiplier of five, as 
shown in equation D7.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.134

    (viii) Alternative Casualty Expectancy (EC) Analysis. 
An applicant may employ specified variations to the analysis defined 
in subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii). Those variations are identified in 
subparagraphs (viii)(A) through (F) of this paragraph. Subparagraphs 
(A) through (D) permit an applicant to make conservative assumptions 
that would lead to an overestimation of Ec compared with 
the analysis defined in subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii). In 
subparagraphs (E) and (F), an applicant that would otherwise fail 
the analysis prescribed by subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii) may avoid 
(d)(1)(i)-(vii)'s overestimation of the probability of impact on 
each populated area. An applicant employing a variation shall 
identify the variation used, show an discuss

[[Page 34392]]

the specific assumptions made to modify the analysis defined in 
subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii), and justify how each assumption leads 
to overestimation of the corridor Ec compared with the 
analysis defined in subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii).
    (A) Assume that Px and Py have a valve of 
1.0 for all populated areas.
    (B) Combine populated areas into one or more larger populated 
areas, and use a population density for the combined area or areas 
equal to the most dense populated area.
    (C) For any given populated area, assume Px has a 
value of one.
    (D) For any given populated area, assume Py has a 
value of one.
    (E) For a given populated area, divide the populated area into 
small rectangles, determine Pi for each individual 
rectangle, and sum the individual impact probabilities to determine 
Pi for the entire populated area.
    (F) For a given populated area, use the ratio of the populated 
area to the area of the Pi rectangle from the 
subparagraph (d)(1)(i)-(vii) analysis.
    (2) If the estimated expected casualty does not exceed 30  x  
10-6, then no additional steps are necessary.
    (3) If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 30  x  
10-6, then an applicant may modify its proposal and then 
repeat the impact risk analysis per this appendix D. If no set of 
impact dispersion areas exist which satisfy the FAA's risk 
threshold, the applicant's proposed launch site will fail the launch 
site location review.

Appendix E to Part 420.--Tables for Explosive Site Plan

                   Table E-1 Quantity Distance Requirements for Division 1.3 Solid Propellants
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Quantity (lbs.) (over)     Qhantity (lbs.) (not over)  Public area distance (ft.)   Intraline distance (ft.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        0                        1,000                           75                          50
                    1,000                        5,000                          115                          75
                    5,000                       10,000                          150                         100
                   10,000                       20,000                          190                         125
                   20,000                       30,000                          215                         145
                   30,000                       40,000                          235                         155
                   40,000                       50,000                          250                         165
                   50,000                       60,000                          260                         175
                   60,000                       70,000                          270                         185
                   70,000                       80,000                          280                         190
                   80,000                       90,000                          195                         195
                   90,000                      100,000                          300                         200
                  100,000                      200,000                          375                         250
                  200,000                      300,000                          450                         300
                  300,000                      400,000                          525                         350
                  400,000                      500,000                          600                         400
                  500,000                    1,000,000                          800                         500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


           Table E-2: Liquid Propellant Explosive Equivalents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Propelland combinations                Explosive equivalent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LO2/LH2............................  The larger of: 8W2/3 where W is the
                                      weight of LO2/LH2, or 14% of W.
LO2/LH2+LO2/RP-1...................  Sum of (20% for LO2/RP-1)+the
                                      larger of: 8W2/3 where W is the
                                      weight of LO2/LH2, or 14% of W.
LO2/RP-1...........................  20% of W up to 500,000 pounds plus
                                      10% of W over 500,000 pounds,
                                      where W is the weight of LO2/RP-1.
N2O4N2H4 (or UDMH OR UDMH/N2H4       10% of W, where W is the weight of
 Mixture).                            the propellant.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


            Table E-3: Propellant Hazard and Compatibility Groupings and Factors To Be Used When Converting Gallons of Propellant Into Pounds
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                         At temperature
               Propellant                            Hazard group                     Compatibility group             Pounds/gallon          deg.F
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hydrogen Perioxide.....................  II                                   A                                                 11.6                  68
Hydrazine..............................  III                                  C                                                  8.4                  68
Liquid Hydrogen........................  III                                  C                                                  0.59               -423
Liquid Oxygen..........................  II                                   A                                                  9.5                -297
Nitrogen Tetroxide.....................  I                                    A                                                 12.1                  68
RP-1...................................  I                                    C                                                  6.8                  68
UDMH...................................  III                                  C                                                  6.6                  68
UDHM/Hydrazine.........................  III                                  C                                                  7.5                  68
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                       Table E-4:--Hazard Group I
------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Pounds of propellant          Public area and    Intragroup and
------------------------------------    incompatible       compatible
       Over            Not over     ------------------------------------
------------------------------------  Distance in feet  Distance in feet
                                    ------------------------------------
     Column 1          Column 2           Column 3          Column 4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
             0                100                30                 25
           100                200                35                 30
           200                300                40                 35
           300                400                45                 35

[[Page 34393]]

 
           400                500                50                 40
           500                600                50                 40
           600                700                55                 40
           700                800                55                 45
           800                900                60                 45
           900              1,000                60                 45
         1,000              2,000                65                 50
         2,000              3,000                70                 55
         3,000              4,000                75                 55
         4,000              5,000                80                 60
         5,000              6,000                80                 60
         6,000              7,000                85                 65
         7,000              8,000                85                 65
         8,000              9,000                90                 70
         9,000             10,000                90                 70
        10,000             15,000                95                 75
        15,000             20,000               100                 80
        20,000             25,000               105                 80
        25,000             30,000               110                 85
        30,000             35,000               110                 85
        35,000             40,000               115                 85
        40,000             45,000               120                 90
        45,000             50,000               120                 90
        50,000             60,000               125                 95
        60,000             70,000               130                 95
        70,000             80,000               130                100
        80,000             90,000               135                100
        90,000            100,000               135                105
       100,000            125,000               140                110
       125,000            150,000               145                110
       150,000            175,000               150                115
       175,000            200,000               155                115
       200,000            250,000               160                120
       250,000            300,000               165                125
       300,000            350,000               170                130
       350,000            400,000               175                130
       400,000            450,000               180                135
       450,000            500,000               180                135
       500,000            600,000               185                140
       600,000            700,000               190                145
       700,000            800,000               195                150
       800,000            900,000               200                150
       900,000          1,000,000               205                155
     1,000,000          2,000,000               235                175
     2,000,000          3,000,000               255                190
     3,000,000          4,000,000               265                200
     4,000,000          5,000,000               275                210
     5,000,000          6,000,000               285                215
     6,000,000          7,000,000               295                220
     7,000,000          8,000,000               300                225
     8,000,000          9,000,000               305                230
     9,000,000         10,000,000               310                235
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                           Table E-5: Hazard Group II
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Pounds of propellant                          Public area and        Intragroup and compatible
---------------------------------------------------------        incompatible        ---------------------------
            Over                       Not over          ----------------------------      Distance in feet
---------------------------------------------------------      Distance in feet      ---------------------------
                                                         ----------------------------
          Column 1                     Column 2                    Column 3                    Column 4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        0                          100                           60                          30
                      100                          200                           75                          35
                      200                          300                           85                          40
                      300                          400                           90                          45
                      400                          500                          100                          50
                      500                          600                          100                          50
                      600                          700                          105                          55

[[Page 34394]]

 
                      700                          800                          110                          55
                      800                          900                          115                          60
                      900                        1,000                          120                          60
                    1,000                        2,000                          130                          65
                    2,000                        3,000                          145                          70
                    3,000                        4,000                          150                          75
                    4,000                        5,000                          160                          80
                    5,000                        6,000                          165                          80
                    6,000                        7,000                          170                          85
                    7,000                        8,000                          175                          85
                    8,000                        9,000                          175                          90
                    9,000                       10,000                          180                          90
                   10,000                       15,000                          195                          95
                   15,000                       20,000                          205                         100
                   20,000                       25,000                          215                         105
                   25,000                       30,000                          220                         110
                   30,000                       35,000                          225                         110
                   35,000                       40,000                          230                         115
                   40,000                       45,000                          235                         120
                   45,000                       50,000                          240                         120
                   50,000                       60,000                          250                         125
                   60,000                       70,000                          255                         130
                   70,000                       80,000                          260                         130
                   80,000                       90,000                          265                         135
                   90,000                      100,000                          270                         135
                  100,000                      125,000                          285                         140
                  125,000                      150,000                          295                         145
                  150,000                      175,000                          305                         150
                  175,000                      200,000                          310                         155
                  200,000                      250,000                          320                         160
                  250,000                      300,000                          330                         165
                  300,000                      350,000                          340                         170
                  350,000                      400,000                          350                         175
                  400,000                      450,000                          355                         180
                  450,000                      500,000                          360                         180
                  500,000                      600,000                          375                         185
                  600,000                      700,000                          385                         190
                  700,000                      800,000                          395                         195
                  800,000                      900,000                          405                         200
                  900,000                    1,000,000                          410                         205
                1,000,000                    2,000,000                          470                         235
                2,000,000                    3,000,000                          505                         255
                3,000,000                    4,000,000                          535                         265
                4,000,000                    5,000,000                          555                         275
                5,000,000                    6,000,000                          570                         285
                6,000,000                    7,000,000                          585                         295
                7,000,000                    8,000,000                          600                         300
                8,000,000                    9,000,000                          610                         305
                9,000,000                   10,000,000                          620                         310
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                      Table E-6:--Hazard Group III
------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Pounds of propellant          Public area and    Intragroup and
------------------------------------    incompatible       compatible
       Over            Not over     ------------------------------------
------------------------------------  Distance in feet  Distance in feet
                                    ------------------------------------
     Column 1          Column 2           Column 3          Column 4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
             0                100               600                 30
           100                200               600                 35
           200                300               600                 40
           300                400               600                 45
           400                500               600                 50
           500                600               600                 50
           600                700               600                 55
           700                800               600                 55
           800                900               600                 60
           900              1,000               600                 60

[[Page 34395]]

 
         1,000              2,000               600                 65
         2,000              3,000               600                 70
         3,000              4,000               600                 75
         4,000              5,000               600                 80
         5,000              6,000               600                 80
         6,000              7,000               600                 85
         7,000              8,000               600                 85
         8,000              9,000               600                 90
         9,000             10,000               600                 90
        10,000             15,000             1,200                 95
        15,000             20,000             1,200                100
        20,000             25,000             1,200                105
        25,000             30,000             1,200                110
        30,000             35,000             1,200                110
        35,000             40,000             1,200                115
        40,000             45,000             1,200                120
        45,000             50,000             1,200                120
        50,000             60,000             1,200                125
        60,000             70,000             1,200                130
        70,000             80,000             1,200                130
        80,000             90,000             1,200                135
        90,000            100,000             1,200                135
       100,000            125,000             1,800                140
       125,000            150,000             1,800                145
       150,000            175,000             1,800                150
       175,000            200,000             1,800                155
       200,000            250,000             1,800                160
       250,000            300,000             1,800                165
       300,000            350,000             1,800                170
       350,000            400,000             1,800                175
       400,000            450,000             1,800                180
       450,000            500,000             1,800                180
       500,000            600,000             1,800                185
       600,000            700,000             1,800                190
       700,000            800,000             1,800                195
       800,000            900,000             1,800                200
       900,000          1,000,000             1,800                205
     1,000,000          2,000,000             1,800                235
     2,000,000          3,000,000             1,800                255
     3,000,000          4,000,000             1,800                265
     4,000,000          5,000,000             1,800                275
     5,000,000          6,000,000             1,800                285
     6,000,000          7,000,000             1,800                295
     7,000,000          8,000,000             1,800                300
     8,000,000          9,000,000             1,800                300
     9,000,000         10,000,000             1,800                310
------------------------------------------------------------------------


         Table E-7:--Distances When Explosive Equivalents Apply
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Distance in feet
     TNT equivalent weight of      -------------------------------------
            propellants               To public area       Intraline
Column 1                                     Column 2           Column 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not Over:                                                Unbarricaded
    100...........................              1,250                 80
    200...........................              1,250                100
    300...........................              1,250                120
    400...........................              1,250                130
    500...........................              1,250                140
    600...........................              1,250                150
    700...........................              1,250                160
    800...........................              1,250                170
    900...........................              1,250                180
    1,000.........................              1,250                190
    1,500.........................              1,250                210
    2,000.........................              1,250                230

[[Page 34396]]

 
    3,000.........................              1,250                260
    4,000.........................              1,250                280
    5,000.........................              1,250                300
    6,000.........................              1,250                320
    7,000.........................              1,250                340
    8,000.........................              1,250                360
    9,000.........................              1,250                380
    10,000........................              1,250                400
    15,000........................              1,250                450
    20,000........................              1,250                490
    25,000........................              1,250                530
    30,000........................              1,250                560
    35,000........................              1,310                590
    40,000........................              1,370                620
    45,000........................              1,425                640
    50,000........................              1,475                660
    55,000........................              1,520                680
    60,000........................              1,565                700
    65,000........................              1,610                720
    70,000........................              1,650                740
    75,000........................              1,685                770
    80,000........................              1,725                780
    85,000........................              1,760                790
    90,000........................              1,795                800
    95,000........................              1,825                820
    100,000.......................              1,855                830
    125,000.......................              2,115                900
    150,000.......................              2,350                950
    175,000.......................              2,565              1,000
    200,000.......................              2,770              1,050
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. 99-15384 Filed 6-24-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M