Federal Register, Volume 64 Issue 122 (Friday, June 25, 1999)

[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 122 (Friday, June 25, 1999)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 34316-34396]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-15384]

[[Page 34315]]

_______________________________________________________________________

Part II

Department of Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

Federal Aviation Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

14 CFR Parts 417 and 420

Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site;
Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 64, No. 122 / Friday, June 25, 1999 /
Proposed Rules

[[Page 34316]]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 417, 420

[Docket No. FAA-1999-5833; Notice No. 99-07]
RIN 2120-AG15

Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation's (DOT or the Department)
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing to amend its
commercial space transportation licensing regulations to add licensing
and safety requirements for the operation of a launch site. To date,
commercial launches have occurred principally at federal launch ranges
under safety procedures developed by federal launch range operators. To
enable the development and use of launch sites that are not operated by
a federal launch range, rules are needed to establish specific
licensing and safety requirements for operating a launch site, whether
that site located on or off of a federal launch range. These proposed
rules would provide licensed launch site operators with licensing and
safety requirements to protect the public from the risks associated
with activities at a launch site.
A separate rulemaking will address licensing and safety
requirements for operation of a reentry site.

DATES: Comments on the proposed regulations must be submitted on or
before September 23, 1999.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this proposed rulemaking should be mailed or
delivered, in duplicate, to: U.S. Department of Transportation Dockets,
Docket No. FAA-1999-5833, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Room Plaza 401,
Washington, DC 20590. Comments may also be sent electronically to the
following Internet address: [email protected]. Comments may be filed
and/or examined in Room Plaza 401 between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: J. Randall Repcheck, Licensing and
Safety Division (AST-200), Commercial Space Transportation, Federal
Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591;
telephone (202) 267-8602; or Laura Montgomery, Office of the Chief
Counsel (AGC-250), FAA, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591;
telephone (202) 267-3150.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by
submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire.
Comments relating to the environmental, energy, federalism, or economic
impact that might result from adopting the proposals in this notice are
also invited. Substantive comments should be accompanied by cost
estimates. Comments must identify the regulatory docket or notice
number and be submitted in triplicate to the Rules Docket address
specified above.
All comments received, as well as a report summarizing each
substantive public contact with FAA personnel on this rulemaking, will
be filed in the docket. The docket is available for public inspection
before and after the comment closing date.
All comments received on or before the closing date will be
considered by the FAA before taking action on this proposed rulemaking.
Late-filed comments will be considered to the extent practicable, and
consistent with statutory deadlines. The proposals contained in this
Notice may be changed in light of the comments received.
Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments
submitted in response to this notice must include a pre-addressed,
stamped postcard with those comments on which the following statement
is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-1999-5833.'' The postcard will be
date stamped and mailed to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem
and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section
of the Fedworld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 703-321-
3339), the Government Printing Office's electronic bulletin board
service (telephone: 202-512-1661), or the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking
Advisory Committee Bulletin Board service (telephone: (800) 322-2722 or
(202) 267-5948). Internet users may reach the FAA's web page at http://
www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the Government Printing Office's
webpage at http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara for access to recently
published rulemaking documents.
Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request
to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1,
800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202)
267-9680. Communications must identify the notice number or docket
number of this NPRM.
Persons interested in being placed on the mailing list for future
NPRM's should request from the above office a copy of Advisory Circular
No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution System, that
describes the application procedure.

Outline of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking:

I. Background
A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role
B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry
C. Current Practices
II. Discussion of Proposed Regulations
A. License and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch
Site
B. Explosive Site Plan Review
C. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures
D. Launch Site Location Review
E. License Conditions
F. Operational Responsibilities
III. Part Analysis
IV. Required Analyses

I. Background

The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as codified at 49 U.S.C.
Subtitle IX--Commercial Space Transportation, ch. 701, Commercial Space
Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121 (the Act), authorizes the
Secretary of Transportation to license a launch or the operation of a
lunch site carried out by a U.S. citizen or within the United States.
49 U.S.C. 70104, 70105. The Act directs the Secretary to exercise this
responsibility in the interests of public health and safety, safety of
property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States 49 U.S.C. 70105. On August 4, 1994, a National Space
Transportation Policy reaffirmed the government's commitment to the
commercial space transportation industry and the critical role of the
Department of Transportation (DOT) in encouraging and facilitating
private sector launch activities. A National Space Policy released on
September 19, 1996, notes and reaffirms that DOT is responsible as the
lead agency for regulatory guidance pertaining to commercial space
transportation activities.

A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role

On November 15, 1995, the Secretary of Transportation delegated
commercial space licensing authority to the Federal

[[Page 34317]]

Aviation Administration. The FAA licenses commercial launches and the
operation of launch sites pursuant to the Act and implementing
regulations at 14 CFR Ch. III. The commercial launch licensing
regulations were issued in April 1988, when no commercial launches had
yet taken place. Accordingly, DOT established a flexible licensing
process intended to be responsive to an emerging industry while
ensuring public safety. The Department noted that it would ``continue
to evaluate and, when necessary, reshape its program in response to
growth, innovation, and diversity in this critically important
industry.'' ``Commercial Space Transportation; Licensing Regulations,''
53 FR 11,004, 11,006 (Apr. 4, 1988).
Under the 1988 regulations, DOT implemented a case-by-case approach
to evaluating launch and launch site operator license applications. At
the time, it was envisioned that most commercial launches would take
place from federal launch ranges, which imposed extensive ground and
flight safety requirements on launch operators, pending the development
of commercial launch sites. The Federal launch ranges provided
commercial launch operators with facilities and launch support,
including flight safety services.
Since 1988, DOT and now the FAA have taken steps designed to
simplify further the licensing process for launch operators. The
regulatory and licensing emphasis during the past decade has been on
launch operators. The emergence of a commercial launch site sector has
only become a reality during the past few years.

B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry

The commercial space transportation industry continues to grow and
diversify. Between the first licensed commercial launch in August 1989,
and June 1999, 113 licensed launches have taken place from five
different federal launch ranges, one from a launch site operated by a
licensed launch site operator and one has taken place from Spain. The
vehicles have included traditional orbital expendable launch vehicles,
such as the Atlas, Titan, and Delta, sub-orbital launch vehicles such
as the Starfire, new expendable launch vehicles using traditional
launch techniques, such as Athena and Conestoga, and unique vehicles,
such as the air-borne Pegasus. In a notice of proposed rulemaking
issued on March 19, 1997, 62 FR 13216, the FAA discussed how the
commercial launch industry has evolved from one relying on traditional
orbital and suborbital launch vehicles to one with a diverse mix of
vehicles using new technology and new concepts. A number of
international ventures involving U.S. companies have also formed,
further adding to this diversity.
Development in cost savings and innovation are not confined to the
launch industry. The launch site industry, the focus of this NPRM, has
also made progress. Commercial launch site operations are coming on
line with the stated goal of providing flexible and cost-effective
facilities both for existing launch vehicles and for new vehicles. When
the commercial launch industry began, commercial launch companies based
their launch operations chiefly at federal launch ranges operated by
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). Federal launch ranges that have supported
licensed launches include the Eastern Range, located at Cape Canaveral
Air Station in Florida (CCAS), and the Western Range located at
Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), in California, both operated by the
U.S. Air Force; Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia, operated by NASA;
White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico, operated by the U.S.
Army; and the Kauai Test Facility in Hawaii, operated by the U.S. Navy.
Federal launch ranges provide the advantage of existing launch
infrastructure and range safety services. Launch companies are able to
obtain a number of services from a federal launch range, including
radar, tracking and telemetry, flight termination and other launch
services.
Today, most commercial launches still take place from federal
launch ranges; however, this pattern may change as other launch sites
become more prevalent. On September 19, 1996, the FAA granted the first
license to operate a launch site to Spaceport Systems International to
operate California Spaceport. That launch site is located within VAFB.
Three other launch site operators have received licenses. Spaceport
Florida Authority (SEA) received an FAA license to operate Launch
Complex 46 at CCAS as a launch site. Virginia Commercial Space Flight
Authority (VCSFA) received a license to operate Virginia Spaceflight
Center (VSC) within NASA's Wallops Flight Facility. Most recently,
Alaska Aerospace Development Corporation (AADC) received a license to
operate Kodiak Launch Complex (KLC) as a launch site on Kodiak Island,
Alaska. The New Mexico Office of Space Commercialization (NMOSC)
proposes to operate Southwest Regional Spaceport (SRS) adjacent to the
White Sands Missile Range as a site for reusable launch vehicles. It is
evident from this list that federal launch ranges still play a role in
the licensed operation of a number of launch sites. California
Spaceport, Spaceport Florida and VSC are located on federal launch
range property.
Whether launching from a federal launch range, a launch site
located on a federal launch range, or a non-federal launch site, a
launch operator is responsible for ground and flight safety under its
FAA license. At a federal launch range a launch operator must comply
with the rules and procedures of the federal launch range. The safety
rules, procedures and practice, in concert with the safety functions of
the federal launch ranges, have been assessed by the FAA, and found to
satisfy the majority of the FAA's safety concerns. In contrast, when
launching from a non-federal launch site, a launch operator's
responsibility for ground and flight safety takes on added importance.
In the absence of federal launch range oversight, it will be incumbent
upon each launch operator to demonstrate the adequacy of its ground and
flight safety to the FAA.

C. Current Practices

Because of the time and investment involved in bringing a
commercial launch facility into being, several entities that have been
planning to establish these facilities asked the DOT for guidance
concerning the information that might be requested as part of an
application for a license to operate a launch site. In response to
these requests. DOT's then Office of Commercial Space Transportation
(Office) published ``Site Operators License, Guidelines for
Applicants,'' on August 8, 1995, as guidance for potential launch site
operators. The guidelines describe the information that DOT, and now
the FAA, expects from an applicant for a license to operate a
commercial launch site. This information includes launch site location
information, a hazard analysis, and a launch site safety operations
document that governs how the facility should be operated to ensure
public safety and the safety of property. The Office intended that the
guidelines would assist an applicant with the parts of the application
that are critical to assuring the suitability of the launch site
location, the applicant's organization, and the facility for providing
safe operations.
The Office issued the guidelines as an interim measure for
potential developers of launch sites pending this

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rulemaking, and the guidelines describe the information that the FAA
requests of an applicant as part of its application for a license to
operate a launch site. The pace of development of the launch site
industry has resulted in the FAA describing the process and
requirements for applications for launch site operator licenses under
the guidelines. As noted above, the FAA issued its first license to
operate a launch site to Spaceport Systems International for the
operation of California Spaceport. The FAA issued this license under
its general authority under 49 U.S.C. 70104 and 70105 and 14 CFR Ch.
III to license the operation of a launch site. Because the operation of
California Spaceport as a launch site occurs at a federal launch range,
the U.S. Air Force is expected to play a significant role in California
Spaceports's safety process. In fact, the FAA was able to review the
Spaceport Systems International application expeditiously because the
applicant certified its intention to observe the safety requirements
currently applied by the Western Range and contained in ``Eastern and
Western Range 127-1. Range Safety Requirements (EWR 127-1),'' (Mar.
1995).\1\ The FAA determined that applicant compliance with EWR 127-1,
together with Air Force approval of other important elements of the
operation of a launch site protected public health and safety and the
safety of property. In general, the FAA deems the compliance by a
licensed launch site operator with these requirements in combination
with other safety practices imposed by a federal launch range as
acceptable for purposes of protecting the public and property from
hazards associated with launch site activities at a licensed launch
site operator's facilities. In 1997, the FAA entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement with Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and
Space Administration regarding safety oversight of licensed launch site
operators located on federal launch ranges.
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\1\ EWR 127-1 is updated on an ongoing basis. The latest version
of these requirements may be found at http://www.pafb.af.mil/45SW/.
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Until these proposed rules become final, the guidelines provide the
only published criteria for guiding a prospective license applicant and
in identifying the criteria that the FAA uses in determining whether a
proposed commercial launch site is acceptable.
Comparison of the Guidelines and the Proposed Regulations
The existing guidelines will no longer be in effect once the
proposed regulations are issued as final rules. A comparison of some of
the similarities and differences may therefore prove of assistance. The
FAA will issue a license to operate a launch site under either the
guidelines or the proposed rules only if the operation of the launch
site will not jeopardize the public health and safety, the safety of
property, or national security or foreign policy interests of the
United States. The guidelines are flexible and are intended to identify
the major elements of an application and lead the applicant through the
application process with the FAA. The proposed rules would codify the
requirements that must be met before a license will be issued.
The guidelines and the proposed rules share some common elements,
namely, the need for the applicant to supply information to support the
FAA's environmental determination under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and the FAA's policy review that addresses national
security and foreign policy issues. These requirements are discussed in
detail below, in the description of the proposed regulations. Under the
proposed regulations, the information requirements for these reviews
remain for the most part unchanged from the guidelines.
A review of the suitability of the proposed location of the launch
site is an important component of both the guidelines and the proposed
regulations. Although both approaches call for a site location review,
the reviews differ in breadth and specificity. The guidelines request
an applicant to provide information regarding geographic
characteristics, flight paths and impact areas and the meteorological
environment. To describe a launch site's geographic characteristics, an
applicant is requested to provide information regarding the launch site
location, size, and shape, its topographic and geological
characteristics, its proximity to populated areas, and any local
commercial and recreational activities that may be affected by launches
such as air traffic, shipping, hunting, and offshore fishing. An
applicant also provides planned possible flight paths and general
impact areas designated for launch. If planned flight corridors overfly
land, the guidelines request that an applicant provide flight safety
analyses for generic sets of launch vehicles and describe, where
applicable, any arrangements made to clear the land of people prior to
launch vehicle flight. With respect to the meteorological environment,
the guidelines request an applicant to provide data regarding
temperature, surface and upper wind direction and velocity, temperature
inversions, and extreme conditions that may affect the safety of launch
site operations. Under the guidelines, an application should include
the frequency (average number of days for each month) of extremes in
wind or temperature inversion that could have an impact on launch.
In contrast, the proposed rules would require an applicant to use
specified methods to demonstrate the suitability of the launch site
location for launching at least one type of launch vehicle, including
orbital, guided sub-orbital, or unguided sub-orbital expendable launch
vehicles, and reusable launch vehicles. Each proposed launch point on
the launch site must be evaluated for each type of launch vehicle that
the applicant wishes to have launched from the launch point. An
applicant would be provided with a choice of methods to develop a
flight corridor for a representative launch of an orbital or guided
sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, or to develop a set of impact
dispersion areas for a representative launch of an unguided sub-orbital
expendable launch vehicle. If a flight corridor or set of impact
dispersion areas exists that does not encompass populated areas, no
additional analysis would be required. Otherwise, an applicant would be
required to conduct a risk analysis to demonstrate that the risk to the
public from a representative launch would not exceed a casualty
expectation (Ec) of 30 x 10-6. The FAA would
review the applicant's analyses to ensure the applicant's process was
correct, and would approve the launch site location if the
Ec risk criteria were met.
Under either the guidelines or the proposed regulations, little or
no launch site location review would be needed if the applicant
proposed to locate a launch site at a federal launch range. The
fundamental purpose of the FAA's proposed launch site location review--
to assure that a launch may potentially take place safely from the
proposed launch site--has been amply demonstrated at each of the
ranges. Exceptions may occur if a prospective launch site operator
plans to use a launch site at a federal launch range for launches
markedly different from past federal launch range launches, or if an
applicant proposes a new launch point from which no launch has taken
place.
The guidelines and proposed regulations differ markedly in their
approach to ground and flight safety. For ground safety under the
guidelines, applicants perform a hazard analysis and develop a
comprehensive ground safety plan and a safety organization. Explosive
safety is part of the analysis

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and safety plan. In contrast, the proposed regulations require the
submission of an explosive site plan, but impose fewer operational
ground safety responsibilities on a launch site operator. For flight
safety, under the guidelines and proposed rules, a launch site operator
license contains minimal flight safety responsibilities. The FAA
assigns almost all responsibility for flight safety and significant
ground safety responsibility to a licensed launch operator. Extensive
ground and flight safety requirements will accompany a launch license.
This does not mean a launch site operator cannot offer flight safety
services or equipment to its customers. However, the adequacy of such
service and equipment typically will be assessed in the FAA's review of
a launch license application.

II. Discussion of Proposed Regulations

The proposed regulations specify who must obtain a license to
operate a launch site, application requirements and licensee
responsibilities. Because a launch licensee's license covers ground
operations as well as the flight of a launch vehicle, a launch operator
is not required to obtain a license to operate a launch site. The FAA
is aware that a launch operator may select a launch site for its own
launches. In that event, a launch operator requires a license to
launch. Only if a prospective launch site operator proposes to offer
its launch site to others, need that person obtain a license to operate
a launch site.
By means of operational, location, and site layout constraints, the
FAA intends its regulations to ensure that the public is not harmed by
launches that take place from a launch site whose operation the FAA has
licensed. Additionally, in the course of a license review, the FAA will
ensure that environmental and international obligations are addressed,
and that national security interests are reviewed by the appropriate
agencies. To further these objectives, the FAA proposes to create in 14
CFR Chapter III a new part 420 to contain the requirements for
obtaining and possessing a license to operate a launch site. The FAA's
proposed part 420 would require an applicant to obtain certain FAA
approvals in order to receive a license to operate a launch site. These
required approvals consist of policy, explosive site plan, and location
approvals. Environmental review may precede or be concurrent with the
licensing process.
The grant of a license to operate a launch site will not guarantee
that a launch license will be granted for any particular launch
proposed for the site. All launches will be subject to separate FAA
review and licensing.

A. Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site

The FAA's proposed approach to licensing the operation of a launch
site would focus on four areas of concern critical to ensuring that
operation of a launch site would not jeopardize public health and
safety, the safety of property or foreign policy and other U.S.
interests. These reviews would encompass the environment, policy,
siting of explosives, and site location. Under the proposed
regulations, an applicant would be required to provide the FAA with
information sufficient to conduct environmental and policy reviews and
determinations. An applicant would also be required to submit an
explosive site plan that shows the location of all explosive hazard
facilities and distances between them, and the distances to public
areas.
In the case of launch site location approval, the proposed
regulations would provide an applicant options for proving to the FAA
that a launch could be conducted from the site without jeopardizing
public health and safety. The requirement for a launch site location
approval would not normally apply to an applicant who proposes to
operate an existing launch point at a federal launch range, unless the
applicant plans to use a launch point different than used previously by
the federal launch range, or to use an existing launch point for a
different type or larger launch vehicle than used in the past. The fact
that launches have taken place safely from any particular launch point
at a federal launch range may provide the same demonstration that would
be accomplished by the FAA's proposed location review: Namely, a
showing that launch may occur safely from the site.
The FAA is proposing to impose specific ground safety
responsibilities on a licensed launch site operator, and will require
that an applicant demonstrate how those requirements will be met. A
launch site operator licensee's responsibilities would include:
Preventing unauthorized public access to the site; properly preparing
the public and customers to visit the site; informing customers of
limitations on use of the site; scheduling and coordinating hazardous
activities conducted by customers; and arranging for the clearing of
air and sea routes and notifying adjacent property owners and local
jurisdictions of the pending flight of a launch vehicle. Part 420 would
also contain launch site operator responsibilities with regard to
recordkeeping, license transfer, compliance monitoring, accident
investigation and explosives. Other federal government agencies have
jurisdiction over a number of ground safety issues, and the FAA does
not intend to duplicate their efforts.\2\ \3\ The FAA will revisit
ground safety issues in its development of rules for launches from non-
federal launch sites.
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\2\ The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) play a
role in regulating ground activities at a launch site. OSHA
regulations cover worker safety issues, and may, as a by-product,
help protect public safety as well. One provision of particular note
is 29 CFR 1910.119, process safety management of highly hazardous
chemicals (PSM). The requirements of the PSM standard are intended
to eliminate or mitigate the consequences of releases of highly
hazardous chemicals that may be toxic, reactive, flammable, or
explosive. Management controls are emphasized to address the risks
associated with handling or working near hazardous chemicals. These
requirements may apply to some launch site and launch operators. EPA
regulations are designed to protect the public health and safety
from releases of chemicals. One regulation of note is 40 CFR part
68, Accidental release prevention provisions. It applies to an owner
or operator of a stationary source that has more than a threshold
quantity of a regulated substance in a process, and requires the
owner or operator to develop and implement a risk management program
to prevent accidents and limit the severity of any accidents that
occur. The EPA rule further requires sources to conduct an offsite
consequence analysis to define the potential impacts of worst-case
releases and other release scenarios. For any process whose worst-
case release would reach the public, the source must develop and
implement a prevention program and an emergency response program.
Both the EPA and OSHA prevention rules require regulated entities to
conduct formal analyses of the risks involved in the use and storage
of covered substances and consider all possible ways in which
existing systems could fail and result in accidental release.
\3\ ATF regulations cover the long-term storage of explosives.
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Environmental
Licensing the operation of a launch site is a major federal action
for purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321
et seq. As a result, the FAA is required to assess the environmental
impacts of constructing and operating a proposed launch site to
determine whether these activities will significantly affect the
quality of the environment. Although the FAA is responsible under NEPA
regulations for preparing an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement, the proposed rules continue to require a license
applicant to provide the FAA with sufficient information to conduct an
analysis in accordance with the requirements of the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) Regulations Implementing the Procedural
Provisions of NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500-1508, and the FAA's Procedures
for Considering Environmental Impacts, FAA Order

[[Page 34320]]

1050.1D. An applicant will typically engage a contractor with
specialized experience in the NEPA process to conduct the study
underpinning the FAA's environmental analysis. This rulemaking marks no
change in the environmental requirements attendant to obtaining a
license to operate a launch site.
The FAA encourages an applicant to begin the environmental review,
including the gathering of pertinent information to perform the
assessment, early in the planning process, but after the applicant has
defined its proposed action and considered feasible alternatives. The
FAA will determine whether a finding of no significant impact (FONSI)
may be issued after an environmental assessment, or whether an
environmental impact statement followed by a record of decision is
necessary. An applicant may be subject to restrictions on activities at
a proposed launch site. An applicant may acquire property for future
use as a launch site; however, absent a FONSI, the FAA must prepare an
environmental review that includes consideration of reasonable
alternatives to the site. According to the CEQ regulations as
interpreted by the courts, an applicant may not use the purchase of a
site or construction at the site to limit the array of reasonable
alternatives. As a result, an applicant must complete the environmental
process before construction or improvement of the site. The FAA will
not issue a license if an environmental review in accordance with all
applicable regulations and guidelines is not concluded.
Policy
Under current practice, the FAA conducts a policy review of an
application for a license to operate a launch site to determine whether
operation of the proposed launch site would jeopardize national
security, foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the
United States. The FAA conducts the policy review in coordination with
other federal agencies that have responsibility for national and
international interests. The Department of Defense is consulted to
determine whether a license application presents any issues affecting
national security. The Department of State reviews an application for
issues affecting foreign policy or international obligations. Other
agencies, such as NASA, are consulted as appropriate. By this
rulemaking, the regulations would require an applicant to supply
information relevant to the FAA's policy approval, including, for
example, identification of foreign ownership of the applicant. The FAA
will obtain other information required for a policy review from
information submitted by an applicant in other parts of the
application. During a policy review, the FAA would consult with an
applicant regarding any question or issues before making a final
determination. An applicant would have the opportunity to address any
questions before completion of the review.

B. Explosive Site Plan Review

Proposed subpart B would establish criteria and procedures for the
siting of facilities at a launch site where solid and liquid
propellants are to be located to prepare launch vehicles and payloads
for flight. Subpart B also would establish application procedures for
an applicant to demonstrate compliance with the siting criteria. The
requirements in subpart B are commonly referred to as quantity-distance
(Q-D) requirements because they provide minimum separation distances
between explosive hazard facilities, surrounding facilities and
locations where the public may be present on the basis of the type and
quantity of explosive material to be located within the area. Minimum
prescribed separation distances are necessary to protect the public
from explosive hazards on a launch site so that the effects of an
explosion does not reach the public.
An applicant would provide the FAA an explosive site plan that
demonstrates compliance with the proposed Q-D requirements. the FAA
must approve this plan, so applicants are cautioned not to begin
construction of facilities requiring an explosives site plan until
obtaining FAA approval. Note also that the proposed Q-D requirements do
not address any toxic hazards. Toxic hazards may be mitigated through
procedural means, and the FAA will address toxic hazards in a separate
rulemaking. If a toxic hazard is a controlling factor in siting, it
should be considered along with the explosives hazards when the site
plan is prepared.
The FAA proposes to adopt the explosive safety practice in use at
federal launch ranges today, namely, the application of quantity-
distance criteria. Prescribed distances provide for a separation of an
explosive source from people and property that may otherwise be exposed
to explosive events. These criteria have long been used to mitigate
explosive hazards to an acceptable level. Q-D criteria address only the
consequences. The underlying assumption of quantity-distance criteria
is that an accidental explosion will occur for any explosive material
operation.
The quantity-distance criteria in the proposed regulations are a
critical mitigation measure required in a launch site operator
application to provide the public protection from ground operations at
a launch site. The proposed rules have other mitigation measures,
including launch site operator responsibilities that address accident
prevention measures, and procedural requirements to protect visitors
and other launch site customers on the launch site. Any other
procedural requirements necessary to protect the public from explosive
hazards will be the responsibility of a launch operator under a launch
license. The scope of a launch license encompasses ground activities,
including the explosive operations involved with the handling and
assembly of launch vehicles at a launch site.
The requirement to submit an explosive site plan to the FAA would
not apply to an applicant applying for a license to operate a launch
site at a federal launch range. Federal launch ranges have separate
rules which are either identical or similar to the rules proposed, or
permit mitigation measures which otherwise ensure safety.
What follows is a discussion of launch site explosive hazards, the
reason the FAA is proposing explosive siting criteria, current Q-D
standards, the FAA's proposed use of NASA and DOD Q-D standards, other
approaches to explosive safety, application of ATF, DOD or NASA
standards, future changes in liquid propellant requirements, and solid
and liquid bi-propellants at launch pads.
Explosive Hazards on a Launch Site
The hazards associated with launch vehicle pre-flight operations
involving large quantities of propellants may typically be broken down
into phases, including storage, handling, assembly, checkout, ordnance
installation, propellant loading, and final launch preparations. Each
of these are covered below, for liquid and solid propellants.
During storage, liquid propellant hazards include leaking or
ruptured propellant tanks causes by loss of pressure or mechanical
failure. If fuels and oxidizers are stored separately any potentially
harmful event would be limited to fire or tank pressure rupture. Solid
propellant hazards include accidental ordnance initiation caused by
stray electrical energy or dropping a motor with sufficient impact
force to initiate the propellant. Long term storage of solid rocket
motors, although not within the scope of this

[[Page 34321]]

rulemaking,\3\ presents its own unique hazards. As solid rocket motors
age, chemical changes in the binder within the motor cause ammonium
perchlorate to form on the outside of the motor. This is a hazardous
condition. The shelf life of solid rocket motors can be extended by a
carefully controlled environment in the storage facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\3\ ATF regulations cover the long-term storage of explosives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The handling phase may include the transfer of liquid propellants
from one holding tank to another. Explosive reactions may occur if
fuels and oxidizers mix due to under or overpressurization, or if
improper connections cause propellant tanks, transfer lines, or
fittings to leak or rupture. If fuels and oxidizers are handled
separately no explosive reactions should occur. Hazardous handling
operations of solid rocket motors includes transporting and lifting
with cranes at the launch pad or other facility. Any impact during
these activities could cause propellant ignition.
During assembly, liquid propellant operations include the assembly
and encapsulation of spacecraft and upper stages. Assembly and
encapsulation may involve loading hypergolic propellants such as
nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4) and hydrazine. Tank
punctures, impacts caused by lifting, and over- or under-pressurization
could cause fuels and oxidizers to come in contact with one another,
causing fire and fragmentation hazards. This phase includes the final
assembly of solid rocket motors at a launch pad or other facility. Any
motor impact on the ground during these activities could cause
propellant ignition.
Checkout at a launch pad may involve a number of hazards due to the
presence of solid propellant and hypergolic propellant stages. Any
accident causing interaction between hypergolic and solid propellants
can result in fires, pressure ruptures, and propulsive flight.
During ordnance installation, inadvertent initiation of electro-
explosive devices (EEDs) is possible. This does not pose a threat to
the public (although it does to the vehicle and personnel) because EEDs
have a small quantity of explosive and are not, by design, capable of
detonating propellants.
The main hazard during propellant loading is over or under-
pressurization of liquid propellant tanks, which may cause major spills
of fuels and oxidizers. These events could lead to significant
explosive yield, which is the energy released by an explosion.
Final launch preparations, which begin just prior to flight,
involve a fully fueled launch vehicle. Systems are switched to internal
power, and liquid propellant systems are brought to flight pressure. A
mishap here could lead to significant explosive yield. The explosive
yield of a launch vehicle exploding on a launch pad is based on shock
impact for solid propellants, and non-dynamic mixing of liquid
propellants by, for example, the failure or interior bulkheads in the
launch vehicle.
Reason for Proposing Explosive Siting Criteria
After careful consideration, the FAA decided it had to propose
explosive siting criteria to protect the public from explosive hazards
associated with the operation of a launch site. Although the FAA places
much of the responsibility for safety of hazardous ground operations on
the launch operator, the FAA believes that the siting requirements
would be better addressed by a launch site operator. This is because
the siting requirements will more efficiently be satisfied prior to
construction of launch site facilities rather than afterwards. The FAA
does not intend to duplicate or supercede existing regulatory
frameworks. Although both the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have
regulations on explosives, neither provides all the quantity-distance
criteria applicable to launch site necessary to protect the public.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\4\ Another agency, the Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA), DOT, has regulations for the commercial
shipment of explosives (and other hazardous material) by rail, motor
vehicle, cargo aircraft and ship within the United States. The
regulations are found in Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ATF has jurisdiction over the storage of commercial explosives in
order to provide for public safety. The storage requirements in 27 CFR
part 55, Commerce in Explosives, include construction, separation
distances, and some storage compatibility provisions. They also cover
items such as licensing, records, and other administrative procedures.
Two gaps in coverage require FAA involvement, namely, the handling
of explosives and the treatment of liquid bi-propellants. In the first
instance, ATF regulations are limited to storage, not the use or
handling of an explosive. Many of the activities that occur on a launch
site will not constitute storage. These activities include moving or
handling solid rocket motors and other ordnance for the purpose of
preparing a launch vehicle for flight, and the build-up and checkout of
a launch vehicle on a launch pad. The FAA's proposed regulations are
required to ensure the safety of the public from these activities.
Additionally, ATF regulations only address solid explosives and liquid
mono-propellants. Large quantities of liquid by-propellants are often
used on existing launch sites, and many of these bi-propellants pose an
explosive hazard to the public. The FAA is proposing rules to ensure
the safe use and storage of liquid bi-propellants.
OSHA explosives requirements are contained in 29 CFR 1910.109,
Explosives and Blasting Agents. These requirements apply to the
manufacture, keeping, having, storage, sale, transportation, and use of
explosives, blasting agents and pyrotechnics. OSHA regulations do not
address public safety. For example, 29 CFR 1910.109 only includes Q-D
requirements for the separation of magazines from each other. OSHA
requirements do not address public areas such as inhabited buildings,
passenger railways, and public highways. The FAA believes Q-D
requirements that adequately separate the public from the effects of an
explosion are necessary to protect the public.
The FAA recognizes that procedural measures may also be employed to
achieve explosive safety. For example, if two customers of a launch
site operator intend to conduct explosive handling operations in
adjacent facilities that are not sited for public area distances, a
launch site operator may schedule their operations at different times
and keep one facility vacant to maintain safety. A licensee who
proposed such measures as a substitute for the siting criteria proposed
in this rulemaking would have to anticipate license terms and
conditions that achieve an equivalent level for safety.
Current Q-D Standards
Current standards effectively mitigate explosive hazards on federal
launch ranges. The FAA, therefore, studied these standards in order to
adopt the most relevant parts in its proposed Q-D standards. DOD, NASA,
and, for storage, AFT, have explosive standards designed to protect the
public.
The DOD standard, ``DOD STD 6055.9, DOD Ammunition and Explosives
Safety Standards,'' (Aug. 1997), is the standard used for explosive
siting on DOD launch sites and for commercial launch sites located on
DOD property. DOD 6055.9-STD defines general explosive safety criteria
for use throughout the DOD, and

[[Page 34322]]

establishes protection criteria for personnel and assets such as
facilities, equipment, and munitions. The DOD standard provides
quantity-distance criteria to protect against overpressure and
fragments, and permissible exposure levels to protect against thermal
hazards.
The Q-D criteria in DOD STD 6055.90 constitute a refinement of the
American Table of Distances (ATD), originally published in 1910 by the
Institute of Makers of Explosives. Authors of the ATD criteria
acknowledged very early that listed separation distances do not provide
absolute safety. The magnitude of the hazard is simply mitigated to a
level the ATD authors deemed to be acceptable. Because of this, the FAA
encourages license applicants to use greater distances where
practicable.
DOD STD 6055.9 also provides information relating to the
construction and siting of facilities that are potential explosive
sites or that may be exposed to the damaging effects of explosions. The
effects of potential explosions may be altered significantly by
construction features that limit the amount of explosives involved,
attenuate resultant blast overpressure or thermal radiation, and reduce
the quantity and range of hazardous fragments and debris. DOD also
includes additional criteria for electrical safety and lightning.
ATF also adopted the ATD in its approach to facility siting. ATF
regulations provide procedural and substantive requirements regarding,
in relevant part, the issuance of user permits and the storage of
explosive materials. AFT specifies tables of distances for high
explosives, low explosives, and blasting agents. The tables governing
high explosives and low explosives are very pertinent to launch site
operations.
As noted, the scope of operations within a launch site goes beyond
the on-site receipt, transfer and storage of explosives within ATF
jurisdiction. A launch site may have a number of launch vehicle and
payload customers on site who posses liquid and solid propellants that
are being used for incorporation into a launch vehicle or payload.
NASA's safety standards and policy for operations involving
explosives are contained in ``Safety Standard for Explosives,
Propellants, and Pyrotechnics,'' NSS 1740.12 (Aug. 12, 1993) (NASA
Standard). This document contains a uniform set of standards for all
NASA facilities engaged in the development, manufacture, handling,
storage, transportation, processing, or testing of explosives. Like the
DOD standard, the NASA standard contains guidelines and standards for
explosives operations in order to safeguard not only the public, but
personnel and property. It covers not only Q-D criteria, but personnel
training, operating procedures, and other policies such as the use of
all available advances in protective construction to provide the safety
work environment to prevent or minimize the exposure of personnel and
facilities to explosives hazards when performing NASA program
activities.
FAA's Proposed Use of NASA and DOD Q-D Standards for Licensed Operation
of a Launch Site
Because the NASA and DOD standards are similar, and because both
the NASA and DOD standards comprehensively cover explosive hazards at a
launch site, the FAA has used both as a guide in proposing the rules in
subpart B. However, the FAA proposes to employ the tables and many of
the definitions of the NASA standard specifically.
The relevant differences for solid explosives between NASA, DOD,
and ATF are not significant. The NASA and ATF table for division 1.3
explosives (discussed below) are identical except that ATF requirements
stop at 300,000 pounds. The NASA division 1.3 table is also the same as
the DOD standard except that the DOD standard has more increments.
The relevant differences for liquid propellants between the NASA
and DOD standards are also minor.\5\ The hazard groups that liquid
propellants fall into, discussed below, are identical in the two
standards. The values in the table used for explosive equivalents are
also identical for quantities greater than 35,000 pounds. A discrepancy
exists under 35,000 pounds because the DOD requirement is based on a
table used for division 1.1 solid explosives.\6\ The distance specified
below 35,000 pounds in the DOD table is based on the ranges of
hazardous fragments and firebrands from an explosion. This is
appropriate for solid explosives but is not necessary for liquid
propellant explosive equivalents. The NASA standard, on the other hand,
has separate tables for division 1.1 solid explosives and liquid
propellant explosive equivalents. The NASA table for division 1.1 solid
explosives takes fragments and firebrands into account, as appropriate.
NASA's table for liquid propellants does not take fragmentation into
account.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\5\ ATF does not regulate liquid propellants, other than mono-
propellants.
\6\ Solid explosives, like liquid explosives, may be measured in
terms of explosive equivalency. The explosive equivalency of a
certain weight of solid explosive is the weight of trinitrotoluene
that would provide an equivalent blast effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Other Approaches to Explosive Safety
The FAA has taken a number of measures in order to simplify the
proposed Q-D standards. The proposed requirements do not account for
the use of hardening or barricades, or for any other solid propellant
other than division 1.3. The proposed rules also reflect that only two
liquid propellant compatibility groups are necessary. These are
discussed below.
The proposed requirements do not account for hardening. Both NASA
and DOD have standards for using protective construction to harden an
explosive hazard facility to suppress explosion effects, and to harden
an area potentially exposed to explosive hazards. In the NASA and DOD
standards, the use of hardening may reduce the required distance
between an explosive hazard facility and a public area. The proposed
rules do not explicitly address hardening. The distances required
between explosive hazard facilities and public areas assume that
neither the explosive hazard facilities nor the public areas are
hardened. Because of the complexity of hardening standards, the FAA
believes hardening is better left to case-by-case approval. If an
applicant plans to use hardening, the applicant should plan on
demonstrating an equivalent level of safety to justify a reduction in
applicable Q-D requirements.
Similarly, the proposed requirements do not account for the use of
barricades and other protective measures to mitigate the effect of an
explosion on exposed areas. An applicant proposing to use such measures
in order to deviate from the proposed siting rules may apply for a
waiver to the FAA, accompanied with a demonstration that the applicant
achieves an equivalent level of safety.
The proposed requirements govern only one type of solid explosive,
division 1.3. To classify solid propellants, the FAA is proposing to
adopt the United Nations Organization (UNO) classification system for
transport of dangerous goods. This classification system is reflected
in DOD and NASA standards, and standards of the Department of
Transportation's Research and Special Programs Administration.
Propellants will be assigned the appropriate DOT class in accordance
with 49 CFR part 173. The hazard classification system used by all
three agencies consists of nine classes for dangerous goods with
ammunition and explosives included in UNO ``Class 1, Explosives.''
Class 1 explosives are

[[Page 34323]]

further subdivided into ``divisions'' based on the character and
predominance of the associated hazards and on the potential for causing
casualties or property damage. As defined in 49 CFR 173.50:
Division 1.1--consists of explosives that have a mass
explosion hazard. A mass explosion is one which affects almost the
entire load instantaneously.
Division 1.2--consists of explosives that have a
projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard.
Division 1.3--consists of explosives that have a fire
hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or
both, but not a mass explosion hazard.
Division 1.4--consists of explosives that present a minor
explosion hazard.
Division 1.5--consists of very insensitive explosives.
Division 1.6--consists of extremely insensitive articles
which do not have a mass explosion hazard.
The FAA proposes criteria only for division 1.3. The only solid
explosives for commercial launches that will likely affect separation
distances on a launch site are division 1.3 propellants. Although
launch vehicles frequently have components incorporating division 1.1
explosives, such as those used to initiate flight termination systems,
the quantity is small. Division 1.1 explosives will not likely be
present in sufficient quantities to affect the application of Q-D
criteria. The only division 1.1 solid rocket motors existing today are
from old military missiles which are not likely to be used at a
commercial launch site. When liquid fuels and oxidizers are located
together, as they would be during a fueling test, the combination has
an explosive potential equal to a percentage of division 1.1
explosives. The proposed rules take such activities into account, but
address liquid propellants separately from solid propellants.
The proposed regulations would not assign compatibility groups for
solid propellants. The NASA and DOD standards assign solid explosives
to compatibility groups. Explosives are assigned to the same group when
they can be stored together without significantly increasing either the
probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of
the effects of such an accident. Because division 1.3 solid propellants
are all compatible, the proposed regulations do not incorporate
compatibility groups for solid propellants.
Like the DOD and NASA standards, the proposed rules classify each
liquid propellant into one hazard group and one compatibility group.
Classifying each liquid propellant into a hazard group is necessary
because the hazards associated with different liquid propellants vary
widely, and the quantity-distance relationship varies accordingly.
Hazard group 1 individually represents a fire hazard, hazard group 2
individually represents a more serious fire hazard, and hazard group 3
individually represents a fragmentation hazard because propellants in
this category can cause rupture of a storage container.
The proposed rules classify current launch vehicle liquid
propellants, namely, liquid hydrogen (LH2), RP-1, hydrazine (N2H4) and
its variants (e.g. UDMH and Aerozine-50), hydrogen peroxide, liquid
oxygen (LO2), and nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4). RP-1 and N2O4 fall into
hazard group 1, hydrogen peroxide and LO2 fall into hazard group 2, and
LH2 and N2H4 fall into hazard group 3. Other propellants will be
classified on a case-by-case basis.
Like the NASA and DOD standards, the proposed rules also assign
each liquid propellant into a compatibility group. However, unlike
those standards which cover many different types of propellants, only
two compatibility groups are represented in the proposed rules, group A
and group C. Group A represents oxidizers, such as LO2, N2O4, and
hydrogen peroxide, and group C represents fuels. Whenever propellants
of different compatibility groups are not separated by the minimum
distance requirements, that is, when fuels and oxidizers are close
enough to each other to potentially mix and explode, the explosive
equivalency of the explosive mixture must be calculated.
Application of ATF, DOD, or NASA Standards
The storage of solid propellant and liquid mono-propellant on a
launch site is covered by ATF regulations, and therefore not addressed
in the FAA's proposed requirements. ATF has a permit process for the
storage of solid propellants and liquid mono-propellants. The FAA's
proposed rules, therefore, do not cover the separation distance between
magazines, or between magazines and public areas. However, an applicant
must show any magazines in its explosive site plan and their location
in relation to other explosive hazard facilities. Applicants should
note that on federal launch ranges DOD or NASA standards apply. These
launch sites may have Q-D requirements that are different than the
FAA's proposed rules.
Future Change in Liquid Propellant Requirements
The DOD Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) has initiated a DOD
Explosive Safety Standard for Energetic Liquids Program, and has
established an interagency advisory board called the Liquid Propellants
Working Group (LPWG). The FAA is a member of this group. A number of
possible inconsistencies and irregularities have been identified in the
current approach to siting liquid propellants. These include Q-D
criteria for most liquid propellants, possible inconsistencies in
hazard group and compatibility group definitions, and possible
inaccurate characterization of blast over pressure hazards of liquid
propellant explosions. The purpose of the LPWG is to address issues of
explosive equivalence, compatibility mixing, and quantity-distance
criteria, and to develop recommended revisions to DOD STD 6055.9
addressing liquid propellants and other liquid energetic materials. The
LPWG is currently consolidating all available test and accident data,
and non-DOD regulatory information to provide a basis for the
revisions.
Because the DDESB is possibly the best equipped group in the
country to address these issues, the FAA will carefully consider its
recommendations. The basic approach outlined in the proposed rule
should not change. However, the DDESB is likely to specify new hazard
and compatibility groups, distance values, and equivalency values, and
the public may anticipate their eventual consideration and possible
adoption by the FAA.
Solid and Liquid Bi-propellants at Launch Pads
The FAA is proposing a special requirement at launch pads for
launch vehicles that use liquid bi-propellant and solid propellant
components. The required separation distance shall be the greater of
the distance determined by the explosive equivalent of the liquid
propellant alone or the solid propellant alone. An applicant does not
have to add the separation distances of both. This notice assumes that
generally, no credible scenario exists that could produce a
simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks and
solid propellant motors. Although not reflected in the published DOD
and NASA standards, the proposed requirement constitutes current
practice at federal launch ranges. The FAA is interested in the
public's view on this approach.

[[Page 34324]]

C. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures

Application of the proposed quantity-distance rules alone will not
prevent mishaps from occurring on a launch site. The proposed Q-D rules
merely reduce the risk to the public to an acceptable level if a mishap
occurs, and if the public is kept away from the mishap by a distance
that is at least as great as the public area distance. Safe facility
design and prudent procedural measure are critical to preventing a
mishap from occurring in the first place. Because visitors to a launch
site cannot be protected by prudent site planning alone, the FAA has
proposed launch site operator responsibilities to prevent mishaps
involving propellants.
The FAA considered measures taken at federal launch ranges to
prevent inadvertent initiation of propellants. For this notice the FAA
focused on those measures that are appropriate to be taken by a launch
site operator. For the most part, the FAA considers it prudent to place
the responsibility on a launch site operator for those measures that
must be built into facilities. Requirements of a more operational
nature will be covered in another rulemaking.
The FAA focused on construction measures intended to prevent
inadvertent initiation of propellant from electricity. These are
particularly important for electro-explosive devices. Electric hazards
include electrostatic discharge such as lightning, static electricity,
electric supply systems, and electromagnetic radiation. As discussed
below, the FAA is proposing launch site operator requirements for two
of these electric hazards: Lightning and electric supply systems. Other
measures were considered but rejected because the FAA's planned
rulemaking on launches from non-federal launch sites will cover other
procedural measures to guard against inadvertent initiation of
propellants from electricity. Moreover, the FAA believes launch and
launch site operators will implement prudent design and construction
measures to comply with local, state, and other federal law, such as
OSHA requirements. The FAA is interested in public views on this
approach and any need to address other facility requirements.
Lighting Protection
Rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels by lightning.
The primary method of protecting against damage from lightning is to
provide a means to direct a lightning discharge directly to the earth
without causing harm to people or property. A lightning protection
system consists of a system of air terminals such as lightning rods, a
system of ground terminals, and a conductor system connecting the air
terminals to the ground terminals. These systems are typically
installed during construction.
The FAA proposes to impose certain requirements on launch site
operators involving lightning protection. The requirements are based on
current industry practice, namely, DOD STD 6055.9, chapter 7, and the
NASA standard's chapter 5. Each of those standards define, in detail,
minimum explosives safety criteria for the design, maintenance, testing
and inspection of lightning protection systems. The FAA's proposed
rules are not as detailed as those standards so that an applicant may
have more flexibility in meeting performance standards. The FAA expects
applicants to achieve the level of safety represented by the DOD and
NASA standard.
The FAA's proposed rules were derived from the DOD and NASA
standards, which are similar to each other. Like NASA and DOD, the
proposed rules require lightning protection for all explosives hazard
facilities. The design of lightning protection systems includes air
terminals, low impedance paths to the ground, referred to as down
conductors, and earth electrode systems. An air terminal is a component
of a lightning protection system that is able to safely intercept
lightning strikes. Air terminals may include overhead wires or grids,
vertical spikes, or a building's grounded structural elements. Air
terminals must be capable of safely conducting a lighting strike. Down
conductors, such as wires or structural elements having high current
capacity, provide low impedance paths from the air terminals described
above to an earth ground system. Earth electrode systems dissipate the
current from a lightning strike to ground.
Bonding and surge protection are other important considerations for
lightning protection systems. Metallic bodies, such as fences and
railroad tracks near an explosive hazard facility, should be bonded to
ensure that voltage potentials due to lightning are equal everywhere in
the explosive hazard facility. Lightning protection systems should also
include surge protection for all incoming conductors, such as metallic
power, communication, and instrumentation lines coming into an
explosive hazard facility, so as to reduce transient voltages due to
lightning to a harmless level.
The FAA proposes to adopt a provision of DOD STD 6055.9 that
exempts the need for a lightning protection system when a local
lightning warning system is used to permit operations to be terminated
before the incidence of an electrical storm, if all personnel can and
will be provided with protection equivalent to a public traffic route
distance, which is equivalent to the FAA's proposed public area
distance. The FAA is interested in views on this exception, and whether
it is sensible in light of the small chance that lightning may cause
inadvertent solid rocket motor flight. The FAA is also interested in
views on whether other exceptions should be added.
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Batterymarch Park,
Quincy, Massachusetts, has published a Lightning Protection Code, NFPA
780 (1995). The FAA is interested in the public's views on the use and
applicability of this code.
Static Electricity
Rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels by extraneous
electricity such as static electricity, fields around electric supply
lines, and radio frequency emissions from radio, radar, and television
transmitters.
Static electricity is generally created by a transfer of electrons
from one substance to another caused by friction or rubbing. The
generation of static electricity is not in itself a hazard. The hazard
arises when static electricity is allowed to accumulate, subsequently
discharging as a spark across an air gap in the presence of highly
flammable materials or energetic materials such as propellants. The
NASA standard states that:

In order for static to be a source of ignition, five conditions
must be fulfilled: (1) A mechanism for generating static electricity
must be present, (2) a means of accumulating or storing the charge
so generated must exist, (3) a suitable gap across which the spark
can develop must be present, (4) a voltage difference sufficient to
cause electrical breakdown or dielectric breakdown must develop
across the gap, and (5) a sufficient amount of energy must be
present in the spark to exceed the minimum ignition energy
requirements of the flammable mixture.\7\

\7\ NASA Standard at 5-29.

Electro-explosive devices are particularly susceptible to static
discharge. The primary method used to neutralize static potential is to
create an electrical path between the objects so that the potential
charges will be equalized. This path can be generated by bonding
potential charged objects to each other and humidifying or ionizing

[[Page 34325]]

the air to create a path for the charge to bleed off.
Both NASA and DOD have standards to control static electricity. For
example, they have standards \8\ to prevent static electricity
accumulations that are capable of initiating combustible dusts, gases,
flammable vapors, or exposed electroexplosive devices. The standards
build on the National Electrical Code, published by the National Fire
Protection Association as NFPA 70, which establishes standards for the
design and installation of electrical equipment and wiring in hazardous
locations containing combustible dusts, flammable vapors and gases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\8\ DOD Standard, chapter 6, NASA Standard, chapter 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

These standards require personnel and equipment in hazardous
locations and locations where static sensitive EEDs are exposed to be
grounded in a manner to effectively discharge static electricity. For
example, the NASA standard requires personnel to wear static
dissipation devices such as legstats and wriststats. Conductive shoes
are required when handling, installing, or connecting or disconnecting
EEDs.
Solid rocket motors may also be initiated by static electricity.
Material contact, specifically, the rubbing or removing of one material
from another, such as removing tooling from a motor, can produce a
static charge buildup in solid rocket motors. This energy, when
released under appropriate conditions, may lead to a cascade discharge
and propellant ignition. A number of incidents have occurred due to
static electricity, including a Pershing II missile burn in West
Germany, a Stage I Peacekeeper missile initiation at a manufacturing
facility (due to the pulling of a tool), and a Minuteman State II
missile ignition on the rapid pulling of the core.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\9\ ``JANNAF Propulsion Systems Hazards Subcommittee
Electrostatic Discharge Panel Report,'' CPIA Publication 510 (Mar.
1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Although the control of static electricity is important for public
safety, the FAA is not proposing any requirements in this rulemaking.
The FAA believes that the control of static electricity in launch
operations is primarily procedural in nature, and is best covered by
the FAA in a future rulemaking on launches. The FAA is interested in
the public's view on whether requirements should be placed on launch
site operators.
Electric Supply Systems
As noted above, rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels
by extraneous electricity such as fields around high tension wires.
Both the NASA standard, chapter 5, and DOD STD 6055.9, chapter 6, have
similar standards to address the hazards from fields around high
tension wires.
The FAA proposes rules that are similar to both the NASA and DOD
standard. As in those standards, the proposed rules require electric
power lines to be no closer to an explosive hazard facility than the
length of the lines between the poles or towers that support the lines,
unless effective means is provided to ensure that energized lines
cannot, on breaking, come in contact with the explosive hazard
facility. The proposed rules also require towers or poles supporting
electric distribution lines that carry between 15 and 69 KV, or
electrical transmission lines that carry 69 KV or more, to be no closer
to an explosive hazard facility than the public area distance for that
explosive hazard facility.
Electromagnetic Radiation
Rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels by extraneous
electricity such as radio frequency emissions from radio, radar, and
television transmitters. Radio frequency (RF) emitters may present a
hazard to the public by direct exposure to high levels of RF energy.
The levels of RF energy that are hazardous are dependent on frequency.
For instance, ``ANSI C95.1-1991 Electromagnetic Fields, Safety Levels
With Respect to Human Exposure to Radio Frequency'' defines the maximum
safe level for personnel for frequencies between 0.003 and 0.1 MHz at
100mWcm \2\, and a level of 180 mW/Cm \2\ for frequencies between 1.34
and 3.0 MHz. More importantly for this proposal, RF emitters may
present hazard to ordnance. At launch sites today, design and
procedural methods are used to mitigate risks to personnel and
ordnance. Separation distances are also used to ensure personnel and
ordancne are not exposed to hazardous levels.
One hazard of particular importance on a launch site is the
accidental firing of electroexplosvie devices by stray electromagnetic
energy. A large number of these devices are initiated by low levels of
electrical energy and are susceptible to unintentional ignition by many
forms of direct or induced stray electrical energy, such as from
lightning discharges, static electricity, and radio frequency due to
ground and airborne emitters.
One federal launch site operator, the U.S. Air Force, defines its
RF requirements in ``Air Force Manual (AFM) 91-201, Explosives Safety
Standards,'' (Jan. 1998). Safe separation distance criteria are
contained in section 2.58. A table is provided that gives minimum
separation distances between EEDs (within explosive hazard facilities)
and the transmitting antenna of all RF emitters. The distances are
based on the frequency, transmitter power, and power ratio of the
transmitting antenna. For worst-case situations, safe separation
distances are based on frequency and effective radiated power. ``Worst-
case'' is defined as EEDs that are the most sensitive in the Air Force
inventory, unshielded, having leads or circuitry which could
inadvertently be formed into a resonant dipole, loop or other antenna.
Where EEDs are in less hazardous configurations, the standard allows
for shorter distances. The standard also allows for the conduct of
power density surveys to ensure safety, in lieu of using the minimum
safe separation distances defined from the table and figure. Power
density surveys measure the actual conditions in an area here EEDs may
be located, and are appropriate when the minimum distances cannot be
complied with, for whatever reason, and when more than one transmitter
is operating in a certain area at different frequencies.
The FAA has not chosen to specifically address RF hazards in this
proposal. OSHA covers direct exposure of personnel to RF.\10\ Although
the FAA is not aware of any other federal regulations that specifically
protect the public from the accidental firing of electroexplosive
devices by stray electromagnetic energy, the FAA with this proposal is
focussing on those measures that a launch site operator must build into
its facilities. The distance requirements discussed above were
considered by the FAA but other procedural means exist to mitigate RF
hazards, including the FAA's proposed scheduling and coordination
requirement for launch site operators. The procedural requirements of
launch operators, covered in a separate rulemaking, in conjunction with
the requirement in proposed Sec. 420.5 for a licensee to develop and
implement procedures to coordinate operations carried out by launch
site customers and their contractors, should prove adequate to address
RF hazards. The FAA is interested in the public's view on whether other
requirements, such as distance requirements, should be placed on launch
site operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\10\ 29 CFR 1910.97.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Launch Site Location Review

The FAA intends a launch site location review to determine whether
the location of a proposed launch site

[[Page 34326]]

would jeopardize public health and safety. To that end, the FAA
proposes to determine whether at least one hypothetical launch could
take place safely from a launch point at the proposed site. The FAA
does not intend to license the operation of a launch site from which a
launch could never safely take place. An applicant should, however,
bear in mind that an FAA license to operate a launch site does not
guarantee that a launch license would be issued for any particular
launch proposed from that site. Accordingly, much of the decision
making with respect to whether a particular site will be economically
successful will rest, as it should, with a launch site operator, who
will have to determine whether the site possesses sufficient flight
corridors for economic viability. The FAA seeks through a location
review only to ensure that at least one flight corridor exists that may
be used safely for a hypothetical launch.
Accordingly, prior to issuing a license to operate a launch site at
the proposed location, the FAA will ascertain whether it is possible to
launch at least one type of launch vehicle on at least one trajectory
from each launch point at the proposed site while meeting the FAA's
collective risk criteria. The FAA wants to ensure that there exists at
least one flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas from a
proposed launch site that would contain debris away from population.
Launch is a dangerous activity that the FAA will allow to occur only
when the risk to people is below an expected casualty (Ec)
of 30 x 10^-6. In other words, if there are too many people
around a launch site or in a flight corridor the FAA will not license
the site. The FAA's proposed methods for determining flight corridors
and impact dispersion areas and estimating Ec are designed
to ascertain whether a hypothetical flight corridor would avoid
creating too much risk.
All this is not to say that the FAA proposed to require an
applicant for a license to operate a launch site to perform a complete
flight safety analysis for a particular launch. The FAA recognizes that
an applicant may or may not yet have customers or a particular launch
vehicle in mind. Accordingly, the FAA's proposed launch site location
review methods only approximate, on the basis of certain assumptions
and recognizing that not all factors need to be taken into account, a
full flight safety analysis that would be normally be performed for an
actual launch. Of course, if an applicant does have a customer who
satisfies the FAA's flight safety criteria for launch and obtains a
license for launch from the site, that showing would also demonstrate
to the FAA that a launch may occur safely from the proposed site, and
the FAA could issue a license to operate the launch site on the basis
of the actual launch proposed.
Bear in mind also that the focus of FAA's proposed launch site
location review methods is on expendable launch vehicles with a flight
history. The reusable launch vehicles (RLV) currently proposed by
industry vary quite a bit. Accordingly, the FAA considered it unwise to
define a detailed analytical method for determining the suitability of
a launch site location for RLVs. An applicant proposed a launch site
limited to the launch of reusable launch vehicles would still need to
define a flight corridor and conduct a risk analysis if population were
present within the flight corridor, but the FAA will review such an
analysis on a case-by-case basis consistent with the principles
discussed in this rulemaking.
Similarly, the FAA has chosen not to define a detailed analytical
method for determining the suitability of a launch site location for
unproven launch vehicles. An applicant proposing a launch site limited
to the launch of unproven launch vehicles would have to demonstrate to
the FAA that the launch site is safe for the activity planned.
A launch site location review would provide an applicant with
alternative methods for demonstrating that a proposed launch site
satisfies FAA safety requirements. Specifically, the applicant must
demonstrate that a flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas
exist that do not encompass populated areas or that do not give rise to
an Ec risk of greater than 30 x 10^-6. Each
proposed launch point must be evaluated for each type of launch
vehicle, whether expendable orbital, guided sub-orbital or unguided
sub-orbital, or reusable, that an applicant proposes would be launched
from each point.
Each of the three methods the FAA proposes for evaluating the
acceptability of a launch site's location require an applicant to
identify an area, whether a flight corridor or a set of impact
dispersion areas, emanating from a proposed launch site. That area
identifies the public that the applicant must analyze for risk of
impact and harm. The FAA proposes to have an applicant who anticipates
customers who use guided orbital launch vehicles define a flight
corridor for a class of vehicles launched from a specific point along a
specified trajectory, that extends 5,000 nautical miles from the launch
point or until the launch vehicle's instantaneous impact point leaves
the earth's surface, whichever is sooner. For guided sub-orbital launch
vehicles, the flight corridor would end at an impact dispersion area of
a final stage. An applicant would have to demonstrate either that there
are no populated areas within the flight corridor or that the risk to
any population in the corridor does not exceed the FAA's risk criteria.
Similarly, for the sub-orbital launch of an unguided vehicle, an
applicant would analyze the risks associated with a series of impact
dispersion areas around the impact points for spent stages. If there
are people in the dispersion areas, the applicant must demonstrate that
the expected casualties from stage impacts do not exceed the FAA's risk
criteria.
Ec, or casualty expectancy, represents the FAA's measure
of the collective risk to a population exposed to the launch of a
launch vehicle. The measure represents the expected average number of
casualties for a specific launch mission. In other words, if there were
thousands of the same mission conducted and all the casualties were
added up and the sum divided by the number of missions, the answer and
the mission's expected casualty should statistically be the same. This
Ec value defines the acceptable collective risk associated
with a hypothetical launch from a launch point at a launch site, and,
as prescribed by the proposed regulations, shall not exceed an expected
average number of casualties of 0.00003 (30 x 10^-6) for
each launch point at an applicant's proposed launch site. This
Ec value defines acceptable collective risk. In contrast to
individual risk, which describes the probability of serious injury or
death to a single person, the launch industry's common measure of risk
is collective risk. The Ec value proposed originated with
the Air Force's measure of acceptable risk. ``EWR 127-1,'' Sec. 1.4, 1-
12. Relying on the Air Force measure, the FAA proposed the adoption of
collective risk and a risk level of 30 x 10^-6 for licensed
launches in an earlier proceeding. ``Commercial Space Transportation
Licensing Regulations,'' (62 FR 13216, 13229-30 (Mar. 19, 1997). The
FAA now proposes to use the same measure for evaluating the suitability
of a proposed launch site location.
Collective risk reflects the probability of injury or death to all
members of a defined population set--in this case, those located within
the flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas being analyzed--
placed at risk by a launch event. Collective risk constitutes the sum
total launch related risk, that is, the

[[Page 34327]]

probability of injury or death, to that part of the public exposed to a
launch. Collective risk is analogous to an estimate of the average
number of people hit by lightning each year, while individual annual
risk would be an individual's likelihood of being hit by lightning in
any given year. Collective risk may be expressed in terms of individual
risk if certain factors associated with any given launch are taken into
account. Collective risk may be expressed in terms of individual risk
when the exposed population consists of one person. Also, individual
risk may be--and will be, in most instances--less than collective risk,
depending on the size of the population exposed. For example, a
collective Ec risk of 30 x 10^-6 for a defined
population of one hundred thousand people exposed to a particular
launch results (assuming the risk is spread equally throughout the
defined population) in a probability of injury or death to any one
exposed individual of 3 x 10^-10 (three per ten billion).
The FAA's proposed methods for identifying a flight corridor or
impact dispersion areas distinguish between guided orbital launch
vehicles with a flight termination system (FTS), guided sub-orbital
launch vehicles with an FTS, and unguided sub-orbital launch vehicles
without an FTS.\11\ For purposes of this proposal, references to a
guided launch vehicle, whether orbital or sub-orbital, may be taken to
mean that the vehicle has an FTS. References to an unguided sub-orbital
may be understood to mean that the vehicle does not possess an FTS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\11\ This proposal does not propose a means for analyzing risks
posed by a launch site for the launch of unguided suborbital launch
vehicles that employ FTS. Historically, few of these vehicles have
been launched. In the event an applicant for a license to operate a
launch site wishes to operate a launch site only for such vehicles,
the FAA will handle the request on a case by case basis. The FAA
does note, however, that unguided suborbital launch vehicles that in
the past have been launched with an FTS were usually launched with
the FTS because the launch was otherwise too close to populated
areas for the type of vehicle and trajectory flown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The FAA's proposed regulations divide guided orbital launch
vehicles into four classes, with each class defined by its payload
weight capability, as shown in table 1. Sub-orbital launch vehicles are
not divided into classes by payload weight, but are categorized as
either guided or unguided. Table 2 shows the payload weight and
corresponding classes of existing orbital launch vehicles. For a launch
site intended for the use of orbital launch vehicles, an applicant
would define a hypothetical flight corridor from a launch point at the
proposed launch site for the largest launch vehicle class anticipated--
which the FAA anticipates would be based on expected customers.

Table 1.--Class of Launch Vehicles by Payload Weight
[LBS]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbital launch vehicles
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 nm orbit Small Medium Medium large Large
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 deg. inc.\1\................ 4,400 >4,400 to 11,100 >11,100 to <18,500 >18,500
90 deg. inc.\2\................ 3,300 >3,330 to 8,400 >8,400 to 15,000 >15,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 28 deg. inclination orbit from a launch point at 28 deg. latitude.
\1\ 90 deg. inclination orbit.

Table 2.--Classification of Common Guided Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Payload weight Payload weight
(lbs) (lbs)
Vehicle -------------------------------- Class
100 nm Orbit 100 nm Orbit
29 deg. inc. 90 deg. inc.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conestoga 1229............................. 600 450 Small.
Conestoga 1620............................. 2,250 1,750 Small.
LML V-1.................................... 1,755 1,140 Small.
LML V-2.................................... 4,390 3,290 Small.
Pegasus.................................... 700 N/A Small.
Pegasus XL................................. 1,015 769 Small.
Scout...................................... 560 460 Small.
Taurus..................................... 3,100 2,340 Small.
Atlas II................................... 14,500 12,150 Medium.
Atlas 2A................................... 16,050 13,600 Medium.
Delta 6920................................. 8,780 6,490 Medium.
Delta 7920................................. 11,220 8,575 Medium.
Titan II................................... N/A 4,200 Medium.
Atlas 2AS.................................. 19,050 16,100 Medium/Large.
Titan III.................................. 31,200 N/A Medium/Large.
Titan IV................................... 47,400 41,000 Large.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Methods for estimating the risk posed by the operation of a launch
site for guided orbital and sub-orbital launch vehicles are presented
in proposed appendices A, B and C. Appendix A contains instructions for
creating a flight corridor for guided orbital and sub-orbital launch
vehicles. Appendix B provides an alternative method to appendix A.
Appendix B also instructs an applicant how to create a flight corridor
for guided launch vehicles, but provides more detailed calculations to
employ so that, although an appendix B flight corridor is typically
less conservative than that of appendix A, it should provide more
representative of actual vehicle behavior. Appendix C

[[Page 34328]]

contains the FAA's proposed method for applicants to analyze the risk
posed by guided launch vehicles within a flight corridor created under
appendix A or B. Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicles are presented in
appendix D, which describes how an applicant should estimate impact
dispersion areas and analyze the risk in those areas.
Appendix A is less complex, but generates a larger flight corridor,
than the methodology of appendix B. No local meteorological or vehicle
trajectory data are required to estimate a flight corridor under
appendix A. Because it is a simpler methodology, an applicant may want
to use it as a screening tool. If an applicant can define a flight
corridor for a single trajectory, using appendix A, that does not
overfly populated areas, the applicant may satisfy the launch site
location review requirements with the least effort. If, however, the
corridor includes populated areas, the applicant has the choice of
creating an appendix B flight corridor, which may be more narrow, or
conducting a casualty expectancy analysis. An applicant is not required
to try appendix A before employing appendix B.
The FAA's proposed location review reflects a number of assumptions
designed to keep the review general rather than oriented toward or
addressing a particular launch. These assumptions are discussed more
fully below, but may be summarized briefly. The location reviews for
appendices A and B flight corridors reflect an attempt to ensure that
launch failure debris would be contained within a safe area. Successful
containment must assume a perfectly functioning flight termination
system. A perfectly functioning flight termination system would ensure
that any debris created by a launch failure would be contained within a
flight corridor. When the high risk event is not launch failure but
launch success, as tends to be the case with an unguided sub-orbital
launch vehicle that does not employ an FTS, the FAA still proposes a
location review based on an assumption of containment.
The approaches provided in the four proposed location review
appendices are based on some comment assumptions that reflect
limitations of the launch site location review analysis. The FAA is not
requiring an application to analyze the risks posed to the public by
toxic materials that might be handled at the proposed site, nor the
risk to ships or aircraft from launch debris or planned jettisoning of
stages. The FAA recognizes that these assumptions represent a
limitation in the launch site location review. The FAA intends that
these three risks will be dealt with through pre-launch operational
controls and launch commit criteria which will be better identified as
part of a launch license review. All launches that take place from an
approved U.S. launch site will either be regulated by the FAA through a
launch license or will be U.S. government launches that the government
carries out for the government.
The two methods for creating guided launch vehicle flight corridors
are intended to account for launch vehicle failure rate, malfunction
turn capability, and the launch vehicle guidance accuracy as defined by
the impact dispersions of these vehicles. The premise undergirding each
of these proposed methods is that debris would be contained within the
defined flight corridor or impact dispersion areas. Accordingly, for
purposes of a launch site location review, only the populations within
the defined areas need to be analyzed for risk. The FAA recognizes that
were a flight termination system fail to destroy a vehicle as intended,
a launch vehicle could stray outside its planned flight corridor. That
concern will be better accommodated through another forum, namely, the
licensing of a launch operator and the review of that launch operator's
flight safety system. Because a containment analysis only looks at how
far debris would travel in the event an errant vehicle were destroyed,
the containment analysis has to assume a perfectly functioning flight
termination system. In other words, for purposes of analyzing the
acceptability of a launch site's location for launching guided
expendable launch vehicles, the FAA will assume that a malfunctioning
vehicle will be destroyed and debris will always impact within
acceptable boundaries. Accordingly, the FAA does not propose to
explore, for purposes of determining the acceptability of a launch
site's location, the possibility that a vehicle's flight termination
system may fail and that the vehicle could continue to travel toward
populated areas. Any proposed site may present such risks--indeed, any
proposed launch presents such risks--but they are best addressed in the
context of individual launch systems. This working assumption of a
perfectly reliable flight termination system will not, of course, apply
to the licensing of a launch of a launch vehicle. The FAA will consider
the reliability of any particular launch vehicle's FTS in the course of
a launch license review. From a practical standpoint, this means that
for the launch site location review, both nominal and failure-produced
debris would be contained within a flight corridor, obviating the need
for risk analyses that address risk outside of a defined flight
corridor or set of impact dispersion areas.
Additionally, the FAA does not propose to require an applicant to
analyze separately the risks posed by the planned impact of normally
jettisoned stages from a guided expendable launch vehicle, except for
the final stage of a guided sub-orbital launch vehicle. The FAA does
not consider intermediate stage impact analysis necessary to assess the
general suitability of a launch point for guided expendable launch
vehicles because the impact location of stages is inherently launch
vehicle-specific, and the trajectory and timing for a guided launch
vehicle can normally be designed so that the risks from nominally
jettisoned stages will be kept to acceptable levels. A launch license
review will have to ensure that vehicle stages are not going to impact
in densely populated areas. Risk calculations performed for launches
from federal launch ranges demonstrate a relatively low risk posed by
controlled disposition of stages in comparison to the risk posed by
wide-spread dispersion of debris due to vehicle failure.
Each of the FAA's proposed approaches to defining flight corridors
or impact dispersion areas is designed to analyze the highest risk
launch event associated with a particular vehicle technology. This is
not meant to imply that lower risk launch events are necessarily
acceptable; only that they will not be considered in the course of this
review. For a guided orbital launch vehicle, that event is vehicle
failure. For an unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle, the launch event
of highest risk is vehicle success, namely, the predicted impact of
stages. For a guided launch vehicle the overflight risk, which results
from a vehicle failure followed by its destruction (assuming no FTS
failure), is the dominant risk. Risks from nominally jettisoned debris
are subsumed in the overflight risk assessment. For an unguided sub-
orbital launch vehicle, the FAA proposes that risk due to stage impact
be analyzed instead of the overflight risk. This distinction is
necessitated by the fact that the failure rate during thrust is
historically significantly lower for unguided vehicles than for guided
vehicles. Current unguided launch vehicles with many years of use are
highly reliable. They do not employ an FTS; therefore, debris pieces
usually consist of vehicle components that are not broken up. Another
reason for the

[[Page 34329]]

difference between analyses is that unguided vehicle stage impact
dispersions are significantly larger than guided vehicle impact
dispersions. These differences add up to greater risk within an
unguided launch vehicle stage impact dispersion area than the areas
outside the dispersion areas. Therefore, a risk assessment is only
performed on those populations within an unguided launch vehicle stage
impact dispersion area.
An applicant must define an area called an overflight exclusion
zone (OEZ) around each launch point, and the applicant must demonstrate
that the OEZ can be clear of the public during a launch. An OEZ defines
the area where the public risk criteria of 30 x 10^-6 would
be exceeded if one person were present in the open. The overflight
exclusion zone was estimated from risk computations for each launch
vehicle type and class. An applicant must define an OEZ because launch
vehicle range rates are slow in the launch area, launch vehicle
effective casualty areas, the area within which all casualties are
assumed to occur through exposure to debris, are large, and impact
dispersion areas are dense with debris so that the presence of one
person inside this hazardous area is expected to produce Ec
values exceeding the public risk criteria. Accordingly, an applicant
would either have to own the property, demonstrate to the FAA that
there are times when people are not present, or that it could clear the
public from the overflight exclusion zone prior to a launch. Evacuating
an overflight exclusion zone for an inland site, might, for example,
require an applicant to demonstrate that agreements have been reached
with local officials to close any public roads during a launch. The FAA
seeks comments on the feasibility of evacuating areas inland and on the
impact of the OEZ requirement on the ability to gain a license for an
inland site.

E. License Conditions

A license may contain conditions flowing from the various reviews
conducted during the application process. For example, a license
granted following approval of a launch site location would be limited
to the launch points analyzed, and the type and class of vehicle used
in the demonstration of site location safety. An applicant may choose
to analyze all three types of launch vehicles in its application. An
FAA launch site operator license authorizing the operation of a launch
site for launch of an orbital expendable launch vehicle would allow the
launch of vehicles from the site that were less than or equal to the
class of launch vehicle, based on payload weight, used to demonstrate
the safety of the site location. If a licensee later wanted to offer
the launch site for the launch of a larger class of vehicles or a
different type of launch vehicle, such as an unguided sub-orbital
launch vehicle, the licensee would be required to request a license
modification and demonstrate that the larger vehicle or different type
of vehicle could be safely launched from the launch site. Likewise, the
addition of a new launch point would require a license modification.
The demonstration would be based on the same kinds of analyses used for
the original license. In some cases, a licensee might be able to use
the safety analyses performed by a launch operator to meet location
review requirements.
Although the authority granted by the launch site operator license
would be limited to certain types or classes of vehicles, the license
would not represent a guarantee that the FAA would necessarily license
any particular launch from an approved launch site. The demonstration
is intended to ensure that the location of the launch site can safely
support at least some type of vehicle, launched on a specific
trajectory. The planned launch of an actual vehicle may differ from the
hypothetical trajectory or vehicle characteristics used for the launch
site location demonstration, potentially posing different risks to the
public than those used in the site location demonstration. In addition
to the protection provided by a safe launch site location, the safety
of any actual flight of a launch vehicle will be dependent on the
safety procedures, personnel qualifications, safety systems, and other
elements of the proposed launch. Consequently, each launch operator,
other than the U.S. Government, must obtain a launch license for its
specific operations.

F. Operational Responsibilities

The FAA is proposing to impose certain operational responsibilities
on an operator of a launch site. In addition, the FAA proposes to
distinguish between activities covered by a license to operate a launch
site and those covered by a launch license. Any activity that will be
approved as part of a launch license will not be covered in a launch
site operator license even if the launch site operator provides the
service. For example, because a launch licensee will need to assure the
adequacy of ground tracking, approval of ground tracking systems will
be handled in the launch license process even if a launch site operator
provides the service. Similarly, in the case of ground safety, a launch
site operator may provide fueling for a launch licensee, but safe
procedures for fueling will be addressed in the launch license.
The operational requirements being proposed for the operator of a
launch site addresses control of public access, scheduling of
operations at the site, notifications, recordkeeping, launch site
accident response and investigation, and explosive safety. A launch
site operator licensee would be required to control access to the site.
Security guards, fences, or other physical barriers may be used. Anyone
entering the site must, on first entry, be informed of the site's
safety and emergency response procedures. Alarms or other warning
signals would be required to alert persons on the launch site of any
emergency that might occur when they are on site. If a launch site
licensee has multiple launch customers on site at one time, the
licensee must have procedures for scheduling their operations so that
the activities of one customer do not create hazards for others.
Because it is more efficient to have a single point of contact for
launches conducted at a site, the FAA is proposing that the launch site
operator be responsible for all initial coordination with the
appropriate FAA regional office having jurisdiction over the airspace
where launches will take place and the U.S. Coast Guard (where
applicable) through a written agreement. The FAA's Air Traffic Service
and the Coast Guard issues Notice to Airmen and Mariners, respectively,
to ensure that they avoid hazardous areas. An FAA Air Route Traffic
Control Center also closes airways during a launch window, if
necessary. A launch site operator would be required to obtain an
agreement regarding procedures for coordinating contacts with these
agencies for launches from the site. The requirement for coordinating
with the Coast Guard might not, of course, always be applicable, for
example, for an inland launch site. A launch site operator licensee
would also have to notify local officials with an interest in the
launch. These would include officials with responsibilities that might
be called into play by a launch mishap, such as fire and emergency
response personnel.
Another operational requirement being proposed is for the operator
of a launch site to develop and implement a launch site accident
investigation plan containing procedures for investigating and
reporting a launch site accident. This would extend similar reporting,
investigation and response procedures

[[Page 34330]]

currently applicable to launch related accidents and incidents to
accidents occurring during ground activities at a launch site. Lastly,
an operator of a launch site would have responsibilities regarding
explosives, specifically, those dealing with lightning and electric
power lines. This has been discussed above.

III. Part Analysis

Part 417--License to Operate a Launch Site

The FAA removes and reserves part 417 and creates part 420 to
address licensing and operation of a launch site.

Part 420--License to Operate a Launch Site

Proposed Sec. 420.1 would describe the scope of proposed part 420.
Part 420 would encompass the requirements for obtaining a license to
operate a launch site and with which a licensee must comply.
Proposed Sec. 420.3 would specify the person who must apply for a
license to operate a launch site, and the person who must comply with
regulations that apply to a licensed launch site operator. Because a
launch site operator is someone who offers a launch site to others for
launch, only someone proposing such an offer need obtain a license to
operate a launch site. A launch operator proposing to launch from its
own launch site need only obtain a launch license because a launch
license will address safety issues related to a specific launch and
because a launch license encompasses ground operations.
Proposed Sec. 420.5 would add terms that have not been previously
defined by the FAA. These definitions would apply in the context of
part 420, which governs the licensing and safety requirements for
operation of a launch site. These terms do not apply outside part 420.
Specifically, the following terms would be defined:
Ballistic Coefficient () means the weight (W) of an object
divided by the quantity product of the coefficient of drag
(Cd) of the object and the area (A) of the object.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.000

A ballistic coefficient is a parameter used to describe flight
characteristics of an object.
Compatibility means the chemical property of materials that may be
located together without adverse reaction. Compatibility in storage
exists when storing materials together does not increase the
probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of
the effects of such an accident. Compatibility determines whether
materials require segregation. The FAA derived this definition from a
NASA definition, which states that compatibility is ``the chemical
property of materials to coexist without adverse reaction for an
acceptable period of time. Compatibility in storage exists when storing
materials together does not increase the probability of an accident or,
for a given quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an accident.
Storage compatibility groups are assigned to provide for segregated
storage.'' \12\ The FAA proposes to adapt the NASA definition in order
to describe coexistence with greater specificity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\12\ NASA Standard at A-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Debris dispersion radius (Dmax) means the estimated
maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels given a worst-
case launch vehicle failure and flight termination at 10 seconds into
flight. If a launch vehicle failure occurs shortly after ignition, and
a flight termination system is employed, the FAA expects the debris to
be contained within an area described by Dmax.
Division 1.3 explosive means an explosive as defined in 49 CFR
173.50. That provision is part of the hazardous materials regulations
of the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) of the
Department of Transportation. Section 173.50 defines a division 1.3
explosive as ``. . . consist(ing) of explosives that have a fire hazard
and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both,
but not a mass explosion hazard.'' This classification is identical to
the United Nations Organization classification, and is also used by
NASA and the Department of Defense.
Downrange area means a portion of a flight corridor beginning where
a launch area ends and ending 5,000 nautical miles (nm) from the launch
point for an orbital launch vehicle, and ending with an impact
dispersion area for a guided sub-orbital launch vehicle.
E,F,G coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed,
geocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system is
at the center of an ellipsoidal Earth model. The E-axis is positive
directed through the Greenwich meridian. The F-axis is positive
directed through 90 degrees east longitude. The EF-plane is coincident
with the ellipsoidal Earth model's equatorial plane. The G-axis is
normal to the EF-plane and positive directed through the north pole.
E,N,U coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed,
topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system
is at a launch point. The E-axis is positive directed east. The N-axis
is positive directed north. The En-plane is tangent to an ellipsoidal
Earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to the geodetic
vertical. The U-axis is normal to the EN-plane and positive directed
away from the Earth.
Effective casualty area (Ac) means the aggregate
casualty area of each piece of debris created by a launch vehicle
failure at a particular point on its trajectory. The effective casualty
area for each piece of debris is the area within which 100 percent of
the unprotected population on the ground are assumed to be a casualty,
and outside of which 100 percent of the population are assumed not to
be a casualty. This area is based on the characteristics of the debris
piece including its size, the path angle of its trajectory, impact
explosions, and debris skip, splatter, and bounce.
Explosive means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that,
when subjected to heat, impact, friction, detonation or other suitable
initiation, undergoes a rapid chemical change that releases large
volumes of highly heated gases that exert pressure in the surrounding
medium. The term applies to materials that either detonate or
deflagrate. With the exception of a minor editorial change, this
proposed definition is identical to that of NASA.\13\ For comparison,
49 CFR 173.50 of RSPA's regulations defines an explosive as, ``. . .
any substance or article . . . which is designed to function by
explosion . . . or which, by chemical reaction within itself, is able
to function in a similar manner even if not designed to function by
explosion. . . .'' Both definitions are consistent with each other, and
the FAA proposes to use the NASA definition because it is more
descriptive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\13\ NASA Standard at A-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Explosive equivalent means a measure of the blast effects from
explosion of a given quantity of material expressed in terms of the
weight of trinitrotoluene (TNT) that would produce the same blast
effects when detonated. This proposed definition is identical to the
NASA definition for ``TNT equivalent,'' and similar to the DOD
definition of ``explosive equivalent'' which defines the term, in
relevant part, as ``(t)he amount of a standard explosive that, when
detonated, will produce a blast effect comparable to that which results
at the same distances from the

[[Page 34331]]

detonation or explosion of a given amount of the material for which
performance is being evaluated.'' \14\ DOD uses TNT as the standard
explosive, thus rendering the NASA and DOD terms interchangeable. FAA
proposes to use the more general term ``explosive equivalent'' instead
of ``TNT equivalent.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\14\ DOD Standard at A-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Explosive hazard facility means a facility at a launch site where
solid or liquid propellant is stored or handled. The FAA proposes to
define this term for the purpose of identifying specific hazard
facilities on a launch site that present potential explosive hazards.
NASA and DOD use the more general term ``potential explosive site,''
which is defined, in part, as ``the location of a quantity of
explosives that will create a blast fragment, thermal, or debris hazard
in the event of an accidental explosion of its contents. . . .'' \15\
As proposed, an explosive hazard facility may include a location where
explosives are either handled or stored.
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\15\ DOD Standard at A-7; NASA Standard at A-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Flight azimuth means the initial direction in which a launch
vehicle flies relative to true north expressed in degrees-decimal-
degrees. For example, due east is 90 degrees.
Flight corridor means an area on the earth's surface estimated to
contain the majority of hazardous debris from nominal and non-nominal
flight of an orbital or guided sub-orbital launch vehicle.
Guided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub: orbital rocket that
employs an active guidance system.
Impact dispersion area means an area representing an estimated five
standard deviation dispersion about a nominal impact point of an
intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch vehicle. The
definition is confined to proposed part 420, and should not be confused
with other impact dispersion areas that may be defined by the federal
launch ranges for their particular launch safety programs.
Impact dispersion factor means a constant used to estimate, using a
stage apogee, a five standard deviation dispersion about a nominal
impact point of an intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch
vehicle. Intermediate stages include all stages up to the final stage.
Impact dispersion radius (R) means a radius that defines an impact
dispersion area. It applies to all launch vehicle stages.
Impact range means the distance between a launch point and the
impact point of a sub-orbital launch vehicle stage.
Impact range factor means a constant used to estimate, with the use
of a launch vehicle stage apogee, the nominal impact point of an
intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch vehicle.
Instantaneous impact point (IIP) means an impact point, following
thrust termination of a launch vehicle, calculated in the absence of
atmospheric drag effects, that is, a vacuum. This shows the point at
which launch vehicle debris would land in the event thrust was
terminated. In this proposal, the IIP calculations would assume a
vacuum.
Instantaneous impact point (IIP) range rate means a launch
vehicle's estimated IIP velocity along the Earth's surface. It is
typically abbreviated as R, or R-dot.
Intraline distance means the minimum distance permitted between any
two explosive hazard facilities in the ownership, possession or control
of one launch site customer. Intraline distance prevents the
propagation of an explosion. In other words, with an appropriate
intraline distance, an explosive mishap at one explosive hazard
facility would not cause an explosive event at another explosive hazard
facility. The FAA anticipates that worker safety requirements will
dictate protection of employees and anticipates that all licensees will
familiarize themselves with those requirements and conform to them in
accordance with the law. Unlike distances used to protect the public,
intraline distance will not protect workers with the same level of
protection as the public. NASA defines intraline distance as ``(t)he
distance to be maintained between any two operating buildings and sites
within an operating line, of which at least one contains or is designed
to contain explosives, . . .''.\16\ Thus, for NASA, the criteria for
using intraline distance is whether the areas are within an operating
line. An operating line is a ``group of buildings used to perform the
consecutive steps in the loading, assembling, modification, normal
maintenance, renovation, or salvaging of an item or in the manufacture
of an explosive or explosive device.'' \17\ The FAA's proposed
definition is more suitable to its statutory obligation to protect
public safety because public safety dictates only that explosive hazard
facilities of one launch operator be sited in a manner to prevent the
propagation of an explosion. If intraline distances are not maintained
between two explosive hazard facilities, then the larger area
encompassing both quantities must be used for Q-D purposes when
determining prescribed distances to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\16\ NASA Standard at A-7.
\17\ NASA Standard at A-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Launch area means, for a flight corridor defined using appendix A,
the portion of a flight corridor from the launch point to a point 100
nm in the direction of the flight azimuth. For a flight corridor
defined using appendix B, a launch site is the portion of a flight
corridor from the launch point to the enveloping line enclosing the
outer boundary of the last Di dispersion circle.
Launch point means a point on the earth from which the flight of a
launch vehicle begins, and is defined by the point's geodetic latitude,
longitude and height on an ellipsoidal Earth model.
Launch site accident means an unplanned event occurring during a
ground activity at a launch site resulting in a fatality or serious
injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who is not associated
with the activity, or any damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to
property not associated with the activity. The FAA considers any
licensee or its employees, or any licensee customer, contractor, or
subcontractor or the employees of any of these persons to be associated
with a ground activity. Property not associated with the activity will
typically include any property belonging to members of the public or
personal property of employees. Property associated with the activity
includes the property of a launch site operator or launch licensee, or
either licensee's customers, contractors or subcontractors.
Net explosive weight (NEW) means the total weight, expressed in
pounds, of explosive material or explosive equivalency contained in an
item. This term is used for applying Q-D criteria to solid propellants,
and for liquid propellants when explosive equivalency applies.
Explosive equivalency applies to liquid propellants when a liquid fuel
and a liquid oxidizer are close enough together that their explosive
potential combined must be used when determining prescribed distances
to the public.
Nominal means, in reference to launch vehicle performance,
trajectory, or stage impact point, a launch vehicle flight where all
launch vehicle aerodynamic parameters are as expected, all vehicle
internal and external systems perform exactly as planned, and there are
no external perturbing influences (e.g., winds) other than atmospheric
drag and gravity.
Nominal trajectory means the position and velocity components of a
nominally

[[Page 34332]]

performing launch vehicle relative to an x,y,z, coordinate system,
expressed in x,y,z,x,y,z. The x,y,z coordinates describe the position
of the vehicle both for projecting the proposed flight path and during
actual flight. The x,y,z variables describe the velocity of the
vehicle.
Overflight dwell time means the period of time it takes for a
launch vehicle's IIP to move past a populated area. For a given
populated area, the overflight dwell time is the time period measure
along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace from the time point whose
normal with the trajectory intersects the most uprange part of the
populated area to the time point whose normal with the trajectory
intersects the most downrange part of the populated area.
Overflight exclusion zone means a portion of a flight corridor
which must remain clear of the public during the flight of a launch
vehicle.
Populated area means a land area with population. For a part 420
site location risk analysis of a populated area within the first 100 nm
of a launch point, a populated area is no greater than a census block
group in the U.S., and an equivalent size outside the U.S. For analysis
of a part 420 flight corridor more than 100 nm downrange from the
launch point, a populated area is no greater than a 1 deg. X 1 deg.
latitude/longitude grid, whether in the United States or not.
Population density means the number of people per unit area in a
populated area.
Position data means data referring to the current position of a
launch vehicle with respect to time using the X, Y, Z coordinate
system.
Public area means any area outside an explosive hazard facility and
is an area that is not in the possession, ownership or other control of
a launch site operator or of a launch site customer who possesses, owns
or otherwise controls that explosive hazard facility. For purposes of
Q-D criteria, the proposed rules treat any location outside a launch
site boundary as a public area for any activity at a launch site.
Certain areas within a launch site are also considered public areas for
purposes of applying Q-D criteria. With respect to any given launch
operator, areas where other launch operators are located, or where the
launch site operator Commission is located, are public areas.
Public area distance means the minimum separation distance
permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard facility.
Although NASA and DoD differentiate between areas that contain
inhabited buildings and areas that contain public traffic routes, with
inhabited buildings requiring greater separation distances, the FAA's
proposed requirements does not make the same differentiation.\18\ The
FAA proposes to use NASA's and DoD's more conservative inhabited
building distance as the required distance between an explosive hazard
facility and all public areas. This is because a public area is not in
the control of the applicant, and can, therefore, contain anything from
open land to groups of office buildings. This is consistent with the
approach taken by NASA and DoD for areas outside a launch site. For
example, NASA defines inhabited building distance as ``(t)he minimum
allowable distance between an inhabited building and an explosive area.
Inhabited building distances are used between explosives areas and
administrative areas, also between operating lines with dissimilar
hazards and between explosive locations and other exposures. Inhabited
building distances will also be provided between explosive areas and
Center boundaries.''\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\18\ Nor does the FAA attempt to protect inhabited buildings
that are not considered property of the public.
\19\ NASA Standard at A-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub-orbital rocket that
does not have a guidance system.
X,Y,Z coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed,
topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system
is at a launch point. The X-axis coincides with the initial launch
azimuth and is positive in the downrange direction. The Y-axis is
positive to the left looking downrange. The XY-plane is tangent to the
ellipsoidal earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to
the geodetic vertical. The Z-axis is normal to the XY-plane and
positive directed away from the earth.
0, 0, 0
means a latitude, longitude, height system where 0
is the geodetic latitude of a launch point, 0 is
the east longitude of the launch point, and h is the height of the
launch point above a reference ellipsoid. 0 and
0 are expressed in degrees decimal degrees, which
is abbreviated as DDD.
Proposed subpart B would contain the criteria and information
requirements for obtaining a license to operate a launch site. Section
420.15 would specify the information that an applicant for a launch
site license would have to submit as part of its license application.
The FAA requires this information to evaluate environmental impacts,
whether the launch site location could safely be used to conduct
launches, issues affecting national security and foreign policy,
explosive site safety, and whether the applicant will operate safely.
Proposed Sec. 420.15(a) contains the environmental review
requirements currently located at Sec. 417.105-107.
Proposed Sec. 420.15(b) would provide the information necessary for
a location review. It would also require foreign ownership information
and an explosive site plan.
Proposed Sec. 420.15(c) requires an applicant to demonstrate how it
will satisfy its subpart D responsibilities. Specifically, a license
applicant must show how the applicant proposes to control public access
pursuant to Sec. 420.53, how it proposes to comply with the scheduling
requirements of Sec. 420.55, and how it proposes to satisfy the
notification obligations of Sec. 420.57. The FAA requires this
information to ascertain whether an applicant will be able to satisfy
the subpart D performance requirements and for compliance monitoring
purposes. With regard to the notification obligations of Sec. 420.57,
an applicant must submit its agreements with the U.S. Coast Guard
district and the FAA regional office for air traffic services to
demonstrate satisfaction of the requirements of Sec. 420.57(b) and (c).
A license applicant must also show how it proposes to comply with the
accident investigation requirements in Sec. 420.59 and requirements on
explosives in Sec. 420.63.
Proposed Sec. 420.15(d) provides that an applicant who is proposing
to locate a launch site at an existing launch point at a federal launch
range is not required to perform a location review if a launch vehicle
of the same type and class as proposed for the launch point has been
safely launched from the launch point. An applicant who is proposing to
locate at a federal launch range is not required to submit an explosive
site plan.
Section 420.17 would establish the bases upon which the FAA will
make its license determination. This includes the FAA's determination
of the adequacy of information provided by the applicant, the
conclusions of the environmental and policy reviews, the adequacy of
the explosive site plan, and satisfaction of site location
requirements. The FAA will notify the applicant of, and allow the
applicant to address, any deficiencies in the application.
Section 420.19 would require an applicant to demonstrate that its
proposed launch site location will allow for the safe launch of at
least one type of launch vehicle by defining flight corridors or impact
dispersion areas and estimating casualty expectancy.

[[Page 34333]]

Section 420.21 would require an applicant to specify which launch
vehicle type and class would be launched from each launch point at the
proposed launch site. This section also proposes to define the minimum
distance from each launch point to a launch site boundary.\20\ The
three types of expendable launch vehicle proposed account for the
critical distinctions between launch vehicles designed for orbital or
sub-orbital flight, and between those with and without guidance
systems. Guided orbital expendable launch vehicles typically require an
FTS, which means that the greatest risk to the public stems from debris
caused by destruction of a vehicle. Guided sub-orbital launch vehicles
will be treated similarly to orbital launch vehicles, except for the
nominal impact of the final stage. In contrast, unguided sub-orbital
launch vehicles generally have high reliability levels, and therefore
crate the greatest public risk through nominal stage impact. The
methods proposed in the appendices are designed to account for these
differences in public risk. Orbital expendable launch vehicles are also
sorted by class, which is determined by payload weight capacity.
Minimum distances are based on actual computations for each of the
launch vehicle types and classes. The safety of launch points for
reusable launch vehicles will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in a
manner consistent with the principles expressed here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\20\ The FAA also proposed minimum distances between a launch
point and a launch site boundary in its explosive site plan
requirements in subpart B. Because both requirements apply, an
applicant must apply the greater of the Dmax or Q-D
distance to accommodate the greater of the hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 420.23 would state that the FAA will evaluate the adequacy
of a launch site location for unproven launch vehicles on a case-by-
case basis.
Subpart B also contains the FAA's proposed explosive facility
siting standards for the protection of the public from launch site
explosive hazards created by liquid and solid propellants. These
standards would be used by an applicant to site facilities that support
activities involving liquid and solid propellants, or facilities
potentially exposed to such activities, and to document the layout of
these facilities.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\21\ An analysis may include evaluations of blast hazards;
fragment hazards; protective construction; grounding, bounding and
lighting protection systems; electrical installations; natural or
man-made terrain features; or other mission or local requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In order to comply with proposed subpart B, an applicant would
first determine those areas at its proposed launch site where solid or
liquid propellant would be stored or handled, and which the FAA
proposes to designate as explosive hazard facilities. They may include
payload processing facilities, launch pads, propellant storage or
transfer tanks, and solid rocket motor assembly buildings. An applicant
must then determine the types and maximum quantity of propellants to be
located at each explosive hazard facility. For solid propellants, the
applicant would determine the total weight, expressed in pounds, of
division 1.3 explosive material to be contained in the items that will
be located at each explosive hazard facility. For liquid propellants,
the applicant would determine either the explosive equivalency of a
fuel and oxidizer combination if fuels and oxidizers would be located
together at, what is referred to as, incompatible distances; or, if
fuels and oxidizers would not be located together, an applicant would
determine the net weight in pounds of liquid propellant in each
explosive hazard facility.
The next step for an applicant would be to determine the minimum
allowable separation distance between each explosive hazard facility
and all other explosive hazard facilities, the launch site boundary,
and other public areas such as the launch complex of another launch
operator, public railways and highways running through the launch site,
and any visitor centers. The distances between explosive hazard
facilities are important to ensure that an explosive event in one
explosive hazard facility would not cause an explosive event in another
explosive hazard facility. The distances between explosive hazard
facilities and public areas are important to ensure that the public is
protected from blast, debris, and thermal hazards. Exact distances must
be given between the wall or corner of the facility closest to the
closest wall or corner of other explosive hazard facilities and public
areas. Minimum allowable distances based on the type and quantity of
propellant to be located within an explosive hazard facility.
Determining the minimum allowable distance between two explosive hazard
facilities is accomplished by applying the applicable criteria to each
and then separating them by at least the greater distance prescribed
for each explosive hazard facility. For example, if a certain amount of
division 1.3 solid propellant would be located at explosive hazard
facility A, and twice as much division 1.3 solid propellant would be
located at explosive hazard facility B, the prescribed distance
generated by explosive hazard facility B would serve as the minimum
distance permitted between explosive hazard facility A and explosive
hazard facility B.
Proposed Sec. 420.31(a) would require an applicant to provide the
FAA an explosive site plan that establishes that the applicant's
proposed distances satisfy the explosive siting criteria. The explosive
site plan must include a scaled map or maps that show the location of
all proposed explosive hazard facilities where solid and liquid
propellants would be stored or handled.\22\ An applicant must include
the class and division for each solid propellant and the hazard and
compatibility group for each liquid propellant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\22\ Areas where solid propellants would be stored would be
included in the plan even though ATF requirements apply. Applicants
with magazines where solid propellants are to be stored must obtain
an ATF permit and meet ATF quantity-distance requirements. The FAA
will use the information to ensure that those of its requirements
unrelated to storage are satisfied and to coordinate with ATF when
necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition to the location of explosive hazard facilities, the map
or maps would indicate actual and minimum allowable distances between
each explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard facilities
and each public area, including the launch site boundary. One means by
which an applicant could show that the distances are at least the
minimum required in the proposed rules would be by drawing a circle or
arc with a radius equal to the minimum allowed distance centered on
each explosive hazard facility.
Unlike the DOD and NASA standards, which both define numerous
separation distances, the proposed rules define only two distances for
solid propellants, namely, a public area distance and an intraline
distance. Public area distance would serve as the minimum distance
permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard facility.
Facilities and other infrastructure such as roads, railways, and
inhabited buildings may or may not be public areas, depending on
whether the public has access at the time explosives are present in the
explosive hazard facility. Examples include a public road or railroad
running through a launch site, and a visitor center where members of
the public would be located.\23\ Likewise,

[[Page 34334]]

different launch site customers are also considered the public with
respect to each other. Intraline distance would provide the minimum
distance permitted between any two explosive hazard facilities used by
one launch site customer. In this regard, for planning purposes, an
applicant should bear in mind that using the greater public area
distance would avoid later operational constraints when different
customers wanted to use facilities sited at intraline distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\23\ A launch site operator who does not wish to employ the
appropriate public area distance between an explosive hazard
facility and public areas such as, for example, a visitor center,
must propose operational limitations in its application. These would
consist of such strictures as not allowing members of the public in
the visitor center while explosives are present in the explosive
hazard facility not sited according to the proposed requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition to containing maps, an explosive site plan would also
describe, through tables or lists, the maximum quantities of liquid and
solid propellants to be located at each explosive hazard facility, and
the activities to be conducted within each explosive hazard facility.
Pursuant to proposed Sec. 420.31(b), the requirement to submit an
explosive site plan to the FAA would not apply to an applicant applying
for a license to operate a launch site at a federal launch range.
Federal launch ranges have separate rules which are either identical or
similar to the rules proposed, or require mitigation measures which
otherwise ensure safety.
The criteria for determining the minimum required distances between
each explosive hazard facility and all other explosive hazard
facilities and each public area, including the launch site boundary,
are proposed in Sec. 420.33 for solid propellants and Sec. 420.35 for
liquid propellants. Proposed Sec. 420.37 includes rules for when liquid
and solid propellants are located together.
Proposed Sec. 420.33 covers quantity determinations and minimum
required distances for explosive hazard facilities where solid
propellants would be handled. Under proposed Sec. 420.33(a), an
applicant would first determine the maximum total quantity of explosive
in each explosive hazard facility where solid propellants would be
handled. The total quantity of explosives in an explosive hazard
facility shall be the maximum total weight, expressed in pounds, of
division 1.3 explosive material in the contents of the explosive hazard
facility. For example, if a facility could hold up to ten solid rocket
motors of a particular type, even though it might only rarely hold that
many motors, the applicant would calculate the total weight of division
1.3 explosive material in the ten motors.
The proposed rules are based on an assumption that only division
1.3 solid propellant will be located at a launch site in sufficient
quantities to affect facility location. The FAA is aware that the
launch vehicle used for the first launch from Kodiak Launch Complex, a
launch site operated by the recently licensed Alaska Aerospace
Development Corporation (AADC), had a second stage motor with division
1.1 propellant. The FAA believes this will be a rare occurrence in the
future. The FAA realizes that 1.1 explosives, such as those used in
launch operator's flight termination system, will also likely be
located at a launch site. However, current practice is to design such
components so as not to be able to initiate division 1.3 components
when installed on a vehicle. The FAA anticipates that it will require
any licensed launch operator to demonstrate that its 1.1 devices do not
initiate 1.3 components as is the current practice at federal launch
ranges. Therefore, the amount of such ordnance used with division 1.3
explosives may be disregarded for Q-D purposes. The total quantity of
explosives shall be the NEW of the division 1.3 components.
Once an applicant has determined the total quantity of solid
propellants in each explosive hazard facility, proposed Sec. 420.33(b)
would require an applicant to separate each explosive hazard facility
where solid propellants will be handled from all other explosive hazard
facilities and each public area, including the launch site boundary, in
accordance with the minimum separation distances contained in proposed
table E-1 in appendix E. Table E-1 provides two distances for each
quantity level. The first, a public area distance, is the minimum
distance permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard
facility. The second, an intraline distance, is the minimum distance
permitted between any two explosive hazard facilities used by one
launch site customer. Other explosive hazard facilities may constitute
public areas, because the definition of public area includes any area
in the possession or ownership, or otherwise under the control of a
launch site operator's other customers. Distance calculations would be
made accordingly. Table E-1 contains the same distances as the NASA and
DOD standards, except that the DOD standard has more increments. An
applicant may use linear interpolation for quantity values between
those provided in the table. Additionally, because table E-1 does not
include quantities greater than 1,000,000 pounds, an applicant with an
explosive hazard facility where solid propellants in quantities greater
than 1,000,000 pounds would be handled would use the equations proposed
in Sec. 420.33(b) to obtain separation distances.
An applicant would measure a separation distance from the closest
source of debris or hazard under proposed Sec. 420.33(c). For example,
for a building, an applicant would use for measurement the wall or
corner of the facility closet to the closest wall or corner of other
explosive hazard facilities and public areas. When solid rocket motors
or motor segments are freestanding, an applicant would measure from the
closest motor or motor segment. An acceptable way to demonstrate that
minimum distance requirements are met is to draw a circle or arc
centered on the closest source of debris or hazard showing that no
other explosive hazard facility or public area is within the distance
permitted.
Note that Q-D requirements address siting of facilities, not
operational control of hazard areas. During actual operations, the
existence and size of a hazard area is dependent on the actual amount
of explosive material in an explosive hazard facility.
Proposed Sec. 420.35 covers quantity determinations and distance
requirements for explosive hazard facilities that support the storage
or handling of liquid propellants. In addition to applying to distances
between an explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard
facilities and public areas, distance requirements may apply within an
explosive hazard facility as well.
Liquid propellants are classified and separated differently than
solid propellants. Where solid propellants are classified by class and
division, each liquid propellant is assigned to one of three hazard
groups and one of two compatibility groups. A hazard group categorizes
liquid propellants according to the hazards they cause. Hazard group 1
represents a fire hazard, hazard group 2 represents a more serious fire
hazard, and, because a liquid propellant in hazard group 3 can rupture
a storage container, it represents a fragmentation hazard. Each liquid
propellant also falls into one of two compatibility groups. Liquid
propellants are compatible when storing them together does not increase
the probability of an accident or, for a given quantity of propellant,
the magnitude of the effects of such an accident. Propellants in the
same compatibility group do not increase the probability or magnitude
of an accident. The two proposed compatibility groups consist of fuels
and oxidizers, and are what the NASA and DOD standards label A and C.
The FAA proposes to use the same labeling to provide continuity.
Proposed group A represents oxidizers

[[Page 34335]]

such as LO2 and N2O4, and proposed group C represents fuels such as RP-
1 and LH2. Proposed appendix E provides the hazard and compatibility
groups for current launch vehicle liquid propellants in table E-3.
Explosive equivalency serves as another source of difference
between the treatment of solid and liquid propellants. Only if fuels
and oxidizers are to be located within certain distances of each other
would the separation requirements designed to account for the hazardous
consequences of their potential combination apply. That combination is
measured in terms of explosive equivalency. Explosive equivalency for
liquid propellants is a measure of the blast effects from explosion of
a given quantity of fuel and oxidizer mixture expressed in terms of the
weight of TNT that would produce the same blast effects when detonated.
Fuels should not be located near oxidizers if possible. The
significance of the hazard groups and compatibility groups is that if
fuels are located far enough from oxidizers, the minimum distance
requirements to public areas and other explosive hazard facilities
depend only on the quantity and hazard group of the individual liquid
propellants. If operational requirements require fuels and oxidizers to
be located near each other, that is, at less than the minimum public
area and incompatible distances proposed in tables E-4, E-5 and E-6,
the explosive equivalency of the incompatible propellants must be
calculated and used to determine the distances proposed in table E-7 to
other explosive hazard facilities and public areas.
Appendix E contains four distance tables with separation
requirements for liquid propellants. Tables E-4, E-5 and E-6 contain
separation distances for hazard group 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Table
E-7 contains separation distances for when fuels and oxidizers are
located less than prescribed distances apart so that explosive
equivalency applies. Table E-7 contains distances similar to those for
1.1 solid explosives. This is because the ``explosive equivalency'' of
a fuel and oxidizer mixture is measured in terms of its equivalent
explosive blast effect to TNT, which is a class 1.1 explosive. Table E-
7 also prescribes public area and intraline distances.
Tables E-4, E-5, and E-6 have two distances listed for each
quantity of liquid propellant by hazard group. The first, a ``public
area and incompatible'' distance, is the minimum distance permitted
between a given quantity of liquid propellant and a public area. The
distance is also the same distance by which incompatible propellants
must be separated (e.g. the minimum distance between a fuel and an
oxidizer) for explosive equivalency and Table E-7 not to apply to the
distance calculations. The second, an ``intragroup and compatible''
distance, is the distance by which propellants in the same hazard
group, or propellants in the same compatibility group must be separated
(e.g. the minimum distance between two fuels) to avoid adding the
quantity of each propellant container being separated in calculating
distances. This is simply because if two propellant tanks are far
enough apart, they cannot react with one another, even were a mishap to
occur. This introduces the third difference between liquid propellant
separation requirements and the requirements for solid propellants.
The third area where liquid propellant separation requirements are
different than those for solid propellants may be found in calculations
of the quantity of liquid propellant that determines the distance
relationship with other explosive hazard facilities and public areas.
Quantity calculations may depend on distance. As an example, suppose
one was determining the minimum distance required between a tank farm
having many containers of fuel, and a launch site boundary. If the
containers were all close together the applicant would simply take the
total amount of fuel, look up the ``public area and incompatible''
distance in the table that corresponded to the hazard group of the
fuel, and ensure that the distance between the closest wall or corner
of the explosive hazard facility and the launch site boundary was at
least the distance listed in the table. However, if the containers were
separated from each other so that the distance between each container
met the minimum ``intragroup and compatible'' \24\ distance in the
table, the total quantity of propellant to be used for the ``public
area'' distance determination is only the quantity in each container.
Therefore, as discussed below, although quantity determination
requirements may be found in proposed Sec. 420.35(a) and proposed
Sec. 420.35(b) contains distance determination requirements, quantity
determinations for liquid propellants may depend on distances between
containers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\24\ The category is called ``intragroup and compatible'' to
cover propellants that are in different hazard groups but are still
compatible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Like the procedure for solid propellant quantity and distance
determinations, an applicant's first step in siting liquid propellants
would be to determine the quantity of liquid propellant or, if
applicable, the explosive equivalent of the liquid propellant to be
located in each explosive hazard facility. An applicant determines this
through three steps specified in proposed Sec. 420.35(a). First,
proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(1) states that the quantity of propellant in a
tank, drum, cylinder, or other container is the net weight in pounds of
the propellant in that container. The weight of liquid propellant in
associated piping must be included in the determination of quantity to
any point where positive means, such as shutoff valves, are provided
for interrupting the flow through the pipe, or for interrupting a
reaction in the pipe in the event of a mishap.
Next, proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(2) applies when two or more
containers of compatible propellants are stored together in an
explosive hazard facility. When liquid propellants are compatible, the
quantity of propellant used to determine the minimum separation
distance between the explosive hazard facility and other explosive
hazard facilities and public areas shall be the total quantity of
liquid propellant in all containers unless either the containers are
separated one from the other by the ``intragroup and compatible''
distance contained in appendix E, table E-4, E-5 or E-6, depending on
the hazard group, or the containers are subdivided by intervening
barriers to prevent their mixing. In those two cases, the quantity of
propellant in the explosive hazard facility requiring the greatest
separation distance must be used to determine the minimum separation
distance between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive
hazard facilities and public areas.
Finally, proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(3) applies to quantity
determinations when two or more containers of incompatible liquid
propellants are stored together in an explosive hazard facility. If
each container is not separated from every other container by the
``public area and incompatible'' distances identified in appendix E,
tables E-4, E-5 and E-6, an applicant must determine the total quantity
of explosives by calculating the explosive equivalent in pounds of the
combined liquids, using NASA formulas contained in table E-2, to
determine the minimum separation distance between the explosive hazard
facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas. If the
containers are, in fact, to be separated one from the other by the
appropriate ``incompatible'' distance, an applicant would determine the
minimum separation distance to another explosive hazard facility or
public area using the quantity of propellant within the explosive
hazard facility requiring the greatest separation distance. For

[[Page 34336]]

example, if 50 pounds of hazard group 1 fuel were 31 feet from 150
pounds of hazard group 1 fuel, the minimum required distance to a
public area would be 35 feet, reflecting the public area distance
required by the greater quantity of fuel.
Proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(4) requires an applicant to convert liquid
propellant quantities from gallons to pounds using conversion factors
in table E-3, and the equation provided. The proposed requirement
reflects a NASA standard.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\25\ NASA Standard at 7-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

After an applicant has determined the quantity of liquid propellant
or, if applicable, the explosive equivalent of the liquid propellants
to be located in each explosive hazard facility, an applicant must then
determine the separation distances between each explosive hazard
facility and public areas. Proposed Sec. 420.35(b) specifies the rules
by which an applicant determines the separation distances between
propellants within explosive hazard facilities, and between explosive
hazard facilities and public areas. An applicant would first use table
E-3 to determine hazard and compatibility groups. An applicant would
then separate propellants from each other and from each public area
using at least the distances provided in tables E-4 through E-7. With
one exception, as discussed below, tables E-1 and E-7 reflect the NASA
standard.
Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(1) would require that an applicant measure
minimum separation distances from the container, building, or positive
cutoff point in piping which is closet to each public area or explosive
hazard facility requiring separation.
Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(2) would impose a minimum separation
distance between compatible propellants. An applicant would measure the
separation distance between compatible propellants using the
``intragroup and compatible'' distance for the propellant quantity and
group that requires the greater distance prescribed in tables E-4, E-5,
and E-6. The distance between any two propellants is computed by first
determining what the minimum required distances is for each propellant
based on the quantity and hazard group of that propellant. The one
requiring the greater distance is controlling for the pair.
Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(3) would apply to the minimum separation
distance between incompatible propellants. An applicant would have to
measure the separation distance between propellants of different
compatibility groups using the ``public area and incompatible''
distance from the propellant quantity and group that requires the
greater distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6, unless the
propellants of different compatibility groups are subdivided by
intervening barriers to prevent their mixing. If intervening barriers
are to be present, the minimum separation distance shall then be the
``intragroup and compatible'' distance for the propellant quantity and
group that requires the greater distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5,
and E-6.
Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(4) would apply to the separation of liquid
propellants from public areas. An applicant shall separate these
propellants from public areas using no less than the ``public area''
distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.
Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(5) would apply to propellants where
explosive equivalents apply prescribed by subparagraph (a)(3). An
applicant shall separate each explosive hazard facility that will
contain propellants where explosive equivalents apply from all other
explosive hazard facilities that are under the control of the same
customer public areas is the public area distance in table E-7. Table
E-7 is a revised form of the NASA standard.
Proposed Sec. 420.37 would specify the rules to be used when solid
and liquid propellants are located together, such as at launch pads and
test stands. For applicants proposing an explosive hazard facility
where solid and liquid propellants are to be located together,
Sec. 420.37 provides three steps that an applicant should use to
determine the minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard
facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas. An
applicant would first determine the minimum separation distances
between the explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard
facilities and public areas required for the solid propellants alone,
in accordance with proposed Sec. 420.33. An applicant would then
determine the minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard
facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas
required for the liquid propellants alone, in accordance with
Sec. 420.35. If explosive equivalents apply, an applicant would
determine the minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard
facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas
required for the liquid propellants using appendix E, table E-7F, in
accordance with Sec. 420.35. An applicant would then apply the greater
of the distances determined by the liquid propellant alone or the solid
propellant alone.
Subpart C contains license term and conditions. Section 420.41
would specify the authority granted to a launch site operator by a
license and the licensee's obligation to comply with representations
contained in the license application as well as the FAA's license terms
and conditions. The provision limits a licensee's authority to the
launch points on the launch site and to the types of launch vehicles
used to demonstrate the safety of the launch site location, and, for
orbital launch vehicles, to vehicles no larger than the class analyzed.
The provision would also clarify the licensee's obligation to comply
with any other laws or regulations applicable to its licensed
activities and identifies certain rights that are not conveyed by a
launch site operator license.
Section 420.43 would specify the duration of a license to operate a
launch site, the grounds for shortening the term, and that a license
may be renewed.
Section 420.45 would provide the procedures that an applicant must
follow to obtain FAA approval for the transfer of an existing license
to operate a launch site.
Section 420.47 would specify the procedures that the FAA would
allow to modify a license through a license order or written approval,
and the procedures that a launch site operator licensee must follow to
obtain an FAA license modification. A licensee must obtain a license
modification if the licensee proposes to operate the launch site in a
manner not authorized by its license. This means, among other things,
that if a representation in the license application regarding an issue
material to public safety is no longer accurate or does not describe
the licensee's operation or intended operation of the site, a licensee
must obtain a license modification. This is because the representations
a licensee makes in its application become part of the terms and
conditions of its license.
A licensee must obtain FAA approval prior to modifying its
operations. For example, a licensee whose application stated that it
would prevent unauthorized access to its launch site through the use of
security personnel might decide, in the course of its operation, that
physical barriers might better serve to accomplish this goal. The FAA
considered that, on the one hand, the ability to immediately institute
a change might best control public access because if a licensee has to
wait for its license to be modified prior to instituting a change,
needed safety improvements might be unnecessarily delayed. On the other
hand, the FAA's

[[Page 34337]]

mandate requires that it first ascertain whether the proposed change is
indeed acceptable. Accordingly, the FAA decided that it must first be
advised of a proposed change and must approve its implementation. In
the event of special circumstances and where safety warrants, the FAA
will work with a licensee to accommodate any timing problems.
Proposed Sec. 420.47 also specifies the procedures for a licensee
to obtain and the FAA to issue a license modification. The FAA could
modify a license using a written approval rather than a license order
in cases where the change addresses an activity or condition that was
represented in the license application but not spelled out in a license
order.
Section 420.49 would impose an obligation on a launch site operator
licensee, its customers, and its contractors to cooperate with the FAA
in compliance monitoring of licensed activities. This requirement
recognizes an FAA compliance monitor's need to observe operations
conducted by all parties at the site and to have access to records and
personnel if the FAA is to be assured that public safety is being
protected.
Subpart D contains the responsibilities of a licensee. Section
420.51 would describe a licensee's obligation to operate its launch
site in accordance with the representations in its license application,
49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, ch. 701 and the FAA's regulations.
Section 420.53 would require a launch site operator licensee to
control public access to the launch site and to protect the public
present at the launch site. The proposed regulation seeks to protect
the public from the consequences of flight and pre-flight activities by
separating the public from hazardous launch procedures. The public
could also be at risk if allowed to enter the launch site or move about
without adequate safeguards. This provision would require the licensee
to prevent the public from gaining unauthorized access to the launch
site. The applicant would be given broad discretion in selecting the
method for controlling access. The provision would also hold the
licensee responsible for informing members of the public of safety
precautions before entry and for warning of emergencies on-site. A
licensee would also be responsible for escorting the public between
harzard areas not otherwise controlled by a launch operator at the
launch site, and employing warning signals or alarms to notify persons
on the launch site of any emergency.
Section 420.55 would require a licensee to develop and implement
procedures to coordinate operations carried out by launch site
customers, including launch operators, and their contractors. This
requirement is necessary to ensure that the operations of one launch
site customer do not interact with the operations of another customer
to create a public safety hazard at the launch site or beyond. For
example, the testing of equipment using radio frequency transmissions
could trigger ordnance used by someone elsewhere on the site, if the
two launch preparation activities are not coordinated or warnings
issued. Likewise, hazardous operations by one customer with the
potential to reach another customer must be coordinated by the launch
site operator. A launch site licensee would be required to ensure that
all customers at the site are informed of procedures and adhere to
scheduling requirements before commencing operations at the launch
site.
Section 420.57 would establish notification requirements for a
licensee. The licensee would be responsible for notifying customers of
any limitations on use of the site. This provision would ensure that
customer activities re compatible with other activities at the launch
site. It would also ensure that limitations on the use of facilities
provided to customers by a launch site operator are communicated to the
customer. The licensee will be responsible for possessing agreements
with the Coast Guard to arrange for issuance of Notices to Mariners
during launches and with the regional FAA office for Notice to Airmen
and closure of air routes. In addition, the licensee will notify local
officials and landowners adjacent to the launch site of the flight
schedule. This provision places an on-going responsibility on the site
operator licensee for establishing notification procedures, rather than
on the numerous launch licensees whose involvement with the launch site
may be more sporadic and temporary. The proposed requirement would,
however, leave open the option of a launch licensee implementing the
procedures established by the launch site operator.
Section 420.59 would require a licensee to development and
implement a launch site accident investigation plan containing
procedures for reporting, investigating and responding to a launch site
accident. The provision would extend reporting, investigation and
response procedures currently applicable to launch related accidents
and incidents to accidents occurring during round activities at a
launch site. The proposed rule allows launch site operators to satisfy
the requirements of Sec. 420.59 by using accident investigation
procedures developed in accordance with the requirements of the U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) at 29 CFR 1910.119
and 120, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at 40 CFR
part 68, to the extent that the procedures include the elements
provided Sec. 420.59.\26\ The FAA wishes to ease the regulatory burden
here and in other parts of the proposed rules where other federal
regulatory agencies impose requirements on launch site operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\26\ The EPA's requirements in 40 CFR part 68 apply to
``incidents which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in
a catastrophic release.'' 40 CFR 68.60(a). OSHA's requirements in 29
CFR 1910.119 are similar, applying to ``each incident which resulted
in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release of a
highly hazardous chemical in the workplace.'' 29 CFR 1910.119(m)(l).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

OSHA's standard at 29 CFR 1910.119 includes provisions for
investigating incidents and emergency response. See 29 CFR 1910.119(m)
and (n). In addition, 29 CFR 1910.120, hazardous waste operations and
emergency response (HAZWOPER), provides for emergency response planning
for operations involving hazardous materials, including those listed by
the Department of Transportation under 49 CFR 172.101.\27\ Launch
operators and launch site operator in compliance with these
requirements will be taking steps to protect the public as well as
their workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\27\ Hazardous materials in AST regulations, Sec. 401.5, are
defined as hazardous materials as defined in 49 CFR 172.101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

EPA's requirements at 40 CFR part 68 also include standards for
incident investigation and emergency response. See 40 CFR 68.60, 68.81,
68.90, and 68.180. for both the OSHA and EPA requirements, compliance
with 42 U.S.C. 11003, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know,
satisfies many of the emergency response provisions.
The FAA is interested in the public's view of proposed Sec. 420.59,
particularly the extent to which other regulatory agency requirements
such as OSHA and EPA help to ensure launch site operators respond to an
investigate launch site accidents.
Section 420.61 would provide the requirements for launch site
operator retention or records, data, and other material needed to
verify that launch site operator operations are conducted in accordance
with representations contained in the licensee, and for recorded
production in the event of

[[Page 34338]]

launch site accident investigation, or compliance monitoring.
Section 420.63 would provide responsibilities of a launch site
operator regarding explosives. Section 420.63(a) would require a launch
site operator to ensure that the configuration of the launch site is in
accordance with the licensee's explosive site plan, and that its
explosive site plan is in compliance with the requirements in
Secs. 420.31-420.37.
Section 420.63(b) would require a launch site operator to ensure
that the public is not exposed to hazards due to the initiation of
explosives by lightning. Unless an explosive hazard facility has a
lightning warning system to permit termination of operations and
withdrawal of the public to public area distance prior to the incidence
of an electrical storm, or the explosive hazard facility is to contain
explosives that cannot be initiated by lightning, it must have a
lightning protection system to ensure explosives are not initiated by
lightning. A lightning protection system shall include an air terminal
to intentionally attract a lightning strike, a low impedance path--
called a down conductor--connecting an air terminal to an earth
electrode system, and an earth electrode system to dissipate the
current from a lightning strike to ground.
Because no lightning protection system is necessary if a launch
site operator has a lightning warning system to permit termination of
operations and withdrawal of the public to public area distance prior
to the incidence of an electrical storm, proposed Sec. 420.63 does not
explicitly protect the public from the inadvertent flight of a solid
rocket motor. The FAA is interested in public views on this point.
A lightning protection system shall also include measures for
bonding and surge protection. For bonding, all metallic bodies shall be
bonded to ensure that voltage potentials due to lightning are equal
everywhere in the explosive hazard facility. Fences within six feet of
the lightning protection system shall have bonds across gates and other
discontinuations and shall be bonded to the lightning protection
system. Railroad tracks that run within six feet of the lightning
protection system shall be bonded to the lightning protection system.
For surge protection, a lightning protection system shall include surge
protection for all metallic power, communication, and instrumentation
lines coming into an explosive hazard facility to reduce transient
voltages due to lightning to a harmless level.
Lightning protection systems shall be visually inspected
semiannually and shall be tested once each year for electrical
continuity and adequacy of grounding. A record of results obtained from
the tests, including action taken to correct deficiencies noted, must
be maintained at the explosive hazard facility.
Section 420.63(c) would require a launch site operator to ensure
that electric power lines on the launch site meet the distance
requirements provided. A full discussion of explosive hazard mitigation
measures is provided in the general preamble above.

Appendix A

Of the two methods the FAA proposes for allowing an applicant to
demonstrate the existence of a guided launch vehicle flight corridor
that satisfies the FAA's risk criteria, appendix A typically offers the
more conservative approach in that it produces a larger area as well as
the more simple of the options available for guided orbital and
suborbital launch vehicles. In order to achieve the simplicity this
approach offers, the FAA based certain decisions regarding the
methodology on a series of what it intends as conservative assumptions
and on hazard areas previously developed by the federal launch ranges
for the guided launch vehicles listed in table 1 of Sec. 420.21.
The greater simplicity of the approach derives from the fact that,
unlike the method of appendix B, an applicant need obtain no
meteorological data and need not plot the trajectory of a particular
launch vehicle. Instead, recognizing that a typical flight corridor
consists of a series of fans of decreasing angle extending out from a
launch point, the FAA proposes, with certain modifications, to employ a
variation on that typical corridor for its proposed appendix A
analysis.
The FAA's proposed appendix A flight corridor estimation contains a
number of elements, each of which an applicant must define for each of
its proposed launch points. An appendix A flight corridor consists of a
circular area around a selected launch point, an overflight exclusion
zone, a launch area and a downrange area. A flight corridor for a
guided orbital launch vehicle ends 5,000 nautical miles from the launch
point, and, for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, the flight corridor
ends with the impact dispersion area of the launch vehicle's final
stage.
Once an applicant has produced an appendix A flight corridor, the
applicant must ascertain whether the flight corridor contains
population, and, if so, whether the use of the corridor would present
unacceptable risk to that population. If so, whether the use of the
corridor would present unacceptable risk to that population. If no
members of the public reside within the corridor, the FAA would approve
the proposed location of the site.\28\ If the flight corridor is
populated, the FAA proposes to require an applicant to perform a risk
analysis as set forth in appendix C. If the proposed corridor satisfies
the FAA's risk criteria, the FAA will approve the location of the site.
If, however, the proposed corridor fails to satisfy the FAA's risk
criteria, an applicant has certain options. The applicant may attempt
another appendix A flight corridor by selecting a different flight
azimuth or by selecting a different launch point at the proposed launch
site, or by selecting a different launch vehicle type or class. Or, the
applicant may, using the more accurate but more complicated
calculations of appendix B, narrow its flight corridor and determine
whether that flight corridor satisfies the FAA's risk criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\28\ An applicant must still obtain written agreements with the
FAA regional office having jurisdiction over the airspace where
launches will take place and, if appropriate, with the U.S. Coast
guard regarding procedures for coordinating launches from the launch
site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

To create a hypothetical flight corridor under proposed appendix A
an applicant must first determine from where on the launch site a
guided launch vehicle would take flight. That position is defined as a
launch point. An applicant must determine the geodetic latitude and
longitude of each launch point that it proposes to offer for launch,
and select a flight azimuth for each launch point. An applicant should
know whether it plans to offer the site for the launch of guided
orbital or sub-orbital launch vehicles. If planning for the launch of
guided orbital launch vehicles, the applicant must decide what launch
vehicle class, as described by payload weight in proposed Sec. 420.21,
table 1, best represents the largest launch vehicle class the launch
site would support.
Once an applicant has made the necessary decisions regarding
location and vehicle class, the next step in creating an appendix A
flight corridor is to look up the maximum distance (Dmax)
that debris is expected to travel from a launch point if a worst-case
launch vehicle failure were to occur and flight termination action
destroyed the launch vehicle at 10 seconds into flight. Dmax
serves as a radius that defines a circular area around the launch
point. The FAA has estimated, on the basis of federal launch range
experience, the Dmax for a guided suborbital launch vehicle
and for

[[Page 34339]]

each guided orbital launch vehicle class and provided the results that
an applicant should employ in table A-1, appendix A.
The circular area, defined by Dmax, is part of an
overflight exclusion zone. An overflight exclusion zone in an appendix
A flight corridor consists of a rectangular area of the length
prescribed by table A-2, capped up-range by a semi-circle with radius
Dmax, centered on the launch point. Its downrange boundary
is defined by an identical semi-circular arc with a radium
Dmax, centered on the endpoint prescribed by table A-2. The
cross-range boundaries consist of two lines parallel to and to either
side of the flight azimuth. Each line is tangent to the upgrade and
downgrade Dmax, circles as shown in appendix A, figure A-1.
An appendix A flight corridor also contains a launch area. The
launch area extends from the uprange boundary, which is coextensive
with the circle created by the radius Dmax, to a line drawn
perpendicular to the flight azimuth one hundred nautical miles down
range of the launch point. The launch area's cross-range boundaries are
a function of the lengths of two lines perpendicular to the flight
azimuth: one drawn ten nautical miles down range from the launch point
and the other line drawn one hundred nautical miles down range from the
launch point. Table A-3 provides the lengths of the line segments.
Adjacent to the launch area is the downrange area. For purposes of
appendix A, a corridor's downrange area extends from the one hundred
nautical miles line to a line, perpendicular to the flight azimuth,
that is 5,000 nautical miles downrange from the launch point for the
guided orbital launch vehicle classes, and to an impact dispersion area
for a guided suborbital launch vehicle corridor. The down range area's
cross-range boundaries connect the prescribed endpoints of the
perpendicular lines at one hundred nautical miles and 5,000 nautical
miles. Table A-3 provides the lengths of the line segments.
All applicants must determine whether the public resides within
this flight corridor. If no populated areas exist, an applicant may
submit its analysis for the FAA's launch site location review. If there
is population located within the flight corridor, the applicant must
calculate the risk to the public following the criteria provided in
appendix C. The expected casualty (Ec) result for the flight
corridor must not exceed 30 x 10^-6 for the applicant to
satisfy the proposed location requirements.

Map Requirements and Plotting Methods

To describe a flight corridor and any populated areas within that
corridor, an applicant must observe data and methodology requirements
for mapping a flight corridor and analyzing populations. These
requirements apply to all appendices.
The FAA proposes to require certain geographical data for use in
describing flight corridors for each appendix. The geographical data
must include the latitude and longitude of each proposed launch point
at a launch site, and all populated areas in a flight corridor. The
accuracy requirement for the launch area portion of the analyses calls
for map scales of no smaller than 1:250,000 inches per inch. The actual
map scale will depend on the smallest census block group size in a
launch area. The FAA bases its proposed scale requirement on average
range rates in the launch area, because range rates have a direct
impact on dwell times over populated areas. While in the launch area of
a flight corridor, the instantaneous impact point (IIP) ground trace
would tend to linger over any populated areas, which increases the
Ec for an individual populated area. The map scale required
by the FAA is large enough to allow an applicant to determine the dwell
time and size for each applicable populated area.
Using a similar approach, the FAA proposes to establish an accuracy
requirement for the downrange area of a flight corridor. A map scale
may be no smaller than 1:20,000,000 inches per inch. The scale would be
smaller than that required for the launch area because the dwell times
over downrange populated areas is small and the map scale must only be
large enough to allow an applicant to determine the dwell time and the
size of each populated area downrange. Maps satisfying these accuracy
requirements are readily available. For example, civil aeronautical
charts are published and distributed by the U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and
are also published by the Defense Mapping Agency and distributed by
NOAA.
Besides scale, the FAA has proposed requirements for projections,
depending on the plotting method used. Proposed appendices A, B, C and
D would require an applicant to use cylindrical, conic, and plane map
projections. The FAA proposes these map projections for the analyses
because they produce only small error with straight line measurements.
Maps may be produced using several different map projections depending
on the map scale, geographic region being depicted, and the
application. A map projection, according to the U.S. Geological
Survey,\29\ is a device for producing all or part of a round body on a
flat sheet. All map projections have inherent distortions. The
distortions are virtually unavoidable and are directly, related to the
techniques for displaying latitude and longitude lines on a flat
surface area. Therefore, many maps are developed for specific
applications requiring that some map characteristics be shown more
accurately at the expense of others. The flight corridor methods are
primarily sensitive to azimuthal direction and geodetic length of the
flight corridor line segments. Therefore, it is important to use map
projections that preserve scale and direction accuracy. Cylindrical,
conic, and plane map projections have been reviewed by the FAA and are
most appropriate types for the launch site application analyses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\29\ Map Projections used by the ``U.S. Geological Survey,''
U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin 1532, 1982.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The regular cylindrical projections consist of meridians, which are
equidistant parallel straight lines, crossed at right angles by
straight parallel lines of latitude, generally not equidistant.
Geometrically, cylindrical projections can be partially developed by
unrolling a cylinder which has been wrapped around a globe representing
the Earth, with the inside of the cylinder touching at the equator, and
on which meridians have been projected from the center of the globe.
When the cylinder is wrapped around the globe in a different direction,
so that it is no longer tangent along the equator, an oblique or
transverse projection results, and neither the meridians nor the
parallels will generally be straight lines.
Normal conic projections are distinguished by the use of arcs of
concentric circles for parallels of latitude and equally spaced
straight radii of those circles for meridians. The angles between the
meridians on the map are smaller than the actual differences in
longitude. The circular arcs may or may not be equally spaced,
depending on the projection. The name ``conic'' originatd from the fact
that the more elementary conic projections may be derived by placing a
cone on the top of a globe representing the Earth, the apex or tip in
line with the axis of the globe, and the sides of the cone touching or
tangent to the globe along a specified ``standard'' latitude which is
true to scale and without distortion.

[[Page 34340]]

Meridians are drawn on the cone from the apex to the points at which
the corresponding meridians on the globe cross the standard parallel.
Other parallels are then drawn as arcs centered on the apex in a manner
depending on the projection. If the cone is cut along one meridian and
unrolled, a conic projection results.
The azimuthal projections are formed onto a plane which is usually
tangent to the globe at either pole, the equator, or any intermediate
point. These variations are called the polar, equatorial (or meridian
or meridional), and oblique (or horizon) aspects, respectively. Some
azimuthals are true perspective projections. Azimuthal projections are
characterized by the fact that the direction, or azimuth, from the
center of the projection to every other point on the map is shown
correctly. The simplest forms of the azimuthal projections are the
polar aspects, in which all meridians are shown as straight lines
radiating at their true angles from the center, while parallels of
latitude are circles concentric about the pole. Most azimuthal maps do
not have standard parallels or standard meridians. Each map has only
one standard point, the center. Thus, the azimuthals are suitable for
minimizing distortion in a somewhat circular region such as Antarctica,
but not for an era with predominant length in one direction.
Scale requirements, geographic location of the launch site, and
plotting method are the main considerations for choosing a map
projection. Of these considerations, the plotting method selected for
development and depiction of the flight corridor line segments is the
most important. Three plotting methods are provided in appendix A.
The ``mechanical method'' is the least complex, least costly, but
also the least accurate of the methods suggested here. Selecting an
appropriate map scale and using a map projection that minimizes
inherent scale and direction distortions can minimize coordinate
plotting errors. The ``Lambert-Conformal'' conic projection is
acceptable because it has characteristics that preserve angles and
scales from any point on the map.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\30\ The projections suggested below for the semi-automated
method are accurate in scale and direction only from a point of
tangency or the standard parallels. These limitations would produce
additional errors when the using mechanical method.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The ``semi-automated method'' provides more accurate techniques for
determining the endpoint coordinates of each flight corridor line
segment. Errors associated with measuring devices and the mapping
medium tend to be the same as those associated with the mechanical
method. Engineering judgment and some map errors are reduced through
the use of range and bearing equations. These equations also allow the
applicant to choose from a wider variety of map projections. The
``Mercator'' and ``Oblique Mercator'' are adequate cylindrical
projections. ``Lambert-Conformal'' and ``Albers Equal-Area'' are
adequate conic projections. The ``Lambert Azimuthal Equal-Area'' and
``Azimuthal Equidistant'' are adequate plane projections. An applicant
may use other maps in support of its application, but the applicant
would be required to demonstrate an equivalent level of accuracy over
the required distances, and would have to describe the consequences of
any mapping errors associated with the proposed map projection.
Each of these projections possesses a number of attributes, which
make some better suited for some parts of the global than others.
Typically, most projections preserve scale and direction when measured
from a point of tangency or along a standard parallel or meridian. A
Mercator projection is cylindrical and conformal, that is, all angles
presented correctly , and for small areas, true shape of features is
maintained. In a Mercator projection, meridians are equally spaced
straight lines and parallels are unequally spaced straight lines,
closest near the equator, cutting meridians at right angles. Scale is
true along the equator, or along two parallels equidistant from the
equator. The Mercator projection may produce great distortion of area
in polar regions.
The Oblique Mercator is cylindrical (oblique) and conformal. It
contains two meridians, 180 deg. apart, which are straight lines. Other
meridians and parallels are complex curves. Scale on the spherical form
is true along a chosen central line, a great circle at an oblique
angle, or along two straight lines parallel to central line. The scale
on the ellipsoidal form is similar, but varies slightly from this
pattern. Scale becomes infinite 90 deg. from the central line.
The Lambert Conformal is conic and conformal. Its parallels are
unequally spaced arcs of concentric circles, more closely spaced near
the center of the map. Meridians are equally spaced radii of the same
circles, and consequently cut parallels at right angles. Scale is true
along two standard parallels normally, or along just one. A pole in the
same hemisphere as standard parallels is a point. The other pole is at
infinity.
The Albers Equal-Area is conic. Parallels are unequally spaced arcs
of concentric circles, more closely spaced at the north and south edges
of the map. Meridians are equally spaced radii of the same circles,
cutting parallels at right angles. There is no distortion in scale or
shape along two standard parallels normally, or along just one. Poles
are arcs of circles.
The Lambert Azimuthal Equal-Area is azimuthal. All meridian in the
polar aspect, the central meridian in other aspects, and the equator in
the equatorial aspect are straight lines. The outer meridian of the
hemisphere in the equatorial aspect, for the sphere, and the parallels
in the polar aspect for sphere or ellipsoid are circles. All other
meridians and parallels are complex curves. Scale decreases radially as
the distance increases from the center, the only point without
distortion.
The Azimuthal Equidistant is azimuthal. Distances measured from the
center are true. Distances not measured along radii from the center are
not correct. The center of projection is the only point without
distortion. Directions from the center are true except on some oblique
and equatorial ellipsoidal forms. All meridians on the polar aspect,
the central meridian on the other aspects, and the equator on the
equatorial aspect are straight lines. Parallels on the polar projection
are circles spaced at true intervals equidistant for the sphere. The
outer meridian of the hemisphere on the equatorial aspect for the
sphere is a circle. All other meridians and parallels are complex
curves.
All of these map projections, with the exception of the ``Lambert-
Conformal'' conic, preserve scale and direction when measured along a
standard parallel or meridian. Because range and bearing computations
are relative to a particular ellipsoid of revolution--a geoid, not the
projection of the geoid, the computed latitude and longitude placement
will be correct for any projection assuming the map datum and the range
and bearing datum are the same.
The FAA will not accept straight lines of long distances that
result in significant distortions of the flight corridor. Attempting to
draw straight lines for distances greater than 7.5 times the map scale
on map scales greater than or equal to 1:1,000,000 will result in
unacceptable errors. The distance factor of 7.5 was determined by
plotting several hundred trajectory IIP points and finding equi-distant
straight line segments that adequately represent the trajectory curve
over a 5,000 nm range.
Appendix A provides an applicant with the equations the FAA
proposes to require to perform range and bearing computations for the
purpose of plotting

[[Page 34341]]

a flight corridor on a map. The range and bearing from a launch point
are used to determine the latitude and longitude coordinates of a point
on the flight corridor. Range and bearing equations are standard
geodesic computations which can be found in most geodesy text books. A
geodesic is a curve describing the minimum length between two points on
the surface of an ellipsoid such as the WGS-84 ellipsoid discussed
below. The range and bearing computations are sometimes referred to as
great circle math routines. Sodano's direct geodetic method is proposed
here. The algorithm was developed in 1963 by Emanuel M. Sodano for the
U.S. Army. The computations provide accuracy to less than a foot for
ranges up to 6,000 nm and less than 1/100th of a second (0.000002778
degrees) for all azimuth angles.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\31\ The FAA developed a software tool to perform the appendix A
calculations for guided orbital launch vehicles. This software tool
has been developed in the FORTRAN computer language using
Microsoft's Fortran Powerstation. All of the assumptions and
equations explained here and contained in appendix A are implemented
in the program. The applicant must provide the geodetic latitude,
longitude, launch azimuth, and Dmax from table A-1 as
input to the program. The software outputs an ASCII text file of
geodetic latitude and longitudes that describe the fight corridor
boundary. The FORTRAN code listing and example intput/output may be
obtained from the FAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

An applicant may create line segments to describe a flight corridor
by using range and bearings from the launch point along various
azimuths. Appendix A provides equations to calculate geodetic latitude
(+N) and longitude (+E) given the launch point geodetic latitude (+N),
longitude (+E), range (nm), and bearing (degrees, positive clockwise
from North). The same equations may also be used to calculate an impact
dispersion area by substituting a final stage impact point for the
launch point. Appendix A also provides equations to calculate the
distance of a geodesic between two points.
An alternative to range and bearing computations is to use
geographic information system (GIS) software with global mapping data.
GIS software is an effective tool for constructing and evaluating a
flight corridor, and has the advantage of allowing an applicant to
create maps of varying scales in the launch and downrange areas.
Commercially available GIS products are acceptable to the FAA for use
in Appendices A, B, C and D if they meet the map and plotting method
requirements in paragraph (b) of appendix A. An applicant should note,
however, that maps of different scales in GIS software may not match
each other. For instance, the coastline of Florida on a U.S. map may
not match the coastline on a world map. Applicants shall resolve such
contradictions by referring to more accurate maps such as NOAA maps.
Once an applicant has selected a map for displaying a flight
corridor's launch area, the line segment lengths may be scaled to the
chosen map. Map scale units are actual distance units measured along
the Earth's surface per unit of map distance. Most map scale units are
given in terms of inches per inch (in/in). An applicant converts
appendix A flight corridor line segment distances to the map scale
distance by dividing the launch area flight corridor line segment
length (inches) by the map scale (in/in). If, for example, an applicant
selected a map scale of 250,000 in/in and the line segment for the
launch area flight corridor was 1677008 inches, the equivalent scaled
length of the line segment for constructing an appendix A launch area
is (1677008/250,000)=6.7 inches of map distance. An applicant would
then plot the line segment on the map for display purposes using the
scaled line segment length of 6.7 inches. If an applicant were to
choose a map with scale units other than inches per inch, the FAA would
require a description of the conversion algorithm to inches per inch
and sample computations. Also note that the FAA proposes to accept
straight lines for distances less than or equal to 7.5 times the map
scale on map scales greater than or equal to 1:1,000,000 inches per
inch; or straight lines representing 100 nm or less on map scales less
than 1:1,000,000in/in.

Weight Classes for Guided Orbital Launch Vehicles

Proposed appendix A distinguishes between the guided orbital launch
vehicles represented in the appendix on the basis of weight class. The
FAA does not propose to distinguish among guided suborbital launch
vehicles on the basis of weight class for purposes of appendix A. For
guided orbital launch vehicles, the FAA proposes to create four
separate weight classes. These are used to determine the size of the
debris dispersion radius around a launch point, and the size of an
Appendix A flight corridor. The FAA selected the four launch vehicle
classes based on the size and characteristics of launch vehicles that
currently exist in the U.S. commercial inventory and that should
approximate any proposed new launch vehicle as well. An applicant
planning to support the launch of guided orbital launch vehicles should
choose the largest launch vehicle class anticipated for launch from the
chosen launch point. This maximizes the area of the flight corridor.
Also, selection of the largest class anticipated lessens the
possibility of having to obtain a license modification to accommodate a
larger customer than an application may have originally encompassed.
The FAA proposes to rely on a 100-nm orbit as the standard for
inter-class launch vehicle comparison purposes. It is a standard
reference orbit used by launch vehicle manufacturers for descriptive
purposes and allows the uniform comparison of launch vehicle throw
weight capability. The FAA obtained the payload weights for the 28 deg.
and 90 deg. orbital inclinations from the ``International Reference
Guide to Space Launch Systems,'' S.J. Isakowitz, 2d Ed. (1995). They
represent capabilities from CCAS and VAFB, respectively.

Dmax Circle

A radius, maximum distance (Dmax), is employed to define
a circular area about a launch point. The circular area indicates the
limits for both flight control and explosive containment following a
worst-case launch vehicle failure and flight termination system
activation at 10 seconds into flight. The worst-case failure represents
a failure response, immediately following first motion, which causes
the launch vehicle to fly in the up-range direction on a trajectory
that maximizes the impact range. The ten second flight time represents
a conservative estimate of the earliest elapsed time after launch that
a flight safety officer would be able to detect the malfunction,
initiate flight termination action, and actuate the flight termination
system on the launch vehicle. The radius is the estimate Dmax
from the launch point that inert debris is expected to travel and
beyond which the overpressure from explosive debris is not expected to
exceed 0.5 pounds per square inch (psi). Dmax accounts for
the public risk posed by the greater of the wind-induced impact
distance of a hazardous piece of inert debris, or the sum of the wind-
induced impact distance of an explosive piece of debris and the debris
0.5 psi overpressure radius from the explosion. The values for
DGmax in table A-1 appendix A, were derived from guided
suborbital launch vehicles and guided orbital launch vehicles of the
classes identified in table 1, Sec. 420.21.

Overflight Exclusion Zone

Table A-2 and figure A-1 define an overflight exclusion zone.
Because of the risks the early stages of flight create, the FAA
proposes to require an applicant to demonstrate that the public

[[Page 34342]]

will not be present in this area during a launch. An overflight
exclusion zone is an area in close promimity to a launch point where
the mission risk is greater than an Ec of
30 x 10^-6 if one member of the public is present in the
open. The FAA derived the data for table A-2 using high fidelity risk
assessment computer models to estimate the Ec for the
different vehicle classes in table 1, Sec. 420.21.
Early in the flight phase launch vehicles have large explosive
potential, a low IIP range rate, and an historically higher probability
of failure relative to the rest of preorbital flight. The relatively
simple risk estimation analysis defined in appendix C does not
adequately model the true risk during this stage of flight, and does
not serve as the basis for determining that the overflight exclusion
zone represents an area where the FAA's risk threshold is not
satisfied. Instead, the FAA derived the overflight exclusion zone using
a high fidelity risk assessment computer program is use by the national
ranges. The program is a launch area risk analysis program called DAMP
(facility DAMage and Personal injury). DAMP relies on information about
a launch vehicle, its trajectory and failure responses, and facilities
and populations in the launch area to estimate hit probabilities and
casualty expectation. The hazards analyzed by DAMP include impacting
inert debris, and blast overpressures and debris projected from impact
explosions.
For the purpose of the FAA's site location assessment, the proposed
overflight exclusion zone downrange distances (DOEZ) in
table A-2 were derived by computing the downrange drag impact point
distance for a ballisitic coefficient of 3 lbs/ft² at the
first major staging event time for each of the expendable launch
vehicle classes in table 1, Sec. 420.21. The effective casually area
used in the analysis was the average effective casualty area for the
period of flight up to the first major staging event time. See table C-
3. The DAMP risk assessment results showed that Ec values
exceeded 30 x 10^-6 for the time up to the first major
staging event for each of the launch vehicle classes in table 1,
Sec. 420.21.
Risk assessments were also conducted for the time of flight
immediately after the first major staging event. The results showed a
significant decrease in the Ec estimates, and those
estimates were within the Ec criteria of
30 x 10^-6. The decrease results from a combination of
decreasing dwell times and a signficant reduction in the size of an
effective casualty area following a major staging event.
The FAA compared the results obtained using the high fidelity risk
models to the estimated casualty expectancy calculated using the risk
analysis method from appendix C. The results from the appendix C method
also show unacceptable risk inside the overflight exclusion zone, as
shown in table ``3'' and ``4'' below. An appendix A flight corridor was
applied to an appendix C risk analysis and the following variables were
input as constants for the guided launch vehicle classes:

Pf=0.10
C=643 seconds
R-dot=.91 nm/s (from table C-2)
Nk=0.5 persons

As described in appendix C, when a populated area is split by a
trajectory ground trace, each part of the populated area is evaluated
separately and the Ec results of each part are summed to
estimate the total Ec for the whole populated area. Hence,
for this comparison a value of Nk=0.5 was used in each of
the OEZ sections so the total Ec after summation would
represent the risk for one person. Tables 3 and 4 show that the
Ec inside the OEZ does not meet FAA criteria and does meet
those criteria outside the OEZ.

Table 3.--Prior to First Major Staging Event
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sigma
Class X1 (mi) X2(nm) Y1(nm) Y2(nm) (nm) Ac(nm2) Ak(nm2) Pi Ec
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small................................................... 0.00 3.70 0.00 1.20 1.62 0.32 6.70 1.71E-04 40.9E-06
Medium.................................................. 0.00 4.58 0.00 1.53 1.82 0.40 8.98 2.35E-04 52.3E-06
Med-Lrg................................................. 0.00 9.67 0.00 1.83 3.56 0.54 12.23 3.25E-04 71.7E-06
Large................................................... 0.00 14.76 0.00 2.14 5.31 1.46 34.66 3.95E-04 83.2E-06
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Med-Lrg values for table ``3'' and ``4'' were interpolated from the bounding
classes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ac=average value up to first major staging
event.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 4.--After First Major Staging Event
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sigma
Class X1 (mi) X2 (nm) Y1 (nm) Y2 (nm) (nm) Ac (nm2) Ak (nm2) Pi Ec
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small................................................ 0.00 3.70 0.00 1.20 1.62 0.0982 6.70 1.71E-04 12.5E-06
Medium............................................... 0.00 4.58 0.00 1.53 1.82 0.0017 8.98 2.35E-04 22.2E-06
Med-Lrg.............................................. 0.00 9.67 0.00 1.83 3.56 0.0831 12.23 3.25E-04 11.0E-06
Large................................................ 0.00 14.76 0.00 2.14 5.31 0.4682 34.66 3.95E-04 26.7E-06
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Med-Lrg values for tables ``3'' and ``4'' were interpolated from the bounding
classes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ac = value after first major staging event.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The FAA believes that it is efficient to address keeping an
overflight exclusion zone clear of the public through a license to
operate a launch site so that the licensee better able to address the
issue does so. Moreover, although the FAA is willing to license the
operation of a launch site from which a limited number or kind of
launches may take place, the FAA does not want to license the operation
of a launch site from which launch may never occur. The FAA proposes,
therefore, to require that an applicant demonstrate either that the
overflight exclusion zone is

[[Page 34343]]

unpopulated, that there are times when no one is present, or that the
public can be excluded from this area during launch. Although a
determination of this nature encompasses issues that will be addressed
in a launch license, a launch site cannot support safe launches unless
overflight of the highest risk area in close proximity to a launch
point takes place without the public present. The FAA considered as an
alternative permitting a prospective launch site operator to show that
it would be able to clear resident population for one launch. For
example, a prospective launch site operator might have a potential
customer who has made arrangements for evacuation for a single launch.
The FAA, however, wants to be assured that an OEZ would be clear for
any launch that takes place from that site, and would, accordingly,
require that, if the public does reside in an OEZ, or have other means
of access to the OEZ, an applicant show that it has made arrangements
for their absence during a launch.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\32\ The FAA recognizes that this requirement would protect
persons within an OEZ during a launch but not their property. For
the time being, the FAA would not address risks to the property of
the public in an OEZ but leave the matter to be accommodated through
private financial arrangements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

An applicant must display an overflight exclusion zone on maps
using the requirements described in paragraph (b) of appendix A.

Launch Area

As noted at the beginning of this discussion, the FAA proposes to
employ a series of fans as the shape of the foundation of its appendix
A flight corridor. The FAA proposes the flight corridor fans to account
for the turning capabilities and wind dispersed debris of a guided
launch vehicle. The launch area fans have been divided into two
regions, of 60 and 30 degrees, representing the malfunction turn
capability of the launch vehicle relative to its velocity in the
downtown direction. Each region is represented by the estimated maximum
turning capability over a ground-range interval. These angles are the
FAA's estimates for the maximum angles that the launch vehicle velocity
vector may turn within a five second time period. The initial fan area
is described by a 60 deg. half angle extending ten nautical miles
downrange from a launch point. The ten nautical mile threshold
represents the FAA's estimate of where a vehicle's maximum turning rate
capability is reduced to approximately 30 degrees due to increasing
velocity in the downrange direction. The FAA obtained these estimates
on the basis of a Delta II launch vehicle trajectory, and by employing
an annualized wind speed within one standard deviation\33\ and a debris
ballistic coefficient of three. The FAA employed a Delta in its
analysis because its thrust profile fell between Atlas and Titan and
thus provided a representation of the mean performance parameters of
launch vehicles at Cape Canaveral Air Station. This data and use of the
appendix B methodology corroborated the selection of 60 and 30 degree
half angles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\33\ The FAA employed the wind speeds from the Global Gridded
Upper Air Statistics database for grid point 27.5 North geodetic
latitude and 280.0 East longitude. The database covers the period
1980 through 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the early stages of flight, but past the 100 nautical mile
range, a guided launch vehicle is capable of malfunction turns up to
30 deg.. Therefore, a 30 deg. half angle was used to define the
secondary fan area beginning 10 nautical mile downrange and ending 100
nautical mile downrange. Once a launch vehicle has reached the 100
nautical mile downrange point, the increasing velocity in the downrange
direction continues to reduce the launch vehicle's ability to maneuver
through a large malfunction turn.
The FAA proposes a 100 nautical mile distance as a delimiter
between the launch area and the downrange area. From the launch point
out to approximately the point where the IIP is 100 nautical miles
downrange, most launch vehicles will be subjected to the aerodynamic
forces of wind and drag. Once a launch vehicle's IIP has cleared the
100 nm limit, the FAA is willing to assume for purposes of appendix A
that most launch vehicles are outside the atmosphere.
Figure 1 in appendix A depicts the launch area of a flight
corridor. Figure 1 shows the relative placement of the line segments
comprising the launch area of a flight corridor. The left and right
sides of the flight corridor are mirror images, with the flight azimuth
serving as the line between the two sides. Table A-3 in appendix A
tabulates the lengths of the perpendicular line segments comprising the
launch area.

[[Page 34344]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.066

BILLING CODE 4910-13-C

[[Page 34345]]

Downrange Area

The FAA derived the proposed appendix A flight corridor's downrange
area from hazard areas previously developed by federal launch ranges
for the classes of launch vehicles defined in table 1 of Sec. 420.21.
The downrange fan area of the flight corridor, as shown in figure 2, is
based on turning capabilities and impact dispersions of guided
expendable launch vehicles. The size of the fan area is necessary for
containing launch vehicle debris in the event that a launch vehicle
failure initiates a maximum-rate malfunction turn and the flight
termination system must be activated. In the later stages of flight a
guided launch vehicle's capability to turn is reduced due to increasing
velocities in the downrange direction. Therefore, a 10 deg. half angle
was used to define the downrange area, which reflects a combination of
normal vehicle dispersions and malfunction turns.
The downrange area of a flight corridor begins 100 nm from a launch
point and, for the guided orbital launch vehicle classes, extends 5,000
nm downrange from the launch point. The FAA proposes 5,000 nm as the
end of an appendix A flight corridor because overflight dwell times for
the remaining flight time result in an insignificant risk to the
public. In general, after an orbital launch vehicle IIP has passed the
5,000 nm point its IIP range rates increase very rapidly as the launch
vehicle approaches orbital insertion. As a result, the dwell times
decrease significantly, reducing the overflight risk to insignificant
levels. For an applicant employing a guided suborbital launch vehicle,
a flight corridor would end with the impact dispersion area of a final
stage.
Figure 2 depicts the downrange area of a flight corridor. The
figure depicts the relative placement of the line segments comprising
the downrange area of a flight corridor. The left and right sides of a
flight corridor are mirror images, with the flight azimuth serving as
the line between the two sides. Table A-3 in appendix A provides the
lengths of the line segments comprising the downrange area. The scaling
information discussed above with respect to the launch area applies to
the downrange area as well. If an applicant chooses a map with scale
units other than inches per inch the FAA will require the applicant to
describe the conversion algorithm to inches per inch and to provide
example computations.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.067

Appendix B

Appendix B provides another means for creating a hypothetical
flight corridor from an applicant's proposed launch site. As with a
flight corridor created pursuant to appendix A, an appendix B corridor
would identify the populations, those within the defined flight
corridor, that must be analyzed for risk. An appendix B analysis offers
an applicant a means to demonstrate whether a flight corridor from its
launch site satisfies the FAA's risk criteria for a guided orbital or
suborbital launch vehicle. Appendix B allows an applicant to perform a
more individualized containment analysis rather than relying on the
more conservative estimates the FAA derived for appendix A. Because an
appendix B analysis uses actual meteorological data and a trajectory,
whether actual or computer simulated, of a real launch vehicle, it
produces a flight corridor of greater accuracy than one created under
appendix A. The FAA derived the methodology from techniques developed
for federal launch ranges to calculate the distance that debris would
travel as a function of perturbing forces. The FAA's derived the
assumptions and simplifications in the appendix B analysis from launch
vehicle data

[[Page 34346]]

representing historical launch vehicle malfunction behavior.
A flight corridor created using appendix B contains, on its face,
the same elements as an appendix A flight corridor, including a
circular area around a launch point with a radius of Dmax,
an overflight exclusion zone, a launch area and a downrange area.
Appendix B, however, produces and configures the last two elements
differently than appendix A. The launch area of an appendix B flight
corridor shows where launch vehicle debris would impact in the event of
a vehicle failure, and takes into account local meteorological
conditions. The downrange area of a flight corridor also shows where
launch vehicle debris would impact given a vehicle failure, but takes
into account vehicle imparted velocity, malfunctions turns, and vehicle
guidance and performance dispersions. Also, like an appendix A flight
corridor, the uprange portion of the flight corridor is described by a
semi-circle arc that is a portion of either the most uprange dispersion
circle, or the overflight exclusion zone, whichever is further uprange.
The FAA's proposed appendix B launch area analysis assumes a
vehicle failure and destruction at one second intervals along a
trajectory z value, which denotes height as measured from the launch
point, up to 50,000 feet. An applicant must determine the maximum
distance a hazardous piece of debris would travel under local
meteorological conditions. The distances that the debris travels
provide the boundaries of an appendix B flight corridor's launch area.
After a height of 50,000 feet, which is where the FAA estimates, for
purposes of this analysis, that debris created by a launch vehicle's
destruction has less exposure to atmospheric forces, an applicant shall
determine how far harmful debris created by destruction of a launch
vehicle would travel based only on malfunction imparted velocity and
vehicle dispersion in order to create a downrange area. Although the
effects of wind above 50,000 feet are not, in reality, non-existent,
they are sufficiently diminished when compared to the effects of
malfunction imparted velocity and launch vehicle dispersion for
purposes of this estimation.

Dmax Circle

As with an appendix A flight corridor, an applicant must select
each launch point at its proposed launch site from which it expects a
guided expendable launch vehicle to take flight. An applicant must
obtain the latitude and longitude of the launch point to four decimal
places. If relying on a guided orbital launch vehicle, the applicant
must also select a launch vehicle class from Sec. 420.21, table 1, that
best represents the largest class each proposed launch point would
support. With the information, the applicant then ascertains the
Dmax that debris is expected to travel from a launch point
if a mishap were to occur in the first 10 seconds of flight by
employing table A-1, appendix A. Table A-1 also provides a maximum
distance for sub-orbital launch vehicles. The Dmax distance
provided by table A-1 defines a circular area around the launch point.

Overflight Exclusion Zone

That circular area is part of an overflight exclusion zone. Again,
an applicant uses information from appendix A to create an overflight
exclusion zone, although an appendix B flight corridor's uprange
boundary may extend further than its overflight exclusion zone. An
overflight exclusion zone consists of the circular area defined by the
radius Dmax at the launch point and a corridor of the length
prescribed by table A-2. Its downrange boundary is defined by an arc
with a radius Dmax centered on the endpoint prescribed by
table A-2. The cross-range boundaries consist of two lines parallel to
and to either side of the flight azimuth. Each line is tangent to the
upgrade and downrange Dmax circles as shown in appendix A,
figure A-1. Creation of an overflight exclusion zone is predetermined
by the requirements of appendix A and does not require a trajectory for
an actual launch vehicle. As with an appendix A overflight exclusion
zone, and for the reasons described in this notice's discussion of
appendix A, the FAA proposes to require that the public be excluded
from this area during launch.

Launch Vehicle Trajectory

An applicant must also obtain or generate a launch vehicle
trajectory. The applicant may use either commercially available
software or a trajectory provided by the launch vehicle's manufacturer.
Because appendix B is based on equations of motion in three dimensions,
the appendix B analysis requires that the trajectory be described using
a three axis coordinate system. The FAA recommends that an applicant
used a WGS-84 ellipsoidal earth model \34\ as the trajectory coordinate
system reference ellipsoid in the appendices, because of its general
applicability to the analyses that the FAA proposes in appendices B, C
and D, the model's wide availability and its development in accordance
with military standards and requirements. The WGS-84 model reflects the
most current and the most accurate Department of Defense standards for
earth models. WGS-84 provides a basic reference frame and geometric
figure for the Earth and provides a means for relating positions on
various local geodetic coordinate systems, including XYZ, to an Earth-
centered, Earth-fixed coordinate system such as the EFG system employed
in the appendix B analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\34\ Department of Defense World Geodetic System, Military
Standard 2401 (Jan. 11, 1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The FAA proposes to require time intervals used in the trajectory
analysis of no greater than one second for both launch and downrange
areas. Data frequency of one second is a compromise a between the low
data frequency requirements of the launch area, where dwell times are
relatively long, and the high frequency requirements of the downrange
area, where dwell times are correspondingly shorter. Accordingly, one
second time intervals are sufficient to accommodate linear
interpolation between trajectory time points, in the launch and
downrange areas, and not degrade the accuracy requirements of the
analysis.
In the launch area, an applicant's trajectory must include position
data in terms of time after liftoff in right-handed XYZ coordinates
centered on the proposed launch point, with the X-axis aligned with the
flight azimuth. In the downrange area, the applicant's trajectory must
show state vector data in terms of time after liftoff in right-handed
x, y, z, x, y, z coordinates, centered on the proposed launch point,
with the X-axis aligned with the flight azimuth.
The FAA proposes to require certain technical information to be
used to compute an appendix B trajectory. The proposed appendix B
parameters comprise the minimum information needed to create a three
axis trajectory with 3-degrees-of-freedom (DOF). The 3-DOF are the
trajectory positions in each of the three axes of the XYZ coordinate
system and it is impossible to adequately describe the launch vehicle
position with less than 3-DOF. Any software used to compute a
trajectory must incorporate the data required by appendix B, paragraph
(b)(1)(ii)(A)-(I).\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\35\ Software for creating a 3-DOF trajectory with the accuracy
required for an appendix B analysis is commercially available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Launch Area

A launch area contains a launch point and an overflight exclusion
zone, and constitutes the part of the flight corridor calculated using
the effects of

[[Page 34347]]

atmospheric drag forces on debris produced by a series of hypothetical
destructions of a launch vehicle at one second intervals along that
trajectory. For purposes of an appendix B analysis, a launch area
extends from the further uprange of an OEZ arc or dispersion circle arc
downrange to a point on the surface of the earth that corresponds to
the debris impact locations, assuming a failure of the vehicle in
flight at a height of 50,000 feet. Typically, federal launch ranges
account for five major parameters to estimate the size of a flight
corridor. These include the effects of vehicle-imparted velocity on
debris, the change in launch vehicle position and velocity due to a
malfunction turn, guidance errors, the ballistic coefficient of debris,
and wind. However, imparted velocity, malfunction turn, and trajectory
dispersion, although not insignificant, do not play as great a role
early in flight as the wind effects on debris. The wind effect on
debris, in turn, depends on the ballistic coefficient of the debris.
The FAA determined that for purposes of the launch area, of these
parameters, launch vehicle debris and meteorological conditions
constitute the most significant, and the FAA therefore proposes to
focus on these two factors in the launch area.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\36\ Note that the determination of the size of Dmax
included considerations of malfunction turns as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The FAA proposes to require an applicant to calculate circles that
approximate the debris dispersion for each one second time point on a
launch vehicle trajectory. The cross-range lines tangent to those
circles provide the borders of a launch area. Calculating the circles
consists, in general terms, of a two step process. An applicant must
first define 15 mean geometric height intervals along the proposed
trajectory in order to obtain data, in accordance with subparagraph
(c)(4) of appendix B, regarding the mean atmospheric density, maximum
wind speed, fall times and debris dispersions in each of those height
intervals. An applicant must then use that data in the calculations
proposed in subparagraphs (c)(5) to derive the radius applicable to
each height interval (Zi). Having obtained that radius, an
applicant uses it to describe, pursuant to subparagraph (c)(6), a
circle referred to as a debris dispersion circle (Di),
around each one second time interval along the vehicle's trajectory,
starting at the launch point. An applicant will then ascertain the
cross-range boundaries of a flight corridor's launch area by drawing
lines that are tangent to all dispersion circles. The final
Di dispersion circle forms the downrange boundary of a
flight corridor's launch area.
The launch area represents the effects of meteorological conditions
on how far inert debris with a ballistic coefficient of 3 lb/ft.\2\
would travel. Debris comes in many sizes and shapes, but the FAA does
not propose to require an applicant's location review analysis to take
all such possibilities into account. A complete analysis for an actual
launch would entail the determination of the type and size of debris
created by each credible failure mode, and the velocity imparted to
each piece of debris due to the failure. Instead, for purposes of the
appendix B analysis, the FAA proposes to categorize launch vehicle
debris by a ballistic coefficient that accounts for the smallest inert
debris that may cause harm and that also accounts for the debris most
sensitive to wind. A ballistic coefficient reflects the sensitivity of
weight and area ratios to drag forces, such as wind dispersion effect.
The FAA evaluated wind drift effects on a piece of debris with the
smallest hazardous ballistic coefficient. A debris piece with the
smallest hazardous ballistic coefficient will play the largest role in
ascertaining the total debris dispersion in a launch area. Low beta
debris, namely, debris with a ballistic coefficient less than or equal
to three pounds per square foot, will have a lower terminal velocity
than high ballistic coefficient debris and will spend more time being
dispersed by wind forces on descent. Therefore, low ballistic
coefficient debris will disperse farther than high ballistic
coefficient debris. The FAA proposes a debris piece with a ballistic
coefficient of three pounds per square foot for launch area
calculations because it is the most wind sensitive debris piece with a
potential for harm of reasonable significance. Experience at federal
launch ranges has shown that, on average, a debris piece that has a
ballistic coefficient of less than three pounds per square foot is not
significant in terms of its potential to harm a person in the open.
Although the FAA proposes to assume a ballistic coefficient of
three as the smallest piece of wind sensitive debris hazardous to the
public, ballistic coefficient is not directly related to fatality
criteria based on the kinetic energy of debris. The ballistic
coefficient of three is related to a kinetic energy of 58 ft/lbs which
represents a probability of fatality of 50 percent for a standing
person. It is therefore possible that fatalities could occur for a
lower ballistic coefficient and that no fatalities may occur for a
higher ballistic coefficient. The FAA proposes to incorporate neither
of these conditions into this analysis, and invites comment.
In addition to knowing what debris is of concern, an applicant must
know the local meteorological conditions. The FAA proposes that an
applicant obtain meteorological data for 15 height intervals in a
launch area up to 50,000 feet. The FAA proposes an upper limit of
50,000 feet in the launch area containment analysis of debris because
winds above this altitude contribute little to drift distance. Also,
once a launch vehicle reaches an altitude of 50,000 feet its velocity
vector has pitched down range so that a malfunction turn and explosion
velocity, rather than atmospheric drag and wind effects, play the
dominant role in determining the dispersion of debris as the debris
falls to the surface. The combination of these two factors
significantly reduces the effect of winds on uprange and crossrange
dispersion after a launch vehicle reaches 50,000 feet. For altitudes
less than 50,000 feet, at the same time as low ballistic coefficient
debris pieces are highly sensitive to drag forces, the velocity of an
explosion caused by destroying a launch vehicle contributes relatively
little to the dispersion effect because the drag produced on these
light weight pieces results in a high deceleration so they achieve
terminal velocity almost instantaneously and drift with the wind.
Therefore, launch vehicle induced explosion-velocities are not
considered for the launch area of an appendix B containment analysis.
Instead, the FAA proposes to require an applicant to use local
statistical wind data by altitude for fifteen height intervals. The
data must include altitude, atmospheric density, mean East/West
meridianal (u) and North/South zonal wind (v), the standard deviation
of u and v wind, a correlation coefficient, the number of observations
and the wind percentile.
Data acceptable to the FAA is available from NOAA's National
Climatic Data Center (NCDC). NOAA Data Centers, of which the NCDC is
the largest, provide long-term preservation of, management, and ready
accessibility to environmental data. The Centers are part of the
National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service. The
NCDC data set acceptable to the FAA is the ``Global Gridded Upper Air
Statistics, 1980-1995, CV1.1, March 1996 (CD-ROM).'' The Global Gridded
Upper Air Statistics (GGUAS) CD-ROM data set describes the atmosphere
for each month of the represented year on a 2.5 degree global grid at
15 standard pressure levels. NCDC provides compiled mean and standard
deviation values for sea level pressure, wind

[[Page 34348]]

speed, air temperature, dew point, height and density. GGUAS also
complies eight-point wind roses. The spatial resolution is a 73 x 144
grid spaced at 2.5 degrees and the temporal resolution is one month.
Monthly data have been statistically combined for the period of record
1980-1995.
To simplify the containment analysis, the FAA proposes to allow an
applicant to use a mean wind (50%). The FAA proposes to further
simplify the analysis by assuming that an applicant's launch pad height
is equal to the surface level of the wind measurements provided by the
NCDC data base. The actual pad height could be lower or higher than the
surface level wind measurement height. The difference between the
actual pad height and the surface level measurement height is
considered insignificant in terms of its effect on the impact
dispersion radius.
The FAA notes that the NCDC database will not necessarily contain
measurements of winds for any particular launch site proposed. If a
launch point is located in the center of a 2.5 degree NCDC weather grid
cell, the farthest distance to a grid cell corner would be along a
diagonal from the center of the grid cell to a corner of the grid cell.
The wind measurements will be no more than approximately 106 nm from
the launch point. This distance is close enough for purposes of a
location review containment analysis, and occurs only for a grid
located on the equator. In general, the topography within approximately
106 nm of a launch point is assumed to be relatively similar with
respect to height above mean-sea-level. As the launch point latitude
increases the distance from the wind measurement grid point will
decrease, which will reduce errors introduced by this assumption.
Having obtained the necessary meteorological data, an applicant
would use data from the GGUAS CD-ROM to estimate the mean atmospheric
density, maximum wind speed, height interval fall times, and height
interval debris dispersions for 15 mean geometric height intervals.
Altitude intervals are denoted by the subscript ``j''. An applicant
would then calculate the debris dispersion radius (Di) for
each trajectory position whose ``Z'' values, are less than 50,000 ft.
Each trajectory time considered is denoted by the variable subscript
``i''. The initial value of ``i'' is one and the value is increased by
increments of one for each subsequent ``Z'' value evaluated. The major
dispersion factors are a combination of wind velocity and debris fall
time. Because the atmospheric density is a function of altitude and
effects the resultant fall time, Di is estimated by summing
the radial dispersions computed for each altitude interval the debris
intersects on its descent trajectory. Once all the debris dispersion
radii have been calculated, the flight corridor's launch area is
produced by plotting each debris dispersion circle on a map, and
drawing enveloping lines that enclose the outer boundary of the debris
dispersion circles. The uprange portion of the flight corridor is
described by a semi-circle arc that is a portion of either the most
uprange Di dispersion circle, or the overflight exclusion
zone, whichever is further uprange. The enveloping lines that enclose
the final Di dispersion circle forms the downrange boundary
of a flight corridor's launch area.

Downrange Area Containment Analysis

A containment analysis also describes the dimensions of a flight
corridor's downrange area. The FAA designed the downrange area analysis
to accommodate launch vehicle imparted velocity, malfunction turns, and
vehicle guidance and performance dispersions. The analysis to obtain
the downrange area of a flight corridor for guided orbital and
suborbital launch vehicle trajectories starts with trajectory positions
with heights greater than 50,000 feet, that is, the point where the
launch area analysis ends. A downrange area for a guided orbital launch
vehicle ends 5,000 nautical miles from the launch point. If an
applicant has chosen a guided suborbital launch vehicle for the
analysis, the analysis must define the impact dispersion area for the
final stage, and that impact dispersion area marks the end of a
downrange area.
An applicant computes the cross-range boundaries of the downrange
area of a flight corridor by calculating the launch vehicle position
after a simulated worst-case four second turn, rotating the launch
vehicle state vector to account for vehicle guidance and performance
dispersions, and then computing an instantaneous impact point. The
locus of IIPs describes the impact boundary.
As a first step, an applicant computes a reduction ratio factor
that decreases with increasing launch vehicle range. Secondly, an
applicant computes the launch vehicle position after a simulated worst-
case four-second malfunction turn for each altitude interval along a
trajectory. For purposes of the launch site location review, the FAA
proposes to rely on a velocity vector malfunction turn angle set at
45 deg. and to decrease this turn angle using the reduction ratio
factor, as a function of downrange distance to simulate the
constraining effects of increasing velocity in the downrange direction
on malfunction turn capability. See figure B-2. The FAA assumes this
worst-case delay result in order to account for the maximum dispersion
of the vehicle during the time necessary for a person in charge of
destroying a launch vehicle to detect a vehicle failure and cause the
vehicle's destruction. Figure B-2 in appendix B depicts the velocity
vector movement in the yaw plane of the vehicle body axis coordinate
system. The figure below depicts the state vector axes and impact
locations for a malfunction turn failure and for an on-trajectory
failure.

[[Page 34349]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.068

The second step described above assumes perfect performance of the
launch vehicle up until the beginning of the malfunction turn. In
order, however, to account for normal five sigma (5)
performance and guidance dispersions of the launch vehicle prior to the
malfunction turn, the applicant next rotates the trajectory state
vector. The trajectory state-vector rotation is accomplished in
conjunction with a XYZ to ENU coordinate system transformation. This
transformation rotates the X and Y axes about the Z axis. The Z and U
axes are coincident. Both position and velocity components are rotated.
The FAA intends the trajectory azimuth rotation to account for the
normal 5-sigma launch vehicle performance and guidance dispersions that
may exist at the beginning of a malfunction turn. The rotation angle
decreases from three degrees to one degree as the vehicle proceeds
downrange, and the rate of decrease is a function of distance from the
launch point. This is done because the trajectory azimuth of a launch
vehicle with 5-sigma performance and guidance dispersions early in
flight could be approximately 3 degrees from the nominal
flight azimuth. Since this azimuth offset is not considered a failure
response, the guidance, navigation, and control system is expected to
achieve steering corrections. These corrections will eventually reduce
the angular offset later in flight as the launch vehicle targets the
mission objectives for orbital insertion. If a launch vehicle has 5-
sigma performance and guidance dispersions later in flight, the effects
of increasing velocity in the downrange direction limits a launch
vehicle's capability to alter the trajectory's azimuth. Launch vehicles
in the four launch vehicle classes were reviewed to determine the
typical range of malfunction-turning rates in the downrange area. The
FAA found these rates to be relatively small compared to launch area
rates. The FAA proposes the three and one degree turn rates because
they encompass the turn rates found during the review process.
Before initiating the IIP computations, an applicant must transform
the ENU coordinate system to an EFG coordinate system. This EFG
coordinate transformation is employed to simplify the IIP computation.
The IIP computation proposed in appendix B are used for demanding
the IIPs to either side of a trajectory by creating latitude and
longitude pairs for the left and right flight corridor boundaries.
Connecting the latitude and longitude pairs describes the boundary of
the downrange area of a flight corridor. The launch site location
review IIP calculations assume the absence of atmospheric drag effects.
Equations B46-B69 implement an iterative solution to the problem of
determining an impact point. This iterative technique includes checks
for conditions that will not result in impact point solutions. The
conditions prohibiting impact solutions are: (1) An initial launch
vehicle position below the earth's surface, (2) a trajectory orbit that
is not elliptical, but, parabolic or hyperbolic, (3) a positive perigee
height, where the trajectory orbit does not intersect the earth, and
(4) the iterative solution does not converge. Any one of the conditions
given above will prohibit the computation of an impact point. The
iterative approach in equations B46-B69 solves these problems.

Software

The FAA has developed a software tool that performs the flight
corridor calculations required by appendix B for a guided orbital
launch vehicle. The

[[Page 34350]]

software was developed in FORTRAN. All of the assumptions and equations
contained in appendix B are implemented in the program. An applicant
must provide the geodetic latitude, longitude, launch azimuth, desired
wind percentile, Dmax from table A-1 and Doez
from table A-2 as input to the program. The software outputs an ASCII
text file of geodetic latitudes and longitudes that describe a flight
corridor boundary.

Estimating Public Risk

Upon completing a flight corridor, an applicant must estimate the
risk to the public within the flight corridor to determine whether that
risk falls within acceptable levels. If an applicant demonstrates that
no part of the flight corridor is over a populated area, the flight
corridor satisfies the FAA's risk thresholds, and an applicant's
application may rely on its appendix B analysis. If a flight corridor
includes a populated area, an applicant has the option of rotating an
appendix B flight corridor using a different launch point or azimuth to
avoid population, or of conducting an overflight risk analysis as
provided in appendix C.

Appendix C

Under a launch site location review, once an applicant has created
a flight corridor employing either appendix A or B, the applicant must
ascertain whether there is population within the flight corridor. If
there is no population, the FAA will approve the location of the
proposed launch point for the type and class of launch vehicle
analyzed. If there is population, an applicant must employ appendix C
to perform an overflight risk analysis for the corridor. An appendix C
risk analysis determines whether or not the risk to the public from a
hypothetical launch exceeds the FAA's risk threshold of an estimated
expected casualty (Ec) of no more than 30 x 10^-6
per launch. An appendix C risk analysis estimates the Ec
overflight contribution from a single hypothetical launch whose flight
termination system is assumed to work perfectly. The analysis takes
into account the probability of a vehicle failing throughout its
trajectory, dwell times \37\ over individual populated areas, and the
probability of impact within those areas. The analysis also takes into
account the effective casualty area of a vehicle class, the size of the
populated area, and the population density of the exposed population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\37\ Although an applicant who calculates an appendix B flight
corridor will know actual dwell times for its Ec
analysis, the FAA proposes to supply a constant to approximate dwell
time for an applicant who relies on an appendix A flight corridor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Estimating Ec for an actual launch takes a large number
of variables and considerations into account. The risk analysis
provided in appendix C provides a somewhat simpler approach to
estimating Ec within the boundaries of a flight corridor
than might be necessary in performing a risk analysis for an actual
launch. The FAA proposes, for purposes of determining the acceptability
of a launch site's location, to rely only on variables relevant to
ensuring that the site itself offers at least one flight corridor
sufficiently isolated from population for safety. Accordingly, many of
the factors that a launch operator will take into account will not be
reflected here.
In brief, in order for an applicant to perform an appendix C risk
analysis, the applicant must first determine whether any populated
areas are present within an appendix A or B flight corridor. If so, the
applicant must obtain area and population data. At this point an
applicant has a choice. Appendix C requires that an applicant calculate
the probability of impact for each populated area, and then determine
an Ec value for each populated area. To obtain the estimated
Ec for an entire flight corridor, the applicant adds--or
sums--the Ec results for each populated area. If the
population within the flight corridor is relatively small, an applicant
may wish to conduct a less rigorous analysis by making conservative
assumptions. Appendix C also offers the option of analyzing a worst-
case flight corridor for those flight corridors where such an approach
might save time and analysis. Examples of such simplifications are
provided.

Identification and Location of Population

In order to perform an Ec analysis, an applicant must
first identify the populated areas within a flight corridor. For the
first 100 nautical miles from a launch point downrange a U.S. census
block group serves as the maximum size of an individual populated areas
permitted under an appendix C analysis. The proposed maximum permitted
size of an individual populated area beyond 100 nautical mile downrange
is a 1 degree latitude x 1 degree longitude grid. The size of that area
analyzed will play out differently depending on the location of the
proposed launch site. For example, if an applicant proposed a coastal
site, the applicant would presumably present the FAA with a flight
corridor mostly over water. Population may be limited to that of a few
islands, minimizing the amount of data and analysis necessary. If an
applicant proposes a launch site located further inland, the applicant
would need to obtain the area and population of each census block group
in the first 100 nm of the flight corridor. This may prove time
consuming, although the FAA has proposed alternative approach that may
simplify the process for such applicants. An applicant may also propose
to operate a launch site on foreign territory, where U.S. census data
would not apply. In that event, the FAA would apply the principles
underlying a launch site location review to the available data on a
case-by-case basis.
The proposed regulations require the analysis of populations at the
census block group level for the first 100 nm from the launch point in
the flight corridor. An applicant shall employ data from the latest
census.\38\ An applicant must also include population that may not be
included in the U.S. census, such as military base personnel. The FAA
recognizes a census block group to be a reasonable populated area for
analysis because the risk early in flight is greatest due to long dwell
times. IIP range rates in a launch area are relatively show, which
exposes the launch area populations to launch vehicle risks for a
longer period of time when compared to similar populations in the
downrange area. Depending on the launch site and launch vehicle, a
census block group could be exposed to launch vehicle risks for tens of
seconds. In contrast to the size of a populated area in the downrange
area, the increased risk due to longer dwell times requires a more
detailed evaluation of the launch area for Ec purposes. A
census block group is an appropriate size for analysis because it is
small enough to accommodate the assumption that a populated area
contains homogeneously distributed population without grossly
distorting the outcome of the Ec estimates, and because the
data is readily available for populations in the United States.
Although a census block is smaller and therefore even more accurate,
only census block centroids, rather than the more useful geographic
area, are available from the U.S. Census Bureau. The FAA also proposes
to allow the census block group to serve as the smallest unit addressed
because electronic data is available at the census block group level,
which will allow for more efficient execution of the computations.
Although not as accurate as a census block, a census block group is
also sufficiently accurate to serve as

[[Page 34351]]

the smallest populated area for a launch site location review because
the launch licensing process will mandate the more thorough risk
analysis necessary for a particular launch. An applicant may find the
need to use only a portion of a census block group, such as when a
populated area is divided by a flight corridor boundary. In that case
an applicant should use the population density of the block group to
reflect the population in that portion of the census block group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\38\ Some geographic information software has the capacity to
import U.S. Census Bureau demographic and geographic data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

FAA proposes to allow an applicant to evaluate the presence of
people in larger increments of area in the downrange area of a flight
corridor than in the launch area of a flight corridor. Populations in
the downrange area of a flight corridor must be analyzed in area no
greater than 1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude and longitude grid coordinates.
Because dwell times downrange are shorter, the risk to the individual
populated areas is less and, therefore, the FAA is willing to accept a
different degree of accuracy. IIP range rates in the downrange area can
achieve speeds of 500 nm/second. Because the longest distance in a grid
space would be approximately 85 nm for a grid on the equator, which is
where the largest grid area will be found, the launch vehicle IIP dwell
time would be less than 0.20 seconds over the grid. This reduces the
risk to population in that grid significantly compared with population
in the launch area.
The data needed for a downrange area analysis is also readily
available. One source for population data in an area no greater than
1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude and longitude grid coordinates in a database
of the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), Oak Ridge
National Laboratory. The CDIAC database is ``Global Population
Distribution (1990), Terrestrial Area and Country Name Information on a
One by One Degree Grid Cell Basis.'' This database contains one degree
by one degree grid information on the world-wide distribution of
population for 1990 and country specific information on the percentage
of a country's population present to each grid cell.
The CDIAC obtained its population estimates from the United Nations
FAO Yearbook,\39\ the Guinness World Data Book,\40\ and the Rand
McNally World Atlas \41\ for approximately 6,000 cities with
populations greater than 50,000 inhabitants. The population data was
updated by CDIAC to 1990 values with available census data. For the
rural population allocation, the CDIAC developed global rural
population distribution factors based on national population data, data
on approximately 90,000 cities and towns, and the assumption that rural
population is proportional to the number of cities and towns within
each grid cell for each country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\39\ United Nations FAO Yearbook, Vol. 47, Rome, 1993.
\40\ The Guinness World Data Book, Guinness Pub. Ltd.,
Middlesex, England, 1993.
\41\ Rand McNally World Atlas, Rand McNally, New York, 1991.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Probability of Impact

The next step in the process would be to ascertain the probability
of impact for each populated area. In other words, an applicant must
find the probability that debris will land in each populated area
within the flight corridor under analysis. For this, the applicant must
find the probability of impact in both the cross-range and downrange
directions, by employing equation C1 for an appendix A flight corridor
for an orbital launch or equations C2 through C4 for an appendix A
corridor that describes a suborbital launch. For an analysis based on
an appendix B flight corridor, an applicant will employ equation C5 for
an orbital launch or equations C6 and C8 for a suborbital launch. For
both appendix A and B corridors, the probability of impact
(Pi) within a particular populated area is equal to the
product of the probability of impact in the downrange (Px)
and cross range (Py) directions, and the probability of
vehicle failure (Pr).

Pi = Py * Px * Pf

The analysis applicable to both appendix A and B flight corridors is
the same for the cross-range direction,\42\ but employs a different
equation to determine the probability of impact in the downrange
direction. For an appendix A corridor, the FAA proposes to specify a
constant in equation C1 to approximate dwell time for the downrange
direction. In equation C5 an applicant will employ actual dwell times
obtained from the trajectory generated pursuant to appendix B.

\42\ See above text for footnote 42
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\42\ For Equations C-1, C-3, C-5 and C-7 the FAA approximated
the probability of impact in the cross-range direction
(Py) by applying Simpson's Normal Probability Function.
The FAA employed Simpson's rule to derive the following equation:

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.013

Simpson's approximation of the Elliptical Normal Probability
Function is described in General Motors Corporation Defense System
Division's Elliptical Normal Probability Function, (Apr. 6, 1960).
An applicant who relies on an appendix A flight corridor will use
equation C1 to determine the probability of impact for a particular
populated area in the downrange direction by finding the range rate and
assuming a total thrusting time of 643 seconds. Equation C1 reflects
the fact that appendix A does not employ trajectory data, and
therefore, employs a technique for estimating dwell times as a function
of range and range rate to determine the probability of impact in the
downrange direction. Proposed table C-2 provides the appendix A flight
corridor IIP range intervals and corresponding IIP range rates for use
in Equation C1.
To create proposed table C-2, the FAA employed actual trajectory
data to determine individual range rates for Atlas, Delta and Titan
launch vehicles. The FAA computed the IIP for each trajectory time
point, and the range rates were determined by subtracting IIP ranges
(RIIP) over one-second intervals. This provided a per second range
rate, referred to below at R-dot. The average range rates over the
range intervals, shown in the table below, were estimated by dividing
the difference of

[[Page 34352]]

the upper value of adjacent IIP ranges by the elapsed trajectory time
over the range interval. For example, the following Delta launch
vehicle data was used to determine the IIP range rate from 101 through
500 nm:

RIIP1 = 100 nm
TALO1 (time after lift-off 1) = 97 sec
RIIP2 = 500 nm
TALO2 = 217 sec
(RIIP2-RIIP1) (TALO2-TALO1) = 3.33 nm/s

The FAA derived the total average thrusting time of 643 seconds
from the data in table 5 by dividing the difference of the upper value
of adjacent IIP ranges by the average IIP range rate corresponding to
the largest IIP range and summing the results over the set of IIP
ranges. The following computations are given as examples of how the FAA
reached this determination.

Let:
RIIP1 = 100 nm
RIIP2 = 500 nm
R-dot = 3.00 nm/s
(RIIP2-RIIP1)/R-dot = 133.33 sec

Table 5.--Data To Derive Total Thrusting Time
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IIP range rate (nm/s)
IIP range (nm) ---------------------------------------------------------------- t(s)
Delta Atlas Titan Avg.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-100........................... 1.03 085 0.96 0.91 110.50
100-500......................... 3.33 3.77 2.23 3.00 133.33
500-1500........................ 4.27 3.66 2.73 3.20 312.99
1500-2500....................... 9.01 21.74 12.99 17.37 57.59
2501-3000....................... 33.33 50.00 41.67 45.84 10.91
3001-4000....................... 66.67 90.91 83.33 87.12 11.48
4001-5000....................... 166.67 142.86 166.67 154.77 6.46
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total-t............ .............. .............. .............. .............. 643.26
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The ``X'' distances were measured directly off the mapping
information source.
An applicant who relies on an appendix B flight corridor will
employ proposed equation C5 or equations C6 through C8 depending on
whether the flight corridor culminates in an impact dispersion area or
not. Equation C5 reflects the fact that, unlike an appendix A flight
corridor, the trajectory data used to create an appendix B flight
corridor provides downrange instantaneous impact points (IIPs).
Accordingly, the dwell time associated with a populated area may be
ascertained for the difference between the closest and furthest
downrange distances of the populated area. See figure C-2.
An applicant may find the following six step procedure helpful in
determining the dwell time for individual populated areas that equation
C5 calls for. The subscripts to not correspond to subscripts in the
appendix.
Step 1: Determine the trajectory time (t1) associated
with the trajectory IIP position (x1), that immediately
precedes the uprange point on the populated area boundary. This is a
accomplished by locating the IIP points in the vicinity of the
populated area, drawing lines normal to the trajectory IIP ground
trace, and choosing the trajectory time for the IIP point whose normal
is closest to the uprange boundary of the populated area but does not
intersect it. The distance from the launch point to x1 may
be determined using the range and bearing equations in appendix A,
paragraph (b).
Step 2: Determine the trajectory time (t2) associated
with the trajectory IIP position (x2) that just exceeds the
downrange point on the populated area boundary. This is accomplished by
locating the IIP point in the vicinity of the populated area, drawing
lines normal to the trajectory IIP ground trace, and choosing the
trajectory time for the IIP point whose normal is closest to the
downrange boundary of the populated area but does not intersect it. The
distance from the launch point to x2 may be determined using
the range and bearing equations in Appendix A, section (b).
Step 3: Determines the average IIP range rate (R) for the flight
period determined in Steps 1 and 2 above.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.014

Step 4: Determine the distance along the nominal trajectory to the
uprange point (x3) on the populated area boundary. This is
accomplished by drawing a line normal to the trajectory IIP ground
trace and tangent to the uprange boundary of the populated area, and
determining the distance along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace
from the launch point to the intersection of the normal and the ground
trace.
Step 5: Determine the distance along the nominal trajectory to the
downrange point (x4) on the populated area boundary. This is
accomplished by drawing a line normal to the trajectory IIP ground
trace and tangent to the downrange boundary of the populated area, and
determining the distance along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace
from the launch point to the intersection of the normal and the ground
trace.
Step 6: The dwell time (td) is estimated by the
following equation.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.015

For either type of flight corridor, an applicant determines the
probability of impact in the cross range direction, (Py),
through a series of steps, of which the first is measuring the distance
from the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace to the closest and
furthest points in the cross range direction of the area that contains
population. The populated area may consist of a census block group or a
1 degree latitude by 1 degree longitude grid. See figure C-1. To
determine the distribution of the debris pattern in that populated
area, the applicant needs to estimate the standard deviation of debris
impacts. The FAA proposes that, for purposes of an appendix C analysis,
that the cross-range boundaries of a flight corridor represent five
standard deviations 5 of all debris impacts form normal and
malfunction trajectories.\43\ To apply this to a populated area, an
applicant must first find the distance

[[Page 34353]]

from the nominal trajectory to the cross-range boundary, measured on a
line normal to the trajectory through the geographic center of the
populated area, and then divide that distance by five.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\43\ Five sigma should represent 99.9999426% of all debris
impacts from normal and malfunction trajectories assuming a
functioning FTS. The one-sided-tail percentage area under the
Gaussian Normal Probability curve beyond five-sigma is approximately
0.000000287%. Since the normal curve is symmetric this value can be
doubled and subtracted from one (1) to determine the percentage area
between the plus-and-minus five sigma limits. This results in the
99.9999426% value. See, Frederick E. Croxton, Elementary Statistics
with Applications in Medicine, 323 (1953).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, the probability of failure is also an element in
calculating the probability of impact. The FAA proposes for the launch
site location analysis to assign a failure probability (Pf)
constant of Pf=0.10 for guided launch vehicles. This
represents a conservative estimate of the failure percentage of current
launch vehicles, since many current launch vehicles are more reliable.
The appendix C process assumes that the probability of impacting within
the corridor is one, and the probability of impacting outside the
corridor is zero. The flight termination system is assumed to function
perfectly in all failure scenarios.
A final variation on computing the probability of impact for a
particular populated area is used when computing the probability of
impact (Pi) within the impact dispersion area of a guided
suborbital launch vehicle. In this case, the probability of success
(Ps) is substituted for the probability of failure
(Pf), and an applicant shall employ a method similar to that
used in appendix D to calculate the probability of impact for any
populated areas inside the impact dispersion area. This divergence, the
use of probability of success rather than probability of failure, from
the variable used for an orbital launch vehicle arises out of the
relative risk associated with an impact dispersion area of a guided
suborbital launch vehicle. The same risks associated with a guided
orbital launch are also associated with a guided sub-orbital launch
except for the final stage of the guided suborbital mission, which is
intended to return to earth rather than to enter orbit. On the basis of
past history, the FAA has concluded that the final stage has a high
reliability and will impact in the designated impact dispersion area,
as intended from a successful mission. The FAA intends through its
proposed launch site location review to analyze high risk events, and
because the risk due to a planned impact in the dispersion area would
be much higher than an unplanned impact, the FAA proposes to use
Ps inside the impact dispersion area rather the
Pf for determining the probability of impact in a guided
suborbital launch vehicle's impact dispersion area.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\44\ The actual probability used in the analysis is 0.98.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Totaling Risk of All Populated Areas in Flight Corridor

The Ec estimate for a flight corridor is a summation of
the risk to each populated area and results in an estimate of
Ec inside the corridor, Ec (Corridor). This means
that an applicant would estimate Ec for each individual
populated area within a flight corridor, using the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.016

Pi is the probability of hitting the populated area.
AC is the effective casualty area of the vehicle and may be
obtained from table C-3. Ak is the area of the populated
area. Nk is the population in Ak, and is obtained
from census data. The label ``k'' is used to identify the individual
populated area. The summed Ec for all populated areas added
together is the Ec (Corridor).
The FAA proposes to require an applicant to use an effective
casualty area specific to a launch vehicle class and range when
performing the Ec calculation. An effective casualty area
(Ac) means the aggregate casualty area of each piece of
debris created by a launch vehicle failure at a particular points on
its trajectory. The casualty area for each piece of debris is the area
within which 100 percent of the unprotected population on the ground is
assumed to be a casualty. This area is based on the characteristics of
the debris piece including its size, the path angle of its trajectory,
impact explosions, and debris skip, splatter, and bounce. In each of
the vehicle classes, the Ac decreases, resulting in a
smaller casualty area, as a function of distance downrange because
vehicle size and explosive potential decreases as explosive propellant
is consumed and expended stages are ejected during vehicle flight.
An effective casualty area is a function of time-after-liftoff is
proposed in table C-3 for launch vehicle classes listed in table 1 of
Sec. 420.21. The FAA derived the effective casualty areas in table C-3
from DAMP, a series of risk estimation computer programs used at
federal launch ranges, to evaluate the vehicle classes described in
table 1, Sec. 420.21. DAMP considers other factors besides debris
characteristics, such as the size of a standing person, which increases
the casualty area, and sheltering, which would tend to decrease the
casualty area. Because considering sheltering has a greater effect than
considering the size of a standing person, and was not assumed in table
C-3, the effective casualty areas in table C-3 are conservative.
An applicant calculates casualty expectancy for each populated area
within a flight corridor. After the casualty expectancies have been
estimated for all populated areas, the Ec values are summed
to obtain the total corridor risk. The total is multiplied by two to
estimate the final value for Ec(Corridor). The FAA is
proposing this multiplier to account for the error introduced by the
risk estimation approach of the launch site location review. Both the
method used to construct a flight corridor and the method used to
analyze risk contributes error. For example, an appendix A flight
corridor is not based on actual wind data, and even though its size is
conservative in nature, this size alone can cause the risk to be
underestimated in appendix C. In other words, what the analysis gains
in conservatism with the greater size of an appendix A corridor it may,
on occasion, lose in conservatism due to the corresponding decrease in
population density relative to an appendix B corridor. Conversely, an
appendix B corridor, which may result in a higher Ec total
due to the greater density attributable to the smaller corridor, may
not encompass a populated area that would otherwise be analyzed for
risk as part of an appendix A corridor. In addition, these calculations
do not account for any secondary effects such as fire and collapsing
structures that may result from impacting debris. Accordingly, to
compensate for these inherent discrepancies, a safety factor is
advisable in order to guard against licensing the operation of a launch
site which may never be able to support a licensed launch. Also, an
appendix B flight corridor is based on a number of approximations,
including the descent rate of a piece of debris, the variability of a
nominal launch vehicle trajectory prior to a failure, and a malfunction
turn. Both the appendix A and B flight corridors for orbital launch
vehicles end at 5,000 am, leaving out a large area of overflight,
albeit with an IIP with very high velocity and extremely small dwell
times. Additionally, the Ec analysis in appendix C itself
can underestimate risk to the population within a flight corridor due
to certain approximations, including the probability of impact in the
cross-range direction (Py), which uses Simpson's
approximation of the Elliptical Normal Probability Function, and the
determination that the width of a flight corridor is assumed to
represent a 5-sigma normal distribution. Cities present in a flight
corridor can also cause the risk to be underestimated because the
appendix C method

[[Page 34354]]

averages population over areas that may be as large as a 1 deg. x
1 deg. grid. Perhaps the most important factor in contributing to
possible error is the fact that the proposed location review assumes a
perfectly functioning flight termination system. Accordingly, the FAA
has chosen a multiplier of two to balance its intent to only approve
launch sites that are safe for the launches intended to be launched
from the launch site, and to minimize the burden on applicants.
The FAA will not approve the proposed launch site location if the
estimated expected casualty exceeds 30 x 10^-6. An
applicant may either modify its proposal, or if the flight corridor
used was generated by the method proposed in appendix A, use the
typically less conservative but more accurate method proposed in
appendix B to narrow the flight corridor and perform another appendix C
overflight risk analysis. An applicant may employ specified variations
to the analysis described above. Six variations are identified in
appendix C. The first four variations permit an application to make
conservative assumptions that would lead to an overestimation of the
corridor Ec compared with the more detailed process
described. Although appendix C's approach simplifies a typical launch
safety analysis somewhat by providing conservative default parameters
to use, it may also prove unnecessarily complex for applicants
proposing launch sites with launch corridors encompassing extremely few
people. For those situations, appendix C provides the option for an
applicant to further simplify the estimation of casualty expectancy by
making worst-case assumptions that would produce a higher value of the
corridor Ec compared with the analysis defined in appendix
C, subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8). This may be particularly useful when an
applicant believes Ec is well below the acceptable
value.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\45\ The purpose of the Ec analysis as part of the
launch site location review is not to determine a value of
Ec but rather to confidently demonstrate that
Ec is less than the acceptable threshold value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

These variations would allow an applicant to assume that
Px and Py have a value of 1.0 for all populated
areas, or combine populated areas into one or more larger populated
areas and use the greatest population density of the component
populated areas for the combined area or areas. An applicant may also
assume Py has a value of one for any given populated area,
or, for any given Px sector, assume Py has a
value of one and use a worst case population density for the sector. A
Px sector is an area spanning the width of a flight corridor
and bounded by two time points on the trajectory IIP ground trace. All
four of these reduce the number of calculations required for applicants
with little population within a flight corridor.
Another option, permitted in appendix C, is for an applicant who
would otherwise fail the baseline analysis to perform a more refined
Ec analysis by negating the baseline approach's
overestimation of the probability of impact in each populated area. If
the flight corridor includes populated areas that are irregular in
shape, the equations for probability of impact in appendix C may cause
Ec to be overestimated. This is because the result of the
Pi computation for each populated area represents the
probability of impacting within a rectangular area that bounds the
populated area. As shown in figure C-1 in appendix C, the length of two
sides of the rectangle would be x2-x1, and the
length of the other two sides would be y2-y1.
Populated areas used to support the appendix C analysis must be no
bigger than a U.S. census block group for the first 100 nautical miles
from a launch point and no bigger than a 1 degree latitude x 1 degree
longitude grid (1 deg. x 1 deg. grid) beyond 100 nautical miles
downrange. Whether the populated area is a census block group, a 1 deg.
x 1 deg. grid, or a land mass such as a small island, it will not
likely be a rectangle. Even a 1 deg. x 1 deg. grid near the equator,
which approximates a rectangle, will not line up with the trajectory
ground trace. Thus, a portion of the Pi rectangle includes
area outside the populated area being evaluated. The probability of
impacting in the rectangle is higher than impacting just in the
populated area being evaluated. The value of the probability of impact
calculated in accordance with appendix C will thus likely be
overestimated.
One approach permitted in appendix C is to divide any given
populated area into smaller rectangles, determine Pi for
each individual rectangle, and sum the individual impact probabilities
to determine Pi for the entire populated area. A second
approach permitted in appendix C is, for a given populated area, to use
the ratio of the populated area to the area of the original
Pi rectangle.
If the estimated expected casualty still exceeds
30 x 10^-6, the FAA will not approve the proposed launch site
location. In that event, the only remaining options for an applicant
would be to rely on one of its potential customers obtaining a launch
license for launch from the proposed site.
The FAA considered the option of increasing the accuracy of
appendix C by employing a procedure that ensures individual populated
areas have homogeneous population densities. The FAA considered this
because the probability of impact equations in appendix C can cause the
Ec for an individual populated area to be underestimated
when unequal population densities occur within the area. This can
occur, for example, when a populated area contains one or more densely
populated cities interspersed with large land mass areas with rural
population. The proposed Ec equation distributes the
population evenly throughout the populated area. Accordingly, the
Ec may be somewhat underestimated or over-estimated for
portions of the populated area. The FAA considered requiring applicants
to use smaller areas with homogeneous population densities in order to
more accurately estimate the Ec, but chose not to because
any error should be accounted for with the multiplier of two discussed
above.

Appendix D

Appendix D contains the FAA's proposed method for determining the
acceptability of the location of a launch site for launching unguided
suborbital launch vehicles. Appendix D describes how to define an
overflight exclusion zone and each impact dispersion area to be
analyzed for risk for a representative launch vehicle. Proposed
appendix D also describes how to estimate whether risk to the public,
measured by expected casualty, falls within the FAA's threshold of
acceptable risk. In short, the proposed approach requires an applicant
to define an overflight exclusion zone around a launch point, determine
the impact point for each spent stage and then define an impact
dispersion area around each impact point. If populated areas are
located in the impact dispersion areas and cannot be excluded by
altering the launch azimuth, the FAA would require a risk analysis that
demonstrates that risk to the public remains within acceptable levels.
As a first step, an applicant would select which launch points at
the proposed launch site would be used for the launch of unguided
suborbital launch vehicles. An applicant must also then select an
existing launch vehicle, for which apogee data is available, whose
final stage apogee represents the maximum altitude of any intended
unguided suborbital launch vehicle intended for launch from that launch
point. The applicant would then plot the distance, which is referred to
as the

[[Page 34355]]

impact range, from the launch point to the nominal impact point on the
azimuth for each stage. Employing the impact dispersion radius of each
stage, the applicant would define an impact dispersion area around each
nominal impact point.
The FAA's proposed methodology for its proposed impact dispersion
area requirements is grounded in three assumptions which reflect
current practice. For purposes of this location review, the FAA assumes
that unguided suborbital launch vehicles are not equipped with a flight
termination system, and that public risk criteria are accordingly met
through the implementation of a wind weighting system, launch
procedures and restrictions, and the proper selection of a launch
azimuth and elevation angles.\46\ These aspects are currently reflected
in FAA guidelines and will be addressed in its regulations for launches
from non-federal launch sites. The cumulative launch experience in
unguided suborbital launch vehicles demonstrates that risk to the
public from launches of these vehicles is attributable to planned stage
impact during a successful flight. Controlling these risks solely
through measures implemented prior to flight rather than relying on
active measures during flight, as is the case for a vehicle equipped
with an FTS, has proved historically an acceptable approach to assuring
protection of the public. Accordingly, the appendix D analysis should
adequately address the general suitability of each launch point for
unguided suborbital launch vehicle launches up to the altitude
proposed. Operational requirements imposed on a launch licensee through
license conditions should adequately address risks posed by the actual
launch of unguided suborbital launch vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\46\ The flight safety program of an unguided suborbital launch
vehicle without a flight termination system typically takes place
and is concluded prior to flight. A launch operator achieves flight
safety by implementing a flight based on launch vehicle performance
parameters, launch vehicle dispersion parameters and other sources
of error, such as wind measurement errors. A launch operator will
offset the effects of winds measured on the day of launch by
adjusting the azimuth and elevation of the launch vehicle's launcher
accordingly. The methodology for correcting for actual wind
conditions on the day of launch is called wind weighting. The
products of a wind weighting analysis determine launcher azimuth and
elevation settings that correct for wind effects on an unguided
launch vehicle.
During preflight planning a launch operator determines launch
vehicle dispersion, which is the potential change in the location of
impact, by modeling the known causes of systematic errors.
Variations in thrust, stage weight, payload weight and stage
ignition time may produce errors, and will typically be included in
any error model. Thrust misalignment, and the misalignment of
nozzles or fins must also be modeled because of their capacity to
contribute to error. A model also incorporates the error created by
separation of the launch vehicle from the launcher, and accounts for
any errors in motor impulse, drag estimate and launcher setting.
Most significantly, a model analyzes wind error. Wind error modeling
accounts for the measurement errors in the measuring system employed
and the time elapsed between the time of measurement and the time of
launch. Once these elements have been determined, wind error will be
incorporated into the model to obtain the predicted impact points
and total launch vehicle dispersion.
Historically, one of three methods have been used to correct for
actual wind conditions on the day of launch. Both NASA at Wallops
Flight Facility and the US Army at White Sands Missile Range have
developed and improved methods of predicting the wind effects over
the years. The three wind weighting methods that have evolved
include: (1) The manual method, (2) the Lewis method, and (3) the 5-
Degree-Of-Freedom (DOF) method. The difference between the methods
is one of complexity and accuracy. The manual method is the least
complex, but produces the largest error. The 5-DOF method is the
most complex, produces the least error, and is currently employed by
safety offices at Wallops Flight Facility and White Sands Missile
Range.
Each of the wind weighting methods produce launch vehicle
elevation and azimuth settings. Other launch factors that play a
role, however, may be necessary to ensure the wind weighting
solutions are within the assumptions made in the pre-flight
dispersion analysis. These factors may include the required height
and period of wind measurements, limitations on the maximum
ballistic wind and wind variability at which launch would be
permitted, and a determination regarding maximum launcher setting
angles.
The FAA derived the methods for defining an impact dispersion
area proposed in appendix D by assuming that a launch operator would
use a 5-DOF method of wind weighting. This does not preclude an
applicant for a launch license from using another wind weighting
method to develop impact dispersion areas, but the FAA proposes to
address such issues in a rulemaking concerning launch licensing
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The proposed location review for a launch point that will support
unguided suborbital launch vehicles also assume that intermediate and
final stages impact the earth within five standard deviations
5 of each nominal, no wind, impact point. This means that an
appendix D analysis does not account for failures outside of five
standard deviations from each intended impact point.
It also means that an appendix D analysis does not simulate an
actual launch in actual wind conditions. For actual launches, wind
weighting can be used to obtain the nominal, no wind, impact point for
the final stage only. In order to ensure that the launch meets
Ec, ship hit, and aircraft hit probabilities, launch
operators compute the wind drifted impact points of all stages using
the launcher settings determined through wind weighting so that
intermediate stage impacts are determined prior to launch. Although
appendix D does not address this fact directly, it does show that at
least some launches can be conducted depending on the wind conditions.

Defining an Overflight Exclusion Zone and Impact Dispersion Areas

The areas an applicant will analyze for risk to the public posed by
the launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle consist of an
overflight exclusion zone and state impact dispersion areas. Having
selected a launch point and a launch vehicle for which empirical data
is available, an applicant defines each zone and area using the
methodology provided. An overflight exclusion zone shall consist of a
circle with a radius of 1600 feet centered on a launch point. An
overflight exclusion zone is the area which must be free of the public
during a launch. Creation of each impact dispersion area involves
several more steps. For each stage of the analyzed vehicle an applicant
must identify the nominal stage impact point on the azimuth where the
stage is supposed to land, and draw a circle around that point, using
the range and bearing equations of appendix A or GIS software. That
circle describes the impact dispersion area, and an applicant defines
an impact dispersion area for each stage.
An applicant must at the outset provide the geodetic latitude and
longitude of a launch point that is proposes to offer for launch, and
select a flight azimuth. Once an applicant has selected a launch point
location and azimuth, the next step is to determine a 1600 foot radius
overflight exclusion zone for that launch point. As with an overflight
exclusion zone created pursuant to appendices A and B, an applicant
must show that the public would be cleared from its overflight
exclusion zone prior to launch. Although suborbital vehicles have a
very low likelihood of failure, failure is more likely to occur in the
early stages of the launch. Consequently, the FAA proposes to guard
against that risk through requiring an applicant to show the ability to
evacuate an overflight exclusion zone. As with the flight corridors of
appendices A and B, the FAA proposes to base the size of the overflight
exclusion zone on the maximum distance that debris is expected to
travel from a launch point if a mishap were to occur very early in
flight. The FAA has estimated the Dmax for an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle, and the result is 1600 feet. Accordingly, an
applicant would define an appendix D overflight exclusion zone as a
circle with a radius of 1600 feet.
Because an applicant must choose the maximum latitude anticipated
of a

[[Page 34356]]

suborbital launch vehicle for launch from its site, an applicant needs
to acquire the apogee of each stage of a representative vehicle. An
applicant need not possess full information regarding a specific
representative launch vehicle. All that is necessary is the apogee of
each stage. The apogee height must be obtained from an actual launch
conducted at an 84 deg. elevation angle. If needed, data is available
from the FAA. The FAA has compiled apogee data from past launches from
Wallops Flight Facility for a range of launch vehicles and payloads.
This data will be provided to an applicant upon request and may be used
to perform the analysis.
An applicant then defines impact dispersion areas for each stage's
nominal impact point. Having selected a launch vehicle most
representative of what the applicant intends for launch from the
proposed launch point, an applicant will use either its own empirical
apogee data or data from one of the vehicles in the FAA's data base.
Whether an applicant uses vehicle apogee data obtained from the FAA or
from elsewhere, the applicant must employ the FAA's proposed range and
dispersion factors to determine the location of each nominal impact
point and the size of each impact dispersion area.
The FAA proposes a means of estimating the distances of both an
impact range and an impact dispersion radius. Under proposed appendix
D, an applicant would estimate the impact range and dispersion
parameters by multiplying the apogee of a launch vehicle intended for
the prospective launch site by the FAA's proposed factors. The FAA
proposes impact range and impact dispersion factors, which it derived
from launch vehicle pedigrees of sounding rockets used by NASA Wallops
Flight Facility in its sounding rocket program.\47\ The proposed
factors provide estimators of staging data for an unguided vehicle
launched at a standard launcher elevation, which is the angle between
the launch vehicle's major axis (x) and the ground, of 84 deg.. the
appendix defines the relationship between the apogee of a launch
vehicle stage, an impact range and a 5 dispersion radius of a
stage. This relationship is expressed as two constants, which vary with
the altitude of the apogee, an impact range factor and an impact
dispersion factor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\47\ These vehicles include Nike Orion, Black Brant IX, Black
Brant XI, and Black Brant XII. They are representative of the
current launch vehicle inventory and should approximate any proposed
new launch vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

To locate each nominal impact point, an applicant will calculate
the impact range for the final stage and each intermediate state. An
impact range describes the distance between an applicant's proposed
launch point and the nominal impact point of a stage, or, in other
words, its estimated landing spot along the azimuth selected for
analysis. For this estimation, an applicant would employ the FAA's
proposed impact range factors of 0.4 or 0.7 as multipliers for the
apogee of the stage. If an apogee is less than 100 kilometers, the
applicant shall employ 0.4 as the impact range factor for that stage.
If the apogee of a stage is 100 kilometers or more, the applicant shall
use 0.7 as a multiplier. In plotting the impact points on a map, an
applicant shall employ the methods provided in appendix A.
An impact dispersion radius descries the impact dispersion area of
a stage. The FAA proposes to rely on an estimated impact dispersion
radius of five standard deviations 5 because significant
population, such as a densely populated city, in areas within distances
up to 5 of the impact point could cause significant public
risk. An applicant shall obtain the radius of the impact dispersion
area by multiplying the stage apogee by the FAA's proposed impact
dispersion factor of 0.4 for an apogee less than 100 kilometers and of
0.7 for an apogee of 100 kilometers or more. The final stage would
typically produce the largest impact dispersion area.
Once an applicant determines the impact dispersion radii, the
applicant must plot each impact dispersion area on a map in accordance
with the requirements of paragraph (b). This is shown in figure D-1. An
applicant may then determine if flight azimuths exist which do not
affect populated areas. If all potential flight azimuths contain impact
dispersion areas which encompass populated areas, then the FAA would
require an Ec estimation of risk.

Public Risk Ec Estimation

The FAA will approve a launch point for suborbital launch vehicles
if there exists a set of impact dispersion areas for a representative
launch vehicle in which the sum of risk to the public does not exceed
the FAA's acceptable risk threshold. An overflight exclusion zone must
contain no people. If a populated area is present within the impact
dispersion areas, the proposed rules require an applicant to estimate
the risk to the public posed by possible stage impact. An applicant
must then determine whether its estimated risk satisfies the FAA
requirement of an Ec of no more than 30 x 10^-6.
The Ec estimation is performed by computing the sum of the
risk for the impact of each stage and accounting for each populated
area located within a 5 dispersion of an impact point. The
equation used to accomplish this is the same as that used in the impact
probability computation in appendix C. Unlike, however, the method in
appendix C, which accounts for an impact due to a failure, the
probability of a stage impact occurring is Ps = 1-
Pf, where Ps is the probability of success, and
Pf is the probability of failure. The FAA proposes, for the
purposes of the launch site location review, a constant of 0.98 for the
probability of success for unguided suborbital launch vehicles. The
probability of success is used in place of Pf in calculating
both the cross-range and downrange probability of impact.
The proposed location review for launch points intended for the
launch of unguided suborbital launch vehicles differs from the approach
proposed for reviewing the location of launch points intended for the
launch of guided orbital and suborbital launch vehicles. In analyzing
whether risk remains at acceptable levels, Ec equations in
appendix D rely on the probability of success rather than the
probability of failure. The use of stage impact probability, typified
as the probability of success (Ps), for suborbital launch
vehicles is necessary because stage impacts are high probability events
which occur near the launch point with dispersions which may overlap or
be adjacent to the launch point. The difference between the methods of
appendices A, B and C and that proposed in appendix D reflects the
fundamental differences between the likely dominant source of risk to
the public guided and unguided vehicles and the methods that have been
developed for guarding public safety against the risks created by each
type of vehicle. In other words, the methods for defining impact
dispersion areas and for conducting an impact risk assessment for an
unguided vehicle are premised on the risks posed by a successful
flight, that is, the planned deposition of stages and debris. In
contrast, the methodology for developing a flight corridor and
associated risk methodology for guided vehicles assumes that the likely
major source of risk to the public arises out of a failure of a mission
and the ensuing destruction of the vehicle. Failures are less probable
and debris impacts are spread throughout a flight trajectory.
The high degree of success recorded for unguided launch vehicles
renders

[[Page 34357]]

the probability of success the greater source of risk. Because of their
relative simplicity of operation, the failure rate, over time, for
unguided launch vehicles is between one and two percent. At this level
of reliability, the FAA believes that its primary focus of concern for
assessing the safety of a launch site should be the more likely event,
namely, the public's exposure to the planned impact of vehicle stages
and other vehicle components, such as fairings, rather than the risk
posed by exposure to debris resulting from a failure. Success is the
high risk event. Although failure rates are low for unguided launch
vehicles, their spent stages have large impact dispersions. Moreover,
the FAA's proposed impact dispersion area estimations generally produce
impact dispersion areas large enough to encompass most of the
populations exposed to a possible failure as well as to a nominal
flight, thus ensuring the inclusion of any large, densely populated
area in the analysis. Thus, all but a small percentage of populated
area will be analyzed to some extent, albeit using impact probabilities
based on success. This fact plus a multiplier of five should provide a
reasonable, conservative estimation of the risks associated with the
launch point.
This is true of unguided sub-orbital launch vehicles because their
impact dispersions are much larger than those for guided vehicles and
they occur closer to the launch point.
In appendix D, the FAA assumes that the stage impact dispersion in
both the downrange and cross range directions are equal. This is a
valid assumption for suborbital launch vehicle rockets because their
trajectories produce near circular dispersions. NASA data on sounding
rocket impact dispersion supports this conclusion.
The impact dispersion area is based on a 5 dispersion.
Appendix D uses the effective casualty area data, the table D-1, which
contains information similar to appendix C, table C-3. This data
represents the estimation of the area produced by both suborbital
launch vehicle inert pieces. The baseline risk estimation approach in
appendix D has the applicant calculate the probability of impact for
each populated area, and then determining an Ec value for
each populated area. To obtain the estimated Ec for an
entire impact dispersion area, the applicant adds the Ec
results for each populated area. If the population within the impact
dispersion area is relatively small, an applicant may wish to conduct a
less rigorous analysis by making conservative assumptions. Appendix D
offers the option of analyzing a worst-case impact dispersion area for
those where such an approach might save time and analysis, similar to
the approach in appendix C.

Paperwork Reduction Act

This proposal contains information collection requirements. As
required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. section
3507(d)), the Department of Transportation has submitted the
information collection requirements associated with this proposal to
the Office of Management and Budget for its review.
Title: Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch
Site.
The FAA is proposing to amend its commercial space transportation
licensing regulations to add licensing and safety requirements for the
operation of a launch site. In the past, commercial launches have
occurred principally at federal launch ranges under safety procedures
developed by federal launch range operators. To enable the development
and use of launch sites that are not operated by a federal launch
ranges, rules are needed to establish specific licensing and safety
requirements for operating a launch site, whether that site is located
on or off of a federal launch range. These proposed rules would provide
licensed launch site operators with licensing and safety requirements
to protect the public from the risks associated with activities at
launch site.
The required information will be used to determine whether
applicants satisfy requirements for obtaining a license to protect the
public from risks associated with operations at a launch site. The
information to be collected includes data required for performing
launch site location analyses. A launch site license is valid for a
period of five years, and it is assumed that all licenses would be
renewed after five years. The frequency of required submissions,
therefore, will depend upon the number of prospective launch site
operators seeking a license and the renewal of site licenses.
The respondents are all licensees authorized to conduct licensed
launch site activities. It is estimated that there will be two
respondents annually at 796 hours per respondent for an estimated
annual burden hours of 1592 hours.
The agency is soliciting comments to (1) evaluate whether the
proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the
information will be practical utility; (2) evaluate the accuracy of the
agency's estimate of the burden; (3) enhance the quality, utility, and,
clarity of the information to be collected; and (4) minimize the burden
of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including
through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or
other technological collection techniques or other forms of information
technology (for example, permitting electronic submission of
responses).
Individuals and organizations may submit comments on the
information collection requirement by August 24, 1999, and should
direct them to the address listed in the ADDRESSES section of this
document.
According to the regulations implementing the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995, (5 CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not conduct or
sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to a collection of
informaiton unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.
The OMB control number for this information collection will be
published in the Federal Register after it is approved by the Office of
Management and Budget.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary

This section summarizes the full regulatory evaluation prepared by
the FAA that provides more detailed estimates of the economic
consequences of this regulatory action. This summary and the full
evaluation quantify, to the extent practicable, estimated costs to the
private sector, consumers, Federal, State and local governments, as
well as anticipated benefits. This evaluation was conducted in
accordance with Executive Order 12866, which directs that each Federal
agency can propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify the
costs. This document also includes an initial regulatory flexibility
determination required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, and
an international trade impact assessment, required by the Office of
Management and Budget. This proposal is not considered a significant
regulatory action under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866. In
addition, under Regulatory Policies and Procedures of the Department of
Transportation (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979), this proposal is
considered significant because there is substantial public interest in
the rulemaking.
The Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend its
commercial space licensing regulations to add licensing requirements
for the operation of a launch site. The proposal would provide launch
site operators with licensing and operating requirements to protect the
public from the risks

[[Page 34358]]

associated with operations at a launch site. The FAA currently issues
licenses to launch site operators on a case-by case-approach. Elements
of that approach are reflected in the guidelines, ``Site Operators
License Guidelines for Applicants,'' which describe the information
that applicants provide the FAA for a license to operate a launch site.
The FAA's interpretation and implementation of the guidelines
constitute another element of the case-by-case approach and additional
elements, such as policy review, not reflected in the guidelines.
The proposal represents quantifiable changes in costs compared to
the guidelines (current practice) in the following two areas. They are
the launch site location review and approval and the launch site
operations review and approval. The FAA has estimated the costs and
cost savings of these changes under two different cost scenarios over a
10-year period discounted at 7 percent in 1997 dollars. The total 10-
year undiscounted cost savings is estimated to be between $84,000 and
$160,000 (or between $53,000 and $105,000, discounted). The most
burdensome cost scenario (where net cost savings is the least) to the
industry would result in the costs to the launch site operators of
$3,000 (or $2,000, discounted) for the launch site location reviews and
approval provisions and a cost savings of $11,000 (or $8,000,
discounted) for the launch site operations review and approval
provisions. Although there would be no cost impact to the FAA, there
would be a cost savings to the FAA from the most burdensome cost
scenario of $104,000 or $70,000 discounted.
There are significant nonquantifiable benefits in two areas. First,
the proposal eliminates overlapping responsibilities. Second, the
proposal provides increased details and specificity, which are not
present in the guidelines.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 establishes ``as a principle
of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, consistent with
the objective of the rule and of applicable statues, to fit regulatory
and informational requirements to the scale of the business,
organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to regulation.''
To achieve that principal, the Act requires agencies to solicit and
consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the rational for
their actions. The Act covers a wide-range of small entities, including
small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and small governmental
jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. If the determination is that it will, the
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis (RFA) as
described in the Act. However, if an agency determines that a proposed
or final rule is not expected to have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 act
provides that the head of the agency must so certify and an RFA is not
required. The certification must include a statement providing the
factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be
clear.
The FAA conducted the required review of this proposal and
determined that it would not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, pursuant to the
regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Federal Aviation
Administration certifies that this rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

Potentially Affected Entities

Entities who are licensed, or have begun the licensing process,
were contacted to determine their size and to gain insight into the
impacts of the proposed regulations on the licensing process. Spaceport
Florida Authority (SFA), Spaceport Systems International, L.P. (SSI),
the Virginia Commonwealth Space Flight Authority (VCSFA) and the Alaska
Aerospace Development Corporation (AADC) are all licensed to operate
launch sites. The New Mexico Office of Space Commercialization (NMOSC)
is mentioned briefly below although it is only in the pre-application
consultation phase.
The Virginia Commonwealth Space Flight Authority (VCSFA) is a not-
for-profit subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia, responsible for
oversight of the activities of the Virginia Commercial Space Flight
Center (VCSFC). The VCSFC is located within the boundaries of the
Wallops Flight Facility (WFF). As a subdivision of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, the VCSFA is empowered by the Acts of the General Assembly to
do all things necessary to carry out its mission of stimulating
economic growth and education through commercial aerospace activities.
The Spaceport Florida Authority (SFA) was created by Florida's
Governor and Legislature as the nation's first state government space
agency. The authority was established to develop space-related
enterprise, including launch activities, industrial development and
education-related projects. SFA operate Spaceport Florida (SPF),
located on Cape Canaveral Air Station.
Launch site operator California Spaceport is located on Vandenberg
Air Force Base. The launch site is operated and managed by Spaceport
Systems International, L.P. who is in partnership with ITT Federal
Services Corporation (ITT FSC). ITT FSC is one of the largest U.S.-
based technical and support services contractors in the world.
The Kodiak Launch Complex is being built by the Alaska Aerospace
Development Corporation. AADC is a public corporation created by the
State of Alaska to develop aerospace related economic and technical
opportunities for the state.
The Southwest Regional Spaceport (SRS) is to be operated by the New
Mexico Office of Space Commercialization (NMOSC). The NMOSC is a
division of the State's New Mexico Economic Development Department.
Commencement of space flight operations is not expected until early the
next decade.

Definition of Small Entities

The Small Business Administration has defined small business
entities relating to space vehicles (SIC codes 3761, 3764 and 3769) as
entities comprising fewer than 1000 employees. Although the above
mentioned entities have fewer than 1000 employees in their immediate
segment of the business, they are affiliated with/or funded by state
governments and large parent companies. The VCSFA is a not-for-profit
subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia; the SFA is a government
space agency; the SSI is affiliated with ITT FSC; and AADC is a
government sponsored corporation.
Under 5 U.S.C. 605, the FAA concludes that this proposal would
impose little or no additional cost on this industry and certifies that
it will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities. The FAA nevertheless requests comments on any
potential impacts associated with this proposal.

International Trade Impact Assessment

Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site
(14 CFR part 420) would not constitute a barrier to international
trade, including the export of U.S. goods and services out of the
United States. The proposal affects operation of launch sites that are
currently located or being proposed within the United States or
operated by U.S. citizens.

[[Page 34359]]

The proposal is not expected to affect the trade opportunities for
U.S. firms doing business overseas or for foreign firms doing business
in the United States. The FAA requests information on the effect that
this proposal would have on international trade.

Federalism Implications

The regulations proposed herein will not have substantial direct
effects on the states, on the relationship between the national
government and the states, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in
accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this
proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant
the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Assessment

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA),
enacted as Pub. L. 104-4 on March 22, 1995, requires each Federal
agency, to the extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment
of the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency
rule that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year.
Section 204(a) of the UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal
agency to develop an effective process to permit timely input by
elected officers (or their designees) of State, local, and tribal
governments on a proposed ``significant intergovernmental mandate.'' A
``significant intergovernmental mandate'' under the UMRA is any
provision in a Federal agency regulation that will impose an
enforceable duty upon State, local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one
year. Section 203 of the UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which supplements section
204(a), provides that before establishing any regulatory requirements
that might significantly or uniquely affect small governments, the
agency shall have developed a plan that, among other things, provides
for notice to potentially affected small governments, if any, and for a
meaningful and timely opportunity to provide input in the development
of regulatory proposals.
This proposed does not meet the cost thresholds described above.
Furthermore, this proposal would not impose a significant cost or
uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, the requirements of Title
II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply.

Environmental Assessment

FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS).
In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, appendix 4, paragraph 4(i),
regulatory documents which cover administrative or procedural
requirements qualify for a categorical exclusion. Proposed sections in
subpart B of part 420 would require an applicant to submit sufficient
environmental information for the FAA to comply with NEPA and other
applicable environmental laws and regulations during the processing of
each license application. Accordingly, the FAA proposes that this rule
qualifies for a categorical exclusion because no significant impacts to
the environment are expected to result from the finalization or
implementation of its administrative provisions for licensing.

Energy Impact

The energy impact of the rulemaking action has been assessed in
accordance with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) and Pub.
L. 94-163, as amended (42 U.S.C. 6362). It has been determined that it
is not a major regulatory action under the provisions of the EPCA.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR 417 and 420

Confidential business information. Environmental protection,
Organization and functions, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Rockets, Space transportation and exploration.

The Amendment

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends Chapter III of Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations to read as follows:

PART 417--[REMOVED AND RESERVED]

1. Part 417 is removed and reserved.
2. Subchapter C of Chapter III, title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations, is amended by adding a new part 420 to read as follows:

PART 420--LICENSE TO OPERATE A LAUNCH SITE

Subpart A--General

Sec.
420.1 Scope.
420.3 Applicability.
420.5 Definitions.
420.6-420.14 [Reserved]

Subpart B--Criteria and Information Requirements for Obtaining a
License

420.15 Information requirements.
420.17 Bases for issuance of a license.
420.19 Launch site location review.
420.21 Launch site criteria for expendable launch vehicles.
420.23 Launch site location review for unproven launch vehicles.
420.31 Explosive site plan.
420.33 Handling of solid propellants.
420.35 Storage or handling of liquid propellants.
420.37 Solid and liquid propellants located together.
420.38-420.40 [Reserved]

Subpart C--License Terms and Conditions

420.41 License to operate a launch site-general.
420.43 Duration.
420.45 Transfer of a license to operate a launch site.
420.47 License modification.
420.49 Compliance monitoring.

Subpart D--Responsibilities of a Licensee

420.51 Responsibilities--general.
420.53 Control of public access.
420.55 Scheduling of launch site operations.
420.57 Notifications.
420.59 Launch site accident investigation plan.
420.61 Records.
420.63 Explosives.
Appendix A to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor
Appendix B to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor
Appendix C to Part 420--Risk Analysis
Appendix D to Part 420--Impact Dispersion Areas and Casualty
Expectancy Estimate for Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicles
Appendix E to Part 420--Tables for Explosive Site Plan

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.

Subpart A--General

Sec. 420.1 Scope.

This part prescribes the information and demonstrations that must
be submitted as part of a license application, the bases for license
approval, license terms and conditions, and post-licensing requirements
with which a licensee shall comply to remain licensed. Requirements for
preparing a license application are also contained in part 413 of this
subchapter.

Sec. 420.3 Applicability.

This part applies to any person seeking a license to operate a
launch site or to a person licensed under this part.

Sec. 420.5 Definitions.

For the purpose of this part,
Ballistic coefficient means the weight of an object divided by the
quantity product of the coefficient of drag of the object and the area
of the object.

[[Page 34360]]

Compatibility means the chemical property of materials that may be
located together without increasing the probability of an accident or,
for a given quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an accident.
Debris dispersion radius (Dmax) means the estimated
maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels given a worst-
case launch vehicle failure and flight termination at 10 seconds into
flight.
Divison 1.3 explosive means an explosive as defined in 49 CFR
173.50.
Downrange area means a portion of a flight corridor beginning where
a launch area ends and ending 5,000 nautical miles from the launch
point for an orbital launch vehicle, and ending with an impact
dispersion area for a guided sub-orbital launch vehicle.
E,F,G coordinate system means an orthgonal, Earth-fixed,
geocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system is
at the center of an ellipsoidal earth model. The E-axis is positive
directed through the Greenwich meridian. The F-axis is positive
directed through 90 degrees east longitude. The EF-plane is coincident
with the ellipsoidal Earth model's equatorial plane. The G-axis is
normal to the EF-plane and positive directed through the north pole.
E,N,U. coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed,
topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system
is at a launch point. The E-axis is positive directed east. The N-axis
is positive directed north. The EN-plane is tangent to an ellipsoidal
Earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to the geodetic
vertical. The U-axis is normal to the EN-plane and positive directed
away from the Earth.
Effective casualty area (Ac) means the aggregate
casualty area of each piece of debris created by a launch vehicle
failure at a particular point on its trajectory. The effective casualty
area for each piece of debris is the area within which 100 percent of
the unprotected population on the ground are assumed to be a casualty,
and outside of which 100 percent of the population are assumed not to
be a casualty. This area is based on the characteristics of the debris
piece including its size, the path angle of its trajectory, impact
explosions, the size of a person, and debris skip, splatter, and
bounce.
Explosive means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that,
when subjected to heat, impact, friction, detonation or other suitable
initiation, undergoes a rapid chemical change that releases large
volumes of highly heated gases that exert pressure in the surrounding
medium. The term applies to materials that either detonate or
deflagrate.
Explosive equivalent means a measure of the blast effects from
explosion of a given quantity of material expressed in terms of the
weight of trinitrotoluene (TNT) that would produce the same blast
effects when detonated.
Explosive hazard facility means a facility at a launch site where
solid or liquid propellant is stored or handled.
Flight azimuth means the initial direction in which a launch
vehicle flies relative to true north expressed in degrees-decimal-
degrees.
Flight corridor means an area on the earth's surface estimated to
contain the majority of hazardous debris from nominal and non-nominal
flight of an orbital or guided suborbital launch vehicle.
Guided suborbital launch vehicle means a suborbital rocket that
employs an active guidance system.
Impact dispersion area means an area representing and estimated
five standard deviation dispersion about a nominal impact point of an
intermediate or final stage of a suborbital launch vehicle.
Impact dispersion factor means a constant used to estimate, using a
stage apogee, a five standard deviation dispersion about a nominal
impact point of an intermediate or final stage of a suborbital launch
vehicle.
Impact dispersion radius (Ri) means a radius that
defines an impact dispersion area.
Impact range means the distance between a launch point and the
impact point of a suborbital launch vehicle stage.
Impact range factor means a constant used to estimate, using the
stage apogee, the nominal impact point of an intermediate or final
stage of a suborbital launch vehicle.
Instantaneous impact point (IIP means an impact point, following
thrust termination of a launch vehicle, calculated in the absence of
atmospheric drag effects.
Instantaneous impact point (IIP) range rate means a launch
vehicle's estimated IIP velocity along the Earth's surface.
Intraline distance means the minimum distance permitted between any
two explosive hazard facilities in the ownership, possession or control
of one launch site customer.
Launch area means, for a flight corridor defined using appendix A
to this part, the portion of a flight corridor from the launch point to
a point 100 nautical miles in the direction of the flight azimuth. For
a flight corridor defined using appendix B to this part, a launch area
is the portion of a flight corridor from the launch point to the
enveloping line enclosing the outer boundary of he last debris
dispersion circle.
Launch point means a point on the Earth from which the flight of a
launch vehicle begins, and is defined by its geodetic latitude,
longitude and height on an ellipsoidal Earth model.
Launch site accident means an unplanned event occurring during a
ground activity at a launch site resulting in a fatality or serious
injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who is not associated
with the activity, or any damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to
property not associated with the activity.
Net explosive weight (NEW) means the total weight, expressed in
pounds, of explosive material or explosive equivalency contained in an
item.
Nominal means, in reference to launch vehicle performance,
trajectory, or stage impact point, a launch vehicle flight where all
launch vehicle aerodynamic parameters are as expected, all vehicle
internal and external systems perform as planned, and there are no
external perturbing influences (e.g., winds) other than atmospheric
drag and gravity.
Nominal trajectory means the position and velocity components of a
nominally performing launch vehicle relative to an x, y, z coordinate
system, expressed in x, y, z, xo, yo, zo.
Overflight dwell time means the period of time it takes for a
launch vehicle's IIP to move past a populated area. For a given
populated area, the overflight dwell time is the time period measured
along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace from the time point whose
normal with the trajectory intersects the most uprange part of the
populated area to the time point whose normal with the trajectory
intersects the most downrange part of the populated area.
Overflight exclusion zone means a portion of a flight corridor
which must remain clear of the public during the flight of a launch
vehicle.
Populated area means a land area with population.
Population density means the number of people per unit area in a
populated area.
Position data means data referring to the current position of a
launch vehicle with respect to flight time expressed through the x, y,
z coordinate system.
Public area means any area outside a hazard area and is an area
that is not in the possession, ownership or other control of a launch
site operator or of a

[[Page 34361]]

launch site customer who possess, owns or otherwise controls that
hazard area.
Public area distance means the minimum distance permitted between a
public area and an explosive hazard facility.
Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub-orbital rocket that
does not have a guidance system.
x,y,z coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed,
topocentric, right-handed system. This origin of the coordinate system
is at a launch point. The x-axis coincides with the initial launch
azimuth and is positive in the downrange direction. The y-axis is
positive to the left looking downrange. The xy-plane is tangent to the
ellipsoidal earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to
the geodetic vertical. The z-axis is normal to the xy-plane and
positive directed away from the earth.
0,0,h0 means a
latitude, longitude, height system where 0 is the
geodetic latitude of a launch point, 0 is the east
longitude of the launch point, and h0 is the height of the
launch point above the reference ellipsoid. 0 and
0 are expressed in degrees-decimal-degrees.

Secs. 420.6-420.14 [Reserved]

Subpart B--Criteria and Information Requirements for Obtaining a
License

Sec. 420.15 Information requirements.

(a) An applicant shall provide the FAA with information for the FAA
to analyze the environmental impacts associated with operation of a
proposed launch site. The information provided by an applicant must be
sufficient to enable the FAA to comply with the requirements of the
National Environment Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (NEPA), the
Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the
Procedural Provisions of NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500-1508, and the FAA's
Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts, FAA Order 1050.1D. An
applicant shall submit environmental information concerning a proposed
launch site not covered by existing environmental documentation and
other factors as determined by the FAA.
(b) An applicant shall:
(1) Provide the information necessary to demonstrate compliance
with Secs. 420.19, 420.21, and 420.23. For launch sites analyzed for
expendable launch vehicles, an applicant shall provide the following
information:
(i) A map or maps showing the location of each launch point
proposed, and the flight azimuth, overflight exclusion zone, flight
corridor, and each impact dispersion area for each launch point;
(ii) Each launch vehicle type and any launch vehicle class proposed
for each launch point;
(iii) Each month and any percent wind data used in the analysis;
(iv) Any launch vehicle apogee used in the analysis;
(v) If populated areas are located within an overflight exclusion
zone, a demonstration that there are times when the public is not
present or that the applicant has an agreement in place to evacuate the
public from the overflight exclusion zone during a launch;
(vi) Each populated area located within a flight corridor or impact
dispersion area;
(vii) The estimated casualty expectancy calculated for each
populated area within a flight corridor or impact dispersion area; and
(vii) The estimated casualty expectancy for each flight corridor or
set of impact dispersion areas.
(2) Identify foreign ownership of the applicant, as follows:
(i) For a sole proprietorship or partnership, all foreign owners or
partners;
(ii) For a corporation, any foreign ownership interest of 10
percent or more; and
(iii) For a joint venture, association, or other entity, any
foreign entities participating in the entity.
(3) Provide an explosive site plan in accordance with Secs. 420.31,
420.33, 420.35 and 420.37.
(c) An applicant shall provide the information necessary to
demonstrate compliance with the requirements of Secs. 420.53, 420.55,
420.57, 420.59 and 420.63.
(d) An applicant who is proposing to locate a launch site at an
existing launch point at a federal launch range is not required to
comply with paragraph (b)(1) of this section if a launch vehicle of the
same type and class as proposed for the launch point has been safely
launched from the launch point. An applicant who is proposing to locate
a launch site at a federal launch range is not required to comply with
paragraph (b)(3) of this section.

Sec. 420.17 Bases for issuance of a license.

(a) The FAA will issue a license under this part when the FAA
determines that:
(1) The application provides the information required under
Sec. 420.15;
(2) The National Environmental Policy Act review is completed;
(3) The launch site location meets the criteria provided in
Secs. 420.19, 420.21, and 420.23;
(4) The explosive site plan meets the criteria provided in
Secs. 420.31, 420.33, 420.35 and 420.37;
(5) The application demonstrates that the applicant shall satisfy
the requirements of subpart D of this part; and
(6) Issuing a license would not jeopardize foreign policy or
national security interests of the United States.
(b) The FAA advises an applicant, in writing, of any issue arising
during an application review that would lead to denial. The applicant
may respond in writing, submit additional information, or revise its
license application.

Sec. 420.19 Launch site location review.

(a) To gain approval for a launch site location, an applicant shall
demonstrate that for at least one type of expendable launch vehicle--
orbital, guided sub-orbital or unguided sub-orbital--or a reusable
launch vehicle, a flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas
exists that does not exceed an estimated expected average number of
0.00003 casualties (Ec) to the collective member of the
public exposed to hazards from any one flight
(Ec^:30 x 10^-6). For an orbital
expendable launch vehicle, an applicant shall choose a weight class as
defined in table 1.
(b) For a guided orbital or guided sub-orbital expendable launch
vehicle, an applicant shall define a flight corridor using one of the
methodologies provided in appendices A or B to this part. If a defined
flight corridor contains a populated area, the applicant shall use
appendix C to this part to estimate the casualty expectation associated
with the flight corridor.
(c) For an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, an
applicant shall define impact dispersion areas as provided by appendix
D to this part. If a defined impact dispersion area contains any
populated areas, the applicant shall use appendix D to this part to
estimate the casualty expectation associated with the set of impact
dispersion areas.
(d) For a reusable launch vehicle, an applicant shall define a
flight corridor that the applicant estimates to contain the hazardous
debris from nominal and non-nominal flight of a reusable launch
vehicle. If the defined flight corridor contains a populated area, the
applicant shall estimate the casualty expectation associated with a
reusable launch vehicle mission. An applicant shall demonstrate that
the estimated expected average number of casualties (Ec) to
the collective member of the public exposed to hazards from any one
mission is less than 0.00003. The FAA will evaluate the adequacy of the
flight corridor and

[[Page 34362]]

casualty expectancy analysis on a case-by-case basis.

Sec. 420.21 Launch site criteria for expendable launch vehicles.

(a) For each launch point proposed for expendable launch vehicles,
an applicant shall use each type of expendable launch vehicle proposed
to be launched from that launch point as the basis of its demonstration
of compliance with the criteria provided in paragraph (b) of this
section and for the analyses provided in appendices A through D to this
part.
(b) For each type of expendable launch vehicle selected under
paragraph (a) of this section, the distance from the proposed launch
point to the launch site boundary must be at least as great as the
minimum distance listed in table 2 for that type and any class of
launch vehicle.

Sec. 420.23 Launch site location review for unproven launch vehicles.

The FA will evaluate the adequacy of a launch site location for
unproven launch vehicles including all new launch vehicles, whether
expendable or reusable, on a case-by-case basis.

Table 1 to Sec. 420.21.--Orbital Launch Vehicle Classes by Payload Weight (lbs)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbital Launch Vehicles
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 nm orbit Small Medium Medium large Large
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 degrees inclination \1\...... 440 >4400 to 11100 >11100 to 18500 >18500
90 degrees inclination \2\...... 3300 >3300 to 8400 >8400 to 15000 >15000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 28 degrees inclination orbit from a launch point at 28 degrees latitude.
\2\ 90 degrees inclination orbit.

Table 2 to Sec. 420.21.--Minimum Distance From Launch Point to Launch Site Boundary (Feet)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbital launch vehicles Suborbital launch vehicles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unguided
Small Medium Medium large Large Guided suborbital suborbital launch
launch vehicle vehicle
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7300 9300 10600 13000 8000 1600
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 420.13 Explosvie site plan.

(a) An applicant shall submit an explosive site plan that
establishes compliance with Secs. 420.33, 420.35, and 420.37. The
explosive site plan shall include:
(1) A scaled map that shows the location of all proposed explosive
hazard facilities at the proposed launch site and that shows actual and
minimal allowable distances between each explosive hazard facility and
all other explosive hazard facilities and each public area, including
the launch site boundary.
(2) A listing of the maximum quantities of liquid and solid
propellants to be located at each explosive hazard facility, including
the class and division for each solid propellant and the hazard and
compatibility group for each liquid propellant; and
(3) A description of each activity to be conducted in each
explosive hazard facility.
(b) An applicant applying for a license to operate a launch site at
a federal launch range need not submit an explosive site plan to the
FAA.

Sec. 420.33 Handling of solid propellants.

(a) An applicant shall determine the total quantity of solid
propellant explosives by class and division in each explosive hazard
facility where solid propellants will be handled. The total quantity of
explosives in an explosive hazard facility shall be measured as the net
explosive weight (NEW) of the solid propellants. When division 1.1
explosives, designed to be installed on launch vehicles and designed
not to detonate division 1.3 components, are located with division 1.3
explosives, that total quantity of explosives shall be the NEW of the
division 1.3 components.
(b) An applicant shall separate each explosive hazard facility
where solid propellants will be handled from all other explosive hazard
facilities, each public area and the launch site boundary by a distance
no less than those provided for each quantity in appendix E, table E-1.
An applicant shall employ no less than the applicable public area
distance to separate an explosive hazard facility from each public area
and from the launch site boundary. An applicant shall employ no less
than an intraline distance to separate an explosive hazard facility
from all other explosive hazard facilities that will be used by a
single customer. An applicant may use linear interpolation for NEW
quantities between table entries. For every explosive hazard facility
where solid propellants in quantities greater than 1,000,000 pounds
will be handled, an applicant shall separate the explosive hazard
facility from all other explosive hazard facilities, each public area
and the launch site boundary in accordance with the minimum separation
distances derived from the following relationships:
(1) For a public area distance:

D = 8W^1/3
where ``D'' equals the minimum separation distance in feet and ``W''
equals the NEW of propellant.

(2) For an intraline distance:

D = 5W^1/3
where ``D'' equals the minimum separation distance in feet and ``W''
equals the NEW of propellant.

(c) An applicant shall measure separation distance from the closest
debris or explosive hazard source in an explosive hazard facility.

Sec. 420.35 Storage or handling of liquid propellants.

(a) For an explosive hazard facility where liquid propellants are
handled or stored, an applicant shall determine the total quantity of
liquid propellant and, if applicable pursuant to paragraph (a)(3) of
this section, the explosive equivalent of liquid propellant in each
explosive hazard facility in accordance with the following:
(1) The quantity of liquid propellant in a tank, drum, cylinder, or
other container is the net weight in pounds of the propellant in the
container. The determination of quantity shall include any liquid
propellant in associated piping to any point where positive

[[Page 34363]]

means are provided for interrupting the flow through the pipe, or
interrupting a reaction in the pipe in the event of a mishap.
(2) Where two or more containers of compatible liquid propellants
will be handled or stored together in an explosive hazard facility, the
total quantity of propellant to determine the minimum separation
distance between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive
hazard facilities and each public area shall be the total quantity of
liquid propellant in all containers, unless:
(i) The containers are separated one from the other by the
appropriate distance as provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this section;
or
(ii) The containers are subdivided by intervening barriers, such as
diking, that prevent mixing.
(iii) If paragraph (a)(2) (i) or (ii) of this section apply, an
applicant shall use the quantity of propellant requiring the greatest
separation distance pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section to
determine the minimum separation distance between the explosive hazard
facility and all other explosive hazard facilities and each public
area.
(3) Where two or more containers of incompatible liquid propellants
will be handled or stored together in an explosive hazard facility, an
applicant shall determine the explosive equivalent in pounds of the
combined liquids, using the formulas provided in appendix E, table E-2,
to determine the minimum separation distance between the explosive
hazard facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas
unless the containers are separated one from the other by the
appropriate distance as determined in paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
An applicant shall then use the quantity of liquid propellant requiring
the greatest separation distance to determine the minimum separation
distance between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive
hazard facilities and each public area.
(4) An applicant shall convert quantities of liquid propellants
from gallons to pounds using the conversion factors provided in
appendix E, table E-3 and the following equation:

Pounds of propellant = gallons x density of propellant (pounds per
gallon).

(b) An applicant shall use appendix E, table E-3 to determine
hazard and compatibility groups and shall separate liquid propellants
from each other and from each public area using distances no less than
those provided in appendix E, tables E-4 through E-7 in accordance with
the following:
(1) An applicant shall measure minimum separation distances from
the hazard source in an explosive hazard facility, such as a container,
building, segment, or positive cutoff point in piping, closest to each
explosive hazard facility.
(2) An applicant shall measure the minimum separation distance
between compatible liquid propellants using the ``intragroup and
compatible'' distance for the propellant quantity and hazard group that
requires the greater distance prescribed by appendix E, tables E-4, E-
5, and E-6.
(3) An applicant shall measure the minimum separation distance
between liquid propellants of different compatibility groups using the
``public area and incompatible'' distance for the propellant quantity
and hazard group that requires the greater distance provided in
appendix E, tables E-4, E-5, and E-6, unless the propellants of
different compatibility groups are subdivided by intervening barriers
that prevent mixing. If such barriers are present, the minimum
separation distance shall be the ``intragroup and compatible'' distance
for the propellant quantity and group that requires the greater
distance provided in appendix E, tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.
(4) An applicant shall separate liquid propellants from each public
area using a distance no less than the ``public area and incompatible''
distance provided in appendix E, tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.
(5) An applicant shall separate each explosive hazard facility that
will contain liquid propellants where explosive equivalents apply
pursuant to paragraph (a)(3) of this section from all other explosive
hazard facilities of a single customer using the intraline distance
provided in appendix E, table E-7, and from each public area using the
public area distance provided in appendix E, table E-7.

Sec. 420.37 Solid and liquid propellants located together.

An applicant proposing an explosive hazard facility where solid and
liquid propellants are to be located together shall determine the
minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard facility and
other explosive hazard facilities and public areas in accordance with
the following. An applicant shall determine the minimum separation
distances between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive
hazard facilities and public areas required for the solid propellants
in accordnace with Sec. 420.33. An applicant shall then apply the
greater of the separation distances determined by the liquid propellant
alone or the solid propellant alone.

Secs. 420.38-420.40 [Reserved]

Subpart C--License Terms and Conditions

Sec. 420.41 License to operate a launch site--general.

(a) A license to operate a launch site authorizes a licensee to
operate a launch site in accordance with the representations contained
in the licensee's application, with terms and conditions contained in
any license order accompanying the license, subject to the licensee's
compliance with 49 U.S.C. subtitle IX, ch. 701 and this chapter.
(b) A license to operate a launch site authorizes a licensee to
offer its launch site to a launch operator for each launch point for
the type and any class of launch vehicle identified in the license
application and upon which the licensing determination is based.
(c) Issuance of a license to operate a launch site does not relieve
a licensee of its obligation to compy with any other laws or
regulations, nor does it confer any proprietary, property, or exclusive
right in the use of airspace or outer space.

Sec. 420.43 Duration.

A license to operate a launch site remains in effect for five years
from the date of issuance unless surrendered, suspended, or revoked
before the expiration of the term and is renewable upon application by
the licensee.

Sec. 420.45 Transfer of a license to operate a launch site.

(a) Only the FAA may transfer a license to operate a launch site.
(b) The FAA will transfer a license to an applicant who has
submitted an application in accordance with 14 CFR part 413, satisfied
the requirements of Sec. 420.15, and obtained each approval required
under Sec. 420.17 for a license.
(c) The FAA may incorporate by reference any findings made part of
the record to support a prior related licensing determination.

Sec. 420.47 License modification.

(a) Upon application or upon its own initiative, the FAA may modify
a license to operate a launch site at any time by issuing a license
order that adds, removes, or modifies a license term or condition to
ensure compliance with the Act and the requirements of this chapter.
(b) After a license to operate a launch site has been issued, a
licensee shall apply to the FAA for modification of its license if:

[[Page 34364]]

(1) The licensee proposes to operate the launch site in a manner
that is not authorized by the license; or
(2) Any representation contained in the license application that is
material to public health and safety or safety of property is no longer
accurate and complete or does not reflect the licensee's actual
operation of the launch site.
(c) An application to modify a license must meet the requirements
of part 413 of this chapter. The licensee shall indicate any part of
its license or license application that would be changed or affected by
the proposed modification.
(d) The FAA will approve a request for modification that satisfies
the requirements set forth in this part.
(e) Upon approval of a request for modification, the FAA will issue
either a written approval to the licensee or a license order modifying
the license if a term or condition of the license is changed, added, or
deleted. A written approval has the full force and effect of a license
order and is part of the licensing record.

Sec. 420.49 Compliance monitoring.

A licensee shall allow access by and cooperate with federal
officers or employees or other individuals authorized by the FAA to
observe any activities of the licensee, its customers, its contractors,
or subcontractors, associated with licensed operation of the licensee's
launch site.

Subpart D--Responsibilities of a Licensee

Sec. 420.51 Responsibilities--general.

(a) A licensee shall operate its launch site in accordance with the
representations in the application upon which the licensing
determination is based.
(b) A licensee is responsible for compliance with 49 U.S.C.
Subtitle IX, ch. 701 and for meeting the requirements of this chapter.

Sec. 420.53 Control of public access.

(a) A licensee shall prevent unauthorized access to the launch
site, and unauthorized, unescorted access to explosive hazard
facilities or other hazard areas not otherwise controlled by a launch
operator, through the use of security personnel, surveillance systems,
physical barriers, or other means approved as part of the licensing
process.
(b) A licensee shall notify anyone entering the launch site of
safety rules and emergency and evacuation procedures prior to that
person's entry unless that person has received a briefing on those
rules and procedures within the previous year.
(c) A licensee shall employ warning signals or alarms to notify any
persons at the launch site of any emergency.

Sec. 420.55 Scheduling of launch site operations.

(a) A licensee shall develop and implement procedures to schedule
operations to ensure that each operation carried out by a customer,
including a launch operator, at the launch site does not create the
potential for a mishap that could result in harm to the public because
of the proximity of the operations, in time or place, to operations of
any other customer at the launch site.
(b) A licensee shall provide its launch site scheduling
requirements to each customer before the customer begins operations at
the launch site.

Sec. 420.57 Notifications.

(a) A licensee shall notify a launch operator of any limitations on
the operations conducted at the launch site that arise out of its
license to operate a launch site.
(b) A licensee shall complete an agreement with the local U.S.
Coast Guard district to establish procedures for the issuance of a
Notice to Mariners prior to launch and other such measures as the Coast
Guard deems necessary to protect public health and safety.
(c) A licensee shall complete an agreement with the FAA regional
office having jurisdiction over the airspace through which launches
will take place, to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice
to Airmen prior to a launch and for closing of air routes during the
launch window and other such measures as the FAA regional office deems
necessary to protect public health and safety.
(d) At least two days prior to flight of a launch vehicle, the
licensee shall notify local officials and all owners of land adjacent
to the launch site of the schedule.

Sec. 420.59 Launch site accident investigation plan.

(a) General. A licensee shall develop and implement a launch site
accident investigation plan that contains the licensee's procedures for
reporting, responding to, and investigating launch site accidents, as
defined in Sec. 420.5. The launch site accident investigation plan must
be signed by an individual authorized to sign and certify the
application in accordance with Sec. 413.7(c) of this chapter.
(b) Reporting requirements. A launch site accident investigation
plan shall provide for--
(1) Immediate notification to the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) Washington Operations Center in the event of a launch site
accident.
(2) Submission of a written preliminary report to the FAA,
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, within
five days of any launch site accident. The report must include the
following information:
(i) Date and time of occurrence;
(ii) Location of the event;
(iii) Description of the event;
(iv) Number of injuries, if any, and general description of types
of injury suffered;
(v) Property damage, if any, and an estimate of its value;
(vi) Identification of hazardous materials, as defined in
Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, involved in the event;
(vii) Any action taken to contain the consequences of the event;
and
(viii) Weather conditions at the time of the event.
(c) Response plan. A launch site accident investigation plan shall
contain procedures that--
(1) Ensure the consequences of a launch site accident are contained
and minimized;
(2) Ensure data and physical evidence are preserved;
((3) Require the licensee to report to and cooperate with FAA or
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations and
designate one or more points of contact for the FAA or NTSB; and
(4) Require the licensee to identify and adopt preventive measures
for avoiding recurrence of the event.
(d) Investigation plan. A launch site accident investigation plan
shall contain--
(1) Procedures for investigating the cause of a launch site
accident, and participating in an investigation of a launch accident
for launches launched from the launch site;
(2) Procedures for reporting launch site accident investigation
results to the FAA; and
(3) Delineated responsibilities, including responsibilities for
personnel assigned to conduct investigations and for any one retained
by the licensee to conduct or participate in investigations.
(e) Applicability of other accident investigation procedures.
Accident investigation procedures developed under 29 CFR 1910.119 and
40 CFR part 68 will satisfy the requirements of paragraphs (c) and (d)
of this section to the extent that they include the elements provided
in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section.

[[Page 34365]]

Sec. 420.61 Records.

(a) A licensee shall maintain all records, data, and other material
needed to verify that its operations are conducted in accordance with
representation contained in the licensee's application. A licensee
shall retain records for three years.
(b) In the event of a launch site accident, a licensee shall
preserve all records related to the event. Records shall be retained
until completion of any federal investigation and the FAA advises the
licensee that the records need not be retained.
(c) A licensee shall make available to federal officials for
inspection and copying all records required to be maintained under the
regulations.

Sec. 420.63 Explosives.

(a) Explosive siting. A licensee shall ensure that the
configuration of the launch-site is in acccordance with the licensee's
explosive site plan, and that the licensee's explosive site plan is in
compliance with the requirements in Secs. 420.31-420.37.
(b) Lightning protection. A licensee shall ensure that the public
is not exposed to hazards due to the initiation of explosives by
lightning.
(1) Elements of a lighting protection system. Unless an explosive
hazard facility meets the conditions of paragraph (b)(3) of this
section, all explosive hazard facilities shall have a lightning
protection system to ensure explosives are not initiated by lightning.
A lightning protection system shall meet the requirements of paragraph
(b)(2) of this section and include the following:
(i) Air terminal. An air terminal to intentionally attract a
lightning strike.
(ii) Down conductor. A low impedance path connecting an air
terminal to an earth electrode system.
(ii) Earth electrode system. An earth electrode system to dissipate
the current from a lightning strike to ground.
(2) Bonding and surge protection.--(i) Bonding. All metallic bodies
shall be bonded to ensure that voltage potentials due to lightning are
equal everywhere in the explosive hazard facility. Any fence within six
feet of a lightning protection system shall have a bond across each
gate and other discontinuations and shall be bonded to the lightning
protection system. Railroad tracks that run within six feet of the
lightning protection system shall be bonded to the lighting protection
system.
(ii) Surge protection. A lightning protection system shall include
surge protection to reduce transient voltages due to lightning to a
harmless level for all metallic power, communication, and
instrumentation lines coming into an explosive hazard facility.
(3) Circumtances where no lightning protection system is required.
No lightning protection system is required for an explosive hazard
facility when a lightning warning system is available to permit
termination of operations and withdrawal of the public to public area
distance prior to an electrical storm, or for an explosive hazard
facility containing explosives that cannot be initiated by lightning.
If no lightning protection system is required, a licensee must ensure
the withdrawal of the public to a public area distance prior to an
electrical storm.
(4) Testing and inspection. Lightning protection systems shall be
visually inspected semiannually and shall be tested once each year for
electrical continuity and adequacy of grounding. A licensee shall
maintain at the explosive hazard facility a record of results obtained
from the tests, including any action taken to correct deficiencies
noted.
(c) Electrical Power Lines. A licensee shall ensure that electric
power lines at its launch site meet the following requirements:
(1) Electric power lines shall be no closer to an explosive hazard
facility than the length of the lines between the poles or towers than
support the lines unless an effective means is provided to ensure that
energized lines cannot, on breaking, come in contact with the explosive
hazard facility.
(2) Towers or poles supporting electrical distribution lines that
carry between 15 and 69 KV, and unmanned electrical substations shall
be no closer to an explosive hazard facility than the public area
distance for that explosive hazard facility.
(3) Towers or poles supporting electrical transmission lines that
carry 69 KV or more, shall be no closer to an explosive hazard facility
than the public area distance for that explosive hazard facility.

Issued in Washington, DC on June 10, 1999.
Patricia G. Smith,
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation.

Appendix A to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor

(a) Introduction

(b) Data Requirements

(1) Maps. An applicant shall use any map for the launch site
region with a scale not less than 1:250,000 inches per inch in the
launch area and 1:20,000,000 inches per inch in the downrange area.
As described in paragraph (b)(2), an applicant shall use a
mechanical method, a semi-automated method, or a fully-automated
method to plot a flight corridor on maps. A source for paper maps
acceptable to the FAA is the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Ocean Service.
(i) Projections for mechanical plotting method. An applicant
shall use a conic projection. The FAA will accept a ``Lambert-
Conformal'' conic projection. A polar aspect of a plane-azimuthal
projection may also be used for far northern launch sites.
(ii) Projections for semi-automated plotting method. An
applicant shall use cylindrical, conic, or plane projections for
semi-automated plotting. The FAA will accept ``Mercator'' and
``Oblique Mercator'' cylindrical projections. The FAA will accept
``Lambert-Conformal'' and ``Albers Equal-Area'' conic projections.
The FAA will accept ``Lambert Azimuthal Equal-Area'' and ``Azimuthal
Equidistant'' plane projections.
(iii) Projections for fully-automated plotting method. The FAA
will accept map projections used by geographical information system
software scaleable pursuant to the requirements of paragraph (b)(1).
(2) Plotting Methods.
(i) Mechanical method. An applicant may use mechanical drafting
equipment such as pencil, straight edge, ruler, protractor, and
compass to plot the location of a flight corridor on a map. The FAA
will accept straight lines for distances less than or equal to 7.5
times the map scale on map scales greater than or equal to
1:1,000,000 inches per inch (in/in); or straight lines representing
100 nm or less on map scales less than 1:1,000,000 in/in.
(ii) Semi-Automated method. An applicant may employ the range
and bearing techniques in paragraph (b)(3) to create latitude and
longitude points on a map. The FAA will accept straight lines for
distances less than or equal to 7.5 times the map scale on map
scales greater than or equal to 1:1,000,000 inches per inch (in/in);
or straight lines representing 100 nm or less on map scales less
than 1:1,000,000 in/in.
(iii) Fully-Automated method. An applicant may use geographical
information system software with global mapping data scaleable in
accordance with paragraph (b)(1).
(3) Range and bearing computations on an ellipsoidal earth
model.
(i) To create latitude and longitude pairs on an ellipsoidal
earth model, an applicant shall use the following equations to
calculate geodetic latitude (+N) and longitude (+E) given the launch
point geodetic latitude (+N),

[[Page 34366]]

longitude (+E) range (nm), and bearing (degrees, positive clockwise
from North).
(A) Input. An applicant shall use the following input in making
range and bearing computations:

1 = Geodetic latitude of launch point (DDD)
1 = Longitude of launch point (DDD)
S = Range from launch point (nm)
12 = Azimuth bearing from launch point (deg)

(B) Computations. An applicant shall use the following equations
to determine the latitude (2) and longitude
(2) of a target point situated ``S'' nm from the
launch point on an azimuth bearing 12 degrees.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.017

Where:

a = WGS-84 semi-major axis (3443.91846652 nmi)
b = WGS-84 semi-minor axis (3432.37165994 nmi)
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(ii) To create latitude and longitude pairs on an ellipsoidal
earth model, an applicant shall use the following equations to
calculate the distance (S) of the geodesic between two points
P1 and P2), the forward azimuth
(12) of the geodesic at P1, and the
back azimuth (21) of the geodesic at
P2, given the geodetic latitude (+N), longitude (+E) of
P1 and P2. Azimuth is measured positively
clockwise form the North.
(A) Input. An applicant shall use the following input:

1 = Geodetic latitude of point P1
(DDD)
1 = Longitude of point P1 (DDD)
2 = Geodetic latitude of point P2
(DDD)
2 = Longitude of point P2 (DDD)

(B) Computations. An applicant shall use the following equations
to determine the distance (S), the forward azimuth
(12) of the geodesic at P1, and the
back azimuth (21) of the geodesic at
P2,
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.039

Where:

a = WGS-84 semi-major axis (3443.91846652 nmi)
b = WGS-84 semi-minor axis (3432.37165994 nmi)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.040

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(1) To define a flight corridor, an applicant shall:
(i) Select a guided suborbital or orbital launch vehicle, and,
for an orbital launch vehicle, select from table 1 in Sec. 420.21 a
launch vehicle class that best represents the type of launch vehicle
the applicant plans to support at its launch point:
(ii) Select a debris dispersion radius (Dmax) from
table A-1 corresponding to the guided suborbital launch vehicle or
orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph (c)(1)(i);
(iii) Select a launch point geodetic latitude and longitude; and
(iv) Select a flight azimuth.
(2) An applicant shall define and map an overflight exclusion
zone using the following method:
(i) Select a debris dispersion radius (Dmax) from
table A-1 and a downrange distance (Doez) from table A-2
to define an overflight exclusion zone for the guided suborbital
launch vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph
(c)(1)(i).
(ii) An overflight exclusion zone is described by the
intersection of the following boundaries, which are depicted in
figure A1:
(A) An applicant shall define an uprange boundary with a half-
circle arc of radius Dmax and a chord of length twice
Dmax connecting the half-circle arc endpoints. the
uprange boundary placement on a map has the chord midpoint
positioned on the launch point with the chord oriented along an
azimuth 90 deg. from the launch azimuth and the half-
circle arc located uprange from the launch point.
(B) An applicant shall define the downrange boundary with a
half-circle arc of radius Dmax and a chord of length
twice Dmax connecting the half-circle arc endpoints. The
downrange boundary placement on a map has the chord midpoint
intersecting the nominal flight azimuth line at a distance DOEZ
inches downrange with the chord oriented along an azimuth
90 deg. from the launch azimuth and the half-circle arc
located downrange from the intersection of the chord and the flight
azimuth line.
(C) Crossrange boundaries of an overflight exclusion zone are
defined by two lines segments. Each is parallel to the flight
azimuth with one to the left side and one to the right side of the
flight azimuth line. Each line connects an uprange half-circle arc
endpoint to a downrange half-circle arc endpoint as shown in figure
A-1.
(iii) An applicant shall identify the overflight exclusion zone
on a map meeting the requirements specified in paragraph (b).
(3) An applicant shall define and map a flight corridor using
the following method:
(i) In accordance with paragraph (b), an applicant shall draw a
flight corridor on a map(s) with the Dmax origin centered
on the intended launch point and the flight corridor centerline (in
the downrange direction) aligned with the initial flight azimuth.
The flight corridor is depicted in figure A-2 and its line segment
lengths are tabulated in table A-3.
(ii) An applicant shall define the flight corridor using the
following boundary definitions:
(A) An applicant shall draw an uprange boundary, which is
defined by an arc-line GB (figure A-2), directly uprange from and
centered on the intended launch point with radius Dmax.
(B) An applicant shall draw line CF perpendicular to and
centered on the flight azimuth line, and positioned 10 nm downrange
from the launch point. The applicant shall use the length of line CF
provided in table A-3 corresponding to the guided suborbital launch
vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph
(d)(1)(i).
(C) An applicant shall draw line DE perpendicular to and
centered on the flight azimuth line, and positioned 100 nm downrange
from the launch point. The applicant shall use the length of line DE
provided in table A-3 corresponding to the guided suborbital launch
vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph
(c)(1)(i).
(D) Except for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an applicant
shall draw a downrange boundary, which is defined by line HI and is
drawn perpendicular to and centered on the flight azimuth line, and
positioned 5,000 nm downrange from the launch point. The

[[Page 34369]]

applicant shall use the length of line HI provided in table A-3
corresponding to the orbital launch vehicle class selected in
paragraph (c)(1)(i).
(E) An applicant shall draw crossrange boundaries, which are
defined by three lines on the left side and three lines on the right
side of the flight azimuth. An applicant shall construct the left
flight corridor boundary according to the following, and as depicted
in figure A-3:
(1) The first line (line BC in figure A-3) is tangent to the
uprange boundary arc, and ends at endpoint C of line CF, as depicted
in figure A-3;
(2) The second line (line CD in figure A-3) begins at endpoint C
of line BC and ends at endpoint D of line DH, as depicted in figure
A-3;
(3) For all orbital launch vehicles, the third line (line DH in
figure A-3) begins at endpoint D of line CD and ends at endpoint H
of line HI, as depicted in figure A-3; and
(4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, the line DH begins
at endpoint D of line CD and ends at a point tangent to the impact
dispersion area drawn in accordance with paragraph (c)(4) and as
depicted in figure A-4.
(F) An applicant shall repeat the procedure in paragraph
(c)(3)(ii)(E) for the right side boundary.
(iii) An applicant shall identify the flight corridor on a map
meeting the requirements specified in paragraph (b).
(4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an applicant shall
define a final stage impact dispersion area as part of the flight
corridor and show the impact dispersion area on a map, as depicted
in figure A-3, in accordance with the following:
(i) An applicant shall select an apogee altitude
(Hap) for the launch vehicle final stage. The apogee
altitude should equal the highest altitude intended to be reached by
a guided suborbital launch vehicle launched from the launch point.
(ii) An applicant shall define the impact dispersion area by
using an impact range factor [IP(Hap)] and a dispersion
factor [DISP(Hap)] as shown below:
(A) An applicant shall calculate the impact range (D) for the
final launch vehicle stage. An applicant shall set D equal to the
maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by the impact
range factor as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.056

Where:

IP(Hap) = 0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km; and
ip(Hap) = 0.7 for an apogee 100 km or greater.

(B) An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius
(R) for the final launch vehicle stage. An applicant shall set R
equal to the maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by
the dispersion factor as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.057

Where:

DISPH(Hap) = 0.05

(iii) An applicant shall draw the impact dispersion area on a
map with its center on the predicted impact point. An applicant
shall then draw line DH in accordance with paragraph
(c)(3)(ii)(E)(4).

(d) Evaluate the Flight Corridor

(1) An applicant shall evaluate the flight corridor for the
presence of any populated areas. If an applicant determines that no
populated area is located within the flight corridor, then no
additional steps are necessary.
(2) If a populated area is located in an overflight exclusion
zone, an applicant may modify its proposal or demonstrate that there
are times when no people are present or that the applicant has an
agreement in place to evacuate the public from the overflight
exclusion zone during a launch.
(3) If a populated area is located within the flight corridor,
an applicant may modify its proposal and create another flight
corridor pursuant to appendix A, use appendix B to narrow the flight
corridor, or complete a risk analysis as provided in appendix C.

BILLING CODE 4910-13-M

[[Page 34370]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.069

[[Page 34371]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.070

[[Page 34372]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.071

[[Page 34373]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.072

BILLING CODE 4910-13-C

[[Page 34374]]

Appendix B to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor

(a) Introduction

(1) This appendix provides a method to construct a flight
corridor from a launch point for a guided suborbital launch vehicle
or any one of the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles
from table 1, Sec. 420.21, using local meteorological data and a
launch vehicle trajectory.
(2) A flight corridor is constructed in two sections--one
section comprising a launch area and one section comprising a
downrange area. The launch area of a flight corridor reflects the
extent of launch vehicle debris impacts in the event of a launch
vehicle failure and applying local meteorological conditions. The
downrange area reflects the extent of launch vehicle debris impacts
in the event of a launch vehicle failure and applying vehicle
imparted velocity, malfunctions turns, and vehicle guidance and
performance dispersions.
(3) A flight corridor includes an overflight exclusion zone in
the launch area and, for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an
impact dispersion area in the downrange area. A flight corridor for
a guided suborbital launch vehicle ends with an impact dispersion
area and, for the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles,
5,000 nautical miles (nm) from the launch point.

(b) Data Requirements

(1) Launch area data requirements. An applicant shall satisfy
the following data requirements to perform the launch area analysis
of this appendix. The data requirements are identified in table B-1
along with sources where data acceptable to the FAA may be obtained.
(i) An applicant must select meteorological data for the
proposed launch site that meet the specifications in table B-1.

Table B-1.--Launch Area Data Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data category Data item Data source
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meteorological Data......... Local statistical wind data versus These data may be obtained from: Global
altitude up to 50,000 feet. Required Gridded Upper Air Statistics, Climate
data are: altitude (ft), atmospheric Applications Branch, National Climatic
density (slugs/ft³), mean East/West Data Center.
meridianal (u) and North/South zonal
(v) wind (ft/sec), standard deviation
of u and v wind (ft/sec), correlation
coefficient, number of observations and
wind percentile (%)
Nominal Trajectory Data..... State vector data versus time after Actual launch vehicle trajectory data;
liftoff in topocentric launch point or trajectory generation software
centered X,Y,Z,X,Y,Z coordinates with meeting requirements in paragraph
the X-axis aligned with the flight (b)(1)(ii).
azimuth. Trajectory time intervals
shall not be greater than one second.
XYZ units are in feet and X,Y,Z units
are in ft/sec
Debris Data................. A fixed ballistic coefficient equal to 3 N/A.
lbs/ft² is used for the launch area
Geographical Data........... Launch point geodetic latitude on the Geographical surveys or Global
WGS-84 ellipsoidal earth model Positioning System.
Launch point longitude on an ellipsoidal
earth model
Maps using scales of not less than Map types with scale and projection
1:250,000 inches per inch within 100 nm information are listed in the Defense
of a launch point and 1:20,000,000 Mapping Agency, Public Sale,
inches per inch for distances greater Aeronautical Charts and Publications
than 100 nm from a launch point Catalog. The catalog and maps may be
ordered through the U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, National
Ocean Service.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) For a guided orbital launch vehicle, an applicant shall
obtain or create a launch vehicle nominal trajectory. An applicant
may use trajectory data from a launch vehicle manufacturer or
generate a trajectory using trajectory simulation software.
Trajectory time intervals shall be no greater than one second. If an
applicant uses a trajectory computed with commercially available
software products, the software must calculate the trajectory using
the following parameters, or demonstrated equivalents:
(A) Launch location:
(1) Launch point, using geodetic latitude and longitude to four
decimal places; and
(2) Launch point height above sea level.
(B) Ellipsoidal earth:
(1) Mass of earth;
(2) Radius of earth;
(3) Earth flattening factor; and
(4) Gravitational harmonic constants (J2, J3, J4).
(C) Vehicle characteristics:
(1) Mass, as a function of time;
(2) Thrust, as a function of time;
(3) Specific impulse (ISP), as a function of time;
and
(4) Stage dimensions.
(D) Launch events:
(1) Stage burn times; and
(2) Stage drop-off times.
(E) Atmosphere:
(1) Density vs. altitude;
(2) Pressure vs. altitude;
(3) Speed of sound vs. altitude; and
(4) Temperature vs. altitude.
(F) Winds:
(1) Wind direction vs. altitude; and
(2) Wind magnitude vs. altitude.
(I) Aerodynamics; drag coefficient vs. mach number for each
stage of flight showing subsonic, transonic and supersonic mach
regions for each stage.
(iii) An applicant shall use a ballistic coefficient ()
of 3 lbs/ft² for debris impact computations.
(iv) An applicant shall satisfy the map and plotting
requirements for a launch area in appendix A, paragraph (b).
(2) Downrange area data requirements. An applicant shall satisfy
the following data requirements to perform the downrange area
analysis of this appendix.
(i) The launch vehicle class and method of generating a
trajectory used in the launch area shall be used by an applicant in
the downrange area as well. Trajectory time intervals must not be
greater than one second.
(ii) An applicant shall satisfy the map and plotting data
requirements for a downrange area in appendix A, paragraph (b).

(1) An applicant shall construct a launch area of a flight
corridor using the processes and equations of this paragraph for a
single trajectory position. An applicant shall repeat these
processes at time points on the launch vehicle trajectory in time
intervals no greater than one second. When choosing wind data, an
applicant shall select a time period between one and 12 months.
(2) A launch area analysis must include all trajectory positions
whose Z-values are less than or equal to 50,000 ft.
(3) Each trajectory time is denoted by the subscript ``i''.
Height intervals for a given atmospheric pressure level are denoted
by the subscript ``j''.
(4) Using data from the GGUAS CD-ROM, an applicant shall
estimate the mean atmospheric density, maximum wind speed, height
interval fall times and height interval debris dispersions for 15
mean geometric height intervals.
(i) The height intervals in the GGUAS source data vary as a
function of the following 15 atmospheric pressure levels (milibars):
Surface, 1000, 850, 700, 500, 400, 300, 250, 200, 150, 100, 70, 50,
30, 10. The actual geometric height associated with each pressure
level varies depending on the time

[[Page 34375]]

of year. An applicant shall estimate the mean geometric height over
the period of months selected in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph
for each of the 15 pressure levels as shown in equation B1.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.058

Where:

Hj=mean geometric height
hm=geometric height for a given month
nm=number of observations for a given month
k=number of wind months of interest

(ii) The atmospheric densities in the source data also vary as a
function of the 15 atmospheric pressure levels. The actual
atmospheric density associated with each pressure level varies
depending on the time of year. An applicant shall estimate the mean
atmospheric density over the period of months selected in
subparagraph (1) of this paragraph for each of the 15 pressure
levels as shown in equation B2.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.059

Where:

pj=mean atmospheric density
m=atmospheric density for a given month
nm=number of observation for a given month
k=number of wind months of interest

(iii) An applicant shall estimate the algebraic maximum wind
speed at a given pressure level as follows and shall repeat the
process for each pressure level.
(A) For each month, an applicant shall calculate the monthly
mean wind speed (Waz) for 360 azimuths using equation B3;
(B) An applicant shall select the maximum monthly mean wind
speed from the 360 azimuths;
(C) An applicant shall repeat subparagraphs (c)(4)(iii)(A) and
(B) for each month of interest; and
(D) An applicant shall select the maximum mean wind speed from
the range of months. The absolute value of this wind is designated
Wmax for the current pressure level.
(iv) An applicant shall calculate speed using the means for
winds from the West (u) and winds from the North (v). An applicant
shall use equation B3 to resolve the winds to a specific azimuth
bearing.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.135

Where:

az=wind azimuth
u=West zonal wind component
v=North zonal wind component
Waz=mean wind speed at azimuth for each month

(v) An applicant shall estimate the interval fall time over a
height interval assuming the initial descent velocity is equal to
the terminal velocity (VT). An applicant shall use
equations B4 through B6 to estimate the fall time over a given
height interval.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.060

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.061

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.062

Where:

=height difference between
two mean geometric heights
=ballistic coefficient
px=mean atmospheric density for the corresponding mean
geometric heights
vTj=terminal velocity

(vi) An applicant shall estimate the interval debris dispersion
(Dj) by multiplying the interval fall time by the
algebraic maximum mean wind speed (Wmax) as shown in
equation B7.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.063

(5) Once the Dj are estimated for each height
interval, an applicant shall determine the total debris dispersion
(Di) for each Zi using a linear interpolation
and summation exercise. An applicant shall use a launch point height
of zero equal to the surface level of the nearest GGUAS grid
location and is shown below in equation B8.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.064

Where:

n=number of height intervals below j^th height interval

(6) Once all the Di radii have been calculated, an
applicant shall produce a launch area flight corridor according to
instructions in subparagraphs (c)(6)(i)-(iv).
(i) On a map meeting the requirements of appendix A, paragraph
(b), an applicant shall plot the Xi position location on
the flight azimuth for the corresponding Zi position;
(ii) An applicant shall draw a circle of radius Di
centered on the corresponding Xi position; and
(iii) An applicant shall repeat the instructions in
subparagraphs (c)(6)(i)-(ii) for each Di radius.
(iv) The launch area of a flight corridor is the enveloping line
that encloses the outer boundary of the Di circles as
shown in Fig. B-1. The uprange portion of a flight corridor is
described by a semi-circle arc that is a portion of either the most
uprange Di dispersion circle, or the overflight exclusion
zone (defined in subparagraph (c)(7)), whichever is further uprange.
(7) An applicant shall define an overflight exclusion zone in
the launch area pursuant to the instructions provided in appendix A,
subparagraph (c)(2).
(8) An applicant shall draw the launch area flight corridor and
overflight exclusion zone on a map(s) meeting the requirements of
table B-1.

[[Page 34376]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.073

(1) The downrange area analysis estimates the debris dispersion
for the downrange time points on a launch vehicle trajectory. An
applicant shall perform the downrange area analysis using the
processes and equations of this paragraph.
(2) The downrange area analysis shall include trajectory
positions at a height (the Zi-values) greater than 50,000
feet and nominal trajectory IIP values less than or equal to 5,000
nm. For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, the final IIP value that
an applicant must consider is the launch vehicle final stage impact
point. Each trajectory time shall be one second or less and is
denoted by the subscript ``i''.
(3) An applicant shall compute the downrange area of a flight
corridor boundary in four steps, from each trajectory time
increment: Determine a reduction ratio factor; calculate the launch
vehicle position after simulating a malfunction turn; rotate the
state vector after the malfunction turn in the range of three
degrees to one degree as a function of Xi distance
downrange; and compute the IIP of the resulting trajectory. The
locus of IIPs describes the boundary of the downrange area of a
flight corridor. An applicant shall use the following subparagraphs,
(d)(3)(i)-(v), to compute the downrange area of the flight corridor
boundary:
(i) Compute the downrange distance to the final IIP position for
a nominal trajectory as follows:
(A) Using equations B30 through B69, determine the IIP
coordinates (max, max) for
the nominal state vector before the launch vehicle enters orbit
where in equation B30 is the nominal flight azimuth angle
measured from True North.
(B) Using the range and bearing equations in appendix A,
paragraph (b)(3), determine the distance (Smax) from the
launch point coordinates (lp
lp) to the IIP coordinates
(max, max) computed in
(3)(i)(A) of this paragraph.
(C) The distance for Smax may not exceed 5000 mm. In
cases when the actual value exceeds 5000 nm the applicant shall use
5000 nm for Smax.
(ii) Compute the reduction ratio factor (Fri) for
each trajectory time increment as follows:
(A) Using equations B30 through B69, determine the IIP
coordinates (i, i) for the
nominal state vector where in equation B30 is the nominal
flight azimuth angle measured from True North.
(B) Using the range and bearing equations in appendix A,
paragraph (b)(3), determine the distance (Si) from the
launch point coordinates (lp
lp) to the IIP coordinates
(i, i) computed in
(3)(ii)(A) of this paragraph.
(C) The reduction ratio factor is:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.065

(iii) An applicant shall compute the launch vehicle position and
velocity components after a simulated malfunction turn for each
i, using the following method.
(A) Turn duration (t)= 4 sec.
(B) Turn angle ().

=(Fri) * 45 degrees.

The turn angle equations perform a turn in the launch vehicle's
yaw plane, as depicted in figure B-2.

[[Page 34377]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.074

(C) Launch vehicle velocity magnitude at the beginning of the
turn (Vb) and velocity magnitude at the end of the turn
(Ve).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.081

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.082

(D) Average velocity magnitude over the turn duration (V).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.084

(E) Velocity vector path angle (i) at turn
epoch.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.085

(F) Launch vehicle position components at the end of turn
duration.

[[Page 34378]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.086

Where:

gi=32.17405 ft/sec.²

(G) Launch vehicle velocity components at the end of turn
duration.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.087

(iv) An applicant shall rotate the trajectory state vector at
the end of the turn duration to the right and left to define the
right-lateral flight corridor boundary and the left-lateral flight
corridor boundary, respectively. An applicant shall perform perform
the trajectory rotation in conjunction with a trajectory
transformation from the X90, Y90,
Z90, X90, Y90, Z90
components to E,N,U,E,N,U. The trajectory subscripts ``R'' and ``L''
from equations B15 and B26 have been discarded to reduce the number
of equations. An applicant shall transform from E,N,U,E,N,U to
E,F,G,E,F,G. An applicant shall use the equations of paragraph
(d)(3)(iv)(A)-(F) to produce the EFG components necessary to
estimate each instantaneous impact point.
(A) An applicant must calculate the flight angle ().
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.088

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.089

or
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.090

(B) An applicant shall transform X90, Y90,
Z90 to E,N,U.

[[Page 34379]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.091

(D) An applicant shall transform the launch point coordinates
(o, o, ho) to
Eo, Fo, Go.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.093

(E) An applicant shall transform E,N,U to E90,
F90, G90.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.094

(F) An applicant shall transform E,N,U to E,F,G.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.095

(v) The IIP computation implements an iterative solution to the
impact point problem. An applicant shall solve Equations B46 to B69,
with the appropriate substitutions, up to a maximum of five times.
Each repetition of the equations provides a more accurate prediction
of the IIP. The required IIP computations are shown in subsection
(d)(3)(v)(A)-(W) below. An applicant shall use this computation for
both the left- and right-lateral offsets. The IIP computations will
result in latitude and longitude pairs for the left-lateral flight
corridor boundary and the right-lateral flight corridor boundary. An
applicant shall use the lines connecting the latitude and longitude
pairs to describe the entire downrange area boundary of the flight
corridor up to 5000 nm or a final stage impact dispersion area.
(A) An applicant shall approximate the radial distance
(k,l) from the geocenter to the IIP. The
distance from the center of the earth ellipsoid to the launch point
shall be used for the initial approximation of rk,l as
shown in equation B46.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.096

(B) An applicant shall compute the radial distance (r) from the
geocenter to the launch vehicle position.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.097

If rk,l then the launch vehicle position is below
the Earth's surface and an impact point cannot be computed. An
applicant

[[Page 34380]]

must restart the calcuations with the next trajectory state vector.
(C) An applicant shall compute the inertial velocity components.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.098

Where:

= 4.178074 x 10^-3 deg/sec

(D) An applicant shall compute the magnitude of the inertial
velocity vector.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.099

(E) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the
trajectory ellipse multiplied by the cosine of the eccentric anomaly
at epoch. (c).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.100

Where:

K=1.407644 x 10¹⁶ ft³/sec²

(F) An applicant shall compute the semi-major axis of the
trajectory ellipse (at).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.101

If at <0 or at> then the
trajectory orbit is not elliptical, but is hyperbolic or parabolic,
and an impact point cannot be computed. The launch vehicle has
achieved escape velocity and the applicant may terminate
computations.
(G) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the
trajectory ellipse multipled by the sine of the eccentric anomaly at
epoch (s).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.102

(H) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the
trajectory ellipse squared (\2\).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.103

If [a(1-)-a]>0 and
0 then the trajectory perigee height is positive
and an impact point cannot be computed. The launch vehicle has
achieved earth orbit and the applicant may terminate computations.
(I) An applicant shall computer the eccentricity of the
trajectory ellipse multiplied by the cosine of the eccentric anomaly
at impact (ck).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.104

(J) An applicant shall compute the eccentrity of the trajectory
ellipse multiplied by the sine of the eccentric anomaly at impact
(sk).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.105

If sk <0 then the trajectory orbit does not
intersect the Earth's surface and an impact point cannot be
computed. The launch vehicle has achieved earth orbit and the
applicant may terminate computations.
(K) An applicant shall compute the cosine of the difference
between the eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly at
epoch (ck).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.106

(L) An applicant shall compute the sine of the difference
between the eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly at
epoch sk).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.107

(M) An applicant shall compute the f-series expansion of
Kepler's equations.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.108

(N) An applicant shall compute the g-series expansion of
Kepler's equations.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.109

(O) An applicant shall compute the E,F,G coordinates at impact
(Ei,Fi,Gi).

[[Page 34381]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.110

(P) An applicant shall approximate the distance from the
geocenter to the launch vehicle position at impact
(rk,2).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.111

Where:

aE=20925646.3255 ft
e²=0.00669437999013

(Q) An applicant shall let rk+1,1=rk,2,
substitute rk+1,1 for rk,1in equation B55 and
repeat equations B55-B64 up to four more times incrementing ``k'' by
one on each loop (e.g. {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}). If
|r5,1-r5,2|>1 then the iterative solution does
not converge and an impact point does not meet the accuracy
tolerance of plus or minus one foot. An applicant must try more
iterations, or restart the calculations with the next trajectory
state vector.
(R) An applicant shall compute the difference between the
eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly at epoch
().
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.112

(S) An applicant shall compute the time of flight from epoch to
impact (t).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.113

(T) An applicant shall compute the geocentric latitude at impact
(').
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.114

Where:

+90 deg. '^oi
-90 deg.

(U) An applicant shall compute the deodetic latitude at impact (
).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.115

Where:

+90 deg. '^oi
-90 deg.

(V) An applicant shall compute the East longitude at impact
().
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.116

(W) If the range from the launch point to the impact point is
equal to or greater than 5000nm, an applicant shall terminate IIP
computations.
(4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an applicant shall
define a final stage impact dispersion area as part of the flight
corridor and show the area on a map using the following procedure:
(i) For equation B70 below, an applicant shall use an apogee
altitude (Hap) corresponding to the highest altitude
reached by the launch vehicle final stage in the applicant's launch
vehicle trajectory analysis done in accordance with paragraph
(b)(1)(ii).
(ii) An applicant shall define the final stage impact dispersion
area by using a dispersion factor [DISP(Hap)] as shown
below. An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius (R)
for the final launch vehicle stage. An applicant shall set R equal
to the maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by the
dispersion factor as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.117

Where:

DISP(Hap) =0.05

(5) An applicant shall combine the launch area and downrange
area flight corridor and any final stage impact dispersion area for
a guided suborbital launch vehicle.
(i) On the same map with the launch area flight corridor, an
applicant shall plot the latitude and longitude positions of the
left and right sides of the downrange area of the flight corridor
calculated in subparagraph (d)(3).
(ii) An applicant shall connect the latitude and longitude
positions of the left side of the downrange area of the flight
corridor sequentially starting with the last IIP calculated on the
left side and ending with the first IIP calculated on the left side.
An applicant shall repeat this procedure for the right side.
(iii) An applicant shall connect the left sides of the launch
area and downrange portions of the flight corridor. An applicant
shall repeat this procedure for the right side.
(iv) An applicant shall plot the overflight exclusion zone
defined in subparagraph (c)(7).
(v) An applicant shall draw any impact dispersion area on the
downrange map with the center of the impact dispersion area on the
launch vehicle final stage point obtained from the applicant's
launch vehicle trajectory analysis done in accordance with
subparagraph (b)(1)(ii).

(e) Evaluate the Launch Site

(1) An applicant shall evaluate the flight corridor for the
presence of populated areas. If no populated area is located within
the flight corridor, then no additional steps are necessary.
(2) If a populated area is located in an overflight exclusion
zone, an applicant may modify its proposal or demonstrate that there
are times when no people are present or that the applicant has an
agreement in place to evacuate the public from the overflight
exclusion zone during a launch.
(3) If a populated area is located within the flight corridor,
an applicant may modify its proposal or complete an overflight risk
analysis as provided in appendix C.

Appendix C to Part 420--Risk Analysis

(a) Introduction

(1) This appendix provides a method for an applicant to estimate
the expected casualty (Ec) for a launch of a guided
launch vehicle using a flight corridor generated either by appendix
A or appendix B. This appendix also provides an applicant options to
simplify the method where population at risk is minimal.
(2) An applicant shall perform a risk analysis when a populated
area is located within a flight corridor defined by either

[[Page 34382]]

appendix A or appendix B. If the estimated expected casualty exceeds
30 x 10^-6, an applicant may either modify its proposal,
or if the flight corridor used was generated by the appendix A
method, use the appendix B method to narrow the flight corridor and
then redo the overflight risk analysis pursuant to this appendix C.
If the estimated expected casualty still exceeds
30 x 10^-6, the FAA will not approve the location of the
proposed launch point.

(b) Data Requirements

(1) An applicant shall obtain the data specified in
subparagraphs (b)(2) and (3) and summarized in table C-1, Table C-1
provides sources where an applicant may obtain data acceptable to
the FAA. An applicant will also employ the flight corridor
information from appendix A or B, including flight azimuth and, for
an appendix B flight corridor, trajectory information.
(2) Population Data. Total population (N) and the total landmass
area within a populated area (A) are required. Population data up to
and including 100 nm from the launch point are required at the U.S.
census block group level. Population data downrange from 100 nm are
required at no greater than 1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude/longitude grid
coordinates.
(3) Launch Vehicle Data. These data consist of the launch
vehicle failure probability (Pf), the launch vehicle
effective casualty area (Ac), trajectory position data,
and the overflight dwell time (td). The failure
probability is a constant (Pf=0.10) for a guided orbital
or suborbital launch vehicle. Table C-3 provides effective casualty
area data based on IIP range. Trajectory position information is
provided from distance computations given in this appendix for an
appendix A flight corridor, or trajectory data used in appendix B
for an appendix B flight corridor. The dwell time (td)
may be determined from trajectory data produced when creating an
appendix B flight corridor.

Table C-1.--Overflight Analysis Data Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data category Data item Data source
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Population Data.................... Total population within a Within 100 nm of the launch point: U.S. census
populated area (N). data at the census block-group level.
Downrange from 100 nm beyond the launch
point, world population data are available
from:
Total landmass area within Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center
the populated area (A). (CDIAC).
Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Database--Global Population Distribution
(1990), Terrestrial Area and Country Name
Information on a One by One Degree Grid Cell
Basis (DB1016 (8-1996)).
Launch Vehicle Data................ Failure probability-- N/A.
Pf=0.10.
Effective casualty area See table C-3.
(Ac).
Overflight dwell time...... Determined by range from the launch point or
trajectory used by applicant.
Nominal Trajectory Data See appendix B, table B-1.
(for an appendix B flight
corridor only).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(1) A corridor casualty expectation [E(Corridor)]
estimate is the sum of the expected casualty measurement of each
populated area inside a flight corridor.
(2) An applicant shall identify and locate each populated area
in the proposed flight corridor.
(3) An applicant shall determine the probability of impact in
each populated area using the procedures in subparagraphs (5) or (6)
of this paragraph. Figures C-1 and C-2 show an area considered for
probability of impact (Pi) computations by the dashed-
lined box around the populated area within a flight corridor, and
figure C-3 shows a populated area in a final stage impact dispersion
area. An applicant shall then estimate the Ec for each
populated area using the procedures in subparagraphs (7) and (8) of
this paragraph.
(4) The Pi computations do not directly account for
populated areas whose areas are bisected by an appendix A flight
corridor centerline or an appendix B nominal trajectory ground
trace. Accordingly, an applicant must evaluate Pi for
each of the bi-sections as two separate populated area, as shown in
figure C-4, which shows one bi-section to the left of an appendix A
flight corridor's centerline and one on its right.
(5) Probability of Impact (Pi) Computations for a
Populated Area in an appendix A Flight Corridor. An applicant shall
computer Pi. for each populated area using the following
method:
(i) For the launch and downrange areas, but not a final stage
impact dispersion area for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an
applicant shall compute Pi, for each populated area using
the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.118

Where:

x1, x2 = closest and farthest downrange
distance (nm) along the flight corridor centerline to the populated
area (see figure C-1)
y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range
distance (nm) to the populated area measured from the flight
corridor centerline (see figure C-1)
= one-fifth of the cross range
distance from the centerline to the flight corridor boundary (see
figure C-1)
exp = exponential function (e^x)
Pf = probability of failure = 0.10
R = IIP range rate (nm/sec) (see table C-2)
C = 643 seconds (constant)

Table C-2.--IIP Range Rate vs. IIP Range
------------------------------------------------------------------------
IIP range
IIP range (nm) rate (nm/s)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-75....................................................... 0.75
76-300..................................................... 1.73
301-900.................................................... 4.25
901-1700................................................... 8.85
1701-2600.................................................. 19.75

[[Page 34383]]

2601-3500.................................................. 42.45
3500-4500.................................................. 84.85
4501-5250.................................................. 154.95
------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) For each populated area within a final stage impact
dispersion area, an applicant shall compute Pi using the
following method:
(A) An applicant shall estimate the probability of final stage
impact in the x and y sectors of each populated area within the
final stage impact dispersion area using equations C2 and C3:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.119

Where:

x1, x2 = closest and farthest downrange
distance, measured along the flight corridor centerline, measured
from the nominal impact point to the populated area (see figure C-3)
= one-fifth of the impact dispersion
radius (see figure C-3)
exp = exponential function (e^x)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.120

Where:

y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range
distance to the populated area measured from the flight corridor
centerline (see figure C-3)
y = one-fifth of the impact dispersion radius
(see figure C-3)
exp = exponential function (e^x)

(B) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area
boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would
otherwise extend outside the impact dispersion area, the
x2 or y2 distance should be set equal to the
impact dispersion area radius. The x2 distance for
populated area A in figure C-3 is an example, If a populated area
intersects the flight azimuth, an applicant shall solve equation C3
by obtaining the solution in two parts. An applicant shall
determine, first, the probability between y1 = 0 and
y2 = a and, second, the probability between y1
= 0 and y2 = b, as depicted in figure C-4. The
probability Py is then equal to the sum of the
probabilities of the two parts. If a populated area interests the
line that is normal to the flight azimuth on the impact point, an
applicant shall solve equation C2 by obtaining the solution in two
parts in a similar manner with the values of x.
(C) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact for
each populated area using equation C4 below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.121

Where:

Ps = 1 - Pf = 0.90

[[Page 34384]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.075

(6) Probability of Impact Computations for a Populated Area in
an appendix B Flight Corridor. An applicant shall compute
Pi using the following method:
(i) For the launch and downrange areas, but not a final stage
impact dispersion area for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an
applicant shall compute Pi for each populated area using
the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.122

Where:

y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range
distance (nm) to a populated area measured from the nominal
trajectory IIP ground trace (see figure C-2)
= one-fifth of the cross range
distance (nm) from nominal trajectory to the flight corridor
boundary (see figure C-2)
exp = exponential function (e^x)
Pf = probability of failure = 0.10
t = flight time from lift-off to orbital insertion (seconds)
td = overflight dwell time (seconds)

[[Page 34385]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.123

Where:

x1, x2 = closest and farthest downrange
distance, measured along nominal trajectory IIP ground trace,
measured from the nominal impact point to the populated area (see
figure C-3)
= one-fifth of the impact dispersion
radius (see figure C-3)
exp = exponential function (e^x)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.124

Where:

y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range
distance to the populated area measured form the nominal trajectory
IIP ground trace (see figure C-3)
= one-fifth of the impact dispersion
radius (see figure C-3)
exp = exponential function (e^x)

(B) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area
boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would
otherwise extend outside the impact dispersion area, the
x2 or y2 distance should be set equal to the
impact dispersion area radius. The x2 distance for
populated area A in figure C-3 is an example. If a populated area
intersects the flight azimuth, an applicant shall solve equation C7
by obtaining the solution in two parts. An applicant shall
determine, first, the probability between y1 = 0 and
y2 = a and, second, the probability between y1
= 0 and y2 = b, as depicted in figure C-4. The
probability Py is then equal to the sum of the
probabilities of the two parts. If a populated area interests the
line that is normal to the flight azimuth on the impact point, an
applicant shall solve equation C6 by obtaining the solution in two
parts in a similar manner with the values of x.
(C) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact for
each populated area using equation C8 below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.125

Where:

Ps = 1 - Pf = 0.90

BILLING CODE 4910-13-M

[[Page 34386]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.076

[[Page 34387]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.077

BILLING CODE 4910-13-C

[[Page 34388]]

(7) Using the Pi calculated in either subparagraph
(c)(5) or (6) of this paragraph, an applicant shall calculate the
casualty expectancy for each populated area within the flight
corridor. Eck is the casualty expectancy for a given
populated area as shown in equation C9, where individual populated
areas are designated with the subscript ``k''.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.126

Where:
Ac = casualty area (from table C-3)
Ak = populated area
Nk = population in Ak

Table C-3--Effective Casualty Area (miles²) vs. IIP Range (nm)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbital launch vehicles Suborbital launch
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vehicles
-----------------------
IIP Range (nmi) Small Medium Medium large Large Guided
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-49........................... 0.43................... 0.53.................. 0.71.................. 1.94.................. 0.43
50-1749........................ 0.13................... 0.0022................ 0.11.................. 0.62.................. 0.13
1750-5000...................... 3.59 x 10^-6.......... 8.3 x 10^-4.......... 1.08 x 10^-1......... 7.17 x 10^-1......... 3.59 x 10^-6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(8) An applicant shall estimate the total corridor risk using
the following summation of risk, including a multiplier of two, as
shown in equation C10.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.127

(9) Alternative Casualty Expectancy (Ec) Analyses. An
applicant may employ specified variations to the analysis defined in
subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8). Those variations are identified in
subparagraphs (9)(i) through (vi) of this paragraph. Subparagraphs
(i) through (iv) permits an applicant to make conservative
assumptions that would lead to an overestimation of the corridor
Ec compared with the analysis defined in subparagraphs
(c)(1)-(8). In subparagraphs (v) and (vi), an applicant that would
otherwise fail the analysis prescribed by subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8)
may avoid (c)(1)-(8)'s overestimation of the probability of impact
in each populated area. An applicant employing a variation shall
identify the variation used, show and discuss the specific
assumptions made to a modify the analysis defined in subparagraphs
(c)(1)-(8), and demonstrate how each assumption leads to
overestimation of the corridor Ec compared with the
analysis defined in subparagraphs (c)(1)-(c)(8).
(i) Assume that Px and Py have a value of
1.0 for all populated areas.
(ii) Combine populated areas into one or more larger populated
areas, and use a population density for the combined area or areas
equal to the most dense populated area.
(iii) for any given populated area, assume Py has a
value of one.
(iv) For any given Px sector (an area spanning the
width of a flight corridor and bounded by two time points on the
trajectory IIP ground trace) Py has a value of one and
use a population density for the sector equal to the most dense
populated area.
(v) For a given populated area, divided the populated area into
smaller rectangles, determined Pi for each individual
rectangle, and sum the individual impact probabilities to determine
Pi for thee entire populated area.
(vi) For a given populated area, use the ratio of the populated
area to the area of the Pi rectangle from the
subparagraph (c)(1)-(8) analysis.

(d) Evaluation of Results

(1) If the estimated expected casualty does not exceed 30
x 10^-6, the FAA will approve the launch site location.
(2) If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 30
x 10^-6, then an applicant may either modify its proposal,
or, if the flight corridor used was generated by the appendix A
method, use the appendix B method to narrow the flight corridor and
then perform another appendix C risk analysis.

Appendix D to Part 420--Impact Dispersion Area and Casualty Expectancy
Estimate for an Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle

(a) Introduction

(1) This appendix provides an method for determining the
acceptability of the location of a launch point from which an
unguided suborbital launch vehicle would be launched. The appendix
describes how to define an overflight exclusion zone and impact
dispersion areas, and how to evaluate whether the public risk
presented by the launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle
remains at acceptable levels.
(2) An applicant shall base its analysis on an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle whose final launch vehicle stage apogee
represents the intended use of the launch point.
(3) An applicant shall use the apogee of each stage of an
existing unguided suborbital launch vehicle with a final launch
vehicle stage apogee equal to the one proposed, and calculate each
impact range and dispersion area using the equations provided.
(4) This appendix also provides a method of performing an impact
risk analysis that estimates the expected casualty (Ec)
within each impact dispersion area. This appendix provides an
applicant options to simplify the method where population at risk is
minimal.
(5) If the Ec is less than or equal to 30
x 10^-6, the FAA will approve the launch point for
unguided suborbital launch vehicles. If the Ec exceeds 30
x 10^-6, the proposed launch point will fail the launch
site location review.

(b) Data Requirements

(1) An applicant shall employ the apogee of each stage of an
existing unguided suborbital launch vehicle whose final stage apogee
represents the maximum altitude to be reached by unguided suborbital
launch vehicles launched from the launch point. The apogee shall be
obtained from one or more actual flights of an unguided suborbital
launch vehicle launched at an 84 degree elevation.
(2) An applicant shall satisfy the map and plotting data
requirements in appendix A, paragraph (b).
(3) Population Data. An applicant shall use total population (N)
and the total landmass are within a populated area (A) for all
populated areas within an impact dispersion area. Population data up
to and including 100 nm from the launch point are required at the
U.S. census block group level. Population data downrange from 100 nm
are required at no greater than 1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude/longitude
grid coordinates.

(1) An applicant shall choose a flight azimuth from a launch
point.
(2) An applicant shall define an overflight exclusion zone as a
circle with a radius of 1600 feet centered on the launch point.
(3) An applicant shall define an impact dispersion area for each
stage of the suborbital launch vehicle chosen in subparagraph (b)(1)
as provided below:
(i) An applicant shall calculate the impact range for the final
launch vehicle stage (Dn). An applicant shall set
Dn equal to the last

[[Page 34389]]

stage apogee altitude (Hn) multiplied by an impact range
factor [IP(Hn)] as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.128

Where:

IP(Hn)=0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km, and
IP(Hn)=0.7 for an apogee 100 km or greater.
(ii) An applicant shall calculate the impact range for each
intermediate stage (Di), where i{1, 2, 3, . . .
(n-1)}, and where n is the total number of launch vehicle stages.
Using the apogee altitude (Hi) of each intermediate
stage, an applicant shall used equation D1 to compute the impact
range of each stage by substituting Hi for Hn.
An applicant shall use the impact range factors provided in equation
D1.
(iii) An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius
for the final launch vehicle stage (Rn). An applicant
shall set Rn equal to the last stage apogee altitude
(Hn) multiplied by an impact dispersion factor
[DISP(Hn)] as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.129

Where:

DISP(Hn)=0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km, and
DISP(Hn)=0.7 for an apogee 100 km or greater
(iv) An applicant shall calculate the impact range for each
intermediate stage (Ri), where i{1,2,3, . . .
(n-1)}. and where n is the total number of launch vehicle stages.
Using the apogee altitude (Hi) of each intermediate
stage, an applicant shall used equation D2 to compute impact
dispression radius of each stage by substituting Hi for
Hn. An applicant shall use the dispersion factors
provided in equation D2.
(4) An applicant shall display an oversflight exclusion zone,
each intermediate and final stage impact point (Di
through Dn), and each impact dispersion area for the
intermediate and final launch vehicle stages on maps in accordance
with paragraph (b)(2).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.078

(d) Evaluate the Overflight Exclusion Zone and Impact Dispersion
Areas

(1) An applicant shall evaluate the overflight exclusion zone
and each impact dispersion area for the presence of any populated
areas. If an applicant determines that no populated area is located
within the overflight exclusion zone or any impact dispersion area,
then no additional steps are necessary.
(2) If a populated area is located in an overflight exclusion
zone, an applicant may modify its proposal or demonstrate that there
are times when no people are present or that the applicant has an
agreement in place to evacuate the public from the overflight
exclusion zone during a launch.
(3) If a populated area is located within any impact dispersion
area, an applicant may modify its proposal and defined a new
exclusion zone and new impact dispersion areas, or perform an impact
risk analysis as provided in paragraph (e).

(e) Impact Risk Analysis

(1) An applicant shall estimate the expected average number of
casualties, EC, within the impact dispersion areas
according to the following method:
(i) An applicant shall calculate the Ec by summing
the impact risk for the impact dispersion areas of the final launch
vehicle stage and all intermediate stages. An applicant shall
estimate Ec for the impact dispersion area of each stage
by using equation D3 through D7 for each of the populated areas
located within the impact dispersion areas.
(ii) An applicant shall estimate the probability of impacting
inside the X and Y sectors of each populated area within each impact
dispersion area using equations D3 and D4 below:

[[Page 34390]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.130

Where:

x1, x2=closest and farthest downrange distance
to populated area (see figure D-2)
x=one-fifth of the impact dispersion radius (see
figure D-2)
exp=exponential function (e^x)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.131

Where:

y1, y2=closest and farthest cross range
distance to the populated area (see figure D-2)
y=one-fifth of the impact dispersion radius (see
figure D-2)
exp=exponential function (e^x)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.079

(iii) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area
boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would
otherwise extend outside the impact dispersion area, the
x2 or y2 distance should be set equal to the
impact dispersion area radius. The x2 distance for
populated area A in figure D-2 is an example.
(iv) If a populated area intersects the flight azimuth, an
applicant shall solve equation D4 by obtaining the solution in two
parts. An applicant shall determine, first, the probability between
y1=0 and y2=a and, second, the probability
between y1=0 and y2=b, as depicted in figure
D-3. The probability Py is then equal to the sum of the
probabilities of the two parts. If a populated area intersects the
line that is normal to the flight azimuth on the impact point, an
applicant shall solve equation D3 by obtaining the solution in two
parts in the same manner as with the values of x.

[[Page 34391]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.080

(v) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact
(Pi) for each populated area using the following
equation;
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.132

Where:

Ps=probability of success=0.98

(vi) An applicant shall calculate the casualty expectancy for
each populated area. Eck is the casualty expectancy for a
given populated area as shown in equation D6, where individual
populated areas are designated with the subscript ``k''.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.133

Where {1, 2, 3, . . . n}
Ac=casualty area (from table D-1)
Ak=populated area
Nk=population in Ak

Table D-1.--Effective Casualty Area (Ac) vs. Impact Range
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effective casualty area
Impact range (nm) (miles²)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-4....................................... 9 x 10^-3
5-49...................................... 9 x 10^-3
50-1,749.................................. 1.1 x 10^-3
1,750-4,999............................... 3.6 x 10^-6
5,000-more................................ 3.6 x 10^-6
------------------------------------------------------------------------

(vii) An applicant shall estimate the total risk using the
following summation of risk, including a multiplier of five, as
shown in equation D7.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.134

(viii) Alternative Casualty Expectancy (EC) Analysis.
An applicant may employ specified variations to the analysis defined
in subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii). Those variations are identified in
subparagraphs (viii)(A) through (F) of this paragraph. Subparagraphs
(A) through (D) permit an applicant to make conservative assumptions
that would lead to an overestimation of Ec compared with
the analysis defined in subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii). In
subparagraphs (E) and (F), an applicant that would otherwise fail
the analysis prescribed by subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii) may avoid
(d)(1)(i)-(vii)'s overestimation of the probability of impact on
each populated area. An applicant employing a variation shall
identify the variation used, show an discuss

[[Page 34392]]

the specific assumptions made to modify the analysis defined in
subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii), and justify how each assumption leads
to overestimation of the corridor Ec compared with the
analysis defined in subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii).
(A) Assume that Px and Py have a valve of
1.0 for all populated areas.
(B) Combine populated areas into one or more larger populated
areas, and use a population density for the combined area or areas
equal to the most dense populated area.
(C) For any given populated area, assume Px has a
value of one.
(D) For any given populated area, assume Py has a
value of one.
(E) For a given populated area, divide the populated area into
small rectangles, determine Pi for each individual
rectangle, and sum the individual impact probabilities to determine
Pi for the entire populated area.
(F) For a given populated area, use the ratio of the populated
area to the area of the Pi rectangle from the
subparagraph (d)(1)(i)-(vii) analysis.
(2) If the estimated expected casualty does not exceed 30 x
10^-6, then no additional steps are necessary.
(3) If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 30 x
10^-6, then an applicant may modify its proposal and then
repeat the impact risk analysis per this appendix D. If no set of
impact dispersion areas exist which satisfy the FAA's risk
threshold, the applicant's proposed launch site will fail the launch
site location review.

Appendix E to Part 420.--Tables for Explosive Site Plan

Table E-1 Quantity Distance Requirements for Division 1.3 Solid Propellants
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantity (lbs.) (over) Qhantity (lbs.) (not over) Public area distance (ft.) Intraline distance (ft.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 1,000 75 50
1,000 5,000 115 75
5,000 10,000 150 100
10,000 20,000 190 125
20,000 30,000 215 145
30,000 40,000 235 155
40,000 50,000 250 165
50,000 60,000 260 175
60,000 70,000 270 185
70,000 80,000 280 190
80,000 90,000 195 195
90,000 100,000 300 200
100,000 200,000 375 250
200,000 300,000 450 300
300,000 400,000 525 350
400,000 500,000 600 400
500,000 1,000,000 800 500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table E-2: Liquid Propellant Explosive Equivalents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Propelland combinations Explosive equivalent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LO2/LH2............................ The larger of: 8W^2/3 where W is the
weight of LO2/LH2, or 14% of W.
LO2/LH2+LO2/RP-1................... Sum of (20% for LO2/RP-1)+the
larger of: 8W^2/3 where W is the
weight of LO2/LH2, or 14% of W.
LO2/RP-1........................... 20% of W up to 500,000 pounds plus
10% of W over 500,000 pounds,
where W is the weight of LO2/RP-1.
N2O4N2H4 (or UDMH OR UDMH/N2H4 10% of W, where W is the weight of
Mixture). the propellant.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table E-3: Propellant Hazard and Compatibility Groupings and Factors To Be Used When Converting Gallons of Propellant Into Pounds
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
At temperature
Propellant Hazard group Compatibility group Pounds/gallon deg.F
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hydrogen Perioxide..................... II A 11.6 68
Hydrazine.............................. III C 8.4 68
Liquid Hydrogen........................ III C 0.59 -423
Liquid Oxygen.......................... II A 9.5 -297
Nitrogen Tetroxide..................... I A 12.1 68
RP-1................................... I C 6.8 68
UDMH................................... III C 6.6 68
UDHM/Hydrazine......................... III C 7.5 68
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table E-4:--Hazard Group I
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pounds of propellant Public area and Intragroup and
------------------------------------ incompatible compatible
Over Not over ------------------------------------
------------------------------------ Distance in feet Distance in feet
------------------------------------
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 100 30 25
100 200 35 30
200 300 40 35
300 400 45 35

[[Page 34393]]

400 500 50 40
500 600 50 40
600 700 55 40
700 800 55 45
800 900 60 45
900 1,000 60 45
1,000 2,000 65 50
2,000 3,000 70 55
3,000 4,000 75 55
4,000 5,000 80 60
5,000 6,000 80 60
6,000 7,000 85 65
7,000 8,000 85 65
8,000 9,000 90 70
9,000 10,000 90 70
10,000 15,000 95 75
15,000 20,000 100 80
20,000 25,000 105 80
25,000 30,000 110 85
30,000 35,000 110 85
35,000 40,000 115 85
40,000 45,000 120 90
45,000 50,000 120 90
50,000 60,000 125 95
60,000 70,000 130 95
70,000 80,000 130 100
80,000 90,000 135 100
90,000 100,000 135 105
100,000 125,000 140 110
125,000 150,000 145 110
150,000 175,000 150 115
175,000 200,000 155 115
200,000 250,000 160 120
250,000 300,000 165 125
300,000 350,000 170 130
350,000 400,000 175 130
400,000 450,000 180 135
450,000 500,000 180 135
500,000 600,000 185 140
600,000 700,000 190 145
700,000 800,000 195 150
800,000 900,000 200 150
900,000 1,000,000 205 155
1,000,000 2,000,000 235 175
2,000,000 3,000,000 255 190
3,000,000 4,000,000 265 200
4,000,000 5,000,000 275 210
5,000,000 6,000,000 285 215
6,000,000 7,000,000 295 220
7,000,000 8,000,000 300 225
8,000,000 9,000,000 305 230
9,000,000 10,000,000 310 235
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table E-5: Hazard Group II
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pounds of propellant Public area and Intragroup and compatible
--------------------------------------------------------- incompatible ---------------------------
Over Not over ---------------------------- Distance in feet
--------------------------------------------------------- Distance in feet ---------------------------
----------------------------
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 100 60 30
100 200 75 35
200 300 85 40
300 400 90 45
400 500 100 50
500 600 100 50
600 700 105 55

[[Page 34394]]

700 800 110 55
800 900 115 60
900 1,000 120 60
1,000 2,000 130 65
2,000 3,000 145 70
3,000 4,000 150 75
4,000 5,000 160 80
5,000 6,000 165 80
6,000 7,000 170 85
7,000 8,000 175 85
8,000 9,000 175 90
9,000 10,000 180 90
10,000 15,000 195 95
15,000 20,000 205 100
20,000 25,000 215 105
25,000 30,000 220 110
30,000 35,000 225 110
35,000 40,000 230 115
40,000 45,000 235 120
45,000 50,000 240 120
50,000 60,000 250 125
60,000 70,000 255 130
70,000 80,000 260 130
80,000 90,000 265 135
90,000 100,000 270 135
100,000 125,000 285 140
125,000 150,000 295 145
150,000 175,000 305 150
175,000 200,000 310 155
200,000 250,000 320 160
250,000 300,000 330 165
300,000 350,000 340 170
350,000 400,000 350 175
400,000 450,000 355 180
450,000 500,000 360 180
500,000 600,000 375 185
600,000 700,000 385 190
700,000 800,000 395 195
800,000 900,000 405 200
900,000 1,000,000 410 205
1,000,000 2,000,000 470 235
2,000,000 3,000,000 505 255
3,000,000 4,000,000 535 265
4,000,000 5,000,000 555 275
5,000,000 6,000,000 570 285
6,000,000 7,000,000 585 295
7,000,000 8,000,000 600 300
8,000,000 9,000,000 610 305
9,000,000 10,000,000 620 310
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table E-6:--Hazard Group III
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pounds of propellant Public area and Intragroup and
------------------------------------ incompatible compatible
Over Not over ------------------------------------
------------------------------------ Distance in feet Distance in feet
------------------------------------
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 100 600 30
100 200 600 35
200 300 600 40
300 400 600 45
400 500 600 50
500 600 600 50
600 700 600 55
700 800 600 55
800 900 600 60
900 1,000 600 60

[[Page 34395]]

1,000 2,000 600 65
2,000 3,000 600 70
3,000 4,000 600 75
4,000 5,000 600 80
5,000 6,000 600 80
6,000 7,000 600 85
7,000 8,000 600 85
8,000 9,000 600 90
9,000 10,000 600 90
10,000 15,000 1,200 95
15,000 20,000 1,200 100
20,000 25,000 1,200 105
25,000 30,000 1,200 110
30,000 35,000 1,200 110
35,000 40,000 1,200 115
40,000 45,000 1,200 120
45,000 50,000 1,200 120
50,000 60,000 1,200 125
60,000 70,000 1,200 130
70,000 80,000 1,200 130
80,000 90,000 1,200 135
90,000 100,000 1,200 135
100,000 125,000 1,800 140
125,000 150,000 1,800 145
150,000 175,000 1,800 150
175,000 200,000 1,800 155
200,000 250,000 1,800 160
250,000 300,000 1,800 165
300,000 350,000 1,800 170
350,000 400,000 1,800 175
400,000 450,000 1,800 180
450,000 500,000 1,800 180
500,000 600,000 1,800 185
600,000 700,000 1,800 190
700,000 800,000 1,800 195
800,000 900,000 1,800 200
900,000 1,000,000 1,800 205
1,000,000 2,000,000 1,800 235
2,000,000 3,000,000 1,800 255
3,000,000 4,000,000 1,800 265
4,000,000 5,000,000 1,800 275
5,000,000 6,000,000 1,800 285
6,000,000 7,000,000 1,800 295
7,000,000 8,000,000 1,800 300
8,000,000 9,000,000 1,800 300
9,000,000 10,000,000 1,800 310
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table E-7:--Distances When Explosive Equivalents Apply
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Distance in feet
TNT equivalent weight of -------------------------------------
propellants To public area Intraline
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not Over: Unbarricaded
100........................... 1,250 80
200........................... 1,250 100
300........................... 1,250 120
400........................... 1,250 130
500........................... 1,250 140
600........................... 1,250 150
700........................... 1,250 160
800........................... 1,250 170
900........................... 1,250 180
1,000......................... 1,250 190
1,500......................... 1,250 210
2,000......................... 1,250 230

[[Page 34396]]

3,000......................... 1,250 260
4,000......................... 1,250 280
5,000......................... 1,250 300
6,000......................... 1,250 320
7,000......................... 1,250 340
8,000......................... 1,250 360
9,000......................... 1,250 380
10,000........................ 1,250 400
15,000........................ 1,250 450
20,000........................ 1,250 490
25,000........................ 1,250 530
30,000........................ 1,250 560
35,000........................ 1,310 590
40,000........................ 1,370 620
45,000........................ 1,425 640
50,000........................ 1,475 660
55,000........................ 1,520 680
60,000........................ 1,565 700
65,000........................ 1,610 720
70,000........................ 1,650 740
75,000........................ 1,685 770
80,000........................ 1,725 780
85,000........................ 1,760 790
90,000........................ 1,795 800
95,000........................ 1,825 820
100,000....................... 1,855 830
125,000....................... 2,115 900
150,000....................... 2,350 950
175,000....................... 2,565 1,000
200,000....................... 2,770 1,050
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. 99-15384 Filed 6-24-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M