

valve, having part number (P/N) 816603-1, and associated gaskets, having P/N 24096-250C, on the bleed low-pressure line of the left- and right-hand engines, with new parts having the same P/N's; in accordance with EMBRAER Alert Service Bulletin 145-36-A011, dated March 19, 1999. Thereafter, repeat the replacement at intervals not to exceed 2,000 flight hours in accordance with the alert service bulletin.

#### Alternative Methods of Compliance

(b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Small Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Atlanta ACO.

**Note 2:** Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Atlanta ACO.

#### Special Flight Permits

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

#### Incorporation by Reference

(d) The replacements shall be done in accordance with EMBRAER Alert Service Bulletin 145-36-A011, dated March 19, 1999. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER), P.O. Box 343—CEP 12.225, Sao Jose dos Campos—SP, Brazil. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, One Crown Center, 1895 Phoenix Boulevard, suite 450, Atlanta, Georgia; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

**Note 3:** The subject of this AD is addressed in Brazilian airworthiness directive 1999-04-01, dated April 12, 1999.

(e) This amendment becomes effective on June 2, 1999.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 10, 1999.

#### D. L. Riggin,

*Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 99-12296 Filed 5-17-99; 8:45 am]

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## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 99-CE-18-AD; Amendment 39-11171; AD 99-10-07]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Raytheon Aircraft Corporation Beech Models 65-90, 65-A90, 65-A90-1, 65-A90-2, 65-A90-3, 65-A90-4, B90, C90, C90A, E90, H90, and F90 Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule; request for comments.

**SUMMARY:** This document publishes in the **Federal Register** an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 99-10-07, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Raytheon Aircraft Corporation (Raytheon) Beech Models 65-90, 65-A90, 65-A90-1, 65-A90-2, 65-A90-3, 65-A90-4, B90, C90, C90A, E90, H90, and F90 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting for interference or damage between the elevator control cable and equipment under the cockpit floor panels (wire harnesses, stainless steel clamps, etc.) and running a cloth wrap around the control cable to detect broken strands of the control cable. This AD also requires replacing or repairing any damaged items, securing any component that is interfering with the elevator control cable, and installing additional supports and clamps as necessary to prevent sagging or further interference. This AD resulted from reports of reduced or loss of elevator control on five of the affected airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct interference between the elevator control cable and equipment under the cockpit floor panels before the elevator control cable breaks, which could result in loss of elevator control with potential loss of control of the airplane.

**DATES:** Effective June 8, 1999, to all persons except those to whom it was made immediately effective by priority letter AD 99-10-07, issued May 3, 1999, which contained the requirements of this amendment.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before July 6, 1999.

**ADDRESSES:** Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Central Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket 99-CE-18-AD,

Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.

Information related to this AD may be examined at the Rules Docket at the address above.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Mr. Todd Dixon, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209, telephone: (316) 946-4152; facsimile: (316) 946-4407.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Discussion

On May 3, 1999, the FAA issued priority letter AD 99-10-07, which applies to all Beech Models 65-90, 65-A90, 65-A90-1, 65-A90-2, 65-A90-3, 65-A90-4, B90, C90, C90A, E90, H90, and F90 airplanes. That AD resulted from reports of reduced or loss of elevator control on Raytheon Beech 90 series airplanes. The following briefly describes these incidents:

- During flight on a Raytheon Beech Model E90 airplane, the pilot realized he could only utilize elevator up control, declared an emergency, and safely landed using engine power and trim. Investigation revealed that the down elevator cable was severed due to chafing between this cable and the windshield de-ice circuit electrical wire. Verbal communication with an FAA Flight Standards employee indicated another incident of loss of elevator control due to interference with electrical wiring on a Raytheon Beech 90 series airplane; and
- The elevator down cable separated on a Raytheon Beech Model E90 airplane because of interference between this cable and the stainless steel clamp that joined two bleed air supply ducts. The FAA has received reports of two other incidents of reduced/loss of elevator control due to interference between the elevator down cable and the bleed air ducts on Raytheon Beech 90 series airplanes.

Priority letter AD 99-10-07 requires the following on the above-referenced airplanes:

- Removing the pilot's seat and floor panels in the cockpit area on the pilot's side of the airplane and inspecting the entire area for interference or damage between the elevator control cable and equipment under the cockpit floor panels (wire harnesses, stainless steel clamps, etc.);
- Running a cloth wrap around the control cable to detect broken strands of the control cable (Ref: 90 Series Maintenance Manual, Sections 5-20-00, 5-20-01 (if applicable), and 20-04-00);

- Replacing or repairing any damaged items found during the required inspection and cloth wrap procedure. This would include chafing damage and nicks, cuts, and broken strands on the control cable (Ref: 90 Series Maintenance Manual, Section 20-04-00, for criteria to determine if the cable needs to be replaced);
- Securing any component that is interfering with the elevator control cable and installing additional supports and clamps as necessary to prevent sagging or further interference between the elevator control cable and equipment under the cockpit floor panels. Use best shop practices and Advisory Circular (AC) 43.13-1B as guides for installing the additional supports;
- reinspecting the elevator control cable upon completion of any rework or replacement to assure that there is no interference; and
- reinstalling the floor panels and the pilot's seat.

#### The FAA's Determination and Explanation of the AD

Since an unsafe condition was identified that is likely to exist or develop in other Raytheon Beech Models 65-90, 65-A90, 65-A90-1, 65-A90-2, 65-A90-3, 65-A90-4, B90, C90, C90A, E90, H90, and F90 airplanes of the same type design airplanes, the FAA:

1. Determined that the elevator control cable on the Raytheon Beech 90 series airplanes could interfere with wire harnesses, stainless steel clamps, and other equipment under the cockpit floor panels;
2. Determined that immediate AD action should be taken to detect and correct such interference before the elevator control cable breaks, which could result in loss of elevator control with potential loss of control of the airplane; and
3. Issued AD 99-10-07 as a priority letter on May 3, 1999.

#### Compliance Time of This AD

The compliance time of this AD is structured such that the required actions would occur at the same time as the first Phase III inspection (at 600 hours time-in-service (TIS)) for low-time airplanes with less than 600 hours TIS or within the next 10 hours TIS for those airplanes with over 590 hours total TIS. The Phase III inspection is the first time the pilot's seat and the floor panels are removed during regular maintenance.

Recent inspections of low-time airplanes and airplanes just off the assembly line have not revealed any of the interference problems referenced in

this document. By structuring the compliance time to coincide with the Phase III inspection, operators of low-time airplanes do not have to accomplish an unnecessary or unjustified inspection.

#### Determination of the Effective Date of the AD

Since it was found that immediate corrective action was required, notice and opportunity for prior public comment thereon were impracticable and contrary to the public interest, and good cause existed to make the AD effective immediately by individual letters issued on May 3, 1999, to all known U.S. operators of Beech Models 65-90, 65-A90, 65-A90-1, 65-A90-2, 65-A90-3, 65-A90-4, B90, C90, C90A, E90, H90, and F90 airplanes. These conditions still exist, and the AD is hereby published in the **Federal Register** as an amendment to § 39.13 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39.13) to make it effective as to all persons.

#### Comments Invited

Although this action is in the form of a final rule that involves requirements affecting immediate flight safety and, thus, was not preceded by notice and opportunity to comment, comments are invited on this rule. Interested persons are invited to comment on this rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments will be considered, and this rule may be amended in light of the comments received. Factual information that supports the commenter's ideas and suggestions is extremely helpful in evaluating the effectiveness of the AD action and determining whether additional rulemaking action would be needed.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might suggest a need to modify the rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report that summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this AD will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this rule must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following

statement is made: "Comments to Docket No. 99-CE-18-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

#### Regulatory Impact

The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

The FAA has determined that this regulation is an emergency regulation that must be issued immediately to correct an unsafe condition in aircraft, and is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866. It has been determined further that this action involves an emergency regulation under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). If it is determined that this emergency regulation otherwise would be significant under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures, a final regulatory evaluation will be prepared and placed in the Rules Docket. A copy of it, if filed, may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

#### Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

#### PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

#### § 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding a new airworthiness directive (AD) to read as follows:

**99-10-07 Raytheon Aircraft Corporation:**  
Amendment 39-11171; Docket No. 99-CE-18-AD.

*Applicability:* Beech Models 65-90, 65-A90, 65-A90-1, 65-A90-2, 65-A90-3, 65-A90-4, B90, C90, C90A, E90, H90, and F90 airplanes, all serial numbers, certificated in any category:

**Note 1:** This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

**Compliance:** Required as indicated in the body of this AD, unless already accomplished.

To detect and correct interference between the elevator control cable and equipment under the cockpit floor panels before the elevator control cable breaks, which could result in loss of elevator control with potential loss of control of the airplane, accomplish the following:

(a) Upon accumulating 600 hours total time in service (TIS) on the airplane or within the next 10 hours TIS after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, accomplish the following:

(1) Remove the pilot's seat and floor panels in the cockpit area on the pilot's side of the airplane and inspect the entire area for interference or damage between the elevator control cable and equipment under the cockpit floor panels (wire harnesses, stainless steel clamps, etc.); and

(2) Run a cloth wrap around the control cable to detect broken strands of the control cable (Ref: 90 Series Maintenance Manual, Sections 5-20-00, 5-20-01 (if applicable), and 20-04-00).

(b) Prior to further flight after the actions required by paragraph (a), including all subparagraphs, of this AD, accomplish the following:

(1) Replace or repair any damaged items found during the inspection and cloth wrap procedure required in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD, respectively. This would include chafing damage and nicks, cuts, and broken strands on the control cable (Ref: 90 Series Maintenance Manual, Section 20-04-00, for criteria to determine if the cable needs to be replaced);

(2) Secure any component that is interfering with the elevator control cable and install additional supports and clamps as necessary to prevent sagging or further interference between the elevator control cables and equipment under the cockpit floor panels. Use best shop practices and Advisory Circular (AC) 43.13-1B as guides for installing the additional supports;

(3) Reinspect the elevator control cables in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this AD upon completion of any rework or replacement to assure that there is no interference; and

(4) Re-install the floor panels and pilot's seat.

**Note 2:** Raytheon Safety Communique No. 143, dated October 1997, is not considered an alternative method of compliance to this AD.

(c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance times that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209. The request shall be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Wichita ACO.

**Note 3:** Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Wichita ACO.

(d) Information related to this priority letter AD may be examined at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.

(e) This amendment becomes effective on June 8, 1999, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by priority letter AD 99-10-07, issued May 3, 1999, which contains the requirements of this amendment.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on May 7, 1999.

**Michael Gallagher,**

*Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 99-12295 Filed 5-17-99; 8:45 am]

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## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 99-SW-03-AD; Amendment 39-11174; AD 99-11-03]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Eurocopter France Model SA341G and SA342J

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule; request for comments.

**SUMMARY:** This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Eurocopter France Model SA341G and SA342J helicopters. This action requires, before further flight, visually inspecting the external body of each main rotor head pitch-change rod (rod) for corrosion. If external corrosion is found, this action also requires a visual inspection of the inside of the body of that rod for corrosion. A rod with external corrosion that exceeds the repair criteria or a rod with any internal corrosion must be replaced with an airworthy rod. This amendment is prompted by the report of a deep internal corrosion fault in a rod found by a military helicopter operator performing a daily inspection. This

condition, if not corrected, could result in failure of a rod and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

**DATES:** Effective June 2, 1999.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before July 19, 1999.

**ADDRESSES:** Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, Attention: Rules Docket No. 99-SW-03-AD, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas 76137.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Mike Mathias, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Rotorcraft Standards Staff, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0111, telephone (817) 222-5123, fax (817) 222-5961.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** The Direction Generale De L'Aviation Civile (DGAC), the airworthiness authority for France, recently notified the FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on Eurocopter France Model SA341G and SA342J helicopters. The DGAC advises of the discovery of corrosion affecting a rod, which could lead to the failure of the rod and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

Eurocopter France issued Telex No. 00079, dated December 23, 1998, which specifies inspecting the body of each rod for stains, paint discoloration, and blistering, particularly on the lower straight section of the rod body. If any of these conditions are found, the telex specifies removal of the rod and an internal check of the body and its lower end fitting. The DGAC issued AD T98-551-039(A), dated December 31, 1998, to ensure the continued airworthiness of these helicopters in France.

These helicopter models are manufactured in France and are type certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of § 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to this bilateral airworthiness agreement, the DGAC has kept the FAA informed of the situation described above. The FAA has examined the findings of the DGAC, reviewed available information, and determined that AD action is necessary for products of this type design that are certificated for operation in the United States.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other Eurocopter France Model SA341G and SA342J helicopters of the same type design registered in the United States, this AD is being issued to prevent the failure of a rod and subsequent loss of control of the