[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 91 (Wednesday, May 12, 1999)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 25540-25705]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-11333]
[[Page 25539]]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part II
Department of Transportation
_______________________________________________________________________
Federal Railroad Administration
_______________________________________________________________________
49 CFR Part 216 et al.
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 64, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 12, 1999 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 25540]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
49 CFR Parts 216, 223, 229, 231, 232, and 238
[FRA Docket No. PCSS-1, Notice No. 5]
RIN 2130-AA95
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing comprehensive Federal safety standards for
railroad passenger equipment. The purpose of these safety standards is
to prevent collisions, derailments, and other occurrences involving
railroad passenger equipment that cause injury or death to railroad
employees, railroad passengers, or the general public; and to mitigate
the consequences of any such occurrences, to the extent they cannot be
prevented. The final rule promotes passenger train safety through
requirements for railroad passenger equipment design and performance;
fire safety; emergency systems; the inspection, testing, and
maintenance of passenger equipment; and other provisions for the safe
operation of railroad passenger equipment. The final rule addresses
passenger train safety in an environment where technology is advancing
and equipment is being designed for operation at higher speeds. The
final rule amends existing regulations concerning special notice for
repairs, safety glazing, locomotive safety, safety appliances, and
railroad power brakes as applied to passenger equipment.
The final rule does not apply to tourist and historic railroad
operations. However, after consulting with the excursion railroad
associations to determine appropriate applicability in light of
financial, operational, or other factors unique to such operations, FRA
may prescribe requirements for these operations that are similar to or
different from those affecting other types of passenger operations.
DATES: This regulation is effective July 12, 1999. The incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in the rule is approved by the
Director of the Federal Register as of July 12, 1999.
ADDRESSES: Any petition for reconsideration should reference FRA Docket
No. PCSS-1, Notice No. 5, and be submitted in triplicate to the Docket
Clerk, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1120 Vermont Avenue, Mail Stop 10,
Washington, D.C. 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ronald Newman, Staff Director, Motive
Power and Equipment Division, Office of Safety Assurance and
Compliance, FRA, 1120 Vermont Avenue, Mail Stop 25, Washington, D.C.
20590 (telephone: 202-493-6300); Daniel Alpert, Trial Attorney, Office
of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1120 Vermont Avenue, Mail Stop 10, Washington,
D.C. 20590 (telephone: 202-493-6026); or Thomas Herrmann, Trial
Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1120 Vermont Avenue, Mail Stop
10, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: 202-493-6036).
Supplementary Information:
Table of Contents for Supplementary Information
I. Introduction
II. Statutory Background
III. Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group
IV. Proceedings to Date
V. Discussion of Specific Comments and Conclusions
A. Application of the final rule to rapid transit operations and
``light rail''
B. Static end strength requirement: application to existing
equipment
C. United States international treaty obligations
D. Non-conventional passenger equipment
E. System safety
F. Side exit doors on passenger cars
G. Fuel tank standards
H. Train interior safety
I. Fire safety
VI. Inspection and Testing of Brake Systems and Mechanical
Components
A. Background prior to 1997 NPRM
B. 1997 NPRM on Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
1. Proposed brake system inspections
2. Proposed mechanical inspections
3. Proposed qualification of inspection and testing personnel
C. Overview of comments relating to proposed inspection and
testing requirements
D. General FRA conclusions
1. Brake and mechanical inspections
2. Qualified maintenance person
3. Long-distance intercity passenger trains
VII. Movement of Defective Equipment
A. Background
B. Overview of 1997 NPRM
C. Discussion of comments on the 1997 NPRM and general FRA
conclusions
1. Movement of equipment with defective brakes
2. Movement of equipment with other than power brake defects
VIII. FRA's Passenger Train Safety Initiatives
IX. Section-by-Section Analysis
X. Regulatory Impact
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT regulatory policies and
procedures
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
C. Paperwork Reduction Act
D. Environmental impact
E. Federalism implications
F. Compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
G. Effects on the Year 2000 computer problem
XI. List of Subjects
I. Introduction
Passenger railroads offer the traveling public one of the safest
forms of transportation available. In the eight-year period 1990-1997,
there were 0.89 passenger fatalities for every billion miles of
passenger transportation by rail. Nevertheless, collisions,
derailments, and other such occurrences continue to occur, often as a
result of factors beyond the control of the passenger railroad.
Further, the rail passenger environment is rapidly changing. Worldwide,
passenger equipment operating speeds are increasing. Passenger
trainsets designed to European safety standards have been proposed for
operation in the United States-and a few are in operation. Overall,
these trainsets do not meet the structural standards that are common
for passenger equipment operating in the United States. FRA believes
that adherence to such common standards by the nation's passenger
railroads has in large measure contributed to the high level of safety
at which rail passenger service is currently provided in the United
States. However, these standards generally do not have the force of
law.
Effective Federal safety standards for freight equipment have long
been in place, but equivalent Federal safety standards for passenger
equipment have not existed. Further, the Association of American
Railroads (AAR) currently sets industry standards for the design and
maintenance of freight equipment that add materially to the safe
operation of such equipment. However, over the years, the AAR has
discontinued the development and maintenance of industry standards for
railroad passenger equipment.
FRA must necessarily be vigilant in ensuring that passenger trains
continue to be designed, built, and operated with a high level of
safety. In general, the railroad operating environment in the United
States requires passenger equipment to operate commingled with very
heavy and long freight trains, often over track with frequent grade
crossings used by heavy highway equipment. European passenger
operations, on the other hand, are intermingled with freight equipment
of lesser weight than in North America. In many cases, highway-rail
grade crossings also pose lesser hazards to passenger trains in Europe
due to lower highway vehicle weight. FRA is concerned with the level
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of safety provided by passenger equipment designed to European and
other international standards when such equipment is operated in the
United States.
A clear set of Federal safety standards for railroad passenger
equipment is needed that is tailored to the nation's operating
environment in order to provide for the safety of rail operations in
the United States and to facilitate sound planning for these
operations. In furtherance of this safety objective, FRA is pleased by
the American Public Transit Association's (APTA) initiative to continue
the development and maintenance of voluntary industry standards for the
safety of railroad passenger equipment. These standards will complement
FRA's safety standards and, thus, will work together to provide an even
higher level of safety for rail passengers, rail employees, and the
public as a whole.
II. Statutory Background
In September, 1994, the Secretary of Transportation convened a
meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail industry with
the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one of the initiatives arising
from this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would
begin developing safety standards for rail passenger equipment over a
five-year period. In November, 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's
schedule for implementing rail passenger equipment regulations and
included it in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994
(the Act), Pub. L. No. 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 (November 2,
1994). Section 215 of the Act, as now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133,
requires:
(a) MINIMUM STANDARDS.--The Secretary of Transportation shall
prescribe regulations establishing minimum standards for the safety
of cars used by railroad carriers to transport passengers. Before
prescribing such regulations, the Secretary shall consider--
(1) the crashworthiness of the cars;
(2) interior features (including luggage restraints, seat belts,
and exposed surfaces) that may affect passenger safety;
(3) maintenance and inspection of the cars;
(4) emergency response procedures and equipment; and
(5) any operating rules and conditions that directly affect
safety not otherwise governed by regulations.
The Secretary may make applicable some or all of the standards
established under this subsection to cars existing at the time the
regulations are prescribed, as well as to new cars, and the
Secretary shall explain in the rulemaking document the basis for
making such standards applicable to existing cars.
(b) INITIAL AND FINAL REGULATIONS.--(1) The Secretary shall
prescribe initial regulations under subsection (a) within 3 years
after the date of enactment of the Federal Railroad Safety
Authorization Act of 1994. The initial regulations may exempt
equipment used by tourist, historic, scenic, and excursion railroad
carriers to transport passengers.
(2) The Secretary shall prescribe final regulations under
subsection
(a) within 5 years after such date of enactment.
(c) PERSONNEL.--The Secretary may establish within the
Department of Transportation 2 additional full-time equivalent
positions beyond the number permitted under existing law to assist
with the drafting, prescribing, and implementation of regulations
under this section.
(d) CONSULTATION.--In prescribing regulations, issuing orders,
and making amendments under this section, the Secretary may consult
with Amtrak, public authorities operating railroad passenger
service, other railroad carriers transporting passengers,
organizations of passengers, and organizations of employees. A
consultation is not subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
U.S.C. App.), but minutes of the consultation shall be placed in the
public docket of the regulatory proceeding.
The Secretary of Transportation has delegated these rulemaking
responsibilities to the Federal Railroad Administrator. 49 CFR 1.49(m).
III. Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group
Consistent with the intent of Congress that FRA consult with the
railroad industry in prescribing these regulations, FRA invited various
organizations to participate in a working group to focus on the issues
related to railroad passenger equipment safety and assist FRA in
developing Federal safety standards. The Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards Working Group (or the ``Working Group'') first met on June 7,
1995, and has assisted FRA throughout the rulemaking process. Since its
initial meeting, the Working Group has evolved so that its membership
includes representatives from the following organizations:
American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners, Inc. (AAPRCO)
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO)
APTA
AAR
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE)
Brotherhood Railway Carmen (BRC)
FRA
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) of DOT
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)
National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP)
Railway Progress Institute (RPI)
Safe Travel America (STA)
Transportation Workers Union of America (TWU)
United Transportation Union (UTU), and
Washington State Department of Transportation (WDOT)
The Working Group is chaired by FRA, and supported by FRA program,
legal, and research staff, including technical personnel from the Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) of the Research
and Special Programs Administration of DOT. FRA has included vendor
representatives designated by RPI as associate members of the Working
Group. FRA has also included the AAPRCO as an associate Working Group
member. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has designated
staff members to advise the Working Group.
In developing proposed safety standards for passenger equipment
operating at speeds greater than 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph, FRA
formed a subgroup (the ``Tier II Equipment Subgroup'') of Working Group
members representing interests associated with the provision of rail
passenger service at such high speeds. The full Working Group
recommended the formation of a smaller subgroup to consider Tier II
passenger equipment standards, as a number of Working Group members
found the operation of high-speed passenger equipment to be outside
their immediate interest and expertise. FRA invited representatives
from organizations including Amtrak, the BLE, BRC, RPI, and UTU to
participate in developing the Tier II standards.
In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 20133(d), the evolving positions of
the Working Group members--as reflected in the minutes of the group's
meetings and associated documentation, together with data provided by
the members during their deliberations--have been placed in the public
docket of this rulemaking.
IV. Proceedings to Date
On June 17, 1996, FRA published an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning the establishment of comprehensive safety
standards for railroad passenger equipment (61 FR 30672). The ANPRM
provided background information on the need for such standards, offered
preliminary ideas on approaching passenger safety issues, and presented
questions on various topics including: system safety programs and
plans; passenger equipment crashworthiness;
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inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements; training and
qualification requirements for mechanical personnel and train crews;
excursion, tourist, and private equipment; commuter equipment and
operations; train make-up and operating speed; tiered safety standards;
fire safety; and operating practices and procedures.
FRA's commitment to developing proposed regulations through the
Working Group necessarily influenced the role and purpose of the ANPRM.
FRA specifically asked that members of the Working Group not respond
formally to the ANPRM. The issues and ideas presented in the ANPRM had
already been placed before the Working Group, and the Working Group had
commented on drafts of the ANPRM. As a result, FRA solicited the
submission of written comments that might be of assistance in
developing a proposed rule from interested persons not involved in the
Working Group's deliberations.
FRA received 12 comments in response to the ANPRM. These comments
were shared with the Working Group and were taken into consideration by
the members of the group as they advised FRA during the development of
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). The Working Group worked
intensively, and concluded with a meeting in Philadelphia on September
30-October 2, 1996. Working Group members agreed to the preparation of
a NPRM reflecting partial consensus on a number of the issues in the
rulemaking. However, the industry parties were unable to agree on any
option with respect to inspection requirements for power brakes or
daily inspection of equipment. Further, one labor organization later
advised FRA that it could not participate in a consensus on less than
the full range of issues in the rulemaking.
FRA prepared in draft an NPRM and shared it with the Working Group
members on March 19, 1997. The NPRM was then enriched with discussions
of issues and options reflecting concerns of Working Group members in
response to the draft, and some changes were incorporated into the
proposed rule.
On September 23, 1997, FRA published the NPRM (1997 NPRM) in the
Federal Register to add a new part, 49 CFR part 238 (Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards), and to amend 49 CFR parts 216 (Special
Notice and Emergency Order Procedures: Railroad Track, Locomotive and
Equipment), 223 (Safety Glazing Standards--Locomotives, Passenger Cars
and Cabooses), 229 (Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards), 231
(Railroad Safety Appliance Standards), and 232 (Railroad Power Brakes
and Drawbars). 62 FR 49728. The proposed part 238 set forth
comprehensive Federal safety standards for the safety of railroad
passenger equipment, including equipment design and performance
standards for passenger and crew survivability in the event of a
passenger train accident, as well as inspection, testing, and
maintenance standards for passenger equipment.
The 1997 NPRM generated written comments from 34 separate parties,
and all of these comments may be found in the public docket of the
rulemaking. The written comments included a request by the New York
Department of Transportation (NYDOT) to extend the comment period for
90 days. The NYDOT sought this additional time to more thoroughly
review the proposed rule, and secure expert testimony and empirical
data on the proposed rule's possible impact on the high-speed intercity
rail passenger program in the State of New York. FRA did not grant the
request, however, particularly because FRA had planned to convene the
Working Group in the interim and needed to assemble the comments on the
rule for discussion within the Working Group. FRA asked the NYDOT to
submit its comments by the close of the comment period on November 24,
1997, and it did so. FRA did explain to the NYDOT that it would
consider comments submitted after the formal close of the comment
period to the extent possible without incurring additional expense or
delay in issuing the final rule, and FRA has done so.
FRA held a public hearing on the proposed rule in Washington, D.C.
on November 21, 1997, at which nine parties submitted oral comments.
These parties consisted of: APTA; the BRC; the BLE; Amtrak; Renfe Talgo
of America, Inc. (Talgo); WDOT; NARP; the Omniglow Corporation; and The
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE). A copy
of the transcript of this hearing is available in the public docket of
this rulemaking.
As noted earlier, FRA convened the Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards Working Group following the close of the comment period to
consider the comments received in response to the 1997 NPRM and help
develop the final rule. This continued the consultative process FRA has
used throughout the rulemaking. Notice of the Working Group meetings
was available through the FRA Docket Clerk, as stated in the NPRM, see
62 FR 49729, and the meetings were open to the public.
The Working Group met in full in Washington, D.C., on December 15-
16, 1997. A smaller body of the Working Group met again on January 6,
1998, to discuss in particular high-speed passenger equipment safety
issues, as well as brake inspection, testing and maintenance issues for
long-distance intercity passenger trains. Minutes of these meetings,
including copies of the discussion documents circulated at the
meetings, are available in the public docket of the rulemaking. See 63
FR 28496; May 26, 1998. FRA received one set of written comments on the
minutes of the meetings, which FRA had prepared, and these comments are
also available in the same docket.
V. Discussion of Specific Comments and Conclusions
A. Application of the Final Rule to Rapid Transit Operations and
``Light Rail''
In the 1997 NPRM, FRA proposed applying the rule to rapid transit
operations in an urban area, unless those operations are not connected
with the general system of railroad transportation. In other words, FRA
made clear that its rule would apply to rapid transit operations over
the general system. The Utah Transit Authority (UTA), in commenting on
the NPRM, expressed concern with the inclusion of rapid transit
operations, including light rail transit, in the proposed rule. The UTA
stated that the rule provided no definition of what is meant by the
phrase ``not connected with the general railroad system of
transportation.'' As a result, the UTA requested that the final rule
provide such a definition. Further, the UTA requested that any such
definition take into account rail operations that are time-separated or
physically separated (using derails and electric locks), or both, so
that under such circumstances rapid transit systems would not be
considered connected with the general railroad system of transportation
and, therefore, be excluded from the rule.
In response to the 1997 NPRM, New Jersey Transit (NJT) commented
that by permitting FRA to rule on whether a transit agency may operate
light rail service over a freight right-of-way, FRA's jurisdiction
would be expanded in conflict with FTA's mandate in 49 C.F.R. part 659.
NJT explained that the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
of 1991, Public Law 102-240, and 49 C.F.R. part 659 promulgated in its
pursuance, required states to designate an agency of the state, other
than a transit agency, to oversee and implement requirements concerning
all fixed-guideway systems not under FRA's jurisdiction.
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The safety jurisdictions of FRA and FTA are mutually exclusive.
FTA's regulatory authority to issue regulations creating a state safety
oversight program applies only to ``rail fixed guideway mass
transportation systems not subject to regulation by the Federal
Railroad Administration.'' 49 U.S.C. 5330(a). Consistent with DOT
Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater's concept of One-DOT and the
need to assure seamless application of intermodal transportation
policies, FRA and FTA are jointly developing a proposed policy
statement outlining the scope of FRA's jurisdiction over ``light rail''
operations that share the use of rights-of-way with conventional
railroads. As discussed later in this document, the two agencies will
be soliciting input from rail operators and other interested entities
during the development of this policy statement.
FRA's safety jurisdiction is very broad and extends to all types of
railroads except for urban rapid transit operations not connected to
the general railroad system. The term ``railroad'' is defined by
statute as follows:
In this part--
(1) ``railroad''--
(A) Means any form of nonhighway ground transportation that runs
on rails or electromagnetic guideways, including--
(i) Commuter or other short-haul railroad passenger service in a
metropolitan or suburban area and commuter railroad service that was
operated by the Consolidated Rail Corporation on January 1, 1979;
and
(ii) High speed ground transportation systems that connect
metropolitan areas, without regard to whether those systems use new
technologies not associated with traditional railroads; but
(B) does not include rapid transit operations in an urban area
that are not connected to the general railroad system of
transportation.
49 U.S.C. 20102.
The statutory definition of the term ``railroad'' makes certain
elements of FRA's safety jurisdiction quite clear:
FRA, with one exception, has jurisdiction over all
railroads regardless of the type of equipment they use, their
connection to the general railroad system of transportation, or their
status as a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce. FRA will,
for example, assert jurisdiction over high-speed intercity rail service
even if completely separated from the general railroad system that now
exists and magnetic levitation systems that are not urban rapid
transit.
Commuter and other short-haul railroad passenger
operations in a metropolitan or suburban area (except for one type of
short-haul operation, i.e., urban rapid transit) are railroads within
FRA's jurisdiction whether or not they are connected to the general
railroad system. For operations on or over the general system, the
commuter/rapid transit distinction has no jurisdictional relevance--all
general system operations are within FRA's exercise of jurisdiction.
Because the only urban rapid transit operations that FRA intends to
cover under this rule are those on the general system, there is no need
to expand on the commuter/rapid transit distinction here.
Rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not
connected to the general railroad system are not within FRA's
jurisdiction. This is the sole exception to FRA's jurisdiction over all
railroads. There is no exception for ``light rail,'' a term not found
in the statute. Although FRA could assert jurisdiction over a rapid
transit operation based on any connection it has to the general
railroad system, FRA believes there are certain connections that are
too minimal to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction. For example, a
rapid transit system that has a switch for receiving shipments from the
general system railroad is not one over which FRA would assert
jurisdiction. This assumes that the switch is used only for that
purpose. In that case, any entry onto the rapid transit line by the
freight railroad would be for a very short distance and solely for the
purpose of dropping off or picking up cars. In this situation, the
rapid transit line is in the same situation as any shipper or
consignee; without this sort of connection, it cannot receive goods by
rail. Absent a change in policy, FRA will not attempt to apply this
rule to rapid transit systems with these sorts of connections. However,
if such a system is properly considered a rail fixed guideway system,
FTA's rules (49 CFR 659) will apply to it.
Rapid transit operations in an urban area that are
connected to the general railroad system of transportation are within
FRA's jurisdiction. FRA will assert jurisdiction over a rapid transit
operation that is conducted on or over the general system. It does not
matter that the rapid transit operation occupies the track only at
times when the freight, commuter, or intercity passenger railroad that
shares the track is not operating. While such time separation could, as
explained in the 1997 NPRM, provide the basis for waiver of certain of
FRA's rules, it does not mean that FRA will not assert jurisdiction.
However, FRA will assert jurisdiction over only the portions of the
rapid transit system that are conducted on the general system. For
example, a rapid transit line that operates over the general system for
a portion of its length but has significant portions of street railway
that are not part of the general system would be subject to FRA's rules
only with respect to the general system portion. The remaining portions
would not be subject to FRA's rules. If the non-general system portions
of the rapid transit line are considered a ``rail fixed guideway
system'' under 49 CFR part 659, those rules, issued by FTA, would apply
to them.
As discussed above, it is the nature and location of the railroad
operation, not the nature of the equipment, that determines whether FRA
has jurisdiction under the safety statutes. Light rail operations that
operate on the general system are always within that statutory
jurisdiction. They are not within the sole statutory exception (urban
rapid transit not connected to the general system) so they are
railroads under the safety statutes. The greatest risk inherent in the
shared use of the trackage is a collision between the light rail
equipment and conventional equipment. The light rail vehicles are not
designed to withstand such a collision with far heavier equipment. Were
such a crash to occur with either or both equipment operating at high
speeds, the consequences for passengers in the light rail vehicle(s)
would likely be catastrophic.
In the past, FRA has withheld exercise of its jurisdiction with
respect to light rail operations over general system trackage where
there was full time separation (freight operations limited to nighttime
hours). The recent proliferation of proposals for light rail operations
on the general system and the issuance of this final rule establishing
the first comprehensive Federal standards for railroad passenger
equipment call for changing this approach. Moreover, recent
developments have indicated that FRA's current approach assumes a
degree of separation that is unlikely to be maintained over time.
Proposals for limited overlap, deadhead movement of transit equipment,
etc., have demonstrated the complexity of using common trackage for
disparate purposes. Accordingly, FRA has asked that new transit starts
that propose using the general rail system trackage submit appropriate
waiver applications to FRA; such applications should be submitted as
early as possible. As previously noted, FTA and FRA are working toward
the development of a joint policy statement on the appropriate scope of
FRA's jurisdiction over ``light rail'' that shares rights-of-way with
conventional railroads. The agencies foresee an approach intended
[[Page 25544]]
to dovetail FRA's safety regulations with the FTA state safety
oversight program where that is appropriate and FTA jurisdiction is
applicable. The agencies would work together to ensure coordination of
decision making. Before general implementation, the policy statement
will be discussed with the affected communities of interest and may be
published (together with any needed regulatory amendments) for formal
comment in the Federal Register. At the same time this joint policy is
issued, FRA plans to issue a separate proposed statement of policy
that, among other things, will provide guidance on how light rail
operators may seek waivers of FRA's rules. In the interim, the policy
expressed in this preamble will guide FRA's actions with respect to
this rule (subject to an appropriate period of consultation and
adjustment with respect to the two time-separated shared use projects
currently in operation).
FRA does, however, recognize that lower speed rail operations that
do not operate over highway-rail grade crossings and that totally
preclude the sharing of trackage between light rail equipment and
conventional equipment provide an operating environment that does not
require the structural standards needed for commingled passenger and
freight operations. Accordingly, the final rule (in Sec. 238.201)
provides that passenger equipment, including locomotives, are not
subject to the structural requirements of the rule if they are used
exclusively on a rail line (A) with no public highway-rail grade
crossings, (B) on which no freight operations occur at any time, (C) on
which only passenger equipment of compatible design is utilized, and
(D) on which trains operate at speeds no higher than 79 mph. FRA will
discuss with the Working Group in Phase II of the rulemaking what
structural standards are appropriate for such operations.
B. Static End Sstrength Requirement: Application to Existing Equipment
In Sec. 238.203 of the 1997 NPRM, FRA generally proposed that on or
after January 1, 1998, all passenger equipment shall be required to
have a minimum static end strength (or ``buff'' or ``compressive''
strength) of 800,000 pounds. As some commenters recognized, FRA
intended the date of January 1, 1998, to represent the effective date
of the final rule. Yet, in light of the actual publication date of the
1997 NPRM, the date of January 1, 1998, appeared anachronistic, and FRA
should have modified the NPRM to make its intent more explicit. A
number of commenters nonetheless raised concerns with the application
of this section-whether the date were January 1, 1998, or later-since
FRA proposed to apply the static end strength requirement to existing
passenger equipment.
APTA recommended, in its comments on the rule, that FRA modify the
proposal so that the requirement apply on or after the effective date
of the final rule to passenger equipment placed in service for the
first time. APTA stated that the AEM-7 locomotive and the RTG model
turbo train could not meet the requirement as proposed. APTA estimated
that the purchase of replacement equipment could take up to four years
and would cost more than $500 million.
Amtrak commented that the proposed requirement to have buff loading
apply to the existing rail fleet is not justified based on the
industry's experience. Amtrak did agree that, in order to move the
industry forward on crash energy management, new equipment must be
built to a uniform strength standard. Amtrak stated that it currently
operates AEM-7 locomotives that do not meet the proposed requirement.
In addition, Amtrak was not sure it had available the appropriate
technical information on whether its fleet of Heritage equipment
conformed to the proposal. At the public hearing, though, Amtrak did
explain that it had no evidence that its fleet of passenger cars did
not comply with the proposal. (See transcript of public hearing, pages
173-174).
The Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation
(Metra), in its comments on the rule, recommended that the static end
strength provision apply only to new passenger equipment orders placed
on or after January 1, 1998. Metra explained that it was awaiting
delivery of cars under construction, that some of the cars may be built
after January 1, 1998, and that a change order would cause a series of
problems.
In commenting on the 1997 NPRM, Talgo expressed concern that FRA
proposed applying the static end strength requirement to existing
passenger equipment in service on or after January 1, 1998. Talgo
stated that this proposal would render unusable its two trainsets then
in service on lease to the WDOT. Additionally, Talgo explained that it
was well underway in manufacturing five new trainsets--two for the
WDOT, one for Amtrak, and two others for future sale in the U.S.
market--that would likewise be rendered unusable in their current form.
Talgo stated that neither it nor any other manufacturer of rail
equipment could have anticipated the proposed regulation's immediate
application of broad structural design changes. Citing discussions
within the Working Group and the comments of other parties, Talgo
asserted that other passenger equipment manufacturers and operators
likewise assumed that modifications in basic structural standards would
be applicable only to equipment purchased after January 1, 1999, or
placed in service after January 1, 2001, and that much existing
passenger equipment operating in the United States would be unable to
comply with the structural requirements scheduled for early
implementation. Talgo also stated that FRA did not properly identify
the economic impact of its proposal on Talgo equipment. Talgo requested
that FRA modify the rule so that the static end strength requirement
and other structural requirements apply only to passenger equipment
ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or placed in service for the first
time on or after January 1, 2001.
The WDOT commented that FRA's proposal appeared to be directly
targeted at the State of Washington and Amtrak's purchase of Talgo
trains under manufacture. WDOT stated that imposition of the proposal
in the middle of the construction process, without ``grandfathering,''
appeared to reveal an effort to make its Talgo equipment non-compliant.
WDOT recommended that the rule be modified so that the static end
strength provision only apply to passenger equipment ordered after
January 1, 1999. The NARP, in its comments on the proposed rule, shared
WDOT's opposition to imposing the static end strength requirement on
existing passenger equipment, and it recommended instead applying the
requirement under a time-table similar to that proposed generally for
structural requirements--i.e., ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or
placed in service for the first time on or after January 1, 2001. The
NARP believed that the proposal could cancel WDOT's rail passenger
program and thereby lead to countless, unnecessary highway deaths
involving people that otherwise would have been on a WDOT passenger
train.
In commenting on the 1997 NPRM, the State of Vermont Agency of
Transportation (VAOT) explained that it was in the process of
implementing new passenger rail service with used rail diesel cars
manufactured by Budd. The cars were originally built to meet the AAR
buff strength requirement, according to the VAOT, but it could not
assure that the vehicles meet the standards today. The VAOT requested
that the Budd cars be grandfathered because they were manufactured to
AAR standards, built prior to April 1,
[[Page 25545]]
1956, and have a proven service record. The VAOT believed it fair for
the rulemaking to grandfather these cars as being compliant at the time
ordered by VAOT. Similarly, the NYDOT recommended in its comments on
the proposed rule that the structural requirements apply only to new
equipment, citing its intent to operate rebuilt turboliner equipment in
the Empire Corridor through a cooperative effort with FRA and Amtrak.
Further, the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT)
expressed concern in its comments on the proposed rule that the
rulemaking would require its fleet of rebuilt passenger, food service
and specialty cars to undergo additional renovations and retrofitting
to comply with the rule. NCDOT commented that its trainsets were
designed to meet the passenger equipment safety standards in effect at
the time of their order, and that the proposed regulation has the
potential to thwart its rail passenger initiative.
In the final rule, FRA is retaining the 800,000-pound static end
strength requirement for most new and existing passenger equipment.
However, the final rule does provide that the static end strength
standard and other structural standards do not apply to equipment used
exclusively on a rail line (A) with no public highway-rail grade
crossings, (B) on which no freight operations occur at any time, (C) on
which only passenger equipment of compatible design is utilized, and
(D) on which trains operate at speeds no higher than 79 mph. See
Sec. 238.201. Furthermore, the final rule creates a presumption that
passenger equipment in service in the United States as of the effective
date of the final rule meets the 800,000-pound static end strength
requirement, unless the railroad operating the equipment knows, or FRA
can show, that the equipment was not built to this 800,000-pound
strength requirement. See Sec. 238.203(b). Under this formulation, for
example, Amtrak's fleet of Heritage passenger cars are presumed to
comply with the static end strength requirement on the basis of
Amtrak's testimony at the public hearing on the NPRM.
FRA has decided that it is in the best interest of safety to apply
the buff strength requirement to existing passenger equipment and
effectively regulate the use of passenger equipment not possessing at
least 800,000 pounds of buff strength as specified in this rule. As
noted, the operating environment in the United States requires railroad
passenger equipment to operate commingled with heavy and long freight
trains, often over track with frequent grade crossings used by heavy
highway equipment. FRA has serious concerns about the operation in such
an environment of passenger equipment not possessing a minimum buff
strength of 800,000 pounds. As a result, and in response to Talgo's and
WDOT's comments on this rule, FRA cannot avoid directly addressing the
current operation in the United States of the passenger trainsets
manufactured by Talgo unless FRA disregards its duty to provide for the
safety of rail passenger transportation. Since FRA has raised the issue
of compressive strength on passenger equipment with all affected
parties since well before the inception of this rulemaking, it would
strain credulity to assert that a requirement for 800,000 pounds of
compressive strength could truly be a matter of surprise in a
rulemaking on railroad passenger equipment safety.
Making the 800,000-pound compressive strength requirement
applicable to existing passenger equipment creates a bright line that
will help bring needed clarity to the growing number of situations
where light rail equipment is likely to be used on the general railroad
system of transportation. Operation on the general system of this
equipment, which is built to standards far lower than the 800,000-pound
standard specified in this rule, presents enormous safety risks to the
occupants of the equipment, absent imposition of strict conditions
designed to virtually eliminate the risk of a light rail/conventional
equipment collision. The need to address these risks as a condition of
operation will be made perfectly clear by imposition of the buff
strength requirement across the board. Light rail operators will have
to seek a waiver of the requirement and will have to plan their
operations in such a way as to maximize the likelihood of obtaining
such a waiver. (A petition for grandfathering approval of the equipment
could also be filed in certain cases, as discussed below.)
In regulating the use of passenger equipment not possessing a
minimum buff strength of 800,000 pounds as specified in this final
rule, the rule permits non-compliant passenger equipment to be
continued in service for a six-month period following publication of
the rule in order to permit the filing of a grandfathering petition
with FRA; if a petition is filed within this six-month period,
operation may continue for up to an additional six months while the
petition is being processed. Grandfathering approval of non-compliant
equipment is limited to usage of the equipment on a particular rail
line or lines. Before grandfathered equipment can be used on another
rail line, a railroad must first file and secure approval of a
grandfathering petition for such usage. See discussion under
Sec. 238.203 for the contents of the petition and the approval process.
FRA will approve a petition for ``grandfathering'' if it complies with
the requirements of Sec. 238.203 and the proposed usage of the
equipment is in the public interest and consistent with railroad
safety. Amtrak and WDOT may file petitions for grandfathering approval
of their Talgo-manufactured passenger equipment, in accordance with the
requirements of Sec. 238.203.
C. United States International Treaty Obligations
The United States is a party to the General Agreement on Tarriffs
and Trade (GATT). One of the GATT agreements is the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), originally concluded in 1979 and
approved by the United States Congress in the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39 (July 26, 1979). A new TBT Agreement was
reached as a result of the 1994 Uruguay Round of GATT multinational
trade negotiations, and subsequently approved by the United States
Congress in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465
(December 8, 1994). The TBT Agreement seeks to avoid creating
unnecessary obstacles to trade, while recognizing the right of
signatory countries to establish and maintain technical regulations for
the protection of human, animal, and plant life or health. The TBT
Agreement has been codified into law at 19 U.S.C. 2531 et seq.
In commenting on the NPRM, Talgo believed that a number of the
proposed structural standards were inconsistent with the TBT Agreement
in that domestic industry would be favored by adopting the de facto
standards of North American passenger equipment. Talgo stated that many
requirements in the proposed rule seem to have been developed
exclusively with domestically-manufactured equipment in mind,
``arbitrarily making compliance with the rules by other, non-U.S.
manufactured equipment--such as Talgo equipment--extremely difficult.''
Talgo also asserted that domestic industry would be favored under the
implementation schedule of the rule by noting FRA's statements in the
NPRM that several of the proposed structural requirements chosen for
early implementation reflect the current construction practice for
North American passenger equipment. Talgo contended that the
implementation
[[Page 25546]]
schedule disregards that, solely because imported equipment has been
designed differently, it cannot satisfy the requirements at once.
FRA believes that this final rule is consistent with the United
States' obligations under the TBT Agreement, and that Talgo's concerns
arise, in part, from a misunderstanding of FRA's use of the term
``North American passenger equipment.'' Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement, cited by Talgo in its comments, states:
Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations,
products imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin and to like products originating in any other
country.
A ``technical regulation'' refers to mandatory product standards, and
FRA agrees with Talgo that the structural standards in this rule fall
under this definition. See Annex 1 to the TBT Agreement, ``Terms and
Their Definitions for the Purpose of this Agreement, 1.'' However, the
impact of this rule on Talgo passenger equipment, specifically its
passenger cars, has nothing to do with the fact that the equipment
originates in a foreign country, Spain, as opposed to the United
States.
Through this rule, FRA is not favoring rail passenger cars that are
domestically manufactured over those of foreign origin since, as far as
FRA is aware, there is currently no domestic manufacturer of rail
passenger cars in the United States. (The General Electric Company and
the General Motors Corporation manufacture locomotives in the United
States--not rail passenger cars; and neither entity is being favored by
FRA in this rule over foreign manufacturers of locomotives.) Of course,
a significant portion of the nation's rail passenger car fleet--the
oldest portion--has been manufactured in the United States. Yet, over
the years, manufacturers from Japan, Canada, and other countries have
exported passenger cars to the United States for service on the
nation's railroads. Overall, these imported rail passenger cars have
possessed the same minimum structural strength as their domestic
forebearers; they have been constructed to standards that are common to
North American passenger equipment, i.e., passenger equipment operated
in North America. The five Talgo trainsets noted earlier have not been
so constructed. FRA's use of the term North American passenger
equipment (or United States passenger equipment, for that matter) was
not intended to refer to passenger equipment manufactured in North
America in distinction to passenger equipment manufactured elsewhere.
Talgo also commented that, to a significant extent, the proposed
requirements were design-based and phrased in a number of places in
variables dependent on design rather than performance. In this regard,
Talgo believed the proposed rule violates Article 2.8 of the TBT
Agreement, which states: ``Wherever appropriate, Members shall specify
technical regulations based on product requirements in terms of
performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics.'' Talgo
asserted that the rule can and should be stated in terms of variables
relating to the performance of the equipment rather than its design,
and that the rule should accommodate different engineering designs,
such as its articulated, lightweight trainsets.
The principal structural requirement of the final rule, which
existing Talgo-manufactured passenger cars do not meet, is in fact a
performance-based requirement. As further specified in Sec. 238.203,
the rule requires that new and existing passenger cars must possess a
minimum static end strength of 800,000 pounds. The rule does not
dictate how a passenger car must be constructed to meet this
requirement, as long as the car can resist the specified 800,000-pound
load. This formulation is consistent with the requirements of 19 U.S.C.
2532(3), which states:
Performance Criteria.--Each Federal agency shall, if
appropriate, develop standards based on performance criteria such as
those relating to the intended use of a product and the level of
performance that the product must achieve under defined conditions,
rather than on design criteria, such as those relating to physical
form of the product or the types of material of which the product is
made.
(Of course, the rule does require that the body structure of a
passenger car be designed, to the maximum extent possible, to fail by
buckling or crushing, or both, of structural members when overloaded in
compression rather than by fracture of structural members or failure of
structural connections. See Sec. 238.203(c). Yet, in any regard, FRA
believes it unsafe to design a passenger car to fail first by fracture
of structural members or failure of structural connections, as the
ability of the car structure to absorb collision energy is negated.)
FRA recognizes that the five Talgo trainsets were designed to
international standards that require lesser compressive strength. Talgo
has pointed out that these trainsets will be configured in the same
manner as two leased trainsets formerly operated in the State of
Washington. These trains are intended to be pulled by a conventional
locomotive and have unoccupied units at the front and rear of the
trainsets which are available to absorb initial crash energy. Talgo
contends that this configuration provides equivalent protection from
loss of occupied volume in a rear-end or head-on collision when
compared with conventional cars which would be occupied by passengers
or crew. FRA has provided a process for WDOT and others to secure
grandfathering approval regarding the compressive strength requirement
for passenger equipment placed in use prior to November 8, 1999, as
previously noted. However, as explained below, FRA is unable to relax
the minimum compressive strength requirement for passenger equipment
simply on the basis of train configuration, since to do so would
diminish the safety provided for the rail travelling public as a whole.
FRA believes the minimum static end strength requirement in the
final rule is not inconsistent with the TBT Agreement, in that it
fulfills FRA's objective of protecting human safety and only restricts
the use of equipment not meeting that objective because of the
performance of the equipment--not because of the origin of the
equipment. In this regard, 19 U.S.C. 2531(b) provides in part:
No standards-related activity of any * * * Federal agency * * *
shall be deemed to constitute an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign
commerce of the United States if the demonstrable purpose of the
standards-related activity is to achieve a legitimate domestic
purpose including * * * the protection of legitimate health or
safety * * * and if such activity does not operate to exclude
imported products which fully meet the objectives of such activity.
Having a passenger car possess a minimum compressive strength of
800,000 pounds, along with other features, has evolved as a result of a
long history of efforts by railroads and suppliers to learn the hard
lessons taught by a difficult operating environment in the United
States. Passenger train collisions and derailments may occur in a
variety of different scenarios and implicate structural features of
passenger equipment in similarly numerous ways. The rule cannot be
applied in a general way to both (1) except any consist of passenger
cars from the same compressive strength requirements applicable to all
other passenger cars solely because the passenger car consist is
buffered at each end by an unoccupied car and linked by articulated
connections, and (2) provide
[[Page 25547]]
for the safety of the occupants of passenger cars.
Further, over the past few years, FRA has funded the most extensive
and detailed research and analysis ever conducted by a public body in
the United States concerning passenger car safety. That effort has
included attention to international practice, particularly for high-
speed equipment. However, given existing data and analysis, FRA is
unable to specify an alternate performance standard for passenger car
compressive strength that would meet FRA's safety objectives and be
equally applicable to passenger cars of any design that might some day
be proffered for use in the United States. Nor, so far as FRA is aware,
has any government or international body achieved a similar feat.
Certainly doing so within the time available to issue standards under
the 1994 statutory mandate would not have been possible.
FRA notes that Talgo further commented that the early
implementation dates proposed for certain structural requirements are
inconsistent with Article 2.12 of the TBT Agreement in that a
sufficient amount of time would not be provided foreign producers to
modify their products' design or manufacturing processes to comply with
new or significantly revised regulatory requirements. Article 2.12
provides:
Except in those urgent circumstances referred to in [Article 2]
paragraph 10 [of the TBT Agreement], Members shall allow a
reasonable interval between the publication of technical regulations
and their entry into force in order to allow time for producers in
exporting Members * * * to adapt their products or methods of
production to the requirements of the importing Member.
In the final rule, the compressive strength requirement takes effect
sooner than any other principal structural requirement, and it applies
to both new and existing passenger cars and locomotives. If any
provision of the rule were found to be inconsistent with Article 2.12
of the TBT Agreement, then, it would most likely be the compressive
strength requirement. However, the United States Congress has expressly
authorized applying the requirements of the final rule to existing
passenger cars, provided only that the basis for doing so is explained
in the rulemaking document. See Section 215 of the Federal Railroad
Safety Authorization Act of 1994, above, as codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133
(``The Secretary may make applicable some or all of the standards
established under this subsection [, 49 U.S.C. 20133(a),] to cars
existing at the time the regulations are prescribed.''). FRA has made
the compressive strength requirement applicable to existing passenger
cars as explained in the preamble. However, through the submission of
appropriate data and analysis, and approval by FRA as further specified
in Sec. 238.203, discussed below, certain passenger cars not possessing
the minimum compressive strength of 800,000 pounds may operate on the
general railroad system of transportation, and the rule does afford a
reasonable time for that information to be gathered.
In providing the possibility that some equipment now being used
which does not meet the buff strength requirement of this rule might
continue to be used (``grandfathered''), FRA intends to permit only
very safe operations to occur. Petitioners will need to demonstrate--
through a quantitative risk assessment that incorporates design
information, engineering analysis of the equipment's static end
strength and of the likely performance of the equipment in derailment
and collision scenarios, and risk mitigation measures to avoid the
possibility of collisions or to limit the speed at which a collision
might occur, or both, that will be employed in connection with the
usage of the equipment on a specified rail line or lines--that use of
the equipment, as utilized in the service environment for which
recognition is sought, is in the public interest and is consistent with
railroad safety. In this regard, FRA notes that passenger equipment not
possessing the minimum static end strength specified in this rule does
not have the same capacity to absorb safely within its body structure
the compressive forces that develop in a collision as equipment meeting
the standard. The engineering analysis submitted by the petitioner
should address how these forces will be dissipated in a manner that
does not jeopardize occupant safety in collision scenarios.
D. Non-Conventional Passenger Equipment
As noted above, commenters have requested that FRA specify design-
neutral or performance-based requirements so that the safety of all
passenger equipment may be evaluated on the same basis. In comments in
this docket, Talgo has suggested substituted (and reduced) force levels
that it believes are appropriate for inclusion in the final rule in
lieu of those proposed for truck-to-carbody attachment and anti-
climbing arrangements, for instance. As explained, FRA has specified
the compressive strength requirement as fairly as we are able in
consideration of the safety of the rail travelling public. FRA has also
done so with respect to the other structural requirements in the rule.
FRA recognizes that the existing Talgo trainsets presents unique
challenges in terms of describing appropriate force levels in several
regards. FRA understands that the Talgo trainsets are articulated, low-
floor trainsets with independently rotating wheels. The car bodies are
made from light-weight aluminum extrusions. In contrast, the vast
majority of passenger carrying equipment used on the nations's
railroads is individually suspended, has automatic couplers, has a
higher floor height above the rail, has wheels fixed to an axle, and is
constructed with a steel underframe made up from fabricated members.
FRA has conducted, and continues to conduct, research which addresses
the influence of carbody construction, suspension configuration, and
coupling arrangement on the crashworthiness, derailment tendency, and
other safety-related aspects of Talgo and other non-conventional
equipment.
Developing safety regulations requires detailed technical knowledge
of the system being regulated. At the time this rule is being written,
FRA is unable to specify alternative performance-based standards with
respect to the structural requirements in this rule that would meet
FRA's safety objectives for passenger equipment of any design. Areas of
particular technical concern with regard to the Talgo trainsets, which
need to be resolved by FRA through an ongoing exchange of information,
include the nature of its articulated connection and its potential to
allow override in a collision, and the welding of the aluminum
extrusions which make up the body shell. The Talgo tilt trainsets have
characteristics that are unique, or nearly unique, that may either
reduce or increase vulnerability in a derailment or collision. For
instance, the articulated design of the trainset may tend to keep the
train in line in the case of a derailment where the decelerations are
reasonably uniform throughout the length of the train, preventing
secondary impacts. On the other hand, the absence of major structural
members in the floor of the passenger units could be a serious problem
should the train be involved in a collision with freight train cars or
lading that has fouled the track on which the passenger train is
travelling, as a result of the freight train having derailed. In this
regard, the absence of major structural members in the floor of the
Talgo passenger units increases their vulnerability to penetration by
the
[[Page 25548]]
trainset's trucks, should the trucks separate from the train.
Historically, the United States industry requirement for a minimum
compressive strength has reinforced a pattern of passenger car
construction resulting in use of stiff, quite substantial underframes
that have served other practical purposes in derailments and
collisions, including prevention of car body buckling, prevention of
harm to passengers from failure of the floor structure and entry of
debris, and resistance to penetration of the car from the side where
the primary impact was at the floor level. Both with respect to
compressive strength and other structural requirements that the Talgo
trainset may not be able to meet, it is important to ensure that
alternative means of achieving crashworthiness are just as successful
as the standards described in this final rule.
Creating alternative performance-based standards for a particular
type of passenger equipment requires a very early dialogue and
technical information exchange. In the summer of 1995, FRA convened the
first meeting of equipment manufacturers (including representatives of
Canadian, European and Japanese consortia) to discuss passenger safety
standards. That meeting led to designation of equipment manufacturer
representatives as associate members of the Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards Working Group. Although notified along with a number of other
manufacturers of passenger equipment, Talgo representatives did not
participate in the process. (For its part, the WDOT did not formally
indicate to FRA an interest in participating in the rulemaking until
after the Working Group had tentatively agreed on the structural
standard proposals--FRA received a letter from the WDOT commenting on
the ANPRM on September 4, 1996. However, AASHTO had participated from
the beginning of the rulemaking.) Talgo did not enter the discussions
directly until publication of the NPRM in September of 1997, and was
still in the process of providing engineering data through October of
1998. Given the timing of this latest submission of data to FRA,
approximately ten-months after the close of the public comment period
on the NPRM, FRA has not had the opportunity to fully evaluate the
information provided by Talgo for purposes of this rule.
FRA appreciates Talgo's recent undertakings to conform any future
trainsets (beyond the five trainsets noted earlier) built for North
American service to the 800,000-pound static end strength requirement
and any other applicable requirements in this rule. FRA will be pleased
to work with Talgo and members of the Working Group in Phase II of the
rulemaking to determine whether different performance-based regulations
are appropriate. In the interim, FRA has provided a special approval
process in Sec. 238.201 for considering whether the new generation of
Talgo equipment and any other passenger equipment of special
construction provide an equivalent level of safety with the Tier I
standards (other than the static end strength requirements) contained
in the final rule. See the discussion in the section-by-section
analysis of Sec. 238.201 for an explanation of the special approval
process.
E. System Safety
FRA believes that passenger railroads should carefully evaluate
their operations with a view toward enhancing the safety of those
operations. The importance of formal safety planning has been
recognized in Emergency Order No. 20 (61 FR 6880; Feb. 22, 1996) and
the rule on passenger train emergency preparedness (63 FR 24630; May 4,
1998). In furtherance of safety planning, the 1997 NPRM contained a set
of system safety requirements to be applied to all intercity passenger
and commuter rail equipment. See 62 FR 49760. FRA intended that each
individual passenger railroad be required to develop a system safety
plan and a system safety program tailored to its specific operation,
including train speed. FRA explained, however, that the Working Group
did not reach consensus on system safety requirements for Tier I
equipment; whereas the Tier II Subgroup did reach full consensus on
system safety program requirements for Tier II equipment. Strong
support did exist among Working Group members to apply formal system
safety planning to Tier I equipment, yet views differed as to whether
system safety planning should be required by law.
In particular, the 1997 NPRM noted that APTA objected to FRA
issuing any regulations governing system safety plans because commuter
railroads have voluntarily agreed to adopt such safety plans. 62 FR
49734. FRA also explained its understanding that APTA's system safety
approach will be more comprehensive than what FRA proposed and address
each commuter railroad's system more as an integrated whole, not
focused principally on rail equipment. See 62 FR 49734. FRA therefore
invited comment on APTA's suggestion that commuter railroads be allowed
to regulate themselves in this area; whether FRA should mandate the
contents of system safety plans; whether the areas FRA proposed to
require railroads to address were appropriate; whether additional areas
should be added; and to what extent FRA should propose to enforce
portions of the system safety plans. FRA further asked whether the rule
should require that system safety plans be comprehensive and address
the entire railroad system in which the equipment operates, as well as
whether the emergency preparedness planning requirements contained in
the passenger train emergency preparedness rulemaking be expressly
integrated with the system safety planning requirements contained in
this part. Id. at 49733-4.
In commenting on the rulemaking, APTA believed FRA's approach to
system safety short-sighted in that it would apply only to the
equipment component of the commuter railroad system and therefore
ignore track, signal system, other infrastructure, and operating
practices components. Further, APTA questioned FRA's general focus in
the system safety plan (on fire safety; software safety; inspection,
testing and maintenance; training; and new equipment) prior to having a
railroad identify its major safety risks through its individual system
level analysis. APTA stated that it supports a true system safety
approach that allows each railroad to determine its own major safety
risks and addresses all the components of the passenger rail system--
not just the equipment component.
As an alternative to Federal regulation, APTA proposed a system
safety program based on system safety plans--developed using MIL-STD-
882C as a guide--that would be submitted by its individual member
railroad properties and audited by APTA. APTA explained it would invite
FRA to observe the audits and the follow-up actions taken by the
commuter railroads in response to the audits. APTA requested that FRA
hold Federal requirements for commuter railroad system safety plans in
abeyance for a 3-year probationary period--corresponding to one
complete audit cycle--while FRA observes and evaluates the program.
Amtrak commented that it supports APTA's position on system safety
for both Tier I and Tier II equipment. Amtrak believed it appropriate
for FRA to start with a voluntary system safety approach and then,
based on actual experience, follow up with specific regulations in the
future. Amtrak believed FRA needs to allow the industry the time to
establish the
[[Page 25549]]
culture and process that allows system safety to function without
creating an unwarranted bureaucratic burden.
In its comments on the 1997 NPRM, Metra agreed with the value of a
system safety plan, but believed that such plans should not be
regulated. Metra recommended the rule contain only a top-level system
safety plan requirement for railroads to identify the most serious
safety risks within their specific operations, and then allow each
railroad to create its own programs to reduce those risks. Metra
explained that a railroad's system safety plan should project beyond
current practice to continuously improve that practice and that Federal
enforcement of such a plan would continually find violations because
current practice would not reflect the ideals set forth in the plan.
Metra believed that FRA regulation would make a system safety plan a
useless tool for improving safety, as the plan would be limited to
mimicking Federal regulation and describing current practice. In
addition, Metra noted that a system safety plan is distinct from a
document that describes current practice for routine and regulated
activities. Metra proposed that this document, a safety policy,
reference all current-practice safety-related procedures and require
railroads to adhere to them.
Bombardier commented that the 1997 NPRM does not provide the
latitude for each railroad to tailor or customize its system safety
plan to its individual operations and needs. Further, Bombardier
believed that the NPRM confuses the requirements for the railroad's
system safety plan with those required for equipment acquisition. If
FRA insists that the rule contain a requirement for a system safety
plan, according to Bombardier, it should be limited to requiring each
railroad to develop its own plan based on MIL-STD-882C or APTA's Manual
for the Development of a System Safety Plan for Commuter Railroads.
Separately, the rule should require a system safety plan specifically
addressing equipment procurement.
The BRC commented that FRA must mandate the contents of system
safety plans to ensure that vital topics are included in such plans.
Further, the BRC believed FRA must have the power to enforce compliance
with system safety plans. Otherwise, the BRC believed the plans
themselves would amount to little more than suggested operating
practices. The BRC also believed that FRA must review each railroad's
system safety plan and approve it only if it complies with Federal
regulations. Similarly, the UTU commented that the 1997 NPRM's
provisions on system safety plans is the most important section of the
rule. The UTU believed FRA should continue to treat it as such and not
allow it to be weakened.
The NTSB commented that it supports FRA mandating the contents of
system safety plans for minimal consistency and oversight, rather than
allowing the railroads to regulate themselves in this area, so that
important safety elements are consistently included in each safety
plan. The NTSB believed that the system safety plans should be
comprehensive and address the entire railroad system in which the
passenger equipment operates. The NTSB observed that if the industry
does not have a comprehensive system safety plan, it may not be able to
identify, track, monitor, or rectify situations that can lead to unsafe
conditions. Further, the NTSB remarked that system safety should be a
continuous, iterative process that has a built-in feedback mechanism
and should be used throughout the program's life cycle to arrive at the
best plan possible.
The NTSB noted that it has made safety recommendations urging FRA
to include specific safety requirements in a system safety plan. It
urged FRA to incorporate the following recommendations into FRA's
general requirements for system safety plans:
Require carriers to train employees in emergency procedures to
be used after an accident, to establish priorities for emergency
action, and to conduct accident simulation to test the effectiveness
of the program, inviting civic emergency personnel participation.
(R-76-29)
Develop and validate through simulated disaster exercises a
model emergency response plan for the guidance of the railroad
industry in formulating individual plans to be utilized by their
train crewmembers in the event of an emergency. (R-80-6)
In this regard, FRA did issue final regulations governing the
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains, in
the passenger train emergency preparedness rulemaking. See 63 FR 24630,
May 4, 1998. That rule specifically requires emergency preparedness
plans to address such subjects as communication, employee training and
qualification, joint operations, tunnel safety, liaison with emergency
responders, on-board emergency equipment, and passenger safety
information. The plan adopted by each affected railroad is also subject
to formal review and approval by FRA.
FRA believes the approach taken in the emergency preparedness
rulemaking in requiring railroads to adopt a safety plan addressing
specific topics is more appropriate than imposing a general requirement
for railroads to adopt a comprehensive system safety plan. FRA believes
this is consistent with the view of the commenters to mandate the
contents of safety program plans for minimal consistency and oversight,
so that important safety elements are included in each safety plan. At
the same time, focusing the safety planning requirements and
streamlining the rule will facilitate the regulated community's
understanding of the rule's requirements and thereby aid in its
compliance. As further specified, the final rule will require that each
railroad adopt safety program plans addressing:
Fire safety;
Employee training and qualifications;
Equipment inspection, testing, and maintenance;
Pre-revenue service acceptance testing of equipment; and
Train hardware and software safety.
In addition, more particular safety planning requirements are imposed
on Tier II passenger equipment, as discussed below, reflecting both the
greater risks to safety from operating the equipment at such high
speeds and the importance of advanced planning in order to meet new
safety challenges.
As FRA recognized in the 1997 NPRM, FRA's proposed approach to
system safety focused principally on rail passenger equipment. This was
not a pure system safety approach, inasmuch as FRA did not focus on
safety planning for others elements of the railroad infrastructure such
as the track and signal system, or for a host of items including
platform safety, security and trespasser prevention.
FRA will closely monitor Tier I railroad operations in their
development and adherence to voluntary, comprehensive system safety
plans. FRA has already established a liaison relationship with APTA and
has already begun participating in system safety plan audits on
commuter railroads. FRA is using this involvement to enrich FRA's
Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP) efforts on these
railroads--which, unlike the triennial audit process for system safety
plans, is a continuous activity with frequent on-property involvement
by FRA safety professionals. FRA will reconsider its decision not to
impose a general requirement for system safety plans on Tier I railroad
operations if the need to do so arises. FRA expects that
[[Page 25550]]
Tier I railroad operations will be able to integrate the specific
safety planning requirements contained in this final rule into their
own system safety plans, in the same way the railroads will incorporate
into their plans the emergency planning requirements contained in 49
CFR part 239.
FRA is retaining more extensive safety planning requirements for
Tier II railroad operations. These requirements are directed at
ensuring the safety of the equipment in its operating environment and
that the introduction of novel technology is thoroughly analyzed prior
to procurement of the equipment. Tier II railroad operations will be
operations with new characteristics that require special attention and
have heightened safety risks due to the speed of the equipment. In
particular, each railroad must a have safety program plan for the
operation of its Tier II passenger equipment prior to placing the
equipment into revenue service. In addition, each railroad must have a
safety program plan for each procurement of Tier II passenger equipment
or major upgrade or introduction of new technology in Tier II passenger
equipment. The railroad must also receive FRA approval of a pre-revenue
service acceptance testing plan, as well as FRA approval prior to
placing such new or modified equipment into revenue service.
In general, however, the final rule does not require that FRA
approve a railroad's safety plans required under the rule. As noted,
FRA believes it best to focus its resources on Tier II passenger
equipment operations due to their special circumstances. Further, FRA
approval may not be necessary when, by operation of the rule, each
railroad must independently comply with specific safety planning
requirements or face sanction from FRA. Under 49 CFR Sec. 238.11 of the
final rule, any person who violates any requirement of this part or
causes the violation of any such requirement is subject to a civil
penalty.
F. Side Exit Doors on Passenger Cars
In the 1997 NPRM, FRA generally proposed that new passenger cars
have a minimum of four exterior side doors--or the functional
equivalent of four such doors--each door permitting at least one 95th-
percentile male to pass through at a single time. See 62 FR 49807
(Sec. 238.237), and 62 FR 49820 (Sec. 238.441). Exterior side doors are
the primary means of egress from a passenger train, yet there is no
Federal requirement that a passenger car be equipped with such doors.
FRA does recognize that in an emergency passengers would generally be
able to move through a passenger car's end doors to seek refuge in
adjacent cars. In fact, it is safer for passengers to remain on a train
unless doing so in itself risks their safety, because of hazards along
the railroad right-of-way such as electrified rails and other trains.
However, the tragic September 22, 1993 Amtrak train derailment near
Mobile, Alabama, and the February 16, 1996 collision involving MARC and
Amtrak passenger trains near Silver Spring, Maryland, show that in a
life-threatening situation passengers have no alternative but to exit
the train. All of the 42 passenger fatalities in the Mobile, Alabama
train derailment resulted from asphyxia due to drowning (NTSB Railroad-
Marine Accident Report 94/01), and the deaths of at least eight of the
eleven persons killed in the Silver Spring, Maryland train collision
resulted from the fire that ensued (NTSB Railroad Accident Report (RAR)
97/02). FRA is not suggesting that the cars involved in those accidents
lacked a sufficient number of emergency exits; nevertheless, these are
examples of instances where passengers have died because they could not
leave the train. (However, the NTSB did note in its investigation
report of the Silver Spring, Maryland train collision that ``[e]xcept
for those passengers who died of blunt trauma injuries, others may have
survived the accident, albeit with thermal injuries, had proper and
immediate egress from the car been available.'' Id. at page 63. The
NTSB explained in its explicit findings on the collision that ``the
emergency egress of passengers was impeded because the passenger cars
lacked readily accessible and identifiable quick-release mechanisms for
the exterior doors, removable windows or kick panels in the side doors,
and adequate emergency instruction signage.'' Id. at 73.)
So that each passenger car has sufficient doorway openings to allow
passengers and crewmembers to exit quickly in a life-threatening
situation, FRA proposed requiring that passenger cars be equipped with
side doors. Exiting a passenger train through a functioning emergency
window exit is slower than exiting a train through a functioning door,
and presents a risk of non-fatal injury. FRA made clear in the 1997
NPRM that the proposed side door requirement was not a recommendation
of the Working Group, although FRA believed such a requirement
necessary at least as an interim measure. See 62 FR 49770. FRA also
recognized that existing designs of passenger cars do not always
provide for four side doors, and, in fact, the proposed requirement did
not specifically require that passenger cars have four side doors. For
instance, the requirement would have been met if a passenger car had
two double-wide doors that permit two 95th-percentile males to pass
through each such door at the same time--the functional equivalent of
four side doors having openings of the same size in the aggregate. FRA
invited comments concerning the extent to which existing designs of
passenger cars could not comply with the proposed requirement, noting
that modifications to the proposal may be necessary based on the
information supplied. Further, as a long-term approach, FRA explained
that it is investigating an emergency evacuation performance
requirement similar to that used in commercial aviation where a
sufficient number of emergency exits must be provided to evacuate the
maximum passenger load in a specified time for various types of
emergency situations.
In its comments on the 1997 NPRM, APTA stated that the proposed
requirement would eliminate certain types of cars as well as certain
desirable car design safety features. Specifically, Amtrak would not be
able to procure Viewliner cars and NJT would not be able to increase
the number of Comet IV cab cars with extra structural protection for
train operators, according to APTA. APTA recommended that the rule text
be modified to include passenger car end doors in the calculation of
the required number of door exits. APTA believed this would encourage
structural changes that involve the elimination of a side door to
provide additional protection to train operators and allow Amtrak to
continue its Viewliner cars in service.
Amtrak, in commenting on the proposal, expressed particular concern
that the proposed requirement would prevent the future construction of
its Bi-Level Superliner equipment in a configuration that maximizes the
equipment's economic performance. Amtrak noted that its current policy
calls for equipping every window in such equipment with at least one
emergency pane, and that the proposed requirement would not take that
into consideration. Amtrak supported APTA's recommended modification to
the rule text.
The NARP also questioned the proposed side exterior door
requirement for passenger cars. The NARP noted that the most common way
to exit a car in an emergency is through the car's end doors, and it
suggested that emergency window exits are probably more reliable than
additional doors, believing the
[[Page 25551]]
doors are more likely to be rendered inoperable. The NARP stated that
research should focus on the relationship between a car's seating
capacity and layout and its emergency-exit capacity. The NARP opposed
requiring four doors on a 44-foot Talgo car, and saw little benefit
from adding additional doors to a Superliner dining car without a
costly stairwell installation. The NARP asserted that a requirement for
four side doors may be economically fatal for a single-level dining
car, and advised instead that one side door may be provided in the
hallway opposite the kitchen and a second side door placed in the
kitchen.
In commenting on the proposal, WDOT believed it not appropriate to
require four side doors on a 44-foot Talgo passenger car, which is
approximately half the length of conventional passenger cars. WDOT
stated that a Talgo passenger car has two exterior doors for a maximum
of 36 people in each car, while an Amtrak Horizon coach has four
exterior doors and seats 72 passengers. WDOT maintained that the rule
should reflect these differences or provide clear, concise performance-
based standards in the alternative. In this regard, WDOT found the term
``functional equivalent'' as used in the rule to be vague and in need
of better definition. Further, WDOT commented that, traditionally,
dining and bistro cars have not had exterior side doors; and requiring
such doors in these cars would significantly decrease the amount of
available dining space, decrease revenue-generating space, and add
substantial costs. WDOT recommended FRA remove dining and bistro cars
from any exterior side door requirement as it would decrease the amount
of available dining space and thereby reduce passenger convenience,
comfort and satisfaction. Talgo similarly commented that the proposed
requirement should be modified to state that the functional equivalent
of four side doors in a car of conventional length is two side doors in
a car of half the length, and that dining and bistro cars be exempted
from any requirement.
In response to the proposal in the NPRM, Bombardier recommended
that the wording of the rule be changed to require that each passenger
car have a minimum of two side doors. Bombardier noted that on Amtrak's
high-speed trainsets (HST), the passenger cars that will be positioned
next to the power cars are equipped with only two exterior side doors,
both of which are located on the end nearest to the power car. In the
event of an evacuation, Bombardier explained that passengers could exit
through those side doors as well as through the door at the opposite
end of the car. Bombardier believed the use of such end doors should be
considered in determining the time needed to evacuate a passenger car,
and it noted in this regard that intercity passenger cars generally
carry fewer passengers than commuter cars.
Based on the comments received, FRA has decided to modify the
requirement for exterior side doors on Tier I passenger cars ordered on
or after September 8, 2000 or placed in service for the first time on
or after September 9, 2002, and for any Tier II passenger car placed in
service. The final rule requires that each such passenger car have a
minimum of two exterior side doors, and each door must have a minimum
clear opening of 30 inches horizontally by 74 inches vertically. Since
the minimum number of required side doors has been reduced from that
proposed in the NPRM, this provision should not hinder railroads from
removing the locomotive engineer's exterior side door in cab car and MU
locomotive control compartments for purposes of adding to the
structural integrity of the equipment. As the BLE raised in its
comments on the rule, removing this side door allows for a continuous
side sill structure along the control compartment, thereby enhancing
the compartment's structural integrity and reducing the risk the
compartment will be crushed in a corner or side impact. A dining car or
other food service car is subject to the side door requirement as a
passenger car under this rule, since FRA believes that all passenger
cars must have exterior side doorway openings to allow for passenger
and crew escape in a life-threatening situation, and also permit
emergency rescue access.
Unlike the proposed rule, FRA has specified the dimensions of the
doorway opening in inches rather than retain the language referencing a
95th-percentile adult male. This modification clarifies the rule for
the regulated community in that what constituted a 95th-percentile
adult male was originally not defined. FRA believes that a doorway with
a minimum clear opening of 30 inches horizontally by 74 inches
vertically will provide passage for a large, fully-clothed person and
accommodate emergency response personnel equipped with fire and rescue
gear. For instance, see the discussion below of Sec. 238.113 (Emergency
window exits) for detail on the sizes of adult backboards used by
emergency responders to evacuate injured persons. FRA has specified the
vertical dimension of 74 inches based on the height of the 95th-
percentile adult male (72.8 inches) stated in Table 2 of Public Health
Service Publication No. 1000, Series 11, No. 8, ``Weight, Height, and
Selected Body Dimensions of Adults,'' June 1965. (A copy of this
document has been placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.) The
stated height of 72.8 inches was recorded for adult males not wearing
shoes, and FRA has adjusted for this. FRA did not find this Public
Health Service Publication that useful for purposes of specifying a
horizontal dimension of the doorway as the stated body dimensions were,
in effect, recorded without clothing (see page 5)--and of course did
not address the size of equipment carried by emergency response
personnel. FRA notes that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Accessibility Specifications for Transportation Vehicles also contain
requirements for doorway width clearance (See 49 CFR part 38). These
ADA requirements apply by their own force independent of the
requirements of this rule.
Further, unlike the proposed rule, the final rule no longer
provides that a passenger car may have the functional equivalent of the
specified number of side doors. Each passenger car must have at least
two separate, exterior side doorway openings. This will increase the
likelihood that at least one of a passenger car's side doorway openings
will allow passage in the event a train collision or derailment results
in either, or both, structural damage to--or blockage of--the door. In
this regard, railroads should consider where the passenger car side
doors are located so as to facilitate passenger and crew escape in a
life-threatening situation.
FRA reemphasizes that this requirement is only an interim measure
that will prevent passenger cars from being introduced into service
without side exterior doors. In Phase II of the rulemaking, FRA will
focus on formulating a systems approach to emergency egress that
provides for a sufficient number of emergency exits to evacuate the
maximum passenger car load in a specified time for various types of
emergency situations. FRA will evaluate with the Working Group whether
APTA's recommended approach to emergency egress under development in
APTA's PRESS Task Force should be incorporated into the Phase II
rulemaking.
G. Fuel Tank Standards
Locomotive diesel fuel tanks are vulnerable to damage from
collisions, derailments, and debris on the roadbed due to their
location on the underframe and between the trucks of locomotives.
Damage to the tank frequently results in spilled fuel, creating the
safety problem
[[Page 25552]]
of an increased risk of fire and the environmental problem of cleanup
and restoration of the spill site. Although 49 CFR 229.71 does require
a minimum clearance of 2.5 inches between the top of the rail and the
lowest point on a part or appliance of a locomotive, such as a fuel
tank, FRA regulations do not address the safety of fuel tanks in
particular.
In 1992, the NTSB issued a report identifying concerns regarding
safety problems caused by diesel fuel spills from ruptured or punctured
locomotive fuel tanks. Entitled ``Locomotive Fuel Tank Integrity Safety
Study,'' the NTSB report cited in particular a collision involving an
Amtrak train and an MBTA commuter train on December 12, 1990, as both
trains were entering a station in Boston, Massachusetts. (NTSB Safety
Study-92/04.) Fuel spilled from a tank which had separated from an
Amtrak locomotive during the collision. The fuel ignited. Smoke and
fumes from the burning diesel fuel filled the tunnel, increasing the
hazard level in the post-crash phase of the accident, and hindering
emergency response activity. As a result of the safety study, the NTSB
made several safety recommendations to FRA, including in particular
that FRA:
Conduct, in conjunction with the Association of American
Railroads, General Electric, and the Electro-Motive Division of
General Motors, research to determine if the locomotive fuel tank
can be improved to withstand forces encountered in the more severe
locomotive derailment accidents or if fuel containment can be
improved to reduce the rate of fuel leakage and fuel ignition.
Consideration should be given to crash or simulated testing and
evaluation of recent and proposed design modifications to the
locomotive fuel tank, including increasing the structural strength
of end and side wall plates, raising the tank higher above the rail,
and using internal tank bladders and foam inserts. (Class II,
Priority Action) (R-92-10)
Establish, if warranted, minimum performance standards for
locomotive fuel tanks based on the research called for in
recommendation R-92-10. (Class III, Longer Term Action) (R-92-11)
The NTSB reiterated Safety Recommendation R-92-10 in a letter to FRA
dated August 28, 1997, conveying the NTSB's final safety
recommendations arising from the February 16, 1996, collision between a
MARC commuter train and an Amtrak passenger train. During the
collision, the fuel tank on the lead Amtrak locomotive ruptured
catastrophically. The fuel sprayed into the exposed interior of the
MARC cab control car and ignited, engulfing the car. (Letter at 12.)
As explained in FRA's report to Congress on locomotive
crashworthiness and working conditions, FRA believes that fuel tank
design has a direct impact on safety. Minimum performance standards for
locomotive fuel tanks should be included in Federal safety regulations.
Accordingly, FRA proposed in the 1997 NPRM that AAR Recommended
Practice No. 506 (RP-506), Performance Requirements for Diesel-Electric
Locomotive Fuel Tanks, be incorporated into the rule as the external
fuel tank requirements for Tier I passenger locomotives. FRA believes
that RP-506 represents a good, interim safety standard for Tier I
passenger locomotives. In the final rule, FRA has restated the
requirements of RP-506 as Appendix D to part 238, as explained below,
and has thereby incorporated it into the final rule.
FRA does note that further study may yield additional safety
improvements for locomotive fuel tank design, and in September of 1997
FRA convened a Locomotive Crashworthiness Working Group of the Railroad
Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) to develop standards regarding a broad
range of crashworthiness issues for both passenger and freight
locomotives, including fuel tanks. Freight locomotive fuel tanks can
cause a risk to passengers in the event of a train-to-train collision
involving a passenger and a freight train. Therefore, in addition to
the economy that can be achieved from standard fuel tank design
requirements for the entire industry, industry-wide design requirements
benefit both public and employee safety. Based on currently available
information through the Locomotive Crashworthiness Working Group, it
appears that locomotives built with AAR RP-506-compliant fuel tanks are
performing well in derailments and highway-rail crossing collisions.
In its comments on the proposed rule, the NTSB agreed that external
fuel tanks on Tier I locomotives should incorporate at a minimum, and
on an interim basis, RP-506. Yet, the NTSB believed that more demanding
safety standards for passenger locomotives be included in the permanent
Tier I fuel tank regulations, specifically: higher ground clearance,
compartmentalization, and a bottom skid plate. The NTSB noted that the
advantages of higher fuel tank ground clearance were shown in Amtrak
derailments in Kingman, Arizona, and Garden City, Georgia. According to
the NTSB, investigation of both accidents revealed that essentially no
fuel loss occurred in the involved locomotive units (GE Models P40 and
P42), despite a substantial accumulation of debris beneath the fuel
tanks that may have otherwise damaged current, conventional frame-
suspended fuel tanks. The NTSB attributed the maintenance of fuel tank
integrity to higher than typical fuel tank ground clearance, not found
in conventionally designed, frame-suspended fuel tanks. Accordingly,
the NTSB specifically recommended that fuel tank regulations should
require higher ground clearance for both Tier I and Tier II operations.
In light of the strong potential safety benefits associated with higher
locomotive fuel tank ground clearance, FRA will carefully consider with
the Working Group how best to implement the NTSB's recommendation in
Phase II of this rulemaking.
In addition, FRA invited comments whether the proposed rule should
require that locomotive fuel tanks be compartmentalized. The Working
Group specifically discussed requiring whether the interior of fuel
tanks be divided into a minimum of four separate compartments so that a
penetration in the exterior skin of any one compartment results in loss
of fuel only from that compartment. The Working Group recommended that
such a requirement be addressed in the second phase of the rulemaking,
to allow for additional research to remedy fuel feeding disruptions
that may result from the compartmentalization of fuel tanks. Commenters
were therefore requested to provide the results of specific research
and operating experience showing how compartmentalization can be
practically accomplished. Commenters were also asked to explain why the
issue of compartmentalization should or should not be addressed in the
final rule of this first phase of the rulemaking.
The NTSB commented that it supported continued research for fuel
tank compartmentalization to remedy fuel loss during derailments. It
stated that compartmentalization is required in aviation applications,
where fuel tanks within the airframe contour must be able to resist
rupture and retain fuel under inertial forces prescribed for emergency
landing conditions (citing 14 CFR 25.963). Therefore, research should
be conducted to determine if similar successes can be attained in
railroad application, according to the NTSB. The BLE also commented
that it supports requirements for compartmentalized fuel tanks on all
passenger locomotives. Noting that diesel fires create devastating
results in passenger train accidents, the BLE believed every effort
should be made to avoid them, including using the most advanced
technology possible. Further, APTA commented that it believes fuel tank
compartmentalization has the potential to reduce the amount of fuel
[[Page 25553]]
spilled in a railroad accident; recommended that FRA consider requiring
compartmentalized fuel tanks on new locomotives if the technical
difficulties resulting in interruptions in fuel flow are resolved; and
suggested that FRA make a priority to resolve these technical
difficulties. In accordance with these comments, FRA will carefully
consider with the Working Group in Phase II of the rulemaking a
requirement to compartmentalize fuel tanks on new locomotives, drawing
upon research conducted and experience gained in the interim through
the Locomotive Crashworthiness Working Group and the APTA PRESS Task
Force.
H. Train Interior Safety
Based on previous research results, the interior passenger
protection requirements for Tier I and II passenger equipment rely on
``compartmentalization'' as a passenger protection strategy. Such a
strategy has the advantages of being passive, i.e., requiring no action
to be taken on the part of the occupants, of being effective for a
range of occupant sizes, and potentially being effective in a wide
range of interior configurations. Research results indicate that during
a collision the interior environment of a passenger coach car is
substantially less hostile than the interiors of automobiles and
aircraft. Owing to this lower hostility in a collision environment, the
interior of a typical passenger coach car can provide a level of
protection to passengers without active restraints at least as
effective in preventing fatality as that protection afforded to
automobile and transport aircraft passengers with active restraints.
See the discussion on train interior safety in the NPRM for more
detail. 62 FR 49745-49749.
Conclusions from the research previously conducted on passenger
protection in train collisions show that lap belts and shoulder
restraints, if used, provide the highest level of occupant protection
of those protection strategies studied--greater than the level of
protection afforded by compartmentalization. However, as noted in the
NPRM, FRA believes that more research is necessary to determine the
feasibility and effectiveness of these active restraints, as well as
the impact on seat design and strength necessary to support the loads
associated with use of the restraints. In this regard, FRA requested
information and comment from interested parties whether there is any
existing research or experience which would justify active seat
restraints in this phase of the rulemaking. See 62 FR 49745.
In comments on the NPRM, Simula Technologies, Inc., (Simula) stated
that there may be a potential for a higher level of occupant protection
offered by passive or active restraints than by compartmentalization.
Simula noted that cost effectiveness considerations differ when
considering the application of occupant protection strategies to a
train crew as compared to passengers. For instance, it believed that
the relatively high expense of passive restraints may be justified for
one or two crewmembers in a particularly severe environment--for
instance, a locomotive cab. Simula agreed with FRA that more research
is needed to determine the most cost effective means of providing
occupant safety improvements.
APTA, in its comments on the NPRM, believed that FRA has taken the
correct approach in not mandating active seat restraints in this stage
of the rulemaking. APTA found accurate the description of the physics
of passenger motion during a collision which was contained in the
preamble of the NPRM. APTA noted that active seat restraints provide
the most benefit in high passenger deceleration situations, such as in
automobile collisions; whereas, in the case of the low decelerations of
passenger train collisions, other types of protection measures such as
compartmentalization to minimize the distance a passenger travels
before striking an interior surface and padding of interior surfaces
can be as effective as active seat restraints in protecting passengers
from secondary collisions.
In its comments on the NPRM, the BRC stated that, ideally,
passenger equipment should have seat belts or other restraints to keep
occupants from striking seats from behind or striking other interior
surfaces and occupants. The BRC believed this to be a true cause of
serious injury and death during rapid decelerations in collisions and
derailments. The BRC further commented that a seat must be strong
enough to hold an occupant utilizing such restraints and yet resist the
force(s) of other unrestrained occupants striking the seat. In
addition, a member of the public commented that Amtrak should provide
its passengers with lap belts and shoulder harnesses, noting that they
can reduce injuries to all occupants when used.
FRA has continued to pursue research into implementing seat belts
and shoulder restraints in intercity and commuter passenger equipment.
The purpose of this research is to develop the information required by
FRA to determine if occupant restraints should be required in future
regulations. This research is being conducted in three steps:
preliminary design studies; design development; and engineering
modeling, construction, and testing. The first step of the research has
been completed. Principal conclusions from the research to date are
that an existing inter-city passenger coach seat can be modified to
accept lap and shoulder belts. In particular, for Amtrak's traditional
seat design, appropriate modification of the connections between the
seat and floor, and between the seat pan and seat back, allow it to
support the loads associated with two restrained 95th-percentile adult
males occupying the seats as well as the loads associated with being
struck from behind by two 95th-percentile adult males. Such seats can
be designed to compartmentalize safely an unrestrained single 5th-
percentile adult female striking the seat from behind.
Existing three-position commuter seat designs cannot be modified to
accept lap and shoulder belts. The additional loads associated with the
third restrained and the third unrestrained occupant cause multiple
structural failures for existing three-position commuter seat designs--
these designs simply fold up under the load. In order to meet weight
requirements, advanced structural materials and fabrication techniques
are likely to be required to develop a three-position commuter seat
design which can support the loads associated with three restrained
95th-percentile adult males in the seats and the loads associated with
being struck from behind the seats by three 95th-percentile adult
males.
For the intercity passenger coach seat, FRA currently plans to
complete work on the details of the necessary modifications to Amtrak's
traditional seat design, modify accordingly four to six pairs of seats
for testing, and then dynamically sled test these seats. For the
commuter seat, a study is planned to develop an engineering model
design of a three-position commuter car passenger seat which
incorporates lap and shoulder belts. Composite structures and advanced
manufacturing techniques will be considered in this study. Principal
design considerations include the need to address secondary collision
loads, as well as manufacturing and maintenance costs, weight, and
durability.
In the second phase of the rulemaking, FRA and the Working Group
will reevaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of requiring active
restraints such as lap belts and shoulder harnesses in passenger
equipment, based on the results of the ongoing research.
[[Page 25554]]
I. Fire Safety
In 1984, FRA published guidelines recommending test methods and
performance criteria for the flammability, smoke emission, and fire
endurance characteristics for categories and functions of materials to
be used in the construction of new or rebuilt rail passenger equipment.
See 49 FR 33076, Aug. 20, 1984; 49 FR 44582, Nov. 7, 1984. The
guidelines were originally developed by the Volpe Center for the Urban
Mass Transit Administration (UMTA now FTA) of DOT in the late 1970s,
and were intended for application to rail transit vehicles. See 47 FR
53559, Nov. 26, 1982; 49 FR 32482, Aug. 14, 1984. FRA recommended
applying the guidelines to intercity and commuter rail cars, due to the
similarity of use for many of the materials in these cars.
The intent of the guidelines is to prevent fire ignition and to
maximize the time available for passenger evacuation if fire does
occur. FRA later reissued the guidelines in 1989 to update the
recommended test methods. See 54 FR 1837, Jan. 17, 1989. Test methods
cited in the FRA guidelines include those of the American Society for
Testing and Materials (ASTM) and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). In particular, the ASTM and FAA testing methods provide a useful
screening device to identify materials that are especially hazardous.
FRA sought comments in the ANPRM on the need for more thorough
guidelines or Federal regulations concerning fire safety. See 61 FR
30696. FRA noted that fire resistance, detection, and suppression
technologies have all advanced since the guidelines were first
published. In addition, FRA explained that a trend toward a systems
approach to fire safety is evident in most countries with modern rail
systems. In response, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
commented that perhaps more thorough guidelines are needed, or at least
should be evaluated. Fire Cause Analysis also responded that, at a
minimum, more in depth guidelines based on current system safety
procedures and available fire safety engineering techniques are needed.
The commenter noted in particular that Federal maintenance standards
related to fire safety are necessary to ensure that materials carefully
qualified for use in rail passenger vehicles because of their fire
safety characteristics are not replaced with either substandard
materials or materials whose origin and fire performance cannot be
determined.
The 1997 NPRM addressed fire safety by proposing to make FRA's fire
safety guidelines mandatory for the construction of new passenger
equipment as well as the refurbishing of existing equipment. See 62 FR
49803. As explained below in the discussion of this final rule, FRA has
simplified and revised the table of tests and performance criteria for
the flammability and smoke emission characteristics of materials used
in passenger cars and locomotive cabs. In addition, FRA has clarified
in the final rule the application of the required tests and performance
criteria. As proposed in the NPRM, the final rule also furthers fire
safety through a fire protection plan and program to be carried out by
each operating railroad, which will include conducting a fire safety
analysis of existing passenger equipment and taking appropriate action
to reduce the risk of personal injuries.
As noted in the NPRM, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) of the United States Department of Commerce is
conducting research under the direction of FRA and the Volpe Center
involving the fire safety of rail passenger vehicles. The NIST project
is investigating the use of alternative fire testing methods and
computer hazard analysis models to identify and evaluate approaches to
passenger train fire safety. The evaluation is examining the effects
and tradeoffs of passenger car and system design (including materials),
fire detection and suppression systems, and passenger egress time. A
peer review committee has been established to provide project guidance
and review interim results and reports. The committee includes
representatives from FRA, the Volpe Center, the NFPA, builders of rail
passenger vehicles, producers of materials, Amtrak and commuter
railroads, and testing laboratories.
In the first phase of the NIST project, selected materials which
satisfy the testing methods referenced in FRA's fire safety guidelines
were evaluated using the ASTM E1354 Cone Calorimeter.\1\ The Cone
Calorimeter provides a measurement of heat release rate (the amount of
energy that a material produces while burning), specimen mass loss,
smoke production, and combustion gases. For a given confined space such
as a rail car interior, the air temperature and risk of harm to
passengers are increased as the heat release rate increases. As a
result, even if passengers do not come in direct contact with a fire,
they may likely be injured from the high temperatures, high heat
fluxes, and large amounts of toxic gases emitted by materials involved
in the fire. The results of the Phase I tests showed a strong
correlation between the FRA-cited test data and the Cone Calorimeter
test data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Fire Safety of Passenger Trains: Phase I Material
Evaluation (Cone Calorimeter).'' (DOT/FRA/ORD/-98/01-DOT-VNTSC-FRA-
98-2, January, 1999). A copy of the report has also been placed in
the public docket of this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase I test data were used in the second phase of the NIST project
to perform a fire hazard analysis of selected passenger train fire
scenarios. Also included in this analysis were data obtained from tests
of larger interior components, including seat assemblies, using the
ASTM E 1537 Furniture Calorimeter. The analysis employed computer
modeling to assess the impact on passenger train fire safety for a
range of construction materials and system design. The interim report
documenting Phase II is in final preparation by NIST. In the final
phase of the project, selected real-scale proof tests using an Amfleet
coach rail car and interior assemblies will be performed to verify the
small-scale (bench-scale) criteria and hazard analysis studies in
actual end use configurations.
Overall, the NIST research effort follows upon FRA-sponsored
studies by the National Bureau of Standards in 1984 and NIST in 1993
which noted, among their findings, that the performance of individual
components of a rail passenger car in a real-world fire environment may
be different from that experienced in bench-scale tests due to vehicle
geometry and materials interaction.\2\ The results of the NIST research
project will help in developing a broad set of performance criteria for
materials using the Cone Calorimeter and the Furniture Calorimeter in a
context similar to that provided generally in the table of FRA fire
safety requirements contained in Appendix B to part 238. In addition,
unlike data derived from most test methods referenced in Appendix B,
heat release rate and other measurements obtained from the Cone
Calorimeter and the Furniture Calorimeter can be used in a fire
modeling methodology to evaluate the contribution of materials to the
overall fire safety of a passenger train. Although FRA has targeted for
consideration in the second phase of the
[[Page 25555]]
rulemaking a broad set of performance criteria employing the Cone
Calorimeter and Furniture Calorimeter for materials used in passenger
cars and locomotive cabs, FRA has introduced use of the Cone
Calorimeter and Furniture Calorimeter in a limited manner in this final
rule as explained below in the discussion of Appendix B to part 238.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Fire Tests of Amtrak Passenger Rail Vehicle Interiors.''
(NBS Technical Note 1193, May 1984); ``Fire Safety of Passenger
Trains: A Review of U.S. and Foreign Approaches.'' (DOT/FRA/ORD-93/
23--DOT-VNTSC-FRA-93-26, December, 1993). The 1993 report is
available to the public through the National Technical Information
Service, Springfield, VA 22161. A copy of both reports have been
placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRA notes that the ASTM has developed a standard which describes
how to evaluate fire hazard assessment techniques (ASTM E 1546, Guide
for the Development of Fire Hazard Assessment Standards). An ASTM
group, the E-5.17 Subcommittee on Transportation, is currently
completing a document entitled ``Standard Guide for Fire Hazard
Assessment of Rail Passenger Vehicles.'' The proposed guide is intended
to provide an alternative approach to ensuring an equivalent level of
fire safety using a performance-based approach which examines fire
scenarios, as well as design considerations, to evaluate the potential
fire hazard of a rail transportation vehicle. One of the principal
issues related to the proposed guide is that calculation methods are
suggested which use models that have not been validated for application
to rail cars. In this regard, the results of the NIST fire safety
research will be helpful for the ASTM subcommittee, as NIST is using
the Hazard I computer model to develop correlations between small-scale
tests of materials and full-scale tests of rail cars.
In the NPRM, FRA explained that the NFPA publishes a standard (NFPA
130) covering fire protection requirements for fixed guideway transit
systems and for life safety from fire in transit stations, trainways,
vehicles, and outdoor maintenance and storage areas. See 62 FR 49744-5.
(A copy of the 1997 edition of this standard has been placed in the
public docket for this rulemaking.) However, this standard has not
historically been applied to passenger railroad systems, including
those that provide commuter service (NFPA 130 1-1.2). FRA noted that an
APTA representative on the Working Group who is a member of the NFPA
initiated an NFPA-sponsored task force to revise the scope of NFPA 130
to cover all rail passenger transportation systems, including intercity
and commuter rail, and revise other provisions as necessary. The NFPA
task force met several times in 1997 and 1998, and submitted
recommended revisions to the NFPA 130 Committee in August, 1998.
Although the NFPA 130 Committee accepted the task force recommendations
in principle, the standard revision approval process will not be
complete until late 1999.
In its comments on the NPRM, the NFPA urged FRA to adopt NFPA 130
upon completion of its revision. The NFPA cited the National Technology
Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-113, and one of its
provisions which requires, in general, that Federal agencies ``use
technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary
consensus standards bodies'' (Section 12, paragraph (d)(1)). In the
second phase of this rulemaking, FRA will consider with the Working
Group the incorporation of NFPA 130, as revised, into this rule.
In response to the NPRM, FRA received a number of other comments on
the provisions of the rule related to fire safety. Those comments on
the proposed fire protection plan and program are noted in particular,
below, in the discussion of 49 C.F.R. Sec. 238.103 in the final rule.
In regard to the proposed table of tests and performance criteria for
the flammability and smoke emission characteristics of materials used
in passenger cars and locomotive cabs contained in Appendix B to part
238, Fire Cause Analysis commented on the advisability of making such
tests and performance criteria mandatory without considerable and
detailed enabling language. Fire Cause Analysis noted in particular
that the table of tests and performance criteria in Appendix B
contained confusing and overlapping component and function categories
for materials; that application of the tests and performance criteria
to ``small parts'' requires special consideration to provide
flexibility for car builders; and that the fire performance of
electrical wiring and cable was not expressly addressed in the NPRM,
although addressed by NFPA 130.
A member of the public commented that he considered FRA's fire
safety guidelines good in some but not all respects. The commenter
stated in particular that the current acceptance levels of smoke
emission are inadequate to protect passengers from toxic levels of
smoke; and that permitting glazing and lighting lenses to have a flame
spread index of 100 with flaming running and flaming dripping is not
justified based on the location of these objects, ease of ignition, and
Btu content of polycarbonate. Nonetheless, the commenter recommended
adoption of the guidelines into law, noting that some vendors, car
builders, and agencies operating rail equipment have not taken the
guidelines seriously. Otherwise, the commenter believed that the fire
safety guidelines will be discounted.
APTA, in its comments on the NPRM, supported the proposed materials
selection criteria for new equipment (as well as the proposed fire
safety program for new equipment discussed below). APTA also
recommended that FRA consider updating the fire safety standards based
on the work of the NFPA 130 task force and the research being conducted
by the NIST. The BRC, in its comments on the NPRM, stated that interior
materials in passenger equipment must be required to meet strict
standards for flammability and smoke emission. The BRC believed that
compliance with the current guidelines alone is insufficient for
safety, and that additional technology, preventative measures, and fire
safety standards must be considered.
In the final rule, FRA has not significantly changed the table of
test methods and performance criteria for the flammability and smoke
emission characteristics of materials used in passenger cars and
locomotive cabs, as contained in Appendix B to part 238. FRA has sought
to maintain the current high levels of safety provided by the fire
safety guidelines, while developing a more workable framework for their
use as a regulation. In fact, as part of the NIST fire safety research,
specific input on the 1989 FRA fire safety guidelines was solicited
from rail system operators, car builders, and consultants at a workshop
held at the NIST Building and Fire Research Lab (BFRL) in July, 1997.
(The minutes of that workshop are contained in Follow-Up Workshop
Notes.\3\ ) This input was used to help simplify and revise the table
of tests and performance criteria contained in Appendix B. In summary,
the specific changes FRA has made to the table in the final rule
include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Follow-Up Notes: NIST/CFR FRA Project, Meeting/Workshop of
7/23/97.'' September 15, 1997. Prepared by J. Zicherman. A copy of
this document has been placed in the public docket for this
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reorganizing table component and function categories;
Adding a dynamic testing requirement for cushions;
Adding a new test method for evaluating seat assemblies;
Providing a test exception and test alternative for small
component parts;
Adding express requirements for wire and cable testing;
Updating test methods for elastomers;
Providing an alternative test method for smoke generation;
Adding express requirements for structural assemblies
other than floors; and
Renumbering and adding notes to the table to reflect the
changes.
[[Page 25556]]
The discussion of Appendix B to part 238, below, provides a detailed
explanation of the changes made to the table of test methods and
performance criteria for the flammability and smoke emission
characteristics of materials used in passenger cars and locomotive
cabs.
VI. Inspection and Testing of Brake Systems and Mechanical
Components
A. Background Prior to 1997 NPRM
In 1992, Congress amended the Federal rail safety laws by adding
certain statutory mandates related to power brake safety. These
amendments specifically address the revision of the power brake
regulations and state in pertinent part:
(r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.--(1) The Secretary shall conduct a
review of the Department of Transportation's rules with respect to
railroad power brakes, and not later than December 31, 1993, shall
revise such rules based on such safety data as may be presented
during that review.
* * * * *
Pub. L. No. 102-365, Sec. 7; codified at 49 U.S.C. 20141, superseding
45 U.S.C. 431(r).
In response to the statutory mandate, various recommendations to
improve power brake safety, and due to its own determination that the
power brake regulations were in need of revision, FRA published an
ANPRM on December 31, 1992, concerning railroad power brake safety. See
57 FR 62546. The ANPRM provided background information and presented
questions on various subjects related to intercity passenger and
commuter train operations, including: training of testing and
inspection personnel; electronic braking systems; cleaning, oiling,
testing, and stenciling (COT&S) requirements; performance of brake
inspections; and high speed passenger train brakes. Following
publication of the ANPRM, FRA conducted a series of public workshops.
The ANPRM and the public workshops were intended as fact-finding tools
to elicit views of those persons outside FRA charged with ensuring
compliance with the power brake regulations on a day-to-day basis.
Furthermore, on July 26, 1993, the NTSB made the following
recommendation to FRA: ``Amend the power brake regulations, 49 Code of
Federal Regulations 232.12, to provide appropriate guidelines for
inspecting brake equipment on modern passenger cars.'' (R-93-16). The
recommendation arose out of the NTSB's investigation of the December
17, 1991, derailment of an Amtrak passenger train in Palatka, Florida.
The derailed equipment struck two homes and blocked a street north of
the Palatka station. The derailment resulted in eleven passengers
sustaining serious injuries and 41 others receiving minor injuries. In
addition, five members of the operating crew and four onboard service
personnel received minor injuries. By letter dated September 16, 1993,
FRA told the NTSB that it was in the process of reviewing and rewriting
the power brake regulations and would consider the NTSB's
recommendation during the process.
Based on comments and information received, FRA published a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking in 1994 (1994 NPRM) regarding revision of the
power brake regulations. The 1994 NPRM contained specific requirements
related to intercity passenger and commuter train operations,
including: general design requirements; movement of defective
equipment; employee qualifications; inspection and testing of brake
systems and mechanical components; single car testing requirements and
periodic maintenance; operating requirements; and requirements for the
introduction of new train brake system technology. See 59 FR 47676,
47722-53, September, 16, 1994. Following publication of the 1994 NPRM,
FRA held a series of public hearings in 1994 to allow interested
parties the opportunity to comment on specific issues addressed in the
1994 NPRM. Due to the strong objections raised by a large number of
commenters, FRA announced by notice published on January 17, 1995, that
it would defer action on the 1994 NPRM and permit the submission of
additional comments prior to making a determination as to how it would
proceed in this matter. See 60 FR 3375.
After review of all the comments submitted, FRA determined that in
order to limit the number of issues to be examined and developed in any
one proceeding it would proceed with the revision of the power brake
regulations via three separate processes. In light of the testimony and
comments received on the 1994 NPRM, emphasizing the differences between
passenger and freight operations and the brake and mechanical equipment
utilized by the two, FRA decided to separate passenger equipment power
brake and mechanical standards from freight equipment power brake
standards.
As passenger equipment power brake and mechanical standards are a
logical subset of passenger equipment safety standards (see 49 U.S.C.
20133(c)), FRA requested the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
Working Group to assist FRA in developing appropriate power brake and
mechanical standards for passenger equipment. The 1997 NPRM, upon which
this final rule is based, was developed by FRA in consultation with
this Working Group.
In addition, FRA determined that a second NPRM covering freight
equipment power brake standards would be developed with the assistance
of FRA's RSAC. See 61 FR 29164, June 7, 1996. Furthermore, in the
interest of public safety and due to statutory as well as internal
commitments, FRA determined that it would separate the issues related
to two-way end-of-train-telemetry devices from both the passenger and
freight issues. FRA convened a public regulatory conference and
published a final rule on two-way end-of-train devices on January 2,
1997. See 62 FR 278.
Beginning in December of 1995, the Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards Working Group adopted the additional task of attempting to
develop power brake and mechanical inspection and maintenance standards
applicable to intercity passenger and commuter train operations and
equipment. The Working Group met on four separate occasions, for a
total of ten days of meetings, with a good portion of these meetings
being devoted to discussion of power brake and mechanical inspection
and maintenance issues. From the outset, a majority of the members, as
well as FRA, believed that any requirements developed by the group
regarding the inspection and testing of the brake and mechanical
equipment should not vary significantly from the current requirements
and should be consistent with current industry practice.
FRA's accident/incident data related to intercity passenger and
commuter train operations support the assumption that the current
practices of these operations in the area of power brake inspection,
testing, and maintenance are for the most part sufficient to ensure the
safety of the public. Between January 1, 1990 and October 31, 1996,
there were only five brake related accidents involving commuter and
intercity passenger railroad equipment. No casualties resulted from any
of these accidents and the total damage to railroad equipment totaled
approximately $650,000, or $96,000 annually. In addition, between
January 1, 1995 and October 31, 1996, FRA inspected approximately
13,000 commuter and intercity passenger rail units for compliance with
49 CFR part 232. The defect ratio for these units during this period
was approximately 0.8 percent. Furthermore, during this same period FRA
inspected approximately 6,300 locomotives for
[[Page 25557]]
compliance with 49 CFR part 229. The brake defect ratio for these units
was approximately 4.65 percent. Consequently, the defect ratio for
brake related defects on locomotives and other passenger equipment
during this period was approximately 2.08 percent.
The existing regulations covering the inspection and testing of the
braking systems on passenger trains are contained in 49 CFR part 232.
The current regulations do provide some requirements relevant to
passenger train operations, including: initial terminal inspection and
testing, intermediate inspections, running tests, and general
maintenance requirements. See 49 CFR 232.12, 232.13(a), 232.16, and
232.17. However, most of the existing regulations are written to
address freight train operations and do not sufficiently address the
unique operating environment of commuter and intercity passenger train
operations or the equipment currently being used in those operations.
Therefore, it has been necessary for FRA to provide interpretations of
some of the current regulations in order to address these unique
concerns.
Currently, all non-MU (multiple unit) commuter trains that do not
remain connected to a source of compressed air overnight and all MU
commuter trains equipped with RT-5 or similar brake systems must
receive an initial terminal inspection of the brake system pursuant to
Sec. 232.12(c)-(j) prior to the train's first departure on any given
calendar day. All non-MU commuter trains that remain connected to a
source of compressed air over-night are permitted to receive an initial
terminal inspection of the brake system sometime during each 24-hour
period in which they are used. Furthermore, all intercity passenger
trains must receive an initial terminal inspection of the brake system
at the point where they are originally made up and must receive an
intermediate inspection in accordance with Sec. 232.12(b) every 1,000
miles.
There are currently no regulations which specifically require the
inspection of the mechanical components on passenger equipment.
Although the current regulations do not contain any mechanical
inspection requirement of passenger equipment, virtually every
passenger railroad currently performs some type of daily mechanical
inspection on its passenger equipment with highly qualified personnel.
For several years Amtrak has been conducting voluntary mechanical
safety inspections of passenger train components.
As noted previously, most of the members of the Working Group
believed that any requirements developed by the group regarding the
inspection, testing, and maintenance of the brake and mechanical
equipment should not vary significantly from the current requirements
and should be consistent with current industry practice. However, the
Working Group was unable to reach consensus on any power brake or
mechanical equipment standards, despite the positing of multiple
alternatives, use of a facilitator, and the foundation provided by the
1994 NPRM. The Working Group identified and discussed options with
which the agency and labor can agree, and others with which FRA and the
railroads can agree. However, bridging the gap between those various
options proved elusive. Consequently, as the Working Group could not
reach any type of consensus on the inspection and testing requirements,
it was determined that FRA would address these issues unilaterally,
based on the information and discussions provided by the Working Group
and the information gathered from the 1994 NPRM.
B. 1997 NPRM on Passenger Safety Equipment Standards
During the Working Group discussions, labor representatives,
particularly the BRC, insisted that a comprehensive power brake
inspection must be performed prior to a train's first run on a given
calendar day. The BRC also believed that it is necessary for the first
inspection of the day to determine whether the brake shoes and the disc
pads actually apply as intended. The BRC further contended that in
order to perform a comprehensive inspection equivalent to an initial
terminal inspection the train must be walked or otherwise inspected on
a car-to-car basis and that these principal inspections should be
performed only by carmen or other qualified mechanical personnel as
they are the only employees sufficiently trained to perform the
inspections. Rail labor representatives also advocated a daily
inspection of all safety-related mechanical components with pass/fail
criteria or limits written into the Federal safety standards much like
the requirements contained in 49 CFR part 215 addressing freight
equipment.
Representatives of intercity passenger and commuter railroads
expressed the desire to have the flexibility to conduct comprehensive
in-depth inspections of the brake and mechanical system sometime during
the day in which the equipment is utilized. These parties argued that
safety would be better served by allowing the railroads the flexibility
to conduct these inspections on a daily basis as it would allow the
railroads to conduct the inspections at locations that are more
conducive to permitting a full inspection of the equipment than many of
the outlying locations where trains are stationed overnight and where
the ability to observe all the equipment may be hampered. It was
further contended that, if the railroads are allowed some flexibility
in conducting these type of inspections, then the equipment can be
moved to a location where a fully qualified mechanical inspector can
perform detailed inspections under optimum conditions.
Several parties also pointed out that, with proper maintenance,
``tread brake units'' and other friction brake components, commonly
used in commuter train operations, are highly reliable and that the
non-functioning of any individual unit would in no way compromise the
overall safety of the train. Furthermore, permitting the inspection of
brake components in the middle of the day, rather than at the beginning
of the day, involves no greater safety risk to passengers because
friction brake systems and their components degrade in performance
based largely on use, and nothing short of a continuous brake
inspection can guarantee 100-percent performance at all times. Railroad
representatives suggested an inspection scheme that would permit an in-
depth, comprehensive brake inspection to be performed sometime during
the day in which the equipment is used with a brake inspection being
performed prior to the first run of the day verifying the continuity of
the trainline by performing a set and release on the rear car of the
train.
APTA and other passenger railroad representatives strongly
maintained that specific inspection criteria or limits related to the
mechanical components of passenger equipment were not necessary. During
the ongoing meetings of the Working Group, FRA repeatedly requested
that railroad representatives provide a recommended list of mechanical
components and criteria for their inspection. These representatives
consistently responded with very broad requirements basically limited
to inspections for obvious and visible defects. Although passenger
railroad representatives did not object to the safety principle of a
mechanical inspection, they did not want their operations to be bound
by a rigid list of components and criteria for the inspection.
Based on consideration of all of the information outlined above,
FRA published an NPRM on Passenger Equipment Safety Standards on
September 23, 1997. See 62 FR 49728.
[[Page 25558]]
This NPRM contained specific proposals related to the inspection,
testing, and maintenance of both the brake and mechanical components on
passenger equipment. The proposal attempted to balance the concerns of
rail labor representatives and representatives of intercity and
commuter railroads.
1. Proposed Brake System Inspections
In the 1997 NPRM, FRA proposed to abandon the terminology related
to the power brake inspection and testing requirements contained in the
current regulations, and proposed to identify various classes of
inspections based on the duties and type of inspection required. See 62
FR 49737, 49774-77, 49810-11. FRA believed that this type of
classification system would avoid confusion with the power brake
inspection and testing requirements applicable to freight operations
and would avoid the connotations historically attached to the current
terminology. FRA also believed that this approach was better suited for
providing operational flexibility to commuter operations while
maintaining the safety provided by the current inspection and testing
requirements. Although FRA proposed a change in the terminology used to
describe the various power brake inspections and tests, the
requirements of the inspections and tests closely tracked the current
requirements with some modifications made to address the unique
operating environment of, and equipment operated in, commuter and
intercity passenger train service. Members of the Working Group
appeared receptive to this kind of classification system and discussed
various options using some of this terminology. Consequently, FRA
proposed four different types of brake inspections, ``Class I,''
``Class IA,'' ``Class II,'' and ``running brake test,'' that were to be
performed by commuter and intercity passenger railroads some time
during the operation of their equipment.
In the proposal, FRA also divided passenger train operations into
two distinct types for purposes of brake inspections and testing. FRA
recognized that there were major differences in the operations of
commuter or short-distance intercity passenger trains, and long-
distance intercity passenger trains. Commuter and short-distance
intercity passenger trains tend to operate for fairly short distances
between passenger stations and generally operate in relatively short
turn-around service between two terminals several times in any given
day. In contrast, long-distance intercity passenger trains tend to
operate for long distances, with trips between the beginning terminal
and ending terminal taking a day or more and traversing multiple states
with relatively long distances between passenger stations.
Consequently, FRA proposed the terms ``commuter train,'' ``short-
distance intercity passenger train,'' and ``long-distance intercity
passenger train'' in order to identify the inspection and testing
requirements associated with each. See 62 FR 49737-38, 49774-76, 49810-
11. For the most part, commuter and short-distance intercity passenger
trains were treated similarly, whereas long-distance intercity
passenger trains had slightly different proposed inspection and testing
requirements. In addition, FRA proposed slightly different requirements
with regard to the movement of defective equipment in long-distance
intercity passenger trains (see the discussion below on the ``Movement
of Equipment with Defective Brakes'').
The proposed Class I brake test basically required an inspection
similar to an initial terminal inspection as currently described at
Sec. 232.12(c)-(j), but was somewhat more extensive and specifically
aimed at the types of equipment being used in commuter and intercity
passenger train service. See 62 FR 49738-39, 49774-76, 49810. The
proposed Class I brake test would require an inspection of the
application and release of the friction brakes on each side of each car
as well as an inspection of the brake shoes, pads, discs, rigging,
angle cocks, piston travel, and brake indicators if the equipment is so
equipped. The Class I brake test would also require testing of the
communication signal system and the emergency braking control devices.
In recognition of the advanced technology and various designs used in
many of these operations, which make observation of the piston travel
virtually impossible, FRA proposed to permit the inspection of the
piston travel to be conducted either through direct observation of the
clearance between the brake shoe and the wheel or by observation of a
brake actuator. Furthermore, FRA proposed to require a brake pipe
leakage test only when leakage will affect service performance.
As FRA proposed that Class I brake tests be comprehensive
inspections of the braking system, FRA believed that commuter and
short-distance intercity passenger train operations should be permitted
some flexibility in conducting these inspections. Consequently, FRA
proposed that commuter and short-distance intercity passenger train
operations perform a Class I brake test sometime during the calendar
day in which the equipment is used. FRA believed that the flexibility
permitted by the proposed requirement would allow railroads to move
equipment to locations that are most conducive to the inspection of the
brake equipment and would allow railroads to combine the daily
mechanical inspections with the brake inspection for added efficiency.
In the NPRM, FRA recognized the differences between commuter or
short-distance intercity operations and long-distance intercity
passenger train operations. FRA noted that long-distance intercity
passenger trains do not operate in shorter turn around service over the
same sections of track on a daily basis for the purpose of transporting
passengers from major centers of employment. Instead, these trains tend
to operate for extended periods of time, over long distances with
greater distances between passenger stations and terminals. Further,
these trains may operate well over 1,000 miles in any 24 hour period.
Thus, FRA believed that the opportunity for conducting inspections on
these trains was somewhat diminished. Therefore, FRA determined that a
thorough inspection of the braking system on these types of operations
must be conducted prior to the train's departure from an initial
starting terminal. Consequently, FRA proposed that a Class I brake
inspection be performed on long-distance intercity passenger trains
prior to departure from an initial terminal. See 62 FR 49810. FRA did
not believe there would be any significant burden placed on these
operations as the current regulations require that an initial terminal
inspection be performed at these locations.
FRA also recognized that these long-distance intercity passenger
trains could conceivably travel significant distances if Class I
inspections were required only once every 24 hours the equipment is in
service as proposed for commuter and short-distance intercity passenger
trains. Thus, FRA believed that some outside mileage limit had to be
placed on these trains between brake inspections. Under the current
regulations a passenger train is permitted to travel no farther than
1,000 miles from its initial terminal, at which point it must receive
an intermediate inspection of brakes that includes an application of
the brakes and the inspection of the brake rigging to ensure it is
properly secured. See 49 CFR 232.12(b). However, in recognition of the
improved technology used in passenger train brake systems combined with
the comprehensive nature of the proposed Class I brake tests and
mechanical safety inspections being
[[Page 25559]]
performed by highly qualified inspectors, FRA proposed to permit long-
distance passenger trains to travel up to 1,500 miles between Class I
brake tests. Under FRA's proposal a comprehensive Class I brake test
would be performed once every calendar day that the equipment is used
or every 1,500 miles, which ever occurred first. See 62 FR 49739,
49775, 49810.
FRA also proposed that the brake inspection and testing intervals
proposed for long-distance passenger trains apply to all Tier II
equipment (i.e., equipment operating at speeds greater than 125 mph but
not exceeding 150 mph), regardless of whether it is used in short-or
long-distance intercity trains. As FRA's proposal permitted operators
of Tier II equipment to develop inspection and testing criteria and
procedures, these operations would be required to develop a brake test
that is equivalent to a Class I brake test for Tier II equipment. Due
to the speeds at which this equipment will be allowed to operate, FRA
believed it was a necessity that an equivalent Class I brake test be
performed on Tier II equipment before it departs from its initial
terminal. Similarly, FRA proposed that the equivalent Class I brake
test be performed every calendar day in which Tier II equipment is used
or every 1,500 miles, whichever comes first. See 62 FR 49739, 49784,
49821.
The proposed Class IA brake test was somewhat less comprehensive
than the proposed Class I brake test but included a detailed inspection
of the brake system to verify the continuity of the brake system and
the proper functioning of the brake valves on each car. A Class IA
brake test would be similar to the intermediate brake inspection
currently required for freight trains prescribed at Sec. 232.13(d)(1).
The proposed Class IA brake test would generally require a walking
inspection of the set and release of the brakes on each car; however,
the proposal allowed brake indicators to be used to verify the set and
release if the railroad determined that operating conditions pose a
safety hazard to an inspector walking along the train. The Class IA
brake test also required a leakage test if leakage affects service
performance, as well as an inspection of: angle cocks; piston travel,
if determinable; brake indicators; emergency brake control devices; and
communication of brake pipe pressure changes at the rear of train to
the controlling locomotive. See 62 FR 49738-39, 49776-77, 49810.
FRA proposed that a Class IA brake test would be performed prior to
a commuter or short-distance intercity passenger train's first
departure on any given day. FRA believed that the proposed Class IA
brake was sufficiently detailed to ensure the proper functioning of the
brake system yet not so intensive that it would require individuals to
perform an inspection for which they are not qualified. Although FRA
tended to agree with the position advanced by many labor
representatives that some sort of car-to-car inspection must be made of
the brake equipment prior to the first run of the day, FRA did not
agree that it is necessary to perform a full Class I brake test in
order to ensure the proper functioning of the brake equipment in all
situations. However, contrary to the position espoused by APTA, FRA
believed that something more than just a determination that the brakes
on the rear car set and release is necessary.
In addition to the proposed Class I and Class IA brake tests, FRA
also proposed a Class II brake test. The proposed Class II brake test
would be an inspection intended to verify the continuity of the train
brake system and would be similar to the intermediate terminal
inspection currently prescribed at Sec. 232.13(a). A Class II brake
test basically required a set and release of the brakes on the rear
car. The proposed Class II test would be required in those
circumstances where minor changes to a train consist occur, such as the
change of a control stand, the removal of cars from the consist, the
addition of previously tested cars, and the situations in which an
operator first takes control of the train. See 62 FR 49739, 49777,
49811.
FRA also proposed that a running brake test be conducted as soon as
conditions safely permit it to be conducted after a train receives a
Class I, Class IA, or Class II brake test. FRA believed that this test
should be conducted in accordance with each railroad's operating rules.
The proposed ``running brake test'' requirement was similar to the
``running test'' requirements currently contained at Sec. 232.16. See
62 FR 49740, 49777, 49811.
2. Proposed Mechanical Inspections
In the 1997 NPRM, FRA proposed three types of mechanical
inspections, these included: a calendar day exterior and interior
inspection, and a periodic inspection. See 62 FR 49771-73, 49807-09.
The proposed exterior calendar day mechanical inspection for passenger
cars and unpowered vehicles used in passenger trains was patterned
after a combination of the current calendar day inspection required for
locomotives under the Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards and the pre-
departure inspection for freight cars under the Railroad Freight Car
Safety Standards. See 49 CFR 229.21 and 215.13, respectively. FRA
proposed that the calendar day mechanical inspection apply to all
passenger cars and all unpowered vehicles used in passenger trains
(which includes, e.g., not only coaches, MU locomotives, and cab cars
but also any other rail rolling equipment used in a passenger train),
and that all exterior mechanical inspections be performed by highly
qualified personnel. A mechanical safety inspection of freight cars has
been a longstanding Federal safety requirement, and FRA believed that
the lack of a similar requirement for passenger equipment created a
serious void in the current Federal railroad safety standards.
Rail labor representatives advocated a daily inspection of all
safety-related mechanical components with pass/fail criteria or limits
written into the Federal safety standards much like the requirements
contained in 49 CFR part 215, whereas APTA and other passenger railroad
representatives on the other hand strongly maintained that specific
inspection criteria or limits are not necessary. During the meetings of
the Working Group, FRA repeatedly requested that railroad
representatives provide a recommended list of mechanical components and
criteria for their inspection. These representatives consistently
responded with very broad requirements basically limited to inspections
for obvious and visible defects. Although passenger railroad
representatives did not object to the safety principle of a mechanical
inspection, they did not want their operations to be bound by a rigid
list of components and criteria for the inspection.
FRA agreed with labor representatives that a specific list of
components to be inspected with enforceable inspection or pass/fail
criteria needed to be included as part of the proposed Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards. In the 1997 NPRM, FRA identified the
components that were to be inspected as part of the exterior calendar
day mechanical safety inspection and provided measurable inspection
criteria for the components. The proposal required the railroad to
ascertain that each passenger car, and each unpowered vehicle used in a
passenger train conforms with the conditions enumerated in the
proposal. The Working Group members generally agreed that the
components contained in the proposal represented valid safety-related
components that should be frequently inspected by railroads.
[[Page 25560]]
However, members of the Working Group had widely different opinions
regarding the criteria to be used to inspect the components. Therefore,
as FRA was not provided any clear guidance from the Working Group, FRA
selected inspection criteria based on the locomotive calendar day
inspection and the freight car safety pre-departure inspection required
by 49 CFR parts 229 and 215, respectively. FRA believed that passenger
equipment should receive an inspection which is at least equivalent to
that received by locomotives and freight cars. The components and
conditions identified by FRA to be included in the exterior calendar
day mechanical inspection included: couplers; suspension system;
trucks; side bearings; wheels; jumpers; cable connections; buffer
plates; products of combustion; batteries; diaphragms; and secondary
brake systems. See 62 FR 49807-08.
FRA also proposed that each railroad perform an interior calendar
day mechanical inspection by individuals qualified by the railroad to
do so. FRA originally contemplated requiring the interior inspections
to be performed by highly qualified personnel to track the exterior
calendar day mechanical inspection requirements. However, after several
discussions with members of the Working Group and several other
representatives of passenger railroads, FRA determined that the
training and experience typical of a mechanical inspector is not
necessary and often does not apply to inspecting interior safety
components of passenger equipment. In addition, the most economical way
to accomplish the mechanical inspection is to combine the exterior
inspection with the Class I brake test and then have a crew member or
train coach cleaner combine the interior mechanical inspection with
coach cleaning. FRA listed the following components that were to be
inspected as part of the interior calendar day mechanical inspection:
trap doors; end and side doors; manual door releases; safety covers,
doors and plates; vestibule step lighting; and safety-related signs and
instructions. See 62 FR 49808.
Because FRA intended the daily exterior and interior mechanical
inspections to serve as the time when the railroad repairs defects that
occurred en route, FRA further proposed that safety components not in
compliance with this part would be required to be repaired before the
equipment was permitted to remain in or return to passenger service
after the performance of the mechanical inspections. In other words,
FRA intended for the flexibility to operate defective equipment in
passenger service to end at the calendar day mechanical inspection.
Initially, FRA considered requiring a more extensive list of
components to be checked at each interior calendar day mechanical
inspection. However, based on discussions conducted with the Working
Group, FRA determined that the daily inspection and repair of some
interior items could be burdensome to the railroads without producing
an offsetting safety benefit. As a result, FRA proposed a periodic
mechanical inspection for passenger cars in order to reduce the
frequency with which certain components require inspection. FRA
proposed that the following components be inspected for proper
operation and repaired, if necessary, as part of the periodic
maintenance of the equipment: emergency lights; emergency exit windows;
seats and seat attachments; overhead luggage racks and attachments;
floor and stair surfaces; and hand-operated electrical switches. See 62
FR 49808-09.
FRA determined that virtually all passenger railroads have defined
periodic maintenance intervals for all of the equipment they operate
with intervals varying from 60 to 180 days, depending on the type of
equipment and the service in which it is used. Although FRA did not
intend to limit the railroad's flexibility to set periodic maintenance
intervals, FRA believed that an outside limit had to be placed on the
performance of the periodic mechanical inspection. Thus, FRA proposed
that the periodic mechanical inspection be performed at least every 180
days, as that appeared to be the outside limit of currently established
maintenance cycles.
In addition to the daily and periodic mechanical inspections, FRA
also proposed extensive requirements regarding the performance of
single car tests on passenger equipment. FRA believed that the proposed
single car test has proven itself effective in uncovering brake system
problems that are the root cause of certain wheel defects or that have
been caused by repairs made to the brake system. The current
regulations require that a single car test be performed on passenger
cars whenever they are on a shop or repair track. As the current
requirement carries the potential of permitting a railroad to avoid the
performance of the test by calling a repair track something other than
a repair track, FRA believed it was prudent to base the requirement to
perform a single car test on the type of defect or repair involved
rather than the location where the defect is repaired. Therefore, FRA
proposed a list of defective conditions and the repair or replacement
of certain components which would trigger the requirement to perform a
single car test. See 62 FR 49774, 49809. In an attempt to promote the
prompt repair of defective equipment, FRA proposed some flexibility in
the performance of the test by permitting cars to be moved to a
location where the test could be performed if repairs were made at a
location that could not perform the test.
3. Proposed Qualifications of Inspection and Testing Personnel
In the 1997 NPRM, FRA proposed the terms ``qualified person'' and
``qualified mechanical inspector'' to differentiate between the type of
personnel that will be permitted to perform certain brake or mechanical
inspections required in the proposal. A ``qualified person'' was
defined as a person determined by the railroad to have the knowledge
and skills necessary to perform one or more functions required under
this part. Whereas, a ``qualified mechanical inspector'' was defined as
a ``qualified person'' who as a part of the training, qualification,
and designation program required by the proposal had received
instruction and training that included ``hands-on'' experience (under
appropriate supervision or apprenticeship) in one or more of the
following functions: trouble-shooting, inspection, testing, and
maintenance or repair of the specific train brake and other components
and systems for which the inspector is assigned responsibility.
Further, the mechanical inspector was to be a person whose primary
responsibility includes work generally consistent with those functions.
See 62 FR 49754.
As FRA intended for Class I brake inspections and exterior calendar
day mechanical inspections to be in-depth inspections of the entire
braking system and the safety-critical mechanical components, which
most likely will be performed only one time in any given day in which
the equipment is used, and because of the flexibility FRA proposed in
the performance of such inspections, FRA proposed that these
inspections had to be performed by individuals possessing not only the
knowledge to identify and detect a defective condition in all of the
brake equipment required to be inspected but also the knowledge to
recognize the interrelational workings of the equipment and the ability
to ``troubleshoot'' and repair the equipment. Consequently, FRA
proposed that only qualified mechanical inspectors would be permitted
to
[[Page 25561]]
perform Class I brake tests and exterior calendar day mechanical
inspections.
As the definition of qualified mechanical inspector required the
person's primary responsibility to be the inspection, testing, or
maintenance of passenger equipment, the definition largely ruled out
the possibility of train crew members becoming qualified mechanical
inspectors because the primary responsibility of a train crew member is
generally the operation of the train. FRA intended the definition to
allow the members of the trades associated with the testing and
maintenance of equipment such as carmen, machinists, and electricians
to become qualified mechanical inspectors. However, FRA made clear that
membership in labor organizations or completion of apprenticeship
programs associated with these crafts was not required to be designated
a qualified mechanical inspector. The two primary qualifications were
the possession of the knowledge required to do the job and a primary
work assignment inspecting, testing, or maintaining the equipment.
FRA included a clear definition of ``qualified person'' to allow
railroads the flexibility of having train crews perform Class IA, Class
II, and running brake tests and interior calendar day mechanical
inspections. A qualified person had to be trained and designated as
able to perform the types of brake and mechanical inspections and tests
that the railroad assigned to him or her. However, a qualified person
did not need the extensive knowledge of brake systems or mechanical
components or be able to trouble-shoot and repair them. The qualified
person was considered to be the ``checker.'' He or she was to possess
the knowledge and experience necessary to be able to identify brake
system problems.
C. Overview of Comments Relating to Proposed Inspection and Testing
Requirements
Those parties filing comments, presenting testimony and
participating in the Working Group meetings with regard to the proposed
inspection and testing requirements have provided the agency with a
wealth of facts and informed opinions, and have been extremely helpful
to FRA in resolving the issues. Most commenters provided testimony or
written comments on more than one issue and generally were supported by
the positions of other commenters. Rather than attempt to paraphrase
each commenter's response to each of the proposed regulatory sections,
FRA believes it would be better, and more understandable, to provide a
brief overview of the thrust of the comments received in this portion
of the preamble and provide general FRA conclusions while addressing
the specific comments of various parties in the section-by-section
analysis. For purposes of discussion, the comments are grouped in three
categories: (1) railroad management representatives; (2) railroad labor
representatives; and (3) other commenters.
Railroad management representatives, APTA and its member railroads
and Amtrak, generally agreed with the concept of performing the
proposed comprehensive daily brake and mechanical inspections. However,
these representatives raised a number of concerns with the proposed
inspections. Commenters for APTA believed that the proposed requirement
to perform a Class IA brake test prior to the first run of the day for
commuter and short-distance intercity trains is unnecessary and adds no
value to the proposed inspection scheme. APTA recommends that a Class I
brake test remain valid for up to 12 hours after it is performed, if
the train remains intact with compressors running, and that the
performance of a Class II brake test prior to the first departure would
be sufficient to ensure the proper operation of the brake system. APTA
contends that the performance of a Class II brake test prior to
departure would detect any brake problems caused by vandalism and that
commuter railroads have been operated safely in this fashion for years.
Railroad management representatives also raised issues concerning
the performance of the proposed exterior calendar day mechanical
inspection. The major concern of these commenters was that the proposal
was unclear as to whether trainsets had to be uncoupled or placed over
a pit to perform the inspections. These commenters recommended that the
rule text explicitly state that the inspection is to be performed to
the extent possible without uncoupling the cars or placing the cars
over an elevated pit. APTA representatives also recommended that some
of the items proposed in the exterior calendar day mechanical
inspection be moved to the periodic mechanical inspection as they could
not reasonably be seen without uncoupling the car or placing it over an
elevated pit. These included certain requirements related to the
inspection of the couplers, the truck and car body assembly, and the
center castings on trucks. Some commenters also recommended elimination
of the requirement that all secondary braking systems be working, since
that could not be known until the train is in operation and the system
is attempted to be used.
APTA representatives also commented on the proposed requirements
for performing single car tests. APTA recommended that FRA adopt the
new single car test procedures recently developed by the PRESS brake
committee rather than the outdated AAR standard. These commenters also
recommended that the replacement or repair of certain proposed
components not trigger the requirement to perform a single car test
since most of the brake system is not disturbed by the repairs and some
sort of partial test could sufficiently demonstrate proper operation of
the brake system. These commenters also sought the flexibility not to
perform the test if a wheel defect is known to be caused by other than
a brake-related problem. APTA further recommended that railroads be
permitted to perform single car tests from the locomotive control
stands.
The major issue raised by railroad management representatives
addressed FRA's proposal that all Class I brake tests and all exterior
calendar day mechanical inspections be performed by a qualified
mechanical inspector (QMI). APTA representatives objected to the use of
this designation for several reasons and recommended the alternative
term ``qualified maintenance person.'' The main objection of these
commenters relates to the requirement that a QMI's primary
responsibility must be the inspection, testing, maintenance,
troubleshooting, or maintenance of the brake system or mechanical
components. These commenters also object to FRA's statement that the
definition of QMI largely rules out the possibility of train crew
members being designated as QMIs. These commenters contend that any
person who is properly trained can perform the inspections proposed by
FRA. These commenters also object to the use of the term qualified
mechanical inspector based on the concern that such a title might lead
employees designated as such to seek premium pay due to the title
bestowed.
APTA representatives contend that the proposed definition of QMI
violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), exceeds FRA's
statutory authority, and is counter to the Railway Labor Act. These
commenters contend that the Administrative record does not support a
finding by FRA that only employees whose ``primary responsibility''
includes work in the area of troubleshooting, testing, inspecting,
maintenance, or repair to train brake and other components are capable
of performing Class I and
[[Page 25562]]
exterior mechanical inspections. These commenters also contend that
FRA's proposed definition is counter to FRA's statutory mandate not to
prescribe employee qualifications except where clearly necessary for
safety reasons. See 49 U.S.C. 20110. Furthermore, it is contended that
the proposed definition is counter to the Railway Labor Act because it
impinges upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Mediation
Board to make final determinations over employee classes or crafts and
to interpret collective bargaining agreements. In essence, this
argument contends that by limiting the employees who can perform a
Class I brake test or an exterior mechanical inspection, FRA is in
effect making an employee class or craft designation.
A concern raised by Metra is interrelated to the proposed QMI
requirement, in that Metra seeks flexibility or relief from the QMI
requirement on weekends. Metra contends that train crews perform most
of the brake tests conducted by the railroad on weekends and have been
for several years. Metra claims that there is no data showing a
decrease in safety on Metra during weekend operations to support FRA's
proposal that these brake inspections must be performed by a QMI rather
than a train crew member. Metra seeks relief from the QMI requirement
on weekends for railroads which have established a successful operating
history of performing the tests with qualified persons rather than
QMIs.
Rail labor representatives, while generally supportive of the
proposed inspection and testing requirements, also raised a number of
concerns related to the proposed requirements. Labor representatives
objected to the proposed Class IA brake test and continued to insist
that railroads should be required to conduct a full Class I brake test
prior to the first run of the day. These commenters also advocated
against providing any leeway for weekend operations with regard to the
proposed inspections and tests, claiming that in many instances
equipment used on weekends is used more rigorously than when used
during the week and, therefore, quality inspections are probably more
important. Labor representatives also noted that FRA failed to address
what tests or inspections are to be performed on equipment added to an
en route passenger train. Furthermore, these commenters supported the
concept of requiring that QMIs perform all Class I brake tests and
exterior mechanical inspections but recommended that FRA develop a
clear and unequivocal definition of QMI which specifically excludes
train crew members from the definition.
Labor representatives agreed with APTA representatives that FRA
should adopt the single car testing procedures developed through the
PRESS brake committee. These representatives believed that the newly
developed procedures were better than the existing AAR procedures but
stressed that the test must be conducted whenever any of the items
listed in the NPRM occurred. Labor commenters believed a single car
test should be performed prior to permitting a car to be moved and that
the test should not be permitted to be performed with a locomotive.
The primary concern raised by labor representatives, particularly
the BRC, involves the proposed 1,500-mile inspection interval for
performing Class I brake tests on long-distance intercity passenger
trains. Although the BRC agrees that the current 1,000-mile inspection
should be replaced with the proposed Class I brake test, the BRC
objects to extending the distance between brake tests to 1,500 miles.
The BRC claims that the proposed increase is not justified by the
facts. The BRC contends that an inspection at 1,000 mile intervals is
necessary to ensure the safety of passenger train operations due to the
numerous defective conditions being found during 1,000 mile
inspections. As support for this contention, the BRC submitted
information compiled by a carman stationed at Union Station in
Washington, D.C. from January 1996 through February of 1997 who
allegedly performed 1,000-mile inspections at this location. The BRC
also cited other specific examples of defective equipment being moved
in passenger trains. Based on this information and extrapolating
similar conditions across the country, the BRC contends that numerous
defective conditions are uncovered at 1,000 mile brake inspections and
that there is no safety justification for extending the distance
between brake inspections.
Amtrak responded to the information provided in the BRC's
submission regarding defects found during inspections at Washington,
D.C. in January 1996 through February 1997. Amtrak contends that
Washington, D.C. is not a 1,000-mile inspection point and thus, should
not be used to determine the appropriate interval for brake
inspections. Amtrak also contends that the data presented was not
sufficiently detailed to determine if the listed defects violated the
railroad's standards for equipment operating en route. Amtrak contends
that based upon their records 66 percent of the 609 cars identified by
the BRC were in trains that terminated at Washington, DC and should not
be considered in determining brake inspection intervals. Of the 204
cars alleged to be defective and that were part of trains which run
through Washington, DC, Amtrak records show that only 7 of the cars
were shopped at Washington, DC and that 110 additional cars were
shopped within 7 days after the date of the reported defect. In almost
all cases the repairs were made at a location other than Washington,
DC, which was frequently the end destination for the train. Amtrak
concludes that the defects reported by the BRC at Washington, DC
constitute items from an in-bound inspection but were not true defects
that required shopping a car from an en route train.
Amtrak provided additional information containing a summary of the
set-outs which took place on the railroad during the period from March
1997 to February 1998 for safety and non-safety related causes. This
information showed that 301 cars were set-out by Amtrak during this
period. Of those 301 cars that were set-out, only 29 were set-out at
intermediate (1,000 mile) inspection points and only 15 of those 29
were for brake-related defects. Therefore, Amtrak contends that 90
percent of the cars that were set-out were set-out en route and were
not found during intermediate inspections. During this same period
Amtrak conducted 1,000-mile inspections on approximately 130,000 cars.
Consequently, Amtrak contends that the annual defect rate at
intermediate inspection points for this period was 0.02 percent and
that it was costing Amtrak approximately $175,000 per defect found to
conduct 1,000-mile inspections.
The BRC submitted a response to the information provided by Amtrak.
In this submission the BRC contends that Amtrak's analysis regarding
the reported defects is faulty and self-serving. This commenter
contends that all the defects found at Union Station must be considered
when evaluating an extension of the 1,000-mile inspection regardless of
whether Union Station is a 1,000-mile inspection point and regardless
of the distance traveled by the cars involved. The BRC contends that
any defective conditions found are indicative of what will be traveling
past 1,000-mile inspection locations should the distance between brake
inspections be extended to 1,500 miles. The BRC further contends that
Amtrak's analysis regarding the number of cars set-out at intermediate
inspections is flawed for
[[Page 25563]]
several reasons. The BRC claims that intermediate inspection points
cited by Amtrak are not 1,000-mile inspection locations and that the
same type of inspection is not performed. (FRA's review of Amtrak's
submission indicates that when Amtrak referred to intermediate
inspection points it was referring to 1,000 mile inspection locations.)
Further, it is contended that looking solely at the number of cars set-
out at these locations is improper because it does not take into
account the defects that are repaired while a car remained entrained.
The BRC reasserted its position that the data does not support an
extension of the 1,000-mile inspection interval and, if anything, the
data supports reducing the inspection requirement to 500 miles.
D. General FRA Conclusions
After consideration of all the comments submitted, both in writing
and through oral testimony and discussion within the Working Group, FRA
intends for the requirements regarding the inspection and testing of
passenger equipment contained in the final rule to closely track the
proposed requirements contained in the 1997 NPRM. In this final rule,
FRA will make slight modifications to the proposed requirements in an
attempt to clarify the requirements, to cover areas that were not
adequately addressed, and to address the specific comments submitted.
FRA generally believes that the approach taken in the NPRM to the
inspection and testing of passenger equipment incorporates the current
best practices of the industry, effectively balances the positions of
the various parties involved, and increases the overall safety of
passenger train operations.
1. Brake and Mechanical Inspections
FRA intends to modify the Class I brake test and the exterior
calendar day mechanical inspection requirements to ensure the proper
operation of all cars added to a train while en route. FRA is adding
certain provisions to require the performance of a Class I brake test
and an exterior mechanical inspection on each car added to a passenger
train at the time it is added to the train unless documentation is
provided to the train crew that a Class I brake test and an exterior
mechanical inspection was performed on the car within the previous
calendar day and the car has not been disconnected from a source of
compressed air for more than four hours. FRA is adding this requirement
in order to address the concerns raised by various labor
representatives that no provisions were provided in the proposal to
address circumstances when cars are added to an en route train. If a
car has received such inspection, the railroad will be required to
perform a Class II brake test at the time the car is added to the
train. FRA believes that these provisions will ensure the integrity of
the brakes and mechanical components on every car added to an existing
train and should not be a burden for railroads since cars are generally
added to passenger trains at major terminals with the facilities and
personnel available for conducting such inspections. Furthermore, these
inspection requirements are very similar to what is currently required
when a freight car is added to a train while en route. See 49 CFR
Secs. 215.13 and 232.13.
FRA is also modifying the requirements for when a Class IA brake
test must be performed. FRA continues to believe that some type of car-
by-car inspection must be performed prior to a passenger train's first
run of the day if the train was used in passenger service the previous
day without any brake inspection being performed after it completed
service and before it laid-up for the evening. However, FRA agrees with
the comments submitted by APTA representatives that the need for such
an inspection is minimized if a Class I brake test is performed within
a relatively short period of time prior to the first run of the day and
the train has not been used in passenger service since the performance
of that inspection. From a safety standpoint, it appears to be
unnecessary to require the performance of a second comprehensive brake
test when the equipment has not been used and has remained on a source
of compressed air since the last comprehensive brake test was
performed. In such circumstances, FRA believes that the performance of
a Class II brake test would be sufficient to determine if there are any
problems with the braking system due to vandalism or other causes since
the last comprehensive Class I brake test. Furthermore, as APTA's
comments point out, commuter railroads have been safely operated in a
fashion similar to this for a number of years. Consequently, the final
rule will require the performance of a Class II brake test prior to the
first run of the day if a Class I brake test was performed within the
previous twelve hours and the train has not been used in passenger
service and has not been disconnected from a source of compressed air
for more than four hours since the performance of the Class I brake
test.
FRA will also include certain minimal recordkeeping requirements
related to the performance of the interior and exterior calendar day
and periodic mechanical inspection provisions. FRA believes that proper
and accurate recordkeeping is a cornerstone of any inspection process
and is essential to ensuring the performance and quality of the
required inspections. Without such records the inspection requirements
would be difficult to enforce. Although recordkeeping was discussed in
the Working Group and FRA believes them to be an integral part of any
inspection requirement, FRA inadvertently omitted any such requirements
in the NPRM specifically related to mechanical inspections. This
omission was brought to FRA's attention through verbal and written
comments provided by various interested parties.
FRA is also making minor changes and clarifications to the proposed
exterior calendar day mechanical inspection. In the final rule, FRA is
explicitly stating that the exterior mechanical inspection is to be
performed to the extent possible without uncoupling the trainset and
without placing the equipment over a pit or on an elevated track. This
explicit statement is being added in response to APTA's concerns
regarding what would constitute proper performance of these
inspections. FRA intended the inspection to be very similar to the
freight car safety inspection currently required pursuant to Part 215.
FRA also recognizes that certain items contained in the proposed
exterior mechanical inspection could not have been easily inspected
without proper shop facilities. Therefore, FRA is moving some of the
exterior mechanical inspection requirements related to couplers and
trucks to the periodic mechanical inspection requirements as these
periodic inspections will likely be performed at locations with
facilities available that are more conducive to inspecting the specific
components. The changes made in the final rule were discussed with the
Working Group at the December 15-16, 1997 meeting.
FRA is also adding various provisions related to the performance of
periodic mechanical inspections. As noted above, FRA is moving certain
items from the exterior calendar day mechanical inspection to the
periodic mechanical inspections as they cannot be easily inspected
without proper shop facilities. In the NPRM, FRA proposed that a
periodic mechanical inspection be performed every 180 days. After a
review of the industry's practices regarding the performance of
periodic mechanical-type inspections, FRA believes that the items
removed from the calendar day mechanical inspection as well as some of
the items previously
[[Page 25564]]
proposed in the 180 day periodic mechanical inspection should be and
are currently inspected on a more frequent basis by the railroads. As
it is FRA's intent in this proceeding to attempt to codify the current
best practices of the industry, FRA believes that the current intervals
for inspecting certain components should be maintained. Therefore, FRA
will require the periodic inspection of certain mechanical components,
floors, passageways, and switches on a 92-day basis. Furthermore, FRA
will also require a 92-day inspection of emergency lighting systems as
they are critical to the safety of passengers in the event of an
accident or derailment. FRA is adding an inspection of the roller
bearings to the 92-day inspection. Although this component was
inadvertently left out of the 1997 NPRM, they were covered in the 1994
NPRM; and FRA believes that roller bearings are an integral part of the
mechanical components and must be part of any mechanical inspection
scheme. Furthermore, several labor commenters recommended inspections
criteria similar to that contained in 49 CFR part 215, which
specifically addresses the condition of roller bearings. See 49 CFR
Sec. 215.115. As roller bearings are best viewed in a shop facility
context, FRA is adding the inspection of this component to the 92-day
periodic mechanical inspection, which is consistent with the current
practices of the industry.
FRA will also retain a semi-annual periodic inspection for certain
components as proposed in the 1997 NPRM. FRA proposed a 180-day
periodic inspection, but in order to remain consistent with the 92-day
inspection scheme, FRA will require a 184-day periodic inspection of
certain components, including: seats; luggage racks; beds; and
emergency windows. FRA removed the inspection of the couplers from the
calendar day inspection and added them to the 184-day inspection
requirement. FRA is placing the coupler inspection at this interval
rather than the 92-day interval in order to reduce the amount of
coupling and uncoupling that will be required. FRA is also extending
the inspection interval related to manual door releases. Due to the
general reliability of these devices and because they are partially
inspected on a daily basis, FRA believes that an annual inspection of
the releases will ensure their proper operation. Thus, FRA will require
an inspection of the manual door releases every 368 days.
Although FRA has established certain periodic inspection intervals
in order to establish a default interval, FRA intends to make clear
that FRA will allow railroads to develop alternative intervals for
performing such inspections for specific components or equipment based
on a more quantitative reliability assessment completed as part of
their system safety programs. FRA expects that railroads will utilize
reliability-based maintenance programs as appropriate, given this
opportunity to do so. As successful reliability based maintenance
programs are dynamic, it is expected that, in the process of defining
and documenting the reliable use of equipment or specific components,
over time, continued assessments may indicate a need to increase or
decrease inspection intervals. FRA will only permit lengthened
inspection intervals beyond the default intervals when such changes are
justified by a quantitative reliability assessment. The previously
described inspection intervals are based on sound but limited
information provided to FRA that FRA believes represents a combination
of operating experience, analytical analyses, knowledge and intuition.
FRA does expect that railroads will collect and respond to additional
data throughout the operating life of the equipment. (A detailed
discussion of reliability-based maintenance programs is contained in
the section-by-section discussion of Sec. 238.307.)
FRA is also modifying the proposed requirements related to the
performance of single car tests. Based on the recommendations of
representatives from both rail labor and rail management, FRA will
reference the single car testing procedures which were developed by
APTA PRESS rather than the AAR single car testing procedures referenced
in the 1997 NPRM. The single car test procedures were issued by APTA on
July 1, 1998 and are contained in APTA Mechanical Safety Standard SS-M-
005-98. The single car test procedures issued by APTA are more
comprehensive and better address passenger equipment than the older AAR
recommended practices. In the 1997 NPRM, FRA proposed to require the
performance of single car tests on all passenger cars and other
unpowered vehicles used in passenger trains. However, the definition of
passenger cars includes self-propelled vehicles such as MU locomotives,
to which FRA did not intend to apply the proposed single car test
requirements. Thus, FRA is modifying the language of the single car
test requirements to clarify that the testing requirements apply to
nonself-propelled passenger cars and unpowered vehicles used in
passenger trains.
FRA is also modifying some of the circumstances under which a
single car test is required to be performed. FRA agrees with several of
the commenters that the 1997 NPRM may have been over-inclusive in
listing the components whose repair, replacement, or removal would
trigger the performance of a single car test. Thus, in accordance with
the discussions conducted with the Working Group in mid-December of
1997, FRA is amending the list of brake components to include only
those circumstances where a relay valve, service portion, emergency
portion, or pipe bracket is removed, repaired, or replaced. Whenever
any other component previously contained in the 1997 NPRM is removed,
repaired, or replaced FRA will require that only that portion that is
renewed or replaced be tested. FRA believes that the items removed from
the previously proposed list can generally be removed, replaced, or
repaired without affecting other portions of the brake system and,
thus, the need to perform a single car test is reduced. FRA also will
not mandate the performance of a single car test for wheel defects,
other than a built-up tread, if the railroad can establish that the
wheel defect is due to a cause other than a defective brake system.
Thus, the burden will fall on the railroad to establish and maintain
sufficient documentation that a wheel defect is due to something other
than a brake-related cause. FRA intends to make it clear that if the
railroad cannot establish the specific non-brake related cause for a
wheel defect, it is required to perform a single car test.
2. Qualified Maintenance Person
An issue related to the inspection and testing requirements on
which FRA has received extensive comment, particularly from APTA
representatives, is the proposed definition of ``qualified mechanical
inspector (QMI).'' FRA recognizes the concern raised by some commenters
that the term QMI might result in employees designated as such to seek
some sort of premium pay status. Although FRA is not overly swayed by
this concern, FRA is changing the term in the manner suggested by these
commenters to ``qualified maintenance person (QMP).'' FRA believes that
the term used to describe the individual responsible for conducting
certain brake and mechanical inspections has little bearing on the
qualifications or knowledge of the individual and, thus, is not adverse
to accommodating a change in the term. However, but for clarifying
language, FRA is not changing
[[Page 25565]]
the underlying definition of what is required to be designated as a
QMP.
The major concern raised by APTA representatives centered on the
requirement contained in the definition of a QMI that the person's
``primary responsibility'' include work in the area of troubleshooting,
testing, inspecting, maintenance, or repair to train brake systems and
other components. These commenters believed that anyone who is properly
trained can perform the required inspections regardless of the amount
of time actually spent engaged in the activity.
The entire concept of QMI (or QMP) is premised on the idea that
flexibility in the inspection of passenger equipment, flexibility in
the movement of defective equipment and slight reductions in periodic
maintenance could be provided if the mechanical components and brake
system were inspected on a daily basis by highly qualified individuals.
Thus, the requirement that a highly qualified person perform certain
brake and mechanical inspections is part of a package which includes
flexibility in the performance of brake and mechanical inspections,
permits wider latitude in the movement of defective equipment, and
provides reductions in the periodic maintenance that is required to be
performed on certain equipment. Therefore, FRA expects the highly
qualified person to be an individual who can not only identify a
particular defective condition but who will have the knowledge and
experience to know how the defective condition affects other mechanical
components or other parts of the brake system and will have an
understanding of what might have caused a particular defective
condition. FRA believes that in order for a person to become highly
proficient in the performance of a particular task that person must
perform the task on a repeated and consistent basis. As it is almost
impossible to develop and impose specific experience requirements, FRA
believes that a requirement that the person's primary responsibility be
in one or more of the specifically identified work areas and that the
person have a basic understanding of what is required to properly
repair and maintain safety-critical brake or mechanical components is
necessary to ensure the high quality inspections envisioned by the
rule.
FRA disagrees with the contentions raised by APTA representatives
that the definition of QMI (or QMP) violates the APA and exceeds FRA's
statutory authority. Contrary to the assertions made by APTA
representatives, the administrative record together with FRA's
independent knowledge of the passenger rail industry do support a
requirement that only a QMI (or QMP) conduct Class I brake tests and
exterior mechanical inspections. Except for limited weekend service
operated by Metra, virtually every passenger train operation affected
by this rule currently conducts daily brake and mechanical inspections
utilizing employees who, except for training on the requirements of
this rule, would meet the definition of a QMI (or QMP). That is, the
employees who are currently responsible for conducting the major daily
brake and mechanical inspections on virtually all passenger trains meet
the ``primary responsibility'' requirement contained in the definition
of QMI (or QMP). Therefore, the industry's current practice
acknowledges and supports the need to conduct daily inspections with
employees whose primary responsibility is the troubleshooting,
inspection, testing, maintenance, or repair of train brake systems or
other mechanical components. Furthermore, due to the flexibility
provided in this rule for conducting brake and mechanical inspections
and moving defective equipment as well as the extension of certain
periodic maintenance, FRA believes that the current best practices of
the railroads with regard to brake and mechanical inspections must be
maintained, especially as they relate to the quality of the personnel
performing the inspections and the continuity of observation provided
by a dedicated work force (which is important to detection of
developing hazards in the fleet).
FRA further believes that APTA's contention that the definition of
QMI (or QMP) violates the Railway Labor Act is due to a
misunderstanding of the definition. FRA is not attempting to make any
determinations over employee classes or crafts or to interpret
collective bargaining agreements. In the 1997 NPRM, FRA stated that the
definition would allow the members of trades associated with testing
and maintenance of equipment such as carmen, machinists, and
electricians to become QMIs (or QMPs). However, FRA further stated that
membership in a labor organization or completion of an apprenticeship
program associated with a particular craft is not required. FRA made
clear that the two overriding qualifications are possession of the
knowledge required to do the job and a primary work assignment
inspecting, testing, or maintaining the equipment.
FRA also intends to clarify the meaning of ``primary
responsibility'' as used in the definition of QMP. As a rule of thumb
FRA will consider a person's ``primary responsibility'' to be the task
that the person performs at least 50 percent of the time. Therefore, a
person who spends at least 50 percent of the time engaged in the duties
of inspecting, testing, maintenance, troubleshooting, or repair of
train brakes systems and other mechanical components could be
designated as a QMP, if the person is properly trained to perform the
tasks assigned and possesses a current understanding of what is
required to properly repair and maintain the safety-critical brake or
mechanical components for which they are assigned responsibility.
However, FRA will consider the totality of the circumstances
surrounding an employee's duties in determining a person's ``primary
responsibility.'' For example, a person may not spend 50 percent of his
or her day engaged in any one readily identifiable type of activity; in
those situations FRA will have to look at the circumstances involved on
a case-by-case basis.
The definition of QMP largely rules out the possibility of train
crew members being designated as these highly qualified inspectors
since the primary responsibility, as defined above, of virtually all
current train crew personnel is the operation of trains and for the
most part train crew personnel do not possess a current understanding
of what is required to properly repair and maintain the safety-critical
brake or mechanical components that are inspected during Class I brake
tests or exterior calendar day mechanical inspections. However,
contrary to the contentions raised by APTA, there is nothing in the
rule which prevents a railroad from utilizing employees who are not
designated as QMPs from conducting brake and mechanical inspections
provided those inspections are not intended to constitute the required
Class I brake test or the exterior calendar day mechanical inspection.
Furthermore, the rule provides that certain required brake and
mechanical inspections (Class IA brake tests, Class II brake tests,
running brake tests, and interior calendar day mechanical inspections)
may be performed by a properly ``qualified person'' and do mandate the
use of a QMP. FRA believes that these are the types of inspections
which train crew members are currently assigned to perform and have
been performing effectively for years. Consequently, FRA believes that
the inspection requirements and the qualification requirements
contained in this rule are merely a codification of the current best
practices of the passenger
[[Page 25566]]
train industry and are necessary to ensure the continued safety of
those operations while providing the industry some flexibility in the
performance of certain inspections and in the movement of defective
equipment as well as providing slight increases in periodic maintenance
cycles for some equipment.
FRA does not intend to provide any special provisions for weekend
operations with regard to the conducting of Class I brake tests and
calendar day mechanical inspection by QMPs as suggested in the comments
by some APTA representatives. The rationale for requiring daily brake
and mechanical attention by highly qualified inspectors, a proposition
generally accepted by Working Group members, appears to apply equally
to weekend periods. In fact based on FRA's experience, equipment used
on weekends is generally used more rigorously than equipment used
during weekday operations. At present only one commuter operation
(Metra) has raised significant concerns regarding weekend operations.
Although there is no specific data suggesting that existing weekend
operations on Metra, which involves having many of the brake
inspections conducted by train crew members, have created a safety
hazard, FRA has found it virtually impossible to draft and justify
provisions providing limited flexibility for Metra that do not create
potential loopholes that could be abused by other passenger train
operations that have not had the apparent safety success of Metra.
Moreover, based on FRA's independent investigation of Metra's
operation, it is believed that the impact of this final rule on Metra's
weekend operations will be significantly less than that indicated in
APTA's written comments and originally perceived by Metra. FRA believes
that most of the personnel needed by Metra to conduct its weekend
operations in accordance with this final rule are available to Metra or
its contractors and that minor adjustments could be made to its weekend
operations that might avoid significant new expense.
As the concerns regarding weekend operations appear to involve just
one commuter operation and because the precise impact on that operation
is not known or available at this time, FRA believes that the waiver
process would be the best method for evaluating any lingering concerns
that may be raised by that operator. This would afford FRA an
opportunity to provide any appropriate relief based on the specific
needs and the safety history of the individual railroad without opening
the door to potential abuses by other railroads that are not similarly
situated.
3. Long-Distance Intercity Passenger Trains
FRA is also retaining the requirements proposed in the 1997 NPRM
related to the performance of Class I brake tests on long-distance
intercity passenger trains. FRA will require that a Class I brake test
be performed on long-distance intercity passenger trains prior to the
trains' departure from an originating terminal and once every 1,500
miles or every calendar day, whichever occurs first. After reviewing
the information and comments submitted by labor representatives, the
information and comments provided by Amtrak, and based upon the
independent information developed by FRA, FRA believes that the
enhanced inspection scheme contained in this final rule will ensure the
continued safety of long-distance intercity passenger trains.
Contrary to the statements made in the comments submitted by some
labor representatives, FRA is not merely increasing the distance
between brake inspections. Rather, FRA is increasing both the quality
and the content of the inspections that must be performed on long-
distance intercity passenger trains and, thus, increasing the safety of
such trains. Under the current regulations these passenger trains are
required to receive an initial terminal brake inspection at the point
where they are originally assembled; from that point the train must
receive an intermediate brake inspection every 1,000 miles. The current
1,000-mile inspection merely requires the performance of a leakage
test, an application of the brakes and the inspection of the brake
rigging on each car to ensure it is properly secured. See 49 CFR
232.12(b). The current 1,000-mile brake inspection does not require 100
percent operative brakes prior to departure and does not require piston
travel to be inspected. The current regulations also do not require the
performance of any type of mechanical inspection on passenger equipment
at 1,000-mile inspection points or at any other time in the train's
journey. Thus, under the current regulations a long-distance intercity
passenger train can travel from New York to Los Angeles on one initial
terminal inspection, a series of 1,000-mile inspections, and no
mechanical inspections.
Whereas, this rule will require the performance of a Class I brake
test, which is more comprehensive than the current initial terminal
inspection, at the point where the train is originally assembled and
will require the performance of another Class I brake test every 1,500
miles or every calendar day thereafter, whichever comes first, by
highly qualified inspectors. Thus, at least every 1,500 miles or every
calendar day a long-distance passenger train will be required to
receive a brake inspection which is more comprehensive than the current
initial terminal inspection and which requires that the train have 100
percent operative brakes and have piston travel set within established
limits. Furthermore, this rule will require the performance of an
exterior and interior mechanical inspection every calendar day that the
train is in service. Consequently, the inspection scheme proposed in
the 1997 NPRM and retained in this final rule will, in FRA's view,
increase the safety and better ensure the integrity of the brake and
mechanical components of long-distance passenger trains.
FRA also believes that some recognition must be given to the
various types of advanced braking system technologies used on many
long-distance intercity passenger trains. Many of these advanced
technologies are not found with any regularity in freight operations.
Dynamic brakes are typically employed on these types of trains to limit
thermal stresses on friction surfaces and to limit the wear and tear on
the brake equipment. Furthermore, the brake valves and brake components
used on today's long-distance passenger trains are far more reliable
than was the case several decades ago. Other technological advances
utilized with regularity by these passenger trains include:
The use of brake cylinder pressure indicators which
provide a reliable indication of the application and release of the
brakes.
The use of disc brakes which provide shorter stopping
distances and decrease the risk of thermal damage to wheels.
The ability to cut out brakes on a per-axle or per-truck
basis rather than a per car basis, thus permitting greater use of those
brakes that are operable.
Brake ratios that are 2\1/2\ times greater than the brake
ratios of loaded freight cars.
The reliability and performance of brake systems on these passenger
trains enhance the safety of these trains and, when combined with other
aspects of this discussion, support FRA's determination that these
brake systems can be safely operated with the inspection intervals that
were proposed in the 1997 NPRM. Although some of the technologies noted
above have existed for several decades, most of the technologies were
not in wide spread use until after 1980. Furthermore, most
[[Page 25567]]
of the noted technological advances just started to be integrated into
one efficient and reliable braking system within the last decade.
Consequently, the technology incorporated into the brake equipment used
in today's long-distance intercity passenger trains has increased the
reliability of the braking system and permits the safe operation of the
equipment for extended distances even though a portion of the braking
system may be inoperative or defective.
FRA also disagrees with the contentions raised by certain labor
representatives that the facts and data do not support the 500 mile
extension in the brake inspection interval even with the more
comprehensive inspection scheme. These commenters recommend that the
current 1,000-mile brake inspection interval be retained together with
the increased inspection regiment. These commenters contend that due to
the large number of defects being found at 1,000-mile inspections that
the need to retain the inspection is justified. As an example and
support for this position, the BRC submitted information containing
numerous defective conditions compiled by carmen stationed at Union
Station in Washington D.C. from January 1996 through February of 1997
that the carmen allegedly found on trains traveling through Union
Station. After reviewing the documentation submitted, FRA does not
believe the information supports the conclusion that 1,000-mile brake
inspections must be maintained and that it would be unsafe to extend
the distance between brake inspections under the inspection scheme
contained in this final rule.
Due to the lack of detail contained in the information submitted by
the BRC, it is impossible to determine whether the vast majority of the
alleged defective conditions were defective under the Federal
regulations or whether the conditions were merely in excess of Amtrak's
voluntary maintenance standards or operating practices. In addition,
based on the description of some of the conditions, they would not be
considered defective conditions under current Federal regulations.
Furthermore, the vast majority of the conditions alleged in the
document were not power brake defects, and thus, under the current
regulations, would not have been required to have been inspected at a
1,000-mile inspection, nor do the current regulations mandate any type
of mechanical inspection on passenger equipment. Moreover, as the vast
majority of the alleged conditions were mechanical and wheel defects,
FRA believes that these types of defective conditions will be addressed
by the exterior calendar day mechanical inspection contained in this
final rule which will be required to be performed every calendar day
that a piece of equipment is in service.
FRA agrees with the comments submitted by the BRC that the data and
information submitted by Amtrak regarding the allegedly defective
equipment found at Washington, D.C., does not fully address whether the
cars identified by carmen at that location were defective and does
indicate that at least many of the cars were repaired for the defective
condition noted within several days after moving through Washington,
D.C. However, contrary to the conclusions reached by labor
representatives, the fact that a car remained in service with an
alleged defective mechanical or brake condition does not necessarily
mean the train involved was in an unsafe condition or that the
equipment was being moved illegally. The current regulations regarding
freight mechanical equipment and the existing statutory mandates
regarding the movement of equipment with defective safety appliances
and brakes permit the movement of a certain amount of defective
equipment to certain locations provided it is determined by a qualified
person that such a movement can be made safely or that a sufficient
percentage of the brakes remain operative. See 49 U.S.C. 20303, 49 CFR
215.9. As this final rule will specifically address the inspection of
the mechanical components on passenger equipment and the movement of
defective mechanical components, which is not covered by existing
regulations, FRA believes that the amount of defective equipment being
operated will be reduced significantly and will be handled safely in
revenue trains. Although FRA agrees that the information submitted by
Amtrak regarding the number of cars set out at 1,000-mile inspection
points does not reflect the true number of defects being found during
the inspections, FRA does find it significant that a very small
percentage of cars set-out by Amtrak are set-out at 1,000-mile
inspection locations and that most set-outs occur en route. (In its
April 17, 1998 letter, Amtrak used the term intermediate inspections
which upon FRA's review of the information provided was intended to
describe 1,000-mile inspection locations.)
FRA also feels it is necessary to make clear that the number of
cars alleged to have been found in defective condition at Union Station
in Washington D.C. is not indicative of a safety problem on long-
distance intercity passenger trains. Assuming that all of the cars
contained in BRC's submission were in fact defective as alleged, it
appears that approximately 750 cars were defective. However, the
information also reveals that approximately 1,300 trains were
inspected, thus, using a conservative estimate of 10 cars per train,
approximately 13,000 cars were inspected. Therefore, approximately only
6 percent of the cars inspected were found to contain either a
mechanical or brake defect. Furthermore, of the approximate 750 cars
alleged to have been found defective, only approximately 20 percent of
those cars contained a power brake-related defect. Consequently, only
about 1-2 percent of the total cars inspected contained a power brake-
related defect. Moreover, from the information provided it appears that
none of the trains contained in the BRC submission were involved in any
type of accident or incident related to the defective conditions
alleged.
FRA believes that the key to any inspection scheme developed for
long-distance intercity passenger trains is the quality of the
inspection which is performed at a train's point of origin. FRA is
convinced that if a train is properly inspected with highly qualified
inspectors and has 100 percent operative brakes at its point of origin,
then the train can easily travel up to 1,500 miles between brake
inspections without significant deterioration of the braking system.
FRA independently monitored a few long-distance intercity passenger
trains running from New York to Miami, New York to New Orleans, and New
York to Chicago and found that when the trains departed from their
point of origin with a brake system that was defect free they arrived
at destination without any defective conditions existing on the trains'
brake system. These findings are consistent with FRA's experience in
inspecting long-distance intercity passenger trains over the last
several years. It should be noted that during this independent
monitoring, FRA did find some trains that after receiving initial
terminal inspections still contained some defective conditions on the
brake system. Although FRA believes that none of the defective
conditions found would have prevented the safe operation of the trains,
FRA recognizes that FRA as well as the railroads must be vigilant in
ensuring that quality brake system inspections are performed on a train
at its point of origin and at each location where a Class I brake test
is required to be performed. Consequently, due to the comprehensive
nature of Class I brake tests and the exterior
[[Page 25568]]
calendar day mechanical inspection combined with the technological
advances incorporated into the braking systems utilized in these types
of trains and after a review of the data and information provided and
based on FRA's experience with these types of operations, FRA intends
to retain the proposed 1,500 mileage interval for the performance of
Class I brake tests in this final rule.
VII. Movement of Defective Equipment
A. Background
The current regulations do not contain requirements pertaining to
the movement of equipment with defective power brakes. The movement of
equipment with these types of defects is currently controlled by a
specific statutory provision originally enacted in 1910, which states:
(a) GENERAL.-- A vehicle that is equipped in compliance with
this chapter whose equipment becomes defective or insecure
nevertheless may be moved when necessary to make repairs, without a
penalty being imposed under section 21302 of this title, from the
place at which the defect or insecurity was first discovered to the
nearest available place at which the repairs can be made--
(1) on the railroad line on which the defect or insecurity was
discovered; or
(2) at the option of a connecting railroad carrier, on the
railroad line of the connecting carrier, if not further than the
place of repair described in clause (1) of this subsection.
49 U.S.C. 20303(a) (emphasis added).
Although there is no limit contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 as to the
number of cars with defective equipment that may be hauled in a train,
FRA has a longstanding interpretation which requires that, at a
minimum, 85 percent of the cars in a train have operative brakes. FRA
bases this interpretation on another statutory requirement which
permits a railroad to use a train only if Aat least 50 percent of the
vehicles in the train are equipped with power or train brakes and the
engineer is using the power or train brakes on those vehicles and on
all other vehicles equipped with them that are associated with those
vehicles in a train.'' 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally enacted
in 1903, section 20302 also granted the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) the authority to increase this percentage, and in 1910 the ICC
issued an order increasing the minimum percentage to 85 percent. See 49
CFR 232.1, which codified the ICC order.
As virtually all freight cars are presently equipped with power
brakes and are operated on an associated trainline, the statutory
requirement is in essence a requirement that 100 percent of the cars in
a train have operative power brakes, unless being hauled for repairs
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Consequently, FRA currently requires that
equipment with defective or inoperative air brakes make-up no more than
15 percent of the train and that, if it is necessary to move the
equipment from where the railroad first discovered it to be defective,
the defective equipment be moved no farther than the nearest place on
the railroad's line where the necessary repairs can be made or, at the
option of the receiving carrier, to a repair point that is no farther
than the repair point on the delivering line.
The requirements regarding the movement of equipment with defective
or insecure brakes noted above can and do create safety hazards as well
as operational difficulties in the area of commuter and intercity
passenger railroad operations. As the provisions regarding the movement
of defective brake equipment were written almost a century ago, they do
not address the realities of these types of operations in today's
world. Strict application of the requirements has the potential of
causing major disruptions of service and serious safety and security
problems. For example, requiring repairs to be made at the nearest
location where the necessary repairs can be made could result in
passengers being discharged between stations where adequate facilities
for their safety are not available or in the overcrowding of station
platforms and trailing trains due to discharging passengers from a
defective train at a location other than the passenger's destination.
In addition, strict application of the statutory requirements could
result in the moving of trains with defective brake equipment against
the current of traffic during busy commuting hours. Irregular movements
of this type increase the risk of collisions on the railroad.
Furthermore, many of today's commuter train operations often utilize
six cars or less in trains and in many instances operate just two-car
trains. Consequently, the necessity to cut out the brakes on one car
can easily result in noncompliance with the 85-percent requirement for
hauling the car for repairs, thus prohibiting the train's movement and
resulting in the same type of safety problems noted above.
B. Overview of 1997 NPRM
In the NPRM, FRA attempted to recognize the nature of commuter and
intercity passenger operations and the importance of addressing the
safety of passengers, as well as avoiding disruption of this service,
when applying the requirements regarding the movement of equipment with
defective brakes on a day-to-day basis. In addition, the
representatives of commuter and intercity passenger train operations
participating in the proceeding requested that the regulations be
brought up to date, recognizing that brakes will have to be cut out en
route from time to time (e.g., because of damage from debris on the
track structure or because of sticking brakes), and that contemporary
braking systems and established stopping distances provide a very
considerable margin of safety. Representatives from APTA proposed a
method of updating the existing requirements regarding the movement of
commuter passenger equipment with defective brakes to bring them more
in line with the realities of today's operations. FRA believed that the
restrictions proposed by APTA were very conservative and effectively
ensure a high level of safety in light of the reliability of braking
systems currently used in commuter and intercity passenger train
operations. FRA believed that affirmatively recognizing appropriate
movement restrictions would actually enhance safety, since compliance
with the existing restrictions is potentially unsafe.
FRA recognized that some of the restrictions proposed in the NPRM
were not in accord with the requirements contained in 49 U.S.C.
20303(a). Therefore, FRA proposed the utilization of the authority
granted in 49 U.S.C. 20306 to exempt passenger train operations covered
by this part from the statutory requirements contained in 49 U.S.C.
20303(a) permitting the movement of equipment with defective or
insecure brakes only if various requirements are met, including the
requirement that the movement for repair be only to the nearest
location where the necessary repairs can be made. FRA believed that the
granting of this exemption was justified based on the technological
advances made in the brake systems and equipment used in passenger
operations, and was necessary for these operations to make efficient
use of the technological advances and protect the safety of the riding
public. See 62 FR 49740-42, 49756-58. Although FRA recognized that it
could be argued that the purpose of section 20306 is too narrow to
comprehend the instant application, FRA believed that the use of the
provision as contemplated in this proposal was consistent with the
authority granted the Secretary of Transportation. As noted previously,
the
[[Page 25569]]
statutory requirements regarding the movement of equipment with
defective brake equipment were written nearly a century ago and, in
FRA's opinion, were focused generally on the operation of freight
equipment and did not contemplate the types of commuter and intercity
passenger train operations currently prevalent throughout the nation.
Since the original enactment in 1910 of the provisions now codified at
49 U.S.C. 20303(a), there have been substantial changes both in the
nature of the operations of passenger trains as well as in the
technology used in those operations.
In the NPRM, FRA noted that contemporary passenger equipment
incorporates various types of advanced braking systems; in some cases
these include electrical activation of brakes on each car (with
pneumatic application through the train line available as a backup).
Dynamic brakes are also typically employed to limit thermal stresses on
friction surfaces and to limit the wear and tear on the brake
equipment. Furthermore, the brake valves and brake components used
today are far more reliable than was the case several decades ago. In
addition to these technological advances, the brake equipment used in
commuter and intercity passenger train operations incorporate advanced
technologies not found with any regularity in freight operations. These
include:
The use of brake cylinder pressure indicators which
provide a reliable indication of the application and release of the
brakes.
The use of disc brakes which provide shorter stopping
distances and decrease the risk of thermal damage to wheels.
The ability to effectuate a graduated release of the
brakes due to a design feature of the brake equipment which permits
more flexibility and more forgiving train control.
The ability to cut out brakes on a per-axle or per-truck
basis rather than a per car basis, thus permitting greater use of those
brakes that are operable.
The use of a pressure-maintaining feature on each car
which continuously maintains the air pressure in the brake system,
thereby compensating for any leakage in the trainline and preventing a
total loss of air in the brake system.
The use of a separate trainline from the locomotive main
reservoir to continuously charge supply reservoirs independent of the
brake pipe train line.
Brake ratios that are 2\1/2\ times greater than the brake
ratios of loaded freight cars.
Although some of the technologies noted above have existed for
several decades, most of the technologies were not in wide spread use
until after 1980. Furthermore, most of the noted technological advances
just started to be integrated into one efficient and reliable braking
system within the last decade. In addition to the technological
advances, commuter and intercity passenger train operations have
experienced considerable growth in the last 15 years necessitating the
need to provide more reliable and efficient service to the riding
public. Since 1980, the number of commuter operations providing rail
service has almost doubled and the number of daily passengers serviced
by passenger operations has more than doubled over the same time
period. Furthermore, commuter and intercity passenger train operations
conduct more frequent single car tests, COT&S, and maintenance of the
braking systems than is generally the practice in the freight industry.
Consequently, FRA concluded that the technology incorporated into the
brake equipment used in today's commuter and intercity passenger train
operations has increased the reliability of the braking system and
permits the safe operation of the equipment for extended distances even
though a portion of the braking system may be inoperative or defective.
FRA also proposed an exemption for passenger train operations from
a long-standing agency interpretation, based on a 1910 ICC order
codified at 49 CFR 232.1, that prohibits the movement of a train for
repairs under 49 U.S.C. 20303 if less than 85 percent of the train's
brakes are operative. FRA found that many passenger operations utilize
a small number of cars in their trains and the necessity to cut out the
brakes on just one car can easily result in noncompliance. FRA believed
that the proposed speed restrictions would compensate for the loss of
brakes on a minority of cars. See 62 FR 49740-42, 49756-58.
Based on the preceding discussions, FRA proposed various
restrictions on the movement of vehicles with defective brake equipment
which allow commuter and intercity passenger train operations to take
advantage of the efficiencies created due to the advanced braking
systems these operations employ as well as the improvements made in
brake equipment over the years, while ensuring if not enhancing the
safety of the traveling public. See 62 FR 49756-58, 49796-98. FRA
proposed to permit trains to be operated with up to 50 percent
inoperative brakes to the next forward passenger station or terminal
based on the percentage of operative brakes, which may have resulted in
movements past locations where the necessary repairs could be made.
However, to ensure the safety of these trains with lower percentages of
operative brakes, FRA also proposed various speed restrictions and
other operating restrictions, based on the percentage of operative
brakes. FRA believed that the proposed speed restrictions were very
conservative and ensured a high level of safety. In fact, test data
established that with the proposed speed restrictions the stopping
distances of those trains with lower percentages of operative brakes
were shorter than if the trains were operating at normal speed and had
100 percent operative brakes. Consequently, FRA believed that the
proposed approach to the movement of equipment with defective brakes
not only enhanced the overall safety of train operations but benefitted
both the railroads, by providing operational flexibility, and the
traveling public, by permitting them to get to their destinations in a
more expedient and safe fashion.
FRA also proposed various requirements to ensure that equipment
being hauled for repairs is adequately identified. Currently, there is
no requirement that equipment with defective power brakes be tagged or
otherwise identified, although most railroads voluntarily engage in
such activity. Furthermore, the current regulations regarding freight
cars and locomotives contain tagging requirements for the movement of
equipment not in compliance with those parts. See 49 CFR 215.9 and
229.9. Therefore, FRA proposed specific requirements related to the
identification of equipment with defective power brakes through either
the traditional tags which are placed in established locations on the
equipment or by an automated tracking system developed by the railroad.
See 62 FR 49796-98. FRA also proposed that certain information be
contained whichever method was used by a railroad. FRA believed that
the proposed tagging or tracking requirements add reliability,
accountability, and enforceability to ensure the timely and proper
repair of equipment with defective power brakes.
FRA also proposed a new method for calculating the percentage of
operative power brakes (operative primary brakes) in a train. Although
the statute discusses the percentage of operative brakes in terms of a
percentage of vehicles, the statute was written nearly a century ago
and at that time the only way to cut out the brakes on a car or
locomotive was to cut out the entire unit. See 49 U.S.C.
20302(a)(5)(B).
[[Page 25570]]
Today, virtually every piece of equipment used in passenger service can
have the brakes cut out on a per-truck or per-axle basis. Consequently,
FRA merely proposed a method of calculating the percentage of operative
brakes based on the design of passenger equipment used today, and thus,
a means to more accurately reflect the true braking ability of the
train as a whole. FRA believed that the proposed method of calculation
was consistent with the intent of Congress when it drafted the
statutory requirement and simply recognized the technological
advancements made in braking systems over the last century.
Consequently, FRA proposed that the percentage of operative brakes
would be determined by dividing the number of axles in the train with
operative brakes by the total number of axles in the train.
Furthermore, for equipment utilizing tread brake units (TBU), FRA
proposed that the percentage of operative brakes be determined by
dividing the number of operative TBUs by the total number of TBUs. See
62 FR 49757, 49797.
The NPRM also contained proposed provisions regarding the movement
of equipment with other than power brake defects. See 62 FR 49758-59,
49798-99. There are currently no statutory or regulatory restrictions
on the movement of passenger cars with defective conditions that are
not power brake or safety appliance related. The proposed provisions
contained in the NPRM were similar to the provisions for moving
defective locomotives and freight cars currently contained in 49 CFR
229.9 and 215.9, respectively. As these provisions have generally
worked well with regard to the movement of defective locomotives and
freight cars and in order to maintain consistency, FRA modeled the
proposed movement requirements on those existing requirements. FRA
proposed to allow passenger railroads the flexibility to continue to
use equipment with non-safety-critical defects until the next scheduled
calendar day exterior mechanical inspection. However, FRA intended for
the calendar day mechanical inspections to be the tool used by
railroads to repair all reported defects and to prevent continued use
of defective equipment to carry passengers.
In the NPRM, FRA intended for 49 CFR 229.9 to continue to govern
the movement of locomotives used in passenger service which develop
defective conditions, not covered by part 238, that are not in
compliance with part 229. FRA also did not intend to alter the current
statutory requirements contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 regarding the
movement of passenger equipment with defective or insecure safety
appliances. Consequently, in the NPRM, FRA required that passenger
equipment that develops a defective or insecure safety appliance
continue to be subject to all the statutory restrictions on its
movement. It should be noted that the proposed requirements applicable
to Tier I equipment merely referenced the Railroad Safety Appliance
Standards (49 CFR part 231); however, FRA proposed separate safety
appliance requirements for Tier II passenger equipment.
FRA proposed that passenger equipment that is found with conditions
not in compliance with this part, other than power brake defects, be
moved only after a QMI has determined that the equipment is safe to
move and determined any restrictions necessary for the equipment's safe
movement. FRA also allowed railroads to move equipment based on an
assessment made by a QMI in communication with on-site personnel. FRA
proposes this based on the reality that mechanical personnel are not
readily available at every location on a railroad's line of road.
However, FRA further proposed that if a QMI does not actually inspect
the equipment to determine that it is safe to move, then, at the first
forward location where a QMI is on duty, an inspector will perform a
physical inspection of the equipment to confirm the initial assessment
made while in communication with on-site personnel previously.
The NPRM also required the tracking of defective equipment in
either of two ways. One option was to tag the equipment in a manner
similar to what is currently required under Sec. 215.9 for freight
cars. The second option was to record the specified information in an
automated tracking system. The latter alternative was offered to
provide railroads some flexibility and was made in recognition of
advances in electronic recordkeeping.
C. Discussion of Comments on the 1997 NPRM and General FRA Conclusions
1. Movement of Equipment With Defective Brakes
Labor representatives raised several concerns, both in their
written comments and at the Working Group meetings, regarding the
proposed provisions related to the movement of passenger equipment with
defective power brakes. These commenters objected to FRA's use of the
authority granted in 49 U.S.C. 20306 to exempt passenger train
operations covered by this part from the statutory requirements
contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(a) permitting the movement of equipment
with defective or insecure brakes only if various requirements are met,
including the requirement that the movement for repair be only to the
nearest location where the necessary repairs can be made. These
commenters contend that the statutory provisions contained in 49 U.S.C.
20306 were not intended to permit FRA to waive the movement for repair
provisions contained in the Safety Appliance Acts for an entire segment
of the industry. Furthermore, these commenters contend that FRA is
improperly relying on technological advances that exist on passenger
trains to invoke the authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306 because many of
the technological advances cited by FRA do not currently exist or are
not currently used on a large portion of the passenger fleet. Labor
representatives contend that passenger equipment which develops
defective brake equipment should only be permitted to move to a
location where the passengers can be off-loaded with appropriate speed
restrictions.
Labor representatives also objected to FRA's statement that the
term ``power brake defect'' does not include a failure to inspect such
a component. These commenters claim that FRA's exclusion of the failure
to properly inspect a brake component eliminates an important means of
enforcement necessary to ensure that proper power brake inspections are
performed. It is claimed that by excluding the failure to inspect from
being a power brake defect, FRA has eliminated any incentive for
railroads to ensure that trains have operative brakes because there
will be little financial repercussion to continuing to use improperly
inspected equipment. These commenters also objected to the proposed
provision that requires the railroad operating long-distance intercity
passenger trains to designate those location where power brake repairs
will be conducted. It is claimed that by allowing the carriers to
designate such locations the carrier is in absolute control of how far
defective equipment will travel and abuse of the provision may occur.
Labor representatives also objected to allowing railroads to use
automated tracking systems to record information regarding defective
equipment. These commenters believe that tagging the equipment must be
required in order for inspectors to readily identify defective
equipment. It is further contended that an automated tracking system is
susceptible to manipulation, abuse and reduces accountability. One
commenter recommended that FRA add further restrictions on the use and
movement of
[[Page 25571]]
cars with defective brakes at the front or rear of the train.
Railroad representatives and APTA representatives did not provide
many comments on the proposed provisions related to the movement of
passenger equipment with defective brakes. These commenters did note
that there was not a major benefit to the railroads with being able to
haul certain defective equipment to the next forward terminal as
proposed. These commenters did recommend that FRA provide the railroads
at least two years to develop and implement the defect reporting and
tracking system proposed in the NPRM.
After considering the written comments submitted and the
information provided at the Working Group meetings, FRA has determined
that some minor changes need to be made to the requirements proposed in
the NPRM regarding the movement of equipment with defective power
brakes. In order to avoid the legal implications involved with
employing the statutory authority contained at 49 U.S.C. 20306 for
exempting equipment from the statutory requirements related to safety
appliances and power brakes, and because railroad representatives
acknowledged that the flexibility provided through reliance on the
exemption is minimal, FRA will not rely on the statutory exemption
provision contained at 49 U.S.C. 20306 in this final rule and will
modify the movement for repair provisions accordingly. FRA will retain
the exemption for passenger train operations from a long-standing
agency interpretation that prohibits the movement of a train for
repairs under 49 U.S.C. 20303 if less than 85 percent of the train's
brakes are operative. The interpretation is based on a 1910 ICC order
codified at 49 CFR 232.1, FRA believes that this requirement is overly
restrictive when applied to passenger train operations as many
passenger operations utilize a small number of cars in their trains and
the necessity to cut out the brakes on just one car can easily result
in noncompliance. FRA believes that the retention of the speed
restrictions contained in the proposal will fully compensate for the
loss of brakes on a minority of cars. FRA rejects the BRC's
recommendation that passenger trains with defective brakes be permitted
to move no farther than the next passenger station because such a
stringent requirement is unnecessary, more restrictive that the current
statutory mandate regarding the movement of defective brake equipment,
and is radically counter to the way passenger trains currently handle
defective equipment.
FRA intends to retain those portions of the movement for repair
requirements that are consistent with the existing statutory provisions
regarding the movement of equipment with power brake defects and revise
those that are contrary. Therefore, passenger trains operating with 75-
99 percent operative brakes will not be permitted to travel to the next
forward terminal as proposed, but will be permitted to travel only to
the next forward location were the necessary repairs to the brake
equipment can be effectuated as mandated in the existing statute. In
FRA's view, all of the other proposed methods for moving defective
power brake equipment are consistent with and are in accordance with
the current statutory requirements and can be retained. For example,
FRA will retain the provisions which permit a passenger train with 50-
75 percent operative brakes to be moved at reduced speeds to the next
forward passenger station. Although the percentage of operative brakes
is lower than currently permitted by FRA's longstanding agency
interpretation (which FRA believes is fully compensated for by the
speed restrictions), FRA believes that the movement of the defective
equipment to the next passenger station is in accordance with the
statutory requirement as the safety of the passengers must be
considered in determining the nearest location where necessary repairs
can be made. In addition, permitting passenger trains to continue to
the next forward location where the necessary repairs can be performed
is also consistent with the statutory requirement as such movement is
necessary to ensure the safety of the traveling public by protecting
them from the hazards incident to performing movements against the
current of traffic. Furthermore, retention of the movement provisions
related to long-distance intercity passenger trains and long-distance
Tier II equipment are consistent with the current statutory
requirements as these provisions permit the movement of defective brake
equipment on these trains only to the next passenger station or the
next repair location, with various speed restrictions depending on the
percentage of operative brakes.
FRA will also retain the requirement that operators of long-
distance passenger trains designate the locations where repairs can be
conducted on the equipment. Although FRA agrees that this provision
puts the control of what locations constitute repair locations in the
hands of the railroad, FRA believes that the operators of these long-
distance intercity trains are in the best position to determine which
locations have the necessary expertise to handle the repairs of the
somewhat advanced braking systems utilized in passenger trains. Due to
the unique technologies used on the brake systems of these operations
and the unique operating environments, the facilities and personnel
necessary to conduct proper repairs on this equipment are somewhat
specialized and limited. Moreover, FRA is retaining the broad
performance-based requirement that railroads operating this equipment
designate a sufficient number of repair locations to ensure the safe
and timely repair of the equipment. Contrary to the beliefs of some
labor commenters, FRA believes that this performance standard provides
FRA sufficient grounds to institute civil penalty enforcement actions
or take other enforcement actions if, based on its expertise and
experience, FRA believes the railroad is failing to designate an
adequate number of repair locations.
Rather than attempt to develop a standard applicable to all
situations in the context of short-distance intercity and commuter
trains, which FRA does not believe can be accomplished, FRA intends to
approach the issue of what constitutes the next forward location where
repairs can be effectuated based on a case-by-case analysis of each
situation. FRA believes that its field inspectors are in the best
position to determine whether a railroad exercised good faith in
determining when and where to move a piece of defective equipment. In
making these determinations both the railroad as well as FRA's
inspectors must conduct a multi-factor analysis based on the facts of
each case. In determining whether a particular location is a location
where necessary repairs can be made or whether a location is the next
forward repair location in a passenger train context, the accessibility
of the location, the ability to safely make the repairs at that
location, and the safety of the passengers are the overriding factors
that must be considered in any analysis. These factors have a multitude
of sub-factors which must be considered, such as: the type of repair
required; the safety of employees responsible for conducting the
repairs; the safety of employees responsible for getting the equipment
to or from a particular location; the switching operations necessary to
effectuate the move; the railroad's recent history and current practice
of making repairs (brake and non-brake) at a particular location;
relevant weather
[[Page 25572]]
conditions; potential overcrowding of passenger platforms; and the
overcrowding of trailing trains.
FRA will also retain the requirement that equipment found with
conditions not in compliance with this part must be appropriately
tagged or recorded in an automated tracking system. Although FRA is
sensitive to the concerns raised by labor representatives regarding the
use of automated tracking systems, FRA believes that provisions must be
provided to allow railroads to take advantage of existing and
developing technologies regarding the electronic maintenance and
retention of records. Although railroad and FRA inspectors may require
additional training on the use of electronic records, FRA believes that
the use of such a medium to track defective equipment can expedite the
identification and repair of defective equipment and, thus, reduce the
time that defective equipment is operated in passenger service. In
response to labor's concerns, the final rule contains a provision which
will give FRA the ability to monitor and review a railroad's automated
tracking system and will provide FRA the ability to prohibit or revoke
a railroad's ability to utilize an automated tracking system in lieu of
directly tagging defective equipment if FRA finds that the automated
tracking system is not properly secure, inaccessible to FRA or a
railroad's employees, or fails to adequately track and monitor the
movement of defective equipment. Furthermore, if the automated tracking
system developed and implemented by a railroad does not accurately and
adequately record the information required by this part, the railroad
will be in violation of the movement for repair provisions and subject
to civil penalty liability.
In response to one labor commenter's concerns, FRA is slightly
modifying the provisions related to the operation of trains with
defective brakes on the front or rear car. In the NPRM, FRA proposed
that if the power brakes on the front or rear unit become inoperative
then a qualified person must be stationed at the handbrake on the unit.
See 62 FR 49797. FRA recognizes that in some instances the handbrake on
a car located at the front or rear of a train may not be accessible to
a member of the train crew or may be located outside the interior of
the car and, thus, unsafe for a crew member to operate while the train
is in motion. FRA also recognizes that in many circumstances when a car
at the front or rear of the train has inoperative brakes certain speed
restrictions should be placed on the train; however, FRA believes that
railroads are in the best position to determine what the appropriate
speed restriction should be given the circumstances involved.
Consequently, FRA is modifying the requirements for the use of such
cars and will add provisions requiring that appropriate speed
restrictions be imposed and that equipment with inaccessible handbrakes
or with handbrakes located outside the interior of a car be removed or
repositioned in the train at the first possible location.
FRA believes that the concern raised by certain labor
representatives regarding FRA's definition of ``power brake defect'' is
due to a lack of understanding of the proposed rule as well as a
misunderstanding of the current regulations. Under the current power
brake regulations the unit of violation for failure to inspect is the
train not individual cars, although FRA can take a separate violation
for each car containing a defective condition upon departure after the
train received or should have received an initial terminal inspection
or for each car not identified as defective after the performance of an
intermediate inspection. Moreover, the failure to inspect a piece of
equipment cannot be cured through any of the proposed provisions
regarding the movement of defective equipment. That is, if a railroad
fails to inspect a piece of equipment as required, the railroad cannot
avoid civil penalty liability by moving the equipment in accordance
with the proposed provisions. Furthermore, the final rule contains
specific civil penalties for a railroad's failure to perform
inspections as required. Railroads will also continue to be subject to
potential civil penalty for any car found in defective condition after
it has performed or should have performed a Class I or Class IA brake
test and any car not properly moved or identified as defective at other
times. The final rule will also retain the proposed provision providing
that passenger equipment will be considered ``in use'' prior to
departure but after it has received or should have received an
inspection required by this part. Thus, FRA inspectors will no longer
have to wait until a piece of equipment departs a location before
issuing a civil penalty, a practice continually criticized by both
labor and railroad representatives.
In addition, the NPRM as well as this final rule provides FRA
inspectors the ability to issue Special Notices for Repair, which
enable an FRA inspector to remove an unsafe piece of equipment from
service until appropriate action is taken by the railroad. See 62 FR
49790. This enforcement tool is not currently available to FRA
inspectors in the area of power brakes and mechanical components on
passenger equipment and could be used in circumstances where passenger
equipment is not inspected prior to being placed in service.
Consequently, the final rule will not only retain all of the
enforcement tools available to FRA under the current regulations but
will include other methods for ensuring compliance by the railroads and
provide both a financial and operational incentive for railroads to
properly inspect passenger equipment.
Some of the members of the Working Group, particularly those
representing labor organizations, expressed concern that any alteration
of the movement for repair provisions made in the context of commuter
and intercity passenger train operations may have a spillover effect
into the freight industry. FRA wishes to make clear that it has no
intention, at this time, of providing freight operations the
flexibility to handle defective brake equipment that it is providing
passenger operations. As noted above, many of the advanced brake system
technologies currently used in passenger service are not used in the
freight context. Furthermore, even if freight operations were to make
similar advances in the braking equipment they employ, this development
on the freight side may not create the efficiencies created in the
passenger train context since the operating environments of freight
trains and passenger trains differ significantly. More importantly, the
special safety considerations relative to passengers are not present in
freight operations.
2. Movement of Equipment With Other Than Power Brake Defects
Railroad representatives expressed some concerns regarding the
provisions related to the movement of equipment with other than a power
brake defect. The primary recommendation of these commenters was that
FRA should revise the proposed provisions to require the use of a
``qualified maintenance person'' (qualified mechanical inspector (QMI)
in the NPRM) only when a potentially safety-critical running gear
defect is involved. These commenters believed that the requirement to
have the car inspected by a QMP whenever a nonsafety-critical running
gear component becomes defective would impose unnecessary, significant
delays to their operations and is counter to current operating
practices. These commenters contended that a ``qualified person'' as
defined in the proposal would be sufficient to determine the safety
implications in moving many of the mechanical components covered by the
rule if they were to become defective en route. For example, it was
noted that
[[Page 25573]]
a highly qualified inspector was not necessary to determine whether a
car that experiences a defective door, cracked window, or burnt out
light bulbs could or should remain in service. Railroad representatives
also sought additional flexibility in the movement of equipment with a
nonsafety-critical running gear defect from a calendar day mechanical
inspection.
Labor representatives also raised a number of concerns with the
provisions related to the movement of equipment with other than power
brake defects. One concern raised by these commenters indicated that
FRA should not allow railroads to determine which mechanical components
are ``safety-critical'' as such an approach would create a massive
loophole and render some of the movement restrictions unenforceable.
These commenters also voiced concerns over FRA's proposal that an off-
site mechanical inspector could make an assessment regarding the safety
of moving a certain piece of equipment based on the communication with
on-site personnel. Although these commenters appeared to recognize the
flexibility provided by such an approach, they raised concerns that
such an approach is ripe for abuse and would require a mechanical
inspector to rely on the observation of personnel lacking the necessary
training and expertise. The commenters believed that further
restrictions need to be placed on these communications but they failed
to specify any specific restrictions that could be utilized. Labor
representatives again raised concerns over FRA's allowance of an
automated tracking system in lieu of direct tagging of defective
equipment. These commenters reiterated their concerns that such a
system can be easily manipulated and removes accountability from the
system of repairing defective equipment.
After review of the comments submitted and provided orally at the
Working Group meetings, FRA has made some modest changes in the final
rule regarding the movement of equipment with non-power brake defects.
FRA agrees with the comments of railroad representatives that the NPRM
may have been over-reaching in requiring a QMP to make a determination
regarding the safety of moving a piece of defective equipment for any
of the mechanical components addressed in this regulation. However, FRA
also agrees with the comments submitted by labor representatives that
railroads should not determine what components are considered safety-
critical. Therefore, FRA will require a determination regarding the
safety of moving a piece of equipment by a QMP whenever a potential
running gear defect is involved. FRA rejects the language proposed by
APTA that the defect be a potentially ``safety-critical'' running gear
defect as FRA believes that any defect to a running gear component is
potentially safety-critical. In order to avoid confusion, FRA is
providing an explicit definition of ``running gear defect.'' FRA is
defining the term to mean any defective condition which involves a
truck component, the propulsion system, the draft system, a wheel or a
wheel component. In the final rule, FRA will permit the use of a
qualified person to determine the safety and establish appropriate
movement restrictions on continued use of equipment which involves non-
running gear defects.
FRA will also provide very limited flexibility to the railroads to
operate defective equipment from a location where a calendar day
mechanical inspection was performed in order to effectuate repairs. FRA
intends for the calendar mechanical inspection to be as comprehensive
as possible and to be the time when all defective components are
identified and repaired. In order to ensure that these daily
inspections are performed by highly qualified personnel, FRA has
provided the railroads with considerable flexibility to perform these
inspections at locations that are best suited to a quality and
comprehensive inspection. Therefore, FRA will permit the movement of
defective equipment from these inspection locations with very stringent
restrictions. Equipment containing running gear defects may only be
moved from such locations if it is not in passenger service and is in a
non-revenue train. Equipment containing non-running gear defects may be
moved in a revenue train provide the equipment is locked-out and empty.
Any equipment moved must also be properly identified and moved in
accordance with any movement restriction imposed. FRA believes these
stringent movement restrictions will provide railroads limited
flexibility to move defective equipment to a location where it can best
be repaired but will limit a railroad's desire or ability to move
defective equipment from these inspection locations and will encourage
the performance of the calendar day mechanical inspections at locations
where repairs to equipment can be conducted.
FRA has also retained the requirement that the QMP may make his or
her determination regarding the continued use of equipment containing a
potential running gear defect based on the description provided by on-
site personnel. Although FRA recognizes the concerns raised by labor
representatives, FRA believes that the rule must recognize the reality
of current operations and acknowledge the fact that mechanical
personnel are not readily available at every location on a railroad's
line of road. Furthermore, when such off-site determinations are made
the rule requires that the equipment only be moved to the next forward
location where the equipment can be inspected by a QMP to verify the
description of the defect provided by the on-site personnel.
FRA is also adding a provision to the requirements dealing with the
movement of equipment with other than power brake defects to address
the inspection of roller bearings on a car whose truck is involved in a
derailment. The added requirement prohibits a railroad from continuing
in service a piece of passenger equipment that has a roller bearing
whose truck was involved in a derailment unless the bearing is
inspected and tested in accordance with the stated provisions. The
added provision is identical to the requirement currently contained in
49 CFR Sec. 215.115(b). Although the existing provision is applicable
to freight cars, virtually every passenger train operation follows the
provisions contained in that section prior to returning a piece of
equipment to service after it was involved in a derailment and, thus,
should not result in any added burden to the industry. FRA believes
that the practice is critical to ensuring the proper operation of the
roller bearing after a derailment occurs and should be incorporated
into this final rule.
FRA also intends to make clear that the movement of equipment with
a defective safety appliance will continue to be governed by the
statutory provisions contained at 49 U.S.C. 20303. As noted previously
this provision permits the movement of defective equipment to the
nearest location where the necessary repairs can be made. The
determination of what constitutes the nearest location where the
necessary repairs can be effectuated in a safety appliance context is
identical to the analysis required when dealing with a power brake
defect. In making these determinations both the railroad as well as
FRA's inspectors must conduct a multi-factor analysis based on the
facts of each case. In determining whether a particular location is a
location where necessary repairs can be made or whether a location is
the nearest repair location in a passenger train context, the
accessibility of the location, the ability to safely make the repairs
at that location, and the safety of the
[[Page 25574]]
passengers are the overriding factors that must be considered in any
analysis. These factors have a multitude of sub-factors which must be
considered, such as: the type of repair required; the safety of the
passengers if a move against the current of traffic is conducted; the
safety of employees responsible for conducting the repairs; the safety
of employees responsible for getting the equipment to or from a
particular location; the switching operations necessary to effectuate
the move; the railroad's recent history and current practice of making
repairs (brake and non-brake) at a particular location; relevant
weather conditions; potential overcrowding of passenger platforms; and
the overcrowding of trailing trains. Therefore, in many circumstances
trains will be permitted to continue to the next forward location where
the necessary repairs can be performed as such movement is necessary to
ensure the safety of the traveling public by protecting them from the
hazards incident to performing movements against the current of
traffic.
VIII. FRA's Passenger Train Safety Initiatives
This final rule is part of several related and complementary
efforts by FRA to improve the safety of rail passenger service. FRA has
issued regulations governing emergency preparedness and emergency
response procedures for rail passenger service in a separate rulemaking
proceeding, designated as FRA No. PTEP-1. See 63 FR 24630, May 4, 1998.
FRA formed a separate working group (the Passenger Train Emergency
Preparedness Working Group) to assist FRA in the development of such
regulations. This related proceeding has addressed some of the issues
FRA originally identified in the ANPRM on passenger equipment safety.
Persons wishing to receive more information regarding this other
rulemaking should contact Mr. Edward R. English, Director, Office of
Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 1120 Vermont Avenue, Mail Stop
25, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone number: 202-493-6300), or David
H. Kasminoff, Esq., Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1120
Vermont Avenue, Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: 202-
493-6043).
Further, in response to the separate collisions involving New
Jersey Transit and MARC trains in early 1996, FRA issued Emergency
Order No. 20 (Notice No. 1) on February 20, 1996, requiring prompt
action to immediately enhance passenger train operating rules and
emergency egress and to develop an interim system safety plan
addressing the safety of operations that permit passengers to occupy
the leading car in a train. 61 FR 6876, Feb. 22, 1996. Both the New
Jersey Transit and MARC train collisions involved operations where a
cab car occupied the lead position in a passenger train. The Emergency
Order explained that in collisions involving the front of a passenger
train, operating with a cab car in the forward position or a multiple
unit (MU) locomotive, i.e., a self-propelled locomotive with passenger
seating, presents an increased risk of severe personal injury or death
as compared with locomotive-hauled service when the locomotive occupies
the lead position in the train and thereby acts as a buffer for the
trailing passenger cars. This risk is of particular concern where
operations are conducted at relatively higher speeds, where there is a
mix of various types of trains, and where there are numerous highway-
rail crossings over which large motor vehicles are operated.
Accordingly, the Emergency Order required in particular that
``railroads operating scheduled intercity or commuter rail service * *
* conduct an analysis of their operations and file with FRA an interim
safety plan indicating the manner in which risk of a collision
involving a cab car is addressed.'' 61 FR 6879.
The Emergency Order also noted that there is a need to ensure that
emergency exits are clearly marked and in operable condition on all
passenger lines, regardless of the equipment or train control system
used. Although FRA Safety Glazing Standards, 49 CFR part 223, require
that passenger cars have a minimum of four emergency window exits
``designed to permit rapid and easy removal during a crisis
situation,'' the Silver Spring collision raised concerns that at least
some of the occupants of the MARC train attempted unsuccessfully to
exit through the windows. The Emergency Order requires ``that any
emergency windows that are not already legibly marked as such on the
inside and outside be so marked, and that a representative sample of
all such windows be examined to ensure operability.'' 61 FR 6880. On
February 29, 1996, FRA issued Notice No. 2 to Emergency Order No. 20 to
refine three aspects of the original order, including providing more
detailed guidance on the emergency egress sampling provision. 61 FR
8703, Mar. 5, 1996.
In addition, FRA submitted a report to Congress on locomotive
crashworthiness and working conditions on September 18, 1996, and
subsequently referred the issues raised in the report to the RSAC. FRA
established RSAC in March of 1996, to provide FRA with advice and
recommendations on railroad safety matters. See 61 FR 9740, Mar. 11,
1996. RSAC consists of 48 individual representatives, drawn from 27
organizations representing various rail industry perspectives, and two
associate nonvoting representatives from the agencies with railroad
safety regulatory responsibility in Canada and Mexico. In September of
1997, FRA convened the Locomotive Crashworthiness Working Group through
RSAC to make recommendations as to the best way to address the findings
of FRA's report to Congress, including developing standards regarding a
broad range of crashworthiness issues for both passenger and freight
locomotives. In the context of improving railroad communications, RSAC
established a working group to specifically address communication
facilities and procedures, with a strong emphasis on passenger train
emergency requirements. The final rule that resulted from this effort
was published on September 4, 1998, reflecting the consensus
recommendations of the RSAC. 63 FR 47182.
FRA notes that, in its comments on the NPRM, Siemens Transportation
Systems, Inc., (Siemens) stated that much of the safety standard
changes for passenger rail cars could be scaled back if more
consideration were given to the technology that is available for crash
avoidance safety systems. Siemens believed the principal safety focus
should be on efforts to avoid collisions in the first place, such as
those at highway-rail grade crossings and with other trains.
FRA recognizes that rail passenger safety involves the safety of
the railroad system as a whole. FRA does have active rulemaking and
research projects in a variety of contexts, including signal and train
control systems, and grade crossing safety. FRA also has existing
regulations governing both railroad and grade crossing signal system
safety, for example. (See 49 C.F.R. parts 233-236.) Nevertheless, this
final rule is designed to address the specific statutory mandate that
minimum standards be prescribed for the safety of cars used to
transport railroad passengers, as noted above.
IX. Section-by-Section Analysis
This section-by-section analysis will explain the provisions of the
final rule and the changes made from the 1997 NPRM. Of course, a number
of the issues and provisions involving this rule have been discussed
and addressed in detail in the preceding discussions. Accordingly, the
preceding discussions should be considered in conjunction
[[Page 25575]]
with those below and will be referred to as appropriate.
Amendments to 49 CFR Part 216
Part 216 authorizes certain FRA and participating State inspectors
to issue Special Notices for Repair, under specified conditions, for
freight cars with defects under part 215, locomotives with defects
under parts 229 or 230 or 49 U.S.C. chapter 207, and track with defects
under part 213. The revisions to part 216 contained in this final rule
will create a fourth category of Special Notices for Repair: for
passenger equipment with defects under part 238. Consequently, if an
inspector determines that noncomplying passenger equipment is ``unsafe
for further service'' and issues a Special Notice for Repair, the
railroad will be required to take the passenger equipment out of
service, to make repairs to bring the equipment into compliance with
part 238, and to report the repairs to FRA. The final rule also makes
conforming changes to part 216 reflecting this new enforcement tool.
This final rule also includes various technical amendments to
update part 216 to reflect the following: (1) Internal organizational
changes within FRA; (2) the division of former part 230, Locomotive
Inspection Regulations, into parts 229 and 230 and the redesignation of
those portions of former part 230 related to non-steam locomotives as
part 229, Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards; and (3) the repeal,
reenactment without substantive change, and recodification of the
Federal railroad safety laws in 1994. See 45 FR 21092, Mar. 31, 1980;
Pub. L. 103-272, July 5, 1994.
Amendments to 49 CFR Parts 223, 229, 231, and 232
FRA is making conforming changes to the applicability sections of
FRA's Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards, Railroad Safety Appliance
Standards, and railroad power brakes and drawbars regulations that were
necessitated by provisions contained in this new part 238. In this
final rule, FRA has adjusted the application of provisions in parts
229, 231, or 232 or has deleted certain provisions in those parts to
avoid duplication of provisions in part 238. FRA has not deleted the
passenger train brake test and maintenance requirements from part 232,
at this time, because part 238 will not cover certain operations
subject to part 232, e.g., tourist, historic, scenic, and excursion
railroad operations on the general system. Moreover, the requirements
contained in part 232 will continue to apply to passenger operations
until the requirements contained in part 238 become effective to such
operations. FRA is also making a technical amendment to part 223 so as
to reference the additional emergency window exit and window safety
glazing requirements found in part 238.
49 CFR Part 238
Subpart A--General
Section 238.1 Purpose and Scope
Paragraph (a) states the purpose of the rule to prevent collisions,
derailments, and other occurrences involving railroad passenger
equipment that cause injury or death to railroad employees, railroad
passengers, and the general public; and to mitigate the consequences of
such occurrences to the extent they cannot be prevented. Paragraph (b)
states that the regulations in this part provide minimum standards for
the subjects addressed. FRA has nonetheless specified in places
throughout the regulatory text that the prescribed requirements are
only minimum standards so as to reinforce this principle. Railroads and
other persons subject to this part may adopt and enforce more stringent
requirements, so long as they are not inconsistent with this part.
Paragraph (c) contains the dates upon which railroads covered by
this part will be required to comply with the requirements contained in
this final rule related to the inspection, testing, maintenance,
training, and movement of defective equipment. FRA recognizes the
interrelationship between the proper training of railroad personnel and
the implementation of the inspection, testing, maintenance and movement
of defective equipment provisions contained in the final rule. FRA
realizes that in order for railroads to comply with the requirements
related to the inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements and
the requirements regarding the movement of defective equipment, the
railroads must first be provided a sufficient amount of time to develop
and implement a proper training program. Based on information received
by FRA, it appears that many railroads are in the initial stages of
developing training programs or modifying existing programs to meet the
requirements of this final rule and that this process should be
completed within a year. After the development of the training programs
the railroads will need several months to a year to rotate their
employees through the programs in order not to disrupt the operation of
their railroads. Thus, FRA believes that 26 months is a sufficient
amount of time for railroads to develop and train their employees as
required by this final rule. Consequently, FRA will require compliance
with the inspection, testing, and maintenance provisions as well the
movement of defective equipment provisions after that same 26 month
period.
FRA also recognizes that there are certain aspects of the
inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements as well as the
movement of defective equipment provisions that provide operational
flexibility to the railroads. Due to this flexibility, FRA believes
that some railroads will desire the ability to begin operations under
the inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements and the movement
of defective equipment provisions as soon as their employees have been
properly trained. Therefore, FRA has included provisions which allow a
railroad to notify FRA in writing that it is willing to begin
compliance with the inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements
and the movement of defective equipment provisions some time earlier
than the 26 months provided. FRA wishes to make clear that it does not
intend for railroads to take advantage of the flexibility provided
under some of the provisions unless the railroad is willing to comply
with all the requirements contained in those provisions. Thus, in order
to begin operating under any of the provisions contained in subpart D,
except the maintenance requirements contained in Secs. 238.309 and
238.311, or to operate defective equipment under Secs. 238.15 or
238.17, the railroad must be performing all of the requirements
contained in those sections and that subpart.
As the maintenance requirements regarding the periodic performance
of COT&S and the performance of single car tests, contained in
Secs. 238.309 and 238.311, are separable from the inspection
requirements, FRA will permit railroads to request earlier application
of those two sections. However, in order to begin operation under
either of these two sections, the railroad must be willing to operate
in accordance with all of the provisions in both sections. That is, the
provisions contained in Secs. 238.309 and 238.311 must be implemented
as a package and cannot be implemented separately, except for the
requirements related to the performance of COT&S on locomotives. This
paragraph makes clear that the requirements related to the performance
of COT&S on MU locomotives and conventional locomotives will become
effective September 9, 1999. As discussed in more detail in the
section-by-section analysis of Sec. 238.309, FRA believes that the
extensions of COT&S contained in
[[Page 25576]]
paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sec. 238.309 are supported either by the
tests conducted by Metro-North or are a practice that has been approved
by waiver for several years. Furthermore, there is no corresponding
single car testing requirement applicable to MU and conventional
locomotives.
As a point of clarification, FRA makes clear that a railroad will
be subject to compliance under the existing inspection, testing, and
maintenance provisions contained in part 232 of this chapter until the
railroad is required to operate under the inspection and testing
provisions of this part (i.e., 26 months) or until the railroad
voluntarily commits to operate under the provisions of this part.
Section 238.3 Application
As a general matter, in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2), the rule
applies to all railroads that operate intercity passenger train service
on the general railroad system of transportation or provide commuter or
other short-haul passenger train service in a metropolitan or suburban
area; that is, the rule applies to commuter or other short-haul service
described in paragraph (a)(2) regardless of whether that service is
connected to the general railroad system. A public authority that
indirectly provides passenger train service by contracting out the
actual operation to another railroad or independent contractor would be
regulated by FRA as a railroad under the provisions of this rule. In
order to avoid confusion, FRA has omitted proposed paragraph (a)(3)
regarding the rule's applicability to rapid transit operations as these
types of operations, which are merely a subset of ``commuter or other
short-haul rail passenger train service,'' are sufficiently covered
under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) in the final rule. Paragraph (b)
makes explicit the liability imposed by statute, 49 U.S.C. 20303, on a
railroad that owns track over which another railroad hauls or uses
equipment with a power brake or safety appliance defect. Under
paragraph (b), a railroad that permits operations over its trackage by
passenger equipment subject to this part that does not comply with a
power brake provision of this part or a safety appliance provision of
this part is subject to the power brake and safety appliance provisions
of this part with respect to such operations that it permits.
This section contains no explicit reference to private cars. Rather
than addressing the scope of applicability of part 238 to private cars
in this section, FRA has indicated in the particular substantive
sections of the rule whether private cars are covered, according to the
terms of those sections. FRA has applied certain requirements of the
rule to private cars that operate on railroads subject to this part.
FRA has taken into account the burden imposed by requiring private car
owners and operators to conform to the requirements of this part.
Further, FRA recognizes that private cars are often hauled by railroads
such as Amtrak and commuter railroads which often impose their own
safety requirements on the operation of the private cars. Accordingly,
FRA has limited the application of the rule only to those requirements
necessary to ensure the safe operation of the passenger train that is
hauling the private car. For instance, private cars are subject to
brake inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements.
The rule is structured to apply to intercity, commuter and other
short-haul service, but not to tourist, scenic, historic, and excursion
operations. The term ``tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion
operations'' is defined in Sec. 238.5 to mean ''railroad operations
that carry passengers, often using antiquated equipment, with the
conveyance of the passengers to a particular destination not being the
principal purpose.'' The term refers to the particular physical
operation, not to the nature of the railroad company as a whole that
conducts the operation. As a result, part 238 exempts not only a
recreational train ride by a tourist railroad company that employs five
people but also a recreational train ride by the Union Pacific Railroad
Company, a Class I freight railroad. FRA has not yet had the
opportunity to fully consult with tourist and historic railroad
operators and their associations to determine the appropriate
applicability of the provisions contained in this final rule to such
railroad operations. The Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of
1994 directs FRA to examine the unique circumstances of tourist
railroads when establishing safety regulations. The Act, which amended
49 U.S.C. 20103, states that:
In prescribing regulations that pertain to railroad safety that
affect tourist, historic, scenic, or excursion railroad carriers,
the Secretary of Transportation shall take into consideration any
financial, operational, or other factors that may be unique to such
railroad carriers. The Secretary shall submit a report to Congress
not later than September 30, 1995, on actions taken under this
subsection.
Pub. L. 103-440, Sec. 217, 108 Stat. 4619, 4624, November 2, 1994. In
its 1996 report to Congress entitled ``Regulatory Actions Affecting
Tourist Railroads,'' FRA responded to the direction in the statutory
provision and also provided additional information related to tourist
railroad safety for consideration of the Congress.
Section 215 of the 1994 Act specifically permits FRA to exempt
equipment used by tourist, historic, scenic, and excursion railroads to
transport passengers from the initial regulations required to be
prescribed by November 2, 1997. 49 U.S.C. 20133(b)(1). FRA is
addressing the passenger equipment safety concerns for these unique
types of operations through the Tourist and Historic Railroads Working
Group formed under RSAC. Any requirements applicable to these
operations will be part of a separate rulemaking proceeding.
FRA notes that the Syracuse, Binghamton and New York Railroad
Corporation (SBNY) commented on the application of the rule to its
passenger shuttle and excursion service on approximately ten miles of
trackage shared with rail freight traffic in the city of Syracuse and
county of Onondaga, New York. SBNY commented that, although it
understands its excursion service would be exempt from the rule, its
shuttle operations appear to fall directly within the proposed
regulation. SBNY believed that applying the proposed regulations to its
shuttle service would impose a significant and unbearable burden with
little if any improvement in safety. SBNY asked that the rule expressly
except from its application passenger train operations on track that is
limited to operating speeds of 30 mph or less.
FRA believes the SBNY is properly characterized as a commuter or
other short-haul railroad subject to this part. FRA has not adopted
SNBY's recommendation to change the application of the final rule so as
to except passenger train operations on track that is limited to
operating speeds of 30 mph or less. First of all, any such operation
must already comply with existing regulations affecting railroad
passenger equipment safety, such as the locomotive safety standards (49
C.F.R. part 229), and standards on railroad power brakes and drawbars
(49 C.F.R. part 231). Second, many provisions of the final rule itself
cannot logically be distinguished in any manner on the basis of
operating speed. For instance, materials in locomotives and passenger
cars should be required to comply with the testing standards for
flammability and smoke emissions characteristics to protect against
sources of ignition--no matter the operating speed of the equipment.
Finally, FRA notes that
[[Page 25577]]
SBNY operates conventional diesel multiple-unit passenger equipment
built to AAR standards. Accordingly, the railroad should not experience
burdens related to structural standards. If there are unique factors
present with regard to SBNY's equipment, the waiver process may provide
a way of accommodating those differences.
The requirements of this rule do not apply to circus trains. In its
comments on the NPRM, Feld Entertainment, Inc., (Feld), parent company
of Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey circus (Ringling Bros.),
supported the rule's consideration of the special circumstances of
certain classes of rail carriers, such as private passenger cars and
circus trains. Feld stated on behalf of Ringling Bros. that it
suspended the use of rim-stamped straight-plate wheels on its tread-
braked passenger cars following the 1994 derailment of a circus train
in Lakeland, Florida. See 62 FR 49743. Feld also stated that Ringling
Bros. takes seriously its commitment to the safety of its employees and
animals. FRA anticipates deferring further consideration of applying
any of the requirements in this final rule to circus trains to the
Tourist and Historic Railroads Working Group.
Section 238.5 Definitions
This section contains a set of definitions to introduce the
regulations. FRA intends these definitions to clarify the meaning of
important terms as they are used in the text of the rule. Several of
the definitions involve new or fundamental concepts which require
further discussion.
``Brake indicator'' means a device, actuated by brake cylinder
pressure, which indicates whether brakes are applied or released on a
car. The use of brake indicators in the performance of brake tests is a
controversial subject. Rail labor organizations correctly maintain that
brake indicators are not fully reliable indicators of brake application
and release on each car in the train. Further, railroads correctly
maintain that reliance on brake indicators is necessary because
inspectors cannot always safely observe brake application and release.
FRA believes that brake indicators serve an important role in the
performance of brake tests. FRA has specified three different types of
brake tests--Class I, Class IA, and Class II (described below)--that
must be performed on passenger equipment. Railroads should perform
Class I brake tests so that the inspector is able to actually observe
brake application and release. However, FRA believes that during the
performance of a Class IA brake test, railroads may rely on brake
indicators if they determine that the inspector cannot safely make a
direct observation of the brake application or release.
``Primary brake'' and ``secondary brake'' are complementary
definitions. ``Primary brake'' refers to ``those components of the
train brake system necessary to stop the train within the signal
spacing distance without thermal damage to friction braking surfaces,''
while ``secondary brake'' refers to ``those components of the train
brake system which develop supplemental brake retarding force that is
not needed to stop the train within signal spacing distances or to
prevent thermal damage to wheels.'' FRA provides these definitions to
help draw the line between safety and economics of brake systems.
Railroads have long held that the dynamic portion of a blended brake is
not a safety system. Under the provisions in this final rule, railroads
must demonstrate through testing and analysis that the dynamic brake
fits the definition of a secondary brake. Defective primary braking
systems are a serious safety problem that railroads must address
immediately. Defective secondary braking systems, as defined in
Sec. 238.5, are not a serious safety concern, because, by definition,
their failure does not result in unacceptable thermal inputs into
friction brake components. Accordingly, FRA intends to allow railroads
more flexibility in dealing with defective secondary braking systems.
Three brake tests are fundamental to this final rule. A ``Class I
brake test'' means a complete passenger train brake system test as
further specified in Sec. 238.313. The Class I test is the most
complete test. It must be performed once each calendar day that a
passenger train is in service by a qualified maintenance person. The
Class I test is intended to replace the current initial terminal brake
test. See 49 CFR 232.12(c)-(j). The Class I test is much more tailored
to the specific designs of passenger equipment than the initial
terminal brake test that is required now.
A ``Class IA brake test'' means a test and inspection (as further
specified in Sec. 238.315) of the air brake system on each car in a
passenger train to ensure the air brake system functions as intended in
response to the command sent through the train line. The Class IA test
is a somewhat less complete test than the Class I test and is intended
to be very similar to the current 1,000-mile brake test. An important
difference between the Class I and Class IA tests is that the Class IA
test may be performed by qualified persons as long as they have been
properly trained and designated by the railroad to perform the
inspection. The Class IA test allows commuter railroads the flexibility
to have trains depart their first run of the day from an outlying point
without having to station qualified maintenance persons at all outlying
points. If railroads take advantage of the flexibility offered by the
Class IA test, they must follow-up with a Class I test sometime during
the day.
A ``Class II train brake test'' means a test (as further specified
in Sec. 238.317) of brake pipe integrity and continuity from
controlling locomotive to rear car. The Class II brake test is a simple
set-and-release test intended to replace the passenger train
intermediate terminal air brake test. See 49 CFR 232.13(b). The Class
II test is also tailored to the special design of the passenger
equipment.
The concept of ``ordered'' is vital to the correct application of
this final rule. As applied to the acquisition of equipment, the term
means that the acquiring entity has given a notice to proceed to
manufacture the equipment that represents a firm financial commitment
to compensate the manufacturer for the contract price of the equipment
or for damages if the order is nullified. Equipment is not ordered if
future exercise of a contract option is required to place the
remanufacturing process in motion. Many of the provisions of this final
rule, particularly structural requirements, will apply only to newly
constructed equipment. When FRA applies certain requirements only to
passenger equipment ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or placed in
service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002, FRA intends
to ``grandfather'' in this regard any equipment that is both ordered
before September 8, 2000, and placed in service for the first time
before September 9, 2002. FRA believes this approach will allow
railroads to minimize, or avoid altogether, any costs associated with
changes to existing orders and yet limit the delay in realizing the
safety benefits of the requirements in this rule.
FRA's definition of ``passenger car'' goes beyond its traditional
meaning. ``Passenger car'' means rail rolling equipment intended to
provide transportation for members of the general public and includes a
self-propelled car designed to carry passengers, baggage, mail, or
express. This term includes a cab car, an MU locomotive, and a
passenger coach. A cab car and an MU locomotive are also a
``locomotive'' under this rule. In the context of articulated
equipment, ``passenger car'' means that segment of the rail rolling
equipment located
[[Page 25578]]
between two trucks. This term does not include a private car.
``Passenger coach'' means rail rolling equipment intended to provide
transportation for members of the general public that is without
propelling motors and without a control stand; therefore, passenger
coaches are a subset of passenger cars. ``Control stand'' is defined in
The Railroad Dictionary of Car and Locomotive Terms (Simmons-Boardman
Publishing Corp. 1980), as ```[t]he upright column upon which the
throttle control, reverser handle, transition lever, and dynamic
braking control are mounted within convenient reach of the engineer on
a locomotive. The air gauges and some switches are also included on the
control stand.''
``Passenger equipment'' is the most inclusive definition. It means
all powered and unpowered passenger cars, locomotives used to haul a
passenger car, and any other rail rolling equipment used in a train
with one or more passenger cars. ``Passenger equipment'' includes a (1)
passenger coach, (2) cab car, (3) MU locomotive, (4) locomotive not
intended to provide transportation for members of the general public
that is used to power a passenger train, and (5) any non-self-propelled
vehicle used in a train with one or more passenger cars. The term
therefore covers a baggage car, express car, freight car, mail car or a
private car when used in a train with one or more passenger cars. In
the context of articulated equipment, ``passenger equipment'' means
that segment of rail rolling equipment located between two trucks that
is used in a train with one or more passenger cars. However, this term
does not include a freight locomotive when used to haul a passenger
train due to failure of a passenger locomotive.
It should be noted that the definition of passenger equipment has
been somewhat modified from that which was proposed in the NPRM. See 62
FR 49794. The change in the definition is based on comments from the
AAPRCO and the American Short Line Railroad Association (ASLRA), and
clarifies FRA's intent with regard to private cars. Under the final
rule, FRA makes clear that a private car is considered ``passenger
equipment'' for purposes of this rule only when it is used in a train
with one or more passenger cars. Consequently, a private car will not
be considered ``passenger equipment'' under the rule when the private
car is being used alone; or used in a train consisting only of private
cars or freight cars, or both. This approach is consistent with FRA's
intent in drafting the NPRM, and fully incorporates the AAPRCO's and
ASLRA's comments.
FRA has also modified the definition of ``passenger equipment'' so
that the term does not include a freight locomotive when used to haul a
passenger train due to failure of a passenger locomotive. At the
Working Group meeting in December, 1997, the AAR had raised the concern
that the proposed rule did not provide an exclusion for a freight
locomotive used to haul a passenger train for relief purposes. FRA
believes that a limited exception is warranted for a freight locomotive
used to haul a passenger train due to the failure of the passenger
train's own motive power; FRA does not wish for the passenger train to
be stranded. FRA has modified the definition of the term ``locomotive''
accordingly in this final rule.
In the context of articulated equipment, FRA has clarified that
``passenger equipment'' means that segment of rail rolling equipment
located between two trucks that is used in a train with one or more
passenger cars. In the NPRM, FRA had used similar language in the
definition of ``unit'' (see 62 FR 49796). Since the definition of
``unit'' itself draws upon the definition of ``passenger equipment,''
FRA has decided to insert this clarifying language here.
The terms ``passenger station'' and ``terminal'' are crucial to
understanding the requirements related to the inspection of equipment
and the movement of defective equipment contained in this final rule.
``Passenger station'' means a location designated in the railroad's
timetable where passengers are regularly scheduled to get on or off any
train. Under certain carefully controlled conditions, the rule permits
a passenger train with defective equipment to move to the next forward
passenger station. This flexibility is allowed to prevent railroads
from discharging passengers in potentially unsafe locations and to
minimize schedule impacts where this can safely be done. By contrast,
``terminal'' means a train's starting point or ending point of a single
scheduled trip, where passengers may embark or disembark a train;
normally, a ``terminal'' is a point where the train would reverse
direction or change destinations.
The concepts of ``qualified person'' and ``qualified maintenance
person'' are vital to understanding the required inspection, testing,
and maintenance provisions of the rule. A ``qualified person'' is a
person determined by the railroad to have the knowledge and skills
necessary to perform one or more functions required under this part.
With the proper training, a train crewmember could be a qualified
person.
A ``qualified maintenance person'' is a ``qualified person'' who as
a part of the training, qualification, and designation program required
under Sec. 238.111 has received instruction and training that includes
``hands-on'' experience (under appropriate supervision or
apprenticeship) in one or more of the following functions: trouble-
shooting, inspection, testing, maintenance or repair of the specific
train brake and other components and systems for which the inspector is
assigned responsibility. This person shall also possess a current
understanding of what is required to properly repair and maintain the
safety-critical brake or mechanical components for which the person is
assigned responsibility. Further, the qualified maintenance person
shall be a person whose primary responsibility includes work generally
consistent with the above-referenced functions and is designated to:
(1) conduct Class I brake tests under this part; (2) conduct exterior
calendar day and periodic mechanical inspections on MU locomotives or
other passenger cars and unpowered vehicles under this part; or (3)
determine whether equipment not in compliance with this part may be
moved as required by Sec. 238.17.
As noted in detail in the preceding general preamble discussion,
FRA is slightly modifying the terminology and definition of these
highly qualified inspectors from that proposed in the 1997 NPRM in
order to address the concerns by some commenters and to clarify the
definition as much as possible. In the 1997 NPRM, FRA proposed the term
``qualified mechanical inspector'' (QMI) to describe these highly
qualified inspectors. FRA recognizes the concern raised by some
commenters, that the term QMI might result in employees designated as
such to seek some sort of premium pay status. Although FRA is not
overly swayed by this concern, FRA is changing the term in the manner
suggested by these commenters to ``qualified maintenance person
(QMP).'' FRA believes that the term used to describe the individual
responsible for conducting certain brake and mechanical inspections has
little bearing on the qualifications or knowledge of the individual
and, thus, is not adverse to accommodating a change in the term.
However, but for clarifying language, FRA is not changing the
underlying definition of what is required to be designated as a QMP.
The definition contained in this final rule clarifies the intent of
the NPRM by specifically stating that a QMP must be properly trained
and have a primary responsibility in the function of trouble-shooting,
inspection, testing,
[[Page 25579]]
maintenance, or repair of the specific train brake and other components
and systems for which the inspector is assigned responsibility. The
slightly modified definition also clarifies that a QMP also possess a
current understanding of what is required to properly repair and
maintain the safety-critical brake or mechanical components for which
the person is assigned responsibility.
The major concern raised by APTA representatives centered on the
requirement contained in the definition of a QMI that the person's
``primary responsibility'' include work in the area of troubleshooting,
testing, inspecting, maintenance, or repair to train brake systems and
other components. These commenters believed that anyone who is properly
trained can perform the required inspections regardless of the amount
of time actually spent engaged in the activity. The entire concept of
QMP (or QMI) is premised on the idea that flexibility in the inspection
of passenger equipment, flexibility in the movement of defective
equipment and slight reductions in periodic maintenance could be
provided if the mechanical components and brake system were inspected
on a daily basis by highly qualified individuals. Thus, the requirement
that a highly qualified person perform certain brake and mechanical
inspections is part of a package which includes flexibility in the
performance of brake and mechanical inspections, permits wider latitude
in the movement of defective equipment, and provides reductions in the
periodic maintenance that is required to be performed on certain
equipment. Therefore, FRA expects the highly qualified person to be an
individual who can not only identify a particular defective condition
but who will have the knowledge and experience to know how the
defective condition affects other mechanical components or other parts
of the brake system and will have an understanding of what might have
caused a particular defective condition. FRA believes that in order for
a person to become highly proficient in the performance of a particular
task that person must perform the task on a repeated and consistent
basis. As it is almost impossible to develop and impose specific
experience requirements, FRA believes that a requirement that the
person's primary responsibility be in one or more of the specifically
identified work areas and that the person have a basic understanding of
what is required to properly repair and maintain safety-critical brake
or mechanical components is necessary to ensure the high quality
inspections envisioned by the rule. FRA notes the frequent contention
of railroad representatives that mechanical forces are intimately
familiar with the vehicles in the fleet for which they are responsible.
FRA wishes to continue this record of careful attention to those
fleets, which will tend to help ensure that developing problems are
identified early and are dealt with across those fleets.
FRA disagrees with the contentions raised by APTA representatives
that the definition of QMP violates the Administrative Procedure Act
and exceeds FRA's statutory authority. Contrary to the assertions made
by APTA representatives, the administrative record together with FRA's
independent knowledge of the passenger rail industry do support a
requirement that only a QMP conduct Class I brake tests and exterior
mechanical inspections. Except for limited weekend service operated by
Metra, virtually every passenger train operation affected by this rule
currently conducts daily brake and mechanical inspections utilizing
employees who, except for training on the requirements of this rule,
would meet the definition of a QMP. That is, the employees who are
currently responsible for conducting the major daily brake and
mechanical inspections on virtually all passenger trains meet the
``primary responsibility'' requirement contained in the definition of
QMP. Therefore, the industry's current practice acknowledges and
supports the need to conduct daily inspections with employees whose
primary responsibility is the troubleshooting, inspection, testing,
maintenance, or repair of train brake systems or other mechanical
components. Furthermore, due to the flexibility provided in this rule
for conducting brake and mechanical inspections and moving defective
equipment as well as the extension of certain periodic maintenance, FRA
believes that the current best practices of the railroads with regard
to brake and mechanical inspections must be maintained, especially as
it relates to the quality of the personnel performing the inspections.
FRA further believes that APTA's contention that the definition of
QMP violates the Railway Labor Act is due to a misunderstanding of the
definition. FRA is not attempting to make any determinations over
employee classes or crafts or to interpret collective bargaining
agreements. As was made clear in the 1997 NPRM, the definition would
allow the members of trades associated with testing and maintenance of
equipment such as carmen, machinists, and electricians to become QMPs.
However, membership in a labor organization or completion of an
apprenticeship program associated with a particular craft is not
required. FRA makes clear that the two overriding qualifications are
possession of the knowledge required to do the job and a primary work
assignment involving the troubleshooting, inspecting, testing,
maintaining, or repairing the equipment.
FRA is also clarifying the meaning of ``primary responsibility'' as
used in the definition of QMP. As a rule of thumb FRA will consider a
person's ``primary responsibility'' to be the task that the person
performs at least 50 percent of the time. Therefore, a person who
spends at least 50 percent of the time engaged in the duties of
inspecting, testing, maintenance, troubleshooting, or repair of train
brakes systems and other mechanical components could be designated as a
QMP, provided the person is properly trained to perform the tasks
assigned and possesses a current understanding of what is required to
properly repair and maintain the safety-critical brake or mechanical
components for which the person is assigned responsibility. However,
FRA will consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding an
employee's duties in determining a person's ``primary responsibility.''
For example, a person may not spend 50 percent of his or her day
engaged in any one readily identifiable type of activity; in those
situations FRA will have to look at the circumstances involved on a
case-by-case basis.
The definition of QMP largely rules out the possibility of train
crew members from being designated as these highly qualified inspectors
since the primary responsibility, as defined above, of virtually all
current train crew personnel is the operation of trains, and for the
most part, train crew personnel do not possess a current understanding
of what is required to properly repair and maintain the safety-critical
brake or mechanical components that are inspected during Class I brake
tests or exterior calendar day mechanical inspections. However,
contrary to the contentions raised by APTA there is nothing in the rule
which prevents a railroad from utilizing employees who are not
designated as QMPs from conducting brake and mechanical inspections
provided those inspections are not intended to constitute the required
Class I brake test or the exterior calendar day mechanical inspection.
Furthermore, the rule provides that certain required brake and
mechanical
[[Page 25580]]
inspections (Class IA brake tests, Class II brake tests, running brake
tests, and interior calendar day mechanical inspections) may be
performed by a properly ``qualified person'' and do not mandate the use
of a QMP. FRA believes that these are the types of inspections which
train crew members are currently assigned to perform and have been
performing effectively for years. Consequently, FRA believes that the
inspection requirements and the qualification requirements contained in
this rule are merely a codification of the current best practices of
the passenger train industry and are necessary to ensure the continued
safety of those operations while providing the industry some
flexibility in the performance of certain inspections and in the
movement of defective equipment as well as providing slight increases
in periodic maintenance for some equipment.
The term ``running gear defect'' has been added to the final rule's
list of definitions. A running gear defect is defined as any defective
condition which involves a truck component, a propulsion system
component, a draft system component, a wheel or a wheel component. This
term is important for understanding the restrictions regarding the
movement of equipment with other than power brake defects. FRA agrees
with the comments of railroad representatives that the 1997 NPRM may
have been over-reaching in requiring a qualified mechanical inspector
to make a determination regarding the safety of moving a piece of
defective equipment for any of the mechanical components addressed in
this regulation. However, FRA also agrees with the comments submitted
by labor representatives that railroads should not determine what
components are considered safety-critical. Therefore, FRA has modified
the movement of defective equipment provisions in this final rule to
require a determination regarding the safety of moving a piece of
equipment by a qualified maintenance person (as discussed above)
whenever a potential running gear defect is involved. FRA rejects the
language proposed by APTA that the defect be a potentially ``safety-
critical'' running gear defect as FRA believes that any defect to a
running gear component is potentially safety-critical. In order to
avoid confusion, FRA is providing an explicit definition of running
gear defect. In the final rule, FRA is permitting the use of a
qualified person to determine the safety and establish appropriate
movement restrictions on continued use of equipment which involves non-
running gear defects.
Definitions of the various types of trains covered by this final
rule are extremely important to understand how FRA intends for the rule
to be applied. The most general definition is that of a ``passenger
train.'' The definition makes two points very clear. First, the final
rule does not apply to tourist and excursion railroads; and, second,
the provisions of the rule do apply to non-passenger carrying units
included in a passenger train.
An important distinction highlighted in these definitions is the
difference between a ``long-distance intercity passenger train'' and a
``short-distance intercity passenger train.'' ``Long-distance intercity
passenger train'' means a passenger train that provides service between
large cities more than 125 miles apart and is not operated exclusively
in the National Railroad Passenger Corporation's (Amtrak) Northeast
Corridor between Washington D.C. and Boston, Massachusetts. ``Short-
distance intercity passenger train'' means a passenger train that
provides service exclusively on the Northeast Corridor or between
cities that are not more than 125 miles apart. This distinction
attempts to recognize the special set of operating conditions on the
Northeast Corridor in light of the need to treat long-distance trains
differently than short-distance trains. Additionally, APTA advised FRA
that there are commuter rail systems that operate trains over 100 miles
in distance on a single run, and thus recommended the use of the 125-
mile distance in these definitions.
The definition of the term ``in service'' is modeled after the
definition of that term in the Railroad Freight Car Safety Standards.
See 49 CFR 215.5(e). Passenger equipment that is in service includes
passenger equipment ``in passenger service,'' meaning ``carrying, or
available to carry, fare-paying passengers,'' as well as all other
passenger equipment unless it falls into one of the following four
categories:
(a) Is being handled in accordance with Secs. 238.15, 238.17,
238.305(c)(5), or 238.503(f), as applicable;
(b) Is in a repair shop or on a repair track;
(c) Is on a storage track and is not carrying passengers; or
(d) Has been delivered in interchange but has not been accepted
by the receiving railroad.
The term ``in service'' is important because if the train or passenger
equipment is not in service, it is not subject to a part 238 civil
penalty.
FRA has revised the definition of ``skin'' to reflect more
appropriately its meaning in the broad sense as the outer covering of a
fuel tank and a rail vehicle as a whole, not just the forward-facing
end of a locomotive. Moreover, as noted below in the discussion of
Sec. 238.209 (Forward-facing end structure of locomotives), the
exclusion from the definition of ``skin'' originally included as part
of the definition itself proposed in the NPRM has instead been
incorporated into the appropriate rule text for clarity at Sec. 238.209
and Sec. 238.409 (Forward end structures of power car cabs).
The last definition that warrants discussion is ``vestibule.'' FRA
intends ``vestibule'' to mean an area of a passenger car that normally
does not contain seating and that is used for passage between the
seating area and the side exit doors. The definition of ``vestibule''
is important to determine the requirements for side door emergency-
release mechanisms. For instance, a powered side door in a vestibule
that is partitioned from the passenger compartment of a Tier I
passenger car must have a manual override feature as specified in
Sec. 238.235 by December 31, 1999.
Section 238.7 Waivers
This section sets forth the procedures for seeking waivers of
compliance with the requirements of this rule. Requests for such
waivers may be filed by any interested party. In reviewing such
requests, FRA conducts investigations to determine if a deviation from
the general criteria can be made without compromising or diminishing
rail safety. This section has been modified from that proposed in the
1997 NPRM to keep it consistent with the general waiver provisions
contained in other Federal regulations issued by FRA. FRA recognizes
that circumstances may arise when the operation of passenger equipment
that does not meet the standards contained in this rule is appropriate
and in the public interest.
Section 238.9 Responsibility for Compliance
General compliance requirements are contained in this section.
Paragraph (a). Paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) prohibit a railroad subject
to part 238 from committing a series of specified acts with respect to
a train or a piece of passenger equipment while the train or passenger
equipment is in service if it has a condition that does not comply with
part 238 or if it has not been inspected and tested as required by part
238. In particular, consistent with 49 U.S.C. chapter 203, paragraph
(a)(1) imposes a strict liability standard with respect to violations
of the safety
[[Page 25581]]
appliance and power brake provisions of part 238. In addition to the
acts prohibited by paragraph (a)(2) (that is, the use, haul, offering
in interchange, or accepting in interchange of defective or not
properly inspected equipment), paragraph (a)(1) prohibits a railroad
from merely permitting the use or haul on its line of such equipment if
it does not conform with the safety appliance and power brake
provisions. See Sec. 238.3(b). By contrast, paragraph (a)(2) imposes a
lower standard of liability for using, hauling, delivering in
interchange, or accepting in interchange a train or passenger equipment
that is defective or not properly inspected, in violation of another
provision of this part; a railroad subject to this part is liable only
if it knew, had notice, or should have known of the existence of either
the defective condition of the equipment or the failure to inspect and
test. Finally, paragraph (a)(3) establishes a strict liability standard
for noncompliance with any other provision of this part.
Paragraph (b). In accordance with the ``use'' or ``haul'' language
previously contained in the Safety Appliance Acts (49 U.S.C. chapter
203) and with FRA's general rulemaking authority under the Federal
railroad safety laws, FRA in paragraph (b) makes clear that passenger
equipment will be considered ``in use'' prior to departure but after it
receives or should have received the necessary tests and inspections
required for movement. FRA will no longer wait for a piece of equipment
with a power brake defect to be hauled before issuing a violation, a
practice frequently criticized by the railroads. FRA believes that this
approach will increase FRA's ability to prevent the movement of
defective equipment that creates a potential safety hazard to both the
public and railroad employees. FRA does not feel that this approach
increases the railroads' burden since equipment should not be operated
if it is found in defective condition in the pre-departure tests and
inspections, unless permitted by the regulations.
Paragraph (c). This paragraph clarifies FRA's position that the
requirements contained in this final rule are applicable not only to
any ``railroad'' subject to this part but also to any ``person,'' as
defined in Sec. 238.5, that performs any function required by this
final rule. Although various sections of the final rule address the
duties of a railroad, FRA intends that any person who performs any
action on behalf of a railroad or any person who performs any action
covered by the final rule is required to perform that action in the
same manner as required of a railroad or be subject to FRA enforcement
action. For example, private car owners and contract shops that perform
duties covered by these regulations would be required to perform those
duties in the same manner as required of a railroad.
Section 238.11 Civil Penalties
This section identifies the civil penalties that FRA may impose
upon any person, including a railroad or an independent contractor
providing goods or services to a railroad, that violates any
requirement of this part. These penalties are authorized by 49 U.S.C.
21301, 21302, and 21304. The penalty provision parallels penalty
provisions included in numerous other safety regulations issued by FRA.
Essentially, any person who violates any requirement of this part or
causes the violation of any such requirement will be subject to a civil
penalty of at least $500 and not more than $11,000 per violation. Civil
penalties may be assessed against individuals only for willful
violations, and where a grossly negligent violation or a pattern of
repeated violations creates an imminent hazard of death or injury to
persons, or causes death or injury, a penalty not to exceed $22,000 per
violation may be assessed. In addition, each day a violation continues
will constitute a separate offense. Furthermore, a person may be
subject to criminal penalties under 49 U.S.C. 21311 for knowingly and
willfully falsifying reports required by these regulations. FRA
believes that the inclusion of penalty provisions for failure to comply
with the regulations is important in ensuring that compliance is
achieved. The final rule includes a schedule of civil penalties as
appendix A to this part. Because the penalty schedule is a statement of
policy, notice and comment was not required prior to its issuance. See
5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A).
It should be noted that this section has been modified slightly
from that proposed in the 1997 NPRM. The modifications were made to
address the statutory requirements contained in the Federal Civil
Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-410 Stat. 890,
28 U.S.C. 2461 note, as amended by the Debt Collection Improvement Act
of 1996, Pub. L. 104-134, April 26, 1996, which required agencies to
adjust for inflation the maximum civil monetary penalties within the
agencies' jurisdiction. Consequently, the resulting $11,000 and $22,000
maximum penalties were determined by applying the criteria set forth in
sections 4 and 5 of the statute to the maximum penalties otherwise
provided for in the Federal railroad safety laws.
Section 238.13 Preemptive Effect
Section 238.13 informs the public as to FRA's views regarding what
will be the preemptive effect of the final rule. While the presence or
absence of such a section does not in itself affect the preemptive
effect of a final rule, it informs the public about the statutory
provision which governs the preemptive effect of the rule. Section
20106 of title 49 of the United States Code provides that all
regulations prescribed by the Secretary relating to railroad safety
preempt any State law, regulation, or order covering the same subject
matter, except a provision necessary to eliminate or reduce an
essentially local safety hazard that is not incompatible with a Federal
law, regulation, or order and that does not unreasonably burden
interstate commerce. With the exception of a provision directed at an
essentially local safety hazard, 49 U.S.C. 20106 will preempt any State
regulatory agency rule covering the same subject matter as the
regulations in this final rule.
Section 238.15 Movement of Passenger Equipment With Defective Power
Brakes
This section contains the requirements for movement of passenger
equipment with a power brake defect without civil penalty liability
under this part. (Railroads remain liable, however, ``in a proceeding
to recover damages for death or injury of a railroad employee arising
from the movement of'' the defective equipment. See 49 U.S.C.
20303(c).) A ``power brake defect,'' as defined in paragraph (a), ``is
a condition of a power brake component, or other primary brake
component, that does not conform with this'' rule. The term does not
include a failure to properly inspect such a component.
Labor representatives objected to FRA's determination that the term
``power brake defect'' does not include a failure to inspect such a
component. These commenters claim that FRA's exclusion of the failure
to properly inspect a brake component eliminates an important means of
enforcement necessary to ensure that proper power brake inspections are
performed. It is claimed that by excluding the failure to inspect from
being a power brake defect, FRA has eliminated any incentive for
railroads to ensure that trains have operative brakes because there
will be little financial repercussion to continuing to use improperly
inspected equipment.
FRA believes that the concern raised by certain labor
representatives regarding FRA's definition of ``power brake defect''
under this section is due to a lack of understanding of the rule as
[[Page 25582]]
well as a misunderstanding of the existing regulations. Under the
current power brake regulations the unit of violation for failure to
inspect is the train not individual cars, although FRA can take a
separate violation for each car containing a defective condition upon
departure after the train received or should have received an initial
terminal inspection or for each car not identified as defective after
the performance of an intermediate inspection. Moreover, the failure to
inspect a piece of equipment cannot be cured through any of the
provisions contained in this final rule regarding the movement of
defective equipment. Thus, if a railroad fails to inspect a piece of
equipment as required, the railroad cannot avoid civil penalty
liability by moving the equipment in accordance with the movement for
repair provisions. Furthermore, the final rule contains specific civil
penalties for a railroad's failure to perform inspections as required.
Therefore, railroads will also continue to be subject to potential
civil penalty for any car found in defective condition after it has
performed or should have performed a Class I or Class IA brake test,
and for any car not properly moved or identified as defective at other
times.
The final rule also retains the provision stating that passenger
equipment will be considered ``in use'' prior to departure but after it
has received or should have received an inspection required by this
part. See Sec. 232.9. Thus, FRA inspectors will no longer have to wait
until a piece of equipment departs a location before issuing a civil
penalty, a practice continually criticized by both labor and railroad
representatives. In addition, this final rule provides FRA inspectors
the ability to issue Special Notices for Repair, which enable an FRA
inspector to remove an unsafe piece of equipment from service until
appropriate action is taken by the railroad. See Amendments to 49 CFR
part 216. This enforcement tool is not currently available to FRA
inspectors in the area of power brakes and mechanical components on
passenger equipment and could be used in circumstances where passenger
equipment is not inspected prior to being placed in service.
Consequently, the final rule not only retains all of the enforcement
tools available to FRA under the current regulations but includes other
methods for ensuring compliance by the railroads and provides both a
financial and operational incentive for railroads to properly inspect
passenger equipment.
Paragraph (b)(1). This paragraph addresses the movement for repair
of equipment with a power brake defect found during a Class I or IA
brake test or, for Tier II equipment, the equivalent of a Class I or IA
brake test. This paragraph allows railroads the flexibility to move
passenger equipment with a power brake defect found during such a test
if the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) If the train is
moved for purposes of effecting repair of the defect, without
passengers; (2) the applicable operating restrictions set forth in
paragraph (d) are complied with; and (3) the information concerning the
defect is recorded on a tag affixed to the equipment or in an automated
defect tracking system as specified in paragraph (c)(2).
Paragraph (b)(2). This paragraph permits railroads to move, for
purposes of scrapping or sale, passenger equipment with a power brake
defect found during a Class I or IA brake test (or the Tier II
equivalent) if each of the following conditions is satisfied: if the
movement is without passengers, if the speed of the movement is 15 mph
or less, and if the railroad's air brake or power brake instructions
are followed when making the movement. This provision allows railroads
to move surplus equipment without having to request permission for one-
time moves from FRA, as is currently required. FRA has not had any
serious safety concerns with the methods currently used by railroads to
move this equipment and does not believe its limited resources should
be tied up in approving these types of moves.
Paragraph (c), generally. This paragraph addresses the use of
passenger equipment with a power brake defect that develops en route
from a location where a Class I or IA brake test (or the Tier II
equivalent) was performed on the equipment. The two basic requirements
are that, at the location where the railroad first finds the defect,
specified information (such as the nature of the defect and the
destination where the defect will be repaired) must be placed on tags
attached to the equipment or in a computer tracking system and that the
railroad must observe the applicable operating restrictions in
paragraph (d). A third requirement, found in paragraph (c)(4), is a
special conditional requirement, applying only if the defect causes any
brakes to be cut out or renders the brakes inoperative. This provision
was slightly modified from what was proposed in order to prevent a
railroad from avoiding the requirements contained in this subsection by
simply not cutting-out an inoperative brake. Consequently, the language
was modified so that the provision includes situations where a defect
renders the brakes inoperative, not just situations where brakes are
cut-out.
Paragraph (c)(2) requires that equipment being hauled for repairs
be adequately identified. Currently, there is no requirement that
equipment with defective power brakes be tagged or otherwise
identified, although most railroads voluntarily engage in such
activity. Furthermore, the current regulations regarding freight cars
and locomotives contain tagging requirements for the movement of
equipment not in compliance with those parts. See 49 CFR 215.9 and
229.9. Consequently, FRA is requiring the identification of equipment
with defective power brakes through either the traditional tags which
are placed in established locations on the equipment or by an automated
tracking system developed by the railroad. Certain information must be
contained whichever method is used by a railroad. FRA believes that the
tagging or automated tracking requirements add reliability,
accountability, and enforceability for the timely and proper repair of
equipment with defective power brakes.
FRA is retaining the requirement that equipment found with
conditions not in compliance with this part must be appropriately
tagged or recorded in an automated tracking system. Although FRA is
sensitive to the concerns raised by labor representatives regarding the
use of automated tracking systems, FRA believes that provisions must be
provided to allow railroads to take advantage of existing and
developing technologies regarding the electronic maintenance and
retention of records. Although railroad and FRA inspectors may require
additional training on the use of electronic records, FRA believes that
the use of such a medium to track defective equipment can expedite the
identification and repair of defective equipment and, thus, reduce the
time that defective equipment is operated in passenger service. In
response to labor's concerns, a new paragraph (c)(3) has been added
which contains a provision giving FRA the ability to monitor and review
a railroad's automated tracking system and provides FRA the ability to
prohibit or revoke a railroad's ability to utilize an automated
tracking system in lieu of directly tagging defective equipment if FRA
finds that the automated tracking system is not properly secure, is
inaccessible to FRA or a railroad's employees, or fails to adequately
track and monitor the movement of defective equipment. urthermore, if
the automated tracking
[[Page 25583]]
system developed and implemented by a railroad does not accurately and
adequately record the information required by this part, the railroad
will be in violation of the movement for repair provisions and subject
to civil penalty liability.
In addition, under paragraph (c)(4), if the defect causes the
brakes on the equipment to be cut out, then the railroad must first
find out what percentage of the power brakes in the train are cut out
or inoperative in some other way, using the formula in paragraph
(d)(1). Next, the railroad must notify the person responsible for the
movement of trains of the percentage of operative brakes and the
movement restrictions imposed by paragraph (d), inform the railroad's
mechanical department about the brake defect, and walk the train to
confirm the percentage of operative brakes at the next point where it
is safe to do so. Slight modification was made to paragraph (c)(4)(ii)
and (iii) replacing the term ``dispatcher'' with the phrase ``person
responsible for the movement of trains'' as some railroads do not use
the term dispatcher and the term mechanical ``desk'' was removed as it
is unnecessary and covered by the term ``mechanical department.''
Paragraph (d)(1). This paragraph explains the term ``inoperative
power brakes'' and contains a new method for calculating the percentage
of operative power brakes (operative primary brakes) in a train.
Regarding the term itself, a cut-out power brake is an inoperative
power brake, but the failure or cutting out of a secondary brake system
(as defined in Sec. 238.5) does not result in inoperative power brakes.
For example, failure of dynamic brakes does not render a power brake
inoperative unless the dynamic brakes are in fact primary brakes.
Although the statute discusses the percentage of operative brakes in
terms of a percentage of vehicles, the statute was written nearly a
century ago and at that time the only way to cut out the brakes on a
car or locomotive was to cut out the entire unit. See 49 U.S.C.
20302(a)(5)(B). Today, virtually every piece of equipment used in
passenger service can have the brakes cut out on a per-truck or per-
axle basis. Consequently, FRA is merely providing a method of
calculating the percentage of operative brakes based on the design of
passenger equipment used today, and, thus, a means to more accurately
reflect the true braking ability of the train as a whole. FRA believes
that the method of calculation contained in this final rule is
consistent with the intent of Congress when it drafted the statutory
requirement and simply recognizes the technological advancements made
in braking systems over the last century. Consequently, FRA intends to
require the percentage of operative brakes to be determined by dividing
the number of axles in the train with operative brakes by the total
number of axles in the train. Furthermore, for equipment utilizing
tread brake units (TBU), FRA requires that the percentage of operative
brakes be determined by dividing the number of operative TBUs by the
total number of TBUs.
Paragraphs (d)(2)-(d)(4), generally. These paragraphs contain
various speed and other operating restrictions based on the percentage
of operative brakes in order to permit passenger railroads the
flexibility to efficiently move passengers without compromising safety.
FRA believes that the movement restrictions contained in these
paragraphs actually enhance the safety of the riding public. The
requirements retain the basic principle that a train carrying
passengers shall not depart a location where major brake inspections or
tests are performed on a train unless the train has 100 percent
operational brakes.
As previously noted in the general discussion, FRA has determined
that some minor changes need to be made to the requirements proposed in
the 1997 NPRM regarding the movement of equipment with defective power
brakes. In order to avoid the legal implications involved with
employing the statutory authority contained at 49 U.S.C. 20306 for
exempting equipment from the statutory requirements related to safety
appliances and power brakes, and because railroad representatives
acknowledged that the flexibility provided through reliance on the
exemption is minimal, FRA will not rely on the statutory exemption
provision contained at 49 U.S.C. 20306 in this final rule and has
modified the movement for repair provisions accordingly.
FRA will retain the exemption proposed in the 1997 NPRM for
passenger train operations from a long-standing agency interpretation
that prohibits the movement of a train for repairs under 49 U.S.C.
20303 if less than 85 percent of the train's brakes are operative. This
interpretation is based on a 1910 ICC order codified at 49 CFR 232.1.
FRA believes that this requirement is overly restrictive when applied
to passenger train operations as many passenger operations utilize a
small number of cars in their trains and the necessity to cut out the
brakes on just one car can easily result in noncompliance. FRA believes
that the retention in this final rule of the proposed speed
restrictions will fully compensate for the loss of brakes on a minority
of cars. FRA rejects the BRC's recommendation that passenger trains
with defective brakes be permitted to move no further than the next
passenger station because such a stringent requirement is unnecessary,
more restrictive than the current statutory mandate regarding the
movement of defective brake equipment, and is radically counter to the
way passenger trains currently handle defective equipment.
FRA is retaining those portions of the proposed movement for repair
requirements that it believes are fully consistent with the existing
statutory provisions regarding the movement of equipment with power
brake defects and has revised those that are contrary to the statutory
provisions. Therefore, passenger trains operating with 75-99 percent
operative brakes will not be permitted to travel to the next forward
terminal as proposed, but will be permitted to travel only to the next
forward location where the necessary repairs to the brake equipment can
be effectuated as mandated in the existing statute. In FRA's view, all
of the other proposed methods for moving defective power brake
equipment are consistent with and are in accordance with the current
statutory requirements and will be retained. For example, FRA is
retaining the provision which permits a passenger train with 50-75
percent operative brakes to be moved at reduced speeds to the next
forward passenger station. Although the percentage of operative brakes
is lower than currently permitted by FRA's longstanding agency
interpretation (which FRA believes is fully compensated for by the
proposed speed restrictions), FRA believes that the movement of the
defective equipment to the next passenger station is in accordance with
the statutory requirement as the safety of the passengers must be
considered in determining the nearest location where necessary repairs
can be made. In addition, permitting passenger trains to continue to
the next forward location where the necessary repairs can be performed
is also consistent with the statutory requirement as such movement is
necessary to ensure the safety of the traveling public by protecting
them from the hazards incident to performing movements against the
current of traffic and recognizes the hazards incident to overcrowding
platforms and trailing trains. Furthermore, retention of the movement
provisions related to long-distance intercity passenger trains and
long-distance Tier II equipment is
[[Page 25584]]
consistent with the current statutory requirements as these provisions
permit the movement of defective brake equipment on these trains only
to the next passenger station or the next repair location, with various
speed restrictions depending on the percentage of operative brakes.
FRA recognizes that there are major differences in the operations
of commuter or short-distance intercity passenger trains, and long-
distance intercity passenger trains. Commuter and short-distance
intercity passenger trains tend to operate for fairly short distances
between passenger stations and generally operate in relatively short
turn-around service between two terminals several times in any given
day. On the other hand, long-distance intercity passenger trains tend
to operate for long distances, with trips between the beginning
terminal and ending terminal taking a day or more and traversing
multiple States with relatively long distances between passenger
stations. Consequently, the final rule contains slightly different
requirements with regard to the movement of defective brake equipment
in long-distance intercity passenger trains.
FRA believes that passenger railroads can safely and efficiently
operate trains with en route brake failures under the strict set of
conditions in this final rule. FRA has long held that the industry can
safely operate trains at normal track speeds with as low as 85 percent
effective brakes as long as the inoperative brakes were due to failures
which occurred en route or due to defective cars being picked up en
route and being moved for repairs. The only change in this final rule
to current practice is the additional flexibility for certain passenger
operations to move their equipment with a lower percentage of operative
brakes, under strict speed restrictions, and recognition of the safety
need to allow passenger trains to move to the nearest forward location
capable of performing the repairs.
Paragraph (d)(2). This paragraph contains operating requirements
for the movement of any passenger train that develops en route brake
failures resulting in 74 to 50 percent operative brakes. In these
circumstances, FRA will allow the train to proceed only to the next
passenger station at a reduced speed, not to exceed 20 mph, to
discharge passengers before proceeding without passengers to the
nearest location where the necessary repairs can be made. This
provision recognizes the dangers of unloading passenger at locations
other than passenger stations by allowing railroads to move the
equipment to a location with the facilities to handle the discharge of
passengers. Furthermore, engineering evidence and test data demonstrate
that the reduced speed more than compensates for the reduced braking
force. At the reduced speed, even with only 50 percent effective
brakes, a train is able to stop in a much shorter distance than the
same train traveling at the maximum operating speed with 100 percent
operative brakes.
Paragraphs (d)(3)(i) and (ii). FRA will also permit commuter,
short-distance intercity, and short-distance Tier II passenger trains
experiencing en route brake failures resulting in 99 to 75 percent
operative brakes to continue in service only to the next forward
location where the necessary repairs can be effectuated. FRA will
permit these passenger trains to continue in service past a repair
location to the next forward passenger station only if the repair
location does not have the facilities to safely unload passengers.
However, FRA will require the speed of the train with 84 to 75 percent
operative brakes to be reduced to 50 percent of the train's maximum
operating speed or 40 mph, whichever is less. Engineering evidence and
test data demonstrate that the reduced speed more than compensates for
the reduced braking force. At the reduced speed, even with only 75
percent effective brakes, a train is able to stop in a much shorter
distance than the same train traveling at the maximum operating speed
with 100 percent operative brakes. APTA also presented engineering
evidence and test data that demonstrated that stopping distances
remained well within signal spacing distances with a large margin of
safety even for trains with as low as 85 percent effective brakes.
Consequently, FRA will not impose speed restrictions on trains
operating with 85 to 99 percent operative brakes.
Paragraph (d)(4). This paragraph contains the operating
restrictions on moving equipment with defective brakes in long-distance
intercity passenger trains. This paragraph permits the movement of
defective brake equipment in these trains only to the nearest forward
location designated as a repair location for this equipment by the
operating railroad in the list required by Sec. 238.19(d). FRA will
also permit long-distance intercity passenger trains to continue in
service past a designated repair location to the next forward passenger
station only if the designated repair location does not have the
facilities to safely unload passengers. Although FRA is permitting the
continued operation of long-distance intercity passenger trains that
develop en route brake failures resulting in 99 to 85 percent operative
brakes at normal speeds, the final rule contains a speed restriction of
no greater than 40 mph when the en route brake failures result in 84 to
75 percent operative brakes. Therefore, these trains gain flexibility
in being permitted to move a greater percentage of defective equipment
than currently allowed and are able to move that equipment to the next
forward repair location rather than the ``nearest'' repair location as
currently required. See 49 U.S.C. 20303(a). As noted previously, FRA
believes that the safety of the traveling public mandates the
flexibility of permitting passenger trains to continue to the next
forward repair location or passenger station because requiring trains
to reverse directions and perform back hauls to the nearest repair
location increases the risk of collision on the railroad.
In this final rule, FRA is retaining the proposed requirement that
operators of long-distance passenger trains designate the locations
where repairs can be conducted on the equipment. Although FRA agrees
that this provision puts the control of what locations constitute
repair locations in the hands of the railroad, FRA believes that the
operators of these long-distance intercity trains are in the best
position to determine which locations have the necessary expertise to
handle the repairs of the somewhat advanced braking systems utilized in
passenger trains. Due to the unique technologies used on the brake
systems of these operations and the unique operating environments, the
facilities and personnel necessary to conduct proper repairs on this
equipment are somewhat specialized and limited. Moreover, FRA is
retaining the broad performance-based requirement that railroads
operating this equipment designate a sufficient number of repair
locations to ensure the safe and timely repair of the equipment.
Contrary to the beliefs of some labor commenters, FRA believes that
this performance standard provides FRA sufficient grounds to institute
civil penalty enforcement actions or take other enforcement actions if,
based on its expertise and experience, FRA believes the railroad is
failing to designate an adequate number of repair locations.
Furthermore, rather than attempt to develop a standard applicable
to all situations in the context of short-distance intercity and
commuter trains, which FRA does not believe can be accomplished, FRA
will approach the issue of what constitutes the next forward location
where repairs can be effectuated based on a case-by-case
[[Page 25585]]
analysis of each situation. FRA believes that its field inspectors are
in the best position to determine whether a railroad exercised good
faith in determining when and where to move a piece of defective brake
equipment. In making these determinations both the railroad as well as
FRA's inspectors must conduct a multi-factor analysis based on the
facts of each case. In determining whether a particular location is a
location where necessary repairs can be made or whether a location is
the next forward repair location in a passenger train context, the
accessibility of the location, the ability to safely make the repairs
at that location, and the safety of the passengers are the overriding
factors that must be considered in any analysis. These factors have a
multitude of sub-factors which must be considered, such as: the type of
repair required; the safety of employees responsible for conducting the
repairs; the safety of employees responsible for getting the equipment
to or from a particular location; the switching operations necessary to
effectuate the move; the railroad's recent history and current practice
of making repairs (brake and non-brake) at a particular location;
relevant weather conditions; potential overcrowding of passenger
platforms; and the overcrowding of trailing trains.
Paragraph (e). This paragraph contains the operating restrictions
on passenger trains with inoperative power brakes on the front or rear
unit of the train. Similar provisions were contained in the 1997 NPRM
and included in each of the various operating restriction contained in
paragraph (d). In order to make the rule easier to understand, FRA has
added this paragraph to the final rule and removed the repetitious
language from each of the provisions contained in paragraph (d). As
noted in the general preamble discussion above, FRA is slightly
modifying the provisions related to the operation of trains with
defective brakes on the front or rear car. In the 1997 NPRM, FRA
proposed that if the power brakes on the front or rear unit become
inoperative then a qualified person must be stationed at the handbrake
on the unit. See 62 FR 49797. FRA recognizes that in some instances the
handbrake on a car located at the front or rear of a train may not be
accessible to a member of the train crew or may be located outside the
interior of the car and, thus, unsafe for a crew member to operate
while the train is in motion. FRA also recognizes that in many
circumstances when a car at the front or rear of a train has
inoperative brakes certain speed restrictions should be placed on the
train; however, FRA believes that railroads are in the best position to
determine what the appropriate speed restriction should be given the
circumstances involved. Therefore, FRA is modifying the requirements
for the use of such cars and paragraph (e) requires that appropriate
speed restrictions be imposed with inoperative brakes on the front or
rear unit and that trains containing equipment with inaccessible
handbrakes or with handbrakes located outside the interior of a car be
operated at restricted speed (i.e. 20 mph) and that the defective
equipment be removed or repositioned in the train at the first possible
location. The operating restrictions contained in this paragraph are
consistent with current industry practice and should not impose any
additional burden to the industry.
It should be noted that the provisions contained in 49 U.S.C.
20303(c) continue to remain applicable to a railroad when hauling
equipment with defective or insecure power brakes or other safety
appliances pursuant to the requirements contained in this final rule.
This section of the statute contains the liability provisions attendant
with the movement of equipment with defective or insecure safety
appliances, including power brakes.
Section 238.17 Movement of Passenger Equipment With Other Than Power
Brake Defects
This section contains the requirements for the movement of
passenger equipment with a condition not in compliance with part 238,
excluding a power brake defect and including a safety appliance defect,
without civil penalty liability under this part. (Railroads remain
liable, however, under 49 U.S.C. 20303(c), as described in the
discussion of the previous section.)
As previously noted, there are currently no statutory or regulatory
restrictions on the movement of passenger cars with defective
conditions that are not power brake or safety appliance defects. The
provisions contained in this section are similar to the provisions for
moving defective locomotives and freight cars currently contained in 49
CFR 229.9 and 215.9, respectively. As these provisions have generally
worked well with regard to the movement of defective locomotives and
freight cars and in order to maintain consistency, FRA has modeled
these movement requirements on those existing requirements. FRA is
allowing passenger railroads the flexibility to continue to use
equipment with non-safety-critical defects until the next scheduled
calendar day exterior mechanical inspection. However, FRA intends the
calendar day mechanical inspection to be the tool used by railroads to
repair all reported defects and to prevent continued use of defective
equipment to carry passengers. (Compare Sec. 238.17(b) with
Sec. 238.17(c).) FRA intends for 49 CFR 229.9 to continue to govern the
movement of locomotives used in passenger service which develop
defective conditions, not covered by part 238, that are not in
compliance with part 229. Part 229 will continue to cover (non-steam)
locomotives that are used by the tourist railroads until such railroads
are covered by part 238.
After review of the comments submitted and provided orally at the
Working Group meetings, FRA is making some modest changes in this final
rule regarding the movement of equipment with non-power brake defects.
FRA agrees with the comments of railroad representatives that the 1997
NPRM may have been over-reaching in requiring a QMP to make a
determination regarding the safety of moving a piece of defective
equipment for any of the mechanical components addressed in this
regulation. However, FRA also agrees with the comments submitted by
labor representatives that railroads should not determine what
components are considered safety-critical. Therefore, FRA will require
a determination regarding the safety of moving a piece of equipment by
a QMP (as discussed above) whenever a potential running gear defect is
involved. FRA rejects the language proposed by APTA that the defect be
a potentially ``safety-critical'' running gear defect as FRA believes
that any defect to a running gear component is potentially safety-
critical. In order to avoid confusion, FRA is providing an explicit
definition of ``running gear defect.'' FRA is defining the term to mean
any condition not in compliance with this part which involves a truck
component, a propulsion system component, a draft system component, a
wheel or a wheel component. In this final rule, FRA will permit the use
of a qualified person to determine the safety and establish appropriate
movement restrictions on continued use of equipment which involves non-
running gear defects.
In paragraph (b), FRA is providing very limited flexibility to
railroads to operate defective equipment from a location where a
calendar day mechanical inspection was performed in order to effectuate
repairs. FRA intends for the calendar day mechanical inspection to be
as comprehensive as possible and to be the time when all
[[Page 25586]]
defective components are identified and repaired. In order to ensure
that these daily inspections are performed by highly qualified
inspectors, FRA has provided the railroads with considerable
flexibility to perform these inspections at locations that are best
suited to a quality and comprehensive inspection. Therefore, FRA will
permit the movement of defective equipment from these inspection
locations only with very stringent restrictions. Equipment containing
running gear defects may only be moved from such locations if it is not
in passenger service and is in a non-revenue train. Equipment
containing non-running gear defects may be moved in a revenue train
provided the equipment is locked-out and empty, except that the
equipment may be used and occupied by a member of the train crew to the
extent necessary to safely operate the train. Any defective equipment
moved from such locations must also be properly identified as required
in paragraph (c)(4) and moved in accordance with any movement
restriction imposed. FRA believes these stringent movement restrictions
will provide railroads limited flexibility to move defective equipment
to a location where it can best be repaired but will limit a railroad's
desire or ability to move defective equipment from these inspection
locations and will encourage the performance of the calendar day
mechanical inspections at locations where repairs to equipment can be
conducted.
Paragraph (c) contains the requirements regarding the movement of
passenger equipment that develops a condition not in compliance with
this part, other than a safety appliance defect, while en route to its
destination after its calendar day mechanical inspection was performed.
This paragraph has been slightly modified from that proposed in the
1997 NPRM in order to recognize the differing requirements for running
rear defects and non-running gear defects as noted in the discussion
above. Paragraph (c)(1) retains the requirement that the QMP may make
the determination regarding the continued use of equipment containing a
potential running gear defect based on the description provided by on-
site personnel. Although FRA recognizes the concerns raised by labor
representatives, FRA believes that the rule must recognize the reality
of current operations and acknowledge the fact that mechanical-type
personnel are not readily available at every location on a railroad's
line of road. Furthermore, when such off-site determinations are made
the rule requires that the equipment only be moved to the next forward
location where the equipment can be inspected by a QMP to verify the
description of the defect provided by the on-site personnel. Paragraph
(c)(2) also permits determinations regarding the continued use of
equipment containing non-running gear defects to be made by a qualified
person based on a description provided by on-site personnel. In cases
where non-running gear defects are involved, FRA will not require that
the equipment be inspected at the next forward location by a qualified
person as the safety impact of such defects should be readily
identifiable based upon a description by on-site personnel and can be
adequately addressed via radio communication.
Paragraph (c)(4) contains the requirements for identifying
defective equipment. This paragraph permits the identification and
tracking of defective equipment in either of two ways. One option is to
tag the equipment in a manner similar to what is currently required
under Sec. 215.9 for freight cars. The second option is to record the
specified information in an automated tracking system. Although FRA is
sensitive to the concerns raised by labor representatives regarding the
use of automated tracking systems, FRA believes that provision must be
made to allow railroads to take advantage of existing and developing
technologies regarding the electronic maintenance and retention of
records. Although railroad and FRA inspectors may require additional
training on the use of electronic records, FRA believes that the use of
such a medium to track defective equipment can expedite the
identification and repair of defective equipment and, thus, reduce the
time that defective equipment is operated in passenger service. In
response to labor's concerns, paragraph (c)(5) has been added to this
final rule and contains a provision which gives FRA the ability to
monitor and review a railroad's automated tracking system and provides
FRA the ability to prohibit or revoke a railroad's ability to utilize
an automated tracking system in lieu of directly tagging defective
equipment if FRA finds that the automated tracking system is not
properly secure, is inaccessible to FRA or a railroad's employees, or
fails to adequately track and monitor the movement of defective
equipment. Furthermore, if the automated tracking system developed and
implemented by a railroad does not accurately and adequately record the
information required by this part, the railroad will be in violation of
the movement for repair provisions contained in this section and
subject to civil penalty liability.
Paragraph (d) contains a requirement that was inadvertently omitted
from the 1997 NPRM but which is integral to the movement of equipment
which has been involved in a derailment. This paragraph addresses the
inspection of roller bearings on a car whose truck is involved in a
derailment. As the proper operation and condition of a vehicle's roller
bearing is a key element in ensuring the safe movement of the vehicle,
FRA believes it is vital that this provision be included in these final
regulations. The added requirement prohibits a railroad from continuing
in service a piece of passenger equipment that has a roller bearing
whose truck was involved in a derailment unless the bearing is
inspected and tested in accordance with the provisions stated. The
added provision is identical to the requirement currently contained in
49 CFR Sec. 215.115(b). Although the existing provision is applicable
to freight cars, virtually every passenger train operation follows the
provisions contained in that section prior to returning a piece of
equipment to service after it was involved in a derailment and, thus,
should not result in any added burden to the industry. FRA believes
that the practice is critical to ensuring the proper operation of the
roller bearing after a derailment occurs and should be incorporated
into this final rule.
Paragraph (e) contains the special statutory restrictions on the
movement of passenger equipment with a safety appliance defect, other
than a power brake defect. FRA does not intend to alter the current
statutory requirements contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 regarding the
movement of passenger equipment with defective or insecure safety
appliances. See Secs. 238.229, 238.429, 238.431. Consequently, in
paragraph (e), FRA is requiring that passenger equipment that develops
a defective or insecure safety appliance continue to be subject to all
the statutory restrictions on its movement. Under the current statutory
language--
A vehicle that is equipped in compliance with this chapter whose
equipment becomes defective or insecure nevertheless may be moved
when necessary to make repairs * * * from the place at which the
defect or insecurity was first discovered to the nearest available
place at which the repairs can be made--
(1) on the railroad line on which the defect or insecurity was
discovered; or
(2) at the option of a connecting railroad carrier, on the
railroad line of the connecting carrier, if not farther than the
place of repair described in clause (1) of this subsection.
[[Page 25587]]
49 U.S.C. 20303(a). It should be noted that the safety appliance
requirements applicable to Tier I equipment merely references the
Railroad Safety Appliance Standards (49 CFR part 231); however, FRA has
mandated separate safety appliance requirements for Tier II passenger
equipment. See Secs. 238.429 and 238.431.
As noted previously, the statutory provisions related to the
movement of equipment with defective or insecure safety appliances
permit the movement of such equipment to the nearest location where the
necessary repairs can be made. The determination of what constitutes
the nearest location where the necessary repairs can be effectuated in
a safety appliance context is identical to the analysis required when
dealing with a power brake defect. In making these determinations both
the railroad as well as FRA's inspectors must conduct a multi-factor
analysis based on the facts of each case. In determining whether a
particular location is a location where necessary repairs can be made
or whether a location is the nearest repair location in a passenger
train context, the accessibility of the location, the ability to safely
make the repairs at that location, and the safety of the passengers are
the overriding factors that must be considered in any analysis. These
factors have a multitude of sub-factors which must be considered, such
as: the type of repair required; the safety of the passengers if a move
against the current of traffic is conducted; the safety of employees
responsible for conducting the repairs; the safety of employees
responsible for getting the equipment to or from a particular location;
the switching operations necessary to effectuate the move; the
railroad's recent history and current practice of making repairs (brake
and non-brake) at a particular location; relevant weather conditions;
potential overcrowding of passenger platforms; and the overcrowding of
trailing trains. Therefore, in many circumstances trains will be
permitted to continue to the next forward location where the necessary
repairs can be performed as such movement is necessary to ensure the
safety of the traveling public by protecting them from the hazards
incident to performing movements against the current of traffic.
Section 238.19 Reporting and Tracking Defective Equipment
This section contains the reporting and tracking requirements that
passenger railroads must maintain regarding defective passenger
equipment. FRA is requiring that each railroad develop and maintain a
system for reporting and tracking equipment defects. Paragraph (a) of
this section requires that, for each equipment defect discovered by the
railroad on equipment used by the railroad, the system record the
following information: the number by which the equipment is identified,
type of defect, when the defect occurred, the determination made by a
qualified person or a qualified maintenance person on handling the
equipment, the name of such person, any operating restrictions placed
on the equipment, and finally how and when the defect was corrected.
FRA has not identified any specific method or means by which a railroad
should gather and maintain the required information. FRA believes that
each railroad is in the best position to determine the method of
obtaining the required information which is most efficient and
effective based on its specific operation. Thus, railroads could
maintain this information either in some type of written medium or
electronically in conjunction with some type of automated tracking
system.
FRA believes that the reporting and tracking of defective equipment
is an essential feature of any effective system safety program.
Railroad managers are able to utilize such systems to ensure that the
railroad complies with safety regulations, does not use unsafe
equipment, makes needed repairs, and has failure data to make
reliability-based decisions on maintenance intervals. Furthermore, most
passenger railroads currently have some sort of reporting and tracking
system in place. FRA recognizes that some railroads may have to incur
additional initial costs to develop or improve defect reporting and
tracking systems; however, FRA believes these costs can be recouped
through the increased operating efficiency that an effective recording
and tracking system provides.
Paragraph (a) makes clear that railroads have this tracking system
in place within 26 months after publication of the final rule in the
Federal Register. APTA recommended that railroads be provided a two-
year phase-in period for this requirement to become effective. As the
requirements for tracking defective equipment are contingent on
completion of a railroad's training of its employees, FRA will provide
the same time period for implementation of the reporting and tracking
system. However, FRA believes that APTA's recommendation was based on a
misunderstanding that the defect tracking system had to be an automated
electronic system. As the previous discussion makes clear, the defect
tracking system need not be an electronic automated system but could
consist of a written records retention system. Thus, even if a railroad
needs two or more years to develop an automated tracking system, the
railroad could utilize a written tracking system while the automated
system is being developed. Virtually all railroads currently track
their defective equipment by some means; FRA believes that these
current methods of compiling data could be slightly modified to
include--or already include--all of the information required by this
section.
Paragraph (b) requires that railroads maintain the required
information for a period equal to one periodic maintenance interval for
each specific type of equipment. FRA believes that this minimum
retention period will ensure that the records remain available when
they are most needed, but will not place a burdensome record storage
requirement on railroads. However, FRA strongly encourages railroads to
keep these records for longer periods of time because they form the
basis for future reliability-driven decisions concerning test and
maintenance intervals.
In paragraph (d), FRA retains the previously proposed requirement
that railroads operating long-distance passenger trains and Tier II
passenger equipment maintain a list of the locations where repairs can
be made to the equipment's power brake components. Although FRA agrees
that this provision puts the control of what locations constitute
repair locations in the hands of the railroad, FRA believes that the
operators of these long-distance intercity trains and Tier II passenger
equipment are in the best position to determine which locations have
the necessary expertise to handle the repairs of the somewhat advanced
braking systems utilized in these passenger trains. Due to the unique
technologies used in the brake systems of these operations and the
unique operating environments, the facilities and personnel necessary
to conduct proper repairs on this equipment are somewhat specialized
and limited. Moreover, this final rule retains the broad performance-
based requirement that railroads operating this equipment designate a
sufficient number of repair locations to ensure the safe and timely
repair of the equipment. Contrary to the beliefs of some labor
commenters, FRA believes that this performance standard provides FRA
sufficient grounds to institute civil penalty enforcement actions or
take other enforcement actions if, based on its expertise and
experience, FRA believes the railroad is failing to
[[Page 25588]]
designate an adequate number of repair locations.
Section 238.21 Special Approval Procedure
This section contains the procedures to be followed when seeking to
obtain FRA approval of an alternative standard under Secs. 238.103
(fire safety), 238.223 (fuel tanks), 238.309 (periodic brake equipment
maintenance), 238.311 (single car test), 238.405 (longitudinal static
compressive strength), or 238.427 (suspension system); for approval of
alternative compliance under Sec. 238.201 (covers structural standards
other than the static end strength requirement); and for special
approval of pre-revenue service acceptance testing plans as required by
Sec. 238.111. Procedures for obtaining FRA approval of inspection,
testing, and maintenance programs for Tier II equipment under
Sec. 238.503 are found at Sec. 238.505. FRA has revised this section in
the final rule from that which was proposed in the NPRM, consistent
with other changes made in the final rule.
FRA intends to entertain petitions for alternative compliance under
Sec. 238.201 to allow operation of equipment that complies with the
static end strength requirement (Sec. 238.203) but does not fully
comply with the other final standards in subpart C of part 238,
provided the petitioner can demonstrate ``equivalent safety'' in that
the equipment will operate at a level of safety that is at least
equivalent to that afforded by the provision(s) of subpart C for which
alternate compliance is sought. Equivalent safety may be afforded by
features or measures that compensate for equipment that does not meet
such standard(s) on its own. Equivalent safety is met when railroad
employees, passengers, and the general public are no more at risk from
passenger equipment that does not specifically meet the requirement(s)
for which alternative compliance is sought, but is protected by
compensating features or measures, than when the equipment specifically
complies with the requirement(s) itself.
FRA recommends that the risk assessment portion of a railroad's
system safety program be used to demonstrate equivalent safety. The
burden would be on the petitioning railroad to perform a comparative
risk assessment and to prove equivalent safety. FRA has experience with
two instances involving different passenger equipment operations where
a comparative risk assessment has been used successfully. Amtrak
commissioned a comparative risk assessment between current Northeast
Corridor operations and proposed operations involving the HST at speeds
up to 150 mph. The risk assessment demonstrated that proposed
countermeasures such as enhancements to the train control system and
the increased structural strength and the crash energy management
design of the HST should compensate for the increased operating speed.
The comparative risk assessment quantitatively showed that, with the
safety improvements included in the Amtrak plan, passengers were no
more at risk travelling on the HST at 150 mph on the Northeast Corridor
than if they were travelling on an existing Amtrak passenger train at a
lesser speed on the same corridor.
The second instance is the proposed Florida Overland Express (FOX)
operation of a French TGV high speed rail system in Florida that was
being considered until January 1999. The State of Florida has withdrawn
its support for the project, and work on the project has ceased.
Nonetheless, FOX had performed a comparative risk assessment of three
operations: the HST on the Northeast Corridor, the TGV on high speed
lines in France, and the proposed FOX operation in Florida. See FRA
Docket: RM Pet. 97-1. The analysis showed the TGV operation in France
to pose less risk to passengers than the HST on the Northeast Corridor,
and the proposed FOX operation to be even safer than the TGV in France.
The FOX risk assessment suggested that collision avoidance provided by
a dedicated right-of-way with no grade crossings more than compensated
for the increased speed and decreased structural strength of the
proposed equipment.
FRA cites these two instances as examples of what is expected to
demonstrate equivalent safety for proposed operations when a petition
for alternative compliance is submitted in accordance with
Sec. 238.201. Any such analysis would need to be predicated on a
detailed engineering analysis of the crashworthiness of the vehicles
proposed to be employed, permitting FRA to assess the gap in safety
between those vehicles and equipment built to the specific requirements
of subpart C. FRA would also expect an analysis showing the
effectiveness of clearly compensating features or measures, such as
closing grade crossings, providing absolute separation of lighter rail
equipment from heavy rail equipment, or using highly capable signal and
train control systems that significantly reduce the probability of
accidents caused by human error. FRA would provide advice and guidance
to organizations wishing to demonstrate equivalent safety, but the
burden of performing a comparative risk assessment and establishing
that the operation provides equivalent safety is on the entity
proposing to operate equipment that does not fully comply with the
standards in subpart C.
Section 238.23 Information Collection
This provision shows which sections of this part have been approved
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for compliance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. See 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. A more
detailed discussion of the information collection requirements in this
part is provided below.
Subpart B--Safety Planning and General Requirements
Section 238.101 Scope
This subpart contains safety planning requirements and other
generally applicable requirements for all passenger equipment subject
to this part.
Section 238.103 Fire Safety.
This section contains the fire safety planning and analysis
requirements for passenger equipment, as well as the requirements for
the materials used in passenger equipment. This section is comprised of
parts of proposed sections 238.105 and 238.115 in the NPRM, which FRA
has combined together in this final rule as APTA had suggested in its
comments.
Paragraph (a)(1) contains the fire safety requirements for
materials used in constructing passenger cars and cabs of locomotive
ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the
first time on or after September 9, 2002. Such materials shall comply
with the test performance criteria for flammability and smoke emission
characteristics as specified in Appendix B to this part, or alternative
standards issued or recognized by an expert consensus organization
after special approval of FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety
under the procedures specified in section 238.21. Paragraph (a)(1) is
based on proposed Sec. 238.115(a)(1) in the NPRM. See 62 FR 49803.
In the final rule, paragraph (a)(1) expressly applies to materials
used in constructing a passenger car or a locomotive cab, unlike the
wording of proposed Sec. 238.115(a)(1) in the NPRM, see 62 FR 49803,
which expressly applied to all materials used in constructing the
interior of a passenger
[[Page 25589]]
car or a locomotive cab. As proposed in the NPRM, of course, such
materials were required to meet the test performance criteria for
flammability and smoke emission characteristics contained in Appendix B
to part 238, see 62 FR 49823-4, or alternative standards after FRA
approval. FRA has removed the word ``interior'' from this paragraph in
the final rule because its use is inconsistent with the requirements of
part 238 as a whole. In the NPRM, proposed Appendix B itself provided
test performance criteria for a category of materials entitled,
``Exterior Plastic Components''; specifically, ``End Cap'' and ``Roof
Housings'' under the function of material column in the table. Further,
proposed Appendix B separately provided test methods and performance
criteria for a function of material termed ``Exterior Boxes'' under the
category entitled, ``Component Box Covers.'' As expressed in the NPRM,
FRA intended that ``exterior'' materials used in constructing passenger
cars and locomotive cabs comply with test performance criteria for
flammability and smoke emission characteristics.
In the final rule, materials used in constructing passenger cars
and locomotive cabs are required to meet the test performance criteria
for flammability and smoke emission characteristics as specified in
Appendix B, or alternative standards after FRA approval. As a result,
with the exception of any alternative standards approved by FRA, the
terms of Appendix B govern which testing of materials is, or is not,
required as a threshold inquiry. Whether materials are physically
located on the exterior or in the interior of a passenger car, for
example, such materials are subject to testing for flammability and
smoke emission characteristics if so required by the terms of Appendix
B. Overall, FRA believes that the final rule more appropriately
specifies the flammability and smoke emission testing requirements for
materials used in constructing passenger cars and locomotive cabs,
without unnecessarily burdening railroads. In particular FRA notes
that, unlike the NPRM, Appendix B in the final rule provides express
exceptions from the need to test materials used in constructing
passenger cars and locomotive cabs under certain conditions. (See the
section-by-section analysis discussion of Appendix B to part 238,
explaining the changes to Appendix B.)
In its comments on the NPRM, APTA recommended that the requirements
of paragraph (a)(1) apply to passenger cars and cabs of locomotives
ordered on or after one year following the effective date of the final
rule. APTA's suggested rule text did not contain an outside limit on
the placement in service of new passenger equipment not meeting the
requirements of paragraph (a)(1), although ordered within the permitted
time. However, FRA believes that an outside limit on the placement in
service of new passenger equipment not meeting the requirements of this
section needs to be retained so as not to delay unnecessarily the
implementation of the rule.
Under paragraph (a)(2), on or after November 8, 1999 materials
introduced into a passenger car or a locomotive cab, during any kind of
rebuild, refurbishment, or overhaul of such passenger equipment, shall
meet the test performance criteria for flammability and smoke emission
characteristics as specified in Appendix B, or alternative standards
after FRA approval as specified in this rule. Originally, FRA proposed
that the test performance criteria for flammability and smoke emission
characteristics apply as of the effective date of the final rule to
materials used in refurbishing passenger car and locomotive cab
interiors. FRA has removed the express reference to passenger car and
locomotive cab interiors for the reasons stated in the above discussion
of paragraph (a)(1).
In response to the NPRM, APTA commented that it may support a rule
requiring the materials selection criteria to be used when the
interiors of existing passenger equipment are refurbished, if the term
refurbish were carefully defined in the Working Group meetings. In
either case, APTA recommended that this provision should apply as of
one year following the effective date of the final rule. FRA has
refined paragraph (a)(2) to address APTA's concern: Simply put, if
material is introduced into passenger cars and locomotive cabs during
any kind of rebuild, refurbishment, or overhaul of the equipment, the
material must comply with the test performance criteria for
flammability and smoke emission characteristics as specified in
Appendix B, or alternative standards after FRA approval. For example,
if a seat or a section of a wall is replaced, then the materials used
to replace those components (including an individual seat cushion) must
comply with the test performance criteria for flammability and smoke
emission characteristics as specified in Appendix B, or alternative
standards after FRA approval. However, paragraph (a)(2) does not in
itself require a railroad to remove existing materials from a vehicle
that do not comply with test performance criteria for flammability and
smoke emission characteristics, when such materials are found but not
intended to be replaced during the railroad's rebuilding,
refurbishment, or overhaul of that vehicle. Of course, such non-
compliant materials may be required to be removed from the vehicle
pursuant to the fire safety analyses required under paragraph (d) of
this section; yet, again, the requirements of paragraph (a)(2) do not
specifically require such removal. FRA believes that deferring the
implementation of this provision for one year, as recommended by APTA,
is therefore not necessary for railroads in light of this section's
clearly defined application.
As noted above in the discussions of paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2),
railroads can request FRA approval to utilize alternative standards
issued or recognized by an expert consensus organization in lieu of
complying with the test performance criteria for flammability and smoke
emission characteristics as specified in Appendix B. A railroad must
make such a request pursuant to the procedures in Sec. 238.21.
Paragraph (b) requires railroads to obtain certification that a
representative sample of combustible materials to be used in
constructing passenger cars and locomotive cabs (pursuant to paragraph
(a)(1)) or introduced into such equipment as part of any kind of
rebuild, refurbishment, or overhaul of the equipment (pursuant to
paragraph (a)(2)) have been tested and comply with the fire safety
requirements specified in this part. Paragraph (b) is based on
Sec. 238.115(b) in the NPRM. FRA has modified the certification
requirement following a comment by APTA on the NPRM that the
certification be based on a representative sample of the combustible
materials used. In response to another APTA comment, FRA has also
clarified that the certification be based on the results at the time
the materials were tested.
Paragraph (c) requires each railroad to address the fire safety of
new equipment during the design stage so as to reduce the risk of harm
due to fire to an acceptable level using MIL-STD-882C as a guide or
another such formal methodology. (A copy of MIL-STD-882C has been
placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.) To this end, the rule
requires that each railroad complete a written analysis of the fire
safety problem and ensure that good fire protection practice is used
during the design of the equipment. This paragraph is based on proposed
Sec. 238.105(a) and (b) in the NPRM. See 62 FR 49800.
Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. (Booz-Allen) commented that the risk
[[Page 25590]]
acceptance level be clarified. It stated that MIL-STD-882C does not
define a risk acceptance level itself, and it believed each individual
railroad should determine that level based on its own operating
experience, fleet life, operating conditions, and other factors. FRA
recognizes that MIL-STD-882C does not define a specific acceptance
level itself. Yet, the Standard leads a railroad through the steps
necessary to determine an acceptance level, and the railroad is in the
best position to make that determination. FRA notes that Booz-Allen
also submitted a number of other comments on the elements on the fire
safety analyses required by the rule, and FRA has incorporated several
of these comments in whole and in part.
Paragraph (d) requires that existing passenger equipment and
operations be subjected to a fire safety analysis similar to that
proposed for new equipment in paragraph (c). This paragraph is based on
proposed Sec. 238.105(d) in the NPRM. See 62 FR 49801. A preliminary
fire safety analysis would be required within the first year. This
effort would constitute an overview of the fleet and service
environments, together with known elements of risk (e.g., tunnels). For
any category of equipment and service identified as possibly presenting
unacceptable risk, a full analysis and any necessary remedial action
would be required within the following year. A full fire safety
analysis, including review of the extent to which materials in all
existing cars comply with the test performance criteria for
flammability and smoke emission characteristics contained in Appendix B
to this part or alternative standards approved by FRA under this part,
would be required within 4 years. This overall review would closely
parallel and reinforce the passenger train emergency preparedness
planning effort mandated under a separate docket (see 63 FR 24630; May
4, 1998).
Paragraph (d) responds to NTSB concerns following its investigation
of the collision involving a MARC commuter train with Amtrak's Capitol
Limited at Silver Spring, Maryland, on February 16, 1996. Among 13
recommendations addressed to FRA was the following:
Require that a comprehensive inspection of all commuter
passenger cars be performed to independently verify that the
interior materials in these cars meet the expected performance
requirements for flammability and smoke emissions characteristics.
(R-97-20) (NTSB/RAR-97/02, ``Collision and Derailment of Maryland Rail
Commuter MARC Train 286 and National Railroad Passenger Corporation
AMTRAK Train 29 Near Silver Spring, Maryland on February 16, 1996.'')
The NTSB noted that some materials taken from a MARC car not involved
in the fire that resulted from the collision ``failed current
flammability and smoke emissions testing criteria,'' and that the
materials in the actual cab control car involved in the collision
``also most likely would have failed'' to meet the testing criteria.
(NTSB/RAR 97/02 at 63.) The NTSB did note, however, that had the
materials met current performance criteria, the outcome would not have
been any different because of the presence of diesel fuel sprayed into
the cab control car. Id. Overall, the NTSB found that because other
commuter passenger cars may also have interior materials that may not
meet specified performance criteria for flammability and smoke emission
characteristics, the safety of passengers in those cars could be at
risk.
FRA agrees with the NTSB that steps must be taken to minimize fire
safety vulnerabilities in the existing rail passenger equipment fleet.
Present fire safety guidelines are advisory and were not introduced by
FRA until 1984. Even in recent years, passenger railroads have been
free to utilize non-compliant materials (particularly during interior
refurbishment funded locally without FTA support). It is appropriate
for each commuter authority and Amtrak to evaluate the mix of
materials, possible sources of ignition, and potential fire
environments--including tunnels, cuts and elevated structures where
evacuation to the outside of the vehicle may be difficult or
ineffectual in reducing the risk of injury--relevant to the risk of
injury due to fire or smoke exposure.
FRA is concerned in particular with the risk arising from the
operation of cab cars forward and MU locomotives. Due to their position
in the lead of a passenger train, these vehicles are more greatly
exposed to the risk of fire from collisions with other rail vehicles as
well as highway vehicles at grade crossings. In a collision, fire may
erupt from the fuel tanks of both the rail and highway vehicles, and
also from tanks used by highway vehicles that transport loads of
flammable material. The level of risk on each railroad corresponds to
the number of highway-rail grade crossings, density of rail traffic,
and opportunities for collisions.
FRA requested comments on the costs and benefits associated with
the approach contained in paragraph (d). APTA commented that there
would be little safety benefit to commuter railroads, and potentially
great cost, in requiring the fire safety program for new passenger
equipment to be applied to all categories of existing passenger
equipment. APTA commented that the need for a program of this type has
not been demonstrated, and that neither statistics nor other evidence
has been presented to show that non fuel-fed equipment fires are a
serious cause of injury or death in the passenger railroad industry.
APTA added that, unlike a fire safety analysis of new equipment, where
design flexibility exists to correct in an economical manner any
deficiencies uncovered by the analysis, costs to modify existing
equipment can be an order of magnitude higher. Overall, APTA believed
the impact of the proposal to be great due to the expense of
retrofitting equipment, although it was unable to quantify the exact
impact without performing the fire safety analyses necessary to
determine what modifications needed to be done to equipment. Booz-Allen
also commented that the rule will not be cost-effective for existing
passenger equipment that has less than 5 years of service life.
FRA recognizes the concern that retrofitting existing passenger
equipment may impose considerable cost, and FRA neither proposed nor is
requiring that materials not complying with the test performance
criteria for flammability and smoke emission characteristics be removed
in every instance from existing passenger equipment, if such materials
are found during a fire safety analysis. Accordingly, each railroad is
afforded the flexibility of reducing an unacceptable safety risk
uncovered during an analysis of its equipment by the best means it sees
fit. However, FRA is reluctant to withhold application of this
provision to equipment with less than a specified service life. First,
the practical question exists whether the service life of a vehicle can
be specified in fact, considering the ability to extend a vehicle's
life by rebuilding and the possibility of its sale to other railroads.
Second, FRA believes that a preliminary fire safety analysis of all
passenger equipment is necessary to determine whether any passenger
equipment may present an unacceptable safety risk for passengers and
crewmembers, regardless of the age of the vehicle. If an unacceptable
risk is in fact found and the railroad had intended on retiring the
equipment in the near future, the railroad can evaluate for itself
whether it is more economical to retire the equipment or correct the
safety deficiency. Further, considering the historical record of fires
on passenger equipment, FRA does not expect railroads to find
widespread fire safety
[[Page 25591]]
problems on the equipment it operates, and thus FRA would expect that
most of the time a preliminary fire safety analysis would be all that
is necessary.
In its comments on the NPRM, Booz-Allen questioned whether the fire
safety analysis of existing equipment would include consideration of
nonmetallic and noncombustible materials. FRA believes that such
consideration is necessary because, for example, floor tiles or other
non-metallic materials may have coatings that may emit gas in a fire.
Booz-Allen also commented that the fire risk of equipment depends on
the ignitability of the materials, and, accordingly, ignitability tests
should be included as part of the performance criteria. FRA believes
the ignitability of materials is sufficiently addressed by the test
performance criteria for flammability and smoke emission
characteristics found in Appendix B to this part.
In the end, FRA believes the concern of the commenters as to the
expense of paragraph (d) is overestimated. A railroad is not required
to replace non-compliant materials in every instance, if such materials
are found, and that has been made clear in the rule text. Neither has
FRA specified that the railroad perform a fire safety analysis
equivalent to that required for new equipment under paragraph (c).
As a final point FRA notes that, following its investigation of the
Silver Spring, Maryland, passenger train collision, the NTSB also found
that Federal guidelines on the flammability and smoke emission
characteristics and the testing of interior materials do not provide
for the integrated use of passenger car interior materials and, as a
result, are not useful in predicting the safety of the interior
environment of a passenger car in a fire. (NTSB/RAR-97/02, at 74) FRA
believes that existing fire safety guidelines have continuing value for
their specific purpose. Those guidelines are being codified, as
revised, in this final rule as the best currently available criteria
for analysis of individual materials. As noted above, FRA is conducting
research through NIST to address the interaction of materials and other
aspects of fire safety from a broader, systems approach. This
philosophy is embodied in part in paragraph (c) with respect to new
equipment. Based on this ongoing research and industry fire safety
efforts, FRA expects to propose new fire safety standards in the second
phase of this rulemaking.
Section 238.105 Train Hardware and Software Safety
This section applies to train hardware and software used to control
or monitor safety functions in passenger equipment ordered on or after
September 8, 2000, and such components implemented or materially
modified in new or existing passenger equipment on or after September
9, 2002. Inclusion of these requirements in passenger equipment
reflects the growing role of automated systems to control or monitor
passenger train safety functions.
This section represents the merger of proposed sections 238.107
(``Software safety program'') and 238.121 (`` Train system software and
hardware'') in the NPRM. Although FRA received no particular comments
on these sections in response to the NPRM, FRA determined that these
sections should be combined to make the requirements of the final rule
more concise and clear.
Paragraph (a) requires the railroad to develop and maintain a
written hardware and software safety program to guide the design,
development, testing, integration, and verification of computer
software and hardware that controls or monitors passenger equipment
safety functions. In preparing this paragraph of the final rule, FRA
essentially combined the requirements proposed in Sec. 238.107(a), and
Sec. 238.121(a) of the NPRM. See 62 FR 49801, 49803. Paragraph (b)
states that the hardware and software safety program shall be based on
a formal safety methodology that includes a Failure Modes, Effects,
Criticality Analysis (FMECA); full verification and validation testing
for all hardware and software that controls or monitors equipment
safety functions, including testing for the interfaces of such hardware
and software; and comprehensive hardware and software integration
testing to ensure that the software functions as intended. A formal
safety analysis that includes full verification testing is standard
practice for safety systems that contain software components. Hardware
and software integration testing ensures that the hardware and the
software installed in the hardware function together as intended. This
testing is common practice for safety control systems that include both
software and hardware components. The requirements found in paragraph
(b) arise in particular from Sec. 238.121(a) and (b) of the NPRM. See
62 FR 49803.
Paragraph (c) focuses on ensuring the safety and reliability of
software that controls or monitors passenger equipment safety
functions. Paragraph (c) specifies that, for purposes of complying with
this section, such software shall be considered safety-critical unless
a completely redundant, failsafe, non-software means to provide the
same function is provided. The requirements of this paragraph were
principally drawn from Sec. 238.107(a) and (b) of the NPRM. See 62 FR
49801. FRA notes that the final rule omits proposed Sec. 238.107(c) in
the NPRM as a separate provision in this rule. See id. However, in
complying with paragraph (c) of the final rule, a railroad must
necessarily ensure that software safety requirements are specified in
its contracts for the purchase of the software. The railroad must
further retain documentation to show that the software was manufactured
to the design criteria specified pursuant to this section and that all
required testing was performed. However, verification and validation of
control systems by an independent entity is not required by this rule,
nor is a fully quantitative proof of safety mandated by this rule, as
neither was proposed.
Paragraph (d) specifies that hardware and software that controls or
monitors safety functions shall include design features that result in
a safe condition in the event of a computer hardware or software
failure. Such design features are used in aircraft, as well as in
weapon control systems, to ensure their safety. In the case of primary
braking systems, electronic controls must either fail safely (resulting
in a full service brake application) or access to full pneumatic
control must be provided. As clarified, this provision was proposed in
Sec. 238.121(c) of the NPRM. See 62 FR 49803.
Paragraph (e) makes clear that the railroad shall comply with the
elements of its hardware and software safety program that affect the
safety of the passenger equipment. Failure to carry out a provision
unrelated to the safety of the equipment is not implicated by this
section, so as not to unnecessarily restrict the flexibility of the
railroad. FRA adapted this requirement from that proposed in
Sec. 238.107(d) of the NPRM. See 62 FR 498901.
Overall, the requirements of this section reflect good practices
that have led to reliable, safe computer hardware and software control
systems in other industries. Computer hardware and software systems
designed to these requirements may require a larger initial investment
to develop, but experience in other industries has shown that this
investment is quickly recovered by significantly reducing hardware and
software integration problems and
[[Page 25592]]
minimizing trouble-shooting and debugging of equipment.
Sec. 238.107 Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Plan
This section contains the general provisions requiring railroads to
develop detailed plans for inspecting, testing, and maintaining Tier I
equipment. (The inspection, testing, and maintenance plan for Tier II
equipment is covered under Sec. 238.503.) FRA's goal is for railroads
to develop a set of standards to ensure that equipment remains safe and
operates properly as it wears and ages, and to provide enough
flexibility to allow individual railroads to adapt the maintenance
standards to their own unique operating environment.
Paragraph (b) requires a railroad that operates Tier I passenger
equipment subject to this part to develop and provide to FRA, if
requested, particulars about its inspection, testing, and maintenance
plan for that equipment, including the following:
Inspection procedures, intervals and criteria;
Testing procedures and intervals;
Scheduled preventive maintenance intervals;
Maintenance procedures; and
Training of workers who perform the tasks.
Since FRA does not dictate the exact contents of the plan,
individual railroads retain much flexibility to tailor the plan to
their individual needs and experience. At the same time, FRA believes
this requirement is important and will cause railroads to re-examine
their inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures to determine that
they are adequate to ensure that the safety-related components of their
equipment are not deteriorating over time. This approach represents
good business practice and in most cases merely formalizes what
passenger railroads are already doing. However, FRA believes this
section will provide valuable guidance to regional governments or
coalitions attempting to establish new commuter rail service.
Paragraph (c) makes clear that the inspection, testing, and
maintenance plan required by this section should not include procedures
to address employee working conditions that arise in the course of
conducting the inspections, tests, and maintenance set forth in the
plan. FRA intends for the plan required by this section to detail only
those tasks required to be performed in order to conduct the
inspections, tests, and maintenance necessary to ensure that the
equipment is in safe and proper condition for use. In proposing the
creation of these plans, FRA did not intend to enter into the area of
addressing employee safety while conducting the inspections, tests, and
maintenance covered by the plans. FRA is always concerned with the
safety of employees while conducting their duties, but employee safety
in maintenance and servicing areas generally falls within the
jurisdiction of the United States Department of Labor's Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). It is not FRA's intent to oust
OSHA's jurisdiction with regard to the safety of employees while
performing the inspections, tests and maintenance required by this
part, except where FRA has already addressed workplace safety issues,
such as for blue signal protection. Therefore, in order to prevent any
uncertainty as to FRA's intent, FRA has modified this section by
eliminating any language or provision which could have been potentially
perceived as displacing the jurisdiction of OSHA and has added a
specific clarification that FRA does not intend for the plan required
by this section to address employee safety issues that arise in the
course of conducting the inspections and tests described. Consequently,
the specific elements that FRA proposed to be included in the
inspection, testing, and maintenance plan have been eliminated for the
reasons noted above and because they were merely duplicative of the
general requirements contained in paragraph (b) and are unnecessary.
It should also be noted that the general inspection, testing, and
maintenance requirements previously proposed in the 1997 NPRM at
paragraph (b) of this section (62 FR 49801-802) and the maintenance
interval requirements proposed at paragraph (c) have been removed from
this section in this final rule. The conditions and components
previously proposed in paragraph (b) of this section have been moved to
the periodic mechanical inspection contained in Sec. 238.307(c). As the
conditions previously proposed in this paragraph were intended to
ensure that the railroads had an inspection scheme in place to ensure
that all systems and components of the equipment are free of conditions
that endanger the safety of the crew, passengers or equipment, FRA
believes that a specific inspection interval would be better suited to
address the general condition of the equipment and ensure the safety of
railroad employees, passengers and equipment. In addition, the
maintenance interval requirements have been modified and moved to the
periodic mechanical inspection requirements contained in
Sec. 238.307(b). Consequently, FRA has moved the general conditions
maintenance interval provisions previously addressed in this section to
the specific inspection requirements contained in subpart D of this
final rule.
Section 238.109 Training, Qualification, and Designation Program
This section contains the training, qualification, and designation
requirements for workers (that is, both railroad employees and
contractors as defined in the section) who perform inspection, testing,
and maintenance tasks. FRA believes that worker training,
qualification, and designation are central to a safe operation.
Paragraph (a) requires railroads to adopt and comply with a
training, qualification, and designation program for employees and
contractors who perform safety-related inspection, testing, or
maintenance tasks under this part. ``Contractor,'' in this context,
means ``a person under contract with the railroad or an employee of a
person under contract with the railroad to perform any of the tasks
required by this part.'' FRA intends for the training, qualification,
and designation requirements to apply not only to railroad personnel
but also to contract personnel that are responsible for performing
brake system inspections, maintenance, or tests required by this part.
FRA believes that railroads are in the best position to determine the
precise method of training that is required for the personnel they
elect to use to conduct the required brake system inspections, tests,
and maintenance. Although FRA provides railroads with broad discretion
to develop training programs specifically tailored to the type of
equipment they operate and the personnel they employ, FRA will expect
railroads to fully comply with the training and qualification plans
they develop. This section has been amended slightly from that proposed
in the 1997 NPRM in order to stress that a critical component of this
training is ensuring that a railroad's employees are aware of the
specific Federal requirements that govern their work. Currently, many
railroad training programs fail to distinguish Federal requirements
from company policy.
Paragraph (b) contains a series of general requirements or elements
which must be part of any training and qualification plan developed and
implemented by a railroad. FRA believes that the elements contained in
this section are specific enough to
[[Page 25593]]
ensure high quality training while being sufficiently broad to permit a
railroad to develop a training plan that is best suited to its
particular operation. This paragraph requires each railroad to identify
the specific tasks related to the inspection, testing and maintenance
of the brake systems operated by that railroad, develop written
procedures for performing those tasks, identify the skills and
knowledge necessary to perform those tasks, and specifically identify
and educate its employees on the Federal requirements contained in this
part related to the performance of those tasks. FRA believes that these
requirements will ensure that, at a minimum, the railroad surveys its
entire operation and has identified the various activities its
employees perform. FRA intends for these written procedures and the
identified skills and knowledge to be used as the foundation for any
training program developed by the railroad.
This paragraph also makes clear that railroads are permitted to
train employees only on those tasks that they will be responsible for
performing. FRA tends to agree with several railroad commenters that
there is no reason for individuals who solely perform simple air brake
or mechanical tests and inspections to be as highly trained as those
individuals responsible for conducting comprehensive brake or
mechanical inspections or those individuals responsible for trouble-
shooting, maintaining, and repairing the equipment. This paragraph also
makes clear that a railroad may incorporate an already existing
training program, such as an apprenticeship program. Thus, railroads
would likely not need to provide much additional training, except
training specifically addressing the requirements contained in this
part and possibly refresher training, to its mechanical forces that
have completed an apprentice program for their craft.
This paragraph also contains requirements that any program
developed must include ``hands-on'' training as well as classroom
instruction. FRA believes that classroom training by itself is not
sufficient to ensure that an individual has retained or grasped the
concepts and duties explained in a classroom setting. In order to
adequately ensure that an individual actually understands the training
provided in the classroom, some sort of ``hands-on'' capability must be
demonstrated. FRA believes that the ``hands-on'' portion of the
training program would be an ideal place for railroads to fully involve
its labor forces in the training process. Appropriately trained and
skilled employees would be perfectly suited to provide much of the
``hands-on'' training envisioned by FRA. Consequently, FRA strongly
suggests that railroads work in partnership with their employees to
develop a training program which utilizes the knowledge, skills, and
experience of the employees to the greatest extent possible.
This paragraph specifically requires that employees pass either a
written or oral examination covering the equipment, tasks, and Federal
regulatory requirements for which they are responsible as well as
require that each individual deemed qualified to perform a task
required by this final rule demonstrate ``hands-on'' capability to
perform that task. This paragraph also contains requirements for
conducting periodic refresher training and supervisor oversight of an
employee's performance once training is provided. FRA believes both
these requirements are essential to ensure that an individual continues
to possess the knowledge and skills necessary to continue to perform
the tasks for which the individual is assigned responsibility.
Furthermore, employees must be periodically retrained in order to keep
up with technological advances relating to braking systems that are
constantly being made by the industry.
This paragraph also contains the requirements related to
maintaining adequate records for establishing that individuals are
capable of performing the tasks for which they are assigned
responsibility. FRA believes that the record keeping requirements
contained in this paragraph are the cornerstone of the training and
qualification provisions. As FRA is not proposing specific training
curriculums or specific experience thresholds, FRA believes that these
record keeping provisions are vital to ensuring that proper training is
being provided to railroad personnel. FRA believes these requirements
provide the means by which FRA will judge the effectiveness and
appropriateness of a railroad's training and qualification program.
These provisions also provide FRA with the ability to independently
assess whether the training provided to a specific individual
adequately addresses the tasks for which the individual is deemed
capable of performing, and will most likely prevent potential abuses by
railroads to use insufficiently trained individuals to perform the
necessary inspections, tests, and maintenance required by this rule.
This paragraph makes clear that FRA intends to require that railroads
maintain specific personnel qualification records for all personnel
(including contract personnel) responsible for the inspection, testing,
and maintenance of train brake systems. This paragraph also makes clear
that the records maintained by a railroad contain sufficient detail
regarding the training provided in order for FRA to ascertain the basis
for the railroad's determination.
FRA believes that many benefits can be gained from this increased
investment in training. Better inspections will be performed, resulting
in the running of less defective equipment, which translates to a
better safety record. Equipment conditions requiring maintenance
attention are more likely to be found while the equipment is at a
maintenance or yard site where repairs can be more easily done.
Trouble-shooting of brake and mechanical problems will take less time
and more maintenance will be done right the first time, resulting in
cost savings due to less rework.
Section 238.111 Pre-Revenue Service Acceptance Testing Plan
This section provides requirements for pre-revenue service testing
of passenger equipment and relates to subpart G, which describes
requirements for the procurement of Tier II passenger equipment and for
a major upgrade or introduction of new technology that could affect
safety systems of Tier II passenger equipment. Pre-revenue service
acceptance tests are extremely important in that they are the
culmination of all the safety analysis and component tests of a
railroad's system safety program or other safety planning efforts. The
pre-revenue service tests are intended to prove that the equipment can
be operated safely in its intended environment and demonstrate the
effectiveness of the system safety program or other safety planning
undertaken by the railroad.
FRA has revised and clarified this section based on comments
received in response to the NPRM. APTA believed that the proposed test
program was excessive for equipment that has previous successful
operating experience. It believed that an extensive pre-revenue service
test program is needed only when a new type of equipment is placed in
revenue service for the first time. Otherwise, APTA suggested a simple
compatibility check with the infrastructure of a specific railroad is
all that is needed when the railroad procures new equipment that has
successful operating experience on other railroads. APTA claimed that
FRA does not have the in-house expertise to approve plans, and that the
need for FRA approval will delay the introduction of new equipment,
causing a needless expense. APTA
[[Page 25594]]
recommended that the rule require a full test program only for the
first time equipment is introduced into revenue service, that FRA not
approve the test plans, and that FRA instead be invited by railroads to
witness the pre-revenue service tests.
Amtrak, in its comments on the NPRM, expressly agreed with APTA.
Amtrak believed FRA does not have the resources to support the burden
that would be required by the proposal. Further, Amtrak believed there
is no technical justification to require the formal testing proposed by
FRA when a particular equipment order is nothing more than acquiring
additional equipment identical to that purchased on a previous order.
Amtrak suggested that formal testing be limited to new and untried
types of equipment according to a long-standing AAR practice.
Metra commented that the rule should require railroads to submit
their own pre-revenue service testing plans to FRA and invite FRA to
witness the testing, instead of having FRA determine when and how
railroads should conduct acceptance testing on their systems. Metra
explained that railroads know their own systems and are more capable of
designing testing plans compatible with their systems. Metra believed
waiting for FRA testing and approval would cause needless delay and
expense.
In its comments on the NPRM, the BRC believed this section to be
wholly necessary because of the types of equipment being brought into
service that generally do not comply with the safety appliance laws or
the safety glazing regulations, or both. The BRC believed that this
equipment must comply with applicable laws and regulations affecting
the safety of passengers and railroad workers in order to be brought
into service in the United Service. The BRC also recommended that the
pre-revenue service testing plan be filed with FRA so that the plan
will be available under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
In proposing requirements for pre-revenue service acceptance
testing, FRA did distinguish between passenger equipment that has
previously been used in revenue service in the United States and that
which has not. In lieu of the requirements proposed in Sec. 238.213 (a)
through (e) of the NPRM, paragraph (f) provided for an abbreviated
testing procedure for passenger equipment that has previously been used
in revenue service. See 62 FR 49763, 49802-3. Accordingly, FRA agrees
that when a particular equipment order is nothing more than acquiring
additional equipment identical to that purchased on a previous order,
there is no need for detailed testing requirements. This is reflected
in Sec. 238.111(a) of the final rule, which governs testing
requirements for passenger equipment that has previously been used in
revenue service in the United States. Each railroad is required to test
such equipment only to ensure the compatibility of the equipment with
the railroad's operating system. Although the railroad must keep a
record of such testing and make it available to FRA for inspection and
copying, no formal submission to FRA is required. (In this regard, FRA
does not believe that the plan must be submitted to FRA for the purpose
that it may be available to the public under FOIA, as that
justification, in itself, would require virtually any railroad safety
record to be submitted to FRA, whether or not FRA deems it necessary.)
Further, no FRA approval is required prior to testing the equipment or
placing it in revenue service. FRA expects the requirements of
paragraph (a) to apply in the majority of situations a railroad places
passenger equipment in service for the first time, and FRA has
consequently placed this provision at the beginning of Sec. 238.111 for
ease of use by the regulated community.
As specified in the final rule, Sec. 238.111(a) applies not only to
the actual equipment which has previously been used in revenue service
in the United States or to equipment which is manufactured identically
thereto. Paragraph (a) also applies to equipment which is similarly
manufactured to that equipment and has no material differences in
safety-critical components or systems.
Paragraph (b) contains the requirements for a railroad placing
passenger equipment in service for the first time on its system when
the equipment has not previously been used in revenue service in the
United States--in other words, when the equipment is not covered by
paragraph (a). Each railroad must develop a pre-revenue service
acceptance testing plan and submit the plan to FRA at least 30 days
prior to beginning testing. Previous testing of the equipment at the
Transportation Test Center, on another railroad, or elsewhere should be
included in the submission.
The requirements of paragraph (b) distinguish between whether the
passenger equipment intended for service is Tier I or Tier II passenger
equipment, and FRA has decided to require approval of testing plans
only for Tier II equipment. Although FRA disagrees with APTA's claim
that FRA does not have the in-house expertise to approve the testing
plans, FRA is mindful of APTA's concern that the need for FRA approval
of the plans may unnecessarily delay the introduction of new equipment.
Further, not having endless resources, FRA has decided to focus its
resources here on Tier II passenger equipment in light of the
equipment's higher operating speed and greater potential risk. As a
result, a railroad intending to place in service Tier I equipment under
this paragraph does not need FRA approval of its test plan for the
equipment or FRA approval to place the equipment in service. Of course,
paragraph (b) does provide that for Tier I equipment the railroad must
notify FRA to permit the agency to witness the testing (paragraph
(b)(2)); comply with the testing plan (paragraph (b)(3)); document the
results of the testing and make it available for FRA inspection
(paragraphs (b)(4), (6)); and correct or otherwise compensate for
safety deficiencies uncovered during the testing prior to introducing
the equipment in revenue service (paragraph (b)(5)). Each railroad is
also under an independent duty to comply with the other requirements of
Part 238 and the railroad safety laws in general. In this regard, a
railroad would have to obtain a waiver of FRA safety regulations
through the formal procedures of 49 C.F.R. part 211 before introducing
any equipment into service that does not comply with the safety
appliance regulations or the safety glazing standards, for example.
However, by operation of Sec. 238.111, a railroad is not restricted
from seeking a waiver of an FRA safety regulation under 49 C.F.R. part
211, nor is FRA restricted from granting such a waiver. Part 211
contains procedures to ensure that FRA grants a waiver of a safety
regulation in the interest of employee and public safety.
For Tier II passenger equipment, paragraph (b) requires the
railroad to follow the additional steps of obtaining FRA approval of
the testing plan under the procedures specified in Sec. 238.21
(paragraph (b)(1)); reporting the results of the testing to FRA
(paragraph (b)(4)); agreeing to comply with any operational limitations
imposed by FRA on the use of the equipment (paragraph (b)(5)); and
obtaining FRA approval prior to placing the equipment in revenue
service (paragraph (b)(7)). Under paragraph (b)(7), a railroad is not
required to follow the formal requirements set forth in Sec. 238.21.
Paragraph (c) applies only to Tier II passenger equipment. If a
railroad plans a major upgrade or introduction of new technology in
Tier II passenger equipment that has been used in
[[Page 25595]]
revenue service in the United States and that affects a safety system
on such equipment, the railroad shall follow the procedures specified
in paragraph (b) prior to placing the equipment in revenue service with
such a major upgrade or new technology. This requirement is based on
proposed Secs. 238.603 (b) and (c) in the NPRM. See 62 FR 49823. FRA
has integrated those proposed requirements into the section for
clarity, as alluded to in the NPRM. See 62 FR 49785.
Overall, FRA believes the set of steps and the documentation
required by Sec. 238.111 are necessary to ensure that all safety risks
have been reduced to a level that permits the equipment to be used in
revenue service.
Section 238.113 Emergency Window Exits
This section represents the partial merger of NPRM Sec. 238.235,
emergency window exit requirements for Tier I passenger equipment, and
NPRM Sec. 238.439, as it concerned emergency window exit requirements
for Tier II passenger equipment. FRA has combined these sections
principally in response to the NTSB's comment on the proposed rule that
these requirements should not be differentiated on the basis of train
speed.
Paragraph (a)(1) requires that a single-level passenger car, other
than a sleeping car or similarly designed car, have a minimum of four
emergency window exits, either in a staggered configuration where
practical or with one located in each end of each side of the car. A
bi-level car shall have a minimum of four emergency window exits on
each main level, configured as above, so that the car has a minimum
total of eight emergency window exits.
FRA received several comments relating to the quantity of emergency
window exits that the rule should require. First, the NTSB commented
that specifying a minimum quantity requirement for emergency window
exits in passenger cars is not sufficient. The NTSB believed that the
requirement should be based on the capacity of the passenger car, the
number of door exits, and the scientifically-determined time needed to
completely evacuate the fully-loaded passenger car. Next, Talgo
commented that passenger cars half the length of conventional cars
should be required to have only two emergency window exits on each main
level. Further, Bombardier commented that instead of limiting the
application of this section to emergency window exits, FRA should apply
the requirements of this section broadly to emergency exits--whether or
not those exits are windows--to permit flexibility and innovation in
future passenger car designs. Bombardier added that any such
requirement would be in addition to the requirement for side doors.
The final rule largely carries forward the NPRM's proposal, and the
current Federal requirement in Sec. 223.9(c) of this chapter for four
emergency window exits in each passenger car. The requirement for a
minimum number of window exits is important to ensure an unobstructed
avenue of egress in a variety of accident scenarios, regardless of car
capacity. Of course, as FRA has explained, the Volpe Center is working
on an emergency evacuation performance requirement for passenger cars
to determine the number of total exits necessary to evacuate the
maximum passenger load in a specified time for various situations.
Further, through the APTA PRESS effort, FRA understands that APTA is
developing a systems approach to emergency egress similar to that which
Bombardier has suggested in its comments. FRA recognizes the merit such
approaches have and will consider these alternative approaches in Phase
II of the rulemaking.
Paragraph (b) requires, as specified, each emergency window exit in
a new passenger car, including a sleeping car, to have a minimum
unobstructed opening with dimensions of 26 inches horizontally by 24
inches vertically. In the NPRM, FRA invited comments as to what size
requirements for emergency window exits FRA should impose in the final
rule. FRA had proposed that Tier I equipment have a minimum,
unobstructed emergency window exit opening of 24 inches horizontally by
18 inches vertically, and that Tier II equipment have a minimum,
unobstructed emergency window exit opening of 30 inches horizontally by
30 inches vertically. The Tier II Equipment Subgroup, including Amtrak,
had recommended the latter requirement for application to Tier II
equipment. However, the full Working Group advised against imposing
such a requirement on Tier I equipment. FRA had explained in the NPRM
that, although it would prefer that all emergency window exits afford
the larger opening, the Tier I equipment proposal provided the minimum
opening needed for a fully-equipped emergency response worker to gain
access to the interior of a train.
The NTSB commented that the horizontal and vertical openings of
emergency window exits should be the same for both tiers of equipment,
as the speed at which the equipment travels should not matter. The NTSB
stated that the emergency window exit dimensions should be determined
by the size dimensions needed: (1) To extricate an injured person from
the passenger car; and (2) to allow an emergency responder fitted with
a self-contained breathing apparatus to enter the passenger car. The
NTSB noted that one of the typical adult backboards used by emergency
responders to evacuate injured persons is 24 inches wide by 72 inches
long, and therefore may not clear a window 24 inches wide. (The NTSB
did note that the other typical adult backboards measure 16 inches wide
by 72 inches long, and 12 inches wide by 84 inches long. The NTSB also
stated that a typical steel basket stretcher used by emergency
responders measures about 23 inches horizontally by 8 inches deep by
about 81 inches vertically.) The NTSB further noted the concern that if
a car derails to the extent that the normal vertical dimension becomes
the horizontal dimension, the backboard must be tilted to fit through
the opening. (During Working Group discussions, it was noted that for
this to happen, the car must come to rest on its end.) Moreover, the
NTSB stated that an emergency responder with a self-contained breathing
apparatus may have difficulty entering an 18-inch vertical opening.
FRA agrees that the emergency window exit size requirements should
be the same for both tiers of equipment. The final rule requires that
emergency window exits have a minimum unobstructed opening with
dimensions 26 inches horizontally by 24 inches vertically. This
requirement only applies to new cars, however, as specified in
paragraph (b). FRA recognizes that these dimensions are greater than
those proposed for Tier I passenger equipment (and smaller than those
proposed for Tier II passenger equipment).
A review of emergency window exit sizes on the nation's rail
passenger car shows a wide variation in window size. Differences in
size are not necessarily attributable to the age of the passenger cars:
On certain railroads, some older passenger cars have smaller emergency
window exits than do newer passenger cars; whereas, on other railroads,
some newer passenger cars have smaller emergency window exits than do
older passenger cars. Staff from the Boston, Massachusetts, and Los
Angeles, California, fire departments recommended, upon DOT's inquiry,
that emergency window exits provide at least a 26-inch horizontal
opening to maneuver a 24-inch wide stretcher into and out of the
window. They also expressed concern whether an 18-inch
[[Page 25596]]
vertical opening would be large enough to allow an emergency responder
wearing a self-contained breathing apparatus to fit through the window.
United States Department of Defense MIL-STD-1472E (October 31, 1996),
which contains design criteria for human engineering, provides
dimensions for rectangular access openings for male body passage as
differentiated by the amount of clothing worn. For side access, MIL-
STD-1472E, section 5.7.8.3 provides that openings shall be not less
than 26 inches in depth (vertical) and 30 inches in width (horizontal)
for a male wearing light clothing. Further, the standard provides that
openings shall be not less than 29 inches in depth and 34 inches in
width for a male wearing bulky clothing. (This section of the military
standard has been placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.)
On the basis of the comments and information received following
publication of the NPRM, FRA believes that an emergency window exit
vertical opening of 18 inches is not sufficient for new rail cars. The
emergency window exit size requirements contained in this final rule
provide a more reasonable dimension for passage of large, fully-clothed
persons, including emergency response personnel with fire gear. The
dimensions are practicable in light of the design of many passenger
cars in the United States.
FRA explained in the NPRM that safety may be advanced by staggering
the configuration of emergency window exits so that the exits are
located diagonally across from each other on opposite sides of a car,
instead of placing them directly across from each other. FRA invited
comment on this issue, as well as on the concern that the seat
arrangement of passenger cars may block access to and the removal of
emergency window exits. The NTSB commented that emergency window exits
should be staggered rather than opposite each other, and they must also
be distributed as uniformly as practical to allow for passenger
distribution. The rule will require staggering where practical, but
other considerations must be taken into account, including the need to
provide an unobstructed exit without diminishing normal seating
capacity. Railroads should be mindful that if the ends of a car are
crushed in a collision, then the window exits located at the car's ends
may be rendered inoperable. In this regard, FRA's use of the term ``in
each end'' in paragraph (a)(1) refers to the forward and rear ends of a
car as divided in its center--and does not literally refer to the
extreme forward and rear ends of a car nor require that emergency
window exits be placed at the extreme ends of a car.
FRA is requiring that each sleeping car, and any similarly designed
car having a number of separate compartments intended to be occupied by
passengers or train crewmembers, have at least one emergency window
exit in each compartment. An example of a similarly designed car
subject to this requirement is a crew dormitory car. If an emergency
window exit is not provided in individual sleeping compartments,
occupants of those compartments may have difficulty reaching the car's
doors quickly in an emergency, especially if the car's interior
passageways become blocked or obscured by smoke. An emergency window
exit is necessary in each compartment to enable occupants to quickly
exit the car in a life-threatening situation, as when the car is
submerged. FRA notes that, for purposes of this section, a restroom is
not a compartment specifically required to have an emergency window
exit.
Paragraph (a)(3) requires that each emergency window exit be
designed to permit rapid and easy removal during an emergency situation
without requiring the use of a tool or other implement. In the NPRM,
FRA had specified that the emergency window exit must be easily
operable by a 5th-percentile female without requiring the use of a tool
or other implement. In response to the proposal, Bombardier commented
that the feasibility and practicability of making the emergency exit
operable by a 5th-percentile female is not known at this time.
Bombardier recommended FRA more fully examine the feasibility of
designing and maintaining passenger cars to meet this requirement
before it is made a rule. In the final rule, FRA believes it
appropriate not to specify a requirement at this time for the ease of
operability of an emergency window exit by a 5th-percentile female. In
Phase II of the rulemaking, FRA will evaluate with the Working Group
whether such a concept should be reintroduced. Instead, FRA has decided
to incorporate into the final rule language from the definitions of
``emergency window'' found in 49 CFR parts 223 and 239--that is, each
emergency window must be designed to permit its rapid and easy removal
during an emergency situation--and specifically require that such rapid
and easy removal of the window be able to be accomplished without
requiring the use of a tool or other implement.
Paragraph (c) is reserved for emergency window exit marking and
operating instruction requirements. These requirements are currently
provided in the rule on passenger train emergency preparedness. See 63
FR 24630. In Phase II of the rulemaking, FRA will consider integrating
into this part (part 238) the emergency window exit marking and
operating instruction found in parts 223 and 239 of this chapter.
Additionally, FRA will consider revising those requirements as
necessary.
Section 238.115 Emergency Lighting
Experience gained during emergency response to several passenger
train accidents indicates that emergency lighting systems either did
not work or failed after a short time, greatly hindering rescue
operations. This section requires that passengers cars ordered on or
after September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the first time on or
after September 9, 2002, be equipped with emergency lighting providing
at least an average illumination level of 1 foot-candle at floor level
adjacent to each exterior door and each interior door providing access
to an exterior door (such as a door opening into a vestibule). In
addition, the emergency lighting on such cars must provide an
illumination level of at least an average of 1 foot-candle at floor
level along the center of each aisle and passageway, and a minimum of
0.1 foot-candle at floor level at any point along the center of each
aisle and passageway. The cars must also be equipped with a back-up
power feature capable of operating the lighting for a minimum of 90
minutes after loss of normal power with no more than a 40% loss of the
prescribed illumination levels.
In the NPRM, FRA proposed requiring for both passenger cars and
locomotives a minimum emergency lighting illumination level of 5 foot-
candles at floor level for all potential passenger and crew evacuation
routes from the equipment. See 62 FR 49803. FRA explained that its
proposal was not a recommendation of the Working Group, as FRA believed
an illumination level higher than that suggested by members of the
Working Group was necessary for passengers to locate emergency exits,
read instructions for operation of the exits, and operate the exits.
See 62 FR 49764. FRA did request comments whether the lighting
intensity requirement need be 5 foot-candles at floor level for all
potential evacuation routes if the rail vehicle has a combination of
lower intensity floor proximity lighting, similar to that used on
aircraft to mark the exit path, and higher intensity lighting at the
vehicle's exits. FRA also proposed applying the emergency lighting
requirements to
[[Page 25597]]
rebuilt passenger equipment, and noted that it was considering applying
these requirements to existing passenger equipment sooner than when the
equipment is rebuilt.
In response to FRA's proposal, APTA commented that requiring a
minimum emergency lighting illumination level of 5 foot-candles is
excessive. APTA believed that roughly a five-fold increase in battery
capacity would be necessary to comply with the proposed illumination
standard when combined with the two-hour minimum duration requirement
proposed in the rule. APTA stated that a minimum emergency lighting
illumination level of 1 foot-candle is adequate for new equipment,
based on recent light level measurements taken on passenger coaches by
Volpe Center personnel. APTA noted that a survey in support of its APTA
PRESS efforts shows emergency lighting illumination levels to be
between approximately 0.2 foot-candles and 1 foot-candle on existing
passenger equipment. APTA observed that even an illumination level of
less than 1 foot-candle measured at the floor can allow for an orderly
evacuation of a passenger coach with well-marked exits.
In regard to applying the requirements of this section to existing
passenger equipment, APTA suggested imposing an emergency lighting
illumination level of less than 1 foot-candle on such equipment to
avoid an expensive retrofit. APTA further recommended that the rule
allow the emergency lighting illumination level to decay over the
proposed two-hour duration it would be required to operate, and APTA
suggested allowing the illumination level to degrade to no less than
50% of the original illumination level after two hours. In addition,
APTA noted that emergency lighting systems in conventional locomotive
cabs are radically different from those in passenger cars, and APTA
asked FRA to reconsider how it would apply emergency lighting
requirements inside locomotive cabs.
In commenting on this proposal, the BRC stated that the
requirements for emergency lighting must be phased into existing
passenger equipment sooner than when it is rebuilt. The BRC explained
that for passengers it would be far better to have cars equipped with
emergency and exit lighting to eliminate many of the hazards in getting
out of the cars, and that there is no justification or analysis in the
record for delaying the implementation of the requirements in existing
passenger cars.
Metra, in its comments on this proposal, stated that a requirement
for an emergency lighting illumination level of 5 foot-candles would be
unnecessarily bright and costly. Metra recommended that the
illumination level be set at 0.5 foot-candle. Further, Metra suggested
that for new passenger equipment the requirement be modified to apply
only to new orders placed after January 1, 1998, so as to avoid costs
associated with change orders and dual standards on ongoing orders that
will be delivered both before and after January 1, 1998. Finally, the
Omniglow Corporation (Omniglow) commented in response to the NPRM that
to effectively address an emergency situation where lives are at stake,
each train exit should be equipped with emergency lighting.
In light of these comments and after further analysis, FRA has
revised the requirements of this section in several ways from those
originally proposed in the NPRM. First, under the final rule, the
requirements of this section apply only to passenger cars--and not to
passenger locomotives as proposed in the NPRM. As MU locomotives and
cab cars that transport passengers are considered passenger cars under
this rule, however, the practical effect of this revision is not to
apply the specific emergency lighting requirements in this rule to
conventional passenger locomotives. Moreover, the issue of specifying
emergency lighting requirements for conventional locomotives as a
whole, taking into account their unique characteristics, has been
placed before the RSAC Locomotive Crashworthiness Working Group for its
consideration.
Second, the requirements of the final rule do not apply to rebuilt
passenger equipment. FRA is seeking a broader approach to implementing
emergency lighting requirements in existing passenger cars, whether or
not the cars are rebuilt. To accomplish this, FRA does not necessarily
expect that existing passenger cars will be required to meet the area
lighting standard specified for new equipment. However, FRA desires
that achievable emergency lighting enhancements to existing passenger
cars will be implemented over a reasonable period of time. In the
second phase of the rulemaking, FRA will evaluate the anticipated APTA
PRESS standard for implementing emergency lighting requirements in
existing passenger cars with a view to incorporating the APTA standard
into this Federal standard.
Third, as provided in paragraphs (b)(1)-(3) of the final rule and
modified from the NPRM, this section prescribes the minimum emergency
illumination level for new passenger cars as a 1 foot-candle average at
floor level adjacent to each exterior door and each interior door
providing access to an exterior door (such as a door opening into a
vestibule), a 1 foot-candle average measured 25 inches above the floor
level along the center of each aisle and passageway, and a minimum of
0.1 foot-candle measured 25 inches above the floor level at any point
along the center of each aisle and passageway. These illumination
levels are based on the emergency lighting illumination levels
specified in Section 5-9.2.1 of the National Fire Protection
Association's (NFPA) ``Life Safety Code Handbook,'' Seventh Ed. (a copy
of this section has been placed in the public docket for this
rulemaking) and the Illuminating Engineering Society Lighting Handbook.
Specifying the measurement of the emergency lighting illumination level
at the floor for doors is intended to permit passengers and crewmembers
to see and negotiate thresholds and steps typically located near doors.
Specifying the measurement of the emergency lighting illumination level
at 25 inches above the floor for aisles and passageways is intended to
permit passenger and crewmembers to see and make their way past
obstacles as they exit a train in an emergency, as demonstrated by
tests conducted by the Volpe Center. At the same time, specifying that
the illumination level be measured above the floor for aisles and
passageways recognizes that light emitted from lighting fixtures placed
on the sides of passenger cars may be obstructed, as by car seats,
before the light reaches the floor, and, in this regard, the rule
provides greater flexibility to railroads in the placement of lighting
fixtures. FRA notes that the permanency of this area lighting standard
will be dependent on successful resolution of issues related to
emergency signage, exit path marking, and egress capacity that are
being progressed toward resolution through the APTA PRESS Task Force
and the Volpe Center, as noted below, as a predicate for completion of
the standards in the second phase of this rulemaking.
FRA believes that the emergency lighting illumination levels
specified in this section will enable the occupants of rail cars to
discern their immediate surroundings and thereby minimize or avoid
panic in an emergency. In this regard, a lighting demonstration was
conducted in a SEPTA rail car in March 1998, and in the judgement of
the FRA participants it showed that these illumination levels appear
sufficient. These emergency lighting illumination levels are achievable
for rail cars. In fact, the NFPA 101 specifications for emergency
lighting illumination levels,
[[Page 25598]]
noted above, are recommended for use in rail transit cars through NFPA
130, Section 5-5.3.
In the second phase of the rulemaking, FRA will focus on augmenting
the emergency illumination level specified in this section by including
requirements for lighted signage and exit path marking, as touched on
above. Through a research study conducted by the Volpe Center, FRA has
been investigating emergency lighting requirements as part of a systems
approach to effective passenger train evacuation. This approach takes
into consideration the interrelationship between features such as the
number of door and window exits in a passenger car, lighted signs that
indicate and facilitate the use of the door and window exits, and floor
exit path marking, in addition to the general emergency lighting level
in a car. FRA will also examine the APTA PRESS standard on emergency
lighting, when final, to determine whether the standard satisfactorily
addresses matters related to emergency signage, exit path marking, and
egress capacity so that FRA does not have to revisit the issue of area
lighting with a view toward increased illumination levels. In the
interim, FRA will entertain proposals to utilize alternative methods of
providing at least an equivalent level of emergency illumination to
that prescribed in this rule.
FRA has further revised the requirements of this section from those
proposed in the NPRM by shortening the required operation time period
of the emergency lighting, and by permitting the emergency lighting
illumination level to degrade over time, as well. Specifically, the
final rule requires a passenger car to be equipped with a back-up power
feature capable of operating the lighting for a minimum of 90 minutes
after loss of normal power with no more than a 40% loss of the
prescribed illumination levels. As a result, illumination levels shall
be permitted to decline, as appropriate, from 1 ft-candle to 0.6 foot-
candle, and from 0.1 foot-candle to 0.06 foot-candle. The lighting
decay permitted here is also based on that specified in Section 5-9.2.1
of the NFPA's ``Life Safety Code Handbook,'' cited above. Operation of
emergency lighting for an extended time is particularly necessary in
the event of passenger train rescue operations in remote locations.
Fully-equipped emergency response forces can take an hour or more to
arrive at a remote accident site, and additional time would be required
to deploy and reach people trapped or injured in a train. Even
passenger train accidents in urban areas can pose significant rescue
problems, especially in the case of tunnels, nighttime operations, and
operations in inclement weather.
This section also requires the emergency lighting back-up power
system to be able to operate in all orientations within 45 degrees of
vertical and after experiencing a shock due to a longitudinal
acceleration of 8g and vertical and lateral accelerations of 4g. The
shock requirement will ensure that the back-up power system has a
reasonable chance of operating after the initial shock caused by a
collision or derailment. FRA originally considered that the back-up
power system be capable of operation within a vehicle in any
orientation. However, members of the Working Group advised that some
battery technologies utilize a liquid electrolyte which can leak when
the battery is tilted.
FRA invited commenters to address whether the back-up power system
should be made capable of operation within a vehicle in any
orientation, see 62 FR 49764; and, in response, the BRC commented that
the back-up power system must be capable of operating in any
orientation since railcars do not always remain upright when they
derail. The BRC believed that the fact batteries may have a liquid
electrolyte which can leak when the battery is tilted does not excuse
railroads from obtaining proper batteries that will function in any
orientation.
In the final rule, FRA is not requiring that the back-up power
system be capable of operating in any orientation, and instead FRA is
retaining the proposal in the NPRM that the system be capable of
operating in all equipment orientations within 45 degrees of vertical.
FRA will further examine this issue in the second phase of the
rulemaking, and FRA is aware of a more costly battery technology
utilizing a gel that should not leak when turned in any orientation.
However, even if the back-up power system could operate when turned in
any direction, FRA recognizes that a derailment of the magnitude that
would cause such a situation would potentially destroy the battery box
as a whole or sever the cables connecting the battery to the emergency
lighting fixtures, or both. In this regard, FRA believes it more
important to focus in the second phase of the rulemaking on addressing
the NTSB's recommendation to require reliable emergency lighting
fixtures in passenger cars, each fitted with a self-contained
independent power source (R-97-17). (See NTSB/RAR-97/02) Section
238.115 does permit continued use of battery power common to all
emergency lighting circuits in a particular car.
FRA notes, however, that the concept of a power source at each
fixture, as a regulatory requirement, is novel. FRA findings in recent
accidents support the NTSB's implied concern that placement of
electrical conduits and battery packs below the floor of passenger
coaches can result in damage that leads to the unavailability of
emergency lights precisely at the time they are most needed. However,
from initial investigation it is not certain whether current
``ballast'' technology provides illumination of sufficient light level
quality with reliable maintainability. FRA presented the issue of
placing an independent power source at each emergency lighting fixture
to the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group at a meeting
in December, 1997. FRA will aggressively pursue this option for more
reliable emergency illumination in the second phase of the rulemaking,
and FRA will also work with APTA PRESS on this issue.
Section 238.117 Protection Against Personal Injury
This section contains a general requirement to protect passengers
and crewmembers from moving parts, electrical shock and hot pipes. This
section extends to passenger equipment not classified as locomotives
the protection against personal injury which applies to locomotives
under 49 CFR 229.41. The requirements represent common-sense safety
practice; reflect current industry practice; and should result in no
additional cost burden to the industry. Although FRA received no
specific comments on this section, FRA has modified this section to
make clear that its requirements do not apply to the interior of a
private car, consistent with FRA's overall approach to private cars in
this rule. The protections of this section would apply, of course, to
rail employees and others who may inspect or perform work on the
exterior of a private car.
Section 238.119 Rim-Stamped Straight-Plate Wheels
This section addresses the NTSB's safety recommendation concerning
the use of rim-stamped straight-plate wheels on tread-braked rail
passenger equipment. Following its investigation of a January 13, 1994
Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus train derailment which killed
two circus employees, the NTSB determined that the probable cause of
the derailment was the fatigue failure of a thermally damaged straight-
plate wheel due to
[[Page 25599]]
fatigue cracking that initiated at a stress raiser associated with a
stamped character on the wheel rim. See 62 FR 49743; NTSB/RAR-95/01.
Noting that tread braking is a significant source of wheel overheating
and thermal damage; straight-plate wheels are vulnerable to thermal
damage; and rim-stamping provides a stress concentration for crack
initiation, the NTSB recommended that FRA ``[p]rohibit the replacement
of wheels on any tread-braked passenger railroad car with rim-stamped
straight plate wheels.'' (Class II, Priority Action) (R-95-1).
In the NPRM, FRA stated that because a wheel having a rim-stamped
straight-plate character is a sufficient safety concern in itself, FRA
proposed extending the NTSB's safety recommendation to apply to all
such wheels used on passenger equipment regardless whether the
equipment were tread-braked or not. See 62 FR 49743, 49803. Further,
FRA proposed addressing separately the use of such wheels on passenger
equipment other than private passenger cars--for which there would be
an immediate prohibition on the use of the wheels--in distinction to
the use of such wheels on private cars--for which there would be a
prohibition on the wheels' use as replacement wheels. See 62 FR 49743-
4, 49803.
Based on comments received in response to the proposed rule, and
after further analysis, FRA has modified the requirements of this
section from those proposed in the NPRM. In the final rule, the
restrictions on the use of rim-stamped straight-plate wheels apply only
to such wheels use on tread-braked passenger equipment. AAPRCO, in its
comments on the NPRM, stated that the proposed section was overly broad
in prohibiting rim-stamped straight-plate wheels from being used as
replacement wheels on private cars operated in a passenger train.
Citing the above-noted NTSB report, AAPRCO explained that the only
detected problem involving the use of rim-stamped straight-plate wheels
occurred when such wheels were subjected to tread braking. AAPRCO
believed that there is no known problem involving the use of such
wheels on passenger equipment that is disc-braked and, therefore, not
subject to heating. Accordingly, AAPRCO recommended limiting the
prohibition against using rim-stamped straight-plate wheels as
replacement wheels on private cars to those wheels that are tread-
braked.
FRA notes that the stamping of manufacturers' marks on railroad
wheel rims introduces stress concentrations in the wheel rims. Such
stress risers can help originate cracks as the wheel is subjected to
the low-cycle thermal fatigue of repeated tread-brake applications. As
freight equipment operates with tread brakes, the AAR has discontinued
rim stamping in order to preclude wheel failures due to cracking
initiated at the stamp marks.
Disc brakes use a caliper and pad arrangement (like a bicycle
brake) which operates on (squeeze) a disc which is affixed to the axle
of a rail car, or to the back face of the wheel in a ``cheek'' mounted
scheme, to provide retarding force. Disc brakes introduce no heat into
the rim, since the heat is generated by the friction between the
caliper pads and the disc. This condition is true only if the strategy
to stop a vehicle relies solely on discs without tread-brake
assistance.
Disc-braked rail cars sometimes have tread brakes which are used as
parking brakes. These tread brakes may be applied periodically while
the train is running, using low cylinder forces, in order to clean the
wheel tread surface of oxides and debris which can interfere with the
ability of the wheel to make an electrical connection with the rail for
the purposes of shunting the track circuits to activate signals. This
action is typically of short duration and is controlled by automatic
circuitry (snow brakes) and should not pose a threat to the integrity
of the wheels.
Braking strategies sometimes involve a combination of disc and
tread braking to achieve desired deceleration rates. For example,
Amtrak's AMFLEET I and II cars use such a combination--approximately
40% tread and 60% disc. In such a case, the wheels are tread-braked
every time the vehicle comes to a stop, as opposed to the lower energy
snow braking described above.
Straight plate wheels are well-known to be much more susceptible to
thermal damage than curved or S-plate wheels. Plate curvature permits
radial breathing of the rim as it is heated, resulting in lower rim
stresses. The straight-plate wheel is much stiffer radially and
stresses in these wheels are therefore greater for the same thermal
input. If straight-plate wheels experience tread braking, or if tread
brakes are used in the event of disc brake failure, the possibility
exists for wheel thermal damage. However, the use of straight-plate,
rim-stamped wheels should not pose a safety threat if the wheels are
never tread-braked.
Because the use of straight-plate, rim-stamped wheels should pose
no safety threat if the wheels are never tread-braked, the requirements
of this section do not apply to such wheels used in such circumstances.
Moreover, as provided in paragraph (c), if the wheels are in fact
tread-braked but only in a limited manner to clean the wheel surface,
the requirements of this section likewise do not apply. However, FRA
hereby makes clear that the requirements of this section apply to the
use of straight-plate, rim-stamped wheels when the wheels are subjected
to tread braking in any combination with disc brakes for the purpose of
slowing the passenger equipment.
The second principal change in the final rule from the NPRM
provides particular consideration for the use of Class A rim-stamped,
straight-plate wheels mounted on inboard-bearing axles on commuter
passenger equipment. In commenting on the NPRM, APTA noted that a
number of commuter railroads are currently operating--or are in the
process of implementing service with--Bombardier-manufactured bi-level
coaches that are equipped with Class A rim-stamped, reverse-plate
wheels. APTA specified that the affected commuter railroads operate 182
passenger coaches equipped with these wheels and consist of the
Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink), San Diego
Northern Railway, Tri-County Commuter Rail Authority, Dallas Area Rapid
Transit, and the San Joaquin Railroad Commission. APTA explained that
reverse-plate wheels are considered a hybrid of the straight-plate
design and therefore subject to the prohibition of this section. APTA
added that these wheels have an average service life of five years.
According to APTA, imposing this prohibition on the affected commuter
rail operations will dramatically reduce or terminate commuter rail
operations while replacement wheels are procured and installed. APTA
stated that Class A reverse-plate wheels have a safe history of usage
with no indication of wheel cracks caused by rim stamping, and that
failures of Class B and C wheels of a true straight-plate design led to
the NTSB's recommendation here. Based on these differences, APTA
recommended that FRA allow Class A, rim-stamped reverse-plate wheels to
continue in service.
FRA has considered APTA's comments and notes that the rim-stamped
``reverse''-plate wheels in issue are indeed straight-plate wheels. The
``reverse'' connotation refers to the orientation (angle) of the wheel
plate with respect to the axle. Passenger wheelsets have inboard
bearings--that is, the bearings are located between the wheels on the
axle. Freight wheelsets are outboard-bearing in that the wheels are
mounted between the bearings. The
[[Page 25600]]
wheel plate is pitched one way or the other in either circumstance so
that the wheel flanges end up being the same distance apart. In this
way, either wheelset can transverse the same standard gage track.
From discussions with APTA, FRA understands that these Class A,
rim-stamped straight-plate wheels are installed on rail cars weighing
approximately 115,000 pounds, utilizing blended dynamic and friction
braking. The friction-based portion of the braking system in turn is
composed of approximately 67% tread braking, and 33% disc braking. FRA
further understands that, when properly used, the extended-range
dynamic brake can slow the vehicle from 90 mph--its top operating
speed--to less than 10 mph with no friction (pneumatic) braking
applied, and that this is the recommended method of operating these
rail cars. The service brake rate is 2.0 mph/sec and the emergency rate
is 2.5 mph/sec. In combination with the wheel slip/slide protection
system provided for these cars, FRA believes that the wheels on these
rail cars should be subjected to limited thermal input.
Further, FRA notes that wheels are generally classified as L, A, B,
or C depending on the carbon content of the wheel material. The amount
of carbon determines the hardness and strength of the steel. A Class A
wheel has a lower carbon content, and correspondingly lower hardness
and strength than a Class B or C wheel. Lower hardness means that the
wheel has increased ductility or improved ability to resist cracking
(fracture toughness). This is why Class L and A wheels are recommended
for severe braking conditions. However, since these wheels are
``softer,'' heavy wheel loads will result in poor wear performance,
which is why they are recommended only for light to moderate wheel
loads. Class B and C wheels (with more carbon and increased hardness)
exhibit good wear behavior, but are more prone to cracking. Railroads
choose the wheel type for a particular class of service based on its
operating characteristics.
As reflected in paragraph (a)(2), FRA believes that the commuter
railroads operating vehicles with Class A, rim-stamped straight-plate
wheels mounted on inboard-bearing axles--i.e., reverse-plate wheels--
may continue to do so provided the railroads do not modify the
operation of the vehicles in any way that would result in increased
thermal input to the wheels during braking. As a result, vehicles
equipped with these wheels may not operate at speeds exceeding their
current maximum operating speeds. Further, these wheels may not be
placed on different (especially heavier) rail vehicles. Provided the
conditions for continued use of the wheels are met, however, a railroad
may continue to use the wheels until it exhausts its stock of
replacement wheels held as of May 12, 1999, which is the date of this
final rule's publication. FRA understands that the manufacturer of
these wheels has already started to stamp the wheels on their hubs,
instead of on their rims, and FRA believes that the railroads'
inventory of such rim-stamped wheels will be exhausted within the next
18 months. Once a commuter railroad's inventory of Class A, rim-stamped
straight-plate wheels is exhausted, each such wheel must be replaced at
the end of the wheel's service life with a wheel that is not rim-
stamped.
In commenting on the NPRM, Talgo suggested clarifying the
requirements of this section to state that the stamping of characters
on the rim of a wheel is prohibited due to dangers associated with
stress concentration. According to Talgo, if indeed the purpose of this
section is to address rim-stamping itself, then the rule should be
revised to address all types of wheels and not just straight-plate
wheels. FRA does recognize that the stamping of manufacturers' marks on
railroad wheel rims introduces stress concentrations in the rims, and,
all things being equal, manufacturers should stamp wheels on their hubs
instead of on their rims. Yet, FRA is concerned in particular with rim-
stamped straight-plate wheels because, as noted above, a straight-plate
wheel design is more susceptible to thermal damage than a curved wheel
design. The plate curvature permits radial breathing of the rim as it
is heated, resulting in lower rim stresses.
Similar to the proposal in the NPRM, the final rule allows rim-
stamped, straight-plate wheels on tread-braked private cars to continue
in service throughout the life of each wheel. However, as provided in
paragraph (b), such wheels may not be used as replacement wheels on
these cars. As explained in the NPRM, FRA recognizes that private cars
are generally not highly utilized in comparison to intercity or
commuter passenger equipment, and Amtrak imposes its own safety
requirements on the use of such cars in its trains. See 62 FR 49743-4.
In commenting on the NPRM, a member of the public stated that many
private car owners have a substantial investment in rim-stamped
straight-plate wheels, and precluding their installation would
consequently place a financial burden on many private car owners. This
commenter requested that a provision be added to the rule to allow
private car owners to install such wheels on their cars after January
1, 1998,--which FRA proposed as the effective date for this section--
provided the wheels were owned by that date. In this regard, FRA notes
that Amtrak has issued a letter to private car owners dated September
19, 1995, stating that after June 30, 2000, Amtrak will decline to move
any tread-braked passenger cars with rim-stamped straight-plate wheels.
In addition, Amtrak stated in the same letter that it would not accept
any new applications for wheel change out with rim-stamped straight-
plate wheels, regardless of the brake type. Amtrak's letter referenced
the NTSB's safety recommendation noted in this section.
Since Amtrak is the chief carrier of private rail cars, the ability
of a private rail car owner to use rim-stamped, straight-plate wheels
will be significantly affected independent of the requirements of this
rule. Further, allowing such wheels to continue in use until a car
owner's inventory of the wheels is depleted would prolong the use of
such wheels for potentially decades. FRA believes that the rule allows
due consideration for private rail car owners in allowing them to
continue using tread-braked private rail cars equipped with rim-
stamped, straight-plate wheels throughout the life of each wheel, while
recognizing that, as a whole, the wheels are subject to greater thermal
input when in use and are more susceptible to cracking than the
commuter railroad wheels discussed above. Moreover, FRA notes that
under the definition of ``passenger equipment'' in this rule, a private
rail car not operated in a train with a passenger car, such as in a
freight train, or in a consist of private rail cars, is not subject to
the requirements of this rule. (See above discussion of passenger
equipment in Sec. 238.5.). In addition, the final rule does not apply
to tourist railroads, and a private rail car may therefore operate on
such railroad without complying with the requirements of this rule. See
Sec. 238.3.
Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment
Section 238.201 Scope.
This subpart contains specific requirements for railroad passenger
equipment operating at speeds not exceeding 125 mph. This subpart
contains various structural standards (Sec. 238.203Bstatic end
strength; Sec. 238.205--anti-climbing mechanism; Sec. 238.207--link
between coupling mechanism and car body; Sec. 238.209--forward-facing
end structure of
[[Page 25601]]
locomotives; Sec. 238.211--collision posts; Sec. 238.213--corner posts;
Sec. 238.215--rollover strength; Sec. 238.217--side structure;
Sec. 238.219--truck-to-car-body attachment; and Sec. 238.223--fuel
tanks). These structural standards do not apply to passenger equipment
if used exclusively on a rail line (A) with no public highway-rail
grade crossings, (B) on which no freight operations occur at any time,
(C) on which only passenger equipment of compatible design is utilized,
and (D) on which trains operate at speeds no higher than 79 mph.
In general, except for the static end strength standards ('
238.203) and as otherwise provided in this subpart, the requirements of
this subpart apply only to passenger equipment ordered on or after
September 8, 2000 or placed in service for the first time on or after
September 9, 2002. That is, where no specific date or dates are
provided in the regulatory text for a particular section, such as
Sec. 238.225 (Electrical system), these dates apply to that section's
requirements. Of course, certain existing Federal requirements, such as
the window safety glazing standards in part 223 of this chapter that
are referenced in Sec. 238.221 (Glazing), continue to apply by their
own force.
The rule does provide that passenger equipment placed in service
for the first time on or after September 8, 2000, unless otherwise
provided in the cited sections, must meet the minimum structural
requirements specified in: Sec. 238.205(a) (anti-climbing mechanism);
Sec. 238.207 (link between coupling mechanism and car body); and
Sec. 238.211(a) (collision posts). Further, as specified in detail
below, any such equipment in use on or after November 8, 1999 must also
meet the static end strength standards specified in Sec. 238.203. These
four particular requirements are virtually identical to existing
Federal requirements, found in 49 CFR Sec. 229.141(a)(1)-(4), that
apply to MU locomotives built new after April 1, 1956, and operated in
trains having a total empty weight of 600,000 pounds or more. These
requirements reflect the common construction practices for passenger
equipment currently in service in the United States, and FRA believes
they are minimum safety requirements. FRA notes that the 600,000-pound
consist weight threshold for purposes of 49 CFR Sec. 229.141 is not an
appropriate distinction to apply to passenger equipment operated on the
general system, intermingled with equipment of more substantial
strength; and, as a result, part 238 contains no such consist weight
distinction. In this regard, FRA notes that through this final rule it
is amending the application of 49 CFR Sec. 229.141 so that its
requirements will not apply to passenger equipment subject to part 238.
In addition to these four structural requirements, the rule also
requires that passenger equipment comply with other structural
requirements specified in: Secs. 238.205(b) (anti-climbing mechanism
for locomotives); 238.209 (forward-facing end structure of
locomotives); 238.211(b) (collision posts for locomotives); 238.213
(corner posts); 238.215 (rollover strength); 238.217 (side structure);
238.219 (truck-to-car-body attachment); and 238.223 (fuel tanks). These
requirements apply to passenger equipment ordered on or after September
8, 2000, or placed in service for the first time on or after September
9, 2002, unless otherwise provided in the cited sections. FRA notes
that, under special circumstances, it will allow the placement in
service of passenger equipment not meeting these structural
requirements if the equipment was in fact ordered within September 8,
2000 but not placed in service until after September 9, 2002. In such
case, the railroad must provide documentation to the satisfaction of
the Associate Administrator for Safety that demonstrates the special
circumstances accounting for the delay in placing the equipment in
service.
Structural Standards for Existing Equipment
The final rule requires that all passenger equipment (other than
locomotives that comply with an alternative standard as specified,
private cars, unoccupied vehicles operating at the rear of a passenger
train, or equipment used in non-commingled service, as discussed below)
in use on or after November 8, 1999 have a minimum static end strength
of 800,000 pounds as specified in Sec. 238.203. Static end strength is
critical in protecting passenger equipment from crushing in a head-on
or rear-end collision, especially in the North American railroad
operating environment that includes frequent highway-rail grade
crossings and the mixed operation of freight and passenger trains. FRA
is confident that all but a limited number of existing passenger cars
in the United States have been built to this basic compressive strength
requirement. Beginning in 1939, the AAR recommended that new passenger
cars operated in trains of over 600,000 pounds empty weight have a
minimum static end strength of 800,000 pounds, and since 1956, Federal
Regulations (49 CFR. 229.141) have required that new MU locomotives
operated in such trains must meet this standard. Railroads with
existing passenger cars that do not meet the minimum static end
strength requirement may petition FRA for grandfathering approval to
continue to use the equipment; see discussion under Sec. 238.203.
FRA does, however, recognize that low-speed rail operations that
are structured to totally preclude both operations over highway rail
grade crossings and the sharing of trackage between light rail
equipment and conventional equipment do not require the structural
standards required for commingled operations. Accordingly, the final
rule (in Sec. 238.201) provides that passenger equipment is not subject
to the structural requirements of the rule if it used exclusively on a
rail line (A) with no public highway-rail grade crossings, (B) on which
no freight operations occur at any time, (C) on which only passenger
equipment of compatible design is utilized, and (D) on which trains
operate at speeds no higher than 79 mph. FRA will discuss with the
Working Group in Phase II of the rulemaking what structural standards
are appropriate for such operations.
In the NPRM, FRA considered requiring that one or more of the other
structural requirements for new passenger equipment, discussed above,
be made applicable to existing equipment as soon as one of the
following events occurs: the equipment is sold to another railroad; the
equipment is rebuilt; the equipment reaches 40 years of age; or 10
years elapses after the effective date of the rule. FRA invited
comments on: (1) What equipment would be affected by each of these
structural requirements; (2) the feasibility and costs of retrofitting
such equipment, with costs broken out for each of the different
structural requirements, in the event such triggering events were
adopted in the final rule; (3) whether these triggering events are
reasonable, or whether some other fixed deadline should be established
for making one or more of these structural requirements applicable to
existing passenger equipment; and (4) the safety benefits that could
accrue by making these requirements applicable to existing equipment.
FRA did specifically note in the NPRM that older passenger equipment
may not meet the collision post requirements in Sec. 238.211(a) because
of a change in collision post design following a collision between two
Illinois Central Gulf Railroad commuter trains in Chicago, Illinois, on
October 30, 1972.
In response, APTA commented that it opposed application of the
rule's structural standards to existing
[[Page 25602]]
passenger equipment in light of the potential adverse economic impact
on passenger railroads. AAPRCO, in its comments on the NPRM, believed
the costs associated with rebuilding private cars to meet the new
passenger equipment requirements would be extremely high with no
significant benefit to the public. AAPRCO stated that Amtrak requires
all cars, including private cars, that operate on their system be
maintained to strict standards of inspection, including full 40-year
truck teardowns with specified periodic scheduled truck roll-outs,
annual inspections, and full COT&S. AAPRCO noted that nearly all
private cars currently in operation are over 40 years old.
In the final rule, FRA has made the compressive strength
requirement the only structural requirement applicable to existing
passenger equipment. However, in general, if the need arises to apply
one of the other structural requirements specified in the rule to
existing passenger equipment, FRA will reconsider whether such
requirements should be made applicable to existing equipment. In
particular, FRA will ask its Working Group in Phase II of the
rulemaking to consider applying the other structural requirements
specified in the rule to existing passenger equipment when the
equipment is ``rebuilt'' or otherwise improved such that the useful
life of the equipment is materially extended. Further, FRA will not
specifically limit the consideration of the Working Group in this
regard to the rule's structural requirements, but will include in its
consideration any of the other requirements for Tier I passenger
equipment in this final rule.
Equipment of Special Construction
Comments from Talgo, discussed in general above and in more
specific terms below, question the relevance or appropriateness of some
of the proposed structural standards to a trainset built with
articulated connections using a monocoque or space frame design. In
consultations associated with the Working Group review, FRA sought
information from the commenter regarding its trainset and has sought to
identify requirements that might be appropriate for this configuration.
However, in general, the analytical basis for alternative engineering
values suggested by the commenter either was not evident or was
determined not to be appropriate. Talgo did submit additional
engineering information in October of 1998 but FRA could not
appropriately analyze this data for purposes of the final rule without
substantially delaying the rule's issuance. FRA does recognize that
special attention is needed to the specifics of this design, which is
unique in current service in the United States, both to avoid
inappropriate requirements and to ensure sound functioning of features
that may warrant exceptions from other requirements.
In the final rule, Sec. 238.201 has been amended to permit approval
of equipment of special construction. (This alternative compliance
approval process does not apply to the minimum static end strength
requirements set forth in Sec. 238.203.) The basis for decision would
be similar to that discussed in the NPRM with respect to waivers (62 FR
49728, 49755), but the special approval mechanism would be employed as
a more appropriate means of recognizing whether the equipment provides
an equivalent level of safety with the standard of safety benchmarked
in the particular provisions of the subpart.
No New Safety Appliance Requirements
FRA is not imposing new safety appliance requirements for passenger
equipment subject to this subpart. The safety appliance requirements
referenced in Sec. 238.229 continue to apply to such passenger
equipment and are noted in this rule for clarity. Similarly, the window
glazing requirements in 49 CFR part 223 continue to apply by their own
force.
Section 238.203 Static End Strength
This section contains the requirements for the overall compressive
strength of all Tier I rail passenger equipment, except for equipment
meeting the requirements of Sec. 238.201. This section is based on the
long-standing practice of constructing passenger cars to possess a
minimum static end strength of 800,000 pounds on the line of draft
without permanent deformation of the body structure. This practice has
proven effective in the North American railroad operating environment
that includes frequent highway-rail grade crossings, mixed operation of
freight and passenger trains, and less than fully-capable signal and
train control systems. This section should be read with the discussion
relating to static end strength earlier in the preamble.
In general, paragraph (a) requires that on or after November 8,
1999 all passenger equipment (except as otherwise provided in
Sec. 238.201) shall resist a minimum static end load of 800,000 pounds
applied on the line of draft without permanent deformation of the body
structure. As specified in paragraph (a)(2), unoccupied volumes of a
passenger car or a locomotive may have a lesser static end strength to
allow a crash energy management design approach to be employed, if the
car or locomotive resists a minimum static end load of 800,000 pounds
applied on the line of draft at the ends of its occupied volume without
permanent deformation of the body structure. FRA makes clear that, for
purposes of paragraph (a)(2), the ability of a car or locomotive to
resist a minimum static end load of 800,000 pounds applied on the line
of draft at the ends of its occupied volume without permanent
deformation of the body structure shall be determined on the basis of
the individual car or locomotive's own strength and crash energy
management design. Two or more units of passenger equipment may not be
included in demonstrating the ability of the occupied volume of an
individual passenger car or locomotive to resist a minimum static end
load of 800,000 pounds as specified in paragraph (a)(2).
Paragraph (a)(2) is based on proposed Sec. 238.203(b) in the NPRM,
see 62 FR 49804. In the final rule, FRA has revised and incorporated
that paragraph into paragraph (a). FRA has done so in part to make
clear that a passenger car or a locomotive must first resist a minimum
static end load of 800,000 pounds applied at the ends of the car or
locomotive, unless the car or locomotive employs a crash energy
management design in which case the load may then be resisted at the
ends of the volume of the car or locomotive occupied by passengers or
crewmembers.
FRA has included paragraph (a)(3) in the final rule in response to
the comments on the NPRM that existing AEM-7 locomotives would not
comply with the static end strength requirement proposed by FRA. As FRA
understands, applying the 800,000-pound load at the buff stops of an
AEM-7 locomotive apparently creates too large a moment on either the
draft gear housing or on the buffer beam to side sill connection.
Having analyzed the AEM-7 locomotive, FRA believes that the structure
can support a 1,000,000-pound load applied at the center of the buffer
beam, and provide an equivalent or greater level of safety than that
proposed in the NPRM.
The requirements of paragraph (a)(3) are based on former AAR
Standard 034-69, Section 6--Buffing, paragraph (f). In the final rule,
FRA has doubled the load provided in the AAR Standard from 500,000
pounds to 1,000,000 pounds, to ensure safety. Further, FRA has tailored
paragraph (a)(3) so that the alternative specified therein does not
apply to any locomotive placed in service on or after July 12, 1999, as
FRA wishes to limit
[[Page 25603]]
application of this alternative to existing locomotives. In addition,
the alternative specified in paragraph (a)(3) may not be applied to a
cab car or an MU locomotive. Use of the alternative for such a
locomotive will not provide as high a level of safety as for a
conventional locomotive.
As specified in paragraph (a)(4), the requirements of paragraph (a)
do not apply to unoccupied passenger equipment operating at the rear of
a passenger train. In the NPRM, FRA had proposed excepting from the
requirements of paragraph (a) vehicles such as auto-carriers and
RoadRailers operated at the rear of a passenger train and used solely
to transport freight. To the extent such equipment could be excepted
from the requirements of this paragraph, FRA determined that other
unoccupied passenger equipment operating at the rear of a passenger
train could also be excepted. In general, however, FRA would prefer
that every vehicle in a passenger train have a minimum static end
strength as specified in this section so that in the event of a train
collision the cars in the train will crush or resist crushing with a
certain degree of predictability and, thereby, further the ability of
the train to remain upright and in line. As most collisions involving a
passenger train occur at the train's forward end, the requirement for
unoccupied passenger equipment to possess a minimum compressive
strength is more significant for such equipment operated at the train's
forward end and in front of the passenger car consist, than for such
equipment operated at the rear. As proposed in the NPRM, private cars
are also excepted from the requirements of paragraph (a). Nevertheless,
FRA believes that, at a minimum, most private cars do comply with the
compressive strength requirements that are specified in this paragraph
for other passenger equipment.
In the final rule, FRA has included paragraph (b) to address the
concern of railroads commenting on the NPRM that their existing
passenger equipment may need to undergo potentially costly testing to
determine whether the equipment complies with the static end strength
requirements specified in this rule. Although FRA believes that only a
limited number of existing passenger equipment on the nation's
railroads does not comply with the static end strength requirement
specified in paragraph (a)(1), FRA has included a presumption in the
final rule to alleviate the burden on railroads to show that their
existing equipment complies with the requirements of this paragraph.
Paragraph (b) provides that any passenger equipment placed in service
before November 8, 1999 is presumed to comply with paragraph (a)(1)
(and thus presumed to resist a minimum static end load of 800,000
pounds applied on the line of draft without permanent deformation of
the body structure), unless the railroad operating the equipment has
knowledge, or FRA makes a showing, that such passenger equipment was
not built to the requirements specified in paragraph (a)(1). FRA makes
clear that passenger equipment built in accordance with AAR
specifications for the construction of passenger equipment operating in
trains of more than 600,000 pounds total empty weight is deemed to be
built to the requirements specified in paragraph (a)(1) and, thereby,
compliant in this regard. Originally adopted in 1939, Section 6,
paragraph (a), of AAR Standard S-034-69, ``Specification for the
Construction of New Passenger Equipment Cars,'' provides in part, ``The
car structure shall resist a minimum static end load of 800,000 lbs. at
the rear draft stops ahead of the bolster on the center line of draft,
without developing any permanent deformation in any member of the car
structure.'' FRA also makes clear that, in a case where the railroad
does not know whether its passenger equipment was built to the
requirements specified in paragraph (a)(1) (or, in essence, this AAR
specification), the presumption that the equipment was built to the
requirements specified in paragraph (a)(1) still applies. The
presumption is not applicable only in those cases where the railroad
knows, or FRA can make a showing, that the equipment was not built to
the requirements specified in paragraph (a)(1).
In response to the NYDOT's comment as to the effect of applying the
static end strength requirement to existing passenger equipment, and
thereby to the turboliner equipment planned for use in New York State,
FRA believes that the RTL trainsets undergoing rebuild comply with the
end strength requirement specified in paragraph (a)(1). However, these
RTL trainsets need to be contrasted with the RTG trainsets which the
NYDOT has also expressed an interest in rebuilding for like use. FRA
believes that these RTG trainsets do not meet the end strength
requirement specified in paragraph (a)(1), as FRA understands they were
built in accordance with UIC (International Union of Railways)
structural standards (which provide for lesser structural strength).
FRA does note that no RTG trainsets are currently in service in the
United States and that to rebuild the equipment would involve
substantial cost while failing to meet the crashworthiness objectives
of this rule. Information available to FRA indicates that the only
useable remaining components of these trainsets are their shells.
Further, FRA is not aware that any funding has been allocated to
initiate the remanufacture of these trainsets, and any planned use of
these trainsets should be considered speculative.
To prevent sudden, brittle-type failure of the passenger equipment
body structure, paragraph (c) requires that the body structure be
designed, to the maximum extent possible, to fail by buckling or
crushing, or both, of structural members rather than by fracture of
structural members or failure of structural connections.
In the final rule, FRA has added a paragraph (d) to provide a
process for grandfathering approval of passenger equipment in use on a
rail line or lines on November 8, 1999 that does not meet the minimum
static end strength requirements. If the operator of the equipment
files a petition with FRA seeking grandfathering approval to continue
to use the equipment within this 180-day period after the rule is
published, the equipment could continue in such usage while the
petition is being processed, but such usage must stop May 8, 2000
unless the petition is approved. The section sets forth the
requirements for petitions and service of the petition, and the process
FRA will follow in soliciting comments on the petition and disposing of
petitions.
FRA plans to ``grandfather'' equipment only for use in particular
operating environments providing a sufficient showing is made that any
incremental safety risk incurred in those environments is not of
significant concern or that specific measures mitigating the risk to
the traveling public and to railroad employees are utilized.
Petitioners will need to demonstrate--through a quantitative risk
assessment that incorporates design information, engineering analysis
of the equipment's static end strength and of the likely performance of
the equipment in derailment and collision scenarios, and risk
mitigation measures to avoid the possibility of collisions or to limit
the speed at which a collision might occur, or both, that will be
employed in connection with the usage of the equipment on a specified
rail line or lines--that use of the equipment, as utilized in the
service environment for which recognition is sought, is in the public
interest and is consistent with railroad safety. In this regard, FRA
notes
[[Page 25604]]
that passenger equipment not possessing the minimum static end strength
specified in this rule does not have the same capacity to absorb safely
within its body structure the compressive forces that develop in a
collision as equipment meeting the standard. The engineering analysis
submitted by the petitioner should address how these forces will be
dissipated in a manner that does not jeopardize occupant safety in
collision scenarios.
Grandfathering approval of non-compliant equipment is limited to
usage of the equipment on a particular rail line or lines. Before
grandfathered equipment can be used on another rail line, a railroad
must file and secure approval of a grandfathering petition for such
usage.
Section 238.205 Anti-Climbing Mechanism
This section contains the vertical strength requirements for anti-
climbing mechanisms on rail passenger equipment. The purpose of the
anti-climbing mechanism is to prevent the override or telescoping of
one passenger train unit into another in a derailment or collision. FRA
is requiring that all passenger equipment placed in service for the
first time on or after November 8, 1999 shall have an anti-climbing
mechanism at each end capable of resisting an upward or downward
vertical force of 100,000 pounds without permanent deformation. When
coupled together in any combination to join two vehicles, AAR Type H
and Type F tight-lock couplers satisfy this requirement. This
requirement incorporates a long-standing industry practice into the
final rule.
The rule further requires that the forward end of a locomotive
ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the
first time on or after September 9, 2002, be equipped with an anti-
climbing mechanism capable of resisting an upward or downward vertical
force of 200,000 pounds without failure. This requirement applies to
locomotives or power cars of permanently coupled trains, and includes
cab cars and MU locomotives. Specifying a vertical load requirement for
lead vehicles (locomotives) that is greater than that for coupled
vehicles is needed to address the greater tendency for override in a
collision between uncoupled vehicles. AAR Standard S-580, which
addresses the crashworthiness of locomotives, has included this
requirement for all freight locomotives built since August 1990. FRA
believes this industry practice is sound, and this requirement received
endorsement by passenger railroad representatives. FRA recognizes that
incorporating a separate anti-climbing arrangement in the leading
structure of cab cars and MU locomotives presents a significant
challenge. FRA will continue to work with the APTA PRESS Task Force to
derive a suitable solution.
In its comments on the proposed rule, Talgo remarked that
Sec. 238.205(a), as drafted, seemed to consider that only couplers may
properly function as anti-climbing mechanisms. Talgo recommended
modifying this section to avoid this implication and ensure that anti-
climbing mechanisms of varying design can be evaluated fairly. Talgo
asserted that such a modification would ensure that articulated
trainsets are not unfairly subject to a requirement that focuses only
on conventionally coupled units. WDOT, in its comments on the NPRM,
raised similar points, noting that articulated joints of semi-
permanently coupled trainsets provide anti-climbing ability. As a
result, FRA makes clear that the term anti-climbing mechanism is
intended to be read broadly to encompass more than a conventional
coupler, and that an articulated connection may serve as an anti-
climbing mechanism for the purposes of this section provided it can
withstand the vertical forces specified in this section.
In its comments on the NPRM, Talgo also believed that the rule
should be restated to accommodate trains of different masses.
Specifically, in determining the strength of the anti-climbing feature,
Talgo recommended stating the operative variable as vertical
acceleration, expressed in gs (units of acceleration of gravity),
rather than load, expressed in pounds. Accordingly, Talgo recommended
modifying this section so that the anti-climbing mechanism be capable
of resisting a certain value of acceleration, instead of a vertical
force of 100,000 pounds. Talgo supplemented its comments on this
section following FRA's announcement that the minutes of the
rulemaking's Working Group meetings had been added to the rulemaking's
docket, See 63 FR 28496; May 26, 1998. As FRA had permitted comments
for inclusion in the record as to whether the minutes accurately
reflected statements made at the Working Group meetings, Talgo stated
that the minutes do not mention that a representative of the Volpe
Center acknowledged that this section should be modified to address
lighter rail equipment. Talgo stated that, aside from the ends of its
articulated trainsets which it noted are compliant with the 100,000
pound vertical force requirement, intermediate joints in the trainsets
need only be equipped with anti-climbing mechanisms of 47,000 pounds
strength to provide the same level of safety as required by the rule.
Talgo explained that, for purposes of calculating a vertical force
requirement, one should focus on the static force needed to lift a car
of specified weight from one end while supported by the truck on the
other end. Talgo further explained that this value should be multiplied
by a safety factor--equal to 2.2., as it derived from values in the
proposed rule--in order to take into account the possibilities of
misalignment and similar dynamics in the event of a collision. As a
result, Talgo believed specifying a 47,000-pound strength requirement
for anti-climbing mechanisms on its equipment would provide the same
level of safety as specifying a 100,000-pound strength requirement for
anti-climbing mechanisms on conventional cars.
FRA notes that during a train collision the relatively strong
underframe of a rail vehicle may ride up above the underframe of an
adjacent rail vehicle, and extensively crush the weaker superstructure
of the overridden vehicle. The potential for override to occur is
influenced by the dynamic motions of the cars, the relative heights of
the vehicles' underframes, and the changing geometry of the vehicles'
structures as they crush during the collision. These factors allow the
development of a vertical component of the very high longitudinal
forces occurring in a train during a collision. This vertical force
component, in effect, squeezes one underframe up and over the
underframe of another vehicle in the train. While all three factors
play a role in the occurrence of override, results of actual collisions
indicate that the changing geometry of the car structures as they
crush--which, in effect, creates a ramp during the collision--can
overwhelm the influence of the difference in sill heights. There are
numerous examples of cars with relatively low underframe heights that
have overridden cars with relatively high underframe heights.
FRA has not modified the final rule in response to Talgo's comment
that the rule should require the anti-climbing mechanism to be capable
of resisting a certain value of acceleration instead of a specified
vertical force. First, Talgo has not indicated in its comments what
that value of acceleration should be, and FRA believes that formulating
a performance standard in pounds of force, instead, is appropriate.
Second, Talgo's subsequent comments have focused on specifying a
47,000-pound vertical force as an alternative to the
[[Page 25605]]
100,000-pound vertical force that an anti-climbing mechanism must
resist under this section. In response to this latter suggestion by
Talgo, FRA notes that the longitudinal force acting on a vehicle in a
train during a collision is, in large part, a function of the vehicle's
own deceleration plus the force required to decelerate all the vehicles
behind it. (The longitudinal force is also dependent on the force
required to crush the vehicles in the train.) When a sufficient
vertical component of this total force develops, override occurs.
Because the longitudinal force required to decelerate the trailing
vehicles can exceed the force required to decelerate the subject
vehicle, it is not possible to relate the deceleration of a single
vehicle to the tendency to override in the way that Talgo has explained
in arriving at its proposed 47,000-pound strength value. The Volpe
Center representative cited by Talgo sought to make this point clear at
the December 15, 1997 Working Group meeting. This representative also
tried to make clear that he did not agree that consideration should be
given to lighter rail equipment in the way that Talgo proposed at the
Working Group meeting and in its comments on the rule.
Even though it may be theoretically possible to develop a formula
which relates the decelerations of all the cars in a train to the
tendency to override, such a formula would have to take into account
the specific cars in the train and the time-phasing of the
decelerations of the cars during a collision, as well as the forces
required to crush each of the cars. Development of such a formula is
beyond FRA's resources in issuing initial passenger equipment safety
standards as mandated by Congress. However, FRA will further examine
this issue in evaluating equipment of special construction.
Section 238.207 Link Between Coupling Mechanism and Car Body
This section contains the vertical strength requirements for the
structure that links the coupling mechanism to the car body on
passenger equipment. The purpose of this requirement is to avoid a
premature failure of the draft system so that the anti-climbing
mechanism will have an opportunity to engage.
FRA is requiring that all passenger equipment placed in service for
the first time on or after November 8, 1999 be provided with a coupler
carrier or other coupler-to-car-body linking structure that is designed
to resist a vertical downward thrust from the coupler shank of 100,000
pounds, without permanent deformation for any normal horizontal
position of the coupler or coupling mechanism.
In its comments on the NPRM, Talgo stated that this section should
be modified to apply only in the case where the coupler between cars
itself acts as the anti-climbing mechanism--not in cases where other
anti-climbing designs such as articulated unions are utilized. As a
result, Talgo recommended that the requirements of this section should
apply only to the couplers at the far ends of an articulated trainset,
and not to the interior articulated unions which do not employ
couplers. Talgo believed that this approach has been proposed in the
rule with respect to Tier II passenger equipment. Talgo further
commented that the load requirement should be the same as provided in
Sec. 238.205.
FRA recognizes that in an articulated trainset, the articulated
joint connecting the cars in the train serves as both the coupler
carrier and as the anti-climbing mechanism. Such cars do not have a
coupler shank, per se. For practical reasons, including administration
of the rule, FRA proposed separate requirements for the strength of the
anti-climbing mechanism in Sec. 238.205 and for the strength of the
link between the coupling mechanism and car body in Sec. 238.207
because the vast majority of Tier I passenger equipment possesses a
conventional draft system. However, FRA intended that for passenger
equipment utilizing articulated connections that comply with the
requirements of Sec. 238.205(a), such articulated connections would
also comply with the requirements of this section. In the final rule,
FRA has made this explicit by adding a sentence to the rule text, and
FRA has therefore adopted Talgo's comment in this regard. Talgo's
comment with respect to specifying an appropriate load requirement for
this section is consequently addressed in the discussion of
Sec. 238.205, above.
Section 238.209 Forward-Facing End Structure of Locomotives
This section contains the requirements for the covering or skin of
the forward-facing end structure of each passenger locomotive ordered
on or after September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the first time
on or after September 9, 2002. The purpose of these requirements is to
protect the occupied volume of the locomotive cab. This area is
especially vulnerable in a highway-rail grade crossing collision if a
fuel tank that is part of or being transported by the highway vehicle
ruptures, or bulk hazardous materials are released.
FRA is requiring that the skin covering the forward-facing end of
each passenger locomotive, including a cab car and an MU locomotive, be
at a minimum equivalent to a \1/2\-inch steel plate with a 25,000
pounds-per-square-inch yield strength. Material of a higher yield
strength material may be used to decrease the required thickness of the
material provided at least an equivalent level of strength is
maintained. The skin shall also be designed to inhibit the entry of
fluids into the occupied area of the equipment, and be affixed to the
collision posts or other main vertical structural members of the
forward-facing end structure to add to the strength of the end
structure.
AAR Standard S-580 has included these requirements for all
locomotives built since August 1990. From observations of the improved
performance of locomotives during collisions, FRA believes that this
industry standard should be part of these safety standards. Passenger
railroad representatives in the Working Group endorsed this improved
safety requirement.
In its comments on the NPRM, APTA recommended that paragraph (c) be
clarified so that the skin be designed to permit a train line door with
a window in the forward-facing end structure of cab cars and MU
locomotives. In fact, as proposed in the NPRM, the rule defined
``skin'' to mean the ``outer covering on a fuel tank or the front of a
locomotive, including a cab car and an MU locomotive, excluding the
windows and forward-facing doors.'' See Sec. 238.5; 62 FR 49795 (The
skin may also be covered with another coating of a material such as
fiberglass). APTA's recommendation is therefore consistent with FRA's
proposal. For clarity, however, FRA has revised the final rule by
removing the exclusion concerning windows and forward-facing doors from
the definition of ``skin'' in Sec. 238.5, and placing the exclusion
instead directly in paragraph (d) of this section.
Section 238.211 Collision Posts
This section contains the structural strength requirements for
collision posts. Collision posts provide protection against the
crushing of occupied volumes of passenger equipment, including the
telescoping of one vehicle into another, in the event of a collision or
derailment.
Paragraph (a) requires that all passenger equipment placed in
service for the first time on or after November 8, 1999 shall have
either two full-height collision posts, each collision post having an
ultimate longitudinal strength of not less than 300,000 pounds, or an
equivalent end structure. The 300,000-pound strength requirement makes
[[Page 25606]]
mandatory the long-standing construction practice for collision posts
in passenger equipment operating in the United States and has proven
effective in the Nation's railroad operating environment. This
requirement is similar to that contained in 49 CFR 229.141(a)(4), which
applies to MU locomotives operated in trains having a total empty
weight of 600,000 pounds or more, but also requires the collision posts
to be full-height. As noted, FRA does not believe the 600,000-pound
consist weight threshold is an appropriate distinction to retain for
passenger equipment operating on the general system intermingled with
equipment of more substantial strength, and, as a result, no such
consist weight distinction is made in the final rule.
Full-height collision posts provide additional protection because
they extend higher than posts attached only at the underframe. Little,
if any, additional cost is imposed on builders by requiring full-height
posts. Spacing the collision posts at approximately the one-third
points laterally across the ends of the equipment will allow both posts
to be engaged in many collision scenarios. An equivalent single end
structure may be used in place of the two collision posts provided the
structure can withstand the sum of the forces that each collision post
is required to withstand. This allows for the design of monocoque,
unitized or like structures. FRA notes, of course, that such a single
end structure must also resist the loading requirements for corner
posts as specified in Sec. 238.213, as well as any other applicable end
structure requirements as specified in this rule for Tier I passenger
equipment.
Amtrak, in its comments on the NPRM, noted that its rail passenger
operation is unique in the United States because it includes the use of
unoccupied express and mail cars. Amtrak stated that collision posts
applied to unoccupied head end cars (express cars) are unwarranted
because the posts unnecessarily increase the tare weight of this
equipment without any associated improvement in safety. FRA had
originally proposed requiring that all passenger equipment comply with
the requirements of paragraph (a), except for a vehicle of special
design that operates at the rear of a passenger train and is used
solely to transport freight, such as an auto-carrier or a RoadRailer.
See 62 FR 49804. FRA sought this broader application of the collision
post requirements in part because collision posts serve to repel
adjacent passenger equipment in a train collision or derailment and,
thereby, help prevent the uncontrolled crushing of equipment which
could tend to misalign the train consist. For occupant safety, it is
optimal that a train remain in line and upright in the event of a
collision or derailment, and gradually come to a stop after ``plowing
the ballast'' along the railroad track.
Nonetheless, FRA has revised the final rule to except unoccupied
passenger equipment from the requirements of this section--whether
operated at the rear or forward end of a passenger train. However, as
noted above in the discussion of Sec. 238.203, unoccupied passenger
equipment operated at the forward end of a passenger train must comply
with the static end strength requirement to maintain the integrity of
the train.
Paragraph (b) requires that each locomotive, including a cab car or
MU locomotive, ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or placed in
service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002, have two
forward collision posts, located at approximately the one-third points
laterally across the end of the locomotive, each post capable of
withstanding a 500,000-pound longitudinal force without exceeding the
ultimate strength of the joint. In addition, each post must be capable
of withstanding a 200,000-pound longitudinal force exerted 30 inches
above the joint of the post to the underframe, without exceeding its
ultimate strength. AAR Standard S-580 has included this requirement for
all locomotives built since August 1990. From observation of the
improved performance of these locomotives during collisions, including
collisions with motor vehicles at highway-rail grade crossings, FRA
believes this industry practice should become part of this rule's
safety standards.
As an alternative, an equivalent end structure may be used in place
of the two forward collision posts described in paragraph (b), to allow
for the design of monocoque, unitized or like structures. The single
end structure shall withstand the sum of the forces that each collision
post is required to withstand, in addition to the loading requirements
for corner posts as specified in Sec. 238.213 and any other applicable
end structure requirements as specified in this rule for Tier I
passenger equipment.
Paragraph (c) provides that for a consist of semi-permanently
coupled, articulated units, the end structure requirements in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section apply only to the ends of the
semi-permanently coupled consist of articulated units, provided that
the railroad submits to the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety
under the procedures specified in Sec. 238.21--and FRA accepts as
persuasive--a documented engineering analysis establishing that the
articulated connection is capable of preventing disengagement and
telescoping to the same extent as equipment satisfying the anti-
climbing and collision post requirements contained in this subpart. In
such case, the interior ends of the individual units in the consist
need not be equipped with an end structure meeting the requirements of
paragraphs (a) and (b). FRA notes that, in commenting on proposed
Sec. 238.211(c), both Talgo and WDOT had requested that FRA substitute
the phrase ``semi-permanently coupled'' for ``permanently joined'' in
describing the consist of units subject to the exception provided in
paragraph (c). This recommendation has been adopted.
FRA has modified paragraph (c) from that proposed in the NPRM, see
62 FR 49804, by not providing an automatic exception from the collision
post requirements for the interior ends of individual units in a
consist of semi-permanently coupled, articulated units. Instead, a
railroad must submit a documented engineering analysis supporting the
capabilities of the articulated connection, as described above, and FRA
must find that analysis persuasive. Articulated assemblies have a
history of remaining in line during derailments and collisions and, if
not designed to be uncoupled, only the outside ends of the entire
assembly should be exposed to the risks of override. However, none of
the relevant recent experience is on the North American continent, and
the ability of articulated connections to remain intact during a
collision with North American passenger equipment, freight rolling
stock, or a fixed obstruction has not been demonstrated analytically.
FRA noted the weakness in the proposed exception (Sec. 238.211(c) of
the NPRM) while preparing the final rule. An approved, documented
engineering analysis supporting the capabilities of the articulated
connection is necessary to ensure the safety of passengers and
crewmembers.
Section 238.213 Corner Posts
This section contains the requirements for corner posts on
passenger cars, such as passenger coaches, cab cars and MU locomotives,
ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the
first time on or after September 9, 2002. FRA has clarified the
requirements of this section, as explained below.
A corner post is the vertical structural member normally located at
the intersection of the end of a rail vehicle
[[Page 25607]]
with a side of that vehicle. Paragraphs (a) and (b) specify the loads
and orientation of the loads that a corner post in a passenger car must
resist. The values specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) are the same as
those proposed in the NPRM, see 62 FR 49804, though they have been
stated in a different manner for clarity in the final rule.
This section allows flexibility so that corner posts may be located
at positions other than at the extreme outside corners of a passenger
car, as long as the corner posts are placed ahead of the occupied
volume of the car. In this manner, corner posts may be positioned
adjacent to the occupied volume of a passenger car to provide
structural protection to the occupied volume. For instance, for
passenger coaches equipped with end vestibules, the corner posts may be
located in the side structure inboard of the vestibules' side door
openings, provided that such posts are not placed inside the occupied
volume, which includes any space for crew or passenger seating. FRA has
fully defined ``occupied volume'' in Sec. 238.5 to mean the volume of a
rail vehicle or passenger train where passengers or crewmembers are
normally located during service operation, such as the operating cab,
and passenger seating and sleeping areas. The entire width of a
vehicle's end compartment that contains a control stand is an occupied
volume. Further, a vestibule is typically not considered occupied,
except when it contains a control stand for use as a control cab.
FRA did not intend that the flexibility to place corner posts at
locations other than at the extreme outside corners of passenger cars
would permit such corner posts to be placed inside the occupied volume
of the cars, and FRA recognizes that it should have made this point
more explicit in the NPRM. See 62 FR 49766. (Of course, as a railroad
is free to take safety measures beyond those required in this rule, a
railroad may, therefore, operate a passenger car with corner posts
inside the occupied volume of the car if another set of corner posts
that do comply with the requirements of this section are placed ahead
of the occupied volume.) In light of the vulnerabilities of cab cars
and MU locomotives operating as the leading units in a passenger train,
such passenger cars must be equipped with corner posts meeting the
requirements of this section that are placed ahead of the occupied
volume. Cab cars and MU locomotives will normally be occupied by a
train crewmember in an end compartment, and thus must have corner posts
placed near the extreme ends of the vehicles. As stated in its comments
on the NPRM, the BLE does not wish the cab control compartment to be
the designated section of a passenger car to crush in a collision, and
FRA agrees with the BLE that the cab must be protected.
Bombardier, in its comments on the 1997 NPRM, suggested that
proposed section 238.213(a) be modified so that the corner posts must
resist the loads specified in this section at the point of attachment
to the underframe and at the point of attachment to the roof structure,
as those loads are applied individually. FRA had proposed that the
corner post be able to resist these loads as applied simultaneously,
not as applied individually. FRA has carried forward its proposal into
the final rule, and has not adopted Bombardier's comment. Requiring the
corner post to resist the specified loads as applied simultaneously at
the points of attachment to the underframe and at the roof structure is
a stricter requirement. In addition, the requirement is likely more
representative of the conditions present in an actual collision where
the corner post may be impacted at both points simultaneously, as in
the case of a sideswipe with a passing rail car.
In their comments on the NPRM, Talgo and WDOT stated that the rule
should provide an exception for articulated trainsets similar to that
proposed for collision posts in Sec. 238.211(c) of the NPRM.
Accordingly, these commenters believed that corner posts should be
required only at the far ends of an assembly of semi-permanently
coupled, articulated passenger equipment--not at each end of each
intermediate, semi-permanently coupled vehicle. FRA has not adopted
these comments in the final rule. First, as discussed above, FRA has
modified Sec. 238.211 on collision posts so that there is no automatic
exception from the collision post requirements for intermediate
vehicles in an assembly of semi-permanently coupled, articulated
passenger equipment. Further, corner posts, by their very definition
and location, protect against hazards in a way that collision posts
(positioned closer to the center of the end of a vehicle) cannot. There
are many different scenarios in which a passenger car may be struck at
its corner, such as in a corner-to-corner collision with another rail
vehicle, or a raking collision with an object fouling the right-of-way.
As noted in the NPRM, eight passengers were killed following incursion
of a freight car into the side of two Amtrak coaches beginning at the
corner of each car, near Lugoff, South Carolina, on July 31, 1991.
Although there may be less chance of striking the corner of a semi-
permanently coupled, articulated passenger car under certain
circumstances, the possibility of doing so does exist. FRA, therefore,
cannot grant an exclusion from the corner post requirements to such
equipment operated as an intermediate unit in an assembly of semi-
permanently coupled, articulated passenger cars.
In additional comments on this section, the BLE stated that the
proposed corner post strength requirements for Tier I passenger
equipment do not adequately address its safety concerns. The BLE noted
that past cornering collisions may have resulted in fewer deaths and
injuries had improved corner post structures been in place, and that
Tier I passenger equipment may operate up to 125 mph in corridors with
a significant number of highway-rail intersections. The BLE recommended
that FRA apply the corner post requirements proposed for Tier II power
cars in Sec. 238.409 to all new and upgraded Tier I passenger
equipment.
As FRA explained in the NPRM, the structural parameters for corner
post strength represent the common practice for passenger cars built
for North American service. They are being adopted as an interim
measure to prevent the introduction of equipment not meeting such
minimum requirements. FRA recognizes that current design practice has
proven inadequate to protect the occupied volume in several recent
side-swipe collisions involving passenger trains with cab cars leading.
Crash modeling suggests that it is not feasible to modify current
equipment designs to protect against collisions of the magnitude that
occurred at Secaucus, New Jersey, and Silver Spring, Maryland, in
February of 1996. Nevertheless, stronger corner posts are necessary to
address collisions involving lower closing speeds. FRA is assisting the
APTA PRESS Task Force in preparing a standard for corner post
arrangements on cab cars and MU locomotives. Adoption of a suitable
standard will be an immediate priority upon publication of the final
rule.
Section 238.215 Rollover Strength
This section contains the structural requirements intended to
prevent significant deformation of the normally occupied spaces of a
passenger car in the event it rolls onto its side or roof. This section
essentially requires the vehicle structure to be able to support twice
the dead weight of the vehicle while the vehicle is resting on its side
or roof. Analysis has shown that current passenger car design practice
meets this requirement. This requirement has
[[Page 25608]]
proven effective in preventing massive structural deformation of cars
that have rolled during collisions or derailments. For this reason, FRA
believes this requirement should be incorporated into these safety
standards.
In the NPRM, FRA invited comment whether this requirement should
also apply to locomotives. Representatives from RPI had advised that
locomotives do not roll over frequently enough to justify such
requirements for conventional locomotives.
The BRC commented that this requirement should apply to locomotives
to protect the locomotive's crew from the crush and deformation of the
locomotive's occupied volume. While recognizing that locomotives may
not roll over frequently, the BRC observed that the additional strength
will protect the locomotive's crew if other equipment does land on top
of the locomotive. The BRC believed that the occupied volume of the
locomotive must be protected to increase the chances of survivability
for crewmembers. FRA notes that a rollover strength requirement for all
locomotives--freight and passenger--is being examined in the RSAC
Locomotive Crashworthiness Working Group. FRA believes that the
Locomotive Crashworthiness Working Group is the most appropriate forum
in which to address a rollover strength requirement for locomotives
overall.
In its comments on the NPRM, Talgo stated that paragraph (a) should
include the clarification that local deformations are acceptable when
the car rests on its side, just as paragraph (b) specifies that some
deformation is permitted to the roof when the car is resting thereon.
In paragraph (b), FRA has specified that deformation to the roof
sheathing and framing is allowed to the extent necessary for the
vehicle to be supported directly on the top chords of the side frames
and end frames. This type of deformation does not impinge on the volume
normally occupied by passengers. However, side wall deformations pose a
safety risk to passengers since seats and other interior fittings are
typically attached to the side wall, and passenger limbs are at risk of
entrapment or crushing. Therefore, FRA has modified this section in
response to Talgo's comment only to permit local yielding of the outer
skin of a passenger car provided the resulting deformations in no way
intrude upon the occupied volume of the car.
As Bombardier suggested in its comments on the NPRM, FRA has also
made a minor clarification to this section by substituting the words
``in the structural members of the'' in place of the word ``for'' in
the phrase which originally read in the NPRM, ``the allowable stress
for occupied volumes. . . .'' See 62 FR 49804-49805.
Section 238.217 Side Structure
This section contains car body side structure requirements. These
requirements are intended to prevent the side panels of a passenger car
from flexing excessively while in operation, and help to resist
penetration of the passenger car's side structure by an outside object.
These provisions essentially codify, with minor modifications, sections
16 and 17 of AAR Standard S-034-69, Specification for the Construction
of New Passenger Equipment Cars.
This section was originally entitled ``Side impact strength'' in
the NPRM. FRA has changed the section title because the requirements in
this section principally refer to the stiffness of a car's side panel,
rather than the panel's strength. That is, these provisions principally
focus on preventing the side panel from flexing excessively under
service loads. The greatest service loads acting on the sidewalls of a
passenger car probably result from the aerodynamic loads of a train
entering or exiting a tunnel, and from two trains passing each other at
speed. Residually, these requirements will provide some protection in
the event the passenger car's side panel is struck by an outside
object.
FRA believes that a side structural strength requirement is
necessary because approximately 13% of the grade crossing accidents
involving a passenger train result from a highway vehicle striking the
side of the passenger train. Further, passenger trains may be struck in
the side by other trains, individual rail cars that roll out of
sidings, or freight being transported on trains sharing common rights-
of-way. In addition, during a derailment or train-to-train collision,
trains frequently buckle, exposing the sides of cars to potential
impacts during the collision.
In its comments on this section in the NPRM, Bombardier noted that
the proposed requirement was based on AAR Standard 034, Section 20, and
it believed that to be consistent with the AAR Standard and to take
advantage of the higher strength steels currently used in carbody
construction, the rule should specify in paragraph (a) that, ``Where
minimum section moduli or thickness are specified, they shall be
adjusted in proportion to the ratio of the yield strength of the
material used, to that of mild open-hearth steel.'' FRA agrees that
this comment is applicable to cars whose structural members are made of
steel of higher strength than mild open-hearth steel. Accordingly, FRA
has expressly provided that the minimum section moduli or thickness
specified in paragraph (a) may be adjusted in proportion to the ratio
of the yield strength of the material used to that of mild open-hearth
steel only for a car whose structural members are made of a higher
strength steel.
Talgo, in its comments on this section in the NPRM, believed that
the requirement should be rewritten to specify the units used for each
of the concepts discussed. For clarity, FRA states that the dimensional
units in this paragraph are in inches, and the units for the section
moduli are ``in inches\3\'' (inches cubed) in paragraphs (a)(1) and
(2).
In its comments on the NPRM, WDOT stated that it appeared FRA has
continued to refuse to provide it with detailed information on the
risks and true need for side impact standards. WDOT stated that it had
previously asked FRA for documentation to support FRA's assertion that,
as originally stated in the ANPRM, ``[d]esigns of some passenger
equipment have floor levels low to the rail, creating the tendency for
a heavy highway vehicle striking the side of the train to climb into
the occupied passenger volume rather than being driven under the
underframe of the passenger rail car'' (61 FR 30692). Without such
detailed evidence, WDOT recommended that proposed Sec. 238.217 be
deferred until the second phase of the rulemaking.
The Volpe Center has analyzed a highway vehicle side impact into a
single-level Amfleet car. The results of that analysis indicate that
the Amfleet car will derail and push sideways before significant
crushing of the car can occur. It is expected that rail cars having
similar structures--side sill, body bolster, and center sill--at a
similar height would behave in the same way in such a collision. This
includes most passenger cars operating in the United States. However,
other cars, such as Amtrak's bi-level cars and WDOT's single-level rail
cars, have floor structures that are structurally different and
positioned closer to the rail. Preliminary analysis indicates that
significant crushing may occur if a highway vehicle collides into the
side of one of these cars.
As a general principle in specifying a side impact strength
requirement for a passenger car, the objective is to ensure that the
side of the passenger car is strong enough so that the car derails and
is pushed sideways--rather than collapses--when struck in the side by
[[Page 25609]]
another rail vehicle or a highway vehicle. FRA believes that current
practice may not be adequate to meet this goal, and that cars with low
floors are particularly vulnerable to penetration when struck in the
side. A more meaningful side structure requirement than contained in
this section is necessary to address this concern. Such a requirement
will include specifying minimum shear values at the car's floor as well
as at some point above the floor to protect the car's occupants. This
will be a priority in the second phase of the rulemaking. The
requirement in this final rule is, therefore, an interim measure. As
FRA believes that this section does not address in particular the
vulnerability of low-floor passenger cars to a side impact by a heavy
highway vehicle, FRA has, in effect, deferred consideration of a
requirement to do so.
FRA notes that WDOT also commented as to the likelihood that a
highway vehicle will strike the side of a passenger train. WDOT
disagreed with FRA's analysis and conclusions on this issue as stated
in the NPRM. See 62 FR 49730-1. WDOT stated that FRA had omitted
mentioning that two-thirds of all the highway vehicle side impact
collisions into a passenger train involved the highway vehicle striking
the side of the locomotive. From this, WDOT estimated that one-half of
one percent (0.5%) of all grade crossing accidents over the 10-year
period shown in the NPRM may have involved a ``heavy'' highway vehicle
striking the side of a passenger car.
FRA has gathered more recent data since publication of the NPRM on
highway vehicle side impact collisions into passenger trains. Between
January 1, 1990, and December 31, 1997, 1,572 collisions occurring at
public highway-rail public grade crossings between passenger trains and
highway vehicles were reported to FRA. In 202 of these instances
(12.8%) highway vehicles struck the side of a passenger train. In other
words, a highway vehicle struck the side of a passenger train an
average of approximately 25 times each year in this period. Further, in
this period 137 collisions involved the highway vehicle striking the
first unit of the passenger train, and 65 collisions involved the
highway vehicle striking a unit behind the first unit in the train. As
a result, WDOT is correct insofar as approximately two-thirds of such
collisions involved the highway vehicle striking the first unit in the
passenger train, which ostensibly was a locomotive but could also have
been a passenger car (cab control car or MU locomotive).
Over the same 8-year period, 31 of the 202 occurrences in which a
highway vehicle struck a passenger train involved a ``heavy'' highway
vehicle. For purposes of this analysis, FRA considered heavy highway
vehicles to consist of all those vehicles identified as a ``Truck-
Trailer'' (3) and one-half of those vehicles identified as ``Truck''
(55), as specified according to Form FRA F6180-57--Rail-Highway Grade
Crossing Accident/Incident Report. In this period, then, a heavy
highway vehicle struck the side of a passenger train an average of 4
times each year--and of these occurrences a heavy highway vehicle
struck other than the lead unit in the train an average of 1 to 2 times
each year.
In its comments on the NPRM, the WDOT noted that FRA had not
provided a record of any injuries or deaths occurring from highway
vehicle collisions into passenger trains. FRA states here that in the
8-year period from 1990 through 1997, highway vehicle collisions into
passenger trains resulted in 7 total injuries reported to FRA--3
injuries to railroad employees, and 4 injuries to passengers--and no
reported fatalities. FRA notes that reliance on this passenger injury
data in the abstract is not appropriate when considering the risks
associated with operating a particular rail passenger vehicle. For
example, it is possible that a highway vehicle collision into the side
of an Amfleet rail car that does not injure any passengers would
instead cause injuries under the same circumstances in a collision
involving a rail car with a different floor structure positioned closer
to the rail. As noted above, most of the passenger cars in the United
States possess floor structures similar to the Amfleet rail car,
positioned at a similar height above the rail. FRA maintains that the
potential for a highway vehicle to strike the side of a passenger train
is real, as shown by the record of the frequency of highway vehicles
striking the sides of passenger trains. FRA therefore advises railroads
to consider the risks and consequences of such a collision, with
particular attention to the different units of passenger equipment in
their operations.
As noted above, the side strength of a passenger car is also highly
pertinent to its crashworthiness in a side or raking collision with
other railroad rolling stock. Examples could include a freight car
rolling out of a siding or industrial spur into the side of a passenger
train, or a locomotive moving in a terminal area passing through a
switch and into the side of a passenger train. Recognizing these
concerns, the Tier II provision on side strength does attempt to
address the identified need. This provision was derived from
discussions with Amtrak concerning development of specifications for
its high-speed trainsets for the Northeast Corridor.
Section 238.219 Truck-to-car-body attachment
This section contains the truck-to-car-body attachment strength
requirement for passenger equipment. The attachment is required to
resist without failure a 2g vertical force on the mass of the truck and
a force of 250,000 pounds in any horizontal direction on the truck.
The intent of the requirement for the attachment to resist without
failure a minimum vertical force equivalent to 2g acting on the mass of
the truck is to prevent the truck from separating from the car body if
it is raised or rolls over. In effect, the attachment must resist,
without failure, a force equal to twice the weight of the truck and all
the components attached to the truck. Many types of keepers are used to
keep trucks attached to car bodies. FRA believes that the majority of
them are capable of meeting this requirement. The intent of the
requirement for the attachment to resist without failure a minimum
force of 250,000 pounds acting in any horizontal direction on the truck
is to address the forces that act upon the truck during a derailment
that would tend to shear the truck from the car body. The parameter
selected represents the current design practice that has proven
effective in preventing horizontal shear of trucks from car bodies.
If the truck separates from the car body in a collision or
derailment it may become a hazardous projectile that will intrude upon
the occupied volumes of the equipment involved in the collision or
derailment. Further, if the truck separates from the car body it will
not be able to serve, in effect, as an anti-climbing device in a
collision or derailment. With the truck attached to the car body, the
truck of an overriding rail vehicle is likely to be caught by the
underframe of the overridden rail vehicle, thus arresting the override.
In its comments on the NPRM, Talgo recommended that the regulation
be modified so that the strength of the attachment against horizontal
force is also measured in gs. Specifically, Talgo suggested that the
vertical force resistance limit of 2g could be employed rather than a
fixed load measure that, according to Talgo, did not take into account
individual truck mass. Talgo believed that this modification would not
undermine the intent of the rule, which it noted as allowing the truck
to
[[Page 25610]]
act as an anti-climbing device during a collision, citing the NPRM at
62 FR 49767.
In addressing Talgo's comments, FRA would like to make clear that
the fundamental reason for requiring the truck-to-car-body attachment
to resist without failure a minimum force of 250,000 pounds acting in
any horizontal direction on the truck is to prevent the truck from
shearing off (separating from) the car body. (FRA believed this
implicit in the preamble discussion of the NPRM, and is making it clear
here to remove any doubt.) Whether the truck separates from the car
body if the car rolls over, or whether the truck separates from the car
body from being sheared off, the truck may become a hazardous
projectile in either case. FRA did state in the NPRM, ``If the truck
remains attached to the car body, the truck is less likely to be struck
by [or strike] other units of the train.'' 62 FR 49767. Having the
truck remain attached to the car body also allows the truck to serve,
in effect, as an anti-climbing device to prevent one vehicle from
overriding another in a collision. In this regard, FRA stated in the
NPRM, ``With the truck attached to the car body, the truck of an
overriding vehicle is likely to be caught by the underframe of the
overridden vehicle, thus arresting the override.'' Id. (Emphasis
added.) However, insofar as FRA's statement in the NPRM that the
``Arequirement for the [truck-to-car-body] attachment to resist a
horizontal force is intended to allow the truck to act as an anti-
climbing device during a collision'' has been understood to represent
the only intent of the horizontal loading resistance requirement, FRA
makes clear here that such an understanding of the requirement's intent
is too narrow.
FRA believes it appropriate to specify that a passenger rail
vehicle's truck-to-car-body attachment must resist without failure a
minimum force of 250,000 pounds acting in any horizontal direction on
the truck. This force may be possessed by one rail vehicle (Vehicle A)
as it collides with the truck of another rail vehicle (Vehicle B) in a
collision. Vehicle A is able to possess this force independent of the
mass of Vehicle B's truck--or, for that matter, the mass of Vehicle B
itself. Nonetheless, Vehicle B's truck-to-car-body-attachment must
resist this force so that its truck does not separate from its body. In
this regard, FRA believes it inappropriate to restate the horizontal
force requirement in this section so that it is dependent on the mass
of an individual rail vehicle's truck. FRA does note that it has
related the mass of the truck to the vertical force that the truck-to-
car-body attachment must resist: In this case, the mass of the truck
necessarily determines how strong the truck-to-car-body attachment must
be to prevent the truck from separating from the vehicle, as the weight
of the truck essentially acts to ``pull'' the truck away from the rail
vehicle.
Talgo, in further commenting on the requirements of this section,
recommended that the rule should except articulated equipment utilizing
a single-axle truck positioned between two car bodies. Talgo stated
that in the event a compressive force is generated by a collision, the
truck attached to articulated equipment would become embedded between
the two car bodies. In this case, it believed the truck is not intended
to serve as an anti-climbing device, and that the train's articulated
joints would instead provide protection against climbing. WDOT also
raised this point in its comments on the NPRM, and recommended that FRA
work with Talgo to develop an appropriate alternative to the proposed
rule for non-conventional equipment.
As noted, having the truck remain attached to the car body in a
collision or derailment helps to prevent one vehicle from overriding
another vehicle as the truck of the vehicle attempting the override is
caught on the underframe of the other vehicle. Further, the opportunity
of having the truck of one vehicle caught on the underframe of another
vehicle in such a scenario should be less likely to occur in a
collision involving single-axle articulated passenger rail cars than in
the case of non-articulated, conventional rail equipment. Yet, as FRA
has made clear, the requirements of this section are principally
intended to prevent a truck from separating from a rail passenger
vehicle. Trucks can and have separated from articulated rail equipment
in a collision; and truck separation poses a direct threat to the
safety of a passenger train's occupants, especially when the cars in
which those passengers ride are structurally vulnerable to penetration.
As a result, the requirements of this section must apply to all
passenger rail equipment-whether articulated or not.
Section 238.221 Glazing
This section contains additional requirements concerning the safety
glazing of passenger equipment subject to the requirements of 49 CFR
part 223. Existing safety glazing requirements for windows have largely
proven effective in passenger service at speeds up to 125 mph. However,
part 223 does not address the performance of the frame which attaches
the window glazing to the car body. Paragraph (b)(1) requires each
exterior window on a locomotive cab or a passenger car to remain in
place when subjected to the forces the glazing itself is required to
resist in part 223 of this chapter. In this way, the window glazing
must be secured in place so that it can both resist spalling when
struck by a projectile, for example, and also resist being knocked out
of the window frame. Paragraph (b)(2) requires each exterior window on
a locomotive cab or a passenger car to remain in place when subjected
to the forces due to air pressure differences caused when two trains
pass at the minimum separation for two adjacent tracks, while traveling
in opposite directions, each train traveling at the maximum authorized
speed. This requirement is also intended to prevent the window from
being forced from the window frame, potentially injuring passengers and
crewmembers. FRA believes that most existing passenger equipment
subject to part 223 meets these requirements.
FRA did not receive any specific comments on this section. However,
for clarity, FRA has restated the requirements proposed in
Sec. 238.221(b) and (c) in the NPRM, see 62 FR 49085, as
Sec. 238.221(b) in this final rule. The focus in paragraph (b) in the
final rule is clearly on the ability of each exterior window to remain
in place, however the window may be secured, and not have the window
become a potential projectile itself.
Section 238.223 Fuel tanks
This section contains the structural requirements for external and
internal fuel tanks on passenger locomotives ordered on or after
September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the first time on or after
September 9, 2002.External fuel tanks must comply with the performance
requirements for locomotive fuel tanks contained in Appendix D to this
part, or an industry standard providing at least an equivalent level of
safety if approved by FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety under
Sec. 238.21. The requirements in Appendix D are based on AAR
Recommended Practice-506, Performance Requirements for Diesel Electric
Locomotive Fuel tanks, as adopted on July 1, 1995. In the NPRM, FRA
proposed incorporating the requirements of AAR RP-506 directly into the
rule. See 62 FR 49805. In preparing the final rule, however, FRA
determined that restating the requirements of RP-506 in Appendix D
would facilitate FRA's administration of the external fuel tank
performance requirement. RP-506 itself is not specifically written as a
regulatory
[[Page 25611]]
document, and one of its provisions on fueling does not appear to be a
safety requirement. However, FRA does not intend to make any
substantive change from the requirements of RP-506, except as noted in
detail in the discussion of Appendix D.
FRA has included a definition of external fuel tank in the final
rule to mean a fuel containment volume that extends outside the car
body structure of the locomotive. An external fuel tank is
distinguished from an internal fuel tank, which is defined in the rule
as a fuel containment volume that does not extend outside the car body
structure of the locomotive. As a result, a fuel tank that is built
into the car body structure but is exposed in any way to the outside is
considered an external fuel tank under the rule.
FRA has changed the title of paragraph (b) in the NPRM from
Integral fuel tanks to Internal fuel tanks, reflecting the
clarification in the definitions. This change is consistent with FRA's
intent that, for purposes of the rule, locomotive fuel tanks must
comply with one of two standards, depending upon the exposure of the
fuel tank outside the car body structure. FRA has dispensed with the
term ``integral'' fuel tank--i.e., a fuel tank that is essentially
integrated with a structural member of the locomotive not designed as a
fuel container--because, depending on its placement, an integral fuel
tank either may or may not be exposed outside the locomotive car body
structure.
In commenting on the NPRM, Bombardier noted that the requirements
proposed in this section have not been applied by the industry to
diesel multiple-unit locomotives (DMUs). Bombardier believed that the
need and feasibility of applying these standards to DMUs must be
evaluated specially because DMUs have much smaller enclosed and
protected fuel tanks than those found on conventional North American
locomotives. Accordingly, Bombardier recommended that FRA defer
applying the requirements of this section to DMUs, until specific
requirements for DMUs are developed.
Having considered Bombardier's comment, FRA does not recommend
separately addressing requirements for DMU locomotives at this time.
FRA has not been provided the operational or performance information
necessary for an in-depth evaluation of DMU fuel tanks, and only a
limited number of DMUs presently operate within the U.S. FRA will
further consider formulating separate requirements for DMU fuel tanks
in Phase II of the rulemaking, as operational and performance
information is gained.
Section 238.225 Electrical System
FRA did not receive any specific comments on this section, and it
is adopted as proposed. This section contains the requirements for the
design of electrical systems on passenger equipment. In developing the
proposed rule, the Working Group advised that no single, well-
recognized electrical code or set of standards applied directly to the
design of railroad passenger equipment. As a result, the Working Group
recommended broad performance requirements which reflect common
electrical safety practice and are widely recognized as good electrical
design practice. FRA had offered for comment more detailed electrical
system design requirements in the ANPRM, but as advocated by the
Working Group the NPRM's approach was more performance-oriented and
provided wide latitude in equipment design. FRA believes that this
approach helps to ensure good electrical design practice without
imposing unnecessary costs on the industry.
The electrical system requirements include provisions for:
Electrical conductor sizes and properties to provide a
margin of safety for the intended application;
Battery system design to prevent the risk of overcharging
or accumulation of dangerous gases that can cause an explosion;
Design of resistor grids that dissipate energy produced by
dynamic braking with sufficient electrical isolation and ventilation to
minimize the risk of fires; and
Electromagnetic compatibility within the intended
operating environment to prevent electromagnetic interference with
safety-critical equipment systems and to prevent interference of the
rolling stock with other systems along the rail right-of-way.
Electrical standards currently under development by an APTA PRESS Task
Force will help give effect to these requirements and supplement them
as appropriate.
Section 238.227 Suspension System
This section contains the requirements for suspension system
performance of all Tier I passenger equipment. In the ANPRM, FRA
presented for comment a large set of detailed suspension system
performance requirements. The Working Group advised that such an
extensive set of requirements was not needed for Tier I passenger
equipment, and the NPRM reflected this advice.
Overall, FRA is requiring that all passenger equipment shall
exhibit freedom from hunting oscillations at all speeds. Further, FRA
is requiring particular suspension system safety requirements for
passenger equipment operating at speeds above 110 mph but not exceeding
125 mph, near the transition speed range from Tier I to Tier II
requirements. Although FRA believes that for speeds not exceeding 110
mph existing equipment has not demonstrated serious suspension system
stability problems, most of this same equipment is only operated at
speeds that do not exceed 110 mph. Accordingly, when new or existing
passenger equipment is intended for operation above 110 mph, this
equipment must demonstrate stable operation during pre-revenue service
qualification tests at all speeds up to 5 mph in excess of its maximum
intended operating speed under worst-case conditions--including
component wear--as determined by the operating railroad. The Working
Group advised FRA that a single definition of worst-case conditions
could not be applied generally to all railroads; and, as a result, the
definition of worst-case conditions shall be determined by each
railroad based upon its particular operating environment.
FRA has revised paragraph (a) based on a comment from Talgo by
defining hunting oscillations in the rule text directly, and removing
the definition of hunting oscillations from Sec. 238.5. Further, FRA
has clarified the intent of paragraph (a) that passenger equipment
shall exhibit freedom from hunting oscillations at all ``operating''
speeds, by inserting the word ``operating'' as recommended by
Bombardier in its comments on the rule. FRA has made a similar
clarification in paragraph (b).
AAPRCO, in its comments on the NPRM, stated that ``hunting'' is a
dynamic resonance phenomenon in which factors as diverse as car body
characteristics, truck characteristics, suspension conditions, wheel
tread contours and multiple rail alignment, profile, and lubrication
conditions all interact to produce a condition in which the truck
oscillates back and forth rapidly as the train moves down the track.
AAPRCO recognizes that hunting may be dangerous because high forces can
be generated between the wheels and the rails. However, according to
AAPRCO, because complex interactions of many factors lead to hunting,
there is no straightforward way for a car owner or railroad carrier to
determine ahead of time whether hunting will occur
[[Page 25612]]
without extensive, dynamic testing at operating speed and often on the
particular track in question. AAPRCO believed that all cars which
exhibit hunting when in service should be fixed at the first
opportunity. Yet, AAPRCO recommended deleting from the rule the
requirement that passenger equipment exhibit freedom from hunting
oscillations at all speeds for lack of a practical, predictive method
to determine whether an individual car meets this requirement.
FRA agrees with AAPRCO's comments to the extent that the onset of
truck hunting cannot always be predicted. However, railroads should not
use equipment that they know has a hunting problem; and FRA is
retaining the proposed requirement in the final rule. FRA has added
AAPRCO's suggestion that if hunting oscillations do occur, a railroad
shall take immediate action (such as a reduction in speed and
subsequent attention to wheel contours) to prevent derailment. FRA does
note that private rail cars are typically heavy rail cars and,
therefore, less likely to hunt than lighter rail cars.
FRA has added paragraph (c) to this section to make clear that the
requirements of 49 C.F.R. part 213 concerning vehicle/track interaction
apply by their own force to passenger equipment, notwithstanding any
provision of this section. The requirements of 49 C.F.R. Sec. 213.345
are more detailed than those that are contained in this section, and
apply as specified in that section to the qualification of the vehicle/
track system for track Classes 6 through 9 for passenger equipment
operating above 90 mph (and freight equipment operating above 80 mph).
Section 239.229 Safety appliances
This section references current safety appliance requirements
contained in 49 U.S.C. chapter 203 and 49 CFR part 231. These existing
requirements continue to apply independently to all Tier I passenger
equipment, and FRA is referencing them here for clarity.
Section 238.231 Brake system
This section contains general brake system performance requirements
that apply on or after September 9, 1999 to Tier I passenger equipment
except as otherwise provided. Paragraph (a) contains a requirement that
the primary braking system be capable of stopping the train with a
service application of the brakes from its maximum authorized operating
speed within the signal spacing existing on the track. FRA believes
that this requirement is the most fundamental performance standard for
any train brake system. This section merely codifies a requirement
which is current industry practice and is the basis for safe train
operation in the United States.
Paragraph (b) requires that passenger equipment ordered on or after
September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the first time on or after
September 9, 2002 be designed not to require an inspector to place
himself or herself on, under, or between components of the equipment to
observe brake actuation or release. The requirement allows railroads
the flexibility of using a reliable indicator in place of requiring
direct observation of the brake application or piston travel, because
the current designs of many passenger car brake systems make direct
observation extremely difficult without the inspector placing himself
or herself underneath the equipment. Brake system piston travel or
piston cylinder pressure indicators have been used with satisfactory
results for many years. FRA recognizes the concerns raised by certain
labor representatives regarding the use of piston travel indicators,
and although such indicators do not provide 100 percent certainty that
the brakes are effective, FRA believes that they have proven themselves
effective enough to be preferable to requiring an inspector to assume a
dangerous position.
Paragraph (c) requires that an emergency brake application feature
be available at any time and that it produce an irretrievable stop.
This section merely codifies current industry practice and ensures that
passenger equipment will continue to be designed with an emergency
brake application feature. This provision recognizes the reality that
most passenger brake equipment currently provides a deceleration rate
with a full service application that is close to the emergency brake
rate. The current design requirement contained in 49 CFR Part 232,
Appendix B, requiring the emergency application feature increase a
train's deceleration rate by 15 percent, would require the lowering of
full service brake rates on passenger equipment, thereby compromising
safety and lowering train speeds. Consequently, FRA will not require a
specific deceleration rate that must be obtained through an emergency
brake application.
Paragraph (d) requires that the train brake system respond as
intended to brake control signals and that the brake control system be
designed so that a loss of control signal causes a redundant control to
take over or cause the brakes to apply. These provisions are
fundamental requirements necessary for effective brake system
performance, and a codification of current industry practice. FRA
intends the requirement to apply to all types of brake control signals,
including pneumatic, electric, and radio signals.
Paragraph (e) prohibits the introduction of alcohol or other
chemicals into the brake line. During periods of extreme cold weather,
railroad employees at times resort to adding alcohol or other freezing
point depressants to the brake line in an attempt to prevent
accumulated moisture in the line from freezing. Virtually every
railroad has a policy against this practice because alcohol and other
chemicals attack the o-rings and gaskets that seal the brake system,
causing them to age or fail prematurely. This practice can lead to
dangerous air leaks and it increases maintenance costs.
Paragraph (f) requires that the brake system be designed and
operated to prevent dangerous cracks in wheels. Passenger equipment
wheels are normally heat treated so that the wheel rim is in
compression. This condition forces small cracks that form in the rim to
be closed. Heavy tread braking can heat wheels to the point that a
stress reversal occurs and the wheel rim is in tension to a certain
depth. Rim tension is a dangerous condition because it promotes surface
crack growth. In the 1994 NPRM on power brakes, FRA proposed a wheel
surface temperature limit to prevent this condition. See 59 FR 47729.
Several brake manufacturers and railroads objected to this approach,
claiming that the temperature limit was too conservative and did not
allow for the development of new materials that can withstand higher
temperatures. Based on these comments and concerns, FRA proposed in the
1997 NPRM and is retaining a more flexible performance requirement
rather than a wheel tread surface temperature limit. This is an
extremely important safety requirement because a cracked wheel that
fails at high speed can have catastrophic consequences. In addition to
the safety concerns, FRA believes that this requirement will lead to
longer wheel life, and thus should provide maintenance savings to the
railroads.
Paragraph (g) requires that brake discs be designed and operated so
that the disc surface temperature does not exceed manufacturer
recommendations. In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed a disc surface
temperature limit. See 59 FR 47729. As noted above, several brake
manufacturers and railroads objected to this approach, claiming that
the temperature limit was too conservative and did not allow for the
development
[[Page 25613]]
of new materials that can withstand higher temperatures. Based on these
comments and concerns, FRA proposed in the 1997 NPRM and is retaining a
more flexible requirement rather than a single disc surface temperature
limit. FRA believes this requirement will lead to longer disc life, and
thus will produce maintenance savings to railroads.
Paragraph (h) contains the requirements related to hand brakes and
parking brakes on passenger equipment. A hand or parking brake is an
important safety feature that prevents the rolling or runaway of parked
equipment. In the 1997 NPRM, FRA proposed an all encompassing
requirement that all locomotives, except those ordered and placed in
service before certain dates, and all other passenger equipment be
provided with a hand or parking brake that could be set and released
manually and could hold the equipment on the maximum grade anticipated
by the operating railroad. Based on the concerns of labor
representatives, FRA recognizes that this proposed provision is
somewhat at odds with the hand brake provisions currently contained in
49 CFR part 231, particularly the requirements that the hand brake be
able to be operated while the equipment is in motion and that the hand
brake operate in harmony with the brake system. As it is FRA's intent
to remain consistent with the existing safety appliance requirements
for Tier I passenger equipment, FRA has slightly modified the
provisions requiring hand or parking brakes on passenger equipment.
FRA is retaining the requirement for equipping locomotives, except
for MU locomotives, with either a hand brake or a parking brake that
can be set and released manually and can hold the equipment on the
maximum grade anticipated by the operating railroad. As there are
currently no requirements for equipping locomotives with hand brakes,
FRA will permit the use of a parking brake or hand brake which meets
the above specifications on these vehicles. However, for all other
passenger equipment and for MU locomotives, FRA is requiring that they
be equipped with a hand brake or parking brake which meets the
requirements contained in 49 CFR part 231 regarding hand brakes on
passenger cars. Although part 231 does not currently require hand
brakes on MU locomotives, FRA is requiring that the hand brake required
to be installed on these locomotives under this paragraph comply with
the requirements contained in part 231 for other passenger equipment.
As these locomotives generally transport members of the general public,
similar to passenger coaches, the necessity to apply the hand brake
while the car is in motion becomes critical for passenger safety.
Therefore, FRA believes that MU locomotives should be equipped with a
hand brake which meets the design requirements contained in part 231
regarding passenger cars.
This paragraph contains the requirement that the hand brake or
parking brake hold the loaded unit on the maximum grade anticipated by
the operating railroad. FRA makes clear that the term ``loaded unit''
refers to the maximum weight and capacity that the unit will carry
during its operation. Thus, such things as maximum fuel capacity,
maximum passenger capacity, maximum train crew capacity, and the
maximum weight of any lading that the locomotive or other unit will
carry should be considered in determining the holding ability of any
hand or parking brake utilized.
Paragraph (i) contains the requirement that passenger cars be
equipped with a means for the emergency brake to be applied that is
clearly identified and accessible to passengers. This is a longstanding
industry practice and an important safety feature because crucial time
may be lost requiring passengers sensing danger to find a member of the
train crew to stop the train.
Paragraph (j) contains provisions to ensure that the dynamic brake
does not become a safety-critical device. Railroads have consistently
held that dynamic brakes are not safety devices because the friction
brake alone is capable of safely stopping a train if the dynamic brake
is not available. The provisions in this paragraph include requiring
that the blending of the friction and dynamic brakes be automatic, that
the friction brakes alone be able to stop the train in the allowable
stopping distance, and that a failure of the dynamic brake does not
cause thermal damage to wheels or discs due to the greater friction
braking load. FRA believes that without these requirements the dynamic
brake would most likely become a safety-critical item and railroads
would not be permitted to dispatch trains unless the dynamic brake were
fully operational.
Although FRA recognizes the concerns of labor representatives that
dynamic brakes are safety critical and should be required to work at
all times, FRA believes that in the context of blended braking labor's
concerns are somewhat misplaced and are adequately addressed by various
provisions contained in this final rule. In the blended brake context,
unlike freight operation, there is not an independent dynamic brake:
The dynamic brake and the pneumatic brake systems are automatically
blended without separate action being taken by the locomotive engineer.
Thus, the undue reliance on the dynamic brake is not a major concern
when blended braking systems are utilized. In addition, the provisions
contained in this paragraph ensure that blended brake systems are
designed so that failure of the dynamic portion of the blended braking
system does not impact the safe operation and stopping of the train.
Furthermore, as part of the exterior calendar day mechanical inspection
railroads are required to verify that all secondary braking systems are
in operating mode and do not have any known defects. See
Sec. 238.303(e)(15). Consequently, the railroad must verify that the
dynamic brakes are in operating mode and do not contain any known
defects and take prescribed action whenever the dynamic brakes are
found to be inoperative prior to releasing a locomotive from an
exterior calendar day mechanical inspection.
Paragraph (k) requires that either computer modeling or dynamometer
tests be performed to confirm that new brake designs not result in
thermal damage to wheels or discs. Further, if the operating parameters
of the new braking system change significantly, a new simulation must
be performed. This requirement provides a means to ensure that the
requirements in paragraphs (f) and (g) are being complied with by new
brake designs.
Paragraph (l) requires that all locomotives ordered on or after
September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the first time on or after
September 9, 2002, be equipped with effective air coolers or air dryers
if equipped with air compressors. The coolers or dryers must be capable
of providing air to the main reservoir with a dew point suppression at
least 10 degrees F. below ambient temperature. FRA and most members in
the industry agree that moisture is a major cause of brake line
contamination. Consequently, reducing moisture leads to longer
component life and better brake system performance. Currently,
virtually all passenger railroads purchase only locomotives equipped
with air dryers or coolers. Therefore, FRA is merely requiring the
continuation of what it believes is good industry practice. Although
labor representatives contend that a dew point suppression of 10
degrees below ambient temperature is insufficient to prevent
condensation in the train line, these commenters provided no support
for that contention other than the
[[Page 25614]]
assertion that prior specifications called for a 35 degree dew point
suppression. Based on available information, FRA believes that a 10
degree dew point suppression is adequate. Without further study into
the issue, FRA is reluctant to impose a more burdensome standard than
that which was proposed. This issue may be further considered in the
second phase of this passenger equipment rulemaking process.
Paragraph (m) requires that when a train is operated in either
direct or graduated release, the railroad shall ensure that all cars in
the train consist are set-up in the same operating mode. This provision
was added based upon the concerns of several labor commenters regarding
trains operated by Amtrak which contain a mixture of traditional
passenger equipment and freight-like equipment. Most passenger trains
are operated in what is known as a graduated release mode, whereby
brake cylinder pressure may be reduced in steps proportional to
increments of brake pipe pressure build-up; however, when passenger
trains operated by Amtrak contain certain freight-like equipment the
train is operated in a direct release mode, whereby brake cylinder
pressure is completely exhausted as a result of an increase in brake
pipe pressure. As these two different types of operating modes are now
being utilized on passenger trains, FRA agrees it is necessary to
require a railroad to ensure that all the cars in the train are set-up
in the same operating mode in order to prevent potential train handling
problems.
Section 238.233 Interior Fittings and Surfaces
This section contains the requirements concerning interior fittings
and surfaces that apply, as specified in this section, to passenger
cars and locomotives ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or placed
in service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002.
FRA and NTSB investigations of passenger train accidents have
revealed that luggage, seats, and other interior objects breaking or
coming loose is a frequent cause of injury to passengers and
crewmembers. During a collision, the greatest decelerations and thus
the greatest forces to cause potential failure of interior fitting
attachment points are experienced in the longitudinal direction, i.e.,
in the direction parallel to the normal direction of train travel.
Current practice is to design seats and other interior fittings to
withstand the forces due to accelerations of 6g in the longitudinal
direction, 3g in the vertical direction, and 3g in the lateral
direction. Due to the injuries caused by broken seats and other loose
fixtures, FRA believes that the current design practice is inadequate.
Paragraph (a)(1) requires that each seat in a passenger car remain
firmly attached to the car body when subjected to individually applied
accelerations of 4g in the lateral direction and 4g in the upward
vertical direction acting on the deadweight of the seat or seats, if
held in tandem. Based on a comment from Simula in response to the NPRM,
FRA has clarified this requirement from that proposed in the NPRM by
specifying that the vertical loading is in the ``upward'' direction.
Paragraph (a)(2) specifies that a seat attachment shall have an
ultimate strength capable of resisting the longitudinal inertial force
of 8g acting on the mass of the seat plus the load associated with the
impact into the seat back of an unrestrained 95th-percentile adult male
initially seated behind the seat back, when the floor decelerates with
a triangular crash pulse having a peak of 8g and a duration of 250
milliseconds (msec). By resisting the force of an occupant striking the
seat from behind, a potential domino effect of seats breaking away from
their attachments is avoided. As used in this section, a 95th-
percentile adult male has been defined in Sec. 238.5 of the final rule
based on the same characteristics for such a vehicle occupant specified
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in its
motor vehicle safety standards at 49 CFR Sec. 571.208, S7.1.4. At the
January 1998 Working Group meeting, the NTSB had recommended use of the
NHTSA specifications for purposes of the rule's occupant protection
requirements.
The requirement contained in paragraph (a)(2) represents a
modification from FRA's original proposal that the seat attachment
resist a longitudinal inertial force of 8g acting on the mass of the
seat plus the impact force of the mass of a 95th-percentile male
occupant(s) being decelerated from a relative speed of 25 mph and
striking the seat from behind. See 62 FR 49806. The impact speed at
which the occupant strikes the seatback ahead of him during a collision
depends on the distance from the occupant to the seatback and the
deceleration of the car (the crash pulse) during the collision. In
drafting the rule, FRA has assumed a seat pitch, or distance from the
occupant to the seatback ahead of him, consistent with the longest seat
pitch currently used in intercity passenger train service. As a result,
the final rule specifies the crash pulse and its duration, and need not
specify the secondary impact velocity. This change is intended to
clarify the rule by relating it more directly to how the rule is
applied and allow for different seat pitches. Seat pitches are expected
to reflect actual use of the seats and be less than that assumed by
FRA. Consequently, secondary impact speeds of occupants striking the
seatbacks ahead of them are expected to be 25 mph or less--a marginally
less severe test condition than that provided for in the NPRM.
The revision to this paragraph is based in part on comments from
Simula that the rule require the seat to resist a dynamic crash pulse,
which it believed to be triangular with a 250 millisecond duration and
an 8g peak, plus the impact of representative unrestrained occupants
seated in a second row directly behind the test article. Simula noted
that including a dynamic crash pulse in the longitudinal direction
(parallel to the normal direction of train travel) provides a
simulation of a typical train-to-train collision in which the seat
would be involved. According to Simula, a dynamic crash pulse is more
representative of the crash environment than the shock pulse defined by
a peak acceleration only. Simula explained that the crash pulse is
typically specified for seat testing in the aircraft and automotive
industries. Specifying a crash pulse in essence specifies the operation
of the test equipment. FRA notes that the seat testing proposed in the
NPRM (and required in the final rule) is similar to such testing
performed in the aircraft and automotive industries, and FRA expects
that the actual testing of rail equipment will utilize the same test
equipment as used in these other industries. FRA has, therefore,
specified a crash pulse in this paragraph.
FRA notes that at the Working Group meeting in December 1997, APTA
explained that it could not agree then to change any of the proposed
seat testing requirements, and that it was conducting research in these
matters. However, FRA does not believe the inclusion of a crash pulse
in this paragraph and elimination of the 25 mph impact speed to
significantly alter the required strength of the seats from that
proposed in the NPRM. In fact, the original proposal was potentially
more rigorous than that required under this final rule.
Simula additionally commented that each crash test dummy used to
impact the seat back in testing the strength of the seat must be
instrumented, and that the injury data gathered from each dummy then
meet specified injury criteria. Simula explained that, like automotive
and transport aircraft testing, rail seat design requirements
[[Page 25615]]
should include the use of crash test dummies to measure specified loads
and accelerations for meeting specified injury criteria. FRA believes
that Simula's comment is significant and wholly appropriate for
consideration in the second phase of rulemaking on passenger equipment
safety standards. In this regard, FRA notes that Simula references in
its comments on proposed Sec. 238.435 (the Tier II counterpart to this
section) the use of a future APTA standard to specify occupant injury
criteria and other parameters. Accordingly, resolution of this issue in
the second phase of the rulemaking should benefit from APTA's efforts
in this area.
In its comments on the NPRM, Simula also suggested modifying the
rule so that the requirements of paragraph (a) apply to each seat
assembly and specify that each seat assembly not separate from its
mountings or have any of its parts detach. FRA believes that Simula's
suggested modification restates the requirements of this section, in
effect, and FRA does not find it necessary to change the explicit
wording of the rule text. Simula further recommended specifying in the
rule that in sled testing the strength of the seat attachment to the
car, the attachment that is tested must be representative of the actual
structure and attachment. FRA agrees with Simula that testing a seat
and its attachment of a design or structure not representative of that
actually used in a passenger car would necessarily fail to demonstrate
that the actual seat and its attachment comply with the requirements of
the rule. FRA has made this explicit in paragraph (g). Of course, any
tests of passenger equipment or components of a design or structure not
representative of an actual rail vehicle or actual components subject
to the requirements of this part would necessarily fail to demonstrate
that such actual vehicle or components comply with the requirements of
this part--whether or not FRA has made this explicit in the rule text.
Paragraph (b) requires that overhead storage racks provide
longitudinal and lateral restraint for stowed articles to minimize the
potential for these objects to come loose and injure train occupants.
Further, to prevent overhead storage racks from breaking away from
their attachment points to the car body, these racks shall have an
ultimate strength capable of resisting individually applied
accelerations of 8g longitudinally, 4g vertically, and 4g laterally
acting on the mass of the luggage stowed. This mass shall be specified
by each railroad. In commenting on the NPRM, the BRC did not believe
that a railroad should be allowed to specify the mass of the luggage
stowed for purposes of this requirement. However, each railroad is in
the best position to determine the mass of the luggage that can be
stowed in the stowage area.
Paragraph (c) requires that all other interior fittings in a
passenger car be attached to the car body with sufficient strength to
withstand individually applied accelerations of 8g longitudinally, 4g
vertically, and 4g laterally acting on the mass of the fitting. FRA
believes the attachment strength requirements for seats, overhead
storage racks, and other interior fittings will help reduce the number
of injuries to occupants in passenger cars.
Passenger car occupants may also be injured by protruding objects,
especially if the occupants fall or are thrown against such objects
during a train collision or derailment. As a result, FRA is requiring
in paragraph (d) that, to the extent possible, all interior fittings in
a passenger car, except seats, shall be recessed or flush-mounted.
Fittings that are recessed or flush-mounted do not protrude above
interior surfaces and thereby would help to minimize occupant injuries.
Paragraph (e) is a general, common sense prohibition against sharp
edges and corners in a locomotive cab and a passenger car. Just as FRA
is concerned about protruding objects, these surfaces could also injure
passenger train occupants. If sharp edges and corners cannot be avoided
in the equipment design, they should be padded to mitigate the
consequences of occupant impacts.
The requirements of paragraph (f) apply to each floor-mounted seat
in a locomotive cab as well as to any seat provided for an employee
regularly assigned to occupy the cab. FRA is requiring the seat
attachment to have an ultimate strength capable of resisting the loads
due to individually applied accelerations of 8g longitudinally, 4g
vertically, and 4g laterally acting on the combined mass of the seat
and its occupant. When turned backwards during a collision, seats with
head rests that are designed to this requirement can effectively
restrain crewmembers and minimize or prevent injuries.
In the NPRM, FRA had proposed that the requirements of this section
apply to each floor-mounted seat provided exclusively for a crewmember
assigned to occupy the cab of a locomotive. See 62 FR 49806. Simula, in
its comments on the NPRM, recommended that the requirements of this
section not be limited to floor-mounted seats and instead suggested
substituting the words ``car-mounted seat.'' Simula expressed concern
that railroads may use wall-mounted seats for crewmembers that do not
comply with these requirements. Yet, as noted below in the discussion
of Sec. 238.445(g) (this provision's Tier II counterpart), Bombardier
observed that an additional seat--commonly a flip-up or a shelf-type
seat--is in many cases provided in the cab for a train crewmember who
is not normally in the cab. Bombardier believed these seats should not
be subjected to the same requirements as for the train operators'
seats.
FRA has revised paragraph (f) so that the requirements of this
provision apply to floor-mounted seats and each seat provided for a
crewmember regularly assigned to the locomotive cab. FRA recognizes
that flip-down and other auxiliary seats are provided in locomotive
cabs for the temporary use of employees not regularly assigned to the
cab, such as a supervisor of locomotive engineers conducting an
operational monitoring test of the engineer. These seats do not need to
meet the requirements of this section.
In further commenting on this paragraph, Simula recommended
specifying that the seat resist a triangular crash pulse of a 250 msec
duration having an 8g peak. However, FRA believes that the static 8g
load requirement proposed in the NPRM is a rational option, and has
retained it in the final rule. As train operators' seats are not likely
to be hit from behind, they are not likely to experience the impact
forces that passenger seats experience. Adopting Simula's comment would
result in a more expensive test without a corresponding increase in
safety.
Simula additionally commented that, in conducting a test of the
seat, the attachment of the seat to the sled fixture must be
representative of the actual structure and attachment. FRA has adopted
this comment, as noted above, in paragraph (g). Testing a seat and its
attachment of a design or structure not representative of that actually
used in a locomotive cab would necessarily fail to demonstrate that the
actual seat and its attachment comply with the requirements of the
rule.
Section 238.235 Doors
This section contains the requirements for exterior doors on
passenger cars. These doors are the primary means of egress from a
passenger train.
Paragraph (a) requires that by December 31, 1999, each powered,
exterior side door in a vestibule that is partitioned from the
passenger
[[Page 25616]]
compartment of a passenger car shall have a manual override device that
is: capable of releasing the door to permit it to be opened without
power from inside the car; located adjacent to the door which it
controls; and designed and maintained so that a person may readily
access and operate the override device from inside the car without
requiring the use of a tool or other implement. Passenger cars subject
to this requirement that are not already equipped with such manual
override devices must be retrofitted accordingly. FRA notes that a
vestibule is not partitioned from the passenger compartment of a
passenger car solely by the presence of any windscreen which extends no
more than one-quarter of the width across the car from the wall to
which it is attached.
The requirements in paragraph (a) originally arose from the NTSB's
emergency safety recommendations (R-96-7) as part of its investigation
of the passenger train collision in Silver Spring, Maryland, on
February 16, 1996. In the NPRM, FRA fully set out these emergency
safety recommendations and FRA's response. See 62 FR 49734-5. As
announced following its full investigation of the Silver Spring,
Maryland passenger train collision, and stated here in particular among
its final recommendations, the NTSB recommended that FRA:
Require all passenger cars to have easily accessible interior
emergency quick-release mechanisms adjacent to exterior passageway
doors and take appropriate emergency action to ensure corrective
action until these measures are incorporated into minimum passenger
car safety standards.
(R-97-14) (See NTSB/RAR-97/02)
FRA received a number of comments as to the date by which passenger
cars must be equipped with manual overrides to open exterior, side
doors as specified in this section. In its comments on the NPRM, Septa
asked that the date be set three years after the effective date of the
final rule, citing funding reasons. Metra commented that the date be
set four to six years from the effective date of the final rule. FRA
notes that this comment may have been based on the assumption that the
rule requires manual override devices to be installed on the exterior
of existing passenger cars, which this section does not. The UTU
commented that the proposal in the NPRM afforded railroads more than
enough time to comply with the requirement, considering their advance
notice of this issue. Finally, in its comments on the NPRM, the NTSB
stated that a two-year period to accomplish the equipping of passenger
cars with the manual override feature is too long.
Having considered the comments submitted, FRA has decided to
require that compliance with this section be effected by December 31,
1999. FRA understands that a majority of the passenger cars are already
in compliance with the rule as proposed. FRA recognizes that some
entities may not be able to accomplish the total retrofit within the
required time, to the extent their budget and acquisition process can
only commence once the rule becomes final. However, these are self-
imposed constraints that should not arrest progress in the industry as
a whole. Any entity faced with such constraints should seek a waiver.
Paragraph (b) also provides that each powered, exterior side door
have a manual override feature the same as that required in paragraph
(a) for existing equipment, except that the manual override must also
be capable of opening the door from outside the car. This requirement
is intended to provide quick access to a passenger car by emergency
response personnel, and represents the consensus recommendation of the
Working Group. Paragraph (b) applies to each such door on a passenger
car ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the
first time on or after September 9, 2002. Paragraph (b)'s requirements
for a minimum number and dimension of side doors on a passenger car is
discussed earlier in the preamble.
Paragraph (c) permits a railroad to protect a manul override device
with a cover or screen to safeguard such devices from casual or
inadvertent use. The rule requires that such cover and screens be
capable of being removed by passengers, however.
Paragraph (d) is reserved for door marking and operating
instruction requirements. These requirements are addressed in the final
rule on passenger train emergency preparedness (49 CFR part 239),
specifically Sec. 239.107. See 63 FR 24630; May 4, 1998.
Section 238.237 Automated Monitoring
This section requires on or after November 8, 1999 an operational
alerter or a deadman control in the controlling locomotive of each
passenger train operating in other than cab signal, automatic train
control, or automatic train stop territory. This section further
requires that such locomotives ordered on or after September 8, 2000,
or placed in service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002,
must be equipped with a working alerter. As a result, the use of a
deadman control alone on these new locomotives would be prohibited.
An alerter will initiate a penalty brake application if it does not
receive the proper response from the engineer. Likewise, a deadman
control will initiate a penalty brake application if the engineer fails
to maintain proper contact with the device. The Working Group discussed
establishing specific setting requirements for alerters or deadman
controls based on maximum train speed and the capabilities of the
signal system. This discussion led to the conclusion that settings
should be left to the discretion of individual railroads as long as
they document the basis for the settings that they select. If the
device fails en route, the rule requires a second person qualified on
the signal system and brake application procedures to be stationed in
the cab or the engineer must be in constant radio communication with a
second crewmember until the train reaches the next terminal. This is
intended to allow the train to complete its trip with the device's
function of keeping the operator alert taken over by another member of
the crew.
Alerters are safety devices intended to verify that the engineer
remains capable and vigilant to accomplish the tasks that he or she
must perform. Equipping passenger locomotives with an alerter is
current industry practice. These devices have proven themselves in
service, and the requirement will not impose an additional cost on the
industry.
In the final rule, FRA has clarified the procedures a railroad must
follow if the alerter or deadman control fails en route. In addition to
the requirements of paragraph (d)(1), under paragraph (d)(2)(i) a tag
shall be prominently displayed in the locomotive cab to indicate that
the alerter or deadman control is defective, until such device is
repaired. Further, under paragraph (d)(2)(ii), when the train reaches
its next terminal or the locomotive undergoes its next calender day
inspection, whichever occurs first, the alerter or deadman control
shall be repaired or the locomotive shall be removed as the controlling
locomotive in the train.
Subpart D--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements of Tier I
Passenger Equipment
Section 238.301 Scope
This subpart contains the requirements regarding the inspection,
testing, and maintenance of all types of passenger equipment operating
at speeds of 125 mph or less. This subpart is intended to address both
MU locomotives and push-pull equipment.
[[Page 25617]]
This subpart includes the requirements for the inspection, testing, and
maintenance of Tier I passenger equipment brake systems as well as the
other mechanical and electrical safety components of Tier I passenger
equipment.
Section 238.303 Exterior Calendar Day Mechanical Inspection of
Passenger Equipment
This section contains the requirements for performing exterior
calendar day mechanical inspections on passenger equipment and is
patterned after a combination of the current calendar day inspection
required for locomotives under the Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards
and the pre-departure inspection for freight cars under the Railroad
Freight Car Safety Standards. See 49 CFR 229.21 and 215.13,
respectively. FRA intends for the exterior calendar day mechanical
inspection to generally apply to all passenger cars and all unpowered
vehicles used in passenger trains (which includes, e.g., not only
coaches, MU locomotives, and cab cars but also any other rail rolling
equipment used in a passenger train). However, paragraph (a) has been
slightly modified to clarify that an inspection of secondary braking
systems must be conducted on all passenger equipment, which includes
all locomotives. A mechanical safety inspection of freight cars has
been a longstanding Federal safety requirement, and FRA believes that
the lack of a similar requirement for passenger equipment creates a
serious void in the current Federal railroad safety standards.
As noted in the general preamble discussion, FRA has made minor
changes and clarifications to the exterior calendar day mechanical
inspection that was proposed in the 1997 NPRM. In paragraph (d) of this
final rule, FRA is explicitly stating that the exterior mechanical
inspection is to be performed to the extent possible without uncoupling
the trainset and without placing the equipment over a pit or on an
elevated track. This explicit statement has been added in response to
APTA's concerns regarding what would constitute proper performance of
these inspections. It was never FRA's intent to require this inspection
to be conducted in such a manner. FRA intended the inspection to be
very similar to the freight car safety inspection currently required
pursuant to part 215.
FRA also recognizes that certain items contained in the proposed
exterior mechanical inspection could not have been easily inspected
without proper shop facilities. Therefore, FRA has moved some of the
exterior mechanical inspection requirements related to couplers and
trucks to the periodic mechanical inspection requirements as these
periodic inspections will likely be performed at locations with
facilities available that are more conducive to inspecting the specific
components. The specific items which have been moved to the periodic
mechanical inspection requirements include: all trucks are equipped
with a device or securing arrangement to prevent the truck and car body
from separating in case of derailment; all center castings on trucks
are not cracked or broken; the distance between the guard arm and the
knuckle nose is not more than 5\1/8\ inches on standard type couplers
(MCB contour 1904) or more than 5\5/16\ inches on D&E couplers; the
free slack in the coupler or drawbar not absorbed by friction devices
or draft gears is not more than \1/2\ inch; and the draft gear is not
broken. The changes made in this final rule were discussed with the
Working Group at the December 15-16, 1997 meeting.
Paragraph (a) requires that each passenger car and each unpowered
vehicle used in a passenger train receive an exterior mechanical safety
inspection at least once each calendar day that the equipment is placed
in service except under the circumstances described in paragraph (f).
As noted above, this paragraph also recognizes that the requirement
contained in paragraph (e)(15) that all secondary braking systems on
all passenger equipment are in operating mode and do not have any known
defects. FRA has amended this requirement from that proposed in the
1997 NPRM, which proposed to require that all secondary braking systems
be working (62 FR 49808), in order to acknowledge that it is impossible
to ascertain whether some secondary braking systems, such as dynamic
brakes, are working unless the equipment is in use. Thus, FRA has
modified the language of the requirement to ensure that all secondary
braking systems are capable of working when released from the exterior
mechanical inspection. Paragraph (a) and paragraph (e)(15) have also
been modified to accurately reflect FRA's intent to ensure that all
secondary braking systems are inspected. The requirements for an
exterior calendar day mechanical inspection are generally applicable
only to passenger cars and other unpowered vehicles used in a passenger
trains. Thus, except for MU locomotives and cab cars, other locomotives
would not fall within the requirements of this section. However, many
locomotives contain secondary braking systems such as dynamic brakes.
Thus, in order to effectuate FRA's intent that these secondary braking
systems be inspected, paragraph (e)(15) has been modified to clarify
that it is applicable to all passenger equipment, which includes all
locomotives. Consequently, FRA intends for the secondary braking
systems on all locomotives to be inspected and that it be known that
those systems are in operating mode and do not contain any known
defects.
Paragraph (b) is also a new provision being added to this final
rule in order to address the inspections of vehicles that are added to
a passenger train while en route. FRA is modifying the Class I brake
test and exterior calendar day mechanical inspection requirements to
ensure the proper operation of all cars added to a train while en
route. In paragraph (b) FRA is requiring the performance of an exterior
mechanical inspection on each car added to a passenger train at the
time it is added to the train unless documentation is provided to the
train crew that an exterior mechanical inspection was performed on the
car within the previous calendar day. FRA is adding this requirement in
order to address the concerns raised by various labor representatives
that no provisions were provided in the 1997 NPRM to address
circumstances when cars are added to an en route train. FRA believes
that the added provision will ensure the integrity of the mechanical
components on every car added to an existing train and should not be a
burden for railroads since cars are generally added to passenger trains
at major terminals with the facilities and personnel available for
conducting such inspections. Furthermore, the inspection requirements
contained in this paragraph are very similar to what is currently
required when a freight car is added to a train while en route. See 49
CFR Sec. 215.13.
Paragraph (c) requires that exterior calendar day mechanical
inspections be performed by a qualified maintenance person. FRA
believes the combination of a daily Class I brake test and a mechanical
safety inspection performed by highly qualified personnel is a key to
safer passenger railroad operations. Such a practice will most likely
detect and correct equipment problems before they become the source of
an accident or incident resulting in personal injuries or damage to
property. As noted in previous discussions, FRA does not intend to
provide any special provisions for weekend operations with regard to
conducting calendar day mechanical inspections by QMPs as suggested in
the
[[Page 25618]]
comments submitted by some APTA representatives. The rationale for
requiring daily mechanical attention by highly qualified inspectors, a
proposition generally accepted by Working Group members, appears to
apply equally to weekend periods. In fact, based on FRA's experience,
equipment used on weekends is generally used more rigorously than
equipment used during weekday operations.
At present, only one commuter operation (Metra) has raised
significant concerns regarding weekend operations. Although there is no
specific data suggesting that existing weekend operations on Metra have
created a safety hazard, FRA has found it virtually impossible to draft
and justify provisions providing limited flexibility for Metra that do
not create potential loopholes that could be abused by other passenger
train operations that have not had the apparent safety success of
Metra. Moreover, based on FRA's independent investigation of Metra's
operation, it is believed that the impact of this final rule on Metra's
weekend operations will be significantly less than that indicated in
APTA's written comments and originally perceived by Metra. FRA believes
that most of the personnel needed by Metra to conduct its weekend
operations in accordance with this final rule are available to Metra or
its contractors and that minor adjustments could be made to its weekend
operations that might avoid significant new expense. As the concerns
regarding weekend operations appear to involve just one commuter
operation and because the precise impact on that operation is not known
or available at this time, FRA believes that the waiver process would
be the best method for handling the concerns raised by that operator.
This would afford FRA an opportunity to provide any relief that may be
warranted based on the specific needs and the safety history of the
individual railroad without opening the door to potential abuses by
other railroads that are not similarly situated.
Paragraph (e) identifies the components that are required to be
inspected as part of the exterior daily mechanical safety inspection
and provides measurable inspection criteria for the components. The
railroad is required to ascertain that each passenger car, and each
unpowered vehicle used in a passenger train conforms with the
conditions enumerated in paragraph (e) and that all passenger equipment
conforms with the requirement contained in paragraph (e)(15). Deviation
from any listed condition makes the passenger car or unpowered vehicle
defective if it is in service. The Working Group members generally
agreed that the components contained in this section represent valid
safety-related components that should be frequently inspected by
railroads. However, members of the Working Group had widely differing
opinions regarding the criteria to be used to inspect these components.
FRA selected and has retained inspection criteria based on the
locomotive calendar day inspection and the freight car safety pre-
departure inspection required by 49 CFR parts 229 and 215,
respectively. FRA believes that, at a minimum, passenger cars should
receive an inspection which is at least equivalent to that received by
locomotives and freight cars.
As discussed in the 1997 NPRM, FRA intends for the daily mechanical
inspection to serve as the time when the railroad repairs defects that
occur en route. Thus, this section generally requires that safety
components not in compliance with this part be repaired before the
equipment is permitted to remain in or return to passenger service.
(See Sec. 238.9 for a discussion of the prohibitions against using
passenger equipment containing defects; and Secs. 238.15 and 238.17 for
a discussion of movement of defective equipment for purposes of repair
or sale). The purpose of the defect reporting and tracking system
required in Sec. 238.19 is to have the mechanical forces make all
necessary safety repairs to the equipment before it is cleared for
another day of operation. In other words, FRA generally intends for the
flexibility to operate defective equipment in passenger service to end
at the calendar day mechanical inspection.
In paragraph (e)(15), FRA has modified the requirements regarding
secondary braking systems to clarify that secondary braking systems
must be in operating mode and contain no known defective conditions.
FRA has also included provisions to address the handling of defective
dynamic brakes in order to specifically establish restrictions on the
movement of equipment containing this type of defective secondary brake
and to recognize the concerns raised by several commenters regarding
the importance that these secondary brakes have in the operation of
passenger equipment. FRA agrees that in many circumstances it is
desirable to have operative dynamic brakes in order to prevent thermal
stress to the wheels, which has the potential of occurring if certain
passenger trains are operated for extended periods without dynamic
brakes and compensating train control practices are not used. In
developing the requirements for handling defective dynamic brakes, FRA
has generally incorporated the current best practices of the industry.
This paragraph draws a distinction between dynamic brakes on MU
locomotives and dynamic brakes on conventional locomotives, treating
each slightly differently due to the safety implications involved in
each type of operation. FRA intends to require that MU locomotives
equipped with dynamic brakes found not to be in operating mode or
containing a defective condition which prevents the proper operation of
the dynamic brakes be handled in the same manner as a running gear
defect pursuant to Sec. 238.17. Thus, MU locomotives found with
defective dynamic brakes at the exterior calendar day mechanical
inspection must have the dynamic brakes repaired prior to continuing in
passenger service. FRA further intends that MU locomotives which
experience a dynamic brake defect while en route be handled the same as
a running gear defect pursuant to Sec. 238.17. Thus, the locomotive
would have to be inspected by a QMP and be properly tagged at the
location it is found to be defective.
The requirements related to conventional locomotives found with
dynamic brakes not to be in operating mode or containing a defective
condition which prevents the proper operation of the dynamic brakes are
somewhat less stringent than the movement requirements placed on MU
locomotives. In these cases, the locomotive may remain in passenger
service provided that the unit is properly tagged, each locomotive
engineer taking charge of the train is informed as to the status of the
locomotive, and the locomotive's dynamic brakes are repaired within
three calendar days of being found defective.
FRA has treated MU and conventional locomotives slightly
differently for several reasons. Past history has shown that failure to
have operative dynamic brakes in MU operations increases the potential
of causing thermal stress to the wheels of the vehicles to a much
greater extent than inoperative dynamic brakes in conventional
locomotive operations. MU locomotive operations generally tend to have
a greater number of station stops, requiring the use of the brakes,
than operations where conventional locomotives are utilized and, thus,
the potential for thermal stress to the wheels is increased.
Furthermore, operations utilizing conventional
[[Page 25619]]
locomotives tend to operate for extended distances across the country
and, thus, are further from locations where repairs to the dynamic
brakes can be properly repaired. Therefore, these operations may need
extra time to get a defective locomotive to a particular location for
repair. Furthermore, FRA believes that the tagging and notification
requirements imposed on conventional locomotives reduce the potential
of an engineer's undue reliance on a secondary brake system which is
not available. Finally, the handling requirements contained in this
paragraph are consistent with the current practices within the industry
and should have a minimal impact on passenger operations.
Paragraph (f) contains a narrow exception which allows long-
distance intercity passenger trains that miss a scheduled exterior
calendar day mechanical inspection due to a delay en route to continue
in passenger service to the location where the inspection was scheduled
to be performed. At that point, a calendar day mechanical inspection
must be performed prior to returning the equipment to service of any
kind. This flexibility applies only to the mechanical safety
inspections of coaches. FRA does not intend to relieve the railroad of
the responsibility to perform a locomotive calendar day inspection as
required by 49 CFR part 229.
Paragraph (g) contains certain minimal recordkeeping requirements
related to the performance of the exterior calendar day mechanical
inspection provisions. FRA believes that proper and accurate
recordkeeping is the cornerstone of any inspection process and is
essential to ensuring the performance and quality of the required
inspections. Without such records the inspection requirements would be
difficult to enforce. Although recordkeeping was discussed in the
Working Group and FRA believes it to be an integral part of any
inspection requirement, FRA inadvertently omitted any such requirements
in the NPRM specifically related to mechanical inspections. This
omission was brought to FRA's attention through verbal and written
comments provided by various interested parties and has now been
corrected. This paragraph specifically permits a railroad to maintain
the required records either in writing or electronically, and the
record may be part of a single master report covering an entire group
of cars. Whatever format the railroad elects to use to record the
information, it must contain the specific information listed in this
paragraph.
Paragraph (h) specifies an additional contingent component of the
calendar day exterior mechanical inspection. If a car requiring a
single car test is moved in a train carrying passengers or available to
carry such passengers to a place where the test can be performed, then
the single car test must be performed before or during the exterior
calendar day mechanical inspection. This provision has been retained
from the 1997 NPRM. The comments submitted by APTA suggested that the
word ``next'' be inserted prior to ``calendar day mechanical
inspection.'' FRA did not make this change as it would provide greater
latitude than FRA intended. Paragraph (h) applies to equipment that is
already in transit from the location where repairs were conducted that
required the performance of a single car test. Thus, in order to remain
consistent with the provisions contained in Sec. 238.311(f) such cars
must receive the single car test prior to, or as part of, the car's
exterior calendar day mechanical inspection. Although FRA recognizes
the concerns of labor representatives with regard to this provision,
FRA believes that it is necessary to provide the railroads the
flexibility to make the necessary repairs to a piece of equipment and
then move it to a location which is most conducive to performing the
required single car test. FRA currently permits such flexibility and is
not aware of any significant safety problems that have arisen as a
result of such a practice. However, in order to ensure the safe
movement of such equipment, FRA has added various inspection and
tagging requirements in Sec. 238.311(f) that must be performed prior to
hauling such equipment to another location for the performance of a
single car test. (See section-by-section discussion of Sec. 238.311.)
Section 238.305 Interior Calendar Day Mechanical Inspection of
Passenger Cars
This section contains the requirements for the performance of
interior mechanical inspections on passenger cars (which includes,
e.g., passenger coaches, MU locomotives, and cab cars) each calendar
day that the equipment is used in service except under the
circumstances described in paragraph (d). Unlike the exterior calendar
day mechanical inspection, FRA in paragraph (b) of this section permits
the interior inspections of passenger cars to be performed by
``qualified persons,'' individuals qualified by the railroad to do so.
Thus, these individuals need not meet the definition of a ``qualified
maintenance person.''
As noted in the 1997 NPRM, FRA's original position was to require
the interior inspections to be performed by qualified maintenance
persons. However, after several discussions with members of the Working
Group and several other representatives of passenger railroads, FRA
determined that the training and experience typical of qualified
maintenance persons is not necessary and often does not apply to
inspecting interior safety components of passenger equipment. In
addition, the flexibility created by permitting someone less qualified
than a qualified maintenance person can reduce the cost of performing
the mechanical safety inspection since the most economical way to
accomplish the mechanical inspection is to combine the exterior
inspection with the Class I brake test and then have a crewmember
inspect on arrival at the final terminal or have a train coach cleaner
combine the interior coach inspection with coach cleaning.
Paragraph (c) lists various components that are required to be
inspected as part of the interior calendar day mechanical safety
inspection. As a minimum, FRA requires that the following components be
inspected: trap doors; end and side doors; manual door releases; safety
covers, doors and plates; vestibule step lighting; and safety-related
signs and instructions. Consistent with the discussions regarding the
movement of defective equipment with non-running gear defects, all en
route defects and all noncomplying conditions under this section must
be repaired at the time of the daily interior inspection or the
equipment would be required to be locked-out and empty in order to be
placed or remain in passenger service with the exception of a defect
under Sec. 238.305(c)(5). (See Sec. 238.9 for a discussion of the
prohibitions against using passenger equipment containing defects, and
Sec. 238.17 for a discussion of the movement of defective equipment for
purposes of repair.)
It should be noted that two of the items contained in paragraph (c)
have been slightly modified in order to clarify FRA's intent and to
ensure the safety of the traveling public. Paragraph (c)(5), regarding
the continuing use of a car with a defective door, has been modified by
the addition of subparagraph (c)(5)(iii), which requires that at least
one operative and accessible door be available on each side of the
vehicle in order for the car to continue to be used in passenger
service. FRA believes the addition of this requirement is necessary to
ensure that passengers have adequate egress from the equipment should
an emergency occur.
[[Page 25620]]
Paragraph (c)(8) has also been modified to clarify that the inspection
of the manual door releases, as proposed in the 1997 NPRM, need only be
made to the extent necessary to verify that all D rings, pull handles,
or other means to access manual door releases are in place based on a
visual inspection. FRA recognizes that inspection of the actual manual
door release would be overly burdensome, costly, and unnecessary due to
the relative reliability of such devices. It should also be noted that
the final rule contains a new paragraph (c)(9) which requires that the
interior mechanical inspection ensure that all required emergency
equipment, including fire extinguishers, pry bars, auxiliary portable
lighting, and first aid kits be in place. These items are required
pursuant to the regulations on passenger train emergency preparedness
contained at 49 CFR part 239, and FRA believes that the inspection to
ensure the presence of such equipment is appropriate under this
section.
Paragraphs (d) and (e) contain provisions which are identical to
certain requirements pertaining to exterior calendar day mechanical
inspections. Paragraph (d) allows long-distance intercity passenger
trains that miss a scheduled calendar day mechanical inspection due to
a delay en route to continue in passenger service to the location where
the inspection was scheduled. Paragraph (e) contains the recordkeeping
requirements related to the performance of interior calendar day
mechanical inspections. FRA believes that proper and accurate
recordkeeping is the cornerstone of any inspection process and is
essential to ensuring the performance and quality of the required
inspections. Without such records the inspection requirements would be
difficult to enforce. Although recordkeeping was discussed in the
Working Group and FRA believes it to be an integral part of any
inspection requirement, FRA inadvertently omitted any such requirements
in the 1997 NPRM specifically related to mechanical inspections. This
omission was brought to FRA's attention through verbal and written
comments provided by various interested parties and has been corrected.
This paragraph specifically permits a railroad to maintain the required
records either in writing or electronically, and the record may be part
of a single master report covering an entire group of cars. Whatever
format the railroad elects to use to record the information, it must
contain the specific information listed in this paragraph.
Section 238.307 Periodic Mechanical Inspection of Passenger Cars and
Unpowered Vehicles Used in Passenger Trains
This section contains the requirements for performing periodic
mechanical inspections on all passenger cars and all unpowered vehicles
used in passenger trains. Paragraph (b) makes clear that the periodic
mechanical inspections required under this section are to be performed
by a qualified maintenance person as defined in Sec. 238.5. In the 1997
NPRM, FRA proposed that the following components be inspected for
proper operation and repaired, if necessary, as part of the periodic
maintenance of the equipment: emergency lights; emergency exit windows;
seats and seat attachments; overhead luggage racks and attachments;
floor and stair surfaces; and hand-operated electrical switches. See 62
FR 49808-09. FRA further proposed that such periodic inspections be
performed every 180 days. As noted above, FRA, with the intent of
requiring their inspection on a periodic basis, removed certain items
previously proposed in the exterior calendar day mechanical inspection
as they could not be easily inspected without proper shop facilities.
After a review of the industry's practices regarding the
performance of periodic mechanical-type inspections, FRA believes that
some of the items removed from the exterior calendar day mechanical
inspection as well as some of the items previously proposed in the 180
day periodic mechanical inspection should be and are currently
inspected on a more frequent basis by the railroads. As it is FRA's
intent in this proceeding to attempt to codify the current best
practices of the industry, FRA believes that the current intervals for
inspecting certain components should be maintained. Consequently, FRA
is modifying the time interval for conducting periodic mechanical
inspections to include a 92-day and a 368-day periodic inspection.
In paragraph (c), FRA requires the periodic inspection on a 92-day
basis of certain mechanical components previously proposed as part of
the exterior calendar day mechanical inspection, as well as an
inspection of floors, passageways, and switches. The mechanical
components to be inspected that were previously included as part of the
calendar day mechanical inspection include verification that all trucks
are equipped with a device or securing arrangement to prevent the truck
and car body from separating in case of derailment and that all center
castings on trucks are not cracked or broken. FRA will also require a
92-day inspection of emergency lighting systems as they are critical to
the safety of passengers in the event of an accident or derailment. FRA
is adding an inspection of the roller bearings to the 92-day
inspection. Although this component was inadvertently left out of the
NPRM, FRA believes that roller bearings are an integral part of the
mechanical components and must be part of any mechanical inspection
scheme. Furthermore, several labor commenters recommended inspections
criteria similar to that contained in 49 CFR Part 215, which
specifically addresses the condition of roller bearings. See 49 CFR
Sec. 215.115. As roller bearings are best viewed in a shop facility
context, FRA is adding the inspection of this component to the 92-day
periodic mechanical inspection which is consistent with the current
practices of the industry. FRA is also adding the general conditions
and components previously proposed in Sec. 238.109(b) (62 FR 49801-802)
to the 92-day periodic mechanical inspection contained in this
paragraph. As the conditions previously proposed in Sec. 238.109(b)
were intended to ensure that the railroads had an inspection scheme in
place to ensure that all systems and components of the equipment are
free of conditions that endanger the safety of the crew, FRA believes
that a specific inspection interval is better suited to address the
general condition of the equipment and ensure the safety of the riding
public and railroad employees. This paragraph also requires that all of
the components inspected as part of the exterior and interior calendar
day inspection be inspected at the 92-day periodic inspection.
Paragraph (d) of this section retains a semi-annual periodic
inspection for certain components as proposed in the 1997 NPRM. In the
NPRM, FRA proposed a 180-day periodic inspection, but in order to
remain consistent with the 92-day inspection scheme this paragraph
requires a 184-day periodic inspection of certain mechanical
components. These include: seats; luggage racks; beds; and emergency
windows. This paragraph also contains an added requirement related to
the inspection of the couplers; couplers were removed from the calendar
day inspection and have been inserted in the 184-day inspection scheme.
FRA is placing the coupler inspection at this interval rather than at
the 92-day interval in order to reduce the amount of coupling and
uncoupling of
[[Page 25621]]
equipment that will be required. In paragraph (e) FRA has extended the
inspection interval related to manual door releases over that which was
proposed in the 1997 NPRM. Due to the general reliability of these
devices and because they are partially inspected on a daily basis, FRA
believes that an annual inspection of the releases will ensure their
proper operation. Thus, the final rule requires an inspection of the
manual door releases every 368 days.
In paragraph (b) FRA has attempted to make clear that, although FRA
has established certain periodic inspection intervals in order to
establish a default interval, FRA will allow railroads to develop
alternative intervals for performing such inspections for specific
components or equipment based on a more quantitative reliability
assessment completed as part of their system safety programs. FRA
expects that railroads will utilize reliability-based maintenance
programs as appropriate, given this opportunity to do so. As successful
reliability based maintenance programs are dynamic, it is expected
that, in the process of defining and documenting the reliable use of
equipment or specific components, over time, continued assessments may
indicate a need to increase or decrease inspection intervals. FRA will
only permit lengthened inspection intervals beyond the default
intervals when such changes are justified by a quantitative reliability
assessment. The previously described inspection intervals are based on
sound but limited information provided to FRA that FRA believes
represents a combination of operating experience, analytical analyses,
knowledge and intuition. FRA expects that railroads will collect and
respond to additional data throughout the operating life of the
equipment.
FRA believes that the approach taken to identify the stated default
inspection intervals contained in this section combined both
qualitative, or subjective, judgement with available quantitative
information. FRA believes this approach is appropriate for the
conservative default strategy defined. However, FRA recognizes that
this mixed approach does not yield a quantified level of equipment
reliability. The reliability of a system or component is defined as the
probability that, when operating under stated environmental conditions,
the system or component will perform its intended function adequately
for a specified interval of time, number of cycles of operation, or
number of miles. Reliability is a quantitative measure. FRA believes
that quantified, high levels of reliability are desired for the
continued safe operation of passenger equipment. Therefore, FRA
encourages equipment owners to perform additional sensitivity analyses
to determine which components or equipment has the greatest potential
for introducing risk, thus requiring the most careful monitoring to
increase reliability while reducing the consequences of failure. FRA
believes that, in addition to component design reliability, quality
assurance, as well as maintenance and inspection proficiency may be
considered and evaluated by the equipment owners as a part of this
process. When considering the reliable use of passenger equipment,
elements such as couplers as well as suspension systems; trucks; side
bearings; wheels; jumpers; cable connections; buffer plates;
diaphragms; and secondary brake systems, and human factors as it
relates to inspecting and maintaining these elements may be considered.
Component level structural fatigue, corrosion, and wear are variables
that may be considered to bound or introduce uncertainty in passenger
equipment performance, effectively reducing reliability as well.
Given the limited quantitative information that is presently
available regarding factors that influence the reliability of passenger
equipment, the primary sources of information available for initial
reliability assessments include: judgement; simulations; field,
laboratory, and office experiments; operating environment and
maintenance process reviews; and accident and near-miss investigations.
FRA believes that in the operation of passenger equipment, where
failure costs are high and casualties infrequent, accident data for
informed decision making may be scarce or not fully applicable.
Further, legal and punitive threats may provide significant impediments
to identifying the contributing, initiating, and compounding causes of
failures. Data from near-miss, or near-catastrophic incidents may be
found to be instructive, but often not all of the parameters entering a
quantitative analysis are recorded or communicated in these cases.
FRA believes that for the initial reliability assessments of
passenger equipment and components qualified judgment will be an
important source of quantitative information. Qualified judgment is
based upon both the accumulation of experience and a mental synthesis
of factors allowing the evaluator to assess the situation and produce
results. Such judgment has a rightful place in making initial
quantitative reliability assessments because current available data is
often deficient for the evaluation of a particular situation. However,
as adequately structured databases are developed and implemented for
reliability center maintenance programs, FRA believes more reliance can
be placed on objective data and reliability assessments will be based
on a combination of data and judgment. FRA believes that, in the very
near term, sole reliance cannot be placed on objective data sources to
provide quantitative reliability assessments; instead, adequately
qualified and unbiased judgment will continue to be required in
conjunction with verifiable operating data for analysis purposes.
When planning the maintenance of a component or system to protect
the safety and operating capability of the equipment, FRA expects that
a number of items will be considered in the reliability assessment
process, which include:
1. The consequences of each type of functional failure;
2. The visibility of a functional failure to the operating crew
(evidence that a failure has occurred);
3. The visibility of reduced resistance to failure (evidence that a
failure is imminent);
4. The life or age-reliability characteristics of each item;
5. The economic tradeoff between the cost of scheduled maintenance
and the benefits to be derived from it;
6. A multiple failure, resulting from a sequence of independent
failures, may have consequences that would not be caused by any one of
the individual failures alone. These consequences are taken into
account in the definition of the failure consequences for the first
failure; and
7. A default strategy will continue to govern decision making in
the absence of full information or agreement. This strategy provides
for conservative initial decisions, to be revised on the basis of
information derived from operating experience.
FRA believes that a variety of qualitative approaches, such as a
Failure Modes, Effects, Criticality Analysis (FMECA) may be useful in
evaluating the potential consequences of a functional failure. FRA
believes a qualitative approach may be used in complement and combined
with a quantitative approach such as Probabilistic Risk Analyses (PRA)
or Quantified Risk Analyses (QRA) which may include structured
probabilistic Event Tree, Fault Tree, or Influence Diagram analyses to
provide additional insight to railroads regarding the reliable use of
their equipment. Quantitative approaches are useful to characterize the
details of a system
[[Page 25622]]
whereas qualitative approaches can provide characterization of the
general performance quality of the system analyzed.\4\ Component level
reliability analysis centered around a quantitative, deterministic
design approach such as Damage Tolerance Analysis (DTA) may be
appropriate when information about the ability of a structural
component to sustain anticipated loads in the presence of fatigue,
corrosion, or accidental damage is required.\5\
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\4\ Evaluation Approaches & Quantification (Chapter 8), ``The
Role of Human Error in Design, Construction, and Reliability of
Marine Structures.'' Robert G. Bea, Report No. SSC-378, U.S. Coast
Guard, Washington, D.C. 1994, pp. 127-149.
\5\ ``Reliability and Risk Analysis for Design and Operations
Planning of Offshore Structures.'' T. Moan, Sixth ICOSSAR,
Innsbruck, August 1993.
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FRA expects that analyses of individual components investigated as
a part of the reliability assessment process may require equipment
owners to collect and consider information regarding: a component's
physical features and conditions; a component's actual operating use;
the existence of manufacturing defects and tolerances; the effects of
repairs or modifications made to the component; and capabilities of
available nondestructive evaluation methods used for inspection.
Management of effective reliability-based maintenance programs requires
an organized information system for surveillance and analysis of the
performance of each component under the known operating conditions. FRA
believes that the information derived from such operating experience
can provide information of failures that could affect operating safety;
failures that have operational consequences; the failure modes of units
removed as a result of failures; as well as the general condition of
unfailed parts in units that have failed and serviceable units
inspected as samples.
As stated above, at the time of the development of default
maintenance intervals, FRA used the available information to determine
the inspection intervals necessary to protect safety. However, FRA
believes that the optimum inspection tasks, methods, and intervals as
well as the applicability of age or life limits will be best obtained
from reliability analyses based on additional service-based data
collection, in some cases coupled with appropriate deterministic
analyses to both ensure safety and maximize reliability. For further
information regarding sources of reliability theory and analysis, FRA
recommends that the following materials be considered:
ANSI (American National Standards Institute)/ASQC
(American Society for Quality) S2 (1995) Introduction to Attribute
Sampling;
ANSI/ASQC Z1.4 (1993) Sampling Procedures and Tables
for Inspection by Attributes;
ANSI/ASQC Z1.9 (1993) Sampling Procedures and Tables
for Inspection by Variables for Percent Nonconforming;
Handbook of Reliability Engineering and Management, W.
G. Ireson, McGraw Hill, 1996;
MIL-STD-414 (1957) Sampling Procedures and Tables for
Inspection by Variables for Percent Nonconforming;
MIL-STD-1234A (1974) Single and Multi-Level Continuous
Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspection by Attributes;
Reliability-Centered Maintenance, F. S. Nowlan and H.
F. Heap, Final Report for Contract MDA 903-75-C-0349, Office of
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., 1978;
Reliability-Centered Maintenance, A. M. Smith, McGraw
Hill, 1992;
Reliability-Centered Maintenance, J. Moubray, McGraw
Hill, 1997; and
Reliability in Engineering Design, K.C. Kapur and L. R.
Lamberson, John Wiley & Sons, 1977.
Paragraph (e) contains the recordkeeping requirements related to
the performance of periodic mechanical inspections. FRA believes that
proper and accurate recordkeeping is the cornerstone of any inspection
process and is essential for ensuring the performance and quality of
the required inspections. Without such records, the inspection
requirements would be difficult to enforce. Although recordkeeping was
discussed in the Working Group and FRA believes it to be an integral
part of any inspection requirement, FRA inadvertently omitted any such
requirements in the NPRM specifically related to mechanical
inspections. This omission was brought to FRA's attention through
verbal and written comments provided by various interested parties and
has been corrected. This paragraph specifically permits a railroad to
maintain the required records either in writing or electronically.
Whatever format the railroad elects to use to record the information,
it must contain the specific information listed in this paragraph.
Section 238.309 Periodic Brake Equipment Maintenance
This section contains the requirements related to the performance
of periodic brake maintenance for various types of passenger equipment,
referred to in the industry as clean, oil, test, and stencil (COT&S).
Although FRA has considered the concerns raised by certain labor
representatives during this rulemaking, FRA does not agree with the
conclusions drawn by these commenters with regard to the testing and
data submitted to FRA regarding modest extensions of the COT&S
intervals for equipment utilizing certain types of brake valves. All of
the COT&S intervals contained in this section are based, at least in
part, on current operations under existing waivers and on data and
information which FRA believes provide substantial support that the
valves can be safely operated for the periods of time provided in this
section. Furthermore, FRA believes that the stringent inspection and
testing regiment and the single car test requirements contained in this
final rule also provide sufficient additional safeguards to permit
modest increases in the COT&S intervals for equipment outfitted with
certain brake valves and other equipment having generally shown the
ability to operate for longer periods without failure.
Paragraph (b) extends the periodic maintenance interval for MU
locomotive fleets that are 100 percent equipped with air dryers and
modern brake systems from 736 days to 1,104 days. The requirement
remains 736 days for fleets that are not 100 percent equipped with air
dryers or that are equipped with older brake systems. FRA bases this
extension on tests conducted by Metro-North and monitored by FRA field
inspectors. These tests revealed that after three years brake valves on
MU locomotives equipped with air dryers were very clean and showed
little or no signs of deterioration. Based on the results of these
tests, FRA is confident that these valves can safely operate for three
years between periodic maintenance. FRA believes this extension of the
periodic maintenance interval will result in a cost savings to those
railroads that operate MU locomotives equipped with air dryers.
Paragraph (c) extends the periodic maintenance interval on
conventional locomotives equipped with 26-L or equivalent types of
brakes from the current standard of 736 days to 1,104 days. The
required periodic maintenance interval remains at 736 days for
locomotives equipped with other types of brake systems. This
requirement merely makes universal a practice that has been approved by
waiver for several years. See H-80-7. FRA believes that locomotives
equipped with 26-L brakes have demonstrated an ability to operate
safely for three years between periodic maintenance.
Paragraph (d) extends the periodic maintenance interval on
passenger coaches and other unpowered vehicles equipped with 26-C or
equivalent brake systems from 1,104 days to 1,476 days. This extension
is based on tests
[[Page 25623]]
performed by Amtrak. Based on these tests, FRA granted Amtrak a waiver
for this extension on July 26, 1995. See FRA Docket No. PB 94-3. Amtrak
has operated under the terms of this waiver for several years with no
problems. Consequently, based on Amtrak's experience, FRA believes all
passenger cars with 26-C equipment can safely be operated for four
years between periodic maintenance.
Paragraph (e) recognizes that the same extensions applicable to
locomotives and passenger coaches should be applied to control cab cars
that use brake valves that are identical to the 26-C valves used in
passenger cars or the 26-L valves used on locomotives. Consequently,
based on the information and tests conducted on those valves as well as
waivers currently existing, FRA is extending the periodic maintenance
interval for cab cars to 1,476 days or 1,104 days for those cab cars
that use brake systems identical to the 26-C and 26-L, respectively.
This extension is consistent with recent requests for waivers received
by FRA.
In paragraph (a)(2) FRA provides that a railroad may petition FRA,
under Sec. 238.21, to approve alternative maintenance procedures
providing equivalent safety. Under this provision, railroads could
propose using periodically scheduled single car tests to extend the
time between required periodic maintenance on passenger coaches. FRA
believes that the single car test provides a good alternative to more
frequent periodic maintenance. In fact, in the 1994 NPRM on power
brakes, FRA proposed the elimination of time-based COT&S and in its
stead proposed time intervals for conducting single car tests, ranging
from three to six months, depending on the utilization rate of the
passenger equipment. See 59 FR 47690-91, 47710-11, and 47740-41.
However, comments received and discussions with members of the Working
Group revealed that many passenger railroads would rather perform
periodic maintenance than more frequent single car tests. One reason
for this is that some operators would rather take equipment out of
service every few years and perform the overhaul of the brake system
than have equipment out of service for shorter periods every few
months. Therefore, FRA has retained periodic maintenance intervals but
provided the alternative to railroads to propose single car testing
intervals in order to reduce the frequency with which the periodic
maintenance is performed. Consequently, railroads are afforded some
flexibility to determine the type of maintenance approach that best
suits their operations. However, in response to concerns raised by a
labor commenter, it should be noted that FRA would likely not
completely eliminate the need to perform COT&S on a periodic basis but
might consider extending the interval between such attention depending
on the frequency of the single car test intervals proposed by a
railroad.
Section 238.311 Single Car Test
This section contains the requirements for performing single car
tests on all nonself-propelled passenger cars and all unpowered
vehicles used in passenger trains. As previously discussed in the
general preamble, FRA is modifying the requirements related to the
performance of single car tests from those that were proposed in the
1997 NPRM. In paragraph (a), based on the recommendations of
representatives from both rail labor and rail management, FRA is
referencing the single car testing procedures which were developed by
APTA PRESS rather than the AAR single car testing procedures referenced
in the 1997 NPRM. The single car test procedures were issued by APTA on
July 1, 1998, and are contained in APTA Mechanical Safety Standard SS-
M-005-98. The single car test procedures issued by APTA are more
comprehensive and better address passenger equipment than the older AAR
recommended practices. In paragraph (a), FRA is also slightly modifying
the applicability of this section for clarity. In the 1997 NPRM, FRA
proposed to require the performance of single car tests on all
passenger cars and other unpowered vehicles used in passenger trains.
However, the definition of passenger cars includes self-propelled
vehicles such as MU locomotives, to which FRA did not intend the single
car test requirements to apply. Consequently, FRA has modified the
language of paragraph (a) to clarify that the testing requirements
apply to nonself-propelled passenger cars and unpowered vehicles used
in passenger trains.
Paragraph (b) requires that all single car tests be performed by a
qualified maintenance person. A single car test is a comprehensive
brake test that requires the skills and knowledge of a highly trained
and skilled person with mechanical expertise. Railroads currently use
personnel which would generally meet the definition of ``qualified
maintenance person'' as defined by this part to perform single car
tests, and FRA believes that this practice should continue.
FRA is also modifying some of the circumstances under which a
single car test is required to be performed in paragraphs (c) through
(e). FRA agrees with several of the commenters that the 1997 NPRM may
have been over-inclusive in listing the components whose repair,
replacement, or removal would trigger the performance of a single car
test. Paragraph (c) lists the wheel defects that would trigger the
requirement to perform a single car test. FRA believes that the wheel
defects contained in this paragraph generally tend to indicate some
type of braking equipment problem. FRA believes that merely changing a
wheel to correct a wheel defect that is actually caused by a brake
system problem will only lead to a continuation of the problem on the
new wheel and will increase repair costs to the railroad. A test that
checks for the root cause of the defect is not only a good safety
practice, but is a good business practice that will lead to reduced
operating costs. However, in accordance with the discussions conducted
with the Working Group in mid-December of 1997, paragraph (d) makes
clear that FRA will not mandate the performance of a single car test
for wheel defects, other than a built-up tread, if the railroad can
establish that the wheel defect is due to a cause other than a
defective brake system. Thus, the burden will fall on the railroad to
establish and maintain sufficient documentation that a wheel defect is
due to something other than a brake-related cause. FRA makes clear that
if the railroad cannot establish the specific non-brake related cause
for a wheel defect, it is required to perform a single car test.
Paragraph (e) requires a railroad to conduct a single car test if
one or more of the identified brake system components is removed,
repaired, or replaced. This paragraph also requires that a single car
test be performed if a passenger car or vehicle is placed in service
after having been out of service for 30 or more days. FRA believes that
these requirements will ensure that brake system repairs have been
performed correctly and that the car's brake system will operate as
intended after repairs are made or after the car has been in storage
for extended periods. As noted above, FRA has amended the list of brake
components to include only those circumstances where a relay valve,
service portion, emergency portion, or pipe bracket is removed,
repaired, or replaced. Whenever any other component previously
contained in the 1997 NPRM is removed, repaired, or replaced, paragraph
(g) requires that only that portion that is renewed or replaced be
tested. FRA believes that the items
[[Page 25624]]
contained in paragraph (g) can generally be removed, replaced, or
repaired without affecting other portions of the brake system, thus
reducing the need to perform a single car test. FRA believes that the
requirements contained in paragraphs (e) and (g) are more consistent
with the current practices of most passenger railroads than the
requirement proposed in the 1997 NPRM.
Paragraph (f) provides that if a single car test cannot be made at
the point where repairs are made, the car may be moved in service to
the next forward location where the test can be made. This paragraph
requires that at a minimum the single car test be completed prior to,
or as a part of, the car's next calendar day mechanical inspection. As
noted previously, labor representatives object to permitting cars to be
used in passenger service after a repair is made without the required
single car test being performed. These commenters contend that the
performance of a single car test is necessary prior to using the
vehicle in order to determine whether any other unknown defects to the
brake system exist. Although FRA recognizes the concerns of labor
representatives with regard to this provision, FRA believes that it is
necessary to provide railroads the flexibility to make the necessary
repairs to a piece of equipment and then move it to a location which is
most conducive to performing the required single car test. However, in
order to address labor's concerns and to ensure the safe movement of
such equipment, FRA has added a visual inspection requirement and a
tagging requirement that must be met prior to the railroad being
allowed to haul a car in the fashion provided in this paragraph.
Consequently, this paragraph requires that prior to moving a car in
passenger service for the purposes of conducting a single car test, a
visual inspection verifying the application and release of the brakes
on both sides of the repaired car must be conducted and the car must be
appropriately tagged to indicate the need to perform a single car test.
Section 238.313 Class I Brake Test
This section contains the requirements related to the performance
of Class I brake tests. The requirements in this section apply to all
passenger coaches, control cab cars, MU locomotives, and all nonself-
propelled vehicles that are part of a passenger train. After
consideration of the comments and information submitted, FRA intends to
make very minor changes to the requirements regarding Class I brake
tests from those that were previously proposed in the 1997 NPRM.
Paragraph (a) of this section requires that a Class I brake test be
performed at least once each calendar day that a piece of equipment is
placed in service. As noted previously in the 1997 NPRM, the Working
Group discussed and debated when and how a Class I brake test should be
performed. Labor representatives stressed the need for a thorough brake
test performed by qualified mechanical inspectors on every passenger
train. These representatives strongly contended that this brake test
must be performed prior to the first daily departure of each passenger
train. On the other hand, representatives of passenger railroads
expressed the desire to have flexibility in conducting a comprehensive
brake inspection, arguing that safety would be better served if
railroads were permitted to conduct these inspections on a daily basis.
Although FRA agrees with the position advanced by many labor
representatives that some sort of car-to-car inspection must be made of
the brake equipment prior to the first run of the day in most
circumstances, FRA does not agree that it is necessary to perform a
full Class I brake test in order to ensure the proper functioning of
the brake equipment. As FRA views a Class I brake test as a
comprehensive inspection of the braking system, FRA believes that
commuter and short-distance intercity passenger train operations must
be permitted some flexibility in conducting these inspections.
Consequently, paragraph (a) requires that commuter and short-distance
intercity passenger train operations perform a Class I brake test
sometime during the calendar day in which the equipment is used.
FRA also recognizes the differences between commuter or short-
distance intercity operations and long-distance intercity passenger
train operations. Long-distance intercity passenger trains do not
operate in shorter turnaround service over the same sections of track
on a daily basis for the purpose of transporting passengers from major
centers of employment. Instead, these trains tend to operate for
extended periods of time, over long distances with greater distances
between passenger stations and terminals. Further, these trains may
operate well over 1,000 miles in any 24-hour period, somewhat
diminishing the opportunity for conducting inspections on these trains.
Therefore, FRA believes that a thorough inspection of the braking
system on these types of operations must be conducted prior to the
trains' departure from an initial starting terminal. Consequently,
paragraph (b) retains the proposed requirement that a Class I brake
inspection be performed on long-distance intercity passenger trains
prior to departure from an initial terminal. FRA does not believe there
would be any significant burden placed on these operations as the
current regulations require that an initial terminal inspection be
performed at these locations. Furthermore, virtually all of the initial
terminal inspections currently conducted on these types of trains are
performed by individuals who would be considered qualified maintenance
persons pursuant to Sec. 238.5.
Paragraph (b) also retains the requirements proposed in the 1997
NPRM related to the performance of Class I brake tests on long-distance
intercity passenger trains every 1,500 miles or every calendar day,
whichever comes first. After reviewing the information and comments
submitted by labor representatives, the information and comments
provided by Amtrak, and based upon the independent information
developed by FRA, FRA believes that the enhanced inspection scheme
contained in this final rule will ensure the continued safety of long-
distance intercity passenger trains. (See previous discussion of
comments in general preamble portion of this document.)
Contrary to the statements made in the comments submitted by some
labor representatives, FRA is not merely increasing the distance
between brake inspections for these types of trains. Rather, FRA is
increasing both the quality and the content of the inspections that
must be performed on long-distance intercity passenger trains and,
thus, increasing the safety of such trains. Under the current
regulations these passenger trains are required to receive an initial
terminal brake inspection at the point where they are originally
assembled, and from that point the train must receive an intermediate
brake inspection every 1,000 miles. The current 1,000-mile inspection
merely requires the performance of a leakage test, an application of
the brakes and the inspection of the brake rigging on each car to
ensure it is properly secured. See 49 CFR 232.12(b). The current 1,000-
mile brake inspection does not require 100 percent operative brakes
prior to departure and does not require piston travel to be inspected.
The current regulations also do not require the performance of any type
of mechanical inspection on passenger equipment at 1,000-mile
inspection points or at any other time in the train's journey. Thus,
[[Page 25625]]
under the current regulations a long-distance intercity passenger train
can travel from New York to Los Angeles on one initial terminal
inspection, a series of 1,000-mile inspections, and no mechanical
inspections.
Whereas, this rule will require the performance of a Class I brake
test, which is more comprehensive than the current initial terminal
inspection, at the point where the train is originally assembled and
will require the performance of another Class I brake test every 1,500
miles or every calendar day thereafter, whichever comes first, by
highly qualified inspectors. Thus, at least every 1,500 miles or every
calendar day a long-distance passenger train will be required to
receive a brake inspection which is more comprehensive than the current
initial terminal inspection and which requires that the train have 100
percent operative brakes and have piston travel set within established
limits. Furthermore, this rule will require the performance of an
exterior and interior mechanical inspection every calendar day that the
train is in service. Consequently, the inspection scheme proposed in
the 1997 NPRM and retained in this final rule will, in FRA's view,
increase the safety and better ensure the integrity of the brake and
mechanical components of long-distance passenger trains.
FRA also believes that some recognition must be given to the
various types of advanced braking system technologies used on many
long-distance intercity passenger trains. Many of these advanced
technologies are not found with any regularity in freight operations
and thus the reliability and performance of brake systems on these
passenger trains enhance the safety of these trains and, when combined
with other aspects of this discussion, support FRA's belief that these
brake systems can safely be operated with the inspection intervals that
were proposed in the 1997 NPRM. Dynamic brakes are typically employed
on these types of trains to limit thermal stresses on friction surfaces
and to limit the wear and tear on the brake equipment. Furthermore, the
brake valves and brake components used on today's long-distance
passenger trains are far more reliable than was the case several
decades ago. Other technological advances utilized with regularity by
these passenger trains include:
The use of brake cylinder pressure indicators which
provide a reliable indication of the application and release of the
brakes.
The use of disc brakes which provide shorter stopping
distances and decrease the risk of thermal damage to wheels.
The ability to effectuate a graduated release of the
brakes due to a design feature of the brake equipment which permits
more flexibility and more forgiving train control.
The ability to cut out brakes on a per-axle or per-truck
basis rather than a per car basis, thus permitting greater use of those
brakes that are operable.
Brake ratios that are 2\1/2\ times greater than the brake
ratios of loaded freight cars.
Although some of the technologies noted above have existed for
several decades, most of the technologies were not in wide spread use
until after 1980. Furthermore, most of the noted technological advances
just started to be integrated into one efficient and reliable braking
system within the last decade. Consequently, the technology
incorporated into the brake equipment used in today's long-distance
intercity passenger trains has increased the reliability of the braking
system and permits the safe operation of the equipment for extended
distances even though a portion of the braking system may be
inoperative or defective.
FRA also disagrees with the contentions raised by certain labor
representatives that the facts and data do not support the 500 mile
extension in the brake inspection interval even with the more
comprehensive inspection scheme. These commenters recommend that the
current 1,000-mile brake inspection interval be retained together with
the increased inspection regiment. These commenters contend that due to
the large number of defects being found at 1,000-mile inspections the
need to retain the inspection is justified. As an example and support
for this position, the BRC submitted information containing numerous
defective conditions compiled by carmen stationed at Union Station in
Washington D.C. from January 1996 through February of 1997 that the
carmen allegedly found on trains traveling through Union Station. After
reviewing the documentation submitted, FRA does not believe the
information supports the conclusion that 1,000-mile brake inspections
must be maintained and that it would be unsafe to extend the distance
between brake inspections under the inspection scheme contained in this
final rule.
Due to the lack of detail contained in the information submitted by
the BRC, it is impossible to determine whether the vast majority of the
alleged defective conditions were defective under the Federal
regulations or whether the conditions were merely in excess of Amtrak's
voluntary maintenance standards or operating practices. In addition,
based on the description of some of the conditions, they would not be
considered defective conditions under current Federal regulations.
Furthermore, the vast majority of the conditions alleged in the
document were not power brake defects, and thus, under the current
regulations, would not have been required to have been inspected at a
1,000-mile inspection. Nor do the current regulations mandate any type
of mechanical inspection on passenger equipment (other than on
locomotives under 49 CFR part 229, of course). Moreover, as the vast
majority of the alleged conditions were mechanical and wheel defects,
FRA believes that these types of defective conditions will be addressed
by the exterior calendar day mechanical inspection contained in this
final rule which will be required to be performed every calendar day
that a piece of equipment is in service.
FRA agrees with the comments submitted by the BRC that the data and
information submitted by Amtrak regarding the allegedly defective
equipment found at Washington, D.C., does not fully address whether the
cars identified by carmen at that location were defective and does
indicate that at least many of the cars were repaired for the defective
condition noted within several days after moving through Washington,
D.C. However, contrary to the conclusions reached by labor
representatives, the fact that a car remained in service with an
alleged defective mechanical or brake condition does not necessarily
mean the train involved was in an unsafe condition or that the
equipment was being moved illegally. The current regulations regarding
freight mechanical equipment and the existing statutory mandates
regarding the movement of equipment with defective safety appliances
and brakes permit the movement of a certain amount of defective
equipment to certain locations provided it is determined by a qualified
person that such a movement can be made safely or that a sufficient
percentage of the brakes remain operative. See 49 U.S.C. 20303, 49 CFR
215.9. As this final rule will specifically address the inspection of
the mechanical components on passenger equipment and the movement of
defective mechanical components, which is not covered by existing
regulations, FRA believes that the amount of defective equipment being
operated will be reduced significantly and/or handled safely in revenue
trains. Although FRA agrees that the
[[Page 25626]]
information submitted by Amtrak regarding the number of cars set out at
1,000-mile inspection points does not reflect the true number of
defects being found during the inspections, FRA does find it
significant that a very small percentage of cars set-out by Amtrak are
set-out at 1,000-mile inspection locations and that most set-outs occur
en route.
FRA also finds it necessary to make clear that the number of cars
alleged to have been found in defective condition at Union Station in
Washington, D.C. is not indicative of a safety problem on long-distance
intercity passenger trains. Assuming that all of the cars contained in
BRC's submission were in fact defective as alleged, it appears that
approximately 750 cars were defective. However, the information also
reveals that approximately 1,300 trains were inspected; thus, using a
conservative estimate of 10 cars per train, approximately 13,000 cars
were inspected. As a result, approximately only 6 percent of the cars
inspected were found to contain either a mechanical or brake defect.
Furthermore, of the approximate 750 cars alleged to have been found
defective, only approximately 20 percent of those contained a power
brake-related defect. Consequently, only about 1-2 percent of the total
cars inspected contained a power brake-related defect. Moreover, from
the information provided it appears that none of the trains contained
in the BRC submission were involved in any type of accident or incident
related to the defective conditions alleged.
FRA believes that the key to any inspection scheme developed for
long-distance intercity passenger trains is the quality of the
inspection which is performed at a train's point of origin. FRA is
convinced that if a train is properly inspected with highly qualified
inspectors and has 100 percent operative brakes at its point of origin,
then the train can easily travel up to 1,500 miles between brake
inspections without significant deterioration of the braking system.
FRA independently monitored a few long-distance intercity passenger
trains running from New York to Miami, New York to New Orleans, and New
York to Chicago and found that when the trains departed from their
points of origin with a brake system that was defect free they arrived
at destination without any defective conditions existing in their brake
systems. These findings are consistent with FRA's experience in
inspecting long-distance intercity passenger trains over the last
several years. It should be noted that during this independent
monitoring, FRA did find some trains that after receiving initial
terminal inspections still contained some defective conditions in the
brake system. Although FRA believes that none of the defective
conditions found would have prevented the safe operation of the trains,
FRA recognizes that FRA as well as the railroads must be vigilant in
ensuring that quality brake system inspections are performed on a train
at its point of origin and at each location where a Class I brake test
is required to be performed. Consequently, due to the comprehensive
nature of Class I brake tests and the exterior calendar day mechanical
inspection combined with the technological advances incorporated into
the braking systems utilized in these types of trains and after a
review of the data and information provided and based on FRA's
experience with these types of operations, FRA is retaining the
proposed 1,500 mile interval for the performance of Class I brake tests
in this final rule.
Paragraph (c) contains a provision that was not proposed in the
1997 NPRM to address the inspection of cars added to an en route train.
FRA has modified the Class I brake test requirements to ensure the
proper operation of all cars added to a train while en route. This
paragraph requires the performance of a Class I brake test on each car
added to a passenger train at the time it is added to the train unless
documentation is provided to the train crew that a Class I brake test
was performed on the car within the previous calendar day and the car
has not been disconnected from a source of compressed air for more than
four hours prior to being added to the train. This requirement has been
included in order to address the concerns raised by various labor
representatives that no provisions were provided in the 1997 NPRM to
address circumstances when cars are added to an en route train. Section
238.317 makes clear that if a car has received such inspection, the
railroad will be required to perform a Class II brake test at the time
the car is added to the train. FRA believes that these provisions are
necessary to ensure the integrity of the brake system on every car
added to an existing train and should not be a burden for railroads
since cars are generally added to passenger trains at major terminals
with the facilities and personnel available for conducting such
inspections. Furthermore, these inspection requirements are very
similar to what is currently required when a freight car is added to a
train while en route. See 49 CFR Sec. 232.13.
Paragraph (d) requires that the Class I brake tests be performed by
qualified maintenance persons. As FRA intends for Class I brake tests
to be in-depth inspections of the entire braking system, which most
likely will be performed only one time in any given day in which the
equipment is used, FRA believes that these inspections must be
performed by individuals possessing the knowledge to not only identify
and detect a defective condition in all of the brake equipment required
to be inspected but also the knowledge to recognize the interrelational
workings of the equipment and have a general understanding of what is
necessary to repair the equipment. Furthermore, most passenger
railroads currently have a daily brake test performed by highly
qualified mechanically trained employees so this requirement is not
really a departure from current industry practice. (For a detailed
discussion of ``qualified maintenance person'' see the section-by-
section analysis for Sec. 238.5 and the general preamble discussion
related to qualified maintenance persons.)
Paragraph (e) provides railroads with the option to perform the
Class I brake test either separately or in conjunction with the
calendar day mechanical inspections. FRA has retained this provision
simply to clarify that the two inspections need not be done at the same
time or location as long as they are both performed sometime during the
calendar day that a piece of equipment is in use.
Paragraph (f) prohibits a railroad from using or hauling a
passenger train in passenger service from a location where a Class I
brake test has been performed, or was required to have been performed,
with less than 100 percent operating brakes. (See section-by-section
analysis of Sec. 238.15 for a detailed discussion of movement of
defective equipment for purposes of repair or sale.)
Paragraph (g) contains a list of the safety-related items that must
be inspected, tested, or demonstrated as part of a Class I brake test.
This list was developed based on the experience and knowledge of FRA's
motive power and equipment field inspectors familiar with the
operations and inspection practices of passenger operations. The
Working Group extensively discussed the items contained in this
paragraph. Very few comments were submitted which addressed the
specific items contained in this paragraph. One commenter did recommend
that a few of the provisions be clarified to specifically address tread
brakes. Therefore, paragraph (g)
[[Page 25627]]
generally retains all of the requirements proposed in the 1997 NPRM
except to the extent that a few requirements have been slightly
modified for clarity. Paragraph (g)(1) requires that an inspection be
conducted on each side of each car to verify the application and
release of each brake. This requirement is consistent with FRA's
longstanding interpretation of what the current regulations require
when conducting initial terminal and 1,000 mile brake inspections
pursuant to Sec. 232.12. For clarity and consistency, FRA has
explicitly incorporated the requirement into this final rule. Minor
modifications have been made to paragraphs (g)(3), (g)(5), and (g)(11)
in order to clarify the intent of the requirements to brake systems
utilizing tread brakes. It should be noted that the requirement
contained in paragraph (g)(14) would bar the use of a train that
current regulations allow to be placed in service. This paragraph
requires that brake indicators must function as intended. Although this
provision may require railroads to make more frequent repairs than are
currently required, FRA believes these added costs are necessitated
by--and offset by--the ability to use brake indicators during the
performance of certain brake tests in lieu of direct observation of the
brakes.
Paragraph (h) requires the qualified maintenance person that
performs a Class I brake test to record the date, time and location of
the test as well as the number of the controlling locomotive of the
train. It should be noted that a requirement to record the total number
of cars inspected during the Class I brake test has been added at
paragraph (h)(4). FRA believes this information is necessary to ensure
that the required inspection has been performed on all the cars in a
train and provides a method for the tracking of cars added to en route
trains. This minimal information is required to be available in the cab
of the controlling locomotive to demonstrate to the train crew and
future inspectors that the train is operating under a current Class I
brake test. Furthermore, the use of such records or ``brake slips'' as
they are known in the industry is the current practice of virtually all
passenger railroads. FRA believes that this recordkeeping requirement
adds necessary reliability, accountability, and enforceability to the
inspection requirements contained in this section.
Paragraph (i) allows long distance, intercity passenger trains that
miss a scheduled Class I brake test due to a delay en route to proceed
to the point where the scheduled brake test was to be performed. This
flexibility prevents Amtrak or other operators of long distance trains
from having to dispatch qualified maintenance persons to the location
of a delayed train merely to meet the calendar day Class I brake test
requirement. This is a common sense exception that will not compromise
safety.
Section 28.315 Class IA Brake Test
This section contains the requirements regarding the performance of
Class IA brake tests. As mentioned previously, although FRA agrees with
the position advanced by many labor representatives that some sort of
car-to-car inspection must be made of the brake equipment prior to the
first run of the day, FRA does not agree that it is necessary to
perform a full Class I brake test in order to ensure the proper
functioning of the brake equipment in all situations. However, contrary
to the position espoused by several railroad representatives, FRA
believes that something more than just a determination that the brakes
on the rear car set and release is necessary in many situations.
Currently, the quality of initial terminal tests performed by train
crews is likely adequate to determine that brakes apply on each car.
However, most commuter equipment utilizes ``tread brake units'' in lieu
of cylinders and brake rigging of the kind prevalent on freight and
some intercity passenger cars. It is undoubtedly the case that train
crewmembers do not verify application of the brakes by tapping brake
shoes while the brakes are applied--the only effective means of
determining that adequate force is being applied. This is one reason
why the subject railroads typically conduct redundant initial terminal
tests at other times during the day. Further, train crews are not asked
to inspect for wheel defects and other unsafe conditions, nor should
they be asked to do so, given the conditions under which they are asked
to inspect and the training they receive.
As noted previously, FRA is modifying the requirements for when a
Class IA brake test must be performed from that which was proposed in
the 1997 NPRM. FRA continues to believe that some type of car-by-car
inspection must be performed prior to a passenger train's first run of
the day if the train was used in passenger service the previous day
without any brake inspection being performed after it has completed
service and before it lays-up for the evening. However, FRA tends to
agree with the comments submitted by APTA representatives that the need
for such an inspection is minimized if a Class I brake test is
performed within a relatively short period of time prior to the first
run of the day and the train has not been used in passenger service
since the performance of that inspection. From a safety standpoint, it
appears to be overkill to require the performance of a second
comprehensive brake test when the equipment has not been used in
passenger service and has remained on a source of compressed air since
the last comprehensive brake test was performed. In such circumstances,
FRA believes that the performance of a Class II brake test would be
sufficient to determine if there are any problems with the braking
system due to vandalism or other causes since the last comprehensive
Class I brake test. Furthermore, as APTA's comments point out, commuter
railroads have been safely operated in a fashion similar to this for a
number of years. Consequently, paragraph (a)(1) of this section makes
clear that a Class IA brake test is to be performed prior to the first
morning departure of each commuter or short-distance intercity
passenger train unless a Class I brake test was performed within the
previous twelve hours and the train has not been used in passenger
service and has not been disconnected from a source of compressed air
for more than four hours since the performance of the Class I brake
test. FRA believes that this exception is consistent with the concept
of performing comprehensive brake and mechanical inspections at
centralized locations as this provision affords railroads the ability
to conduct a Class I brake test at the end of a train's daily operating
cycle at a central location and then have the ability to move the train
in non-passenger service to an outlying location without being required
to perform a Class IA brake test prior to departure from the outlying
terminal.
Paragraph (a)(2) requires that a Class IA brake test be performed
prior to placing a train in service if that train has been off a source
of compressed air for more than four hours. This requirement formalizes
a long-standing agency interpretation of the existing power brake
regulations but increases the time limit from two to four hours. Labor
representatives maintain that any number of brake system problems can
develop with equipment off air for only a short time, while management
representatives contend that equipment can be left off air for extended
periods of time with no problems. FRA believes the requirement
contained in this paragraph is a fair compromise that allows railroads
some operating flexibility, but does not allow equipment to be off air
without a new
[[Page 25628]]
brake test for extended periods of time. FRA agrees that its
longstanding administrative interpretation of allowing cars to be ``off
air'' for only two hours was established prior to the development of
new equipment that has greatly reduced leakage problems. However,
contrary to the contentions of some commenters, FRA does not believe
that cars should be allowed to be ``off air'' for extended periods
without being retested. The longer cars sit without a supply of
compressed air attached, the greater the chances are that the integrity
of the system will be compromised, either by weather conditions or
vandalism.
Paragraph (b) allows a commuter or short-distance intercity
passenger train that provides continuing late night service that began
prior to midnight to complete its daily operating cycle after midnight
without performing another Class I or Class IA brake test on the train
prior to its first departure after midnight. This provision is included
to make clear that a train is not required to be stopped during its
operating cycle in order to receive a Class I or Class IA brake test
prior to it first departure of a calendar day. FRA also makes clear
that this provision does not relieve a railroad from its responsibility
under Sec. 238.313 to perform a Class I brake test on each calendar day
that the train is in use. Thus, a train operating past midnight must
receive a Class I brake test sometime on each of the two days it is in
use.
Paragraph (c) allows a Class IA brake test to be performed at a
shop or yard site without needing the test repeated at the first
passenger terminal if the train remains on air and in the custody of
the crew. This provision is an incentive for railroads to conduct the
tests at locations where they can be performed more safely and easily.
FRA believes that a shop or yard location is more conducive for
conducting a proper brake test. Raised platforms and other conditions
frequently found at terminals can make the performance of a brake test
difficult, if not hazardous.
Paragraph (d) permits the Class IA test to be performed by either a
qualified person or a qualified maintenance person. Paragraph (e)
prohibits a railroad from using or hauling a passenger train from a
location where a Class IA brake test has been performed, or was
required to have been performed, with less than 100 percent operative
brakes. (See section-by-section analysis of Secs. 238.15-238.17 for a
discussion of movement of defective equipment for purposes of repair or
sale.) Paragraph (f) contains the specific tasks that must be performed
when conducting a proper Class IA brake test. This paragraph makes
clear that a Class IA brake test include: a check that each brake sets
and releases; a test of the emergency brake application feature; a
check of the deadman or other emergency control device; an observation
that angle cocks and cutout cocks are properly set; an observation that
brake pipe pressure changes are communicated to the rear of the train;
and a test that the communicating signal system is known to be
operative.
Paragraph (g) requires that the inspection of the set and release
of the brakes be performed by walking the train so the inspector
actually observes the set and release of each brake. Labor
representatives strongly contended that this is the only way to do a
proper brake test. They believe that observation of brake indicators
does not give a reliable indication of effective brakes because the
indicators sense brake cylinder pressure rather than the force of the
brake shoe against the wheel or the pad against the disc. However, this
paragraph allows an exception when railroads determine that direct
observation of the set and release can place the inspector in danger.
FRA acknowledges the contention of rail management representatives that
conditions at certain locations where Class IA tests may be performed
could place the inspector in danger if he or she is required to place
himself or herself in a position to actually observe the set and
release of each brake. Where railroads determine this to be the case,
FRA will permit the use of brake indicators for the set and release
step of the Class IA brake test as long as the inspector takes a
position where an accurate observation of the indicators can be made.
Section 238.317 Class II Brake Test
This section contains the requirements regarding how a Class II
brake test is to be performed and contains the conditions for when a
railroad is required to perform the brake test. The Class II brake test
provides passenger railroads the flexibility to continue to use train
crew personnel to perform the limited brake tests required when minor
changes to the train occur. Both labor and management representatives
to the Working Group recognized that train crews are capable of
performing the relatively simple checks required by a Class II brake
test and that the operations of most commuter and passenger railroads
require the flexibility of having operating personnel perform these
tests.
Paragraph (a) contains the circumstances which require the
performance of a Class II brake test. This paragraph has been modified
from that which was proposed in the 1997 NPRM in order to clarify the
requirements, to remain consistent with other provisions of this rule,
and to address recent issues that have been raised with FRA regarding
certain passenger train operations. Although paragraph (a)(1) retains
the proposed requirement that a Class II brake test be performed
whenever the control stand is changed, this paragraph has been modified
in order to clarify that a Class II brake test need not be performed in
circumstances where a train is being moved in non-passenger service
from one track to another inside a terminal complex even though the
changing of the control stand occurs during such movements. In order to
effectuate such movements the control stand may be required to be
changed several times. As these train movements are akin to switching
movements in that they are performed over relatively short distances at
very low speeds and pose minor safety hazards, FRA will not require the
performance of multiple Class II brake tests in order to conduct such
movements. It should be noted that Sec. 238.319 requires the
performance of a running brake test whenever the control stand is
changed during these types of movements in order to ensure the
operation of the brake system during these movements. This paragraph
also requires the performance of a Class II brake test prior to the
train's departure from the terminal complex with passengers.
Paragraph (a)(2) requires the performance of a Class II brake test
prior to the first morning departure of a commuter or short-distance
intercity passenger train where a Class I brake test remains valid as
provided in Sec. 238.315(a)(1). As discussed in the preceding section,
FRA believes that in these limited circumstances the performance of a
Class II brake test will adequately ensure the integrity of the brake
system on the train since the performance of the last Class I brake
test. Paragraph (a)(4) has been added in order to clarify that a Class
II brake test is to be performed whenever cars or equipment are removed
from a train. This provision is consistent with the concept that the
proper operation of the brake system must be verified whenever an event
occurs which may impact the integrity of the brake system and is
consistent with current practice on virtually every railroad.
Paragraph (c) requires that passenger trains not depart from Class
II brake tests which are performed at a terminal or a yard with any
brakes cut-out,
[[Page 25629]]
inoperative, or defective unless the equipment is moved in accordance
with Sec. 238.15. The language of this requirement has been slightly
modified from the language proposed in the 1997 NPRM, in order to make
the provision consistent with the movement for repair provisions
contained in this final rule. See Sec. 238.15. Many terminals and most
yards are locations where brake repairs can be effectuated. Thus,
passenger equipment containing defective brake equipment would not be
permitted to depart those locations capable of making the necessary
repairs until repaired. If the necessary repairs cannot be effectuated
at such locations the equipment must be properly tagged and moved
pursuant to the requirements contained in Sec. 238.15.
Paragraph (d) requires that a Class II brake test consist of: a
check that the brakes on the rear unit of the train apply and release
in response to brake control signals or a check that brake pipe
pressure changes are properly communicated at the rear of the train by
observation of a gauge at the end of the train or in the cab of the
rear unit; a test of the emergency brake application and a test of the
deadman pedal or other emergency control device on MU equipment; and a
test of the communicating signal system to ensure it is operating as
intended. The proposed requirements for observing a set and release of
the brakes on the rear car and for ensuring that brake pipe pressure
changes are properly communicated at the rear of the train have been
combined and stated in the alternative in this final rule, as FRA
believes that the performance of either task indicates proper trainline
continuity and to perform both would be redundant and unnecessary. It
should also be noted that the requirement regarding the testing of the
emergency application and deadman pedal or other emergency control
devices is only applicable to MU equipment due to the ease of
performing such an inspection on that equipment. The requirement that
the communicating signal system be tested is part of both a Class I and
a Class IA brake test and has been added to this brake inspection as
FRA believes the proper operation of the communicating signal system is
necessary for the safe operation of a train and can be easily tested in
a very short amount of time. FRA believes that if the equipment
receives a full Class I brake test and a calendar day mechanical
inspection at some time during each operating day, then these simple
checks are adequate to confirm brake system performance at intermediate
terminals or turning points. This requirement basically codifies
current industry practice.
Section 238.319 Running Brake Tests
This section contains the requirements for conducting running brake
tests on the brakes of passenger trains. A running brake test is merely
a brake application at the first safe opportunity to confirm that the
brake system works as expected by the engineer. Paragraphs (a) and (c)
require that a running brake test be performed in accordance with the
railroad's established operating rules after the train has received a
Class I, Class IA, or Class II brake test as safety permits. FRA
believes that railroads are in the best position to determine when and
where running tests can be safely performed. As most passenger
railroads routinely conduct running brake tests, FRA believes that the
requirements contained in this section capture an important safety
check without changing current operating practice to any great extent.
It should be noted that paragraph (b) has been added to this section to
require the performance of a running brake test whenever the control
stand used to control the train is changed to facilitate the movement
of a passenger train from one track to another within a terminal
complex while not in passenger service. As previously discussed, due to
the special nature of these moves FRA believes that a running brake
test adequately ensures the proper operation of the braking system
during these movements and obviates the need to perform a Class II
inspection each time the control stand is changed in these
circumstances.
Subpart E--Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment
Section 238.401 Scope
This subpart contains the design and performance requirements for
Tier II passenger equipment--that is, passenger equipment operating at
speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph. For the most part,
compliance with the requirements of this section will be demonstrated
by one-time analysis or initial acceptance tests.
The requirements contained in this subpart have their basis in
discussions between Amtrak and FRA involving safety requirements for
the operation of passenger trainsets at speeds up to 150 mph on the
Northeast Corridor (NEC). Aware that FRA was considering the
development of safety standards for high-speed passenger rail
equipment, Amtrak asked FRA for assistance in developing a set of
safety specifications for the procurement of high-speed trainsets which
would address FRA's safety concerns. As a result, Amtrak's high-speed
trainsets, scheduled to begin regular passenger service in 1999, will
very likely comply with all of the safety standards in this subpart.
Amtrak's discussions with FRA led it to sponsor a risk assessment
of high speed rail passenger systems on the north end of the NEC--from
New York to Boston. The discussions also prompted FRA to sponsor
computer modeling to predict the performance of various equipment
structural designs and configurations in collisions. A copy of the risk
assessment performed by Arthur D. Little, Inc., for Amtrak is included
in the docket of this rulemaking. The risk assessment was based on
existing and predicted future right-of-way configurations and traffic
density patterns. The risk assessment concluded that a significant risk
of collisions at speeds below 20 mph and a risk of collisions at speeds
exceeding 100 mph exist over the 20-year projected operational life of
the HSTs--due to heavy and increasing conventional commuter rail
traffic, freight rail traffic on the NEC, highway-rail grade crossings,
moveable bridges, and a history of low speed collisions in or near
stations and rail yards.
Based on the risk assessment and the results of the computer
modeling, Amtrak and FRA determined that full reliance on collision
avoidance measures rather than crashworthiness, though the hallmark of
safe high-speed rail operations in several parts of the world, could
not be implemented in corridors like the north end of the NEC. Existing
traffic and right-of-way configurations do not permit implementation of
the same collision avoidance measures that have proven successful in
Europe and Japan. To compensate for the increased risk of a collision
in the North American rail operating environment, a more crashworthy
trainset design is needed. (FRA does note that on June 3, 1998, near
Eschede in northern Germany, an ICE (Inter City Express) passenger
train derailed at a speed of approximately 125 mph into the support
structure of a highway bridge carrying traffic over the railroad right-
of-way, collapsing the bridge. A number of the cars in the train were
crushed, and 101 fatalities resulted from the derailment.) Accordingly,
the set of structural requirements for Tier II passenger equipment in
this final rule is more stringent than the current design practice for
North American passenger equipment or for high-speed rail equipment in
other parts of the world.
[[Page 25630]]
Section 238.403 Crash Energy Management Requirements
This section requires that each power car and trailer car be
designed with a crash energy management system to dissipate kinetic
energy during a collision.
During discussions with Amtrak for the safety provisions of its
high-speed trainsets, FRA proposed very challenging crash energy
management requirements based on predictions using computer modeling.
Amtrak believed that meeting these requirements would be well beyond
the current state of the art for passenger equipment design, and that
an extensive and costly research and testing program would be required.
As an alternative, Amtrak proposed a crash energy management design
based on the demonstrated, commercially viable design developed in
France and incorporated in the most recent design of the TGV trainset.
FRA believes that Federal safety standards must be capable of
implementation in the design of passenger equipment without driving the
cost of implementation to the point that high-speed rail systems are no
longer financially viable.
Paragraph (c) requires a Tier II train to have a crash energy
management system capable of absorbing a minimum of 13 megajoules (MJ)
of energy at each end of the train. The ability to absorb this energy
must be partitioned as follows: a minimum of 5 MJ by the front end of
the power car ahead of the operator's control compartment; a minimum of
3 MJ by the power car structure behind the operator's control
compartment; and a minimum of 5 MJ by the unoccupied end of the first
trailer car adjacent to the power car. This requirement can be met
using existing technology. However, it will effectively prevent a
conventional cab car from operating as the lead vehicle in a Tier II
passenger train because such equipment cannot absorb 5 MJ of collision
energy ahead of the train operator's position. Recent accidents
involving trains operating with a cab car forward have demonstrated the
vulnerability of this type of equipment in collisions. FRA believes
such equipment should not be used in the forward position of a train
that travels at speeds greater than 125 mph. FRA has also encouraged
Amtrak to use an alternative lead vehicle where speeds exceed 110 mph
and highway-rail grade crossings are prevalent. Further, FRA is
specifically requiring in paragraph (f) that passenger seating be
prohibited in the leading unit of a Tier II train.
In its comments on the NPRM, Talgo observed that the standards in
this section may be unattainable using current technology. However,
Amtrak's high-speed trainsets have been shown to meet the requirements
of this section. Specifically, testing has shown the crash energy
absorbing components of the power car and in the end of the first
trailer car adjacent to the power car to absorb the energy as provided
in paragraph (c).
Talgo further commented that because the kinetic energy of a
running train is a function of its mass and speed, paragraph (c) should
not state a fixed value of energy. Rather, it believed paragraph (c)
should state a value with respect to a specified speed to allow some
flexibility for trains of varying mass and yet preserve the same level
of safety. FRA recognizes that the kinetic energy of a running train is
a function of its mass and speed, and if Tier II trains were at no risk
of colliding with other trains of greater weight, then adopting Talgo's
comment may be possible. However, the Tier II safety standards are
intended to apply to high-speed passenger trains that, as necessitated
by the United States rail operating environment, will operate
commingled with heavier trains, especially heavy and long freight
trains that may themselves operate at speeds up to 80 mph. In the event
of a collision with a heavier train, a Tier II passenger train must
confront the energy possessed by that train. FRA believes that a Tier
II passenger train must have a crash energy management system capable
of absorbing the minimum energy levels specified in paragraph (c) to
protect the train's occupants in light of the risks of colliding with
heavier trains and other objects along the railroad right of way. As a
result, FRA believes it is inappropriate to adopt Talgo's comment.
Additionally, in its comments on the NPRM, Talgo believed
paragraphs (c)(1)-(3) should be rewritten so that the total energy that
is required to be absorbed is dissipated through all inter-car
connections, not just through the first few cars. FRA notes that one of
the reasons the energy absorbing structures of the leading car in a
Tier II passenger train (power car) and the adjacent trailer car must
themselves absorb the energy specified in this section is to reduce the
risk and effects of secondary collisions throughout the train's
subsequent vehicles. Secondary collisions (i.e., impacts with interior
objects) can seriously harm or, in extreme cases, kill train occupants.
This risk of harm to a Tier II passenger train's occupants is,
therefore, minimized overall by requiring the energy absorbing
structures in the first two train cars to absorb collision energy
before it poses a risk to the train's occupants.
Paragraph (d) requires that for a 30-mph collision of a train on
tangent, level track with an identical stationary train, the
deceleration of the occupied compartments of each trailer car shall not
exceed 8g; and when seated anywhere in a trailer car, the velocity at
which a 50th-percentile adult male contacts the seat back ahead of him
shall not exceed 25 mph. A 50th-percentile adult male has been defined
in Sec. 238.5, based on the same characteristics for such a vehicle
occupant's weight and dimensions specified in a NHTSA standard at 49
CFR Sec. 571.208, S7.1.4. FRA does note that, for purposes of this
requirement, the weight of the occupant is not particularly relevant,
as weight generally should not affect how fast the occupant strikes the
seat back ahead of him. In this regard, an occupant of heavier of
lighter weight should be neither more nor less protected by the
requirements of this paragraph.
In its comments on the NPRM, Simula did not recommend defining an
occupant velocity in paragraph (d), noting that it is a function of the
crash pulse, the distance between two rows of seats, as well as
occupant position and size. FRA has specified that occupant velocity
not exceed 25 mph in a secondary collision because an occupant
travelling beyond that speed is at considerable risk of harm from a
secondary impact. In fact, use of an occupant restraint system would
likely have to be required to protect the train occupants in such a
case. FRA believes that compliance with paragraph (d)(1) can be
demonstrated, and that Amtrak's HTS complies with the rule based on
information presented to FRA.
Simula additionally commented that if trailer cars are built to
withstand 30 mph collisions and 10g decelerations, then the seats in
these cars should also be designed to withstand these same forces.
Specifically, Simula did not recommend requiring that the decelerations
in trailer cars be limited in a 30 mph collision to 10g while requiring
seats to withstand the impact of an occupant travelling at 25 mph and a
longitudinal force of 8g, noting that the seats will not be able to
withstand the 10g decelerations and consequently detach from the car.
FRA notes that Simula's comment relates to the seat strength
requirements found in Sec. 238.435. In the final rule, Sec. 238.435(a)
requires that the seat back and seat attachment in a passenger car be
designed to withstand, with deflection but without total failure, the
load associated with the impact into the
[[Page 25631]]
seat back of an unrestrained 95th-percentile adult male initially
seated behind the seat back, when the floor to which the seat is
attached decelerates with a triangular crash pulse having a peak of 8g
and a duration of 250 milliseconds. FRA agrees with Simula that it is
possible that a seat in a trailer car may detach from the car when
subjected to a force that is greater than that required to be withstood
under proposed Sec. 238.435(a) in the NPRM, and expressly permitted by
proposed Sec. 238.403(d). FRA has, therefore, decided to modify
Sec. 238.403(d) so as to limit the permissible decelerations in a
trailer car to 8g under the conditions specified in that paragraph. FRA
believes that meeting this requirement is feasible with current
technology, and that Amtrak's HTS complies with Sec. 238.403(d)(2) on
the basis of information presented to FRA.
In its comments on the NPRM, Talgo believed that paragraph (d)
should make allowances for the short-lived elevations in peak that may
occur during a collision so that peaks exceeding 10g (as proposed) for
a duration no longer than 10 milliseconds are acceptable. FRA believes
that for purposes of demonstrating compliance with this paragraph
through testing, deceleration measurements may be processed through a
low-pass filter having a bandwidth of 50 Hz.
Paragraph (e) contains the analysis process to demonstrate that
equipment meets these crash energy management performance requirements.
The process allows simplifying assumptions to be made so that computer
modeling techniques can be used to confirm compliance.
Section 238.405 Longitudinal Static Compressive Strength
This section contains the requirements for longitudinal compressive
strength of power cars and trailer cars. Paragraph (a) requires the
compressive strength of the underframe of the power car cab to be a
minimum of 2,100,000 pounds without yielding. To form an effective
crash refuge, this strength is needed to take advantage of the strength
of the power car's two end frames. Alternate design approaches that
provide equivalent protection are allowed, but the equivalent
protection must be demonstrated through analysis and testing and be
approved by FRA under the provisions of Sec. 238.21.
In its comments on paragraph (a), Bombardier believed that a design
requirement based on the ultimate strength of the structure, as
proposed in the NPRM, makes the analysis more difficult and testing the
structure impractical and potentially dangerous. According to
Bombardier, the specified test load should be based on the yield
strength of the structure rather than the ultimate strength, as this
would also be consistent with the Amtrak high-speed trainset
specifications. FRA has revised this section pursuant to Bombardier's
comment. FRA notes that the effect of this revision is to require a
stronger power car cab than originally proposed in the rule.
Bombardier additionally commented that clarifying text should be
added to define the structural loading conditions so that the
2,100,000-pound load shall be resisted at the height of the underframe
at the rear of the cab as follows: 300,000 pounds at each rear cab
corner post location; and 750,000 pounds at each rear cab collision
post location. FRA does not believe it necessary to incorporate
Bombardier's comment into the rule, and doing so may result in
confusion. As discussed in Sec. 238.411, FRA believes that each corner
post structure on the rear end of a power car cab must resist a
300,000-pound load at the structure's joint with the underframe, and
each collision post structure must resist a 750,000-pound load in the
same manner. These loads may not be resisted solely at the underframe
as a test of the strength of the corner and collision post structures;
otherwise, the actual ability of the collision and corner post
structures to resist shearing would not be implicated. Further, the
load testing criteria for corner and collision post structures in the
rule is based on ultimate strength; whereas the longitudinal
compressive strength requirement in this paragraph, as revised, is
based on yield strength. In light of the separate requirements for
testing corner and collision post structures, FRA believes it best not
to expressly integrate those requirements with this section.
Paragraph (b) contains the requirements for the static compressive
strength of the occupied volumes of trailer cars. This adopts the
traditional North American design practice of a static strength of
800,000 pounds, without deformation of the underframe. Paragraph (c)
makes clear that unoccupied volumes of power cars or trailer cars may
have a static end strength of less than 800,000 pounds to accommodate
crash energy management designs.
The crash energy management design requirement ensures that the
stronger end structures and the stronger static compressive strength of
the cab of a power car will not make Tier II passenger equipment
incompatible with existing passenger equipment should a collision
between the two different types of equipment occur. The crash energy
management design causes a Tier II passenger train to appear as a
softer collision surface to a conventionally designed train, owing to
the collision energy absorbed by the Tier II train as its unoccupied
volumes intentionally crush.
Section 238.407 Anti-Climbing Mechanism
This section contains the requirements for anti-climbing mechanisms
on power and trailer cars. Paragraph (a) requires a power car to have a
forward anti-climbing mechanism capable of resisting an upward or
downward static vertical force of 200,000 pounds, without exceeding the
ultimate strength of the material. This requirement is virtually
identical to that required of locomotives by AAR S-580. However,
designs are permitted that require the crash energy management
controlled crushing to occur prior to the anti-climber fully engaging.
FRA has revised this paragraph based on a comment from Bombardier that
the rule text, as proposed, did not indicate that the 200,000-pound
value is an ultimate load. Inasmuch as this requirement as stated in
AAR S-580 is in fact based on an ultimate load acceptance criterion,
FRA has modified the rule text accordingly.
Paragraph (b) requires that interior train coupling points between
units, including between units of articulated cars or other permanently
joined units of cars, have an anti-climbing device capable of resisting
an upward or downward vertical force of 100,000 pounds without
yielding. This is consistent with current design practice. FRA has
revised this section based on a comment from Bombardier that the
requirements in paragraph (b) are based on 49 CFR Sec. 229.141(a)(2),
and should thus include a yield strength acceptance criterion. FRA has
modified the rule consistent with the requirements of 49 CFR
Sec. 229.141(a)(2).
Paragraph (c) requires the forward coupler of a power car to resist
a vertical downward force of 100,000 pounds for any horizontal position
of the coupler without yielding, and is virtually identical to that
provided in 49 CFR Sec. 229.141(a) for MU locomotives built new after
April 1, 1956, and operated in trains having a total empty weight of
600,000 pounds or more.
Talgo commented on both this section and its Tier I counterpart in
Sec. 238.205. Talgo explained that it desired to avoid the implication
that only couplers may properly function as anti-climbing
[[Page 25632]]
mechanisms. Talgo also believed that in measuring the strength of the
anti-climbing device, the operative variable should be vertical
acceleration, expressed in gs, rather than load, expressed in pounds,
to accommodate trains of different masses. FRA has discussed these
comments earlier in the preamble.
Section 238.409 Forward End Structures of Power Car Cabs.
This section contains the requirements for forward end structures
of power car cabs. The forward end structure of a power car cab is
vital in a collision with another object. This structure must resist
override, prevent the entry of fluids into occupied spaces of the cab,
and allow the crash energy management system to function. The
requirements in paragraphs (a)-(c) are based on a specific end
structure design that consists of a full-height center collision post,
two side collision posts located at approximately the one-third points
laterally, and two full-height corner posts. This section also includes
loading requirements that each of these structural members must
withstand. However, the rule does permit flexibility for using other
equipment designs that provide equivalent structural protection.
End structures meeting these requirements will provide considerably
greater protection to the train operator than that provided by existing
passenger equipment designs. For example, much stronger corner posts
are required here than for Tier I passenger equipment. FRA believes
these end structures help provide a degree of crashworthiness to
compensate for the increased risk associated with operating at higher
speeds.
The front end structure design also includes in paragraph (d) a
skin requirement equivalent to that required by AAR S-580 and contained
in Sec. 238.209 for Tier I locomotives. FRA has revised paragraphs
(a)(3) and (b)(2) based on a comment from Bombardier. Bombardier noted
that the acceptance criterion proposed by FRA in these paragraphs is
based on the yield or critical buckling stress; whereas the design of
the forward end structures of the Amtrak high-speed power car cab is
based on an ultimate load. FRA agrees that basing the acceptance
criterion on ultimate strength is consistent with the Amtrak high-speed
trainset design specification, and FRA has modified the rule in this
regard.
Bombardier also commented that in paragraph (c)(2) FRA proposed
requiring the corner post to resist a horizontal, lateral force of
100,000 pounds applied at a point 30 inches up from the underframe.
Bombardier stated that the cab on the Amtrak high-speed trainset was
designed to resist the 100,000-pound load at a point 18 inches up from
the underframe, and believed this consistent with all current design
practices for car end structural members. FRA has not modified the rule
on this point. FRA has found no conflict between the proposal and the
Amtrak high-speed trainset specification.
Both Bombardier and Talgo commented that FRA appeared to have
specified the wrong value in paragraph (c)(3) of the proposed rule, as
compared with the values contained in Figure 1. See 62 FR 49812-3. The
commenters are correct that, as proposed, the paragraph wrongly
required each forward corner post to resist a horizontal, longitudinal
or lateral shear load of 150,000 pounds. As Figure 1 demonstrates, FRA
intended each corner post to resist a horizontal, longitudinal or
lateral shear load of 80,000 pounds. FRA has revised paragraph (c)(3)
accordingly in the final rule.
Talgo additionally commented that in paragraph (d)(1), although the
rule makes clear that its reference to a particular thickness of
material does not preclude the use of thinner materials having a higher
yield strength, it would be preferable to avoid specifying a thickness
altogether. Instead, Talgo suggested that the skin strength requirement
could be stated in terms of a specified impact resistance, as FRA
proposed in Sec. 238.421 on safety glazing. FRA recognizes that it may
be possible to specify an impact resistance requirement, yet FRA has
chosen a yield strength requirement based on AAR Standard No. 580 and
the collective judgment of the railroad industry behind that standard.
Accordingly, although FRA would not preclude an equipment design based
on impact resistance that provides equivalent safety, FRA will defer
consideration of specifying such an impact resistance until Phase II of
the rulemaking. FRA does note that the strength of the material, in
terms of its resistance to shear, is also important to ensure occupant
protection.
Section 238.411 Rear end Structures of Power Car Cabs.
The rear end structure of a power car cab provides protection to
crewmembers from intrusion of locomotive machinery or trailing cars
into the cab's occupied volume as a result of a collision or
derailment. The requirements in this section are based on a specific
end structure design that consists of two full-height corner posts
(paragraph (a)) and two full-height collision posts (paragraph (b)). In
addition, this section specifies loading requirements that each of
these structural members must withstand. Of course, the rule does
permit flexibility for using other equipment designs that provide
equivalent structural protection.
The required rear end structural protection will provide
considerably greater protection to the train operator than that
provided by existing passenger equipment designs. Together, the front
and rear end structural protection required in this rule for a power
car cab make the cab a highly survivable crash refuge.
In commenting on the NPRM, Bombardier recommended that in paragraph
(b) the 750,000-pound force at the rear end cab structure collision
posts be applied at the height of the centerline of the underframe, and
not at the collision posts' joint with the underframe. FRA disagrees,
and believes it necessary to test the strength of the collision post
structure at its joint with the underframe to demonstrate the actual
ability of the collision post structure to resist shearing. Otherwise,
if the strength of the collision post structure were tested at the
height of the centerline of the underframe, the collision post
connection would not be loaded and the ability of the collision post
structure to resist shearing would not be tested.
Bombardier also suggested that the horizontal, shear load value of
750,000 pounds specified in paragraph (b)(1) that the collision post is
required to resist be changed to 500,000 pounds. Bombardier believed
this modification necessary to be consistent with the shear strength
requirements for the front collision posts specified both in the rule
as well as in the Amtrak high-speed trainset specifications. FRA
disagrees with this comment, and has not revised the rule on this
point. The 750,000 pounds that each of the two collision posts at the
rear of a power car cab must individually resist--1,500,000 pounds in
the aggregate--is consistent with the 500,000 pounds that each of the
three collision posts at the forward end of the power car cab must
individually resist--again 1,500,000 pounds in the aggregate--under
Sec. 238.409(a) and (b) of this rule. Further, FRA believes these
values to be consistent with the Amtrak high-speed trainset design
specification.
Section 238.413 End Structures of Trailer Cars
The requirements in paragraph (a) are based on a specific end
structure design that consists of two full-height corner posts and two
full-height collision
[[Page 25633]]
posts. The requirements include loading requirements that each of these
structural members must withstand. The rule allows flexibility for
other designs that provide protection structurally equivalent to the
specified design.
Paragraph (b) in the final rule contains an additional requirement
for trailer cars designed with an end vestibule. Such designs provide
an opportunity for additional corner post structures inboard of the
vestibule side doors. These corner posts can be supported by the side
sill and therefore be structurally more substantial than the corner
posts ahead of the side doors. This paragraph includes loading
requirements that these additional full-height corner posts must
withstand. Overall, the double corner post design provides
significantly increased protection to passengers in trailer cars with
end vestibules.
In its comments on the rule, Bombardier stated that, to be
consistent with the design requirements for Amtrak's high speed
trainsets, the corner post loads in paragraphs (a)(1)(ii), (b)(2), and
(b)(3) (as numbered in the final rule) should be applied at 18 inches
up from the underframe, rather than at 30 inches. FRA agrees that these
values are consistent with Amtrak's previous undertakings for the high-
speed trainsets, and has modified the final rule accordingly.
In the 1997 NPRM, FRA proposed an exception from the requirements
of paragraph (a) for a trailer car (or, more appropriately, a consist
of trailer cars) made up of multiple articulated units not designed for
uncoupling other than in a maintenance shop. See 62 FR 49814, proposed
Sec. 238.413(b). FRA proposed that the end structure requirements in
paragraph (a) apply only to the two ends of the entire articulated
assembly (or consist) of units, and that the interior ends of the
individual units of the articulated assembly need not be equipped with
an end structure meeting the requirements in paragraph (a). Articulated
assemblies have a history of remaining in line during derailments and
collisions and, if not designed to be uncoupled, only the outside ends
of the entire assembly should be exposed to the risks of override. (In
this regard, FRA should have only proposed an exception for such
equipment from the collision post requirements in paragraph (a) and not
from the corner post requirements as well since collision posts--not
corner posts--principally protect against override and telescoping of
passenger equipment. Corner posts, by their very definition and
location, protect against hazards along the railroad right-of-way in a
way that collision posts cannot.) However, none of the relevant recent
experience is on the North American continent, and the ability of
articulated connections to remain intact during a high-speed collision
with North American passenger equipment, freight rolling stock, or a
fixed obstruction has not been demonstrated analytically. FRA noted the
weakness in the proposed exception (Sec. 238.413(b) of the NPRM) while
preparing the final rule. FRA has deleted proposed paragraph (b) in its
entirety, and has not provided an exception due to the high operating
speeds of Tier II passenger equipment.
Section 238.415 Rollover Strength
This section contains the requirements for the rollover strength of
passenger cars and power cars. If the occupied volumes of these
vehicles remain intact when they roll onto their side or roof
structures, occupant injury from vehicle collapse will be avoided. This
section essentially requires the vehicle structure to support twice the
deadweight of the vehicle as it rests on its side or roof. Passenger
equipment constructed to North American design practice performs well
in rollover situations. FRA believes this requirement captures this
industry practice.
FRA has revised paragraph (a) to make clear that its requirements
apply to passenger cars. This revision is consistent with the section-
by-section analysis of proposed Sec. 238.415 in the NPRM, see 62 FR
49779, which explained that this section included rollover strength
requirements for both power cars and trailer cars. (The term trailer
car is in fact a more inclusive definition under the rule than the term
passenger car.) FRA has also made clear in paragraph (a) that minor
localized deformations to the outer side skin of the passenger car or
power car are allowed provided such deformations in no way intrude upon
the occupied volume of each car. As in the NPRM, paragraph (b) states
that deformation to the roof sheathing and framing is allowed to the
extent necessary for the vehicle to be supported directly on the top
chords of the side frames and end frames.
As Bombardier suggested in its comments on the NPRM, FRA has also
made a minor clarification to this section by substituting the words
``in the structural members of the'' in place of the word ``for'' in
the phrase which originally read in the NPRM, ``the allowable stress
for occupied volumes .* * *.'' See 62 FR 49816.
Section 238.417 Side Loads
This section contains the requirements intended to resist
penetration of the side structure of a passenger car by a highway or
rail vehicle. The objective is to make the side of the passenger car
strong enough so that the car derails rather than collapses when struck
in the side by a highway or rail vehicle. If the passenger car can move
sideways (derail), less structural damage and potential to injure train
occupants will result.
In its comments on the NPRM, Bombardier stated that for practical
reasons and to be consistent with the Amtrak high-speed trainset design
specifications, local yielding of the side sill should be allowed in
calculating the allowable stress in paragraph (c). FRA agrees that
local yielding of the side skin adjacent to the side sill and belt
rail, and local yielding of the side sill bend radii at the crossbearer
and floor-beam connections is permissible. FRA has modified paragraph
(c) accordingly, and notes that such local yielding is permissible
provided the resulting deformations do not intrude upon the occupied
volume of the passenger car.
Section 238.419 Truck-to-Car-Body and Truck Component Attachment
Paragraph (a) requires the truck-to-car-body attachment on Tier II
passenger equipment to resist without failure a minimum vertical force
equivalent to 2g acting on the mass of the truck and a minimum force of
250,000 pounds acting in any horizontal direction on the truck. The
intent of the requirement to resist without failure the minimum
vertical force equivalent to 2g acting on the mass of the truck is to
prevent the truck from separating from the car body during a rollover.
The intent of the requirement to resist without failure the minimum
force of 250,000 pounds acting in any horizontal direction on the truck
is to resist the forces that act upon the truck during a collision or
derailment that would tend to shear the truck from the car body. If the
truck separates from the car body it may become a hazardous projectile
that will intrude upon the occupied volume of a passenger car or
locomotive. Further, the truck will not be able to serve, in effect, as
an anti-climbing device if it separates from the car body in a
collision or derailment.
Paragraph (b) requires that each component of the truck must remain
attached to the truck when a force equivalent to 2g acting on the mass
of the component is exerted in any direction on that component. Whereas
paragraph (a) is intended to keep the
[[Page 25634]]
truck attached to the car body, paragraph (b) is intended to keep truck
components attached to the truck.
Bombardier, in its comments on the NPRM, requested that FRA modify
paragraph (a) so that the truck-to-car-body attachment must resist the
specified vertical and horizontal forces only as individual loads
applied separately. However, FRA has retained the requirement that the
truck-to-car-body attachment resist the specified vertical and
horizontal forces as applied at the same time. Requiring the truck-to-
car-body attachment to resist the vertical and horizontal forces
applied at the same time reflects actual conditions experienced during
a collision or derailment. For this reason, FRA believes it
inappropriate to adopt Bombardier's comment.
Section 238.421 Glazing
This section contains the glazing requirements for Tier II
passenger equipment. FRA believes that the higher speed of Tier II
passenger equipment necessitates more stringent glazing standards than
currently required by 49 CFR part 223. As a result, FRA proposed
specific standards for end-facing exterior glazing, side-facing
exterior glazing, and interior glazing (which is not addressed in part
223) on windows installed in Tier II passenger equipment. See 62 FR
49817. In response to the NPRM, however, FRA received a number of
comments questioning the appropriateness of FRA's proposals, as well as
the existing glazing standards in part 223. Having considered these
comments, FRA has decided to focus the final rule principally on more
stringent glazing requirements for end-facing exterior windows
installed in Tier II passenger equipment. In the second phase of this
rulemaking, FRA will reexamine the glazing requirements for all windows
installed in Tier II passenger equipment. FRA notes that this final
rule does not amend the requirements of 49 CFR part 223, although FRA
had proposed to amend the application section of that part in the NPRM.
See 62 FR 49791. Such an amendment is no longer appropriate in light of
the requirements of this section (Sec. 238.421) in the final rule. The
requirements of this section and the modifications from the proposed
rule are discussed below in detail.
The requirements of paragraph (a) apply to all exterior windows on
power car cabs and passenger cars. Windows on such equipment are
required to meet the glazing standards contained in 49 CFR part 223,
except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section. Part 223
contains requirements for both end-facing and side-facing window
glazing, and employs different testing methods than specified in this
section. As recommended by Bombardier in its comments on the NPRM,
instead of applying the glazing requirements in this section generally
to power cars as proposed in the NPRM, FRA has decided to limit the
application of the glazing requirements in this section to power car
cabs. This modification is consistent with the glazing requirements in
part 223, see, e.g., 49 CFR Sec. 223.9(a). Bombardier had noted that
one of the side windows on the Amtrak high-speed power cars will lead
to an equipment room, which FRA understands will not be occupied while
the power car is in service.
Paragraph (a) relates to paragraph (b) in that paragraph (b)
contains additional requirements for end-facing exterior window glazing
on power car cabs and passenger cars. First, under paragraph (b)(1),
end-facing exterior window glazing shall resist the impact of a 12-
pound solid steel sphere traveling at the maximum speed of the vehicle
in which the glazing will be installed. The test must be conducted so
that the sphere strikes the window glazing at an angle of 90 degrees
(perpendicular) to the window surface. To successfully pass the test,
the window must neither spall nor be penetrated by the sphere. This
test is similar to the requirements imposed under European glazing
standards for high-speed trains, and should be much more repeatable
than the cinder block test specified in 49 CFR part 223.
In the NPRM, FRA had proposed that end-facing exterior windows
resist an impact with a 12-pound steel sphere at an angle equal to the
angle between the window glazing surface as installed and the direction
of travel of the train. See 62 FR 49817. In commenting on the NPRM,
Automotive Glass Engineering (Automotive Glass) explained that impact
angle depends upon variables such as the vector of the projectile, the
vector of the train, and the angle at which the subject glazing is
installed. Automotive Glass then observed that it would have no advance
knowledge of the angle at which an object would strike the window
glazing when installed in the train. Automotive Glass recommended that
the rule require that tests be conducted at an angle perpendicular to
the surface--noting this would constitute the most severe impact--
unless the rule specifies the method for determining the angle of
incidence. FRA has adopted the comment of Automotive Glass by revising
the rule text to require that the window glazing resist the impact with
the 12-pound steel sphere at an angle 90 degrees to the window surface.
This should result in a requirement as strict or stricter than that
proposed in the NPRM.
Under paragraph (b)(1), end-facing exterior window glazing shall
demonstrate anti-spalling performance by the use of a 0.001 aluminum
witness plate, placed 12 inches from the glazing surface during all
impact tests. The witness plate must not contain any marks from spalled
window glazing particles after any impact test. This requirement was
originally proposed as Sec. 238.421(a)(3)(ii) in the NPRM. When
impacted on the exterior surface, window glazing currently used in
railroad equipment tends to spall from the inside surface. Several eye
injuries to crewmembers have resulted. FRA believes that the witness
plates used in conducting the spalling tests to qualify current glazing
are too thick and have allowed glazing that actually spalled to pass
the test. The witness plate specified in this paragraph is much thinner
and, therefore, more sensitive to detecting spall.
In commenting on the NPRM, Automotive Glass stated that the
performance of a witness plate is critically dependent on the amount of
tension in which it is held, and that a uniform tension procedure would
enhance consistency. Automotive Glass therefore recommended that the
test protocol specify the minimum tension of the foil in terms of some
unit of measure, other than ``taut,'' which it considered an aspiration
not a specification. FRA notes that in testing required under 49 CFR
part 223, the witness plate must have a ``taut''surface. See 49 CFR
part 223, Appendix A, b.(6). In the NPRM, proposed
Sec. 238.421(a)(3)(ii) is silent as to the tension of the witness
plate. As ``taut'' has been the witness plate tension specification
used in all safety glazing testing required by FRA, use of a ``taut''
witness plate is not inconsistent with the requirements of this
section. FRA believes that this issue may be reexamined in the second
phase of the rulemaking.
Automotive Glass also commented that total elimination of spalling
will result in additional weight, additional cost, loss of durability,
or some combination of these three. According to Automotive Glass,
unessential weight above the center of gravity is detrimental because
high-speed trains should have less inertia and a lower center of
gravity. Automotive Glass believed FRA could sacrifice too much by
averting the slight hazard created by the possibility of minor spalling
in an
[[Page 25635]]
extremely unlikely event. Under the final rule, of course, only end-
facing exterior glazing on Tier II passenger equipment is subject to
the particular requirements of this paragraph. Side-facing exterior
glazing is subject to the requirements contained in 49 CFR part 223. As
a result, only a relatively small number of the windows on a Tier II
passenger train will be required to comply with the more stringent
requirements specified in this paragraph. In this regard, FRA believes
that the changes made to the final rule render these comments less
significant.
Automotive Glass further commented that under the proposed rule no
spalling of glass is allowed, and noted that under 49 CFR part 223
spalling is permitted unless it is severe enough to penetrate the
prescribed foil witness plate. Additionally, Automotive Glass stated
that constructing foil witness plates requires great care to avoid
creating indentations in the foil, and that microscopic examination of
the surface could be required to locate indentations to determine
whether they were preexisting or produced by spall. To the extent no
spalling is allowed, Automotive Glass suggested replacing the witness
plate with a capture box that would capture glass fragments in the box.
Automotive Glass believed that use of a capture box would result in a
simpler and more reliable determination whether spalling occurred. In
addition, if the rule would permit minor spalling, Automotive Glass
recommended use of a thinner witness plate positioned closer to the
glazing material to reduce the severity of allowable spalling and
permit determination based on penetration instead of indentation.
FRA desires that no spalling occur, however, and recognizes that
the specified requirement is stricter than that provided in part 223.
Further, FRA believes that use of a capture box is not necessarily a
superior method of testing for spalling, as the integrity of the test
results depend in large part on the attentiveness of the operator
examining the capture box for spalled glass. FRA notes that Automotive
Glass also provided several other comments regarding the testing
protocols specified in this section and 49 CFR part 223. To the extent
that these comments address testing protocols in part 223, they concern
issues affecting glazing tests for both freight and passenger
equipment. Such issues need to be addressed in a broader regulatory
forum than this final rule on passenger equipment safety. FRA does make
clear, nevertheless, in response to a comment from Automotive Glass,
that it is not proper to certify that a segment of window glazing meets
the requirements of this section or part 223, or both, unless that
window segment is composed of the same material and manufactured in the
same manner as the window segment that underwent the testing required
by this section or part 223, or both.
Paragraph (c) contains an alternative to the glazing standards
specified in paragraphs (a) and (b). The alternative standards
specified in paragraph (c) represent proposed '' Secs. 238.421(a) and
(b) in the NPRM. FRA has included this paragraph in the final rule in
recognition that the safety glazing standards proposed in Sec. 238.421
were developed in consultation with Amtrak for use on Amtrak's HTS, and
FRA believed these standards would provide sufficient protection for
the safety of the train occupants. However, the option to use the
alternative standards in paragraph (c) only applies to exterior window
glazing in passenger equipment ordered prior to May 12, 1999. Further,
the option to comply with paragraph (c) is no longer available once the
window needs to be replaced and the railroad has exhausted its
inventory of glazed windows conforming to the requirements of paragraph
(c) as held prior to May 12, 1999. In this manner, exterior window
glazing complying with the requirements in this paragraph will be
phased out over time.
Paragraph (d) is similar to Sec. 238.221(b) in this final rule. FRA
did not receive any specific comments on this section and, for clarity,
FRA has restated the requirements proposed in Secs. 238.421(c) and (d)
in the NPRM, see 62 FR 49817, as Sec. 238.421(d) in this final rule.
The focus of paragraph (d) in the final rule is clearly on the ability
of each exterior window to remain in place, however the window may be
secured, and not have the window become a potential projectile itself.
FRA notes that it is separately evaluating whether securement of window
glazing in existing passenger equipment is sufficient to withstand
pressure differences associated with passing high-speed trains.
Paragraph (e) is a stenciling requirement which FRA has revised in
this final rule as proposed originally in Sec. 238.421(f).
As noted, FRA has decided not to impose on all Tier II passenger
equipment in this final rule the particular requirements for side-
facing exterior window glazing on Tier II passenger equipment which FRA
had proposed in the NPRM. Instead, Tier II power car cabs and passenger
cars must comply with the existing side-facing exterior window glazing
requirements specified in 49 CFR part 223, or comply with the
alternative standards specified in paragraph (c), as appropriate.
However, FRA has included the following comments received on the
proposed side-facing exterior window glazing standards for purposes of
advancing the discussion of these standards in the second phase of the
rulemaking.
FRA had generally proposed requiring that side-facing exterior
window glazing in Tier II passenger equipment resist the impact of a
12-pound solid steel sphere traveling at 15 mph and impacting at an
angle of 90 degrees to the surface of the glazing, with no penetration
or spall. See proposed Sec. 238.421(a)(2)(i), 62 FR 49817. FRA intended
this test to be more stringent than the large object impact test
required for side-facing exterior glazing under 49 CFR part 223, and to
demonstrate whether the side-facing glazing can protect occupants from
a relatively heavy object thrown against the side of the train. In
response to this proposal, GE Plastics (of the General Electrical
Company) commented that, although the energy resulting from the
proposed test would be greater than that required under part 223, the
momentum produced would not be greater. Noting that tests have shown
momentum to be as significant a factor as energy in the consequences of
an impact, GE Plastics did not believe the proposed test could be
considered more stringent than the current requirement in 49 CFR part
223. Instead of FRA's proposed test, GE Plastics recommended a test
involving a steel sphere weighing 24 to 25 pounds travelling at 15 mph,
so that energy and momentum would be greater than the current
requirement.
FRA had also proposed generally requiring that side-facing exterior
window glazing in all Tier II passenger equipment resist the impact of
a granite ballast stone weighing a minimum of 0.5 pounds, traveling at
75 mph, at a 90-degree angle to the glazing surface, with no
penetration or spall. See proposed Sec. 238.421(a)(2)(ii). FRA intended
this test to demonstrate whether the glazing could protect occupants
against impact from a common stone found along the railroad thrown at a
speed slightly faster than a human could throw such an object. In
response, Automotive Glass commented that, because ballast stones are
irregular geometrically and structurally, reproducible tests would not
be possible unless the granite spheres used in the tests were machined
and polished. Second, Automotive Glass stated that the proposed test
would not impose a significantly higher kinetic energy load than that
imposed by the
[[Page 25636]]
test involving a 12-pound steel sphere impacting the glazing surface at
15 mph, and also it would not have greater spall generation potential
than the proposed test involving a 9 mm bullet. Automotive Glass added
that, if a higher kinetic energy test is desired, it would be more
reasonable to increase the impact velocity of the proposed test
involving the 12-pound steel sphere to at least 16 mph.
FRA has also decided to defer imposing a new requirement for
ballistic testing of exterior window glazing on all power car cabs and
passenger cars. In the NPRM, FRA proposed requiring that all exterior
glazing resist the single impact of a 9-mm, 147-grain bullet traveling
at an impact velocity of 900 feet per second, with no bullet
penetration or spall. See proposed Sec. 238.421(a)(3)(i). FRA noted
that this bullet is a much more common handgun round than the 22-
caliber bullet specified in 49 CFR part 223. In response to the
proposal, GE Plastics commented that it had seen no data indicating
that people shoot at trains more frequently with 9 mm bullets, although
it agreed that a 9 mm bullet is a more common handgun round than a .22
caliber bullet. Further, GE Plastics questioned why a 147 grain bullet
was specified, noted that a bullet's shape and composition affect its
penetrating ability, and believed that more detail is needed to
determine which bullet is appropriate. Moreover, GE Plastics expressed
concern about the wording of the proposed test in that it believed a
bullet will rarely be travelling exactly at 900 feet per second during
testing. GE Plastics recommended specifying a minimum and a maximum
velocity, instead, as well as examining the wording of existing
ballistic test standards.
In commenting on the proposal, Automotive Glass noted its belief
that the .22 caliber projectile specified in 49 CFR part 223 represents
the threat of accidental injury from young people hunting or
``plinking'' along a railroad right-of-way, while the proposed 9 mm
projectile represents the threat of injury intentionally inflicted by
vandals or terrorists. Automotive Glass believed that if FRA were to
adopt a policy of requiring any level of protection against
intentionally inflicted injury, it would seem to constitute a departure
from previous policy. If FRA were to adopt this approach, then
Automotive Glass recommended that the proposed test protocol require
each subject glazing specimen to withstand three 9 mm bullets within a
circle eight inches in diameter, as vandals or terrorists are more
likely to fire short bursts. Further, Automotive Glass observed that
any level of ballistic resistance required of glazing which exceeds
that provided by the body panel construction below the glazing would
contribute only to a false sense of security. In the end, Automotive
Glass suggested that individual railroads be given the discretion
whether to utilize glazing with greater ballistic resistance based on
the threat and severity of vandalism or terrorism each faces. Again,
FRA has decided to defer until the second phase of the rulemaking
consideration of imposing a new requirement for ballistic testing on
all exterior window glazing used on power car cabs and passenger cars.
Of course, a railroad may avail itself of the alternative requirements
specified in paragraph (c) at its option, to the extent paragraph (c)
is applicable.
The final rule does not contain a standard covering interior window
glazing, as FRA has decided to defer consideration of imposing such a
standard until the second phase of this rulemaking. In the NPRM, FRA
had proposed requiring that interior glazing meet the minimum
requirements of AS1 type laminated glass as defined in American
National Standard ``Safety Code for Glazing Materials for Glazing Motor
Vehicles Operating on Land Highways,'' ASA Standard Z26.1-1966. See 62
FR 49817. (Bombardier commented that it believed the latest revision to
this standard occurred in 1990 rather than 1966.) FRA intended that the
proposed requirement would alleviate the need for interior window
glazing to meet the stringent impact resistance requirements placed on
exterior glazing, while ensuring that the glazing will shatter in a
safe manner like automotive glazing. In response to this proposal, GE
Plastics commented that requiring the glass to meet the AS1
requirements would exclude recognized safety glazing materials for
reasons unrelated to the glazing's ability to break safely, such as
light transmission, light distortion, and abrasion resistance. GE
plastics further commented that specifying a requirement for laminated
glass would exclude many established safety glazing materials. GE
Plastics recommended that, if safety glazing is desired, FRA
incorporate instead the 1984 version of the ANSI Z97.1 safety glazing
standard for use in buildings, which defines safety glazing as
``Glazing materials so constructed, treated, or combined with other
materials that, if broken by human contact, the likelihood of cutting
and piercing injuries that might result from such contact is
minimized.''
AtoHaas Americas, Inc., (AtoHaas) similarly commented that the AS1
standard incorporated in FRA's interior glazing proposal is an external
glazing standard that contains requirements which may not be needed for
internal glazing, such as light stability, luminous transmittance, and
abrasion resistance. Likewise, AtoHaas commented that specifying a
requirement for laminated glass would exclude other materials able to
meet the safety needs here for internal glazing. AtoHaas noted that
there are many types of glazing that would shatter or break in a safe
manner, and urged FRA to examine the American National Standard for
Safety Glazing Used in Buildings for products meeting FRA's safety
needs. FRA will consider these recommendations with the Working Group
in the second phase of the rulemaking, and presents them here to
advance discussion on potential requirements for interior window
glazing in Tier II passenger equipment.
Section 238.423 Fuel Tanks
This section contains the requirements for fuel tanks for fossil-
fueled Tier II passenger equipment. This section should be read with
the discussion of locomotive fuel tanks in the preamble. This section
contains separate requirements for external fuel tanks, which extend
outside the car body structure, and for internal tanks, which do not
extend outside the car body.
In commenting on the proposed rule, Bombardier recommended that the
same requirements proposed for Tier I fuel tanks apply to Tier II
equipment as well. Bombardier stated that early consensus was reached
to do so in the Tier II working group during development of the NPRM.
Bombardier maintained that this consensus was based on the fact that
there are no fuel tanks on the electric trainsets being built for the
NEC; the maximum speed for a fossil-fueled version of the trainsets
would be 125 mph; and no data exists to support the need for different
fuel tank requirements for Tier I and Tier II equipment. Further,
Bombardier stated that the requirements for Tier I fuel tanks
incorporate the most current industry practices for diesel electric
locomotive fuel tanks.
In response to Bombardier's comment, FRA believes that different
fuel tank requirements for Tier I and Tier II equipment may be
appropriate based on the different maximum speeds at which the
equipment can travel. However, FRA recognizes that the specific
differences between the proposed Tier I and Tier II fuel tank
requirements have not been tightly justified. Accordingly, the final
rule requires compliance with Tier I requirements for internal fuel
tanks, and includes a requirement for
[[Page 25637]]
FRA review and approval of any Tier II external fuel tank for safety
equivalence with Tier I performance.
As Bombardier pointed out in its comments, the NPRM did contain a
technical mistake in proposed Sec. 238.223(b)(2), which had as its Tier
II counterpart proposed Sec. 238.423(b)(3). Accordingly, these
paragraphs have been corrected in the final rule to reflect that the
25,000-lb yield strength described in the proposals is in fact a
25,000-lb per-square-inch yield strength.
Section 238.425 Electrical System.
FRA did not receive any specific comments on this section, and it
is adopted as proposed. This section contains the requirements for the
electrical system design of Tier II passenger equipment. These
requirements reflect common electrical safety practice and are widely
recognized as good electrical design practice. They include provisions
for:
Circuit protection against surges, overload and ground
faults;
Electrical conductor sizes and properties to provide a
margin of safety for the intended application;
Battery system design to prevent the risk of overcharging
or accumulation of dangerous gases that can cause an explosion;
Design of resistor grids that dissipate energy produced by
dynamic braking with sufficient electrical isolation and ventilation to
minimize the risk of fires; and
Electromagnetic compatibility within the intended
operating environment to prevent electromagnetic interference with
safety-critical equipment systems and to prevent interference of the
rolling stock with other systems along the right-of-way.
Section 238.427 Suspension System
In response to comments on the 1997 NPRM and for purposes of
clarification, FRA has revised the requirements of this section.
Changes from the NPRM are noted below in the general discussion of this
section.
As explained in the NPRM, safety requirements concerning the wheel-
rail interface have traditionally been addressed as part of the track
safety standards. In parallel with the Tier II Equipment Subgroup's
effort to develop high-speed equipment safety standards, the RSAC Track
Working Group developed a final rule on track safety standards which
includes high-speed track standards. See 63 FR 33992, June 22, 1998. In
October 1996, FRA sponsored a joint meeting of the Tier II Equipment
Subgroup and members of the Track Working Group focusing on the
development of high-speed track standards to ensure that the two sets
of standards not conflict at the wheel-rail interface, where they
overlap. FRA did receive a comment on the passenger equipment NPRM that
the two sets of standards do in fact conflict, and this comment is
addressed in particular in the discussion of Appendix C to this part
(Suspension System Safety Performance Standards).
To ensure safe, stable performance and ride quality, paragraph (a)
requires suspension systems to be designed to reasonably prevent wheel
climb, wheel unloading, rail rollover, rail shift, and a vehicle from
overturning. These requirements must be met in all operating
environments, and under all track and loading conditions as determined
by the operating railroad. In addition, these requirements must be met
under all track speeds and track conditions consistent with the Track
Safety Standards (49 CFR part 213), up to the maximum operating speed
and maximum cant deficiency of the equipment. These broad suspension
system performance requirements address the operation of equipment at
both high speed over well maintained track and at low speed over lower
classes of track. Suspension system performance requirements are needed
at both high and low speeds as exemplified by incidents where stiff,
high-speed suspension systems caused passenger equipment to derail
while negotiating curves in yards at low speeds.
Compliance with paragraph (a) must be demonstrated during pre-
revenue service acceptance testing of the equipment and by complying
with the safety performance standards for suspension systems contained
in Appendix C to this part. Because better ways to demonstrate
suspension system safety performance may be developed in the future,
the rule allows the use of alternative standards to those contained in
Appendix C if they provide at least equivalent safety and are approved
by the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety under the provisions of
Sec. 238.21.
Paragraph (b) requires the steady-state lateral acceleration of
passenger cars to be less than 0.1g, as measured parallel to the car
floor inside the passenger compartment, under all operating conditions.
Paragraph (c) requires each truck to be equipped with a permanently
installed lateral accelerometer mounted on the truck frame. If hunting
oscillations are detected, the train must be slowed. FRA has revised
this section to specify that hunting oscillations are considered a
sustained cyclic oscillation of the truck which is evidenced by lateral
accelerations in excess of 0.4g root mean square (mean-removed) for 2
seconds. In its comments on the rule, Talgo had recommended that the
permissible limits of hunting oscillations be specified in the rule
text and not in the definitions section, Sec. 238.5, as proposed in the
NPRM. See definition of hunting oscillations in proposed Sec. 238.5, 62
FR 49793. FRA has adopted Talgo's suggestion for clarity. However, FRA
has not adopted Talgo's alternative specification. Talgo commented
that, using the formulation in the NPRM in defining hunting
oscillations for Tier II passenger equipment, lateral oscillations
should apply on a peak basis, rather than on a peak-to-peak basis.
Talgo explained that oscillations would be considered dangerous if the
amplitude of six consecutive peaks exceeded 0.8g. Talgo added that this
approach is followed in Europe, citing UIC-515, and believed it more
reasonable than the proposed formulation. FRA has revised the
definition of hunting oscillations to make it consistent with the
definition of truck hunting in 49 CFR Sec. 213.333, Note 4 to the table
of Vehicle/Track Interaction Safety Limits. FRA determined that the
approach using the root mean square (mean-removed) was the preferred
indicator of the forces associated with truck hunting, and takes into
consideration the oscillatory nature of truck hunting. FRA believes
this definition of truck hunting removes the uncertainty in counting
the number of sustained oscillations.
FRA has further revised the rule to specify that the accelerometer
measurements shall be processed through a filter having a band pass of
0.5 to 10 Hz. Talgo also commented the rule should state that in
measuring the amplitude of lateral oscillations, the signal should be
filtered with a band pass of 4 to 8 Hz so that irrelevant signals are
excluded. FRA has adopted Talgo's recommendation in general, yet has
specified a pass band consistent with the track safety standards. See
49 CFR Sec. 213.333, Note 3 to table of Vehicle/Track Interaction
Safety Limits.
Paragraph (d) provides ride vibration (quality) limits for vertical
accelerations, lateral accelerations, and the combination of lateral
and vertical accelerations. These limits must be met while the
equipment is traveling at the maximum operating speed over its intended
route. In commenting on the NPRM, Bombardier noted that the values
proposed in this paragraph were not fully consistent with the values
found in the then-proposed track safety standards, and requested that
they be
[[Page 25638]]
made consistent. FRA has revised the requirements of this paragraph
accordingly. For clarity, as used in paragraph (d)(1)(iii), the formula
(aL2+aV2) can be restated as the sum of the
square of both accelerations.
FRA has combined paragraph (e) of proposed Sec. 238.427 into
paragraph (d) of the final rule as paragraph (d)(2). This provision
requires that compliance with the requirements of this paragraph be
demonstrated during the equipment's pre-revenue service qualification
tests required under Sec. 238.111 and Sec. 213.345 of the federal track
safety standards. One of the most important objectives of pre-revenue
service qualification testing is to demonstrate that suspension system
performance requirements have been met. FRA makes clear that the
requirements of paragraph (d)(2) need only be shown during pre-revenue
service qualification testing of the equipment.
FRA has added paragraph (d)(3) to make clear that, for purposes of
paragraph (d), acceleration measurements shall be processed through a
filter having a band pass of 0.5 to 10 Hz. In its comments on the NPRM,
Talgo observed that the signal filter to use in performing the limit
calculations had not been specified in this paragraph, and suggested
using a band pass filter of 0.4 to 10 Hz. FRA has effectively adopted
Talgo's comment.
Paragraph (e) requires wheelset journal bearing overheat sensors to
be provided either on board the equipment or at reasonable intervals
along the railroad's right-of-way. FRA prefers sensors to be on board
the equipment to eliminate the risk of a hotbox that develops between
wayside locations. However, FRA does recognize that onboard sensors
have a history of falsely detecting overheat conditions, causing
significant operating difficulties for some passenger railroads.
FRA has clarified paragraph (e) based on a comment from Bombardier
that this provision should apply to each wheelset journal bearing, and
not to each equipment bearing as stated in Sec. 238.427(f), see 62 FR
49818. This is in accord with FRA's original intent.
Section 238.429 Safety Appliances
This section contains the requirements for safety appliances for
Tier II passenger equipment. FRA has attempted to simplify and clarify
how the Safety Appliance Standards contained in 49 CFR part 231 and 49
U.S.C. 20302(a) will be applied to Tier II passenger equipment. The
requirements contained in this section are basically a restatement of
existing requirements but tailored specifically for application to this
new and somewhat unconventional equipment. They represent the consensus
recommendation of the Tier II Equipment Subgroup.
This final rule has retained all of the requirements proposed in
the 1997 NPRM. The only modification to the safety appliance
requirements is in response to one commenter's recommendation that the
requirements related to sill steps be made more consistent with
existing regulations. As a result, the requirement contained in
paragraph (e)(7), regarding the maximum height of the lowest sill step
tread, has been changed to be consistent with existing regulations and
practice.
This same commenter also recommended that a specific grade of steel
be designated in the requirements for the steel or other materials used
for handrails, handholds, and sill steps, and that the grade of SAE
(Society of Automotive Engineers) bolt to be used as mechanical
fasteners be specified as well. FRA believes that steel or other
materials used for handrails, handholds, and sill steps should at least
be equivalent to specification ASTM A-576, Grade 1015-1020 steel.
However, to the extent this need be specified as a requirement, FRA
believes it would be more appropriate to consider doing so for safety
appliances on all passenger equipment--not just Tier II passenger
equipment. FRA had not made such a proposal in the NPRM; and this issue
may be reexamined in Phase II of the rulemaking. As for the strength of
mechanical fasteners, the final rule states that mechanical fasteners
must have a mechanical strength at least equivalent to that of a \1/2\
inch diameter SAE grade steel bolt, as FRA had proposed in the NPRM.
FRA believes that any SAE grade of steel bolt will satisfy this
requirement, and, as a result, FRA has not modified the final rule in
this regard.
Paragraph (b) deserves special mention; it requires that Tier II
passenger trains be provided with a parking or hand brake that can be
set and released manually and can hold the equipment on a 3-percent
grade. A hand brake is an important safety feature that prevents the
rolling or runaway of parked equipment.
Section 238.431 Brake System
This section contains the brake system design and performance
requirements for Tier II passenger equipment, and, except for one
provision, represents the consensus recommendation of the Tier II
Equipment Subgroup. The provisions contained in this section are
virtually identical to the requirements proposed in the 1997 NPRM.
Except for one commenter's recommendation that leeway be provided on
the number of locations in a vehicle that must be equipped with a means
to effectuate an emergency brake application on shorter equipment, no
substantive adverse comments were received on the provisions contained
in this section and, thus, they have been retained without change.
As noted in the 1997 NPRM, the main issue of concern among Subgroup
members involved the capability of sensor technology used to monitor
the application and release of brakes. Labor representatives maintained
that a technology that actually measures the force of brake shoes and
pads against wheels and brake discs is required for a reliable
indication of brake application and release. Railroad operators
contended that this technology is not commercially available and that
monitoring pressure in brake cylinders does provide a reliable
indication of brake application and release, particularly when those
cylinders are directly adjacent to the point where brake friction
surfaces are forced together. FRA agrees that the technology suggested
by certain labor commenters is not currently available and that brake
system piston travel or piston cylinder pressure indicators have been
used with satisfactory results for many years. Although FRA agrees that
these indicators do not provide 100 percent certainty that the brakes
are effective, they have proven effective enough to be preferable to
requiring an inspector to assume a dangerous position while inspecting
a train's brake system.
Aside from this issue, the rest of the brake system design and
performance requirements contained in this section received widespread
support. In fact, several of the requirements were contained in written
positions provided by both rail labor and management members of the
Subgroup, and virtually all of the requirements were discussed in the
high-speed passenger equipment section of the 1994 NPRM on power
brakes. See 59 FR 47693-94, 47699-47700, and 47730. Many of the
requirements in this section are similar to the requirements for Tier I
passenger equipment contained in Sec. 238.231, thus the discussion
related to that section should be read in conjunction with the
following discussion.
Paragraph (a) of this section is virtually identical to the
requirement related to the braking systems of Tier I passenger
equipment in Sec. 238.231(a).
Paragraph (b) contains a requirement similar to that in
Sec. 238.231(b) and is
[[Page 25639]]
intended to protect railroad employees. FRA believes that inspectors of
equipment must be able to ascertain if brakes are applied or released
without placing themselves in a vulnerable position. This final rule
allows railroads the flexibility of using a reliable indicator in place
of requiring direct observation of the brake application or piston
travel because the designs of many of the brake systems used on
passenger equipment make direct observation of the brakes extremely
difficult. Brake system piston travel or piston cylinder pressure
indicators have been used with satisfactory results for many years.
Although indicators do not provide 100 percent certainty that the
brakes are effective, they have proven effective enough to be
preferable to requiring an inspector to assume a dangerous position.
Paragraph (c) is virtually identical to the requirement contained
in Sec. 238.231(c), and is a fundamental brake system performance
requirement that an emergency brake application feature be available at
any time and produce an irretrievable stop. This paragraph contains an
additional requirement that a means to actuate the emergency brake be
provided at two locations in each unit of the train. This additional
requirement ensures the availability of the emergency brake feature and
is in accordance with the current available design of high-speed
passenger equipment. FRA received comments from Renfe Talgo
recommending that FRA change this requirement to permit shorter
equipment to provide only one location in each unit of a train with a
means to actuate the emergency brake. This commenter recommends such
leeway due to the fewer number of passengers in these units and due to
the distance any one passenger would be to the actuation device when
compared to the distance in standard length passenger train units. FRA
has modified this paragraph to provide that equipment that is 45 feet
or less in length (approximately one-half the length of standard
passenger equipment) need provide a means to actuate the emergency
brake at only one location in each such unit of the train.
Paragraph (d) requires the brake system to be designed to prevent
thermal damage to wheels and brake discs.
Paragraph (e) contains requirements related to blended braking
systems. These requirements are similar to those contained in
Sec. 238.231(j). The only additional requirement is that the
operational status of the electric portion of the blended brake be
displayed in the operator's cab. Operators of this high-speed equipment
may use different train handling procedures when the electric portion
of blended brake is not available. Therefore, a dangerous situation
could arise when an operator of these high-speed trainsets expects the
electric portion of the blended brake to be available and it is not.
FRA believes that when operations exceed 125 mph either the train must
not be used if the electric portion of the blended brake is not
available, or the train operator must know that the electric portion of
the blended brake is not available so he or she can be prepared to use
compensating train handling procedures. Further, FRA believes that if
the additional heat input to wheels or discs caused by lack of the
electric portion of the blended brake causes thermal damage to these
braking surfaces, then the electric portion of the blended brake should
be considered a required safety feature and, unless it is available,
the equipment should not be used.
Paragraph (f) requires the brake system to allow a disabled train's
pneumatic brakes to be controlled by a conventional locomotive during
rescue operations.
Paragraph (g) requires that Tier II passenger trains be equipped
with an independent brake failure detection system that compares brake
commands to brake system outputs to determine if a failure has
occurred. This paragraph also requires that the brake failure detection
system report failures to the automated monitoring system, which is
contained in Sec. 238.445, thus alerting the train operator to
potential brake system degradation so that the operator can take
corrective action such as slowing the train.
Paragraph (h) requires that all Tier II passenger equipment be
provided with an adhesion control system designed to automatically
adjust the braking force on each wheel to prevent sliding during
braking. This paragraph also requires that the train operator be
alerted in the event of a failure of this system with a wheel slide
alarm that is visual or audible, or both. This feature ties the
adhesion control system to the automated monitoring system and prevents
dangerous wheel slide flat conditions that can be caused when wheels
lock during braking.
Section 238.433 Draft System
FRA is requiring that leading and trailing automatic couplers of
Tier II trains be compatible with standard AAR couplers with no special
adapters used. FRA believes that compatibility with standard couplers
is necessary in order that a conventional locomotive could assist in
the rescue of disabled Tier II passenger equipment. In addition,
couplers must include an automatic coupling feature as well as an
uncoupling device that complies with 49 U.S.C. chapter 203, 49 CFR part
231, and 49 CFR Sec. 232.2. FRA believes that automatic uncoupling
devices are necessary in order to comply with the intent of the statute
so that employees will not have to place themselves between equipment
in order to perform coupling or uncoupling operations.
Section 238.435 Interior Fittings and Surfaces
This section contains the requirements for interior fittings and
surfaces. Once survivable space is ensured by basic vehicle structural
strength and crash energy management requirements, the design of
interior features becomes an important factor in preventing or
mitigating injuries resulting from collisions or derailments. Loose
seats, equipment, and luggage are a significant cause of injuries in
passenger train collisions and derailments.
Paragraphs (a) through (c) contain requirements for the design of
passenger car seats and the strength of their attachment to the car
body. These requirements are based on sled tests of passenger coach
seats, seat tests conducted for other modes of transportation, and
computer modeling to predict the results of passenger train collisions.
These provisions include a requirement for shock absorbent material on
the backs of seats to cushion the impacts of passengers with the seats
ahead of them.
FRA has modified paragraph (a) based on comments received in
response to the NPRM. In the NPRM, FRA proposed requiring a seat back
in a passenger car to be designed to withstand, with deflection but
without total failure, the load of a seat occupant who is a 95th-
percentile male accelerated at 8g who impacts the seat back. See 62 FR
49819. Simula, in commenting on the NPRM, suggested that the seat back
in a passenger car should be designed to withstand, with deflection but
without total failure, the impact of unrestrained occupant(s) seated
behind the test article (seat back) and subjected to the same crash
pulse. Further, in its comments on the NPRM, Bombardier noted that the
design of the seats in Amtrak's HTS is based on a 185-pound occupant
according to Amtrak's specification, while paragraph (a) specified the
occupant size as a 95th-percentile male.
In the final rule, paragraph (a) requires that the design of the
seat back
[[Page 25640]]
and seat attachment withstand, with deflection but without total
failure, the load associated with the impact into the seat back of an
unrestrained 95th-percentile adult male initially seated behind the
seat, when the floor to which the seat is attached decelerates with a
triangular crash pulse having a peak of 8g and a duration of 250
milliseconds. (As used in this section, a 95th-percentile adult male
has been defined in Sec. 238.5.) This modification clarifies the intent
of the proposal, and specifies a crash pulse. As noted by Simula,
specifying a crash pulse recognizes the importance of testing seats
dynamically to represent actual conditions in a train collision.
Paragraph (a) has also been modified to incorporate paragraph (c)(1) of
the proposed rule by stating that the seat attachment must also resist
the specified load as well, and this is discussed below.
In response to Bombardier's comment on the size of the occupant
seated behind the seat being tested for purposes of determining the
required strength of the seat, FRA notes that the specification for
Amtrak's HTS does provide for use of a smaller occupant than is
specified in the rule. However, the Amtrak specification also provides
that the occupant be subjected to a more severe crash pulse than that
specified in the rule. As a result, FRA believes that under paragraph
(a) the energy required to be absorbed by the seat being tested is not
greater than that provided for in the Amtrak specification, and FRA has
not modified the rule on this point.
As noted above, FRA has modified paragraph (c) in the final rule by
incorporating proposed paragraph (c)(1) into paragraph (a) of the final
rule and retaining, as renumbered in paragraph (c) of the final rule,
proposed paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) in the NPRM. See 62 FR 49819. FRA
has incorporated proposed paragraph (c)(1) into paragraph (a) of the
final rule based in part on a comment from Simula that the ultimate
strength of a seat attachment to a passenger car body shall be
sufficient to withstand a crash pulse representing a typical train
accident (275 msec triangular pulse, peak acceleration 10 G) and the
impact of an unrestrained occupant(s) behind the test article.
Incorporating the longitudinal strength requirement proposed for the
seat attachment in paragraph (c)(1) of the NPRM into paragraph (a) of
the final rule rationalizes the rule and recognizes that the seat
attachment requirement and the seat back requirement both take into
account the force of a train occupant impacting the seat from behind.
However, FRA has not adopted Simula's recommendation to increase the g
loading that the seat attachment is required to withstand or specify a
crash pulse as long as 275 milliseconds, triangular. Simula's
recommendation appears to be based on the assumption that higher speed
train collisions will result in greater decelerations of longer
duration in a trailer car. Yet, FRA believes that the resulting
decelerations will have only a longer duration. As the duration for
which an occupant impacts an interior surface has a negligible
influence on potential injury, the 8g force and 250 msec crash pulse
specified in this paragraph is appropriate for Tier II passenger
equipment.
The lateral and vertical loading requirements in paragraph (c)
remain unchanged from the NPRM other than being renumbered.
FRA has not incorporated two other comments from Simula on this
section for the reasons noted below. First, Simula suggested adding a
requirement that two rows of seats should be included in the seat
testing and positioned to represent the row-to-row pitch for
installation. FRA has not modified the rule in this regard, because FRA
believes it evident that in testing seats to show compliance with the
requirements of this section the positioning of the seats must
represent the actual positioning of the seats in the passenger car
subject to the requirements of this section. In addition, Simula
recommended that instrumented Hybrid III dummies be seated in the row
behind the test article to determine occupant injury potential during a
dynamic test, and that the data measured by the dummies meet specified
injury criteria available in a pending APTA standard. Simula further
recommended that the number and size of unrestrained occupants (crash
test dummies) to be used in testing be defined in the APTA standard.
Simula noted that the results of ongoing research will be used to
complete the standard, and that to meet injury performance criteria the
railroad may have to use some form of occupant restraint system. As
evidenced by Simula's comments, specifying occupant injury criteria is
an ongoing issue and, as such, is best deferred to the second phase of
this rulemaking. FRA does recognize that pursuing the specification of
occupant injury criteria is both sound and technically appropriate, and
encourages research in this regard for use in the second phase of the
rulemaking, in addition to examining the use of NHTSA occupant injury
criteria.
Paragraph (d) contains the requirements for strength of attachment
of interior fittings and is similar to that required in
Sec. 238.233(c). Similar to its comment noted above, Bombardier
remarked that proposed paragraph (d) specified a 95th-percentile male
for use in determining the required strength of certain interior
fittings. See 62 FR 49819-20. Bombardier explained that the design of
tables for Amtrak's HTS does not follow this approach, and that, based
on research conducted within the rail industry, it relates to impact
velocities of a 185-pound occupant. Bombardier was unsure how the
proposed rule compared to the way tables were being designed and
constructed for Amtrak's HTS, and requested that the practicality of
the proposed approach be first considered. As FRA responded above to
Bombardier's similar comment, FRA believes that specifying a larger
occupant size will not in itself increase the strength that the fitting
is required to withstand since the Amtrak specification provides that
the 185-pound occupant must resist a more severe crash pulse than that
provided in the rule. FRA believes the requirement in paragraph (d) is
not greater than that required under the Amtrak specification for HTS.
Paragraph (e) contains a special requirement for the ultimate
strength of seats and other fittings in the cab of a power car. Due to
the extra strength of the cab, its structure is capable of resisting
forces caused by accelerations that exceed 10g. As a result, benefit
can be gained from a greater longitudinal strength requirement for seat
and other interior fitting attachments. FRA is therefore requiring that
seats and equipment in the cab be attached to the car body with
sufficient strength to resist longitudinal forces caused by an
acceleration of 12g. The lateral and vertical requirements remain 4g.
These requirements do not apply to equipment located outside the cab.
In its comments on the NPRM, Simula also recommended that the 12g
longitudinal requirement be supplemented by a 250-millisecond dynamic
crash pulse. However, FRA believes that this will result in a more
expensive test without a corresponding increase in safety. Simula
further suggested that the 4g lateral and vertical loading requirements
apply to the combined mass of the seat and the seat occupant. FRA notes
that such a requirement is provided in Sec. 238.447(f)(2).
Paragraphs (f) and (g) contain requirements representing good
safety design practice for any type of vehicle.
FRA believes the luggage restraint requirement in paragraph (h)
will
[[Page 25641]]
prevent many of the injuries caused by flying luggage that are typical
of passenger train collisions and derailments.
FRA has included paragraph (i) in the final rule, consistent with
its parallel requirement in Sec. 238.233(g) for Tier I passenger
equipment.
Section 238.437 Emergency Communication
This section requires an emergency communication system with back-
up power within a Tier II train. This safety feature will allow the
train crew to provide evacuation and other instructions to passengers,
and help prevent panic that can occur during emergency situations.
FRA's principal revision to this section allows passenger cars 45
feet or less in length to have only one emergency communication
transmission location. FRA had proposed that transmission locations be
placed at both ends of each passenger car. In response to the proposal,
Talgo commented that in considering the placement of transmission
locations, the operative factor should be the distance from any point
on the train to the nearest transmission unit--rather than specifying
that they be placed at the ends of each passenger car. Talgo believed
this necessary to accommodate cars which are half the length in size of
conventional cars.
As the length of a conventional railroad passenger car is typically
between 85 and 90 feet, FRA believes it appropriate to require a car
not more than half that length to have only one emergency communication
transmission unit. However, FRA is not prepared to specify a
requirement to place such transmission units solely on the distance
from any point on the train to the nearest transmission unit. By taking
into account the location of transmission units on a train level, the
nearest transmission unit to a passenger seated in one car may in fact
be a transmission unit located in an adjoining car. However, having to
pass into an adjoining car to access the transmission unit, although
nearer linearly, may at a minimum be impracticable in certain
situations. FRA believes that each Tier II passenger car, no matter its
size, must have its own emergency communication transmission unit.
This section also requires that emergency communication
transmission locations be marked with luminescent material, that clear
instructions be provided for the use of the emergency communication
system, and that the emergency communication system have back-up power
for a minimum period of 90 minutes.
In commenting on the rule, the NTSB noted that FRA had not proposed
emergency communication requirements for Tier I operations. The NTSB
believed that emergency communication requirements are necessary for
Tier I operations because the majority of passenger train accidents
have occurred in those operations. The NTSB also stated that emergency
communication requirements should not be limited to intra-train
operations, but include as well the ability to communicate from the
train to outside sources. In a similar comment on the NPRM, the UTU
stated that passenger trains should not be dispatched without working
head end radios and a reliable backup system. The UTU also commented
that all conductors and crewmembers should be issued portable radios
capable of communicating with each other, the head end, and the
dispatcher or control center.
FRA is not applying the Tier II requirements for intra-train
emergency communication to Tier I operations at this time. FRA agrees
with the NTSB's comment that emergency communication requirements
should not be a function of speed, but rather a function of the design
and configuration of the train and the terrain in which the train
operates. Yet, FRA's decision here is not based on speed. FRA initially
proposed to limit this proposal to Tier II passenger trains because
such trains are intended to operate as a fixed unit, unlike most Tier I
passenger trains. Whereas an emergency system to communicate throughout
the train may be more easily provided for in a train which remains as a
fixed unit, the interchangeability of passenger cars and locomotives
raises practical considerations about the compatibility of
communications equipment in a Tier I passenger train. FRA believes it
best to address these considerations and further examine requirements
concerning emergency communication within a Tier I train in the second
phase of the rulemaking, following consideration of these issues by the
APTA PRESS Task Force.
As to requirements for emergency communication from a train to an
outside source, FRA has addressed such requirements in the Railroad
Communications final rule, designated as Docket No. RSOR-12. See 63 FR
47182; Sept. 4, 1998. FRA recognizes that the ability to communicate in
an emergency is important for all trains--freight and passenger. In
particular, because passenger trains operate commingled with freight
trains, the ability of a freight train crew to notify a railroad
control center of an emergency involving its train may prevent a
collision with an oncoming passenger train. The railroad communications
rulemaking was supported by a working group, established through RSAC,
which specifically addressed communication facilities and procedures,
with a strong emphasis on passenger train emergency requirements. In
general, section 220.209 of the Railroad Communications final rule
provides that, for each railroad having no fewer than 400,000 employee
work hours, each occupied controlling locomotive in a train shall have
a working radio that can communicate with the control center of the
railroad, and each train shall also have communications redundancy,
i.e., a working radio on another locomotive in the consist or other
means of working wireless communication. See 49 CFR Sec. 220.9; 63 FR
47195-6. Moreover, in addition to the requirements of the Railroad
Communications rule, FRA notes that intercity passenger and commuter
railroads already make extensive provision for ensuring communication
capabilities during emergencies. FRA believes that other communications
issues have been resolved either in the railroad communications
rulemaking, the passenger train emergency preparedness rulemaking, or
this final rule. However, any final issues can be addressed in the
second phase of this rulemaking.
Section 238.439 Doors
This section contains the requirements for doors on Tier II
passenger cars. This section should be read with the discussion of
passenger car doors earlier in the preamble. As stated, FRA has
modified the requirement for the number of exterior side doors per
passenger car (contained in paragraph (a)) by specifying that each car
shall have a minimum of two such doors.
The requirements in paragraph (b) are similar to those contained in
Sec. 238.235(b) for Tier I passenger equipment. However, the
requirements of paragraph (c) have no counterpart in Sec. 238.235. This
paragraph requires the status of powered, exterior side doors to be
displayed to the crew in the operating cab and, if door interlocks are
used, the sensors to detect train motion must nominally be set to
operate at not more than 3 mph. Such equipment is well within current
technology. Paragraph (d) requires that powered, exterior side doors be
connected to an emergency back-up power system.
[[Page 25642]]
Paragraph (e) is identical to that provided for Tier I passenger
equipment in Sec. 238.235(c).
Paragraph (f) requires passenger compartment end doors to be
equipped with a kick-out panel, pop-out window, or other means of
egress in the event the doors will not open, or be so designed as to
pose a negligible probability of becoming inoperable in the event of
carbody distortion following a collision or derailment. This paragraph
does not apply to such doors providing access to the exterior of a
trainset, however, as in the case of an end door in the last car of a
train. In the NPRM, FRA discussed that the requirements in this
paragraph originally arose out of the NTSB's emergency safety
recommendations following its investigation of the February 16, 1996,
collision between a MARC commuter train and an Amtrak passenger train
in Silver Spring, Maryland. See 62 FR 49734-5. Specifically, as stated
in its final railroad accident report, the NTSB recommended that FRA:
Require all passenger cars to have either removable windows,
kick panels, or other suitable means for emergency exiting through
the interior and exterior passageway doors where the door could
impede passengers exiting in an emergency and take appropriate
emergency measures to ensure corrective action until these measures
are incorporated into minimum passenger car safety standards. (NTSB/
RAR-97/02) (R-97-15)
As explained in the NPRM, FRA proposed that the first practical
application of the NTSB's recommendation be made with respect to Tier
II passenger car end doors. See 62 FR 49735. FRA has been assisting
APTA through its PRESS task force examine the full range of options for
implementing the NTSB recommendation in Tier I passenger equipment, in
addition to the Volpe Center's work on emergency egress on a systems
level. These complementary efforts will be brought together in the
second phase of the rulemaking.
FRA notes that it has modified paragraph (f) from the proposal in
the NPRM, see 62 FR 49820 (proposed Sec. 238.441(d)), to permit Tier II
passenger car doors to be designed without a kick-out panel, pop-out
window, or like feature, provided that the doors pose a negligible
probability of becoming inoperable in the event of carbody distortion
following a collision or derailment. FRA believes this modification is
consistent with the NTSB's safety recommendation
(R-97-15).
Paragraph (g) is reserved for door marking and operating
instruction requirements. These requirements are currently provided in
the rule on passenger train emergency preparedness at 49 CFR
Sec. 239.107. See 63 FR 24630, 24680. In phase II of the rulemaking,
FRA will consider integrating the door marking and operating
instruction requirements found in part 239 with this part.
Additionally, FRA will consider revising those requirements as
necessary.
Section 238.441 Emergency Roof Entrance Location
This section requires that Tier II passenger equipment either have
a roof hatch or a clearly marked structural weak point in the roof to
provide quick access for properly equipped emergency personnel. Such
features will aid in removing passengers and crewmembers from a vehicle
that is either on its side or upright.
In the NPRM, FRA proposed that each Tier II passenger car be
equipped with a minimum of two such emergency roof entrance locations.
See 62 FR 49820. Talgo, in its comments on this proposal, remarked that
a passenger car half the length of a conventional passenger car should
require only one roof hatch or structural weak point. Further,
Bombardier commented that the high-speed trainsets it is constructing
for Amtrak will have only one structural weak point located in the
center of the passenger cars due to the location of roof-mounted air
conditioning units at each end of the cars.
In the final rule, each Tier II passenger car and each cab of a
power car is required to have at least one emergency roof entrance
location to permit the evacuation of the vehicle's occupants through
the roof. Beyond the issue of the sufficiency of the number of
emergency roof entrance locations for Tier II passenger equipment is
the larger issue of applying requirements for emergency roof entrance
locations to Tier I passenger equipment. The final rule does not
contain such requirements for Tier I passenger equipment, and there was
no consensus within the Working Group to do so. See 62 FR 49750-1.
However, FRA believes that work within the APTA PRESS Task Force will
lead to reconciliation of Tier I and Tier II requirements on this
issue. FRA intends to reexamine the requirements of this section in the
second phase of the rulemaking with a view to applying emergency roof
entrance locations requirements to Tier I passenger equipment. In the
meantime, the public is entitled to the protection afforded by the Tier
II standard. High-speed derailments may be more severe because of the
total energy involved and a potentially longer ``ride down'' during
which injuries may occur, rendering occupants incapable of exiting the
train under their own power.
Paragraph (b) is reserved for marking and instruction requirements
to be specified as necessary in the second phase of this rulemaking.
Section 238.443 Headlights
FRA received no comments on this provision, and it is adopted as
proposed. Because of the high speeds at which Tier II passenger
equipment operates, FRA is requiring that a headlight be directed
farther in front of the train to illuminate a person than is currently
required for existing equipment under 49 CFR Sec. 229.125(a). A Tier II
passenger train will travel distances more quickly than a Tier I
passenger train, and the train operator will have less time to react,
thereby necessitating earlier awareness of objects on the track.
FRA notes that, as further specified in 49 CFR Sec. 229.125(d)-(h),
locomotives operated at speeds greater than 20 miles per hour over one
or more public highway-rail crossings are required to be equipped with
operative auxiliary lights. The requirements contained in
Sec. 229.125(d)-(h) do apply, according to their terms, to Tier II
passenger equipment. Any proposal to the contrary in the NPRM was made
in error.
Section 238.445 Automated Monitoring
This section contains the requirements related to the automated
monitoring of the status or performance of various safety-related
systems on Tier II passenger trains. A number of passenger train
accidents have been either fully or partly caused by human error. The
faster operating speeds of Tier II passenger equipment will afford the
train operator less time to evaluate and react to potentially dangerous
situations, thereby increasing the potential for accidents. Automated
monitoring systems can decrease the risk of accidents by alerting the
train operator to abnormal conditions and advising the operator as to
necessary corrective action. Such systems can even be designed to take
corrective action automatically in certain situations.
FRA received no comments on this section as proposed, and
paragraphs (a) and (c) have been adopted without substantive change.
However, FRA has modified paragraph (b) to make clear when immediate
corrective action must be taken in the event a system or component
required to be monitored is
[[Page 25643]]
operating outside of its predetermined safety limits.
Paragraph (a) requires a Tier II passenger train to be equipped to
monitor the performance of a minimum set of safety-related systems and
components. The monitoring system can also be used to provide
information for trouble-shooting and maintenance and to accumulate
reliability data to form the basis for setting required periodic
maintenance intervals.
Paragraph (b) requires the train operator to be alerted when any of
the systems or components required to be monitored is operating outside
of predetermined safety parameters. When any such system or component
is operating outside of its predetermined safety parameters, immediate
corrective action must be taken if the system or component defect
impairs the train operator's ability to safely operate the train.
Accordingly, a report of a system or component defect may not require
immediate corrective action. The need to take such action would be
determined by the railroad based on whether the defective system or
component impairs the train operator's ability to safely operate the
train. Further, in the event immediate corrective action must be taken,
the rule does not require that intervention be automatic. Of course,
the railroad should have a valid basis for either leaving response in
the hands of the train operator or making the corrective action
automatic.
Paragraph (c) requires the monitoring system to be designed with an
automatic self-test feature that notifies the train operator that the
monitoring capability is functioning correctly and alerts the operator
that a system failure has occurred. Because train operators can become
dependent on automated monitoring systems, they need to know when their
vigilance must be heightened to compensate for a malfunction in such an
automated safety tool.
Section 238.447 Train Operator's Controls and Power Car Cab Layout
This section contains a set of requirements for interior features
in Tier II power car cabs. FRA has clarified and revised this section,
based on comments received in response to the proposal, in two
principal ways: The seat requirements in paragraph (f) apply to any
floor-mounted seat and each seat provided for an employee regularly
assigned to occupy the power car cab, instead of to each crewmember in
the cab; and such seats will not require seatbelts. FRA has also
combined proposed paragraphs Sec. 238.447(a) and (b) in the NPRM, see
62 FR 49820-1, into paragraph (a) of this section in the final rule for
economies of space. Subsequent paragraphs have been renumbered
accordingly.
In its comments on the NPRM, Bombardier explained that an
additional seat--commonly a flip-up or a shelf-type seat--is in many
cases provided in the cab for a train crewmember who is not normally in
the cab. Bombardier believed these seats should not be subjected to the
same requirements as for the train operators' seats, as that was not
the intent of discussions within the Working Group. Accordingly,
Bombardier recommended making clear that the requirements in paragraph
(f) apply only to each seat provided for the train operators.
FRA agrees with Bombardier's comment that the requirements proposed
in Sec. 238.447(g) of the NPRMBnow Sec. 238.447(f) of the final rule--
need not apply to each seat provided for a crewmember in a power car
cab. FRA recognizes that flip-down and other auxiliary seats are
provided in locomotive cabs for the temporary use of employees not
regularly assigned to the cab. These employees may include a supervisor
of locomotive engineers conducting an operational monitoring test of
the engineer(s). Such seats are typically attached to an interior wall
and placed behind those seats used by the train operators. FRA believes
it appropriate to clarify the application of paragraph (f) in the final
rule so that its requirements apply only to each seat provided for an
employee regularly assigned to occupy the power car cab, and to any
floor-mounted seat in the cab. Accordingly, paragraph (f) does not
apply to a wall-mounted, flip-down seat occupied by an employee such as
a supervisor of locomotive engineers who occasionally rides in the cab.
FRA has also modified paragraph (f) by not requiring that seats
subject to that provision be equipped with a single-acting, quick-
release lap belt and shoulder harness as defined in 49 CFR
Sec. 571.209. FRA had proposed such a requirement in the NPRM because
the crew may experience high decelerations in a collision from the
cab's high strength and forward location near the expected point of
impact in many different collision scenarios. See Sec. 238.447(g)(1),
62 FR 49821. In its comments on the NPRM, the BLE stated that its
experience did not support the need to require a lap belt and shoulder
harness, and that its member engineers were overwhelmingly against such
a requirement. The BLE explained that engineers need to rapidly exit
from the seat to a place of safety in the event of an impending
accident or act of vandalism. In such instances, the primary defense of
the engineer is to move quickly from harms way, according to the BLE,
and operating at speeds of 150 mph will decrease the time a locomotive
engineer has to react to such incidents. The BLE noted that it would
change its position on this issue if there is overwhelming evidence
that the force of deceleration on Tier II equipment would be so severe
as to cause injury to engineers or interfere with their operation.
In its comments on the rule, Simula remarked that formal research
is needed to determine both the feasibility of incorporating active
restraints in a cab and the potential for the crew to actually use
them. Simula also noted the option of exploring passive restraints such
as air bags or compartmentalization, as opposed to active restraints
such as lap belts and shoulder harnesses. Simula explained that cost
effectiveness considerations for implementing both compartmentalization
and active and passive restraints are markedly different for the crew
in the cab compared to passengers. Simula asserted that the relatively
high cost of passive restraints may be justified for one or two
crewmembers in a extremely severe environment.
In light of the comments received, FRA has decided to defer until
Phase II of the rulemaking the issue of requiring seats in a power car
cab to be equipped with seat belts and shoulder harnesses. FRA will
continue to explore strategies for train occupant protection--both for
passengers and employees--and FRA will be able to focus on these
strategies with the members of the Working Group in Phase II.
In other statements on the NPRM, commenters recommended applying
the requirements in this section to Tier I passenger equipment. The
NTSB stated that the minimum elements proposed in this section for
operator's controls and cab layout design are sufficient and should
also be included in Tier I operations for ergonomic design and to
minimize the chance of human error in both types of operations. The
NTSB cited safety recommendations arising out of an accident in Kelso,
California, concerning the dangers posed by improperly located safety-
significant controls and switches in locomotives and the need to
relocate and/or protect such controls and switches so they cannot be
inadvertently activated or deactivated. FRA has not fully explored
extension of these concepts with the working group and will take the
issue under advisement for incorporation into
[[Page 25644]]
Tier I standards during Phase II of the rulemaking.
The BLE commented that the proposed requirements for seating in
this section also be applied to Tier I equipment. The BLE stated that
existing seating on some Tier I equipment is woefully inadequate. In
particular, the BLE noted that some cab car seats are not adjustable;
have no suspension; are severely limited in their cushioning; have no
lumbar support; and are injuring their occupants. The BLE also
recommended that both Tier I and Tier II equipment be provided with a
cab temperature control system which maintains a minimum temperature of
65 degrees and a maximum of 85 degrees F.
FRA in not requiring that the detailed provisions in this section
be imposed in full on Tier I passenger equipment. FRA believes these
provisions are more necessary for Tier II passenger equipment because
the higher operating speeds will press human reaction time, and such
requirements will contribute to the ability of the crew to operate the
train as safely as possible. In addition, several members of the
Working Group opposed applying such requirements to Tier I passenger
equipment, asserting that a number of the requirements involved
ergonomic issues which do not directly affect safety. FRA notes that
certain requirements concerning locomotive cab interior safety are
provided in Sec. 238.233 of the final rule.
Through RSAC's working group on Locomotive Cab Working Conditions,
FRA and members of the regulated community have been evaluating issues
concerning locomotive cab working conditions. As a number of issues
concern both passenger and freight operations, FRA believes that such
issues may best be addressed in this RSAC working group. Of course, FRA
does recognize that the concern involving crew seats in cab cars is
more unique to passenger operations, and FRA is therefore pleased by
APTA's voluntary effort to improve crew seats on cab cars.
FRA notes that, for purposes of paragraph (f)(1) in this section,
it has specified the crewmember occupying the seat as a 95th-percentile
adult male, consistent with the use of a 95th-percentile adult male
elsewhere in this rule. In the NPRM, the characteristics of the
crewmember occupying the seat had not been specified, per se. See
proposed Sec. 238.447(g)(2); 62 FR 49821.
FRA further notes that, for purposes of paragraph (f)(2), it has
not specified particular measurements or a particular survey on which
to base the necessary characteristics of persons ranging from a 5th-
percentile adult female to a 95th-percentile adult male. Instead, these
characteristics may be drawn from any recognized survey after 1958 of
weight, height, and other body dimensions of U.S. adults, corrected for
clothing as appropriate. Data from such a survey is presented in Public
Health Service Publication No. 1000, Series 11, No. 8, ``Weight,
Height, and Selected Body Dimensions of Adults,'' June 1965. (A copy of
this document has been placed in the public docket for this
rulemaking.) The definition of 95th-percentile adult male used
elsewhere in the rule is too narrow to apply in this context.
Subpart F--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier
II Passenger Equipment
Section 238.501 Scope
This subpart contains the inspection, testing, and maintenance
requirements for passenger equipment that operates at speeds exceeding
125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph. As discussed in the 1997 NPRM, there
is currently no operating history with regard to Tier II equipment, and
thus there are no regulations or industry standards establishing
detailed testing, inspection, or maintenance procedures, criteria, and
intervals for the equipment. The railroads and the rail labor
organizations differ on the approach that should be taken in
establishing inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements.
Railroads have long appealed to FRA to move away from detailed
``command and control'' regulations and instead to provide broad safety
performance requirements that afford railroads wide latitude to develop
the operational details. Rail labor organizations, on the other hand,
believe that specific inspection, testing, and maintenance criteria
that cannot be unilaterally changed by railroads are the only way that
safe railroad operation can be assured.
FRA believes that the introduction of a new type of passenger
equipment offers the opportunity for a fresh start, where perhaps both
of these seemingly conflicting concerns can be resolved. This final
rule retains the approach taken in the 1997 NPRM and contains general
guidelines on the process to be used by the operating railroad,
together with the system developer, to develop an inspection, testing,
and maintenance program. The operating railroad and the system
developer together have the best information, expertise, and resources
necessary to develop the details of an effective inspection, testing,
and maintenance program. The operating railroad is thereby granted some
latitude to develop the operational details of the program, using the
system safety process to justify the safety decisions that are made.
However, FRA intends to exercise final approval of the inspection,
testing, and maintenance program proposed by the operating railroad;
rail labor organizations will be given an opportunity to discuss their
concerns with FRA during the approval process set forth in
Sec. 238.505. Tier II equipment may not be used prior to FRA approval
of an inspection, testing, and maintenance program. Further, this final
rule makes clear that FRA intends to enforce the safety-critical
inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures, criteria, and
maintenance intervals that result from the approval process.
Labor commenters recommended that if FRA is to permit the railroads
to develop inspection and testing criteria and procedures for Tier II
passenger equipment, then rail labor must be involved in the process as
a full partner. These commenters also believed that any procedures
developed must provide an equivalent level of safety to the inspection
and testing procedures provided for conventional passenger equipment.
Furthermore, these commenters believed that any testing and inspection
procedures developed must be fully enforceable to the same extent as
federal regulations.
Although FRA recognizes and appreciates labor's desire to be a full
partner in the development of any inspection and testing procedures,
and FRA fully endorses and recommends collaboration with appropriate
labor forces, FRA does not believe it appropriate to mandate labor's
participation in the initial stages of the development of such
procedures. As the equipment for which the inspection and testing
programs are being developed will be new, with little operating
history, FRA believes that the operating railroad and the system
developer have the best information, expertise, and resources necessary
to develop the details of an effective inspection, testing, and
maintenance program. Moreover, FRA believes this final rule provides
the industry's labor forces with an adequate avenue for raising any
issues and providing input on any criteria or procedure developed by a
railroad. Section 238.505 ensures that designated representatives of a
railroad's employees are provided a copy of any inspection, testing,
and maintenance criteria or procedures submitted by the railroad for
FRA approval and provides an opportunity for these parties to present
their views on the submitted plans and procedures
[[Page 25645]]
prior to FRA's approval or rejection of any program. Furthermore, this
section addresses all of the major inspections and test provisions
related to conventional passenger equipment and ensures that any
program developed by a railroad regarding the inspection, testing, and
maintenance of Tier II passenger equipment incorporate these major
requirements. Finally, paragraph (b) of this section, as discussed in
detail below, makes clear that the provisions of any program approved
by FRA related to the inspection and testing of power brakes or other
inspection, test, or maintenance procedure, criteria, and interval that
is deemed to be safety-critical will be enforceable to the same extent
as any other requirement contained in this part.
Section 238.503 Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements
This section requires the establishment by the railroad of an FRA-
approved inspection, testing, and maintenance program based on a daily
complete brake system test and mechanical safety inspection of the
equipment performed by qualified maintenance persons, coupled with a
periodic maintenance program based on a system safety analysis.
Although paragraph (a) contains some basic requirements to be included
in a program, FRA does not intend to prescribe every detail of what a
program must contain. FRA requires the operating railroad to develop
and justify the details of any program it adopts based on the specific
safety needs and operating environment of the high-speed rail system
being developed.
Paragraph (b) intends to make enforceable, subject to civil
penalties and other enforcement action, the inspection and testing of
power brakes and the other safety-critical inspection, testing, and
maintenance requirements that are identified in the railroad's program
and approved by FRA. ``Safety-critical'' requirements are those that,
if not fulfilled, increase ``the risk of damage to equipment or
personal injury to a passenger, crewmember, or other person.'' See
Sec. 238.5. Under paragraph (l), the railroad must identify which items
in its inspection, testing, and maintenance program are safety-
critical. The railroad must submit the program to FRA under the
procedures contained in Sec. 238.505. Once these programs are approved
by FRA, this section makes clear those items identified as safety-
critical are enforceable by FRA. FRA agrees with labor representatives
to the Working Group that safety standards are stronger when they
contain specific provisions that can be enforced.
Paragraph (c) requires that the operating railroad develop an
inspection, testing, and maintenance program to ensure that all systems
and components of Tier II passenger equipment are free of general
conditions that endanger the safety of the crew, passengers, or
equipment. FRA has identified the various conditions enumerated in
paragraph (c) that would need to be addressed in the railroad's
program. Consequently, FRA has defined what the inspection, testing,
and maintenance program must accomplish, but not how to accomplish it.
Paragraph (d) contains the more specific requirements that any
inspection, testing, and maintenance program must incorporate. In
paragraph (d)(1), FRA requires that Tier II equipment receive the
equivalent of a Class I brake test, as described in Sec. 238.313,
before its departure from an originating terminal and every 1,500 miles
after that or once each calendar day the equipment remains in service.
The test must be performed by a qualified maintenance person. For
example, a Tier II train must receive the equivalent of a Class I brake
test at its originating terminal and must receive a second Class I
equivalent brake test after traveling 1,500 miles from the time of the
original Class I brake test, whether or not it is the same calendar
day. Furthermore, a Tier II train must receive the equivalent of a
Class I brake test each calendar day it is used in service even if it
has not traveled 1,500 miles since the last Class I equivalent brake
test. Due to the speeds at which this equipment is permitted to
operate, FRA believes that a comprehensive brake test must be performed
prior to the equipment being placed in service.
Paragraph (d)(2) requires that a complete exterior and interior
mechanical inspection be conducted by a qualified maintenance person at
least once each calendar day that the equipment is used. In order to
perform a quality mechanical inspection, railroads must be provided
some flexibility in determining the locations where these inspections
can best be performed. FRA believes that permitting railroads to
conduct these mechanical inspections at any time during the calendar
day provides adequate flexibility to move equipment to appropriate
locations. Trains that miss a scheduled Class I brake test or
mechanical inspection due to a delay en route may proceed to the
location where the Class I brake test or mechanical inspection was
scheduled to be performed. FRA recognizes that, due to the specialized
nature of this equipment, proper inspections can only be conducted at a
limited number of locations. FRA also recognizes that trains become
delayed en route due to problems which are not readily foreseeable.
Thus, FRA will permit the continued use of such equipment to the
location where the required inspection was scheduled to be performed.
Paragraph (e) restates Sec. 238.15 and provides a cross-reference
to that section. The paragraph provides that trains developing en route
defective, inoperative, or insecure primary brake equipment be moved in
accordance with the requirements of that section.
Paragraph (f) restates Sec. 238.17 and adds a narrow exception to
that section. The paragraph requires that Tier II equipment that
develops a defective condition not related to the primary brake be
moved and handled in accordance with the requirements contained in
Sec. 238.17, with one exception. The exception to these requirements
applies to a failure of the secondary portion of the brake that occurs
en route. In those circumstances, the train may proceed to the next
scheduled equivalent Class I brake test at a speed no greater than the
maximum safe operating speed demonstrated through analysis and testing
for braking with the friction brake alone. At that location the brake
system shall be restored to 100 percent operation before the train
continues in service. This final rule allows extensive flexibility for
the movement of equipment with defective brakes, but also contains a
hard requirement that all brake components be repaired and the brake
system, including secondary brakes, be restored at the location of the
train's next major brake test. FRA believes that this approach
recognizes the secondary role played by the electric portion of blended
brakes. If the railroad has demonstrated that the friction brake alone
can stop the train within signal spacing without thermal damage to
braking surfaces, then the train may be used at normal maximum speed in
the event of an electric brake failure. This final rule essentially
limits the use of trains without available secondary braking systems to
no more than 48 hours. FRA believes that Sec. 238.17 strikes the
correct balance between the need of railroads to transport passengers
to their destination and the need to have equipment with defects that
could lead to more serious safety problems quickly repaired. This
requirement places a heavy responsibility on qualified maintenance
persons to exercise their judgment on when and how equipment is safe to
move.
[[Page 25646]]
Paragraph (g) requires that scheduled maintenance intervals be
based on the analysis conducted pursuant to the railroad's safety plan,
and be approved by FRA under the procedures of Sec. 238.505. The rule
allows the maintenance intervals for safety-critical components to be
changed only when justified by accumulated acceptable operating data.
Changes in maintenance cycles of safety-critical components must be
based on verifiable data made available to all interested parties and
shall be reviewed by FRA. This paragraph is another attempt to balance
the needs of the operating railroad to run efficiently and the concern
of rail labor organizations that railroads not have the ability to
unilaterally make safety decisions. For a new system, with no operating
history, a formal system safety analysis is the only justifiable way to
set initial maintenance intervals. The paragraph recognizes that as
time passes and an operating history is developed, a basis for changing
maintenance intervals can be established. However, the decision to make
these changes must have the participation of all the affected parties.
Paragraph (h) requires that the operating railroad establish a
training, qualification, and designation program as defined in the
training program plan under Sec. 238.109 to qualify individuals to
perform safety inspections, tests, and maintenance on the equipment. If
the railroad deems it safety-critical, then only qualified individuals
may perform the safety inspection, test, or maintenance of the
equipment. This paragraph does not prescribe a detailed training
program or qualification and designation process. Those details are
left to the operating railroad, but FRA must approve the program
proposed by the operating railroad under procedures contained in
Sec. 238.505.
Paragraph (i) requires the operating railroad to establish standard
procedures for performing all safety-critical inspections, tests,
maintenance, or repair. This paragraph also makes clear that the
inspection, testing, and maintenance program required by this section
should not include procedures to address employee working conditions
that arise in the course of conducting the inspections, tests, and
maintenance set forth in the program. FRA intends for the program
required by this section to detail only those tasks required to be
performed in order to conduct the inspections, tests, and maintenance
necessary to ensure that the equipment is in safe and proper condition
for use. In proposing the creation of these plans, FRA did not intend
to enter into the area of addressing employee safety while conducting
the inspections, tests, and maintenance covered by the programs. FRA is
always concerned with the safety of employees while conducting their
duties, but employee safety in maintenance and servicing areas
generally falls within the jurisdiction of OSHA. It is not FRA's intent
to oust OSHA's jurisdiction with regard to the safety of employees
while performing the inspections, tests and maintenance required by
this part, except where FRA has already addressed workplace safety
issues, such as blue signal protection. Therefore, in order to prevent
any uncertainty as to FRAs intent, FRA has modified this paragraph by
eliminating any language or provision which could have been potentially
perceived as displacing the jurisdiction of OSHA and has added a
specific clarification that FRA does not intend for the program
required by this section to address employee safety while conducting
the inspections and tests described. Consequently, the specific
elements that FRA proposed to be included in the inspection, testing,
and maintenance plan have been eliminated for the reasons noted above
and because they were merely duplicative of the general requirements
contained in paragraph (a) of this section and are unnecessary.
Paragraph (k) requires that the operating railroad establish an
inspection, testing, and maintenance quality control program enforced
by railroad or contractor supervisors. In essence, this creates the
need for the operating railroad to perform spot checks of the work
performed by its employee and contract equipment maintainers to ensure
that the work is performed in accordance with established procedures
and Federal requirements. FRA believes this is an important management
function that has a history of being neglected in the railroad
industry.
Paragraph (l) requires the operating railroad to identify each
inspection and testing procedure and criterion and each maintenance
interval that the railroad considers safety-critical.
Section 238.505 Program Approval Procedure
This section contains the procedures a railroad shall follow in
securing FRA approval of its inspection, testing, and maintenance
program for Tier II passenger equipment. As no substantive adverse
comments were received on this section, FRA has retained this section
as proposed in the 1997 NPRM.
Subpart G--Specific Safety Planning Requirements for Tier II Passenger
Equipment
Section 238.601 Scope
This subpart contains specific requirements for Tier II passenger
equipment safety planning. These safety planning requirements include
requirements for the operation of Tier II passenger equipment,
procurement of Tier II passenger equipment, and the introduction or
major upgrade of new technology in existing Tier II passenger equipment
that affects a safety system on such equipment.
The discussion of this subpart should be read in conjunction with
the general discussion of safety planning earlier in the preamble. FRA
is retaining more extensive safety planning requirements for Tier II
railroad operations, as these will be operations with new
characteristics that require special attention and have heightened
safety risks due to the speed of the equipment.
Section 238.603 Safety Planning Requirements
Paragraph (a) requires that, prior to commencing revenue service
operation of Tier II passenger equipment, each railroad shall prepare
and execute a written plan for the safe operation of such equipment.
The plan may be combined with a pre-revenue service acceptance testing
plan required under Sec. 238.111, and any other plan required under
this part provided that the individual planning elements required under
this part are addressed. The plan shall be updated at least every 365
days.
Paragraph (b) requires that for each procurement of Tier II
passenger equipment, and for each major upgrade or introduction of new
technology in existing Tier II passenger equipment that affects a
safety system on such equipment, each railroad shall prepare and
execute a written safety plan. The plan may also be combined with a
pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan required under
Sec. 238.111, and any other plan required under this part provided that
the individual planning elements required under this part are
addressed.
As noted earlier in the preamble, Bombardier, in its comments on
the NPRM, believed that the proposed rule confused the requirements for
a railroad's system safety plan with those required for equipment
acquisition. Bombardier recommended that they be separately addressed.
This section in the final rule reflects these comments in that
paragraph (a) addresses requirements for an overall safety plan for
Tier II passenger equipment, while paragraph (b) addresses planning
[[Page 25647]]
requirements for equipment acquisition and upgrade.
Paragraph (c) requires that each railroad maintain sufficient
documentation to demonstrate how the operation and design of its Tier
II passenger equipment complies with safety requirements or, as
appropriate, addresses safety requirements under paragraphs (a)(4) and
(b)(7) of this section. Each railroad shall also maintain sufficient
documentation to track how safety issues are raised and resolved.
Paragraph (d) requires that each railroad make available to FRA for
inspection and copying upon request each safety plan required by this
section and any documentation required pursuant to such plan. This
section does not in itself require FRA approval of a plan. However, FRA
approval would be required for those sections of a plan intended to
comply with the requirements of Sec. 238.111, for example.
Appendix A--Schedule of Civil Penalties
This appendix contains a schedule of civil penalties to be used in
connection with this part. Because such penalty schedules are
statements of policy, notice and comment are not required prior to
their issuance. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A). Commenters were invited to
submit suggestions to FRA describing the types of actions or omissions
under each regulatory section that would subject a person to the
assessment of a civil penalty. Commenters were also invited to
recommend what penalties may be appropriate, based upon the relative
seriousness of each type of violation. FRA received no specific
comments in response.
Appendix B--Test Methods and Performance Criteria for the Flammability
and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in Passenger Cars
and Locomotive Cabs
The table of test methods and performance criteria contained in
Appendix B has been revised to address concerns related to their
adoption as a regulation. These revisions include reorganization of
categories and function of materials listed in the table in Appendix B;
inclusion of a note to permit the substitution of seat and mattress
assembly tests for individual material tests; inclusion of a note to
require dynamic tests to be performed for seat cushions prior to fire
tests; revision of performance criteria for certain materials;
inclusion of a note to permit a testing exception for small parts;
inclusion of a note to permit the use of an alternative heat release
rate and smoke generation test for small miscellaneous, discontinuous
parts; and addition of a category for wire and cable insulation
requirements. Three definitions which relate to heat release rate were
added to those previously listed in Appendix B of the NPRM. A new
category of structural components other than structural flooring which
may be exposed to fire hazards and associated notes was also added. The
complete list of notes has also been renumbered from that contained in
the NPRM to reflect these revisions.
The revisions were selected based on the results of analysis of
input from several resources. (A detailed rationale for all revisions
is also contained in a supporting document prepared under contract to
the Volpe Center and placed in the public docket for this
rulemaking.\6\) First, the comments of the parties who responded to the
NPRM were reviewed. As raised in particular by Fire Cause Analysis in
its comments on the NPRM, the current classification of items listed in
the categories and functions in the table contained in Appendix B in
the NPRM (based on FRA's 1989 guidelines) has caused confusion and
conflict as to what materials should be tested according to what test
methods. Second, a document containing the rationale for the
development of the original flammability and smoke emission tests and
performance criteria was reviewed.\7\ Third, the previous Federal
Register notices pertaining to tests and performance criteria published
as the 1989 FRA guidelines (54 FR 1837; Jan 17, 1989) and published as
recommended practices by FTA (then-UMTA) for rail transit vehicles (47
FR 53559, Nov. 26, 1982; 49 FR 32482, Aug. 14, 1984) and for transit
buses and vans (55 FR 27402, July 2, 1990; 57 FR 1360, Jan 13, 1992; 58
FR 54250, Oct. 20, 1993) were reviewed. Fourth, the input from railroad
operators, carbuilders, and consultants who participated in a Workshop
held at the NIST Building and Fire Research Laboratory in July 1997 was
considered.\8\ Fifth, documentation prepared by the NFPA Railroad Task
Force for the NFPA 130 Committee was reviewed.9,10 Sixth,
the results of the ongoing FRA-sponsored NIST fire safety research
project were reviewed; as well as the results of tests jointly funded
by Amtrak and FRA using alternative seat assemblies considered for use
in Amtrak's high-speed trainsets. Seventh, the results of the NTSB-
sponsored fire tests conducted for MARC commuter rail cars were
reviewed.\11\ All of these inputs and further analysis were used as the
basis to simplify the table in Appendix B of the NPRM and reduce
confusion and duplication in revising the list of tests and performance
criteria and related notes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ ``Recommendations for Revising the Fire Safety Performance
Requirements in Federal Railroad Administration Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) For Passenger Equipment, September 23, 1997,''
Prepared by J. Zicherman and S. Markos. Draft Project Memorandum.
December, 1998.
\7\ ``Rationale for Recommended Fire Safety Practices for Rail
Transit Materials Section.'' Transportation Systems Center. Report
nos: MA-06-0098-82-1, and DOT-TSC-UMTA 81-74, January, 1983. A copy
of this document has been placed in the public docket for this
rulemaking.
\8\ ``Follow-UP Notes: NIST/CFR FRA Project, Meeting/Workshop of
7/23/97,''above.
\9\ ``Proposed Revision of NFPA 130, Table 4-2.4,
Recommendations for Testing the Flammability and Smoke Emission
Characteristics of Rail Transit Vehicle Materials; Review Paper--
Status Update.'' NFPA 130 Press Working Group Meeting of 8/15/97.
Prepared by J. Zicherman. A copy of this document has been placed in
the public docket for this rulemaking.
\10\ ``Proposed Revision of NFPA 130 Table 4-2.4,
Recommendations for Testing the Flammability and Smoke Emission
Characteristics of Rail Transit Vehicle Materials; Review Paper--
Status Update.'' NFPA 130 Press Working Group Meeting of 10/15/97.
Prepared by J. Zicherman. A copy of this document has been placed in
the public docket for this rulemaking.
\11\ ``Interpretive Report: Flammability and Smoke Compliance
and Fire Analysis (MARC/Amtrak Collision, February 16, 1996).''
Prepared for National Transportation Safety Board. Prepared by J. G.
Quintiere, University of Maryland. Final Report. December 19, 1996.
A copy of this document has been placed in the public for this
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most of the items listed under ``Function of Material'' in the
table in Appendix B of the NPRM have identical (or nearly identical)
flammability pass/fail performance criteria. For example, although they
were listed separately in the NPRM under function of material in the
table, ``Seat and/or Mattress Frame''; ``Seat and Toilet Shroud'';
``Wall''; ``Ceiling''; ``Windscreen''; ``Partition, Tables and
Shelves''; ``HVAC Ducting''; ``Window''; ``Light Diffuser''; ``End Cap
[and] Roof Housings''; and ``Interior [and] Exterior Boxes'' all were
subject to the same ASTM E 162 test procedure and performance criteria
for flame spread. Accordingly, in the final rule, all of these items
have been combined under the single category of ``Vehicle Components''
in the table in Appendix B. Overall, the items listed under
``Category'' and ``Function of Material'' have been decreased from
seven to six and from twenty-eight to ten, respectively, from the same
table in the NPRM. The majority of entries have also been re-titled.
The new ``Category'' and ``Function of Material'' titles streamline the
table presentation while retaining all the actual material functions
used in an intercity or commuter rail passenger car
[[Page 25648]]
or locomotive cab. Some revisions have also been made to acknowledge
that certain existing performance criteria are so close as to be
indistinguishable based on the precision of the test methods used
(e.g., flame spread values of 25 vs. 35 using test procedure ASTM E
162). Of course, some material categories or subcategories could not be
combined since they require different test methods, e.g., fabrics
versus cushions. In addition, other considerations (such as ballistic
test requirements for plastic window glazing) have precluded the
combination of (and thus identical performance criteria for) some
categories and material functions.
Specific revisions to the table in Appendix B of the NPRM are
summarized in the following text. In addition, the notes to the table
have been revised and renumbered to reflect the table's reorganization,
and the text for several new notes has been added. The notes to the
table will be discussed where appropriate in the discussion of the
table below, and a discussion of the complete list of notes is also
provided.
``Cushions, Mattresses'' is a new category in the table which was
formerly listed under the function of material column and included
under the previously used category ``Passenger seats, Sleeping and
dining car components.'' See 62 FR 49823. Note 1 to the table which
concerns flaming dripping or running is virtually identical to Note 1
as proposed in the NPRM. Note 2 is virtually identical to Note 5 as
proposed in the NPRM, and pertains to ASTM E 662 smoke emission limits.
The note renumbering provides consecutive numbering logic within the
revised categories and function of materials.
As explained, FRA has been investigating the testing of assemblies
of materials for performance in a fire, rather than individually
testing the materials which comprise such assemblies, to more
accurately reflect the interaction of materials in a fire. As part of
the FRA-sponsored fire safety research program managed by the Volpe
Center, six full-scale alternative seat assemblies being considered for
the Amtrak high-speed train sets were tested in March, 1997, using a
furniture calorimeter (ASTM E 1537). \12\ The tests, jointly funded by
FRA and Amtrak, used current Amtrak upholstery and different cushion
foams; fire blocking layers were used in some trials. The test results
showed that fire blocking layers can significantly prevent fire
ignition, and limit flame spread, fire growth, and smoke generation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ ``Passenger Rail Car Seat Fire Tests; ASTME E 1357/CAL TB
133.'' J. Zicherman and S. Markos. Draft Project Memorandum.
December 1998. A copy of the report has been placed in the public
docket for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 3 permits the testing of seat and mattress assemblies
incorporating heat release rate methods developed by consensus. Testing
the performance of a seat or mattress assembly as an integrated unit,
which is more representative of an actual condition, will be an
alternative to individually testing the components that comprise the
seat or mattress assembly. Seat assemblies and mattresses to be tested
in this alternative manner shall use ASTM E 1537, ``Standard Test
Method for Fire Testing of Upholstered Seating Furniture,'' and shall
use pass/fail criteria specified in California Technical Bulletin (CAL
TB) 133, ``Flammability Test Procedure for Seating Furniture for Use in
Public Occupancies.'' CAL TB 133 has a successful history of use at
state and municipal levels for high-hazard occupied places, such as
nursing homes. Results of the March, 1997 tests using the ASTM E 1537
test procedure on seat assemblies being considered for Amtrak's high-
speed trainsets showed that certain assemblies met the Cal TB 133 test
criteria and exhibited a total lack of flame spread as well as low heat
and smoke release. Id. In addition, data from Amtrak-funded tests
showed that seat assemblies selected for use on Amtrak's high-speed
trainsets passed both the ASTM D 3675 and FAA ``oil burner'' tests.
Acceptance of results using the alternative test approach in Note 3
for seat and mattress assemblies requires an accompanying fire hazard
analysis for the specific application. This analysis may take the form
of a specific system safety or fire protection analysis. The analysis
must provide for necessary quality control of components used in these
assemblies in actual day-to-day use. Quality control must be part of
the daily operating plans for a system to ensure that individual
substandard materials or components are not substituted within a given
component assembly for parts having an identical function which are of
acceptable quality. In conducting the fire hazard analysis, the
operating environment within which seat and mattress assemblies
qualified by assembly tests will be used must also be considered in
relation to the risk of vandalism, puncture, cutting, or other acts or
external forces which may expose the individual components of the
assemblies. Seats and mattresses using certain types of foams must
resist vandalism, puncture, cutting, and other acts and external
forces. Robust blocking layer(s), resistant to both fire (as used to
meet FAA fire seat regulations), as well as to cutting and puncture,
may be required. If used, these blocking layers must be applied in a
manner which seals the seams (e.g., using bonding or ceramic thread
with binding tape) and ensures that the foam does not leak or drip out
and become exposed to ignition. The U.S. Coast Guard has issued a
Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NAVIC) for structural fire
protection which permits the use of fire blockers if tested according
to Cal TB 133; the NAVIC states that these materials have proven
effective in protecting combustible foams from being involved in a
fire. \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ ``Navigation and Inspection Circular No. 9-97. Guide to
Structural Fire Protection.'' US Coast Guard. COMDTPUB P16700.4,
October 31, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRA notes that the ASTM E 1537 test procedure was not expressly
referenced in the NPRM to allow testing of seat and mattress assemblies
in this alternative manner. However, FRA did intend to permit use of
alternative test procedures to demonstrate flammability and smoke
emission characteristics of materials (upon special approval by FRA).
See 62 FR 49803. FRA has, in effect, granted approval to any party to
use the ASTM E 1537 test procedure to demonstrate the flammability and
smoke emission characteristics of seat and mattress assemblies in
accordance with the requirements of Note 3, in lieu of utilizing the
testing methods otherwise required by the table in Appendix B.
Note 4 applies to seat cushion testing without upholstery and is
identical to Note 9 as proposed in the NPRM. The note renumbering
provides consecutive numbering logic within the revised categories and
function of materials.
Note 5 requires the dynamic testing of seat cushions to address the
retention of fire retardant characteristics of foams after the
materials have been in service for a period of time. The precedent for
the addition of Note 5 requiring the performance of an endurance test
(ASTM D 3574, Test I2 (Dynamic Fatigue Test by the Roller
Shear at Constant Force) or Test I3 (Dynamic Fatigue Test by
Constant Force Pounding) both using Procedure B) for seat cushions is
noted in the FTA notices relating to transit bus and van materials (58
FR 54250, 57 FR 1360). The concern that fire and smoke emission
characteristics of materials may change over time will be more fully
examined in the second phase of this rulemaking.
A new category title ``Fabrics'' includes seat upholstery, mattress
ticking and covers, and curtains, as formerly included under the
category
[[Page 25649]]
``Passenger seats, Sleeping and dining car components'' in the table in
Appendix B of the NPRM. The term ``All'' under function of material
eliminates confusion as to what must be tested; if composed of fabric,
window shades, draperies and wall coverings are required to be tested.
The test procedure for purposes of the burn test is an FAA test found
at 14 CFR part 25, Appendix F, Part I (vertical test). FRA has
referenced this test procedure directly in the table and, thereby,
removed the intermediate reference to 14 CFR Sec. 25.853(a), as stated
in the NPRM. Formerly, smoke emission requirements were limited to
250 for ``coated'' and 100 for ``uncoated''
fabrics at four minutes. The latter is typically PVC vinyl-based
upholstery fabric. It was determined that a uniform criteria of
200 at four minutes for the smoke emission rate would be
appropriate for both classes of fabrics, based in part on the known
performance of the range of fabrics available, and the definition of
coated and uncoated used by the ASTM, rather than the terms used in the
above-cited report, ``Rationale for Recommended Fire Safety Practices
for Rail Transit Materials Selection,'' prepared by the Volpe Center in
the early 1980s. Moreover, allowing a higher smoke emission performance
criteria for coated fabrics--more than twice that allowed for uncoated
fabrics--provides an inconsistent level of safety. In addition, the
NFPA 130 Committee has accepted a recommendation for the identical
change in its revised table requirements.
Notes 6 and 7, which pertain to washing and dry cleaning of
materials, are almost identical to Notes 2 and 3 as proposed in the
NPRM. These notes were renumbered to reflect consecutive numbering
logic within the revised categories and function of materials. In
addition, some upholstery materials must be dry cleaned. Accordingly,
Note 7 applies to upholstery materials.
Note 8 was formerly the second sentence in Note 3 as proposed in
the NPRM. However, since that sentence also included the words
``washed,'' as well as ``dry cleaned,'' this text was separated into a
new Note 8 to ensure that the labeling requirement would be clearly
understood to apply whatever cleaning method is used.
The new category ``Vehicle Components'' includes the majority of
those materials formerly listed in the NPRM under the categories of
``Panels,'' ``Flooring'' (except structural), thermal and acoustical
``Insulation'' (see discussion below), ``Elastomers,'' ``Exterior
Plastic Components,'' and ``Component Box Covers.'' Note 9 specifies,
as a minimum, which combustible component materials must be tested, and
is based on the components listed in the table in Appendix B of the
NPRM.
Note 10 provides that testing of vehicle component miscellaneous,
discontinuous small parts may not be necessary if such parts do not
contribute materially to fire growth and the surface area of any
individual small part is not greater than or equal to 16 square inches
(100 cm2) in end use configuration. A fire hazard analysis
is required that considers both the quantity of the parts (e.g.,
limited) and the location of the parts (e.g., at discontinuous, or
isolated locations, or both), as well as the vulnerability of the parts
to ignition and contribution to flame spread. As an example, grommets
used on seats or window shades present an insignificant fire threat and
could logically and safely be exempted from testing. Such small parts
have been selectively exempted through the use of similar language in
rail car specification documents for many years. On the other hand,
other materials, such as those used to produce wire ties (of which
hundreds or thousands may be included in a single car to mount power
and low voltage cable bundles) shall not be exempted from testing, as
specified in Note 11.
Note 11 relates to Note 10. If the surface area of any individual
small part is less than 16 square inches (100 cm2) in end
use configuration, such small part must be tested using the ASTM E
1354-97 test procedure, ``Standard Test Method for Heat and Visible
Smoke Release Rates for Materials and Products Using an Oxygen
Consumption Calorimeter'' (e.g., Cone Calorimeter), unless such small
part has been shown not to contribute materially to fire growth
following an appropriate fire hazard analysis as specified in Note 10.
ASTM E 1354 measures heat release rate (HRR) at a prescribed heat flux
using oxygen depletion techniques and produces information including
data for time of ignition and peak HRR. The quotient of these two
parameters has been evaluated as part of the current FRA-funded NIST
research program, as well as in other research, and has been shown to
reliably predict ignitability (see Hirschler, 1992, 1995 14
15). Ignitability is also a parameter of importance for certain small
parts used in rail passenger cars. In addition, such parts, because of
their small size and end uses, may be important from an ignition
perspective, but not from a flame spread perspective. The pass/fail
criterion:
\14\ ``Tools Available to Predict Full Scale Fire Performance of
Furniture,'' Fire and Polymers II. Hirschler, M.M. Ed. G. L. Nelson,
ACS Symp. Series 599. Ch. 36, pp. 593-608.
\15\ ``Effect of a Single Furnishing Product on Fire Hazard in
Actual Occupancies Based on Heat Release Rate.'' Hirschler, M.M.
Proceedings, NFPRF Symposium and FIre Risk & Hazard, San Francisco,
June 25-27, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
tig/ q//max 1.5
is defined by the ratio of a given sample's sustained time in seconds
(s) to ignition (tig) to its peak (maximum) heat release
rate (q//max), as measured in the Cone Calorimeter under the
stipulated exposure conditions. This quantity has been demonstrated to
be a direct measure of a material's sensitivity to ignition, which is
important since the class of parts referred to here will not, due to
their small size, contribute markedly to fire growth and heat release.
However, these parts may, if capable of showing sustained ignition,
cause secondary ignition of surrounding materials subsequent to their
own ignition. The required heat flux exposure of 50 kW/m2 is
sufficiently high to ignite materials which have a reasonable degree of
intrinsic ignition resistance. The pass/fail criterion is based on
relatively current research, including that conducted by NIST for
passenger railroad materials cited earlier. FRA notes that the ASTM E
1354 test method was not expressly referenced in the NPRM. However, as
identified by the Volpe Center during its fire safety research, this
test procedure is an appropriate way to address the flammability and
smoke emission characteristics of small parts and its use in this final
rule complements the exemption from testing otherwise provided for
small parts as specified in Note 10. Note 12 relates to Note 11. If, in
accordance with Note 11, small miscellaneous, discontinuous parts are
tested using ASTM E 1354 and an appropriate fire hazard analysis
accompanies the test results, such small parts do not have to be tested
for smoke generation using the ASTM E 662 test procedure.
Flexible cellular foam products not used for seat and mattress
applications are now included in the separate ``Vehicle Components''
category to address the unique fire-related properties represented when
used for arm rests, seatback ``crash'' padding, and thermal and
acoustical insulation. The different armrest test requirements in Note
8 in the NPRM have been deleted. The differentiation is no longer
necessary since the new Function of Material ``Flexible Cellular
Foams'' requires that armrest foam material be tested according to ASTM
D 3675. If
[[Page 25650]]
hard plastic, the armrest test requirement is ASTM E 162. Tests
conducted by NIST in 1983 of Amtrak interior materials showed that foam
armrests assist flame spread from seat cushions to wall liners.
Thermal and acoustical insulation materials were previously
included as a separate table category in the NPRM, with values
identical to cushions and mattresses for flame spread (less than or
equal to 25) and smoke emission (less than or equal to 100 for 1.5
minutes). (Thermal and acoustical insulation did not expressly contain
a smoke emission criterion for 4 minutes in the NPRM, though intended
to be less than or equal to 200.) Flexible cellular foam is sometimes
used as thermal and acoustical insulation; if so used, the requirements
remain unchanged (25, 100, and 200, respectively). Otherwise, the
performance criteria for insulation materials are now 35, 100, and 200,
respectively, to be consistent with other vehicle components.
Note 13 relates to the use of carpet on walls and ceilings and is
virtually identical to Note 10 as proposed in the NPRM. Note 14
concerns floor coverings and is virtually identical to Note 7 as
proposed in the NPRM.
Two items having identical test performance criteria relating to
use of plastics in light transmitting assemblies under the function of
material column in the table in Appendix B in the NPRM have been
combined into a new ``Light transmitting plastics'' function of
material column in the final rule. This terminology is consistent with
use of the term for identical plastics in the construction industry and
building codes. The test performance criteria remain unchanged from the
NPRM. In addition, this category also provides for uniform acceptance
criteria for transparent plastics used in windscreens, which formerly
were not clearly addressed. Note 15 pertains to window glazing and is
virtually identical to that in Note 4 as proposed in the NPRM.
Renumbering of the note reflects consecutive numbering logic.
The separate category of ``Elastomers'' in the table in the NPRM
has been included under the function of material column in the
``Vehicle Components'' category in the table in the final rule. As
indicated in Note 16, the flammability test method for elastomers has
been revised to reference ASTM C 1166, which has superseded ASTM C 542
as proposed in the NPRM. As specified in Note 16, only elastomeric
parts with surface areas equal to or more than 16 square inches (100
cm2) in end use configuration are required to be tested
using ASTM C 1166; elastomeric parts with smaller surface areas need
not be tested using ASTM C 1166. Accordingly, diaphragms, window
gaskets, door nosing, and roof mats would continue to be tested; in
addition, due to their size, flexible flat seat ``springs'' or
suspension membranes are also required to be tested using ASTM C 1166.
Testing requirements for miscellaneous small parts comprised of
elastomeric composition having a surface area less than 16 square
inches are discussed in Notes 10, 11, and 12.
The test requirement differentiation in Notes 10, 11,12, and 16
according to part size is based on several factors. Many small
miscellaneous parts used in car construction may be composed of
elastomeric materials. These parts include cleats, blocks, abrasion and
vibration damping pads. As such, these parts are frequently molded and
are not readily available for testing in sizes required for either the
ASTM E 162 or ASTM C 1166 test methods without undergoing special
fabrication. Moreover, as noted in the discussion concerning Note 11,
ASTM E 1354 is sensitive to ignition properties rather than flame
spread. The later parameter would be a critical variable if such parts
were used in applications with larger exposed surface areas.
The subject of ``Wire and Cable'' has been addressed by the
addition of a new category in the table which requires smoke and
flammability emission screening for wire and cable insulation. This is
especially important due to the greater quantities of wire and cable
used in electrically-powered intercity and commuter rail passenger
cars. Fire-related tests and performance criteria for wire and cable
insulation were not expressly included in the table proposed in
Appendix B of the NPRM. The test methods of the IEEE, Insulated Cable
Engineers Association (ICEA), National Electrical Manufacturers
Association (NEMA), and Underwriters Laboratories Inc. (UL) specified
in the final rule have long and successful histories of use, and have
also been specified in the existing NFPA 130 requirements. In Note 17,
one set of test methods is comprised of NEMA WC 3/ICEA S-19-1981,
paragraph 6.19.6, and the second set is comprised of UL 44 and UL 83.
The ICEA and NEMA jointly issued NEMA WC 3/ICEA S-19-1981, and it
includes testing for both thermosetting wire insulation and for
thermoplastic wire insulation. In Note 18, in addition to passing ANSI/
IEEE Standard 383, section 2.5, the power cable must also demonstrate
continued circuit integrity for 5 minutes to allow continued short term
operation of power when exposed to ignition.
FRA notes that, in its comments on the NPRM, the IEEE (like the
NFPA) referred to the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
of 1995, above, and the provision which requires, in general, that
Federal agencies ``use technical standards that are developed or
adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies.'' The IEEE cited its
own development of voluntary consensus standards and their potential
for integration in this rulemaking. In the second phase of the
rulemaking, FRA will consider with the Working Group the appropriate
use of other IEEE standards in this and other subject areas, in
addition to the IEEE standard contained in this rule for fire safety.
The new category ``Structural Components'' addresses the structural
integrity of floor assemblies and other structural elements. In
Appendix B of the NPRM, only the performance of structural flooring was
expressly addressed in the table itself and in the text of former Note
6. The first sentence of text relating to penetrations as proposed in
Note 6 in the NPRM has been separated and inserted as Note 19 in the
final rule. Note 19 requires that penetrations be tested as part of
floor assemblies and other structural elements. The text in the second
sentence of Note 6 as proposed in the NPRM specifically pertained to
structural flooring assemblies, and it has been separated and inserted
into Note 20 in the final rule.
Note 21 addresses the structural integrity of less well defined and
design dependent rail car structural elements, other than floors. These
structural elements may carry significant weight loads or have
important fire barrier functions in protecting train occupants, or
both. Examples include extensive HVAC or power-conditioning equipment
installed on roofs or electrical equipment lockers, which may become
involved in fires. Such fires may result from mechanical failures,
electrical insulation breakdown, or from other hazards. Accordingly,
Note 21 requires that portions of the vehicle body (other than floors
but including the roof) which separate major ignition sources, or
sources of fuel load from the vehicle interior, demonstrate fire
endurance by a fire hazard analysis acceptable to the railroad.
The following summary lists the changes to the content of the notes
and their numbering from the NPRM, reflecting both the table
reorganization in the final rule as well as additional requirements:
Note 1 is virtually identical to that in the NPRM. Note 2 is
[[Page 25651]]
virtually identical to Note 5 in the NPRM. Note 3 permits the testing
of seat and mattress assemblies according to ASTM E 1537 using Cal TB
133 performance criteria. Note 4 is identical to Note 9 in the NPRM.
Note 5 requires dynamic testing of seat cushions. Notes 6 and 7 are
virtually identical to Notes 2 and 3 in the NPRM. The text of Note 8 is
virtually identical to the second sentence of Note 3 in the NPRM. Note
9 lists vehicle component materials which must be tested, at a minimum.
Note 10 allows a testing exception for materials used to fabricate
small, discontinuous parts that will not contribute materially to fire
growth in end use configuration, provided an appropriate fire hazard
analysis is conducted. Note 11 requires that if the surface area of any
individual small part is less than 16 square inches (100
cm2) in end use configuration, such small part must be
tested using the ASTM E 1354 test procedure, unless such small part has
been shown not to contribute materially to fire growth following an
appropriate fire hazard analysis as specified in Note 10. Note 12
relates to Note 11. If, in accordance with Note 11, small parts are
tested using ASTM E 1354 and an appropriate fire hazard analysis
accompanies the test results, such small parts do not have to be tested
for smoke generation using the ASTM E 662 test procedure. Note 13 is
virtually identical to Note 10 in the NPRM. Note 14 is virtually
identical to Note 7 in the NPRM. Note 15 is virtually identical to Note
4 in the NPRM. Note 16 provides test requirements for elastomeric
materials greater than 16 square inches (100 cm2) in end use
configuration and requires that, at a minimum, window gaskets, door
nosings, diaphragms, and roof mats be tested. Notes 17 and 18 apply to
wire and cable insulation. Note 19 is based on the last sentence of
text formerly in Note 6 in the NPRM. Note 20 contains the first part of
text of Note 6 in the NPRM. Note 21 addresses new test requirements for
other structural components, such as car roofs and electrical cabinets,
in addition to the floor assembly.
The list of standards contained in Appendix B, paragraph (c), in
the NPRM has been revised and updated.
Appendix C--Suspension System Safety Performance Standards
The purpose of Appendix C is to prevent the occurrence of a variety
of derailments due to forces on wheels. FRA has revised and clarified
the requirements of this appendix based on comments received in
response to the NPRM.
First, Bombardier commented that as proposed by FRA some
differences existed between Appendix C and the requirements of the
then-proposed Track Safety Standards, Sec. 213.333. Consequently,
Bombardier recommended that FRA change Appendix C to resolve the
discrepancies; or eliminate Appendix C and reference the track safety
standards' table of vehicle/track interaction performance limits in
Sec. 213.333 and incorporate Bombardier's proposed changes submitted as
part of its September 15, 1997 hearing testimony on the track safety
standards.
At the Working Group meeting in January 1998, a Volpe Center
representative explained that the discrepancy between proposed Appendix
C and the proposed track safety standards may be justifiable because
Appendix C would apply only to new passenger equipment; whereas the
then-proposed standards in the track safety rule would apply to both
new and existing equipment. Appendix C's standards could therefore be
necessarily stricter. In this regard, FRA has retained Appendix C and
not simply referenced the track safety standards' table of vehicle/
track interaction performance limits in 49 CFR Sec. 213.333. Points 4
and 6 in Appendix C are not found in the track safety standards' table
of vehicle/track interaction safety limits, and thus need to be
retained in this passenger equipment rule to ensure the safety of new
passenger equipment. However, FRA has otherwise reconciled Appendix C
with the track safety standards' table in Sec. 213.333.
Talgo, in its comments on proposed Appendix C, suggested that FRA
reword the second paragraph in the Appendix to clarify that the
performance standards are meant to apply to the average values for the
parameters recorded during the time the train travels six feet. FRA has
not adopted Talgo's suggestion, however. FRA intended that the
performance standards apply to the maximum values for the parameters
recorded to ensure that the passenger equipment operates within outer
safety limits. Use of average values would mask real safety concerns.
Talgo also recommended that FRA define the method for signal
filtering. FRA has adopted Talgo's recommendation and specified that,
for purposes of this appendix, wheel/rail force measurements shall be
processed through a low pass filter having a cut-off frequency of 25
Hz.
Finally, Talgo recommended that points 4 and 5 in the appendix be
revised to acknowledge that they should not be applied to single-axle
trucks. FRA has not adopted Talgo's recommendation with respect to
points 4 and 5, to the extent that an exemption for rail cars with
single-axle trucks was sought. However, FRA provides the following
clarification of points 4 and 5. Point 4 provides that the sum of the
vertical wheel loads on one side of any truck shall not be less than or
equal to 20 percent of the static vertical axle load, and that this
shall include the effect of a crosswind allowance as specified by the
railroad for the intended service of the equipment. Whether the rolling
assembly is a single-axle or a double-axle truck, or whether solid or
stub axles are used to configure the truck, the risk of wheel unloading
is still present. If the vehicle is subjected to forces that reduce the
static vertical load per truck side to 20% or less of the static axle
load, an unsafe condition may exist. Point 4, therefore, requires that
the sum of vertical wheel loads on any side of any truck (or any other
suspension configuration per car end or between two car ends) be always
greater than 20% of the static vertical axle load. For stub (non-solid)
axles, an equivalent static vertical axle load may be computed by
adding the static vertical wheel loads on opposite sides. If the
rolling assembly has only one axle per suspension unit, as in the case
of Talgo equipment, then any single wheel load is required to be always
greater than 20% of its static value. As a result, point 4 of this
appendix will constitute a more stringent requirement than provided in
point 3. Point 5 of the appendix requires that the maximum truck side
L/V ratio not exceed 0.6. If the rolling assembly has only one axle per
suspension unit, as in the case of Talgo equipment, then the
corresponding L/V ratio computed for each consecutive pair of axles
shall be similarly limited to 0.6.
Appendix D to Part 238--Requirements for External Fuel Tanks on Tier I
Locomotives
This appendix contains the performance requirements for external
fuel tanks on Tier I locomotives, as adapted from AAR Recommended
Practice (RP) 506, ``Performance Requirements for Diesel Electric
Locomotive Fuel Tanks,'' effective July 1, 1995. In incorporating this
industry practice into Federal regulation, FRA has rephrased the text
of RP-506 in part. Yet, no substantive change is intended, except as
noted below. RP-506, a copy of which is available in the public docket
of this rulemaking, is comprised of sections entitled ``Scope,''
``Background,'' ``Limitations,'' and ``Structural Strength
Requirements.'' Appendix D represents the section
[[Page 25652]]
entitled ``Structural Strength Requirements,'' or Section 4 in RP-506.
FRA has not included Section 4.4 of RP-506 in Appendix D. Section
4.4 (``Fueling'') states, ``Internal structures of [the] tank must not
impede the flow of fuel through the tank while fueling at a rate of 300
gpm [gallons per minute].'' The rate at which a fuel tank may be fueled
is only a safety concern in the broad sense that the fuel not spill
from the tank while fueling. Of course, FRA recognizes that railroad
fuel dispensers utilize automatic shut-off devices that will stop the
flow of fuel before the fuel spills out of the tank if the fuel is
dispensed too readily for the tank to process. The ability of the tank
to accept fuel at a certain rate per minute therefore appears to be
more of an operational concern than a safety concern for a railroad in
that the process of fueling locomotives not be unnecessarily delayed..
As a result, FRA will not make Section 4.4. of RP-506 a safety
requirement of this rule, even though a railroad is free to make it its
own requirement in acquiring locomotives.
X. Regulatory Impact
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
This rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing policies
and procedures and is considered to be significant under both Executive
Order 12866 and DOT policies and procedures (44 FR 11034; Feb. 26,
1979). FRA has prepared and placed in the docket a full regulatory
evaluation of the rule (only a summary is provided below). This
evaluation estimates the costs and consequences of the rule as well as
its anticipated economic and safety benefits. The evaluation may be
inspected and photocopied during normal business hours by visiting the
FRA Docket Clerk at the Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, Seventh Floor,
1120 Vermont Avenue, in Washington, D.C. Photocopies may also be
obtained by submitting a written request by mail to the FRA Docket
Clerk at the Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1120 Vermont Ave, Mail Stop
10, Washington, D.C. 20590.
Certain requirements in the rule reflect current industry practices
or restate existing regulations, or both. As a result, in calculating
the costs of this rule, FRA has neither included the cost of those
actions that would have been performed voluntarily in the absence of
this rule, nor the costs of those actions that would have been required
by the existing regulations that have been restated in this rule.
Further, in calculating the benefits arising from this rule, FRA has
not included as a benefit any good resulting from such actions.
FRA expects that overall this rule will save the passenger rail
industry approximately $20 million Net Present Value (NPV) over the
next twenty years. Rail passengers are expected to benefit from reduced
delays totaling approximately $11 million (twenty-year NPV). FRA
expects the NPV of the total twenty-year costs incurred associated with
the rule to be $68.5 million. The NPV of the total twenty-year savings
expected to accrue to the industry from the rule is approximately $87
million. For some passenger rail operators, the total costs incurred
will exceed the total cost savings. For others, the cost savings will
outweigh the costs. Expected safety benefits coupled with reduced
passenger train delays outweigh the estimated costs of compliance with
this rule.
The following tables present the estimated twenty-year costs and
savings (NPV) associated with the specific requirements in this final
rule. To the best of FRA's ability, FRA has apportioned the total costs
and savings in the following tables between Amtrak, commuter railroads,
and the State of Washington to more precisely show the effects of this
final rule on these different entities. In commenting on the NPRM, APTA
had recommended that FRA segregate the costs and benefits to commuter
railroads from those involving Amtrak--and not represent both Amtrak
and commuter railroads together. FRA has separately identified the
State of Washington in the tables below because of the unique concerns
involving its operation of Talgo passenger equipment, discussed above
in the preamble.
Ideally, FRA would separately show the costs and savings for
commuter railroads from those involving Amtrak for each requirement in
the rule. However, FRA cannot separate some of the twenty-year costs
and savings of this rule with any degree of accuracy between Amtrak and
commuter railroads, especially for passenger equipment that is not yet
in service. For instance, FRA does not know how often Amtrak will order
new equipment or what specific type of equipment that may be. To a
certain extent, railroads will be able to control their level of
expenditures in response to this rule by choosing to overhaul or
rebuild equipment they own or by purchasing existing equipment from
other railroads instead of ordering new equipment. Of course, FRA can
more precisely apportion the costs and savings between Amtrak and
commuter railroads for the inspection, testing, and maintenance
requirements in this rule; those requirements will most significantly
impact the existing fleet of passenger equipment, which is readily
identifiable.
NPV 20-Year Costs Incurred
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Washington
Requirement category Amtrak Commuter rail State Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fire Safety--Materials.......................... $0 $0 $0 $0
Certification................................... (*) .............. .............. 84,752
New Equipment............................... .............. .............. .............. 253,625
Existing Equipment.......................... .............. .............. .............. 675,004
Inspect/Test/Maint.......................... .............. .............. .............. 142,056
Train Hardware & Software....................... 0 0 0 0
Inspect/Test/Maint. Program:
Existing Equipment.......................... .............. .............. .............. 277,816
New Equipment............................... .............. .............. .............. 167,958
Training Program:
Course Development.......................... .............. .............. .............. 1,720,629
Exterior Mech. Inspect...................... .............. .............. .............. 5,081,250
Interior Mech. Inspect...................... .............. .............. .............. 3,408,940
Pre-Revenue Service Testing:
Equip w/Prev. Op. Exp....................... .............. .............. .............. 16,950
Equip w/Out Prev. Op. Exp................... .............. .............. .............. 233,373
Rim-Stamped Straight-Plate Wheels............... 0 0 0 0
[[Page 25653]]
Emergency Lighting.............................. 0 0 0 0
Talgo--Risk Assessment.......................... 0 0 280,634 280,634
Anticlimber & Link to Car Body.................. 0 129,296 0 129,296
Forward End Structures.......................... 0 8,190,145 0 8,190,145
Corner Posts.................................... 0 1,532,517 0 1,532,517
Rollover Strength............................... .............. .............. .............. 29,305
Side Structure.................................. 0 0 0 0
Truck to Car Body Attachment.................... 0 0 0 0
Glazing......................................... .............. .............. .............. 1,303,894
Fuel Tanks...................................... 0 0 0 0
Electrical System............................... 0 0 0 0
Suspension System............................... 0 0 0 0
Brake System--Ease of Inspection................ .............. .............. .............. 32,179
Interior fittings and Surfaces.................. .............. .............. .............. 2,608,856
Emergency Window Exits.......................... 0 0 0 0
Doors--Manual Door Release...................... 0 3,968,598 0 3,968,598
Automated Monitoring............................ .............. .............. .............. 30,503
Mvmt Defective Equip--Non Brakes................ .............. .............. .............. 25,934
Mvmt Defective Equip--Brakes.................... .............. .............. .............. 735,249
Reporting and Tracking System................... 0 5,371,054 0 5,371,054
Daily Exterior Mech. Inspections................ 3,009,223 16,712,854 0 19,722,077
Qualified Maintenance Person.................... 0 1,447,370 .............. 1,447,370
Daily Interior Mech. Inspections................ .............. .............. .............. 10,861,361
Periodic Mechanical Inspection.................. .............. .............. .............. 201,639
Single Car Test................................. 0 0 0 0
---------------
Total Costs................................. .............. .............. .............. 68,532,966
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV 20-Year Savings
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Washington
Requirement category Amtrak Commuter rail State Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COT&S Interval Extensions:
Coaches..................................... $0 $9,227,510 $0 $9,227,510
MU locomotives.............................. 0 33,368,421 0 33,368,421
Cab cars.................................... 0 7,191,358 0 7,191,358
1,500-mile brake inspection..................... 31,852,373 0 0 31,852,373
Class IA brake tests............................ 0 4,360,701 0 4,360,701
Mvmt Defect Brakes--RR.......................... .............. .............. .............. 632,592
Mvmt Defect Brakes--Passengers.................. .............. .............. .............. 11,368,651
---------------
Total Savings............................... .............. .............. .............. 98,019,605
Total Twenty-Year Net Impact: $29,486,639 (Savings).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(* In the above tables, a ``--'' indicates that total costs or savings, as appropriate, could not be apportioned
between Amtrak, commuter railroads, and the State of Washington.)
FRA notes that as a result of the final rule's requirement to
conduct fire safety analyses of existing passenger equipment, the
analyses may indicate that modifications to existing equipment are
necessary to reduce the level of risk of fire or smoke to an acceptable
level. Although costs associated with performing the analyses are
included in the calculations above, costs associated with performing
any equipment modifications are not. If costs associated with equipment
modifications are incurred, they will be incurred over the first four
years of the rule and could total between $8.75 million and $14 million
for existing equipment. If costs associated with installation of
additional fire and smoke detection and suppression systems are
incurred for new equipment, total twenty-year costs (NPV) could
increase by up to $3.9 million. These costs are not included in the
calculations presented above because FRA cannot predict with any degree
of precision the results of the fire safety analyses. Should equipment
modifications, and fire and smoke detection and suppression systems be
required, the total net impact of the rule could be reduced from a
savings of $29.5 million to a savings of $11.6 million (NPV). Rail
operators would experience a minimal savings.
Intercity passenger and commuter railroads generally offer the
travelling public one of the safest forms of transportation available.
However, the history of passenger train accidents shows that the
potential for injury and loss of life is significant. Between January
1, 1990, and December 31, 1997, there were a total of 93 passenger
fatalities on intercity passenger and commuter railroads, representing
a total economic loss of $251 million. Sixty-eight passenger fatalities
occurred when the trains carrying the passengers were involved in
derailments or collisions. FRA believes that it is reasonable to expect
that the measures called for in this rule will prevent or mitigate the
severity of casualties greater in value than the costs to rail carriers
of implementing the requirements of this rule.
[[Page 25654]]
The unique circumstances surrounding each future passenger train
accident will determine the ultimate effectiveness of this rule and
FRA's other strategies to improve passenger rail safety. Similar
accidents have unique characteristics which ultimately determine an
accident's severity in terms of casualties. As a result, we cannot at
this time forecast future accident scenarios with a level of precision
that would allow us to predict the actual need for the particular
measures in this rule. However, this rule protects railroad employees
and passengers against known hazards that can be mitigated in a cost-
effective manner. For each cost associated with a requirement in this
rule, FRA has examined the potential safety benefits accruing from the
requirement. Certain elements of the rule, such as the structural
requirements, will directly improve safety by decreasing threats to
life and property. Other elements of the rule will provide savings to
the rail industry while maintaining or improving the industry's
excellent safety record overall.
In its comments on the proposed rule, the NCDOT stated that the
summary economic analysis contained in the NPRM did not include an
analysis of the impact on individual States. The NCDOT believed the
cost summary to be understated and not include an operator by operator
analysis. The above summary does specify this rule's impact on
Washington State. Further, as noted, a copy of the full regulatory
evaluation of this rule is available through the FRA Docket Clerk. That
evaluation does include, where appropriate, discussions of the rule's
impact on particular railroads or groups of railroads. The evaluation
also takes into consideration that individual States will contract with
Amtrak for the provision of rail service on their behalf. In this
regard, for example, a State may utilize Amtrak's inspection forces
trained under the rule, and thus not have to train inspection forces on
its own.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.)
requires an assessment of the impacts of proposed rules on small
entities. FRA has conducted a regulatory flexibility assessment of this
final rule's impact on small entities, and the assessment has been
placed in the public docket for this rulemaking. FRA certifies that the
final rule will not have a significant impact on a substantial number
of small entities. This final rule affects intercity passenger and
commuter railroads, rapid transit operations that operate on the
general system of transportation, and certain private car owners. FRA
notes that the standards contained in this rule were developed in
consultation with a Working Group that included Amtrak, individual
commuter railroads, APTA, and the AAPRCO. APTA represents the interests
of commuter railroads and rapid transit systems in regulatory matters.
The AAPRCO represents the interests of private car owners in regulatory
matters.
Except for private car owners, the entities impacted by the final
rule are governmental jurisdictions, known as transit authorities, none
of which are small for purposes of the prevailing law. The statutory
definition of ``small governmental jurisdictions'' is a governmental
entity that serves a population center of 50,000 or less. See 5 U.S.C.
601(5). The transit authorities subject to the requirements of this
rule do not fall within the class established by statute. Nevertheless,
FRA considered the impacts of this final rule on the smaller entities
subject to the rule. Commuter railroads and rapid transit systems are
part of larger transit organizations that receive Federal funds. The
level of costs incurred by each organization should generally vary in
proportion to either the size of the organization or the extent to
which the organization purchases newly manufactured passenger
equipment. For instance, railroads with fewer employees and passenger
equipment will have lower costs associated with employee training and
the inspection, testing, and maintenance of passenger equipment. FRA
notes that this rule offers railroads the opportunity to experience
savings in the areas of inspection, testing, and maintenance of
passenger equipment. The extent of these savings will generally vary
proportionally with the size of the fleet of each railroad.
FRA is making only certain requirements in this rule applicable to
private cars that are operated in passenger trains subject to this
rule. FRA considered the potential burdens associated with applying the
various requirements in this rule to private car owners and operators.
FRA is limiting the application of this rule only to those requirements
necessary to ensure the safe operation of the passenger train in which
the private cars operate, as well as the safety of railroad personnel
handling or inspecting the cars. The economic impacts to private cars
owners are expected to be minimal, however. Among the provisions
applicable to private cars are daily mechanical inspection
requirements; brake inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements;
and a prohibition concerning rim-stamped straight-plate wheels on
tread-braked passenger equipment.
FRA recognizes that private cars affected by this final rule are
principally hauled by Amtrak, which imposes its own safety requirements
on the operation of private cars. As a result, the daily exterior
mechanical inspection requirements in this final rule, though new
Federal requirements, are only minimally more stringent than the
mechanical inspections currently performed by Amtrak on its own. The
final rule does offer the flexibility to move equipment with power
brake defects, as well as the flexibility to perform daily brake tests
and mechanical inspections at locations best suited for performing such
tests and inspections. To the extent that all passenger equipment is
subject to daily exterior mechanical inspections, private cars will not
be affected disproportionately.
Generally, the final rule requires that rim-stamped straight-plate
wheels not be used as replacement wheels on tread-braked private cars.
Amtrak has established a private car policy which does not allow the
use of rim-stamped straight-plate wheels as replacement wheels on
private cars. Further, Amtrak will decline to move any tread-braked
private car with a rim-stamped straight-plate wheel after June 30,
2000. Because Amtrak holds private cars to standards as high or higher
than those contained in this rule, there will be no additional economic
impact imposed on private cars operated in Amtrak trains from this
rule's rim-stamped straight-plate wheel provision. Private cars are
also subject to provisions in this final rule concerning protection
against personal injury, suspension system safety, safety appliances,
and brake system safety. These requirements represent either current
industry practice or current Federal safety requirements (which are
being restated in this final rule).
Smaller passenger rail operations such as tourist, scenic,
excursion, and historic railroads are exempt from this final rule. A
joint FRA/industry Working Group will be developing recommendations
regarding the applicability of FRA regulations, including this one, to
tourist, scenic, historic, and excursion railroads. Based on that
Working Group's recommendations, portions of the final rule may apply
to some or all of these railroads.
C. Paperwork Reduction Act
This rule contains information collection requirements. FRA has
[[Page 25655]]
submitted these information collection requirements to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for review and approval in accordance with
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The
sections that contain the new or revised information collection
requirements, or both, and the estimated time to fulfill each
requirement are as follows:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total annual Average time per Total annual burden Total annual burden
CFR section Respondent universe responses response hours cost
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
216.14--Special notice for repairs-- 19 railroads.......... 12 forms............. 5 minutes............ 1 hour............... $39
passenger equipment.
238.1--Earlier application--rule 19 railroads.......... 15 notifications..... 45 minutes........... 11 hours............. 429
requirements--sections 238.15,
238.17, 238.19, 238.107, 238.109.
238.7--Waivers..................... 19 railroads.......... 12 waivers........... 2 hrs/25 hrs......... 70 hours............. 2,730
238.11--Penalties.................. 19 railroads.......... 1 falsified rept..... 15 minutes........... .25 hr............... 9
238.15--Movement of passenger 19 railroads.......... 1,000 cards/tags..... 3 minutes............ 50 hours............. 2,500
equipment with power brake
defects, and
--Movement of passenger 19 railroads.......... 288 cards/tags....... 3 minutes............ 14 hours............. 700
equipment with power brake
defects develop en route.
--Conditional requirement...... 19 railroads.......... 144 notifications.... 3 minutes............ 7 hours.............. 350
238.17--Movement of passenger 19 railroads.......... 200 tags/cards....... 3 minutes............ 10 hours............. 340
equipment with other than power
brake defects.
--Movement of passenger 19 railroads.......... 76 tags.............. 3 minutes............ 4 hours.............. 136
equipment with safety
appliance defects.
19 railroads.......... 38 notifications..... 30 seconds........... 19 min............... 11
238.19--Reporting and tracking 19 railroads.......... N/A.................. Usual and customary N/A.................. N/A
defective passenger equipment. procedure.
--List of power brake repair 1 railroad............ 1 list............... 2 hours.............. 2 hours.............. 78
points.
--Amendments to list........... 1 railroad............ 1 update............. 1 hour............... 1 hour............... 39
238.21/238.103/238.223(a)/
238.309(2)/238.311(a)/ 238.405(a)/
238.427(a):
--Petitions for special 19 railroads.......... 1 petition........... 16 hours............. 16 hours............. 624
approval of alternative
standard.
--Petitions for special 19 railroads.......... 1 petition........... 120 hours............ 120 hours............ 4,680
approval of alternative
compliance.
--Petitions for special 19 railroads.......... 1 petition........... 24 hours............. 24 hours............. 936
approval of pre-revenue
service acceptance testing
plan.
--Comments on the petitions.... Unknown............... 2 comments........... 1 hour............... 2 hours.............. 140
238.103--Fire Safety:
--Plan......................... 6 equipment 2.4 eq. design (5 yr. 200 hours............ 480 hours............ 33,360
manufacturers. average).
--Subsequent equipment orders.. 6 equipment 2.4 eq. design (5 yr. 60 years............. 144 hours............ 14,400
manufacturers. average).
--Preliminary fire safety 19 railroads.......... 19 documents......... 119 hours............ 2,264 hours.......... 501,241
analysis.
--Final fire safety analysis... 18 railroads.......... 6 documents (3 yr. 135 hours............ 811 hours............ 81,067
average).
--Fire safety analysis on 19 railroads.......... 1 document........... 8 hours.............. 8 hours.............. 800
equipment transfer.
--Written procedures--fire 19 railroads.......... 19 written procedures 80 hours............. 1,520 hours.......... 106,400
safety system and fire safety
equipment.
238.105--Train hardware and 197 railroads......... N/A.................. Usual and customary N/A.................. N/A
software safety. procedure.
238.107--Inspection, testing, and
maintenance plan:
--Plan......................... 19 railroads.......... N/A.................. Usual and Customary N/A.................. N/A
procedure.
--Annual plan review by 19 railroads.......... 19 reviews........... 60 hours............. 1,140 hours.......... 44,460
railroads.
238.109 Training, qualification,
and designation program:
[[Page 25656]]
--Training employees to perform 17 railroads.......... N/A.................. Usual and customary N/A.................. N/A
brake-related inspections, procedure.
tests, or maintenance.
--Training employees to perform 19 railroads.......... 6,020 trained 2 hours.............. 12,522 hours......... 421,410
daily mechanical inspections. employees/241
instructors.
--Development of training 19 railroads.......... 19 programs.......... 520 hours............ 9,880 hours.......... 360,620
program.
--Recordkeeping................ 19 railroads.......... 6,020 records........ 3 minutes............ 301 hours............ 11,739
238.111--Pre-revenue service 6 equipment 2.4 plans (5 yr. 16 hours............. 38 hours............. 2,641
acceptance testing plan--equip. manufacturers. average).
prev. in revenue service.
--Pass equip. that has not been 6 equipment 2.4 plans (5 yr. 200 hours............ 480 hours............ 42,144
in revenue service in U.S. manufacturers. average).
--Subsequent equipment orders.. 6 equipment 2.4 plans (5 yr. 60 hours............. 144 hours............ 11,472
manufacturers. average).
--Major upgrades/intro. new 1 equipment manuf..... None likely.......... N/A.................. N/A.................. N/A
tech.--Tier II.
238.201--Alternative compliance.... 19 railroads.......... Incl. in 238.21...... Inc. 238.21.......... Incl. 238.21......... Incl. 238.21
238.203--Static end strength:
--Grandfathering non-compliant 19 railroads.......... 1 petition........... 300 hours............ 300 hours............ 21,000
equip.
--Comment...................... Unkown................ 6 comments........... 20 hours............. 120 hours............ 8,400
238.211--Collision posts........... 19 railroads.......... Incl. in 238.21...... Incl. 238.21......... Incl. 238.21......... Inc. 238.21
238.223--Locomotive fuel tanks-- 19 railroads.......... Incl. in 238.21...... Incl. 238.21......... Incl. 238.21......... Inc 238.21
alt. std.
238.231--Brake system--identified & 2 brake manu- N/A.................. N/A.................. Usual and cust....... N/A
marked. facturers.
238.237--Automated monitoring:
--Alerter/Deadman control-- 19 railroads.......... 19 documents......... 2 hours.............. 38 hours............. 1,482
documentation.
--Defective alerter/Deadman 19 railroads.......... 100 tags............. 3 minutes............ 5 hours.............. 250
control.
238.301--Scope--requirements--earli 19 railroads.......... Incl. in 238.1....... Incl. in 238.1....... Incl. in 238.1....... Incl. 238.1
er application.
238.303--Exterior calendar day N/A................... N/A.................. Usual and customary N/A.................. N/A
mechanical inspection of passenger procedure.
equipment--door and cover plates
guarding high voltage equip.
--MU locomotives w/ inoperative 19 railroads.......... 50 tags/cards........ 3 minutes............ 3 hours.............. 150
dyn. brakes.
--Conventional locos. w/ 19 railroads.......... 50 tags/cards........ 3 minutes............ 3 hours.............. 150
inoper. dyn. brakes.
--Written notice--inoperative 19 railroads.......... 25 written not....... 3 minutes............ 1 hour............... 34
dyn. brakes.
--Records--ext. calendar day 19 railroads.......... 2,022,436 recd....... 1 minute............. 33,707 hours......... 1,146,038
mech. insp.
238.305--Interior calendar day
mechanical inspection of passenger
cars:
--Stenciling or marking N/A................... N/A.................. Usual and customary N/A.................. N/A
emergency brake valve. procedure.
--Stenciling or marking high N/A................... N/A.................. Usual and customary N/A.................. N/A
voltage equipment. procedure.
--Tagging of defective doors... 10 railroads.......... 600 tags............. 1 minute............. 10 hours............. 340
--Safety related signage....... N/A................... N/A.................. Usual and customery N/A.................. N/A
customery procedure.
--Records...................... 19 railroads.......... 1,866,904 recds...... 1 minute............. 31,115 hours......... 1,057,910
238.307--Periodic mechanical
inspection of passenger cars:
--Written notification--alt. 5 railroads........... 5 notifications...... 5 hours.............. 25 hours............. 975
periodic insp. int.
--Switches--markings........... N/A................... N/A.................. Usual and customary N/A.................. N/A
procedure.
[[Page 25657]]
--Records...................... 6 railroads........... 15 records........... 3 minutes............ .75 hours............ 29
--Detailed documentation--alt. 5 railroads........... 5 documents.......... 100 hours............ 500 hours............ 19,500
insp. interval.
238.309--Alternative maintenance 19 railroads.......... Incl. in 238.21...... Incl. in 238.21...... Incl. in 238.21...... Inc. 238.21
proc.
--Records of periodic N/A................... N/A.................. Usual and customary N/A.................. N/A
maintenance. procedure.
238.311--Single car test--alt. 19 railroads.......... Incl. in 238.21...... Incl. in 238.21...... Incl. in 238.21...... Inc.--238.21
procedure.
--Tagging to indicate need-- 19 railroads.......... 25 tags.............. 3 minutes............ 1 hour............... 34
single car test.
238.313--Class I brake test........ N/A................... N/A.................. Usual and customary N/A.................. N/A
procedure.
--Documentation--test already ...................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ......................
performed.
--Qualif. maint. Person.-- ...................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ......................
statement in cab.
238.315--Class IA brake test:
--Brake pipe pressure-- 19 railroads.......... 365,000 comm......... 3 seconds............ 304 hours............ 10,336
communications.
--Communicating signal system-- 19 tests.............. 365,000 tests........ 15 seconds........... 1,521 hours.......... 51,714
tests.
238.317--Class II Brake Test:
--Brake pipe pressure-- 19 railroads.......... 365,000 comm......... 3 seconds............ 304 hours............ 10,336
communications.
--Communicating signal system-- 19 railroads.......... 365,000 tests........ 15 seconds........... 1,521 hours.......... 51,714
tests.
238.403--Crash energy management 1 railroad............ 1 design............. 120 hours............ 120 hours............ 12,000
requirements.
238.405--Longitudinal static 1 railroad............ Incl. in 238.21...... Incl.--238.21........ Incl.--238.21........ Inc.--238.21
compressive.
238.421--Gazing:
--Marking of glazing material.. N/A................... N/A.................. Usual and customary N/A.................. N/A
procedure.
--Stenciling requirement....... N/A................... N/A.................. Usual and customary N/A.................. N/A
procedure.
238.423--Fuel tanks--equiv. level N/A................... Incl. in 238.21...... Incl. in 238.21...... Incl. in 238.21...... Inc.--238.21
of safety.
238.427--Suspension system--alt. N/A................... Incl. in 238.21...... Incl. in 238.21...... Incl. in 238.21...... Incl.--238.445
stds.
--Hunting oscillations--alarms 1 railroad............ Incl. in 238.445..... Inc.--238.445........ Inc.--238.445........ In.--238.445
to train oper.
238.431--Brake system.............. 1 railroad............ 1 analysis........... 40 hours............. 40 hours............. 1,560
--Brake system failures........ 1 railroad............ Incl. 238.445........ Incl. 238.445........ Incl. 238.445........ In 238.445
--Wheel slide alarms........... 1 railroad............ Incl. 238.445........ Incl. 238.445........ Incl. 238.445........ In 238.445
238.437--Emergency communication... 3 car manufacturers... 3 instructions....... 1 hour............... 3 hours.............. 102
238.441--Emergency roof entrance 3 car manufacturers... 16 cars marked....... 15 minutes........... 4 hours.............. 136
location.
--Markings..................... ...................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ......................
238.445--Automated monitoring...... 1 railroad............ 200 alerts........... 1 second............. 3 minutes............ 2
--Self test feature-- 1 railroad............ 6,300 notifications.. 1 second............. 2 hours.............. 68
notifications to train
operator.
238.447--Train operator's controls N/A................... N/A.................. Usual and customary N/A.................. N/A
and power car cab layout. procedure.
238.503--Inspection, testing, and
maintenance requirements:
238.505--Program approval
procedures:
--Submission of program........ 1 railroad............ 1 program............ 80 hours............. 80 hours............. 3,120
--Amendments to program........ 1 railroad............ 1 amendment.......... 8 hours.............. 8 hours.............. 312
--Comments..................... 4 unions/individuals.. 4 comments........... 1 hour............... 4 hours.............. 276
--Approval..................... N/A................... N/A.................. No disapprovals N/A.................. N/A
expected at this
time.
238.603--Safety planing 1 railroad............ 1 safety plan........ 100 hours............ 100 hours............ 3,900
requirements--Process to introduce
new technology.
Appendix B to Part 238--labeling 5-6 seat manufacturers N/A.................. Usual customary N/A.................. N/A
requirement. procedure.
[[Page 25658]]
--Seat/Mattress assemblies-- 5-6 manuf............. Incl. 238.103........ Incl. 238.103........ Incl. 238.103........ In 238.103
fire haz. analysis.
--Disc. small parts--fire 5-6 manuf............. Incl. in 238.103..... Incl. 238.103........ Incl. 238.103........ In238.103
hazard analysis.
--Surface any small part--fire 5-6 manuf............. Incl. in 238.103..... Incl. 238.103........ Incl. 238.103........ In238.103
haz. analysis.
--Small elastomers/misc. parts-- 5-6 manuf............. Incl. in 238.103..... Incl. 238.103........ Incl. 238.103........ In238.103
fire haz. anal.
--Portions vehicle body--fire 5-6 manuf............. Incl. in 238.103..... Incl. 238.103........ Incl. 238.103........ In238.103
hazard analysis.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions;
searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed
data; and reviewing the information. For information or a copy of the
paperwork package submitted to OMB contact Mr. Robert Brogan, Office of
Safety, Planning and Evaluation Division, RRS-21, Federal Railroad
Administration, 1120 Vermont Ave., N.W., Mail Stop 17, Washington, D.C.
20590 (telephone: (202) 493-6292) or Ms. Dian Deal, Office of
Information Technology and Productivity Improvement, RAD-20, Federal
Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Ave., N.W., Mail Stop 35,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: (202) 493-6133).
FRA cannot impose a penalty on persons for violating information
collection requirements which do not display a current OMB control
number, if required. The information collection requirements contained
in this rule have been approved under OMB control number 2130-0544.
D. Environmental Impact
FRA has evaluated these regulations in accordance with its
procedures for ensuring full consideration of the environmental impact
of FRA actions, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other environmental statutes, Executive
Orders, and DOT Order 5610.1c. This final rule meets the criteria that
establish this as a non-major action for environmental purposes.
E. Federalism Implications
This rule has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order 12612, and it has been determined
that the rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to
warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment. The fundamental
policy decision providing that Federal regulations should govern
aspects of service provided by municipal and public benefit
corporations (or agencies) of State governments is embodied in the
statute quoted above (49 U.S.C. 20133). Further, FRA has consulted with
commuter railroad authorities in developing this rule.
F. Compliance With the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
Pursuant to the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) each Federal agency ``shall, unless otherwise prohibited by law,
assess the effects of Federal Regulatory actions on State, local, and
tribal governments, and the private sector (other than to the extent
that such regulations incorporate requirements specifically set forth
in law).'' Sec. 201. Section 202 of the Act further requires that
``before promulgating any general notice of proposed rulemaking that is
likely to result in promulgation of any rule that includes any Federal
mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of
$100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any 1 year,
and before promulgating any final rule for which a general notice of
proposed rulemaking was published, the agency shall prepare a written
statement . . .'' detailing the effect on State, local and tribal
governments and the private sector. The final rules issued today will
not result in the expenditure, in the aggregate, of $100,000,000 or
more in any one year, and thus preparation of a statement was not
required.
G. Effects on the Year 2000 Computer Problem
This rule does not mandate business process changes nor require
modifications to computer systems that will detract from resources
railroads will apply toward addressing any possible Year 2000 computer
problems. Although business process changes and modifications to
computer systems may occur as this rule is implemented, railroads would
only voluntarily make such changes and modifications before the year
2000.
Implementation of certain inspection, testing, and maintenance
requirements, as well as recordkeeping and tracking of defective
equipment requirements, would require use of the same resources
railroads will apply toward resolving Year 2000 computer problems.
However, FRA will not require that such implementation occur before
July, 2000. FRA will apply requirements for inspection, testing, and
maintenance of equipment, and recordkeeping and tracking, at an earlier
date only to those railroads that indicate a desire for this to occur.
Because certain of the requirements for inspection, testing, and
maintenance offer railroads an opportunity to achieve efficiencies and
savings, some railroads may voluntarily choose to have these
requirements applied to them earlier. FRA notes that its implementation
schedule for inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements, as well
as recordkeeping and tracking requirements, was also developed taking
into consideration the time generally needed for railroads to develop
maintenance programs and implement training requirements as required by
this rule.
XI. List of Subjects
49 CFR Part 216
Penalties, Railroad safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Special notice for repairs.
49 CFR Part 223
Glass and glass products, Glazing, Penalties, Railroad safety,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
49 CFR Part 229
Locomotives, Penalties, Railroad safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
49 CFR Part 231
Penalties, Railroad safety, Safety appliances.
49 CFR Part 232
Penalties, Power brakes, Railroad safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
[[Page 25659]]
49 CFR Part 238
Fire prevention, Incorporation by reference, Passenger equipment,
Penalties, Railroad safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
The Rule
In consideration of the foregoing, chapter II, subtitle B of title
49, Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:
PART 216--[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for part 216 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-04, 20111, 20133, 20137-38, 20141,
20143, 20301-02, 20701-02, 21301-02, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).
2. Section 216.1(a) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 216.1 Application.
(a) This part applies, according to its terms, to each railroad
that uses or operates--
(1) A railroad freight car subject to part 215 of this chapter;
(2) A locomotive subject to 49 U.S.C. chapter 207 (49 U.S.C. 20701-
03); or
(3) Railroad passenger equipment subject to part 238 of this
chapter.
* * * * *
Sec. 216.3 [Amended]
3. Section 216.3(b) is amended by removing the phrase ``section 206
of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 435)'' and adding
in its place the phrase ``49 U.S.C. 20105''.
Sec. 216.5 [Amended]
4. Section 216.5(c) is amended by adding after ``216.13,'':
``216.14,''.
Sec. 216.13 [Amended]
5. The first sentence of Sec. 216.13(a) is removed and a new
sentence is added in its place to read as follows: ``When an FRA Motive
Power and Equipment Inspector or State Equipment Inspector determines a
locomotive is not safe to operate in the service to which it is put,
whether by reason of nonconformity with the FRA Railroad Locomotive
Safety Standards set forth in part 229 of this chapter or the FRA
Railroad Locomotive Inspection Regulations set forth in part 230 of
this chapter or by reason of any other condition rendering the
locomotive unsafe, he or she will notify the railroad in writing that
the locomotive is not in serviceable condition.''
5a. The third sentence of Sec. 216.13(a) is amended by removing the
phrase ``part 230'' and adding in its place the phrase ``parts 229 and
230''.
6. Section 216.14 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 216.14 Special notice for repairs--passenger equipment.
(a) When an FRA Motive Power and Equipment Inspector or a State
Equipment Inspector determines that railroad passenger equipment is not
in conformity with one or more of the requirements of the FRA Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards set forth in part 238 of this chapter and
that it is unsafe for further service, he or she will issue a written
Special Notice to the railroad that the equipment is not in serviceable
condition. The Special Notice describes the defect or defects that
cause the equipment to be in unserviceable condition. After receipt of
the Special Notice, the railroad shall remove the equipment from
service until it is restored to serviceable condition. The equipment
may not be deemed in serviceable condition until it complies with all
applicable requirements of part 238 of this chapter.
(b) The railroad shall notify in writing the FRA Regional
Administrator for the FRA region in which the Special Notice was issued
when the equipment is returned to service, specifying the repairs
completed.
(c) Railroad passenger equipment subject to a Special Notice may be
moved from the place where it was found to be unsafe for further
service to the nearest available point where the equipment can be
repaired, if such movement is necessary to make the repairs. However,
the movement is subject to the further restrictions of Secs. 238.15 and
238.17 of this chapter.
Sec. 216.17 [Amended]
7. Section 216.17(a) is amended as follows:
a. By adding, after ``216.13'', ``216.14,'';
b. By adding, after the word ``locomotive,'' in the third sentence,
the phrase ``railroad passenger equipment,''; and
c. By revising the fifth sentence to read as follows:
``If upon reinspection, the railroad freight car, locomotive, or
passenger equipment is found to be in serviceable condition, or the
track is found to comply with the requirements for the class at which
it was previously operated by the railroad, the FRA Regional
Administrator or his or her agent will immediately notify the railroad,
whereupon the restrictions of the Special Notice cease to be
effective.''
Subpart B--[Amended]
8. In subpart B of part 216, the phrases ``the FRA Regional
Director for Railroad Safety'', ``the FRA Regional Director of Railroad
Safety'', ``a Regional Director'' and ``the Regional Director'' are
removed, and the phrase ``the FRA Regional Administrator'' is added in
their place.
PART 223--[AMENDED]
9. The authority citation for part 223 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-03, 20133, 20701-20702, 21301-02,
21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).
10. Section 223.8 is added to subpart B to read as follows:
Sec. 223.8 Additional requirements for passenger equipment.
In addition to the requirements contained in this part,
requirements for emergency window exits and window safety glazing on
passenger equipment, as defined in Sec. 238.5 of this chapter, are also
found in part 238 of this chapter.
PART 229--[AMENDED]
11. The authority citation for part 229 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-03, 20133, 20137-38, 20143, 20701-03,
21301-02, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).
12. Section 229.3 is amended by revising paragraph (a) and adding
new paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) to read as follows:
Sec. 229.3 Applicability.
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) through (e) of this
section, this part applies to all standard gage railroads.
(b) * * *
(c) Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sec. 229.125 do not apply to Tier II
passenger equipment as defined in Sec. 238.5 of this chapter (i.e.,
passenger equipment operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not
exceeding 150 mph).
(d) On or after November 8, 1999, paragraphs (a)(1) and (b)(1) of
Sec. 229.141 do not apply to ``passenger equipment'' as defined in
Sec. 238.5 of this chapter, unless such equipment is excluded from the
requirements of Secs. 238.203 through 238.219, and Sec. 238.223 of this
chapter by operation of Sec. 238.201(a)(2) of this chapter.
(e) Paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(4), and (b)(2) through (b)(4) of
Sec. 229.141 do not apply to ``passenger equipment'' as defined in
Sec. 238.5 of this chapter that is placed in service for the first time
on or after September 8, 2000, unless such equipment is excluded from
the requirements of Secs. 238.203 through
[[Page 25660]]
238.219, and Sec. 238.223 of this chapter by operation of
Sec. 238.201(a)(2) of this chapter.
PART 231--[AMENDED]
13. The authority citation for part 231 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-03, 20131, 20301-03, 21301-02, 21304;
49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).
14. Section 231.0 is amended by redesignating paragraphs (c)
through (e) as paragraphs (d) through (f), respectively; by revising
paragraph (a); and by adding a new paragraph (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 231.0 Applicability and penalties.
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section,
this part applies to all standard gage railroads.
(b) * * *
(c) Except for the provisions governing uncoupling devices, this
part does not apply to Tier II passenger equipment as defined in
Sec. 238.5 of this chapter (i.e., passenger equipment operating at
speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph).
* * * * *
PART 232--[AMENDED]
15. The authority citation for part 232 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-03, 20133, 20141, 20301-03, 20306,
21301-02, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49 (c), (m).
16. Section 232.0 is amended by redesignating paragraphs (c)
through (e) as paragraphs (d) through (f), respectively; by revising
paragraph (a); and by adding a new paragraph (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 232.0 Applicability and penalties.
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section,
this part applies to all standard gage railroads.
(b) * * *
(c) Except for Secs. 232.2 and 232.21 through 232.25, this part
does not apply to a ``passenger train'' or ``passenger equipment'' as
defined in Sec. 238.5 of this chapter that is subject to the inspection
and testing requirements contained in part 238 of this chapter.
* * * * *
17. Part 238 is added to read as follows:
PART 238--PASSENGER EQUIPMENT SAFETY STANDARDS
Subpart A--General
Sec.
238.1 Purpose and scope.
238.3 Applicability.
238.5 Definitions.
238.7 Waivers.
238.9 Responsibility for compliance.
238.11 Civil penalties.
238.13 Preemptive effect.
238.15 Movement of passenger equipment with power brake defects.
238.17 Movement of passenger equipment with other than power brake
defects.
238.19 Reporting and tracking defective passenger equipment.
238.21 Special approval procedure.
238.23 Information collection.
Subpart B--Safety Planning and General Requirements
238.101 Scope.
238.103 Fire safety.
238.105 Train hardware and software safety.
238.107 Inspection, testing, and maintenance plan.
238.109 Training, qualification, and designation program.
238.111 Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.
238.113 Emergency window exits.
238.115 Emergency lighting.
238.117 Protection against personal injury.
238.119 Rim-stamped straight-plate wheels.
Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment
238.201 Scope/alternative compliance.
238.203 Static end strength.
238.205 Anti-climbing mechanism.
238.207 Link between coupling mechanism and car body.
238.209 Forward-facing end structure of locomotives.
238.211 Collision posts.
238.213 Corner posts.
238.215 Rollover strength.
238.217 Side structure.
238.219 Truck-to-car-body attachment.
238.221 Glazing.
238.223 Locomotive fuel tanks.
238.225 Electrical system.
238.227 Suspension system.
238.229 Safety appliances.
238.231 Brake system.
238.233 Interior fittings and surfaces.
238.235 Doors.
238.237 Automated monitoring.
Subpart D--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for
Tier I Passenger Equipment
238.301 Scope.
238.303 Exterior calendar day mechanical inspection of passenger
equipment.
238.305 Interior calendar day mechanical inspection of passenger
cars.
238.307 Periodic mechanical inspection of passenger cars and
unpowered vehicles used in passenger trains.
238.309 Periodic brake equipment maintenance.
238.311 Single car test.
238.313 Class I brake test.
238.315 Class IA brake test.
238.317 Class II brake test.
238.319 Running brake test.
Subpart E--Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment
238.401 Scope.
238.403 Crash energy management.
238.405 Longitudinal static compressive strength.
238.407 Anti-climbing mechanism.
238.409 Forward end structures of power car cabs.
238.411 Rear end structures of power car cabs.
238.413 End structures of trailer cars.
238.415 Rollover strength.
238.417 Side loads.
238.419 Truck-to-car-body and truck component attachment.
238.421 Glazing.
238.423 Fuel tanks.
238.425 Electrical system.
238.427 Suspension system.
238.429 Safety appliances.
238.431 Brake system.
238.433 Draft system.
238.435 Interior fittings and surfaces.
238.437 Emergency communication.
238.439 Doors.
238.441 Emergency roof entrance location.
238.443 Headlights.
238.445 Automated monitoring.
238.447 Train operator's controls and power car cab layout.
Subpart F--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier
II Passenger Equipment
238.501 Scope.
238.503 Inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements.
238.505 Program approval procedure.
Subpart G--Specific Safety Planning Requirements for Tier II Passenger
Equipment
238.601 Scope.
238.603 Safety planning requirements.
Appendix A to Part 238--Schedule of Civil Penalties
Appendix B--Test Methods and Performance Criteria for the Flammability
and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in Passenger Cars
and Locomotive Cabs
Appendix C to Part 238--Suspension System Safety Performance Standards
Appendix D to Part 238--Requirements for External Fuel Tanks on Tier I
Locomotives
Appendix E to Part 238--General Principles of Reliability-Based
Maintenance Programs
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20302-03,
20306, and 20701-02; 49 CFR 1.49.
Subpart A--General
Sec. 238.1 Purpose and scope.
(a) The purpose of this part is to prevent collisions, derailments,
and other occurrences involving railroad passenger equipment that cause
injury or death to railroad employees, railroad passengers, or the
general public; and to
[[Page 25661]]
mitigate the consequences of such occurrences to the extent they cannot
be prevented.
(b) This part prescribes minimum Federal safety standards for
railroad passenger equipment. This part does not restrict a railroad
from adopting and enforcing additional or more stringent requirements
not inconsistent with this part.
(c) Railroads to which this part applies shall be responsible for
compliance with all of the requirements contained in Secs. 238.15,
238.17, 238.19, 238.107, 238.109, and subpart D of this part effective
July 12, 2001.
(1) A railroad may request earlier application of the requirements
contained in Secs. 238.15, 238.17, 238.19, 238.107, 238.109, and
subpart D upon written notification to FRA's Associate Administrator
for Safety. Such a request shall indicate the railroad's readiness and
ability to comply with all of the provisions referenced in paragraph
(c) introductory text of this section.
(2) Except for paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sec. 238.309, a railroad
may specifically request earlier application of the maintenance and
testing provisions contained in Secs. 238.309 and 238.311
simultaneously. In order to request earlier application of these two
sections, the railroad shall indicate its readiness and ability to
comply with all of the provisions contained in both of those sections.
(3) Paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sec. 238.309 shall apply beginning
September 9, 1999.
Sec. 238.3 Applicability.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, this part
applies to all:
(1) Railroads that operate intercity or commuter passenger train
service on standard gage track which is part of the general railroad
system of transportation; and
(2) Railroads that provide commuter or other short-haul rail
passenger train service in a metropolitan or suburban area as described
by 49 U.S.C. 20102(1), including public authorities operating passenger
train service.
(b) Railroads that permit to be used or hauled on their lines
passenger equipment subject to this part, in violation of a power brake
provision of this part or a safety appliance provision of this part,
are subject to the power brake and safety appliance provisions of this
part with respect to such operations.
(c) This part does not apply to:
(1) Rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not
connected to the general railroad system of transportation;
(2) A railroad that operates only on track inside an installation
that is not part of the general railroad system of transportation;
(3) Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations, whether on
or off the general railroad system of transportation; or
(4) Circus trains.
Sec. 238.5 Definitions.
As used in this part--
AAR means the Association of American Railroads.
APTA means the American Public Transit Association.
Administrator means the Administrator of the Federal Railroad
Administration or the Administrator's delegate.
Alerter means a device or system installed in the locomotive cab to
promote continuous, active locomotive engineer attentiveness by
monitoring select locomotive engineer-induced control activities. If
fluctuation of a monitored locomotive engineer-induced control activity
is not detected within a predetermined time, a sequence of audible and
visual alarms is activated so as to progressively prompt a response by
the locomotive engineer. Failure by the locomotive engineer to
institute a change of state in a monitored control, or acknowledge the
alerter alarm activity through a manual reset provision, results in a
penalty brake application that brings the locomotive or train to a
stop.
Anti-climbing mechanism means the parts at the ends of adjoining
vehicles in a train that are designed to engage when subjected to large
buff loads to prevent the override of one vehicle by another.
Bind means restrict the intended movement of one or more brake
system components by obstruction, increased friction, or reduced
clearance.
Block of cars means one car or multiple cars in a solid unit
coupled together for the purpose of being added to, or removed from, a
train as a solid unit.
Brake, air or power brake means a combination of devices operated
by compressed air, arranged in a system, and controlled manually,
electrically, or pneumatically, by means of which the motion of a rail
car or locomotive is retarded or arrested.
Brake, disc means a retardation system used on some rail vehicles,
primarily passenger equipment, that utilizes flat metal discs as the
braking surface instead of the wheel tread.
Brake, dynamic means a train braking system whereby the kinetic
energy of a moving train is used to generate electric current at the
locomotive traction motors, which is then dissipated through banks of
resistor grids or back into the catenary or third rail system.
Brake, effective means a brake that is capable of producing its
required design retarding force on the train. A rail car's air brake is
not considered effective if its piston travel is in excess of the
maximum prescribed limits.
Brake indicator means a device, actuated by brake cylinder
pressure, which indicates whether brakes are applied or released.
Brake, inoperative means a primary brake that, for any reason, no
longer applies or releases as intended or is otherwise ineffective.
Brake, on-tread friction means a braking system that uses a brake
shoe that acts on the tread of the wheel to retard the vehicle.
Brake, parking or hand brake means a brake that can be applied and
released by hand to prevent movement of a stationary rail car or
locomotive.
Brake pipe means the system of piping (including branch pipes,
angle cocks, cutout cocks, dirt collectors, hoses, and hose couplings)
used for connecting locomotives and all rail cars for the passage of
air to control the locomotive and car brakes.
Brake, power means ``air brake'' as that term is defined in this
section.
Brake, primary means those components of the train brake system
necessary to stop the train within the signal spacing distance without
thermal damage to friction braking surfaces.
Brake, secondary means those components of the train brake system
which develop supplemental brake retarding force that is not needed to
stop the train within signal spacing distances or to prevent thermal
damage to friction braking surfaces.
Brake shoes or pads aligned with tread or disc means that the
surface of the brake shoe or pad, respectively, engages the surface of
the wheel tread or disc, respectively, to prevent localized thermal
stress.
Braking system, blended means a braking system where the primary
brake and one or more secondary brakes are automatically combined to
stop the train. If the secondary brakes are unavailable, the blended
brake uses the primary brake alone to stop the train.
Calendar day means a time period running from one midnight to the
next midnight on a given date.
Class I brake test means a complete passenger train brake system
test and inspection (as further specified in Sec. 238.313) performed by
a qualified
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maintenance person to ensure that the air brake system is 100 percent
effective.
Class IA brake test means a test and inspection (as further
specified in Sec. 238.315) performed by a qualified person of the air
brake system on each car in a passenger train to ensure that the brakes
apply and release on each car in the train in response to train line
commands.
Class II brake test means a test and inspection (as further
specified in Sec. 238.317) performed by a qualified person of brake
pipe integrity and continuity from the controlling locomotive to the
rear unit of a passenger train.
Collision posts means structural members of the end structures of a
vehicle that extend vertically from the underframe to which they are
securely attached and that provide protection to occupied compartments
from an object penetrating the vehicle during a collision.
Control valves means that part of the air brake equipment on each
rail car or locomotive that controls the charging, application, and
release of the air brakes, in response to train line commands.
Corner posts means structural members located at the intersection
of the front or rear surface with the side surface of a rail vehicle
and which extend vertically from the underframe to the roof. Corner
posts may be combined with collision posts to become part of the end
structure.
Crack means a fracture without complete separation into parts,
except that, in a casting, a shrinkage crack or hot tear that does not
significantly diminish the strength of the member is not a crack.
Crash energy management means an approach to the design of rail
passenger equipment which controls the dissipation of energy during a
collision to protect the occupied volumes from crushing and to limit
the decelerations on passengers and crewmembers in those volumes. This
may be accomplished by designing energy-absorbing structures of low
strength in the unoccupied volumes of a rail vehicle or passenger train
to collapse in a controlled manner, while providing higher structural
strength in the occupied volumes. Energy deflection can also be part of
a crash energy management approach. Crash energy management can be used
to help provide anti-climbing resistance and to reduce the risk of
train buckling during a collision.
Crash refuge means a volume with structural strength designed to
maximize the survivability of crewmembers stationed in the locomotive
cab during a collision.
Crewmember means a railroad employee called to perform service
covered by the Federal hours of service laws at 49 U.S.C. 21103 and
subject to the railroad's operating rules and program of operational
tests and inspections required in Sec. 217.9 and Sec. 217.11 of this
chapter.
Critical buckling stress means the minimum stress necessary to
initiate buckling of a structural member.
Emergency brake application means an irretrievable brake
application resulting in the maximum retarding force available from the
train brake system.
Emergency window means that segment of a side-facing glazing panel
which has been designed to permit rapid and easy removal in an
emergency situation.
End structure means the main support structure projecting upward
from the underframe of a locomotive, passenger car, or other rail
vehicle. The end structure is securely attached to the underframe at
each end of a rail vehicle.
50th -percentile adult male means a person weighing 164 pounds
(plus or minus 3 pounds) and possessing the following dimensions: erect
sitting height: 35.7 inches (plus or minus 0.1 inch); hip breadth
(sitting): 14.7 inches (plus or minus 0.7 inch); hip circumference
(sitting): 42 inches; waist circumference (sitting): 32 inches (plus or
minus 0.6 inch); chest depth: 9.3 inches (plus or minus 0.2 inch); and
chest circumference: 37.4 inches (plus or minus 0.6 inch).
Foul means restrict the intended movement of one or more brake
system components because the component is snagged, entangled, or
twisted.
FRA means the Federal Railroad Administration.
Fuel tank, external means a fuel containment volume that extends
outside the car body structure of a locomotive.
Fuel tank, internal means a fuel containment volume that does not
extend outside the car body structure of a locomotive.
Full-height collision post, corner post, or side frame post means
any vertical framing member in the rail car body structure that spans
the distance between the underframe and the roof at the car body
section where the post is located. For collision posts located at the
approximate third points laterally of an end frame, the term ``full-
height'' applies to posts that extend and connect to supporting
structural members in the roof at the location of the posts, or to a
beam connected to the top of the end-frame and supported by the roof
rails (or anti-telescoping plate), or to both.
Full service application means a brake application which results in
a brake cylinder pressure at the service limiting valve setting or
equivalent.
Glazing, end-facing means a glazing panel located where a line
perpendicular to the exterior surface of the panel makes an angle of 50
degrees or less with the longitudinal center line of the rail vehicle
in which the panel is installed. A glazing panel that curves so as to
meet the definition for both side-facing and end-facing glazing is
considered end-facing glazing.
Glazing, exterior means a glazing panel that is an integral part of
the exterior skin of a rail vehicle and has a surface exposed to the
outside environment.
Glazing, side-facing means a glazing panel located where a line
perpendicular to the exterior surface of the panel makes an angle of
more than 50 degrees with the longitudinal center line of the rail
vehicle in which the panel is installed.
Handrails means safety appliances installed on either side of a
rail vehicle's exterior doors to assist passengers and crewmembers to
safely board and depart the vehicle.
Head end power means power generated on board the locomotive of a
passenger train used for purposes other than propelling the train, such
as cooking, heating, illumination, ventilation and air conditioning.
In passenger service/in revenue service means a train or passenger
equipment that is carrying, or available to carry, passengers.
Passengers need not have paid a fare in order for the equipment to be
considered in passenger or in revenue service.
In service, when used in connection with passenger equipment,
means:
(1) Passenger equipment subject to this part that is in passenger
or revenue service; and
(2) All other passenger equipment subject to this part, unless the
passenger equipment:
(i) Is being handled in accordance with Secs. 238.15, 238.17,
238.305(c)(5), or 238.503(f), as applicable;
(ii) Is in a repair shop or on a repair track;
(iii) Is on a storage track and is not carrying passengers; or
(iv) Has been delivered in interchange but has not been accepted by
the receiving railroad.
Interior fitting means any component in the passenger compartment
which is mounted to the floor, ceiling, sidewalls, or end walls and
projects into the passenger compartment more than 25
[[Page 25663]]
mm (1 in.) from the surface or surfaces to which it is mounted.
Interior fittings do not include side and end walls, floors, door
pockets, or ceiling lining materials, for example.
Lateral means the horizontal direction perpendicular to the
direction of travel.
Locomotive means a piece of on-track rail equipment, other than hi-
rail, specialized maintenance, or other similar equipment, which may
consist of one or more units operated from a single control stand with
one or more propelling motors designed for moving other passenger
equipment; with one or more propelling motors designed to transport
freight or passenger traffic, or both; or without propelling motors but
with one or more control stands. This term does not include a
locomotive propelled by steam power unless it is used to haul an
intercity or commuter passenger train. Nor does this term include a
freight locomotive when used to haul a passenger train due to failure
of a passenger locomotive.
Locomotive cab means the compartment or space on board a locomotive
where the control stand is located and which is normally occupied by
the engineer when the locomotive is operated.
Locomotive, cab car means rail rolling equipment intended to
provide transportation for members of the general public that is
without propelling motors but equipped with one or more control stands.
Locomotive, controlling means the locomotive from which the
locomotive engineer exercises control over the train.
Locomotive, MU means rail rolling equipment self-propelled by any
power source and intended to provide transportation for members of the
general public; however, this term does not include an MU locomotive
propelled by steam power unless it is used to haul an intercity or
commuter passenger train.
Longitudinal means in a direction parallel to the normal direction
of travel.
Luminescent material means material that absorbs light energy when
ambient levels of light are high and emits this stored energy when
ambient levels of light are low, making the material appear to glow in
the dark.
L/V ratio means the ratio of the lateral force that any wheel
exerts on an individual rail to the vertical force exerted by the same
wheel on the rail.
MIL-STD-882C means a military standard issued by the United States
Department of Defense to provide uniform requirements for developing
and implementing a system safety plan and program to identify and then
eliminate the hazards of a system or reduce the associated risk to an
acceptable level.
Monocoque means a type of rail vehicle construction where the shell
or skin acts as a single unit with the supporting frame to resist and
transmit the loads acting on the rail vehicle.
Mph means miles per hour.
95th -percentile adult male means, except as used in
Sec. 238.447(f)(2), a person weighing 215 pounds and possessing the
following dimensions: erect sitting height: 38 inches; hip breadth
(sitting): 16.5 inches; hip circumference (sitting): 47.2 inches; waist
circumference (sitting): 42.5 inches; chest depth: 10.5 inches; and
chest circumference 44.5 inches.
Occupied volume means the volume of a rail vehicle or passenger
train where passengers or crewmembers are normally located during
service operation, such as the operating cab and passenger seating and
sleeping areas. The entire width of a vehicle's end compartment that
contains a control stand is an occupied volume. A vestibule is
typically not considered occupied, except when it contains a control
stand for use as a control cab.
Ordered, as applied to acquisition of equipment, means that the
acquiring entity has given a notice to proceed to manufacture the
equipment that represents a firm financial commitment to compensate the
manufacturer for the contract price of the equipment or for damages if
the order is nullified. Equipment is not ordered if future exercise of
a contract option is required to place the remanufacturing process in
motion.
Override means to climb over the normal coupling or side buffers
and linking mechanism and impact the end of the adjoining rail vehicle
or unit above the underframe.
Passenger car means rail rolling equipment intended to provide
transportation for members of the general public and includes a self-
propelled car designed to carry passengers, baggage, mail, or express.
This term includes a passenger coach, cab car, and an MU locomotive. In
the context of articulated equipment, ``passenger car'' means that
segment of the rail rolling equipment located between two trucks. This
term does not include a private car.
Passenger coach means rail rolling equipment intended to provide
transportation for members of the general public that is without
propelling motors and without a control stand.
Passenger equipment--means
(1) All powered and unpowered passenger cars, locomotives used to
haul a passenger car, and any other rail rolling equipment used in a
train with one or more passenger cars. Passenger equipment includes--
(i) A passenger coach,
(ii) A cab car,
(iii) A MU locomotive,
(iv) A locomotive not intended to provide transportation for a
member of the general public that is used to power a passenger train,
and
(v) Any non-self-propelled vehicle used in a passenger train,
including an express car, baggage car, mail car, freight car, or a
private car.
(2) In the context of articulated equipment, ``passenger
equipment'' means a segment of rail rolling equipment located between
two trucks that is used in a train with one or more passenger cars.
This term does not include a freight locomotive when used to haul a
passenger train due to failure of a passenger locomotive.
Passenger station means a location designated in a railroad's
timetable where passengers are regularly scheduled to get on or off any
train.
Permanent deformation means the undergoing of a permanent change in
shape of a structural member of a rail vehicle.
Person means an entity of any type covered under 1 U.S.C. 1,
including but not limited to the following: a railroad; a manager,
supervisor, official, or other employee or agent of a railroad; any
owner, manufacturer, lessor, or lessee of railroad equipment, track, or
facilities; any independent contractor providing goods or services to a
railroad; and any employee of such owner, manufacturer, lessor, lessee,
or independent contractor.
Piston travel means the amount of linear movement of the air brake
hollow rod (or equivalent) or piston rod when forced outward by
movement of the piston in the brake cylinder or actuator and limited by
the brake shoes being forced against the wheel or disc.
Power car means a rail vehicle that propels a Tier II passenger
train or is the lead vehicle in a Tier II passenger train, or both.
Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan means a document, as
further specified in Sec. 238.111, prepared by a railroad that explains
in detail how pre-revenue service tests of passenger equipment
demonstrate that the equipment meets Federal safety standards and the
railroad's own safety requirements.
Primary responsibility means the task that a person performs at
least 50 percent of the time. The totality of the circumstances will be
considered on a case-by-case basis in circumstances
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where an individual does not spend 50 percent of his or her day engaged
in any one readily identifiable type of activity.
Private car means rail rolling equipment that is used only for
excursion, recreational, or private transportation purposes. A private
car is not a passenger car.
Public highway-rail grade crossing means a location where a public
highway, road or street, including associated sidewalks or pathways,
crosses one or more active railroad tracks at grade.
Qualified maintenance person means a qualified person who has
received, as a part of the training, qualification, and designation
program required under Sec. 238.109, instruction and training that
includes ``hands-on'' experience (under appropriate supervision or
apprenticeship) in one or more of the following functions:
troubleshooting, inspection, testing, maintenance, or repair of the
specific train brake and other components and systems for which the
person is assigned responsibility. This person shall also possess a
current understanding of what is required to properly repair and
maintain the safety-critical brake or mechanical components for which
the person is assigned responsibility. Further, the qualified
maintenance person shall be a person whose primary responsibility
includes work generally consistent with the above-referenced functions
and is designated to:
(1) Conduct Class I brake tests under this part;
(2) Conduct exterior calendar day mechanical inspections on MU
locomotives or other passenger cars and unpowered vehicles under this
part; or
(3) Determine whether equipment not in compliance with this part
may be moved as required by Sec. 238.17.
Qualified person means a person determined by a railroad to have
the knowledge and skills necessary to perform one or more functions
required under this part. The railroad determines the qualifications
and competencies for employees designated to perform various functions
in the manner set forth in this part.
Railroad means any form of nonhighway ground transportation that
runs on rails or electromagnetic guideways and any entity providing
such transportation, including--
(i) Commuter or other short-haul railroad passenger service in a
metropolitan or suburban area and commuter railroad service that was
operated by the Consolidated Rail Corporation on January 1, 1979; and
(ii) High speed ground transportation systems that connect
metropolitan areas, without regard to whether those systems use new
technologies not associated with traditional railroads; but does not
include rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not
connected to the general railroad system of transportation.
Refresher training means periodic retraining required by a railroad
for employees or contractors to remain qualified to perform specific
equipment inspection, testing, or maintenance functions.
Repair point means a location designated by a railroad where
repairs of the type necessary occur on a regular basis. A repair point
has, or should have, the facilities, tools, and personnel qualified to
make the necessary repairs. A repair point need not be staffed
continuously.
Respond as intended means to produce the result that a device or
system is designed to produce.
Rollover strength means the strength provided to protect the
structural integrity of a rail vehicle in the event the vehicle leaves
the track and impacts the ground on its side or roof.
Roof rail means the longitudinal structural member at the
intersection of the side wall and the roof sheathing.
Running brake test means a test (as further specified in
Sec. 238.319) performed by a qualified person of a train system or
component while the train is in motion to verify that the system or
component functions as intended.
Running gear defect means any condition not in compliance with this
part which involves a truck component, a propulsion system component, a
draft system component, a wheel, or a wheel component.
Safety appliance means an appliance required under 49 U.S.C.
chapter 203, excluding power brakes. The term includes automatic
couplers, hand brakes, sill steps, handholds, handrails, or ladder
treads made of steel or a material of equal or greater mechanical
strength used by the traveling public or railroad employees that
provide a means for safely coupling, uncoupling, or ascending or
descending passenger equipment.
Safety-critical means a component, system, or task that, if not
available, defective, not functioning, not functioning correctly, not
performed, or not performed correctly, increases the risk of damage to
passenger equipment or injury to a passenger, crewmember, or other
person.
Semi-permanently coupled means coupled by means of a drawbar or
other coupling mechanism that requires tools to perform the uncoupling
operation. Coupling and uncoupling of each semi-permanently coupled
unit in a train can be performed safely only while at a maintenance or
shop location where personnel can safely get under a unit or between
units.
Shear strength means the ability of a structural member to resist
forces or components of forces acting perpendicular to compression or
tension forces, or both, in the member.
Shock absorbent material means material designed to prevent or
mitigate injuries due to impact by yielding and absorbing much of the
energy of impact.
Side posts means main vertical structural elements in the sides of
a rail vehicle.
Side sill means that portion of the underframe or side at the
bottom of the rail vehicle side wall.
Single car test means a comprehensive test (as further specified in
Sec. 238.311) of the functioning of all critical brake system
components installed on an individual passenger car or unpowered
vehicle, other than a self-propelled passenger car, used or allowed to
be used in a passenger train.
Single car test device means a device capable of controlling the
application and release of the brakes on an individual passenger car or
an unpowered vehicle, other than a self-propelled passenger car,
through pneumatic or electrical means.
Skin means the outer covering of a fuel tank and a rail vehicle.
The skin may be covered with another coating of material such as
fiberglass.
Spall, glazing means small pieces of glazing that fly off the back
surface of the glazing when an object strikes the front surface.
Switching service means the classification of freight cars
according to commodity or destination; assembling of cars for train
movements; changing the position of cars for purposes of loading,
unloading, or weighing; placing of locomotives and cars for repair or
storage; or moving of rail equipment in connection with work service
that does not constitute a train movement.
Telescope means override an adjoining rail vehicle or unit and
penetrate into the interior of that adjoining vehicle or unit because
of compressive forces.
Terminal means a starting point or ending point of a single
scheduled trip for a train, where passengers may get on or off a train.
Normally, this location is a point where the train would reverse
direction or change destinations.
Tier I means operating at speeds not exceeding 125 mph.
[[Page 25665]]
Tier II means operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not
exceeding 150 mph.
Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations means railroad
operations that carry passengers, often using antiquated equipment,
with the conveyance of the passengers to a particular destination not
being the principal purpose.
Trailer car means a rail vehicle that neither propels a Tier II
passenger train nor is the leading unit in a Tier II passenger train. A
trailer car is normally without a control stand and is normally
occupied by passengers.
Train means a locomotive unit or locomotive units coupled, with or
without cars. For the purposes of the provisions of this part related
to power brakes, the term ``train'' does not include such equipment
when being used in switching service.
Train brake communication line means the communication link between
the locomotive and passenger equipment in a train by which the brake
commands are transmitted. This may be a pneumatic pipe, electrical
line, or radio signal.
Train, commuter means a passenger train providing commuter service
within an urban, suburban, or metropolitan area. The term includes a
passenger train provided by an instrumentality of a State or a
political subdivision of a State.
Train, long-distance intercity passenger means a passenger train
that provides service between large cities more than 125 miles apart
and is not operated exclusively in the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation's Northeast Corridor.
Train, passenger means a train that transports or is available to
transport members of the general public. If a train is composed of a
mixture of passenger and freight equipment, that train is a passenger
train for purposes of this part.
Train, short-distance intercity passenger means a passenger train
that provides service exclusively on the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation's Northeast Corridor or between cities that are not more
than 125 miles apart.
Train, Tier II passenger means a short-distance or long-distance
intercity passenger train providing service at speeds that include
those exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph.
Trainset, passenger means a passenger train.
Transverse means in a direction perpendicular to the normal
direction of travel.
Ultimate strength means the load at which a structural member
fractures or ceases to resist any load.
Uncoupling mechanism means the arrangement for operating the
coupler by any means.
Underframe means the lower horizontal support structure of a rail
vehicle.
Unit means passenger equipment of any type, except a freight
locomotive when used to haul a passenger train due to failure of a
passenger locomotive.
Unoccupied volume means the volume of a rail vehicle or passenger
train which does not contain seating and is not normally occupied by
passengers or crewmembers.
Vehicle, rail means passenger equipment of any type and includes a
car, trailer car, locomotive, power car, tender, or similar vehicle.
This term does not include a freight locomotive when used to haul a
passenger train due to failure of a passenger locomotive.
Vestibule means an area of a passenger car that normally does not
contain seating and is used in passing from the seating area to the
side exit doors.
Witness plate means a thin foil placed behind a piece of glazing
undergoing an impact test. Any material spalled or broken from the back
side of the glazing will dent or mark the witness plate.
Yard means a system of tracks within defined limits provided for
the making up of trains, storing of cars, or other purposes.
Yard air test means a train brake system test conducted using a
source of compressed air other than a locomotive.
Yield strength means the ability of a structural member to resist a
change in length caused by a heavy load. Exceeding the yield strength
may cause permanent deformation of the member.
Sec. 238.7 Waivers.
(a) A person subject to a requirement of this part may petition the
Administrator for a waiver of compliance with such requirement. The
filing of such a petition does not affect the person's responsibility
for compliance with that requirement while the petition is being
considered.
(b) Each petition for waiver under this section shall be filed in
the manner and contain the information required by part 211 of this
chapter.
(c) If the Administrator finds that a waiver of compliance is in
the public interest and is consistent with railroad safety, the
Administrator may grant the waiver subject to any conditions the
Administrator deems necessary.
Sec. 238.9 Responsibility for compliance.
(a) A railroad subject to this part shall not--
(1) Use, haul, permit to be used or hauled on its line, offer in
interchange, or accept in interchange any train or passenger equipment,
while in service,
(i) That has one or more conditions not in compliance with a safety
appliance or power brake provision of this part; or
(ii) That has not been inspected and tested as required by a safety
appliance or power brake provision of this part; or
(2) Use, haul, offer in interchange, or accept in interchange any
train or passenger equipment, while in service,
(i) That has one or more conditions not in compliance with a
provision of this part, other than the safety appliance and power brake
provisions of this part, if the railroad has actual knowledge of the
facts giving rise to the violation, or a reasonable person acting in
the circumstances and exercising reasonable care would have that
knowledge; or
(ii) That has not been inspected and tested as required by a
provision of this part, other than the safety appliance and power brake
provisions of this part, if the railroad has actual knowledge of the
facts giving rise to the violation, or a reasonable person acting in
the circumstances and exercising reasonable care would have that
knowledge; or
(3) Violate any other provision of this part.
(b) For purposes of this part, passenger equipment will be
considered in use prior to departure but after it has received, or
should have received, the inspection required under this part for
movement and is deemed ready for passenger service.
(c) Although the duties imposed by this part are generally stated
in terms of the duty of a railroad, any person as defined in
Sec. 238.5, including a contractor for a railroad, who performs any
function covered by this part must perform that function in accordance
with this part.
Sec. 238.11 Penalties.
(a) Any person, as defined in Sec. 238.5, who violates any
requirement of this part or causes the violation of any such
requirement is subject to a civil penalty of at least $500 and not more
than $11,000 per violation, except that: Penalties may be assessed
against individuals only for willful violations, and, where a grossly
negligent violation or a pattern of repeated violations has created an
imminent hazard of death or injury to persons, or has caused death or
injury, a penalty not to exceed $22,000 per violation may be assessed.
Each day a violation continues shall
[[Page 25666]]
constitute a separate offense. See Appendix A to this part for a
statement of agency civil penalty policy.
(b) Any person who knowingly and willfully falsifies a record or
report required by this part may be subject to criminal penalties under
49 U.S.C. 21311.
Sec. 238.13 Preemptive effect.
Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of the regulations in this part
preempts any State law, regulation, or order covering the same subject
matter, except an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or
order that is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local
safety hazard; that is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or
order of the United States Government; and that does not unreasonably
burden interstate commerce.
Sec. 238.15 Movement of passenger equipment with power brake defects.
Beginning July 12, 2001 the following provisions of this section
apply to railroads operating Tier I passenger equipment covered by this
part. A railroad may request earlier application of these requirements
upon written notification to FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety
as provided in Sec. 238.1(c) of this part.
(a) General. This section contains the requirements for moving
passenger equipment with a power brake defect without liability for a
civil penalty under this part. Railroads remain liable for the movement
of passenger equipment under 49 U.S.C. 20303(c). For purposes of this
section, Sec. 238.17, and Sec. 238.503, a ``power brake defect'' is a
condition of a power brake component, or other primary brake component,
that does not conform with this part. (Passenger cars and other
passenger equipment classified as locomotives under part 229 of this
chapter are also covered by the movement restrictions contained in
Sec. 229.9 of this chapter for those defective conditions covered by
part 229 of this chapter.)
(b) Limitations on movement of passenger equipment containing a
power brake defect found during a Class I or IA brake test. Except as
provided in paragraph (c) of this section (which addresses brakes that
become defective en route after a Class I or IA brake test was
performed), a commuter or passenger train that has in its consist
passenger equipment containing a power brake defect found during a
Class I or IA brake test (or, for Tier II trains, the equivalent) may
only be moved, without civil penalty liability under this part--
(1) If all of the following conditions are met:
(i) The train is moved for purposes of repair, without passengers;
(ii) The applicable operating restrictions in paragraphs (d) and
(e) of this section are observed; and
(iii) The passenger equipment is tagged, or information is
recorded, as prescribed in paragraph (c)(2) of this section; or
(2) If the train is moved for purposes of scrapping or sale of the
passenger equipment that has the power brake defect and all of the
following conditions are met:
(i) The train is moved without passengers;
(ii) The movement is at a speed of 15 mph or less; and
(iii) The movement conforms with the railroad's air brake or power
brake instructions.
(c) Limitations on movement of passenger equipment in passenger
service that becomes defective en route after a Class I or IA brake
test. Passenger equipment hauled or used in service in a commuter or
passenger train that develops a power brake defect while en route to
another location after receiving a Class I or IA brake test (or, for
Tier II trains, the equivalent) may be hauled or used by a railroad for
repair, without civil penalty liability under this part, if the
applicable operating restrictions set forth in paragraphs (d) and (e)
of this section are complied with and all of the following requisites
are satisfied:
(1) En route defect. At the time of the train's Class I or IA brake
test, the passenger equipment in the train was properly equipped with
power brakes that comply with this part. The power brakes on the
passenger equipment become defective while it is en route to another
location.
(2) Record. At the place where the railroad first discovers the
defect, a tag or card is placed on both sides of the defective
passenger equipment, or an automated tracking system is provided, with
the following information about the defective passenger equipment:
(i) The reporting mark and car or locomotive number;
(ii) The name of the inspecting railroad;
(iii) The name of the inspector;
(iv) The inspection location and date;
(v) The nature of each defect;
(vi) The destination of the equipment where it will be repaired;
and
(vii) The signature, if possible, and job title of the person
reporting the defective condition.
(3) Automated tracking system. Automated tracking systems used to
meet the tagging requirements contained in paragraph (c)(2) of this
section may be reviewed and monitored by FRA at any time to ensure the
integrity of the system. FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety may
prohibit or revoke a railroad's ability to utilize an automated
tracking system in lieu of tagging if FRA finds that the automated
tracking system is not properly secure, is inaccessible to FRA or a
railroad's employees, or fails to adequately track or monitor the
movement of defective equipment. Such a determination will be made in
writing and will state the basis for such action.
(4) Conditional requirement. In addition, if an en route failure
causes power brakes to be cut out or renders the brake inoperative on
passenger equipment, the railroad shall:
(i) Determine the percentage of operative power brakes in the train
based on the number of brakes known to be cut out or otherwise
inoperative, using the formula specified in paragraph (d)(1) of this
section;
(ii) Notify the person responsible for the movement of trains of
the percent of operative brakes and movement restrictions on the train
imposed by paragraph (d) of this section;
(iii) Notify the mechanical department of the failure; and
(iv) Confirm the percentage of operative brakes by a walking
inspection at the next location where the railroad reasonably judges
that it is safe to do so.
(d) Operating restrictions based on percent operative power brakes
in train.
(1) Computation of percent operative power brakes.
(i) Except as specified in paragraphs (d)(1)(ii) and (iii) of this
section, the percentage of operative power brakes in a train shall be
determined by dividing the number of axles in the train with operative
power brakes by the total number of axles in the train.
(ii) For equipment with tread brake units (TBUs), the percentage of
operative power brakes shall be determined by dividing the number of
operative TBUs by the total number of TBUs.
(iii) Each cut-out axle on a locomotive that weighs more than
200,000 pounds shall be counted as two cut-out axles for the purposes
of calculating the percentage of operative brakes. Unless otherwise
specified by the railroad, the friction braking effort over all other
axles shall be considered uniform.
(iv) The following brake conditions not in compliance with this
part are not considered inoperative power brakes for purposes of this
section:
(A) Failure or cutting out of secondary brake systems;
[[Page 25667]]
(B) Inoperative or otherwise defective handbrakes or parking
brakes;
(C) Excessive piston travel that does not render the power brakes
ineffective; and
(D) Power brakes overdue for inspection, testing, maintenance, or
stenciling under this part.
(2) All passenger trains developing 50-74 percent operative power
brakes. A passenger train that develops inoperative power brake
equipment resulting in at least 50 percent but less than 75 percent
operative power brakes may be used only as follows:
(i) The train may be moved in passenger service only to the next
forward passenger station;
(ii) The speed of the train shall be restricted to 20 mph or less;
and
(iii) After all passengers are discharged, the defective equipment
shall be moved to the nearest location where the necessary repairs can
be made.
(3) Commuter, short-distance intercity, and short-distance Tier II
passenger trains developing 75-99 percent operative power brakes.
(i) 75-84 percent operative brakes. Commuter, short-distance
intercity, and short-distance Tier II passenger trains which develop
inoperative power brake equipment resulting in at least 75 percent but
less than 85 percent operative brakes may be used only as follows:
(A) The train may be moved in passenger service only to the next
forward location where the necessary repairs can be made; however, if
the next forward location where the necessary repairs can be made does
not have the facilities to handle the safe unloading of passengers, the
train may be moved past the repair location in service only to the next
forward passenger station in order to facilitate the unloading of
passengers; and
(B) The speed of the train shall be restricted to 50 percent of the
train's maximum allowable speed or 40 mph, whichever is less; and
(C) After all passengers are discharged, the defective equipment
shall be moved to the nearest location where the necessary repairs can
be made.
(ii) 85-99 percent operative brakes. Commuter, short-distance
intercity, and short-distance Tier II passenger trains which develop
inoperative power brake equipment resulting in at least 85 percent but
less than 100 percent operative brakes may only be used as follows:
(A) The train may be moved in passenger service only to the next
forward location where the necessary repairs can be made; however, if
the next forward location where the necessary repairs can be made does
not have the facilities to handle the safe unloading of passengers, the
train may be moved past the repair location in service only to the next
forward passenger station in order to facilitate the unloading of
passengers; and
(B) After all passengers are discharged, the defective equipment
shall be moved to the nearest location where the necessary repairs can
be made.
(4) Long-distance intercity and long-distance Tier II passenger
trains developing 75-99 operative power brakes.
(i) 75-84 percent operative brakes. Long-distance intercity and
long-distance Tier II passenger trains which develop inoperative power
brake equipment resulting in at least 75 percent but less than 85
percent operative brakes may be used only if all of the following
restrictions are observed:
(A) The train may be moved in passenger service only to the next
forward repair location identified for repair of that equipment by the
railroad operating the equipment in the list required by
Sec. 238.19(d); however, if the next forward repair location does not
have the facilities to handle the safe unloading of passengers, the
train may be moved past the designated repair location in service only
to the next forward passenger station in order to facilitate the
unloading of passengers; and
(B) The speed of the train shall be restricted to 50 percent of the
train's maximum allowable speed or 40 mph, whichever is less; and
(C) After all passengers are discharged, the defective equipment
shall be moved to the nearest location where the necessary repairs can
be made.
(ii) 85-99 percent operative brakes. Long-distance intercity and
long-distance Tier II passenger trains which develop inoperative power
brake equipment resulting in at least 85 percent but less than 100
percent operative brakes may be used only if all of the following
restrictions are observed:
(A) The train may be moved in passenger service only to the next
forward repair location identified for repair of that equipment by the
railroad operating the equipment in the list required by
Sec. 238.19(d); however, if the next forward repair location does not
have the facilities to handle the safe unloading of passengers, the
train may be moved past the designated repair location in service only
to the next forward passenger station in order to facilitate the
unloading of passengers; and
(B) After all passengers are discharged, the defective equipment
shall be moved to the nearest location where the necessary repairs can
be made.
(e) Operating restrictions on passenger trains with inoperative
power brakes on the front or rear unit. If the power brakes on the
front or rear unit in any passenger train are completely inoperative
the following shall apply:
(1) If the handbrake is located inside the interior of the car:
(i) A qualified person shall be stationed at the handbrake on the
unit;
(ii) The car shall be locked-out and empty except for the railroad
employee manning the handbrake; and
(iii) Appropriate speed restrictions shall be placed on the train
by a qualified person;
(2) If the handbrake is located outside the interior of the car or
is inaccessible to a qualified person:
(i) The car shall be locked-out and empty;
(ii) The train shall be operated at restricted speed not to exceed
20 mph; and
(iii) The car shall be removed from the train or repositioned in
the train at the first location where it is possible to do so.
(f) Special Notice for Repair. Nothing in this section authorizes
the movement of passenger equipment subject to a Special Notice for
Repair under part 216 of this chapter unless the movement is made in
accordance with the restrictions contained in the Special Notice.
Sec. 238.17 Movement of passenger equipment with other than power
brake defects.
Beginning July 12, 2001 the following provisions of this section
apply to railroads operating Tier I passenger equipment covered by this
part. A railroad may request earlier application of these requirements
upon written notification to FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety
as provided in Sec. 238.1(c) of this part.
(a) General. This section contains the requirements for moving
passenger equipment with other than a power brake defect. (Passenger
cars and other passenger equipment classified as locomotives under part
229 of this chapter are also covered by the movement restrictions
contained in Sec. 229.9 of this chapter for those defective conditions
covered by part 229 of this chapter.)
[[Page 25668]]
(b) Limitations on movement of passenger equipment containing
defects found at time of calendar day inspection. Except as provided in
Secs. 238.303(e)(15) and 238.305(c)(5), passenger equipment containing
a condition not in conformity with this part at the time of its
calendar day mechanical inspection may be moved from that location for
repair if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) If the condition involves a running gear defect, the defective
equipment is not used in passenger service and is moved in a non-
revenue train;
(2) If the condition involves a non-running gear defect, the
defective equipment may be used in passenger service in a revenue train
provided that a qualified maintenance person determines that it is safe
to do so, and if so, the car is locked out and empty, and all movement
restrictions are observed except that the car may be occupied by a
member of the train crew or a railroad employee to the extent necessary
to safely operate the train;
(3) The requirements of paragraphs (c)(3) and (c)(4) of this
section are met; and
(4) The special requirements of paragraph (e) of this section, if
applicable, are met.
(c) Usual limitations on movement of passenger equipment that
develops defects en route. Except as provided in Secs. 238.303(e)(15)
and 238.503(f), passenger equipment that develops en route to its
destination, after its calendar day inspection was performed and before
its next calendar day mechanical inspection is performed, any defect
not in compliance with this part, other than a power brake defect, may
be moved only if the railroad complies with all of the following
requirements and, if applicable, the special requirements in paragraph
(e) of this section:
(1) Prior to movement of equipment with a potential running gear
defect, a qualified maintenance person shall determine if it is safe to
move the equipment in passenger service and, if so, the maximum speed
and other restrictions necessary for safely conducting the movement. If
appropriate, these determinations may be made based upon a description
of the defective condition provided by a crewmember. If the
determinations required by this paragraph are made by an off-site
qualified maintenance person based on a description of the defective
condition by on-site personnel, then a qualified maintenance person
shall perform a physical inspection of the defective equipment, at the
first location possible, to verify the description of the defect
provided by the on-site personnel.
(2) Prior to movement of equipment with a non-running gear defect,
a qualified person or a qualified maintenance person shall determine if
it is safe to move the equipment in passenger service and, if so, the
maximum speed and other restrictions necessary for safely conducting
the movement. If appropriate, these determinations may be made based
upon a description of the defective condition provided by the on-site
personnel.
(3) Prior to movement of any defective equipment, the qualified
person or qualified maintenance person shall notify the crewmember in
charge of the movement of the defective equipment, who in turn shall
inform all other crewmembers of the presence of the defective
condition(s) and the maximum speed and other restrictions determined
under paragraph (c)(1) or (c)(2) of this section. The movement shall be
made in conformance with such restrictions.
(4) The railroad shall maintain a record of all defects reported
and their subsequent repair in the defect tracking system required in
Sec. 238.19. In addition, prior to movement of the defective equipment,
a tag or card placed on both sides of the defective equipment, or an
automated tracking system, shall record the following information about
the defective equipment:
(i) The reporting mark and car or locomotive number;
(ii) The name of the inspecting railroad;
(iii) The name of the inspector, inspection location, and date;
(iv) The nature of each defect;
(v) Movement restrictions and safety restrictions, if any;
(vi) The destination of the equipment where it will be repaired;
and
(vii) The signature, if possible, as well as the job title and
location of the person making the determinations required by this
section.
(5) Automated tracking system. Automated tracking systems used to
meet the tagging requirements contained in paragraph (c)(4) of this
section may be reviewed and monitored by FRA at any time to ensure the
integrity of the system. FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety may
prohibit or revoke a railroad's ability to utilize an automated
tracking system in lieu of tagging if FRA finds that the automated
tracking system is not properly secure, is inaccessible to FRA or a
railroad's employees, or fails to adequately track or monitor the
movement of defective equipment. Such a determination will be made in
writing and will state the basis for such action.
(6) After a qualified maintenance person or a qualified person
verifies that the defective equipment is safe to remain in service as
required in paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this section, the defective
equipment that develops a condition not in compliance with this part
while en route may continue in passenger service not later than the
next calendar day mechanical inspection, if the requirements of this
paragraph are otherwise fully met.
(d) Inspection of roller bearings on equipment involved in a
derailment.
(1) A railroad shall not continue passenger equipment in service
that has a roller bearing whose truck was involved in a derailment
unless the bearing has been inspected and tested by:
(i) Visual examination to determine whether it shows any sign of
damage; and
(ii) Spinning freely its wheel set or manually rotating the bearing
to determine whether the bearing makes any unusual noise.
(2) The roller bearing shall be disassembled from the axle and
inspected internally if:
(i) It shows any external sign of damage;
(ii) It makes any unusual noise when its wheel set is spun freely
or the bearing is manually rotated;
(iii) Its truck was involved in a derailment at a speed of more
than 10 miles per hour; or
(iv) Its truck was dragged on the ground for more than 200 feet.
(e) Special requisites for movement of passenger equipment with
safety appliance defects. Consistent with 49 U.S.C. 20303, passenger
equipment with a safety appliance not in compliance with this part or
with part 231 of this chapter, if applicable, may be moved--
(1) If necessary to effect repair of the safety appliance;
(2) From the point where the safety appliance defect was first
discovered by the railroad to the nearest available location on the
railroad where the necessary repairs required to bring the passenger
equipment into compliance can be made or, at the option of the
receiving railroad, the equipment may be received and hauled for repair
to a point on the receiving railroad's line that is no farther than the
point on the delivering railroad's line where the repair of the defect
could have been made;
(3) If a tag placed on both sides of the passenger equipment or an
automated tracking system contains the information required under
paragraph (c)(4) of this section; and
[[Page 25669]]
(4) After notification of the crewmember in charge of the movement
of the defective equipment, who in turn shall inform all other
crewmembers of the presence of the defective condition(s).
(f) Special Notice for Repair. Nothing in this section authorizes
the movement of equipment subject to a Special Notice for Repair under
part 216 of this chapter unless the movement is made in accordance with
the restrictions contained in the Special Notice.
Sec. 238.19 Reporting and tracking defective passenger equipment.
(a) General. Beginning July 12, 2001 each railroad shall have in
place a reporting and tracking system for passenger equipment with a
defect not in conformance with this part. A railroad may request
earlier application of these requirements upon written notification to
FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety as provided in Sec. 238.1(c)
of this part. The reporting and tracking system shall record the
following information:
(1) The identification number of the defective equipment;
(2) The date the defect occurred;
(3) The nature of the defect;
(4) The determination made by a qualified person or qualified
maintenance person on whether the equipment is safe to run;
(5) The name of the qualified person or qualified maintenance
person making such a determination;
(6) Any operating restrictions placed on the equipment; and
(7) Repairs made and the date that they were made.
(b) Retention of records. At a minimum, each railroad shall keep
the records described in paragraph (a) of this section for one periodic
maintenance interval for each specific type of equipment as described
in the railroad's inspection, testing, and maintenance plan required by
Sec. 238.107. FRA strongly encourages railroads to keep these records
for longer periods of time because they form the basis for future
reliability-based decisions concerning test and maintenance intervals
that may be developed pursuant to Sec. 238.307(b).
(c) Availability of records. Railroads shall make defect reporting
and tracking records available to FRA upon request.
(d) List of power brake repair points. Railroads operating long-
distance intercity and long-distance Tier II passenger equipment shall
designate locations, in writing, where repairs to passenger equipment
with a power brake defect will be made and shall provide the list to
FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety and make it available to FRA
for inspection and copying upon request. Railroads operating these
trains shall designate a sufficient number of repair locations to
ensure the safe and timely repair of passenger equipment. These
designations shall not be changed without at least 30 days' advance
written notice to FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety.
Sec. 238.21 Special approval procedure.
(a) General. The following procedures govern consideration and
action upon requests for special approval of alternative standards
under Secs. 238.103, 238.223, 238.309, 238.311, 238.405, or 238.427;
for approval of alternative compliance under Sec. 238.201; and for
special approval of pre-revenue service acceptance testing plans as
required by Sec. 238.111. (Requests for approval of programs for the
inspection, testing, and maintenance of Tier II passenger equipment are
governed by Sec. 238.505.)
(b) Petitions for special approval of alternative standard. Each
petition for special approval of an alternative standard shall
contain--
(1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary
person to be contacted with regard to review of the petition;
(2) The alternative proposed, in detail, to be substituted for the
particular requirements of this part;
(3) Appropriate data or analysis, or both, establishing that the
alternative will provide at least an equivalent level of safety; and
(4) A statement affirming that the railroad has served a copy of
the petition on designated representatives of its employees, together
with a list of the names and addresses of the persons served.
(c) Petitions for special approval of alternative compliance. Each
petition for special approval of alternative compliance shall contain--
(1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary
person to be contacted with regard to the petition;
(2) The elements prescribed in Sec. 238.201(b); and
(3) A statement affirming that the railroad has served a copy of
the petition on designated representatives of its employees, together
with a list of the names and addresses of the persons served.
(d) Petitions for special approval of pre-revenue service
acceptance testing plan.
(1) Each petition for special approval of a pre-revenue service
acceptance testing plan shall contain--
(i) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary
person to be contacted with regard to review of the petition; and
(ii) The elements prescribed in Sec. 238.111.
(2) Three copies of each petition for special approval of the pre-
revenue service acceptance testing plan shall be submitted to the
Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration,
1120 Vermont Ave., N.W., Mail Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20590.
(e) Federal Register notice. FRA will publish a notice in the
Federal Register concerning each petition under paragraphs (b) and (c)
of this section.
(f) Comment. Not later than 30 days from the date of publication of
the notice in the Federal Register concerning a petition under
paragraphs (b) or (c) of this section, any person may comment on the
petition.
(1) Each comment shall set forth specifically the basis upon which
it is made, and contain a concise statement of the interest of the
commenter in the proceeding.
(2) Three copies of each comment shall be submitted to the
Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration,
1120 Vermont Ave., Mail Stop 25, Washington, D. C. 20590.
(3) The commenter shall certify that a copy of the comment was
served on each petitioner.
(g) Disposition of petitions.
(1) FRA will conduct a hearing on a petition in accordance with the
procedures provided in Sec. 211.25 of this chapter.
(2) If FRA finds that the petition complies with the requirements
of this section or that the proposed plan is acceptable or changes are
justified, or both, the petition will be granted, normally within 90
days of its receipt. If the petition is neither granted nor denied
within 90 days, the petition remains pending for decision. FRA may
attach special conditions to the approval of the petition. Following
the approval of a petition, FRA may reopen consideration of the
petition for cause stated.
(3) If FRA finds that the petition does not comply with the
requirements of this section, or that the proposed plan is not
acceptable or that the proposed changes are not justified, or both, the
petition will be denied, normally within 90 days of its receipt.
(4) When FRA grants or denies a petition, or reopens consideration
of the petition, written notice is sent to the petitioner and other
interested parties.
[[Page 25670]]
Sec. 238.23 Information collection.
(a) The information collection requirements of this part were
reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et. seq.) and are
assigned OMB control number 2130-0544.
(b) The information collection requirements are found in the
following sections: Secs. 238.1, 238.7, 238.11, 238.15, 238.17, 238.19,
238.21, 238.103, 238.105, 238.107, 238.109, 238.111, 238.201, 238.203,
238.211, 238.223, 238.231, 238.237, 238.301, 238.303, 238.305, 238.307,
238.309, 238.311, 238.313, 238.315, 238.317, 238.403, 238.405, 238.421,
238.423, 238.427, 238.431, 238.437, 238.441, 238.445, 238.447, 238.503,
238.505, and 238.603.
Subpart B--Safety Planning and General Requirements
Sec. 238.101 Scope.
This subpart contains safety planning and general safety
requirements for all railroad passenger equipment subject to this part.
Sec. 238.103 Fire safety.
(a) Materials. (1) Materials used in constructing a passenger car
or a cab of a locomotive ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or
placed in service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002,
shall meet the test performance criteria for flammability and smoke
emission characteristics as specified in Appendix B to this part, or
alternative standards issued or recognized by an expert consensus
organization after special approval of FRA under Sec. 238.21.
(2) On or after November 8, 1999, materials introduced in a
passenger car or a locomotive cab, as part of any kind of rebuild,
refurbishment, or overhaul of the car or cab, shall meet the test
performance criteria for flammability and smoke emission
characteristics as specified in Appendix B to this part, or alternative
standards issued or recognized by an expert consensus organization
after special approval of FRA under Sec. 238.21.
(b) Certification. A railroad shall require certification that a
representative sample of combustible materials to be--
(1) Used in constructing a passenger car or a locomotive cab, or
(2) Introduced in a passenger car or a locomotive cab, as part of
any kind of rebuild, refurbishment, or overhaul of the car or cab, has
been tested by a recognized independent testing laboratory and that the
results show the representative sample complies with the requirements
of paragraph (a) of this section at the time it was tested.
(c) Fire safety analysis for procuring new passenger equipment. In
procuring new passenger equipment, each railroad shall ensure that fire
safety considerations and features in the design of the equipment
reduce the risk of personal injury and equipment damage caused by fire
to an acceptable level using MIL-STD-882C as a guide or an alternative,
formal safety methodology. To this end, each railroad shall complete a
written fire safety analysis for the passenger equipment being
procured. In conducting the analysis, the railroad shall--
(1) Take effective steps to design the equipment to be sufficiently
fire resistant so that fire detection devices permit evacuation of all
passengers and crewmembers before fire, smoke, or toxic fumes cause
injury to any passenger or crewmember.
(2) Identify, analyze, and prioritize the fire hazards inherent in
the design of the equipment.
(3) Reasonably ensure that a ventilation system in the equipment
does not contribute to the lethality of a fire.
(4) Identify in writing any train component that is a risk of
initiating fire and which requires overheat protection. An overheat
detector shall be installed in any component when the analysis
determines that an overheat detector is necessary.
(5) Identify in writing any unoccupied train compartment that
contains equipment or material that poses a fire hazard, and analyze
the benefit provided by including a fire or smoke detection system in
each compartment so identified. A fire or smoke detector shall be
installed in any unoccupied compartment when the analysis determines
that such equipment is necessary to ensure sufficient time for the safe
evacuation of passengers and crewmembers from the train. For purposes
of this section, an unoccupied train compartment means any part of the
equipment structure that is not normally occupied during operation of
the train, including a closet, baggage compartment, food pantry, etc.
(6) Determine whether any occupied or unoccupied space requires a
portable fire extinguisher and, if so, the proper type and size of the
fire extinguisher for each location. As required by Sec. 239.101 of
this chapter, each passenger car is required to have a minimum of one
portable fire extinguisher. If the analysis performed indicates that
one or more additional portable fire extinguishers are needed, such
shall be installed.
(7) On a case-by-case basis, the railroad shall analyze the benefit
provided by including a fixed, automatic fire-suppression system in any
unoccupied train compartment that contains equipment or material that
poses a fire hazard, and determine the proper type and size of the
automatic fire-suppression system for each location. A fixed, automatic
fire suppression system shall be installed in any unoccupied
compartment when the analysis determines that such equipment is
practical and necessary to ensure sufficient time for the safe
evacuation of passengers and crewmembers from the train.
(8) Describe the analysis and testing necessary to--
(i) Demonstrate that the fire protection approach taken in the
design of the equipment will meet the fire protection requirements of
this part, and
(ii) Select materials which help provide sufficient fire resistance
to reasonably ensure adequate time to detect a fire and safely evacuate
the passengers and crewmembers.
(9) Explain how safety issues are resolved in relation to cost and
performance issues in the design of the equipment to reduce the risk of
each fire hazard.
(d) Fire safety analysis for existing passenger equipment. (1) Not
later than July 10, 2000, each passenger railroad shall complete a
preliminary fire safety analysis for each category of existing rail
equipment and current rail service.
(2) Not later than July 10, 2001, each such railroad shall--
(i) Complete a final fire safety analysis for any category of
existing passenger equipment and service evaluated during the
preliminary fire safety analysis as likely presenting an unacceptable
risk of personal injury. In conducting the analysis, the railroad shall
consider the extent to which materials comply with the test performance
criteria for flammability and smoke emission characteristics as
specified in Appendix B to this part or alternative standards approved
by FRA under this part.
(ii) Take remedial action to reduce the risk of personal injuries
to an acceptable level in any such category, if the railroad finds the
risk to be unacceptable. In considering remedial action, a railroad is
not required to replace material found not to comply with the test
performance criteria for flammability and smoke emission
characteristics required by this part, if:
(A) The risk of personal injuries from the material is negligible
based on the railroad's operating environment and the material's size,
or location, or both; or
[[Page 25671]]
(B) The railroad takes alternative action which reduces the risk of
personal injuries to an acceptable level.
(3) Not later than July 10, 2003, each such railroad shall--
(i) Complete a fire safety analysis for all categories of equipment
and service. In completing this analysis, the railroad shall, as far as
practicable, determine the extent to which remaining materials comply
with the test performance criteria for flammability and smoke emission
characteristics as specified in Appendix B to this part or alternative
standards approved by FRA under this part.
(ii) Take remedial action to reduce the risk of personal injuries
to an acceptable level in any such category, if the railroad finds the
risk to be unacceptable. In considering remedial action, a railroad is
not required to replace material found not to comply with the test
performance criteria for flammability and smoke emission
characteristics required by this part, if:
(A) The risk of personal injuries from the material is negligible
based on the railroad's operating environment and the material's size,
or location, or both; or
(B) The railroad takes alternative action which reduces the risk of
personal injuries to an acceptable level.
(4) Where possible prior to transferring existing equipment to a
new category of service, but in no case more than 90 days following
such a transfer, the passenger railroad shall complete a new fire
safety analysis taking into consideration the change in railroad
operations and shall effect prompt action to reduce any identified risk
to an acceptable level.
(5) As used in this paragraph, ``category of rail equipment and
current rail service'' shall be determined by the railroad based on
relevant fire safety risks, including available ignition sources,
presence or absence of heat/smoke detection systems, known variations
from the required material test performance criteria or alternative
standards approved by FRA, and availability of rapid and safe egress to
the exterior of the vehicle under conditions secure from fire, smoke,
and other hazards.
(e) Inspection, testing, and maintenance. Each railroad shall
develop and adopt written procedures for the inspection, testing, and
maintenance of all fire safety systems and fire safety equipment on the
passenger equipment it operates. The railroad shall comply with those
procedures that it designates as mandatory for the safety of the
equipment and its occupants.
Sec. 238.105 Train hardware and software safety.
These requirements of this section apply to hardware and software
used to control or monitor safety functions in passenger equipment
ordered on or after September 8, 2000, and such components implemented
or materially modified in new or existing passenger equipment on or
after September 9, 2002.
(a) The railroad shall develop and maintain a written hardware and
software safety program to guide the design, development, testing,
integration, and verification of computer software and hardware that
controls or monitors equipment safety functions.
(b) The hardware and software safety program shall be based on a
formal safety methodology that includes a Failure Modes, Effects,
Criticality Analysis (FMECA); verification and validation testing for
all hardware and software components and their interfaces; and
comprehensive hardware and software integration testing to ensure that
the software functions as intended.
(c) Under the hardware and software safety program, software that
controls or monitors safety functions shall be considered safety-
critical unless a completely redundant, failsafe, non-software means
ensuring the same function is provided. The hardware and software
safety program shall include a description of how the following will be
accomplished, achieved, carried out, or implemented to ensure software
safety and reliability:
(1) The software design process;
(2) The software design documentation;
(3) The software hazard analysis;
(4) Software safety reviews;
(5) Software hazard monitoring and tracking;
(6) Hardware and software integration safety tests; and
(7) Demonstration of overall software safety as part of the pre-
revenue service tests of equipment.
(d) Hardware and software that controls or monitors passenger
equipment safety functions shall include design feature(s) that result
in a safe condition in the event of a computer hardware or software
failure.
(e) The railroad shall comply with the elements of its hardware and
software safety program that affect the safety of the passenger
equipment.
Sec. 238.107 Inspection, testing, and maintenance plan.
(a) General. Beginning July 12, 2001 the following provisions of
this section apply to railroads operating Tier I passenger equipment
covered by this part. A railroad may request earlier application of
these requirements upon written notification to FRA's Associate
Administrator for Safety as provided in Sec. 238.1(c).
(b) Each railroad shall develop, and provide to FRA upon request, a
detailed inspection, testing, and maintenance plan consistent with the
requirements of this part. This plan shall include a detailed
description of the following:
(1) Inspection procedures, intervals, and criteria;
(2) Test procedures and intervals;
(3) Scheduled preventive maintenance intervals;
(4) Maintenance procedures; and
(5) Special testing equipment or measuring devices required to
perform inspections and tests.
(c) The inspection, testing, and maintenance plan required by this
section is not intended to address and should not include procedures to
address employee working conditions that arise in the course of
conducting the inspections, tests, and maintenance set forth in the
plan. When requesting a copy of the railroad's plan, FRA does not
intend to review any portion of the plan that relates to employee
working conditions.
(d) The inspection, testing, and maintenance plan required by this
section shall be reviewed by the railroad annually.
Sec. 238.109 Training, qualification, and designation program.
(a) Beginning July 12, 2001 each railroad shall have adopted a
training, qualification, and designation program for employees and
contractors that perform safety-related inspections, tests, or
maintenance of passenger equipment, and trained such employees and
contractors in accordance with the program. A railroad may request
earlier application of these requirements upon written notification to
FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety as provided in Sec. 238.1(c).
For purposes of this section, a ``contractor'' is defined as a person
under contract with the railroad or an employee of a person under
contract with the railroad to perform any of the tasks required by this
part.
(b) As part of this program, the railroad shall, at a minimum:
(1) Identify the tasks related to the inspection, testing, and
maintenance that must be performed on each type of equipment that the
railroad operates;
(2) Develop written procedures for the performance of the tasks
identified;
(3) Identify the skills and knowledge necessary to perform each
task;
(4) Develop or incorporate a training curriculum that includes
classroom and
[[Page 25672]]
``hands-on'' lessons designed to impart the skills and knowledge
identified as necessary to perform each task. The developed or
incorporated training curriculum shall specifically address the Federal
regulatory requirements contained in this part that are related to the
performance of the tasks identified;
(5) Require all employees and contractors to successfully complete
the training course that covers the equipment and tasks for which they
are responsible as well as the specific Federal regulatory requirements
contained in this part related to equipment and tasks for which they
are responsible;
(6) Require all employees and contractors to pass a written
examination covering the equipment and tasks for which they are
responsible as well as the specific Federal regulatory requirements
contained in this part related to equipment and tasks for which they
are responsible;
(7) Require all employees and contractors to individually
demonstrate ``hands-on'' capability to successfully perform the tasks
required to be performed as part of their duties on the type equipment
to which they are assigned;
(8) Require supervisors to complete the program that covers the
employees whom they supervise, including refresher training;
(9) Require supervisors to exercise oversight to ensure that all
the identified tasks are performed in accordance with the railroad's
written procedures;
(10) Designate in writing that each employee and contractor has the
knowledge and skills necessary to perform the safety-related tasks that
are part of his or her job;
(11) Require periodic refresher training at an interval not to
exceed three years that includes classroom and ``hands-on'' training,
as well as testing;
(12) Add new equipment to the qualification and designation program
prior to its introduction to revenue service; and
(13) Maintain records adequate to demonstrate that each employee
and contractor performing safety-related tasks on passenger equipment
is currently qualified to do so. These records shall be adequate to
distinguish the qualifications of the employee or contractor as a
qualified person or as a qualified maintenance person.
Sec. 238.111 Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.
(a) Passenger equipment that has previously been used in revenue
service in the United States. For passenger equipment that has
previously been used in revenue service in the United States, each
railroad shall test the equipment on its system prior to placing such
equipment in revenue service for the first time on its railroad to
ensure the compatibility of the equipment with the railroad's operating
system (including the track, and signal system). A description of such
testing shall be retained by the railroad and made available to FRA for
inspection and copying upon request. For purposes of this paragraph,
passenger equipment that has previously been used in revenue service in
the United States means:
(1) The actual equipment used in such service;
(2) Equipment manufactured identically to that actual equipment;
and
(3) Equipment manufactured similarly to that actual equipment with
no material differences in safety-critical components or systems.
(b) Passenger equipment that has not been used in revenue service
in the United States. Before using passenger equipment for the first
time on its system that has not been used in revenue service in the
United States, each railroad shall:
(1) Prepare a pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan for the
equipment which contains the following elements:
(i) An identification of any waivers of FRA or other Federal safety
regulations required for the testing or for revenue service operation
of the equipment;
(ii) A clear statement of the test objectives. One of the principal
test objectives shall be to demonstrate that the equipment meets the
safety requirements specified in this part when operated in the
environment in which it is to be used;
(iii) A planned schedule for conducting the testing;
(iv) A description of the railroad property or facilities to be
used to conduct the testing;
(v) A detailed description of how the testing is to be conducted,
including a description of the criteria to be used to evaluate the
equipment's performance;
(vi) A description of how the test results are to be recorded;
(vii) A description of any special instrumentation to be used
during the tests;
(viii) A description of the information or data to be obtained;
(ix) A description of how the information or data obtained is to be
analyzed or used;
(x) A description of any criteria to be used as safety limits
during the testing;
(xi) A description of the criteria to be used to measure or
determine the success or failure of the tests. If acceptance is to be
based on extrapolation of less than full-level testing results, the
analysis to be done to justify the validity of the extrapolation shall
be described;
(xii) Quality control procedures to ensure that the inspection,
testing, and maintenance procedures are followed;
(xiii) Criteria to be used for the revenue service operation of the
equipment; and
(xiv) A description of any testing of the equipment that has
previously been performed.
(2) Submit a copy of the plan to FRA at least 30 days prior to
testing the equipment and include with that submission notification of
the times and places of the pre-revenue service tests to permit FRA
observation of such tests. For Tier II passenger equipment, the
railroad shall obtain FRA approval of the plan under the procedures
specified in Sec. 238.21.
(3) Comply with the plan, including fully executing the tests
required by the plan.
(4) Document in writing the results of the tests. For Tier II
passenger equipment, the railroad shall report the results of the tests
to the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety at least 90 days prior to
its intended operation of the equipment in revenue service.
(5) Correct any safety deficiencies identified in the design of the
equipment or in the inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures,
uncovered during the testing. If safety deficiencies cannot be
corrected by design changes, the railroad shall impose operational
limitations on the revenue service operation of the equipment that are
designed to ensure that the equipment can operate safely. For Tier II
passenger equipment, the railroad shall comply with any operational
limitations imposed by the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety on
the revenue service operation of the equipment for cause stated
following FRA review of the results of the test program. This section
does not restrict a railroad from petitioning FRA for a waiver of a
safety regulation under the procedures specified in part 211 of this
chapter.
(6) Make the plan and documentation kept pursuant to that plan
available for inspection and copying by FRA upon request.
(7) For Tier II passenger equipment, obtain approval from the FRA
Associate Administrator for Safety prior to placing the equipment in
revenue service. The Associate Administrator grants such approval upon
a showing of the
[[Page 25673]]
railroad's compliance with the applicable requirements of this part.
(c) If a railroad plans a major upgrade or introduction of new
technology on Tier II passenger equipment that has been used in revenue
service in the United States and that affects a safety system on such
equipment, the railroad shall follow the procedures specified in
paragraph (b) of this section prior to placing the equipment in revenue
service with such a major upgrade or introduction of new technology.
Sec. 238.113 Emergency window exits.
(a) The following requirements apply on or after Novermber 8,
1999--
(1) Each passenger car shall have a minimum of four emergency
window exits, either in a staggered configuration where practical or
with one exit located in each end of each side of the passenger car. If
the passenger car has multiple levels, each main level shall have a
minimum of four emergency window exits, either in a staggered
configuration where practical or with one exit located in each end of
each side on each level.
(2) Each sleeping car, and any similarly designed car having a
number of separate compartments intended to be occupied by passengers
or train crewmembers, shall have at least one emergency window exit in
each compartment.
(3) Each emergency window exit shall be designed to permit rapid
and easy removal during an emergency situation without requiring the
use of a tool or other implement.
(b) Each emergency window exit in a passenger car, including a
sleeper car, ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or placed in
service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002, shall have a
minimum unobstructed opening with dimensions of 26 inches horizontally
by 24 inches vertically.
(c) Marking and instructions. [Reserved]
Sec. 238.115 Emergency lighting.
(a) This section applies to each passenger car ordered on or after
September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the first time on or after
September 9, 2002. This section applies to each level of a multi-level
passenger car.
(b) Emergency lighting shall be provided in each passenger car and
shall include the following:
(1) A minimum, average illumination level of 1 foot-candle measured
at floor level adjacent to each exterior door and each interior door
providing access to an exterior door (such as a door opening into a
vestibule);
(2) A minimum, average illumination level of 1 foot-candle measured
25 inches above floor level along the center of each aisle and
passageway;
(3) A minimum illumination level of 0.1 foot-candle measured 25
inches above floor level at any point along the center of each aisle
and passageway; and
(4) A back-up power system capable of:
(i) Operating in all equipment orientations within 45 degrees of
vertical;
(ii) Operating after the initial shock of a collision or derailment
resulting in the following individually applied accelerations:
(A) Longitudinal: 8g;
(B) Lateral: 4g; and
(C) Vertical: 4g; and
(iii) Operating all emergency lighting for a period of at least 90
minutes without a loss of more than 40% of the minimum illumination
levels specified in this paragraph (b).
Sec. 238.117 Protection against personal injury.
On or after November 8, 1999, all moving parts, high voltage
equipment, electrical conductors and switches, and pipes carrying hot
fluids or gases on all passenger equipment shall be appropriately
equipped with interlocks or guards to minimize the risk of personal
injury. This section does not apply to the interior of a private car.
Sec. 238.119 Rim-stamped straight-plate wheels.
(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, on
or after November 8, 1999, no railroad shall place or continue in
service any vehicle, other than a private car, that is equipped with a
rim-stamped straight-plate wheel if a brake shoe acts on the tread of
the wheel for the purpose of slowing the vehicle.
(2) A commuter railroad may continue in service a vehicle equipped
with a Class A, rim-stamped straight-plate wheel mounted on an inboard-
bearing axle until the railroad exhausts its replacement stock of
wheels held as of May 12, 1999, provided the railroad does not modify
the operation of the vehicle in any way that would result in increased
thermal input to the wheel during braking.
(b) A rim-stamped straight-plate wheel shall not be used as a
replacement wheel on a private car that operates in a passenger train
if a brake shoe acts on the tread of the wheel for the purpose of
slowing the car.
(c) The requirements of this section do not apply to a wheel that
is periodically tread-braked for a short duration by automatic
circuitry for the sole purpose of cleaning the wheel tread surface.
Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment
Sec. 238.201 Scope/alternative compliance.
(a) Scope. (1) This subpart contains requirements for railroad
passenger equipment operating at speeds not exceeding 125 miles per
hour. As stated in Sec. 238.229, all such passenger equipment remains
subject to the safety appliance requirements contained in Federal
statute at 49 U.S.C. chapter 203 and in FRA regulations at part 231 and
Sec. 232.2 of this chapter. Unless otherwise specified, these
requirements only apply to passenger equipment ordered on or after
September 8, 2000 or placed in service for the first time on or after
September 9, 2002.
(2) The structural standards of this subpart (Sec. 238.203B-static
end strength; Sec. 238.205--anti-climbing mechanism; Sec. 238.207--link
between coupling mechanism and car body; Sec. 238.209--forward-facing
end structure of locomotives; Sec. 238.211--collision posts;
Sec. 238.213--corner posts; Sec. 238.215--rollover strength;
Sec. 238.217--side structure; Sec. 238.219--truck-to-car-body
attachment; and Sec. 238.223--locomotive fuel tanks) do not apply to
passenger equipment if used exclusively on a rail line:
(i) With no public highway-rail grade crossings;
(ii) On which no freight operations occur at any time;
(iii) On which only passenger equipment of compatible design is
utilized; and
(iv) On which trains operate at speeds not exceeding 79 mph.
(b) Alternative compliance. Passenger equipment of special design
shall be deemed to comply with this subpart, other than Sec. 238.203,
for the service environment in which the petitioner proposes to operate
the equipment if the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety determines
under paragraph (c) of this section that the equipment provides at
least an equivalent level of safety in such environment with respect to
the protection of its occupants from serious injury in the case of a
derailment or collision. In making a determination under paragraph (c)
the Associate Administrator shall consider, as a whole, all of those
elements of casualty prevention or mitigation relevant to the integrity
of the equipment that are addressed by the requirements of this
subpart.
(c)(1) The Associate Administrator may only make a finding of
equivalent safety and compliance with this subpart,
[[Page 25674]]
other than Sec. 238.203, based upon a submission of data and analysis
sufficient to support that determination. The petition shall include:
(i) The information required by Sec. 238.21(c);
(ii) Information, including detailed drawings and materials
specifications, sufficient to describe the actual construction of the
equipment of special design;
(iii) Engineering analysis sufficient to describe the likely
performance of the equipment in derailment and collision scenarios
pertinent to the safety requirements for which compliance is required
and for which the equipment does not conform to the specific
requirements of this subpart; and
(iv) A quantitative risk assessment, incorporating the design
information and engineering analysis described in this paragraph,
demonstrating that the equipment, as utilized in the service
environment for which recognition is sought, presents no greater hazard
of serious personal injury than equipment that conforms to the specific
requirements of this subpart.
(2) Any petition made under this paragraph is subject to the
procedures set forth in Sec. 238.21, and will be disposed of in
accordance with Sec. 238.21(g).
Sec. 238.203 Static end strength.
(a)(1) Except as further specified in this paragraph or in
paragraph (d), on or after November 8, 1999 all passenger equipment
shall resist a minimum static end load of 800,000 pounds applied on the
line of draft without permanent deformation of the body structure.
(2) For a passenger car or a locomotive, the static end strength of
unoccupied volumes may be less than 800,000 pounds if:
(i) Energy absorbing structures are used as part of a crash energy
management design of the passenger car or locomotive, and
(ii) The passenger car or locomotive resists a minimum static end
load of 800,000 pounds applied on the line of draft at the ends of its
occupied volume without permanent deformation of the body structure.
(3) For a locomotive placed in service prior to November 8, 1999,
as an alternative to resisting a minimum static end load of 800,000
pounds applied on the line of draft without permanent deformation of
the body structure, the locomotive shall resist a horizontal load of
1,000,000 pounds applied along the longitudinal center line of the
locomotive at a point on the buffer beam construction 12 inches above
the center line of draft without permanent deformation of the body
structure. The application of this load shall not be distributed over
an area greater than 6 inches by 24 inches. The alternative specified
in this paragraph is not applicable to a cab car or an MU locomotive.
(4) The requirements of this paragraph do not apply to:
(i) A private car; or
(ii) Unoccupied passenger equipment operating at the rear of a
passenger train.
(b) Passenger equipment placed in service before November 8, 1999
is presumed to comply with the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of this
section, unless the railroad operating the equipment has knowledge, or
FRA makes a showing, that such passenger equipment was not built to the
requirements specified in paragraph (a)(1).
(c) When overloaded in compression, the body structure of passenger
equipment shall be designed, to the maximum extent possible, to fail by
buckling or crushing, or both, of structural members rather than by
fracture of structural members or failure of structural connections.
(d) Grandfathering of non-compliant equipment for use on a
specified rail line or lines.
(1) Grandfathering approval is equipment and line specific.
Grandfathering approval of non-compliant equipment under this paragraph
is limited to usage of the equipment on a particular rail line or
lines. Before grandfathered equipment can be used on another rail line,
a railroad must file and secure approval of a grandfathering petition
under paragraph (d)(3) of this section.
(2) Temporary usage of non-compliant equipment. Any passenger
equipment placed in service on a rail line or lines before November 8,
1999 that does not comply with the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) may
continue to be operated on that particular line or (those particular
lines) if the operator of the equipment files a petition seeking
grandfathering approval under paragraph (d)(3) before November 8, 1999.
Such usage may continue while the petition is being processed, but in
no event later than May 8, 2000, unless the petition is approved.
(3) Petitions for grandfathering. Petitions for grandfathering
shall include:
(i) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary
person to be contacted with respect to the petition;
(ii) Information, including detailed drawings and material
specifications, sufficient to describe the actual construction of the
equipment;
(iii) Engineering analysis sufficient to describe the likely
performance of the static end strength of the equipment and the likely
performance of the equipment in derailment and collision scenarios
pertinent to the equipment's static end strength;
(iv) A description of risk mitigation measures that will be
employed in connection with the usage of the equipment on a specified
rail line or lines to decrease the likelihood of accidents involving
the use of the equipment; and
(v) A quantitative risk assessment, incorporating the design
information, engineering analysis, and risk mitigation measures
described in this paragraph, demonstrating that the use of the
equipment, as utilized in the service environment for which recognition
is sought, is in the public interest and is consistent with railroad
safety.
(e) Service. Three copies of each petition shall be submitted to
the Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad
Administration, 1120 Vermont Ave., Mail Stop 25, Washington, D.C.
20590.
(f) Federal Register notice. FRA will publish a notice in the
Federal Register concerning each petition under paragraph (d) of this
section.
(g) Comment. Not later than 30 days from the date of publication of
the notice in the Federal Register concerning a petition under
paragraph (d) of this section, any person may comment on the petition.
(1) Each comment shall set forth specifically the basis upon which
it is made, and contain a concise statement of the interest of the
commenter in the proceeding.
(2) Three copies of each comment shall be submitted to the
Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration,
1120 Vermont Ave., Mail Stop 25, Washington, D. C. 20590.
(3) The commenter shall certify that a copy of the comment was
served on each petitioner.
(h) Disposition of petitions.
(1) FRA will conduct a hearing on a petition in accordance with the
procedures provided in Sec. 211.25 of this chapter.
(2) If FRA finds that the petition complies with the requirements
of this section and that the proposed usage is in the public interest
and consistent with railroad safety, the petition will be granted,
normally within 90 days of its receipt. If the petition is neither
granted nor denied within 90 days, the petition remains pending for
decision. FRA may
[[Page 25675]]
attach special conditions to the approval of the petition. Following
the approval of a petition, FRA may reopen consideration of the
petition for cause stated.
(3) If FRA finds that the petition does not comply with the
requirements of this section or that the proposed usage is not in the
public interest and consistent with railroad safety, the petition will
be denied, normally within 90 days of its receipt.
(4) When FRA grants or denies a petition, or reopens consideration
of the petition, written notice is sent to the petitioner and other
interested parties.
Sec. 238.205 Anti-climbing mechanism.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, all
passenger equipment placed in service for the first time on or after
September 8, 2000 shall have at both the forward and rear ends an anti-
climbing mechanism capable of resisting an upward or downward vertical
force of 100,000 pounds without failure. When coupled together in any
combination to join two vehicles, AAR Type H and Type F tight-lock
couplers satisfy this requirement.
(b) Each locomotive ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or
placed in service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002,
shall have an anti-climbing mechanism at its forward end capable of
resisting an upward or downward vertical force of 200,000 pounds
without failure, in lieu of the forward end anti-climbing mechanism
requirements described in paragraph (a) of this section.
Sec. 238.207 Link between coupling mechanism and car body.
All passenger equipment placed in service for the first time on or
after September 8, 2000 shall have a coupler carrier at each end
designed to resist a vertical downward thrust from the coupler shank of
100,000 pounds for any normal horizontal position of the coupler,
without permanent deformation. For passenger equipment that is
connected by articulated joints that comply with the requirements of
Sec. 238.205(a), such passenger equipment also complies with the
requirements of this section.
Sec. 238.209 Forward-facing end structure of locomotives.
The skin covering the forward-facing end of each locomotive shall
be:
(a) Equivalent to a \1/2\ inch steel plate with a 25,000 pounds-
per-square-inch yield strength--material of a higher yield strength may
be used to decrease the required thickness of the material provided at
least an equivalent level of strength is maintained;
(b) Designed to inhibit the entry of fluids into the occupied cab
area of the equipment; and
(c) Affixed to the collision posts or other main vertical
structural members of the forward end structure so as to add to the
strength of the end structure.
(d) As used in this section, the term ``skin'' does not include
forward-facing windows and doors.
Sec. 238.211 Collision posts.
(a) Except as further specified in this paragraph and paragraphs
(b) and (c) of this section--
(1) All passenger equipment placed in service for the first time on
or after September 8, 2000 shall have either:
(i) Two full-height collision posts, located at approximately the
one-third points laterally. Each collision post shall have an ultimate
longitudinal shear strength of not less than 300,000 pounds at a point
even with the top of the underframe member to which it is attached. If
reinforcement is used to provide the shear value, the reinforcement
shall have full value for a distance of 18 inches up from the
underframe connection and then taper to a point approximately 30 inches
above the underframe connection; or
(ii) An equivalent end structure that can withstand the sum of
forces that each collision post in paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section
is required to withstand. For analysis purposes, the required forces
may be assumed to be evenly distributed at the end structure at the
underframe joint.
(2) The requirements of this paragraph do not apply to unoccupied
passenger equipment operating in a passenger train.
(b) Each locomotive, including a cab car and an MU locomotive,
ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the
first time on or after September 9, 2002, shall have at its forward
end, in lieu of the structural protection described in paragraph (a) of
this section, either:
(1) Two forward collision posts, located at approximately the one-
third points laterally, each capable of withstanding:
(i) A 500,000-pound longitudinal force at the point even with the
top of the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the
joint; and
(ii) A 200,000-pound longitudinal force exerted 30 inches above the
joint of the post to the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate
strength; or
(2) An equivalent end structure that can withstand the sum of the
forces that each collision post in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section
is required to withstand.
(c) The end structure requirements in paragraphs (a) and (b) of
this section apply only to the ends of a semi-permanently coupled
consist of articulated units, provided that:
(1) The railroad submits to the FRA Associate Administrator for
Safety under the procedures specified in Sec. 238.21 a documented
engineering analysis establishing that the articulated connection is
capable of preventing disengagement and telescoping to the same extent
as equipment satisfying the anti-climbing and collision post
requirements contained in this subpart; and
(2) FRA finds the analysis persuasive.
Sec. 238.213 Corner posts.
(a) Each passenger car shall have at each end of the car, placed
ahead of the occupied volume, two full-height corner posts capable of
resisting:
(1) A horizontal load of 150,000 pounds at the point of attachment
to the underframe without failure;
(2) A horizontal load of 20,000 pounds at the point of attachment
to the roof structure without failure; and
(3) A horizontal load of 30,000 pounds applied 18 inches above the
top of the floor without permanent deformation.
(b) For purposes of this section, the orientation of the applied
horizontal loads shall range from longitudinal inward to transverse
inward.
Sec. 238.215 Rollover strength.
(a) Each passenger car shall be designed to rest on its side and be
uniformly supported at the top (``roof rail''), the bottom cords
(``side sill'') of the side frame, and, if bi-level, the intermediate
floor rail. The allowable stress in the structural members of the
occupied volumes for this condition shall be one-half yield or one-half
the critical buckling stress, whichever is less. Local yielding to the
outer skin of the passenger car is allowed provided that the resulting
deformations in no way intrude upon the occupied volume of the car.
(b) Each passenger car shall also be designed to rest on its roof
so that any damage in occupied areas is limited to roof sheathing and
framing. Other than roof sheathing and framing, the allowable stress in
the structural members of the occupied volumes for this condition shall
be one-half yield or one-half the critical buckling stress, whichever
is less. Deformation to the roof sheathing and framing is allowed to
the extent necessary to permit the vehicle to be supported directly on
the top chords of the side frames and end frames.
[[Page 25676]]
Sec. 238.217 Side structure.
Each passenger car shall comply with the following:
(a) Side posts and corner braces.
(1) For modified girder, semi-monocoque, or truss construction, the
sum of the section moduli in inches \3\--about a longitudinal axis,
taken at the weakest horizontal section between the side sill and side
plate--of all posts and braces on each side of the car located between
the body corner posts shall be not less than 0.30 multiplied by the
distance in feet between the centers of end panels.
(2) For modified girder or semi-monocoque construction only, the
sum of the section moduli in inches \3\--about a transverse axis, taken
at the weakest horizontal section between the side sill and side
plate--of all posts, braces and pier panels, to the extent available,
on each side of the car located between body corner posts shall be not
less than 0.20 multiplied by the distance in feet between the centers
of end panels.
(3) The center of an end panel is the point midway between the
center of the body corner post and the center of the adjacent side
post.
(4) The minimum section moduli or thicknesses specified in
paragraph (a) of this section may be adjusted in proportion to the
ratio of the yield strength of the material used to that of mild open-
hearth steel for a car whose structural members are made of a higher
strength steel.
(b) Sheathing.
(1) Outside sheathing of mild, open-hearth steel when used flat,
without reinforcement (other than side posts) in a side frame of
modified girder or semi-monocoque construction shall not be less than
1/8 inch nominal thickness. Other metals may be used of a thickness in
inverse proportion to their yield strengths.
(2) Outside metal sheathing of less than \1/8\ inch thickness may
be used only if it is reinforced so as to produce at least an
equivalent sectional area at a right angle to reinforcements as that of
the flat sheathing specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
(3) When the sheathing used for truss construction serves no load-
carrying function, the minimum thickness of that sheathing shall be not
less than 40 percent of that specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this
section.
Sec. 238.219 Truck-to-car-body attachment.
Passenger equipment shall have a truck-to-car-body attachment with
an ultimate strength sufficient to resist without failure a force of 2g
vertical on the mass of the truck and a force of 250,000 pounds in any
horizontal direction on the truck. For purposes of this section, the
mass of the truck includes axles, wheels, bearings, the truck-mounted
brake system, suspension system components, and any other components
attached to the truck by design.
Sec. 238.221 Glazing.
(a) Passenger equipment shall comply with the applicable Safety
Glazing Standards contained in part 223 of this chapter, if required by
that part.
(b) Each exterior window on a locomotive cab and a passenger car
shall remain in place when subjected to:
(1) The forces described in part 223 of this chapter; and
(2) The forces due to air pressure differences caused when two
trains pass at the minimum separation for two adjacent tracks, while
traveling in opposite directions, each train traveling at the maximum
authorized speed.
Sec. 238.223 Locomotive fuel tanks.
(a) External fuel tanks. External locomotive fuel tanks shall
comply with the requirements contained in Appendix D to this part, or
an industry standard providing at least an equivalent level of safety
if approved by FRA under Sec. 238.21.
(b) Internal fuel tanks.
(1) Internal locomotive fuel tanks shall be positioned in a manner
to reduce the likelihood of accidental penetration from roadway debris
or collision.
(2) Internal fuel tank vent systems shall be designed so they do
not become a path of fuel loss in any tank orientation due to a
locomotive overturning.
(3) Internal fuel tank bulkheads and skin shall at a minimum be
equivalent to a \3/8\-inch thick steel plate with a 25,000 pounds-per-
square-inch yield strength. Material of a higher yield strength may be
used to decrease the required thickness of the material provided at
least an equivalent level of strength is maintained. Skid plates are
not required.
Sec. 238.225 Electrical system.
All passenger equipment shall comply with the following:
(a) Conductors. Conductor sizes shall be selected on the basis of
current-carrying capacity, mechanical strength, temperature,
flexibility requirements, and maximum allowable voltage drop. Current-
carrying capacity shall be derated for grouping and for operating
temperature.
(b) Main battery system.
(1) The main battery compartment shall be isolated from the cab and
passenger seating areas by a non-combustible barrier.
(2) Battery chargers shall be designed to protect against
overcharging.
(3) If batteries are of the type to potentially vent explosive
gases, the battery compartment shall be adequately ventilated to
prevent the accumulation of explosive concentrations of these gases.
(c) Power dissipation resistors.
(1) Power dissipating resistors shall be adequately ventilated to
prevent overheating under worst-case operating conditions as determined
by the railroad.
(2) Power dissipation grids shall be designed and installed with
sufficient isolation to prevent combustion.
(3) Resistor elements shall be electrically insulated from resistor
frames, and the frames shall be electrically insulated from the
supports that hold them.
(d) Electromagnetic interference and compatibility.
(1) The operating railroad shall ensure electromagnetic
compatibility of the safety-critical equipment systems with their
environment. Electromagnetic compatibility may be achieved through
equipment design or changes to the operating environment.
(2) The electronic equipment shall not produce electrical noise
that affects the safe performance of train line control and
communications or wayside signaling systems.
(3) To contain electromagnetic interference emissions, suppression
of transients shall be at the source wherever possible.
(4) All electronic equipment shall be self-protected from damage or
improper operation, or both, due to high voltage transients and long-
term over-voltage or under-voltage conditions. This includes protection
from both power frequency and harmonic effects as well as protection
from radio frequency signals into the microwave frequency range.
Sec. 238.227 Suspension system.
On or after November 8, 1999--
(a) All passenger equipment shall exhibit freedom from hunting
oscillations at all operating speeds. If hunting oscillations do occur,
a railroad shall immediately take appropriate action to prevent
derailment. For purposes of this paragraph, hunting oscillations shall
be considered lateral oscillations of trucks that could lead to a
dangerous instability.
(b) All passenger equipment intended for service above 110 mph
shall demonstrate stable operation during pre-revenue service
qualification tests at all operating speeds up to 5 mph in
[[Page 25677]]
excess of the maximum intended operating speed under worst-case
conditions--including component wear--as determined by the operating
railroad.
(c) Nothing in this section shall affect the requirements of part
213 of this chapter as they apply to passenger equipment as provided in
that part.
Sec. 238.229 Safety appliances.
Except as provided in this part, all passenger equipment continues
to be subject to the safety appliance requirements contained in Federal
statute at 49 U.S.C. chapter 203 and in Federal regulations at part 231
and Sec. 232.2 of this chapter.
Sec. 238.231 Brake system.
Except as otherwise provided in this section, on or after September
9, 1999 the following requirements apply to all passenger equipment and
passenger trains.
(a) A passenger train's primary brake system shall be capable of
stopping the train with a service application from its maximum
authorized operating speed within the signal spacing existing on the
track over which the train is operating.
(b) The brake system design of passenger equipment ordered on or
after September 8, 2000 or placed in service for the first time on or
after September 9, 2002, shall not require an inspector to place
himself or herself on, under, or between components of the equipment to
observe brake actuation or release.
(c) Passenger equipment shall be provided with an emergency brake
application feature that produces an irretrievable stop, using a brake
rate consistent with prevailing adhesion, passenger safety, and brake
system thermal capacity. An emergency brake application shall be
available at any time, and shall be initiated by an unintentional
parting of the train.
(d) A passenger train brake system shall respond as intended to
signals from a train brake control line or lines. Control lines shall
be designed so that failure or breakage of a control line will cause
the brakes to apply or will result in a default to control lines that
meet this requirement.
(e) Introduction of alcohol or other chemicals into the air brake
system of passenger equipment is prohibited.
(f) The operating railroad shall require that the design and
operation of the brake system results in wheels that are free of
condemnable cracks.
(g) Disc brakes shall be designed and operated to produce a surface
temperature no greater than the safe operating temperature recommended
by the disc manufacturer and verified by testing or previous service.
(h) Hand brakes and parking brakes.
(1) Except for a locomotive that is ordered before September 8,
2000 or placed in service for the first time before Sepbember 9, 2002,
and except for MU locomotives, all locomotives shall be equipped with a
hand or parking brake that can:
(i) Be applied or activated by hand;
(ii) Be released by hand; and
(iii) Hold the loaded unit on the maximum grade anticipated by the
operating railroad.
(2) Except for a private car and locomotives addressed in paragraph
(h)(1) of this section, all other passenger equipment, including MU
locomotives, shall be equipped with a hand brake that meets the
requirements for hand brakes contained in part 231 of this chapter and
that can:
(i) Be applied or activated by hand;
(ii) Be released by hand; and
(iii) Hold the loaded unit on the maximum grade anticipated by the
operating railroad.
(i) Passenger cars shall be equipped with a means to apply the
emergency brake that is accessible to passengers and located in the
vestibule or passenger compartment. The emergency brake shall be
clearly identified and marked.
(j) Locomotives equipped with blended brakes shall be designed so
that:
(1) The blending of friction and dynamic brake to obtain the
correct retarding force is automatic;
(2) Loss of power or failure of the dynamic brake does not result
in exceeding the allowable stopping distance;
(3) The friction brake alone is adequate to safely stop the train
under all operating conditions; and
(4) Operation of the friction brake alone does not result in
thermal damage to wheels or disc rotor surface temperatures exceeding
the manufacturer's recommendation.
(k) For new designs of braking systems, the design process shall
include computer modeling or dynamometer simulation of train braking
that shows compliance with paragraphs (f) and (g) of this section over
the range of equipment operating speeds. A new simulation is required
prior to implementing a change in operating parameters.
(l) Locomotives ordered on or after September 8, 2000 or placed in
service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002, shall be
equipped with effective air coolers or dryers that provide air to the
main reservoir with a dew point at least 10 degrees F. below ambient
temperature.
(m) When a passenger train is operated in either direct or
graduated release, the railroad shall ensure that all the cars in the
train consist are set up in the same operating mode.
Sec. 238.233 Interior fittings and surfaces.
(a) Each seat in a passenger car shall--
(1) Be securely fastened to the car body so as to withstand an
individually applied acceleration of 4g acting in the lateral direction
and 4g acting in the upward vertical direction on the deadweight of the
seat or seats, if held in tandem; and
(2) Have an attachment to the car body of an ultimate strength
capable of resisting simultaneously:
(i) The longitudinal inertial force of 8g acting on the mass of the
seat; and
(ii) The load associated with the impact into the seatback of an
unrestrained 95th-percentile adult male initially seated behind the
seat, when the floor to which the seat is attached decelerates with a
triangular crash pulse having a peak of 8g and a duration of 250
milliseconds.
(b) Overhead storage racks in a passenger car shall provide
longitudinal and lateral restraint for stowed articles. Overhead
storage racks shall be attached to the car body with sufficient
strength to resist loads due to the following individually applied
accelerations acting on the mass of the luggage stowed as determined by
the railroad:
(1) Longitudinal: 8g;
(2) Vertical: 4g; and
(3) Lateral: 4g.
(c) Other interior fittings within a passenger car shall be
attached to the car body with sufficient strength to withstand the
following individually applied accelerations acting on the mass of the
fitting:
(1) Longitudinal: 8g;
(2) Vertical: 4g; and
(3) Lateral: 4g.
(d) To the extent possible, all interior fittings in a passenger
car, except seats, shall be recessed or flush-mounted.
(e) Sharp edges and corners in a locomotive cab and a passenger car
shall be either avoided or padded to mitigate the consequences of an
impact with such surfaces.
(f) Each seat provided for a crewmember regularly assigned to
occupy the cab of a locomotive and each floor-mounted seat in the cab
shall be secured to the car body with an attachment having an ultimate
strength capable of withstanding the loads due to the following
individually applied accelerations acting on the combined mass of the
seat and a 95th-percentile adult male occupying it:
[[Page 25678]]
(1) Longitudinal: 8g;
(2) Lateral: 4g; and
(3) Vertical: 4g.
(g) If, for purposes of showing compliance with the requirements of
this section, the strength of a seat attachment is to be demonstrated
through sled testing, the seat structure and seat attachment to the
sled that is used in such testing must be representative of the actual
seat structure in, and seat attachment to, the rail vehicle subject to
the requirements of this section. If the attachment strength of any
other interior fitting is to be demonstrated through sled testing, for
purposes of showing compliance with the requirements of this section,
such testing shall be conducted in a similar manner.
Sec. 238.235 Doors.
(a) By December 31, 1999, each powered, exterior side door in a
vestibule that is partitioned from the passenger compartment of a
passenger car shall have a manual override device that is:
(1) Capable of releasing the door to permit it to be opened without
power from inside the car;
(2) Located adjacent to the door which it controls; and
(3) Designed and maintained so that a person may readily access and
operate the override device from inside the car without requiring the
use of a tool or other implement.
(b) Each passenger car ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or
placed in service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002
shall have a minimum of two exterior side doors, each door providing a
minimum clear opening with dimensions of 30 inches horizontally by 74
inches vertically.
Note: The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility
Specifications for Transportation Vehicles also contain requirements
for doorway clearance (See 49 CFR part 38).
Each powered, exterior side door on each such passenger car shall have
a manual override device that is:
(1) Capable of releasing the door to permit it to be opened without
power from both inside and outside the car;
(2) Located adjacent to the door which it controls; and
(3) Designed and maintained so that a person may access the
override device from both inside and outside the car without requiring
the use of a tool or other implement.
(c) A railroad may protect a manual override device used to open a
powered, exterior door with a cover or a screen capable of removal
without requiring the use of a tool or other implement.
(d) Marking and instructions. [Reserved]
Sec. 238.237 Automated monitoring.
(a) Except as further specified in this paragraph, on or after
November 8, 1999 a working alerter or deadman control shall be provided
in the controlling locomotive of each passenger train operating in
other than cab signal, automatic train control, or automatic train stop
territory. If the controlling locomotive is ordered on or after
September 8, 2000, or placed into service for the first time on or
after September 9, 2002, a working alerter shall be provided.
(b) Alerter or deadman control timing shall be set by the operating
railroad taking into consideration maximum train speed and capabilities
of the signal system. The railroad shall document the basis for setting
alerter or deadman control timing and make this documentation available
to FRA upon request.
(c) If the train operator does not respond to the alerter or
maintain proper contact with the deadman control, it shall initiate a
penalty brake application.
(d) The following procedures apply if the alerter or deadman
control fails en route:
(1)(i) A second person qualified on the signal system and brake
application procedures shall be stationed in the locomotive cab; or
(ii) The engineer shall be in constant communication with a second
crewmember until the train reaches the next terminal.
(2)(i) A tag shall be prominently displayed in the locomotive cab
to indicate that the alerter or deadman control is defective, until
such device is repaired; and
(ii) When the train reaches its next terminal or the locomotive
undergoes its next calender day inspection, whichever occurs first, the
alerter or deadman control shall be repaired or the locomotive shall be
removed as the controlling locomotive in the train.
Subpart D--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for
Tier I Passenger Equipment
Sec. 238.301 Scope.
(a) This subpart contains requirements pertaining to the
inspection, testing, and maintenance of passenger equipment operating
at speeds not exceeding 125 miles per hour. The requirements in this
subpart address the inspection, testing, and maintenance of the brake
system as well as other mechanical and electrical components covered by
this part.
(b) Beginning July 12, 2001 the requirements contained in this
subpart shall apply to railroads operating Tier I passenger equipment
covered by this part. A railroad may request earlier application of the
requirements contained in this subpart upon written notification to
FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety as provided in Sec. 238.1(c).
(c) Paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sec. 238.309 shall apply beginning
September 9, 1999.
Sec. 238.303 Exterior calendar day mechanical inspection of passenger
equipment.
(a) General.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, each
passenger car and each unpowered vehicle used in a passenger train
shall receive an exterior mechanical inspection at least once each
calendar day that the equipment is placed in service.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, all
passenger equipment shall be inspected as required in this section at
least once each calendar day that the equipment is placed in service to
ensure that the equipment conforms with the requirement contained in
paragraph (e)(15) of this section.
(3) If a passenger care is also classified as a locomotive under
part 229 of this chapter, the passenger car shall also receive a daily
inspection pursuant to the requirements of Sec. 229.21 of this chapter.
(b) Each passenger car and each unpowered vehicle added to a
passenger train shall receive an exterior calendar day mechanical
inspection at the time it is added to the train unless documentation is
provided to the train crew that an exterior mechanical inspection was
performed on the car the previous calendar day.
(c) The exterior calendar day mechanical inspection shall be
performed by a qualified maintenance person.
(d) The exterior calendar day mechanical inspection required by
this section shall be conducted to the extent possible without
uncoupling the trainset and without placing the equipment over a pit or
on an elevated track.
(e) As part of the exterior calendar day mechanical inspection, the
railroad shall verify conformity with the following conditions, and
nonconformity with any such condition renders the passenger car or
unpowered vehicle used in a passenger train defective whenever
discovered in service:
[[Page 25679]]
(1) Products of combustion are released entirely outside the cab
and other compartments.
(2) Each battery container is vented and each battery is kept from
gassing excessively.
(3) Each coupler is in the following condition:
(i) Sidewall or pin bearing bosses and the pulling face of the
knuckles are not broken or cracked;
(ii) The coupler assembly is equipped with anti-creep protection;
(iii) The coupler carrier is not broken or cracked; and
(iv) The yoke is not broken or cracked.
(4) A device is provided under the lower end of all drawbar pins
and articulated connection pins to prevent the pin from falling out of
place in case of breakage.
(5) The suspension system, including the spring rigging, is in the
following condition:
(i) Protective construction or safety hangers are provided to
prevent spring planks, spring seats, or bolsters from dropping to the
track structure in event of a hanger or spring failure;
(ii) The top (long) leaf or any of the other three leaves of the
elliptical spring is not broken, except when a spring is part of a nest
of three or more springs and none of the other springs in the nest has
its top leaf or any of the other three leaves broken;
(iii) The outer coil spring or saddle is not broken;
(iv) The equalizers, hangers, bolts, gibs, or pins are not cracked
or broken;
(v) The coil spring is not fully compressed when the car is at
rest;
(vi) The shock absorber is not broken or leaking oil or other
fluid; and
(vii) Each air bag or other pneumatic suspension system component
inflates or deflates, as applicable, correctly and otherwise operates
as intended.
(6) Each truck is in the following condition:
(i) Each tie bar is not loose;
(ii) Each motor suspension lug, equalizer, hanger, gib, or pin is
not cracked or broken; and
(iii) The truck frame is not broken and is not cracked in a stress
area that may affect its structural integrity.
(7) Each side bearing is in the following condition:
(i) Each friction side bearing with springs designed to carry
weight does not have more than 25 percent of the springs in any one
nest broken;
(ii) Each friction side bearing does not run in contact unless
designed to carry weight; and
(iii) The maximum clearance of each side bearing does not exceed
the manufacturer's recommendation.
(8) Each wheel does not have any of the following conditions:
(i) A single flat spot that is 2\1/2\ inches or more in length, or
two adjoining spots that are each two or more inches in length;
(ii) A gouge or chip in the flange that is more than 1\1/2\ inches
in length and \1/2\ inch in width;
(iii) A broken rim, if the tread, measured from the flange at a
point \5/8\ of an inch above the tread, is less than 3\3/4\ inches in
width;
(iv) A shelled-out spot 2\1/2\ inches or more in length, or two
adjoining spots that are each two or more inches in length;
(v) A seam running lengthwise that is within 3\3/4\ inches of the
flange;
(vi) A flange worn to a \7/8\ inch thickness or less, gauged at a
point \3/8\ of an inch above the tread;
(vii) A tread worn hollow \5/16\ of an inch or more;
(viii) A flange height of 1\1/2\ inches or more measured from the
tread to the top of the flange;
(ix) A rim less than 1 inch thick;
(x) A crack or break in the flange, tread, rim, plate, or hub;
(xi) A loose wheel; or
(xii) A weld.
(9) No part or appliance of a passenger coach, except the wheels,
is less than 2\1/2\ inches above the top of the rail.
(10) Each unguarded, noncurrent-carrying metal part subject to
becoming charged is grounded or thoroughly insulated.
(11) Each jumper and cable connection is in the following
condition:
(i) Each jumpers and cable connection between coaches, between
locomotives, or between a locomotive and a coach is located and guarded
in a manner that provides sufficient vertical clearance. Jumpers and
cable connections may not hang with one end free;
(ii) The insulation is not broken or badly chafed;
(iii) No plug, receptacle, or terminal is broken; and
(iv) No strand of wire is broken or protruding.
(12) Each door and cover plate guarding high voltage equipment is
marked ``Danger--High Voltage'' or with the word ``Danger'' and the
normal voltage carried by the parts so protected.
(13) Each buffer plate is in place.
(14) Each diaphragm, if any, is in place and properly aligned.
(15) Each secondary braking system is in operating mode and does
not have any known defective condition which prevents its proper
operation. If the dynamic brakes on a locomotive are found not to be in
operating mode or are known to have a defective condition which
prevents their proper operation at the time that the exterior
mechanical inspection is performed or at any other time while the
locomotive is in service, the following requirements shall be met in
order to continue the locomotive in service:
(i) MU locomotives equipped with dynamic brakes found not to be in
operating mode or containing a defective condition which prevents the
proper operation of the dynamic brakes shall be handled in the same
manner as a running gear defect pursuant to Sec. 238.17.
(ii) Conventional locomotives equipped with dynamic brakes found
not to be in operating mode or containing a defective condition which
prevents the proper operation of the dynamic brakes shall be handled in
accordance with the following:
(A) A tag bearing the words ``inoperative dynamic brakes'' shall be
securely displayed in a conspicuous location in the cab of the
locomotive and contain the locomotive number, the date and location
where the condition was discovered, and the signature of the person
discovering the condition;
(B) The locomotive engineer shall be informed in writing that the
dynamic brakes on the locomotive are inoperative at the location where
the locomotive engineer first takes charge of the train; and
(C) The inoperative or defective dynamic brakes shall be repaired
within 3 calendar days of being found in defective condition or at the
locomotive's next periodic inspection pursuant to Sec. 229.23 of this
chapter, whichever occurs first.
(f) Exception. A long-distance intercity passenger train that
misses a scheduled exterior calendar day mechanical inspection due to a
delay en route may continue in service to the location where the
inspection was scheduled to be performed. At that point, an exterior
calendar day mechanical inspection shall be performed prior to
returning the equipment to service. This flexibility applies only to
the exterior mechanical safety inspections required by this section,
and does not relieve the railroad of the responsibility to perform a
calendar day inspection on a unit classified as a ``locomotive'' under
part 229 of this chapter as required by Sec. 229.21 of this chapter.
(g) Records. A record shall be maintained of each exterior calendar
day mechanical inspection performed.
(1) This record may be maintained in writing or electronically
provided FRA has access to the record upon request.
[[Page 25680]]
(2) The written or electronic record must contain the following
information:
(i) The identification number of the unit;
(ii) The place, date, and time of the inspection;
(iii) Any non-complying conditions found; and
(iv) The signature of the inspector.
(3) This record may be part of a single master report covering an
entire group of cars and equipment.
(4) This record shall be maintained at the place where the
inspection is conducted or at one central location and shall be
retained for at least 92 days.
(h) Cars requiring a single car test in accordance with
Sec. 238.311 that are being moved in service to a location where the
single car test can be performed shall have the single car test
completed prior to, or as a part of, the exterior calendar day
mechanical inspection.
Sec. 238.305 Interior calendar day mechanical inspection of passenger
cars.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, each
passenger car shall receive an interior mechanical inspection at least
once each calendar day that it is placed in service.
(b) The interior calendar day mechanical inspection shall be
performed by a qualified person or a qualified maintenance person.
(c) As part of the interior calendar day mechanical inspection, the
railroad shall verify conformity with the following conditions, and
nonconformity with any such condition renders the car defective
whenever discovered in service, except as provided in paragraph (c)(5)
of this section:
(1) All fan openings, exposed gears and pinions, exposed moving
parts of mechanisms, pipes carrying hot gases and high-voltage
equipment, switches, circuit breakers, contactors, relays, grid
resistors, and fuses are installed in non-hazardous locations or
equipped with guards to prevent personal injury.
(2) The words ``Emergency Brake Valve'' are legibly stenciled or
marked near each brake pipe valve or shown on an adjacent badge plate.
(3) All doors and cover plates guarding high voltage equipment are
marked ``Danger--High Voltage'' or with the word ``Danger'' and the
normal voltage carried by the parts so protected.
(4) All trap doors safely operate and securely latch in place in
both the up and down position.
(5) All end doors and side doors operate safely and as intended. If
a door is defective and all of the following conditions are satisfied,
the car may remain in passenger service until the next interior
calendar day mechanical inspection is due at which time the appropriate
repairs shall be made:
(i) A qualified person or a qualified maintenance person determines
that the repairs necessary to bring a door into compliance cannot be
performed at the time the interior mechanical inspection is conducted;
(ii) A qualified person or a qualified maintenance person
determines that it is safe to move the equipment in passenger service;
(iii) At least one operative and accessible door is available on
each side of the car; and
(iv) A notice is prominently displayed directly on the defective
door indicating that the door is defective.
(6) All safety-related signage is in place and legible.
(7) All vestibule steps are illuminated.
(8) All D rings, pull handles, or other means to access manual door
releases are in place based on a visual inspection.
(9) All emergency equipment, including a fire extinguisher, pry
bar, auxiliary portable lighting, and first aid kits, as applicable,
are in place.
(d) A long-distance intercity passenger train that misses a
scheduled calendar day interior mechanical inspection due to a delay en
route may continue in service to the location where the inspection was
scheduled to be performed. At that point, an interior calendar day
mechanical inspection shall be performed prior to returning the
equipment to service.
(e) Records. A record shall be maintained of each interior calendar
day mechanical inspection performed.
(1) This record may be maintained in writing or electronically
provided FRA has access to the record upon request.
(2) The written or electronic record must contain the following
information:
(i) The identification number of the unit;
(ii) The place, date, and time of the inspection;
(iii) Any non-complying conditions found; and
(iv) The signature of the inspector.
(3) This record may be part of a single master report covering an
entire group of cars and equipment.
(4) This record shall be maintained at the place where the
inspection is conducted or at one central location and shall be
retained for at least 92 days.
Sec. 238.307 Periodic mechanical inspection of passenger cars and
unpowered vehicles used in passenger trains.
(a) General.
(1) Railroads shall conduct periodic mechanical inspections of all
passenger cars and all unpowered vehicles used in a passenger train as
required by this section or as warranted and justified by data
developed pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this section. A periodic
inspection conducted under part 229 of this chapter satisfies the
requirement of this section with respect to the features inspected.
(2) A railroad may, upon written notification to FRA's Associate
Administrator for Safety, adopt and comply with alternative periodic
mechanical inspection intervals for specific components or equipment in
lieu of the requirements of this section. Any alternative interval must
be based upon a documented reliability assessment conducted under a
system safety plan subject to periodic peer audit. (See Appendix E to
this part for a discussion of the general principles of reliability-
based maintenance programs.) The periodic inspection intervals provided
in this section may be changed only when justified by accumulated,
verifiable data that provides a high level of confidence that the
component(s) will not fail in a manner resulting in harm to persons.
FRA may monitor and review a railroad's implementation and compliance
with any alternative interval adopted. FRA's Associate Administrator
for Safety may prohibit or revoke a railroad's ability to utilize an
alternative inspection interval if FRA determines that the adopted
interval is not supported by credible data or does not provide adequate
safety assurances. Such a determination will be made in writing and
will state the basis for such action.
(b) Each periodic mechanical inspection required by this section
shall be performed by a qualified maintenance person.
(c) As part of the periodic mechanical inspection the railroad
shall verify the condition of the following interior and exterior
mechanical components, which shall be inspected not less frequently
than every 92 days. At a minimum, this inspection shall determine that:
(1) Floors of passageways and compartments are free from oil,
water, waste, or any obstruction that creates a slipping, tripping, or
fire hazard, and floors are properly treated to provide secure footing.
(2) Emergency lighting systems are operational.
(3) With regard to switches:
(i) All hand-operated switches carrying currents with a potential
of more than 150 volts that may be operated while under load are
covered and are operative from the outside of the cover;
[[Page 25681]]
(ii) A means is provided to display whether the switches are open
or closed; and
(iii) Switches not designed to be operated safely while under load
are legibly marked with the voltage carried and the words ``must not be
operated under load''.
(4) All trucks are equipped with a device or securing arrangement
to prevent the truck and car body from separating in case of
derailment.
(5) All center castings on trucks are not cracked or broken.
(6) All roller bearings do not have any of the following
conditions:
(i) A sign of having been overheated as evidenced by discoloration
or other telltale sign of overheating such as damage to the seal or
distortion of any bearing component;
(ii) A loose or missing cap screw;
(iii) A broken, missing, or improperly applied cap screw lock; or
(iv) A seal that is loose or damaged or permits leakage of
lubricant in clearly formed droplets.
(7) All mechanical systems and components of the equipment are free
of all the following general conditions that endanger the safety of the
crew, passengers, or equipment:
(i) A continuous accumulation of oil or grease;
(ii) Improper functioning of a component;
(iii) A crack, break, excessive wear, structural defect, or
weakness of a component;
(iv) A leak;
(v) Use of a component or system under a condition that exceeds
that for which the component or system is designed to operate; and
(vi) Insecure attachment of a component.
(8) All of the items identified in the exterior calendar day
mechanical inspection contained at Sec. 238.303 are in conformity with
the conditions prescribed in that section.
(9) All of the items identified in the interior calendar day
mechanical inspection contained at Sec. 238.305 are in conformity with
the conditions prescribed in that section.
(d) The periodic mechanical inspection shall specifically include
the following interior and exterior mechanical components, which shall
be inspected not less frequently than every 184 days. At a minimum,
this inspection shall determine that:
(1) Seats and seat attachments are not broken or loose.
(2) Luggage racks are not broken or loose.
(3) All beds and bunks are not broken or loose, and all restraints
or safety latches and straps are in place and function as intended.
(4) A representative sample of emergency window exits on the
railroad's passenger cars properly operate, in accordance with the
requirements of Sec. 239.107 of this chapter.
(5) Each coupler is in the following condition:
(i) The distance between the guard arm and the knuckle nose is not
more than 5\1/2\ inches on standard type couplers (MCB contour 1904),
or not more than 5\5/16\ inches on D&E couplers;
(ii) The free slack in the coupler or drawbar not absorbed by
friction devices or draft gears is not more than \1/2\ inch; and
(iii) The draft gear is not broken.
(e) The periodic mechanical inspection shall specifically include
the manual door releases, which shall be inspected not less frequently
than every 368 days. At a minimum, this inspection shall determine that
all manual door releases operate as intended.
(f) Records. (1) A record shall be maintained of each periodic
mechanical inspection required to be performed by this section. This
record may be maintained in writing or electronically provided FRA has
access to the record upon request. The date and place of the periodic
inspection shall be recorded and the person performing the inspection
and that person's supervisor shall sign the form, if possible. This
record shall be kept in the railroad's files, the cab of the
locomotive, or a designated location in the passenger car until the
next periodic mechanical inspection of the same type is performed.
(2) Detailed documentation of any reliability assessments depended
upon for implementing an alternative inspection interval under
paragraph (a)(2) of this section, including underlying data, shall be
retained during the period that the alternative inspection interval is
in effect. Data documenting inspections, tests, component replacement
and renewals, and failures shall be retained for not less than three
(3) inspection intervals.
(g) Nonconformity with any of the conditions set forth in this
section renders the car or vehicle defective whenever discovered in
service.
Sec. 238.309 Periodic brake equipment maintenance.
(a) General.
(1) This section contains the minimum intervals at which the brake
equipment on various types of passenger equipment shall be periodically
cleaned, repaired, and tested. This maintenance procedure requires that
all of the equipment's brake system pneumatic components that contain
moving parts and are sealed against air leaks be removed from the
equipment, disassembled, cleaned, and lubricated and that the parts
that can deteriorate with age be replaced.
(2) A railroad may petition FRA's Associate Administrator for
Safety to approve alternative maintenance procedures providing
equivalent safety, in lieu of the requirements of this section. The
petition shall be filed as provided in Sec. 238.21.
(b) MU locomotives. The brake equipment of each MU locomotive shall
be cleaned, repaired, and tested at intervals in accordance with the
following schedule:
(1) Every 736 days if the MU locomotive is part of a fleet that is
not 100 percent equipped with air dryers;
(2) Every 1,104 days if the MU locomotive is part of a fleet that
is 100 percent equipped with air dryers and is equipped with PS-68, 26-
C, 26-L, PS-90, CS-1, RT-2, RT-5A, GRB-1, CS-2, or 26-R brake systems.
(This listing of brake system types is intended to subsume all brake
systems using 26 type, ABD, or ABDW control valves and PS68, PS-90,
26B-1, 26C, 26CE, 26-B1, 30CDW, or 30ECDW engineer's brake valves.);
and
(3) Every 736 days for all other MU locomotives.
(c) Conventional locomotives. The brake equipment of each
conventional locomotive shall be cleaned, repaired, and tested at
intervals in accordance with the following schedule:
(1) Every 1,104 days for a locomotive equipped with a 26-L or
equivalent brake system; and
(2) Every 736 days for a locomotive equipped with other than a 26-L
or equivalent brake system.
(d) Passenger coaches and other unpowered vehicles. The brake
equipment on each passenger coach and each unpowered vehicle used in a
passenger train shall be cleaned, repaired, and tested at intervals in
accordance with following schedule:
(1) Every 1,476 days for a coach or vehicle equipped with a 26-C or
equivalent brake system; and
(2) Every 1,104 days for a coach or vehicle equipped with other
than a 26-C or equivalent brake system.
(e) Cab cars. The brake equipment of each cab car shall be cleaned,
repaired, and tested at intervals in accordance with the following
schedule:
(1) Every 1,476 days for that portion of the cab car brake system
using brake
[[Page 25682]]
valves that are identical to the passenger coach 26-C brake system;
(2) Every 1,104 days for that portion of the cab car brake system
using brake valves that are identical to the locomotive 26-L brake
system; and
(3) Every 736 days for all other types of cab car brake valves.
(f) Records of periodic maintenance.
(1) The date and place of the cleaning, repairing, and testing
required by this section shall be recorded on Form FRA 6180-49A or a
similar form developed by the railroad containing the same information,
and the person performing the work and that person's supervisor shall
sign the form, if possible. Alternatively, the railroad may stencil the
vehicle with the date and place of the cleaning, repairing, and testing
and maintain an electronic record of the person performing the work and
that person's supervisor.
(2) A record of the parts of the air brake system that are cleaned,
repaired, and tested shall be kept in the railroad's files, the cab of
the locomotive, or a designated location in the passenger car until the
next such periodic test is performed.
Sec. 238.311 Single car test.
(a) Except for self-propelled passenger cars, single car tests of
all passenger cars and all unpowered vehicles used in passenger trains
shall be performed in accordance with either APTA Standard SS-M-005-98,
``Code of Tests for Passenger Car Equipment Using Single Car Testing
Device,'' published March, 1998; or an alternative procedure approved
by FRA pursuant to Sec. 238.21. The incorporation by reference of this
APTA standard was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. You may obtain a
copy of the incorporated document from the American Public Transit
Association, 1201 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. You
may inspect a copy of the document at the Federal Railroad
Administration, Docket Clerk, 1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Suite 7000,
Washington, D.C. or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North
Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C.
(b) Each single car test required by this section shall be
performed by a qualified maintenance person.
(c) A railroad shall perform a single car test of the brake system
of a car or vehicle described in paragraph (a) of this section if the
car or vehicle is found with one or more of the following wheel
defects:
(1) Built-up tread;
(2) Slid flat wheel;
(3) Thermal crack;
(4) Overheated wheel; or
(5) Shelling.
(d) A railroad need not perform the single car test required in
paragraph (c) of this section, if the railroad can establish that the
wheel defect is other than built-up tread and is due to a cause other
than a defective brake system on the car.
(e) Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, a railroad
shall perform a single car test of the brake system of a car or vehicle
described in paragraph (a) of this section when:
(1) The car or vehicle is placed in service after having been out
of service for 30 days or more; or
(2) One or more of the following conventional air brake equipment
items is removed, repaired, or replaced:
(i) Relay valve;
(ii) Service portion;
(iii) Emergency portion; or
(iv) Pipe bracket.
(f) Exception. If the single car test cannot be made at the point
where repairs are made, the car may be moved in passenger service to
the next forward location where the test can be made. A railroad may
move a car in this fashion only after visually verifying an application
and release of the brakes on both sides of the car that was repaired,
and provided that the car is appropriately tagged to indicate the need
to perform a single car test. The single car test shall be completed
prior to, or as a part of, the car's next calendar day mechanical
inspection.
(g) If one or more of the following conventional air brake
equipment items is removed, repaired, or replaced only that portion
which is renewed or replaced must be tested to satisfy the provisions
of this section:
(1) Brake reservoir;
(2) Brake cylinder;
(3) Piston assembly;
(4) Vent valve;
(5) Quick service valve;
(6) Brake cylinder release valve;
(7) Modulating valve or slack adjuster; or
(8) Angle cock or cutout cock.
Sec. 238.313 Class I brake test.
(a) Each commuter and short-distance intercity passenger train
shall receive a Class I brake test once each calendar day that the
train is placed or continues in passenger service.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (i) of this section, each long-
distance intercity passenger train shall receive a Class I brake test:
(1) Prior to the train's departure from an originating terminal;
and
(2) Every 1,500 miles or once each additional calendar day,
whichever occurs first, that the train remains in continuous passenger
service.
(c) Each car added to a passenger train shall receive a Class I
brake test at the time it is added to the train unless documentation is
provided to the train crew that a Class I brake test was performed on
the car within the previous calendar day and the car has not been
disconnected from a source of compressed air for more than four hours
prior to being added to the train.
(d) Each Class I brake test shall be performed by a qualified
maintenance person.
(e) Each Class I brake test may be performed either separately or
in conjunction with the exterior calendar day mechanical inspection
required under Sec. 238.303.
(f) Except as provided in Sec. 238.15(b), a railroad shall not use
or haul a passenger train in passenger service from a location where a
Class I brake test has been performed, or was required by this part to
have been performed, with less than 100 percent operative brakes.
(g) A Class I brake test shall determine and ensure that:
(1) The friction brakes apply and remain applied on each car in the
train until a release of the brakes has been initiated on each car in
response to train line electric, pneumatic, or other signals. This test
shall include a verification that each side of each car's brake system
responds properly to application and release signals;
(2) The brake shoes or pads are firmly seated against the wheel or
disc with the brakes applied;
(3) Piston travel is within prescribed limits, either by direct
observation, observation of an actuator, or by observation of the
clearance between the brake shoe and the wheel or between the brake pad
and the brake disc with the brakes released;
(4) The communicating signal system is tested and known to be
operating as intended;
(5) Each brake shoe or pad is securely fastened and correctly
aligned in relation to the wheel or to the disc;
(6) The engineer's brake valve or controller will cause the proper
train line commands for each position or brake level setting;
(7) Brake pipe leakage does not exceed 5 pounds per square inch per
minute if leakage will affect service performance;
(8) The emergency brake application and deadman pedal or other
emergency control devices function as intended;
(9) Each brake shoe or pad is not below the minimum thickness
established by the railroad. This
[[Page 25683]]
thickness shall not be less than the minimum thickness necessary to
safely travel the maximum distance allowed between Class I brake tests;
(10) Each angle cock and cutout cock is properly positioned;
(11) The brake rigging or the system mounted on the car for the
transmission of the braking force does not bind or foul so as to impede
the force delivered to a brake shoe, impede the release of a brake
shoe, or otherwise adversely affect the operation of the brake system;
(12) If the train is equipped with electropneumatic brakes, an
electropneumatic application of the brakes is made and the train is
walked to determine that the brakes on each car in the train properly
apply;
(13) Each brake disc is free of any crack in accordance with the
manufacturer's specifications or, if no specifications exist, free of
any crack to the extent that the design permits;
(14) If the equipment is provided with a brake indicator, the brake
indicator operates as intended; and
(15) The communication of brake pipe pressure changes at the rear
of the train is verified.
(h) A qualified maintenance person that performs a Class I brake
test on a train shall place in the cab of the controlling locomotive of
the train a written statement, which shall be retained in the cab until
the next Class I brake test is performed and which shall contain the
following information:
(1) The date and time the Class I brake test was performed;
(2) The location where the test was performed;
(3) The identification number of the controlling locomotive of the
train; and
(4) The total number of cars inspected during the Class I brake
test.
(i) A long-distance, intercity passenger train that misses a
scheduled calendar day Class I brake test due to a delay en route may
proceed to the point where the Class I brake test was scheduled to be
performed. A Class I brake test shall be completed at that point prior
to placing the train back in service.
Sec. 238.315 Class IA brake test.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, either a
Class I or a Class IA brake test shall be performed:
(1) Prior to the first morning departure of each commuter or short-
distance intercity passenger train, unless all of the following
conditions are satisfied:
(i) A Class I brake test was performed within the previous twelve
(12) hours;
(ii) The train has not been used in passenger service since the
performance of the Class I brake test; and
(iii) The train has not been disconnected from a source of
compressed air for more than four hours since the performance of the
Class I brake test; and
(2) Prior to placing a train in service that has been off a source
of compressed air for more than four hours.
(b) A commuter or short-distance intercity passenger train that
provides continuing late night service that began prior to midnight may
complete its daily operating cycle after midnight without performing
another Class I or Class IA brake test. A Class I or Class IA brake
test shall be performed on such a train before it starts a new daily
operating cycle.
(c) A Class I or Class IA brake test may be performed at a shop or
yard site and need not be repeated at the first passenger terminal if
the train remains on a source of compressed air and in the custody of
the train crew.
(d) The Class IA brake test shall be performed by either a
qualified person or a qualified maintenance person.
(e) Except as provided in Sec. 238.15(b), a railroad shall not use
or haul a passenger train in passenger service from a location where a
Class IA brake test has been performed, or was required by this part to
have been performed, with less than 100 percent operative brakes.
(f) In performing a Class IA brake test, it shall be determined
that:
(1) Brake pipe leakage does not exceed 5 pounds per square inch per
minute if brake pipe leakage will affect service performance;
(2) Each brake sets and releases by inspecting in the manner
described in paragraph (g) of this section;
(3) On MU equipment, the emergency brake application and the
deadman pedal or other emergency control devices function as intended;
(4) Each angle cock and cutout cock is properly set;
(5) Brake pipe pressure changes at the rear of the train are
properly communicated to the controlling locomotive; and
(6) The communicating signal system is tested and known to be
operating as intended;
(g) In determining whether each brake sets and releases--
(1) The inspection of the set and release of the brakes shall be
completed by walking the train to directly observe the set and release
of each brake, if the railroad determines that such a procedure is
safe.
(2) If the railroad determines that operating conditions pose a
safety hazard to an inspector walking the brakes, brake indicators may
be used to verify the set and release on cars so equipped. However, the
observation of the brake indicators shall not be made from the cab of
the locomotive. The inspector shall walk the train in order to position
himself or herself to accurately observe each indicator.
Sec. 238.317 Class II brake test.
(a) A Class II brake test shall be performed on a passenger train
when any of the following events occurs:
(1) Whenever the control stand used to control the train is
changed; except if the control stand is changed to facilitate the
movement of a passenger train from one track to another within a
terminal complex while not in passenger service. In these
circumstances, a Class II brake test shall be performed prior to the
train's departure from the terminal complex with passengers;
(2) Prior to the first morning departure of each commuter or short-
distance intercity passenger train where a Class I brake test remains
valid as provided in Sec. 238.315(a)(1);
(3) When previously tested units (i.e., cars that received a Class
I brake test within the previous calendar day and have not been
disconnected from a source of compressed air for more than four hours)
are added to the train;
(4) When cars or equipment are removed from the train; and
(5) When an operator first takes charge of the train, except for
face-to-face relief.
(b) A Class II brake test shall be performed by a qualified person
or a qualified maintenance person.
(c) Except as provided in Sec. 238.15, a railroad shall not use or
haul a passenger train in passenger service from a terminal or yard
where a Class II brake test has been performed, or was required by this
part to have been performed, with any of the brakes cut-out,
inoperative, or defective.
(d) In performing a Class II brake test on a train, a railroad
shall determine that:
(1) The brakes on the rear unit of the train apply and release in
response to a signal from the engineer's brake valve or controller of
the leading or controlling unit, or a gauge located at the rear of the
train or in the cab of the rear unit indicates that brake pipe pressure
changes are properly communicated at the rear of the train;
(2) On MU equipment, the emergency brake application and deadman
pedal or other emergency control devices function as intended; and
(3) The communicating signal system is tested and known to be
operating as intended.
[[Page 25684]]
Sec. 238.319 Running brake test.
(a) As soon as conditions safely permit, a running brake test shall
be performed on each passenger train after the train has received, or
was required under this part to have received, either a Class I, Class
IA, or Class II brake test.
(b) A running brake test shall be performed whenever the control
stand used to control the train is changed to facilitate the movement
of a passenger train from one track to another within a terminal
complex while not in passenger service.
(c) The running brake test shall be conducted in accordance with
the railroad's established operating rules, and shall be made by
applying brakes in a manner that allows the engineer to ascertain
whether the brakes are operating properly.
(d) If the engineer determines that the brakes are not operating
properly, the engineer shall stop the train and follow the procedures
provided in Sec. 238.15.
Subpart E--Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment
Sec. 238.401 Scope.
This subpart contains specific requirements for railroad passenger
equipment operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 150
mph. The requirements of this subpart apply beginning on September 9,
1999. As stated in Sec. 238.433(b), all such passenger equipment
remains subject to the requirements concerning couplers and uncoupling
devices contained in Federal statute at 49 U.S.C. chapter 203 and in
FRA regulations at part 231 and Sec. 232.2 of this chapter.
Sec. 238.403 Crash energy management.
(a) Each power car and trailer car shall be designed with a crash
energy management system to dissipate kinetic energy during a
collision. The crash energy management system shall provide a
controlled deformation and collapse of designated sections within the
unoccupied volumes to absorb collision energy and to reduce the
decelerations on passengers and crewmembers resulting from dynamic
forces transmitted to occupied volumes.
(b) The design of each unit shall consist of an occupied volume
located between two normally unoccupied volumes. Where practical,
sections within the unoccupied volumes shall be designed to be
structurally weaker than the occupied volume. During a collision, the
designated sections within the unoccupied volumes shall start to deform
and eventually collapse in a controlled fashion to dissipate energy
before any structural damage occurs to the occupied volume.
(c) At a minimum, each Tier II passenger train shall be designed to
meet the following requirements:
(1) Thirteen megajoules (MJ) shall be absorbed at each end of the
train through the controlled crushing of unoccupied volumes, and of
this amount a minimum of 5 MJ shall be absorbed ahead of the operator's
cab in each power car;
(2) A minimum of an additional 3 MJ shall be absorbed by the power
car structure between the operator's cab and the first trailer car; and
(3) The end of the first trailer car adjacent to each power car
shall absorb a minimum of 5 MJ through controlled crushing.
(d) For a 30-mph collision of a Tier II passenger train on tangent,
level track with an identical stationary train:
(1) When seated anywhere in a trailer car, the velocity at which a
50th-percentile adult male contacts the seat back ahead of him shall
not exceed 25 mph; and
(2) The deceleration of the occupied volumes of each trailer car
shall not exceed 8g. For the purpose of demonstrating compliance with
this paragraph, deceleration measurements may be processed through a
low-pass filter having a bandwidth of 50 Hz.
(e) Compliance with paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section
shall be demonstrated by analysis using a dynamic collision computer
model. For the purpose of demonstrating compliance, the following
assumptions shall be made:
(1) The train remains upright, in line, and with all wheels on the
track throughout the collision; and
(2) Resistance to structural crushing follows the force-versus-
displacement relationship determined during the structural analysis
required as part of the design of the train.
(f) Passenger seating shall not be permitted in the leading unit of
a Tier II passenger train.
Sec. 238.405 Longitudinal static compressive strength.
(a) To form an effective crash refuge for crewmembers occupying the
cab of a power car, the underframe of the cab of a power car shall
resist a minimum longitudinal static compressive force of 2,100,000
pounds without permanent deformation to the cab, unless equivalent
protection to crewmembers is provided under an alternate design
approach, validated through analysis and testing, and approved by FRA
under the provisions of Sec. 238.21.
(b) The underframe of the occupied volume of each trailer car shall
resist a minimum longitudinal static compressive force of 800,000
pounds without permanent deformation to the car. To demonstrate
compliance with this requirement, the 800,000-pound load shall be
applied to the underframe of the occupied volume as it would be
transmitted to the underframe by the full structure of the vehicle.
(c) Unoccupied volumes of a power car or a trailer car designed to
crush as part of the crash energy management design are not subject to
the requirements of this section.
Sec. 238.407 Anti-climbing mechanism.
(a) Each power car shall have an anti-climbing mechanism at its
forward end capable of resisting an ultimate upward or downward static
vertical force of 200,000 pounds. A power car constructed with a crash
energy management design is permitted to crush in a controlled manner
before the anti-climbing mechanism fully engages.
(b) Interior train coupling points between units, including between
units of articulated cars or other permanently joined units of cars,
shall have an anti-climbing mechanism capable of resisting an upward or
downward vertical force of 100,000 pounds without yielding.
(c) The forward coupler of a power car shall be attached to the car
body to resist a vertical downward force of 100,000 pounds for any
horizontal position of the coupler without yielding.
Sec. 238.409 Forward end structures of power car cabs.
This section contains requirements for the forward end structure of
the cab of a power car. (A conceptual implementation of this end
structure is provided in Figure 1 to this subpart.)
(a) Center collision post. The forward end structure shall have a
full-height center collision post, or its structural equivalent,
capable of withstanding the following:
(1) A shear load of 500,000 pounds at its joint with the underframe
without exceeding the ultimate strength of the joint;
(2) A shear load of 150,000 pounds at its joint with the roof
without exceeding the ultimate strength of the joint; and
(3) A horizontal, longitudinal force of 300,000 pounds, applied at
a point on level with the bottom of the windshield, without exceeding
its ultimate strength.
(b) Side collision posts. The forward end structure shall have two
side collision posts, or their structural equivalent, located at
approximately the one-third points laterally, each capable of
withstanding the following:
(1) A shear load of 500,000 pounds at its joint with the underframe
without
[[Page 25685]]
exceeding the ultimate strength of the joint; and
(2) A horizontal, longitudinal force of 300,000 pounds, applied at
a point on level with the bottom of the windshield, without exceeding
its ultimate strength.
(c) Corner posts. The forward end structure shall have two full-
height corner posts, or their structural equivalent, each capable of
withstanding the following:
(1) A horizontal, longitudinal or lateral shear load of 300,000
pounds at its joint with the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate
strength of the joint;
(2) A horizontal, lateral force of 100,000 pounds applied at a
point 30 inches up from the underframe attachment, without exceeding
the yield or the critical buckling stress; and
(3) A horizontal, longitudinal or lateral shear load of 80,000
pounds at its joint with the roof, without exceeding the ultimate
strength of the joint.
(d) Skin. The skin covering the forward-facing end of each power
car shall be:
(1) Equivalent to a \1/2\-inch steel plate with a 25,000 pounds-
per-square-inch yield strength--material of a higher yield strength may
be used to decrease the required thickness of the material provided at
least an equivalent level of strength is maintained;
(2) Securely attached to the end structure; and
(3) Sealed to prevent the entry of fluids into the occupied cab
area of the equipment. As used in paragraph (d), the term ``skin'' does
not include forward-facing windows and doors.
Sec. 238.411 Rear end structures of power car cabs.
The rear end structure of the cab of a power car shall be designed
to include the following elements, or their structural equivalent. (A
conceptual implementation of this end structure is provided in Figure 2
to this subpart.)
(a) Corner posts. The rear end structure shall have two full-height
corner posts, or their structural equivalent, each capable of
withstanding the following:
(1) A horizontal, longitudinal or lateral shear load of 300,000
pounds at its joint with the underframe without exceeding the ultimate
strength of the joint; and
(2) A horizontal, longitudinal or lateral shear load of 80,000
pounds at its joint with the roof without exceeding the ultimate
strength of the joint.
(b) Collision posts. The rear end structure shall have two full-
height collision posts, or their structural equivalent, each capable of
withstanding the following:
(1) A horizontal, longitudinal shear load of 750,000 pounds at its
joint with the underframe without exceeding the ultimate strength of
the joint; and
(2) A horizontal, longitudinal shear load of 75,000 pounds at its
joint with the roof without exceeding the ultimate strength of the
joint.
Sec. 238.413 End structures of trailer cars.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the end
structure of a trailer car shall be designed to include the following
elements, or their structural equivalent. (A conceptual implementation
of this end structure is provided in Figure 3 to this subpart.)
(1) Corner posts. Two full-height corner posts, each capable of
withstanding the following:
(i) A horizontal, longitudinal shear load of 150,000 pounds at its
joint with the underframe without exceeding the ultimate strength of
the joint;
(ii) A horizontal, longitudinal or lateral force of 30,000 pounds
applied at a point 18 inches up from the underframe attachment without
exceeding the yield or the critical buckling stress; and
(iii) A horizontal, longitudinal or lateral shear load of 20,000
pounds at its joint with the roof without exceeding the ultimate
strength of the joint.
(2) Collision posts. Two full-height collision posts each capable
of withstanding the following:
(i) A horizontal, longitudinal shear load of 300,000 pounds at its
joint with the underframe without exceeding the ultimate strength of
the joint; and
(ii) A horizontal, longitudinal shear load of 60,000 pounds at its
joint with the roof without exceeding the ultimate strength of the
joint.
(b) If the trailer car is designed with an end vestibule, the end
structure inboard of the vestibule shall have two full-height corner
posts, or their structural equivalent, each capable of withstanding the
following (A conceptual implementation of this end structure is
provided in Figure 4 to this subpart):
(1) A horizontal, longitudinal shear load of 200,000 pounds at its
joint with the underframe without exceeding the ultimate strength of
the joint;
(2) A horizontal, lateral force of 30,000 pounds applied at a point
18 inches up from the underframe attachment without exceeding the yield
or the critical buckling stress;
(3) A horizontal, longitudinal force of 50,000 pounds applied at a
point 18 inches up from the underframe attachment without exceeding the
yield or the critical buckling stress; and
(4) A horizontal, longitudinal or lateral shear load of 20,000
pounds at its joint with the roof without exceeding the ultimate
strength of the joint.
Sec. 238.415 Rollover strength.
(a) Each passenger car and power car shall be designed to rest on
its side and be uniformly supported at the top (``roof rail'') and the
bottom chords (``side sill'') of the side frame. The allowable stress
in the structural members of the occupied volumes for this condition
shall be one-half yield or one-half the critical buckling stress,
whichever is less. Minor localized deformations to the outer side skin
of the passenger car or power car is allowed provided such deformations
in no way intrude upon the occupied volume of each car.
(b) Each passenger car and power car shall also be designed to rest
on its roof so that any damage in occupied areas is limited to roof
sheathing and framing. The allowable stress in the structural members
of the occupied volumes for this condition shall be one-half yield or
one-half the critical buckling stress, whichever is less. Deformation
to the roof sheathing and framing is allowed to the extent necessary to
permit the vehicle to be supported directly on the top chords of the
side frames and end frames.
Sec. 238.417 Side loads.
(a) Each passenger car body structure shall be designed to resist
an inward transverse load of 80,000 pounds of force applied to the side
sill and 10,000 pounds of force applied to the belt rail (horizontal
members at the bottom of the window opening in the side frame).
(b) These loads shall be considered to be applied separately over
the full vertical dimension of the specified member for any distance of
8 feet in the direction of the length of the car.
(c) The allowable stress shall be the lesser of the yield stress,
except as otherwise allowed by this paragraph, or the critical buckling
stress. In calculating the stress to show compliance with this
requirement, local yielding of the side skin adjacent to the side sill
and belt rail, and local yielding of the side sill bend radii at the
crossbearer and floor-beam connections is allowed. For purposes of this
paragraph, local yielding is allowed provided the resulting
deformations in no way intrude upon the occupied volume of the car.
(d) The connections of the side frame to the roof and underframe
shall support the loads specified in this section.
Sec. 238.419 Truck-to-car-body and truck component attachment.
(a) The ultimate strength of the truck-to-car-body attachment for
each unit in
[[Page 25686]]
a train shall be sufficient to resist without failure a vertical force
equivalent to 2g acting on the mass of the truck and a force of 250,000
pounds acting in any horizontal direction on the truck.
(b) Each component of a truck (which include axles, wheels,
bearings, the truck-mounted brake system, suspension system components,
and any other components attached to the truck by design) shall remain
attached to the truck when a force equivalent to 2g acting on the mass
of the component is exerted in any direction on that component.
Sec. 238.421 Glazing.
(a) General. Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this
section, each exterior window on a passenger car and a power car cab
shall comply with the requirements contained in part 223 of this
chapter.
(b) Particular end-facing exterior glazing requirements. Each end-
facing exterior window on a passenger car and a power car cab shall
also:
(1) Resist the impact of a 12-pound solid steel sphere at the
maximum speed at which the vehicle will operate, at an angle of 90
degrees to the window's surface, with no penetration or spall; and
(2) Demonstrate anti-spalling performance by the use of a 0.001
aluminum witness plate, placed 12 inches from the window's surface
during all impact tests. The witness plate shall contain no marks from
spalled glazing particles after any impact test.
(3) Be permanently marked, prior to installation, in such a manner
that the marking is clearly visible after the material has been
installed. The marking shall include:
(i) The words ``FRA TYPE IHP'' to indicate that the material has
successfully passed the testing requirements specified in this
paragraph;
(ii) The name of the manufacturer; and
(iii) The type or brand identification of the material.
(c) Passenger equipment ordered prior to May 12, 1999. Each
exterior window in passenger equipment ordered prior to May 12, 1999
may comply with the following glazing requirements in the alternative
of the requirements specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
section, until the window is replaced and the railroad has exhausted
its inventory of replacement windows conforming to the requirements of
this paragraph that it held as of May 12, 1999.
(1) Each end-facing exterior window shall resist the impact of a
12-pound solid steel sphere at the maximum speed at which the vehicle
will operate, at an angle equal to the angle between the window's
surface as installed and the direction of travel, with no penetration
or spall.
(2) Each side-facing exterior window shall resist the impact of a:
(i) 12-pound solid steel sphere at 15 mph, at an angle of 90
degrees to the window's surface, with no penetration or spall; and
(ii) A granite ballast stone weighing a minimum of 0.5 pounds,
traveling at 75 mph and impacting at a 90-degree angle to the window's
surface, with no penetration or spall.
(3) All exterior windows shall:
(i) Resist a single impact of a 9-mm, 147-grain bullet traveling at
an impact velocity of 900 feet per second, with no bullet penetration
or spall; and
(ii) Demonstrate anti-spalling performance by the use of a 0.001
aluminum witness plate, placed 12 inches from the window's surface
during all impact tests. The witness plate shall contain no marks from
spalled glazing particles after any impact test.
(iii) Be permanently marked, prior to installation, in such a
manner that the marking is clearly visible after the material has been
installed. The marking shall include:
(A) The words ``FRA TYPE IH'' for end-facing glazing or ``FRA TYPE
IIH'' for side-facing glazing, to indicate that the material has
successfully passed the testing requirements of this section;
(B) The name of the manufacturer; and
(C) The type or brand identification of the material.
(d) Glazing securement. Each exterior window on a passenger car and
a power car cab shall remain in place when subjected to:
(1) The forces due to air pressure differences caused when two
trains pass at the minimum separation for two adjacent tracks, while
traveling in opposite directions, each train traveling at the maximum
authorized speed; and
(2) The impact forces that the glazed window is required to resist
as specified in this section.
(e) Stenciling. Each car that is fully equipped with glazing
materials that meet the requirements of this section shall be stenciled
on an interior wall as follows: ``Fully Equipped with FRA Part 238
Glazing'' or similar words conveying that meaning, in letters at least
\3/8\ of an inch high.
Sec. 238.423 Fuel tanks.
(a) External fuel tanks. Each type of external fuel tank must be
approved by FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety upon a showing
that the fuel tank provides a level of safety at least equivalent to a
fuel tank that complies with the external fuel tank requirements in
Sec. 238.223(a).
(b) Internal fuel tanks. Internal fuel tanks shall comply with the
requirements specified in Sec. 238.223(b).
Sec. 238.425 Electrical system.
(a) Circuit protection.
(1) The main propulsion power line shall be protected with a
lightning arrestor, automatic circuit breaker, and overload relay. The
lightning arrestor shall be run by the most direct path possible to
ground with a connection to ground of not less than No. 6 AWG. These
overload protection devices shall be housed in an enclosure designed
specifically for that purpose with the arc chute vented directly to
outside air.
(2) Head end power, including trainline power distribution, shall
be provided with both overload and ground fault protection.
(3) Circuits used for purposes other than propelling the equipment
shall be connected to their power source through circuit breakers or
equivalent current-limiting devices.
(4) Each auxiliary circuit shall be provided with a circuit breaker
located as near as practical to the point of connection to the source
of power for that circuit; however, such protection may be omitted from
circuits controlling safety-critical devices.
(b) Main battery system.
(1) The main batteries shall be isolated from the cab and passenger
seating areas by a non-combustible barrier.
(2) Battery chargers shall be designed to protect against
overcharging.
(3) Battery circuits shall include an emergency battery cut-off
switch to completely disconnect the energy stored in the batteries from
the load.
(4) If batteries are of the type to potentially vent explosive
gases, the batteries shall be adequately ventilated to prevent
accumulation of explosive concentrations of these gases.
(c) Power dissipation resistors.
(1) Power dissipating resistors shall be adequately ventilated to
prevent overheating under worst-case operating conditions.
(2) Power dissipation grids shall be designed and installed with
sufficient isolation to prevent combustion between resistor elements
and combustible material.
(3) Power dissipation resistor circuits shall incorporate warning
or protective
[[Page 25687]]
devices for low ventilation air flow, over-temperature, and short
circuit failures.
(4) Resistor elements shall be electrically insulated from resistor
frames, and the frames shall be electrically insulated from the
supports that hold them.
(d) Electromagnetic interference and compatibility.
(1) The operating railroad shall ensure electromagnetic
compatibility of the safety-critical equipment systems with their
environment. Electromagnetic compatibility can be achieved through
equipment design or changes to the operating environment.
(2) The electronic equipment shall not produce electrical noise
that interferes with trainline control and communications or with
wayside signaling systems.
(3) To contain electromagnetic interference emissions, suppression
of transients shall be at the source wherever possible.
(4) Electrical and electronic systems of equipment shall be capable
of operation in the presence of external electromagnetic noise sources.
(5) All electronic equipment shall be self-protected from damage or
improper operation, or both, due to high voltage transients and long-
term over-voltage or under-voltage conditions.
Sec. 238.427 Suspension system
(a) General requirements.
(1) Suspension systems shall be designed to reasonably prevent
wheel climb, wheel unloading, rail rollover, rail shift, and a vehicle
from overturning to ensure safe, stable performance and ride quality.
These requirements shall be met:
(i) In all operating environments, and under all track conditions
and loading conditions as determined by the operating railroad; and
(ii) At all track speeds and over all track qualities consistent
with the Track Safety Standards in part 213 of this chapter, up to the
maximum operating speed and maximum cant deficiency of the equipment.
(2) Passenger equipment shall meet the safety performance standards
for suspension systems contained in Appendix C to this part, or
alternative standards providing at least equivalent safety if approved
by FRA under the provisions of Sec. 238.21.
(b) Lateral accelerations. Passenger cars shall not operate under
conditions that result in a steady-state lateral acceleration of 0.1g
(measured parallel to the car floor inside the passenger compartment)
or greater.
(c) Hunting oscillations. Each truck shall be equipped with a
permanently installed lateral accelerometer mounted on the truck frame.
The accelerometer output signals shall be processed through a filter
having a band pass of 0.5 to 10 Hz to determine if hunting oscillations
of the truck are occurring. If hunting oscillations are detected, the
train monitoring system shall provide an alarm to the operator, and the
train shall be slowed to a speed at least 5 mph less than the speed at
which the hunting oscillations stopped. For purposes of this paragraph,
hunting oscillations are considered a sustained cyclic oscillation of
the truck which is evidenced by lateral accelerations in excess of 0.4g
root mean square (mean-removed) for 2 seconds.
(d) Ride vibration (quality). (1) While traveling at the maximum
operating speed over the intended route, the train suspension system
shall be designed to:
(i) Limit the vertical acceleration, as measured by a vertical
accelerometer mounted on the car floor, to no greater than 0.55g single
event, peak-to-peak over a one second period;
(ii) Limit lateral acceleration, as measured by a lateral
accelerometer mounted on the car floor, to no greater than 0.3g single
event, peak-to-peak over a one second period; and
(iii) Limit the combination of lateral acceleration (aL)
and vertical acceleration (av) occurring over a 1 second
period as expressed by the square root of (aL2
+aV2) to no greater than 0.6g, where
aL may not exceed 0.3g and (aV) may not exceed
0.55g.
(2) Compliance. Compliance with the requirements contained in this
paragraph shall be demonstrated during the equipment pre-revenue
service acceptance tests required under Sec. 238.111, and Sec. 213.345
of this chapter.
(3) For purposes of this paragraph, acceleration measurements shall
be processed through a filter having a band pass of 0.5 to 10 Hz.
(e) Overheat sensors. Overheat sensors for each wheelset journal
bearing shall be provided. The sensors may be placed either on-board
the equipment or at reasonable intervals along the railroad's right-of-
way.
Sec. 238.429 Safety appliances.
(a) Couplers.
(1) The leading and the trailing ends of a semi-permanently coupled
trainset shall each be equipped with an automatic coupler that couples
on impact and uncouples by either activation of a traditional
uncoupling lever or some other type of uncoupling mechanism that does
not require a person to go between the equipment units.
(2) The automatic coupler and uncoupling device on the leading and
trailing ends of a semi-permanently coupled trainset may be stored
within a removable shrouded housing.
(3) If the units in a train are not semi-permanently coupled, both
ends of each unit shall be equipped with an automatic coupler that
couples on impact and uncouples by either activation of a traditional
uncoupling lever or some other type of uncoupling mechanism that does
not require a person to go between the equipment units.
(b) Hand brakes. Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this
section, Tier II trains shall be equipped with a parking or hand brake
that can be applied and released manually and that is capable of
holding the train on a 3-percent grade.
(c) Safety appliance mechanical strength and fasteners.
(1) All handrails, handholds, and sill steps shall be made of 1-
inch diameter steel pipe, \5/8\-inch thickness steel, or a material of
equal or greater mechanical strength.
(2) All safety appliances shall be securely fastened to the car
body structure with mechanical fasteners that have mechanical strength
greater than or equal to that of a \1/2\-inch diameter SAE grade steel
bolt mechanical fastener.
(i) Safety appliance mechanical fasteners shall have mechanical
strength and fatigue resistance equal to or greater than a \1/2\-inch
diameter SAE steel bolt.
(ii) Mechanical fasteners shall be installed with a positive means
to prevent unauthorized removal. Self-locking threaded fasteners do not
meet this requirement.
(iii) Mechanical fasteners shall be installed to facilitate
inspection.
(d) Handrails and handholds. Except as provided in paragraph (f) of
this section:
(1) Handrails shall be provided for passengers on both sides of all
steps used to board or depart the train.
(2) Exits on a power vehicle shall be equipped with handrails and
handholds so that crewmembers can get on and off the vehicle safely.
(3) Throughout their entire length, handrails and handholds shall
be a color that contrasts with the color of the vehicle body to which
they are fastened.
(4) The maximum distance above the top of the rail to the bottom of
vertical handrails and handholds shall be 51 inches, and the minimum
distance shall be 21 inches.
(5) Vertical handrails and handholds shall be installed to continue
to a point at least equal to the height of the top edge of the control
cab door.
[[Page 25688]]
(6) The minimum hand clearance distance between a vertical handrail
or handhold and the vehicle body shall be 2\1/2\ inches for the entire
length.
(7) All vertical handrails and handholds shall be securely fastened
to the vehicle body.
(8) If the length of the handrail exceeds 60 inches, it shall be
securely fastened to the power vehicle body with two fasteners at each
end.
(e) Sill steps. Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this
section, each power vehicle shall be equipped with a sill step below
each exterior door as follows:
(1) The sill step shall have a minimum cross-sectional area of \1/
2\ by 3 inches;
(2) The sill step shall be made of steel or a material of equal or
greater strength and fatigue resistance;
(3) The minimum tread length of the sill step shall be 10 inches;
(4) The minimum clear depth of the sill step shall be 8 inches;
(5) The outside edge of the tread of the sill step shall be flush
with the side of the car body structure;
(6) Sill steps shall not have a vertical rise between treads
exceeding 18 inches;
(7) The lowest sill step tread shall be not more than 24,
preferably not more than 22, inches above the top of the track rail;
(8) Sill steps shall be a color that contrasts with the color of
the power vehicle body to which they are fastened;
(9) Sill steps shall be securely fastened;
(10) At least 50 percent of the tread surface area of each sill
step shall be open space; and
(11) The portion of the tread surface area of each sill step which
is not open space and is normally contacted by the foot shall be
treated with an anti-skid material.
(f) Exceptions.
(1) If the units of the equipment are semi-permanently coupled,
with uncoupling done only at maintenance facilities, the equipment
units that are not required by paragraph (a) of this section to be
equipped with automatic couplers need not be equipped with sill steps
or end or side handholds that would normally be used to safely perform
coupling and uncoupling operations.
(2) If the units of the equipment are not semi-permanently coupled,
the units shall be equipped with hand brakes, sill steps, end
handholds, and side handholds that meet the requirements contained in
Sec. 231.14 of this chapter.
(3) If two trainsets are coupled to form a single train that is not
semi-permanently coupled (i.e., that is coupled by an automatic
coupler), the automatically coupled ends shall be equipped with hand
brakes, sill steps, end handholds, and side handholds that meet the
requirements contained in Sec. 231.14 of this chapter. If the trainsets
are semi-permanently coupled, these safety appliances are not required.
(g) Optional safety appliances. Safety appliances installed at the
option of the railroad shall be firmly attached with mechanical
fasteners and shall meet the design and installation requirements
provided in this section.
Sec. 238.431 Brake system.
(a) A passenger train's brake system shall be capable of stopping
the train from its maximum operating speed within the signal spacing
existing on the track over which the train is operating under worst-
case adhesion conditions.
(b) The brake system shall be designed to allow an inspector to
determine that the brake system is functioning properly without having
to place himself or herself in a dangerous position on, under, or
between the equipment.
(c) Passenger equipment shall be provided with an emergency brake
application feature that produces an irretrievable stop, using a brake
rate consistent with prevailing adhesion, passenger safety, and brake
system thermal capacity. An emergency brake application shall be
available at any time, and shall be initiated by an unintentional
parting of the train. A means to initiate an emergency brake
application shall be provided at two locations in each unit of the
train; however, where a unit of the train is 45 feet or less in length
a means to initiate an emergency brake application need only be
provided at one location in the unit.
(d) The brake system shall be designed to prevent thermal damage to
wheels and brake discs. The operating railroad shall demonstrate
through analysis and testing that no thermal damage results to the
wheels or brake discs under conditions resulting in maximum braking
effort being exerted on the wheels or discs.
(e) The following requirements apply to blended braking systems:
(1) Loss of power or failure of the dynamic brake does not result
in exceeding the allowable stopping distance;
(2) The friction brake alone is adequate to safely stop the train
under all operating conditions;
(3) The operational status of the electric portion of the brake
system shall be displayed for the train operator in the control cab;
and
(4) The operating railroad shall demonstrate through analysis and
testing the maximum operating speed for safe operation of the train
using only the friction brake portion of the blended brake with no
thermal damage to wheels or discs.
(f) The brake system design shall allow a disabled train's
pneumatic brakes to be controlled by a conventional locomotive, during
a rescue operation, through brake pipe control alone.
(g) An independent failure-detection system shall compare brake
commands with brake system output to determine if a failure has
occurred. The failure detection system shall report brake system
failures to the automated train monitoring system.
(h) Passenger equipment shall be equipped with an adhesion control
system designed to automatically adjust the braking force on each wheel
to prevent sliding during braking. In the event of a failure of this
system to prevent wheel slide within preset parameters, a wheel slide
alarm that is visual or audible, or both, shall alert the train
operator in the cab of the controlling power car to wheel-slide
conditions on any axle of the train.
Sec. 238.433 Draft system.
(a) Leading and trailing automatic couplers of trains shall be
compatible with standard AAR couplers with no special adapters used.
(b) All passenger equipment continues to be subject to the
requirements concerning couplers and uncoupling devices contained in
Federal Statute at 49 U.S.C. chapter 203 and in FRA regulations at part
231 and Sec. 232.2 of this chapter.
Sec. 238.435 Interior fittings and surfaces.
(a) Each seat back and seat attachment in a passenger car shall be
designed to withstand, with deflection but without total failure, the
load associated with the impact into the seat back of an unrestrained
95th-percentile adult male initially seated behind the seat back, when
the floor to which the seat is attached decelerates with a triangular
crash pulse having a peak of 8g and a duration of 250 milliseconds.
(b) Each seat back in a passenger car shall include shock-absorbent
material to cushion the impact of occupants with the seat ahead of
them.
(c) The ultimate strength of each seat attachment to a passenger
car body shall be sufficient to withstand the following individually
applied accelerations acting on the mass of the seat plus the
[[Page 25689]]
mass of a seat occupant who is a 95th-percentile adult male:
(1) Lateral: 4g; and
(2) Vertical: 4g.
(d)(1) Other interior fittings shall be attached to the passenger
car body with sufficient strength to withstand the following
individually applied accelerations acting on the mass of the fitting:
(i) Longitudinal: 8g;
(ii) Lateral: 4g; and
(iii) Vertical: 4g.
(2) Fittings that can be expected to be impacted by a person during
a collision, such as tables between facing seats, shall be designed for
the mass of the fitting plus the mass of the number of occupants who
are 95th-percentile adult males that could be expected to strike the
fitting, when the floor of the passenger car decelerates with a
triangular crash pulse having a peak of 8g and a duration of 250
milliseconds.
(e) The ultimate strength of the interior fittings and equipment in
power car control cabs shall be sufficient to resist without failure
loads due to the following individually applied accelerations acting on
the mass of the fitting or equipment:
(1) Longitudinal: 12g;
(2) Lateral: 4g; and
(3) Vertical: 4g.
(f) To the extent possible, interior fittings, except seats, shall
be recessed or flush-mounted. Corners and sharp edges shall be avoided
or otherwise padded.
(g) Energy-absorbent material shall be used to pad surfaces likely
to be impacted by occupants during collisions or derailments.
(h) Luggage stowage compartments shall be enclosed, and have an
ultimate strength sufficient to resist loads due to the following
individually applied accelerations acting on the mass of the luggage
that the compartments are designed to accommodate:
(1) Longitudinal: 8g;
(2) Lateral: 4g; and
(3) Vertical: 4g.
(i) If, for purposes of showing compliance with the requirements of
this section, the strength of a seat attachment is to be demonstrated
through sled testing, the seat structure and seat attachment to the
sled that is used in such testing must be representative of the actual
seat structure in, and seat attachment to, the rail vehicle subject to
the requirements of this section. If the attachment strength of any
other interior fitting is to be demonstrated through sled testing, for
purposes of showing compliance with the requirements of this section,
such testing shall be conducted in a similar manner.
Sec. 238.437 Emergency communication.
A means of emergency communication throughout a train shall be
provided and shall include the following:
(a) Except as further specified, transmission locations at each end
of each passenger car, adjacent to the car's end doors, and accessible
to both passengers and crewmembers without requiring the use of a tool
or other implement. If the passenger car does not exceed 45 feet in
length, only one transmission location is required;
(b) Transmission locations that are clearly marked with luminescent
material;
(c) Clear and understandable operating instructions at or near each
transmission location; and
(d) Back-up power for a minimum period of 90 minutes.
Sec. 238.439 Doors.
(a) Each passenger car shall have a minimum of two exterior side
doors, each door providing a minimum clear opening with dimensions of
30 inches horizontally by 74 inches vertically.
Note: The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility
Specifications for Transportation Vehicles also contain requirements
for doorway clearance (See 49 CFR part 38).
(b) Each passenger car shall be equipped with a manual override
feature for each powered, exterior side door. Each manual override must
be:
(1) Capable of releasing the door to permit it to be opened,
without power, from both inside and outside the car;
(2) Located adjacent to the door which it controls; and
(3) Designed and maintained so that a person may readily access and
operate the override device from both inside and outside the car
without the use of any tool or other implement.
(c) The status of each powered, exterior side door in a passenger
car shall be displayed to the crew in the operating cab. If door
interlocks are used, the sensors used to detect train motion shall be
nominally set to operate at 3 mph.
(d) Each powered, exterior side door in a passenger car shall be
connected to an emergency back-up power system.
(e) A railroad may protect a manual override device used to open a
powered, exterior door with a cover or a screen capable of removal
without requiring the use of a tool or other implement.
(f) A passenger compartment end door (other than a door providing
access to the exterior of the trainset) shall be equipped with a kick-
out panel, pop-out window, or other similar means of egress in the
event the door will not open, or shall be so designed as to pose a
negligible probability of becoming inoperable in the event of car body
distortion following a collision or derailment.
(g) Marking and instructions. [Reserved]
Sec. 238.441 Emergency roof entrance location.
(a) Each passenger car and power car cab shall have a minimum of
one roof hatch emergency entrance location with a minimum opening of 18
inches by 24 inches, or at least one clearly marked structural weak
point in the roof having a minimum opening of the same dimensions to
provide quick access for properly equipped emergency response
personnel.
(b) Marking and instructions. [Reserved]
Sec. 238.443 Headlights.
Each power car shall be equipped with at least two headlights. Each
headlight shall produce no less than 200,000 candela. One headlight
shall be focused to illuminate a person standing between the rails 800
feet ahead of the power car under clear weather conditions. The other
headlight shall be focused to illuminate a person standing between the
rails 1500 feet ahead of the power car under clear weather conditions.
Sec. 238.445 Automated monitoring.
(a) Each passenger train shall be equipped to monitor the
performance of the following systems or components:
(1) Reception of cab signals and train control signals;
(2) Truck hunting;
(3) Dynamic brake status;
(4) Friction brake status;
(5) Fire detection systems;
(6) Head end power status;
(7) Alerter or deadman control;
(8) Horn and bell;
(9) Wheel slide;
(10) Tilt system, if so equipped; and
(11) On-board bearing-temperature sensors, if so equipped.
(b) When any such system or component is operating outside of its
predetermined safety parameters:
(1) The train operator shall be alerted; and
(2) Immediate corrective action shall be taken, if the system or
component defect impairs the train operator's ability to safely operate
the train. Immediate corrective action includes limiting the speed of
the train.
(c) The monitoring system shall be designed with an automatic self-
test feature that notifies the train operator
[[Page 25690]]
that the monitoring capability is functioning correctly and alerts the
train operator when a system failure occurs.
Sec. 238.447 Train operator's controls and power car cab layout.
(a) Train operator controls in the power car cab shall be arranged
so as to minimize the chance of human error, and be comfortably within
view and within easy reach when the operator is seated in the normal
train control position.
(b) The train operator's control panel buttons, switches, levers,
knobs, and the like shall be distinguishable by sight and by touch.
(c) An alerter shall be provided in the power car cab. If not
acknowledged, the alerter shall cause a brake application to stop the
train.
(d) Power car cab information displays shall be designed with the
following characteristics:
(1) Simplicity and standardization shall be the driving criteria
for design of formats for the display of information in the cab;
(2) Essential, safety-critical information shall be displayed as a
default condition;
(3) Operator selection shall be required to display other than
default information;
(4) Cab or train control signals shall be displayed for the
operator; and
(5) Displays shall be readable from the operators's normal position
under all lighting conditions.
(e) The power car cab shall be designed so at to permit the crew to
have an effective field of view in the forward direction, as well as to
the right and left of the direction of travel to observe objects
approaching the train from either side. Field-of-view obstructions due
to required structural members shall be minimized.
(f) Each seat provided for an employee regularly assigned to occupy
a power car cab and any floor-mounted seat in the cab shall be:
(1) Secured to the car body with an attachment having an ultimate
strength capable of withstanding the loads due to the following
individually applied accelerations acting on the combined mass of the
seat and the mass of a seat occupant who is a 95th-percentile adult
male:
(i) Longitudinal: 12g;
(ii) Lateral: 4g; and
(iii) Vertical: 4g;
(2) Designed so that all adjustments have the range necessary to
accommodate a person ranging from a 5th-percentile adult female to a
95th-percentile adult male, as persons possessing such characteristics
are specified, correcting for clothing as appropriate, in any
recognized survey after 1958 of weight, height, and other body
dimensions of U.S. adults;
(3) Equipped with lumbar support that is adjustable from the seated
position;
(4) Equipped with force-assisted, vertical-height adjustment,
operated from the seated position;
(5) Equipped with a manually reclining seat back, adjustable from
the seated position;
(6) Equipped with an adjustable headrest; and
(7) Equipped with folding, padded armrests.
(g) Sharp edges and corners shall be eliminated from the interior
of the power car cab, and interior surfaces of the cab likely to be
impacted by an employee during a collision or derailment shall be
padded with shock-absorbent material.
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
[[Page 25691]]
Figure 1--to Subpart E
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[[Page 25692]]
Figure 2--to Subpart E
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR12MY99.001
[[Page 25693]]
Figure 3--to Subpart E
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR12MY99.002
[[Page 25694]]
Figure 4--to Subpart E
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR12MY99.003
BILLING CODE 4910-06-C
[[Page 25695]]
Subpart F--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for
Tier II Passenger Equipment.
Sec. 238.501 Scope.
This subpart contains inspection, testing, and maintenance
requirements for railroad passenger equipment that operates at speeds
exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph.
Sec. 238.503 Inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements.
(a) General. Under the procedures provided in Sec. 238.505, each
railroad shall obtain FRA approval of a written inspection, testing,
and maintenance program for Tier II passenger equipment prior to
implementation of that program and prior to commencing passenger
operations using that equipment. As further specified in this section,
the program shall describe in detail the procedures, equipment, and
other means necessary for the safe operation of the passenger
equipment, including:
(1) Inspection procedures, intervals, and criteria;
(2) Testing procedures and intervals;
(3) Scheduled preventive-maintenance intervals;
(4) Maintenance procedures;
(5) Special testing equipment or measuring devices required to
perform inspections, tests, and maintenance; and
(6) The training, qualification, and designation of employees and
contractors to perform inspections, tests, and maintenance.
(b) Compliance. After the railroad's inspection, testing, and
maintenance program is approved by FRA under Sec. 238.505, the railroad
shall adopt the program and shall perform--
(1) The inspections and tests of power brakes and other primary
brakes as described in the program;
(2) The other inspections and tests described in the program in
accordance with the procedures and criteria that the railroad
identified as safety-critical; and
(3) The maintenance tasks described in the program in accordance
with the procedures and intervals that the railroad identified as
safety-critical.
(c) General safety inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures.
The inspection, testing, and maintenance program under paragraph (a) of
this section shall contain the railroad's written procedures to ensure
that all systems and components of in service passenger equipment are
free of any general condition that endangers the safety of the crew,
passengers, or equipment. These procedures shall protect against:
(1) A continuous accumulation of oil or grease;
(2) Improper functioning of a component;
(3) A crack, break, excessive wear, structural defect, or weakness
of a component;
(4) A leak;
(5) Use of a component or system under a condition that exceeds
that for which the component or system is designed to operate; and
(6) Insecure attachment of a component.
(d) Specific inspections. The program under paragraph (a) of this
section shall specify that all Tier II passenger equipment shall
receive thorough inspections in accordance with the following
standards:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(3) of this section, the
equivalent of a Class I brake test contained in Sec. 238.313 shall be
conducted prior to a train's departure from an originating terminal and
every 1,500 miles or once each calendar day, whichever comes first,
that the train remains in continuous service.
(i) Class I equivalent brake tests shall be performed by a
qualified maintenance person.
(ii) Except as provided in Sec. 238.15(b), a railroad shall not use
or haul a Tier II passenger train in passenger service from a location
where a Class I equivalent brake test has been performed, or was
required by this part to have been performed, with less than 100
percent operative brakes.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(3) of this section, a
complete exterior and interior mechanical inspection, in accordance
with the railroad's inspection program, shall be conducted by a
qualified maintenance person at least once during each calendar day the
equipment is used in service.
(3) Trains that miss a scheduled Class I brake test or mechanical
inspection due to a delay en route may proceed to the point where the
Class I brake test or mechanical inspection was scheduled to be
performed.
(e) Movement of trains with power brake defects. Movement of trains
with a power brake defect as defined in Sec. 238.15 (any primary brake
defect) shall be governed by Sec. 238.15.
(f) Movement of trains with other defects. Movement of a train with
a defect other than a power brake defect shall be conducted in
accordance with Sec. 238.17, with the following exception: When a
failure of the secondary brake on a Tier II passenger train occurs en
route, that train may remain in service until its next scheduled
calendar day Class I brake test equivalent at a speed no greater than
the maximum safe operating speed demonstrated through analysis and
testing for braking with the friction brake alone. The brake system
shall be restored to 100 percent operation before the train departs
that inspection location.
(g) Maintenance intervals. The program under paragraph (a) of this
section shall include the railroad's initial scheduled maintenance
intervals for Tier II equipment based on an analysis completed pursuant
to the railroad's safety plan. The maintenance interval of a safety-
critical component shall be changed only when justified by accumulated,
verifiable operating data and approved by FRA under Sec. 238.505 before
the change takes effect.
(h) Training, qualification, and designation program. The program
under paragraph (a) of this section shall describe the training,
qualification, and designation program, as defined in the training
program plan under Sec. 238.109, established by the railroad to qualify
individuals to inspect, test, and maintain the equipment.
(1) If the railroad deems it safety-critical, then only qualified
individuals shall inspect, test, and maintain the equipment.
(2) Knowledge of the procedures described in paragraph (a) of this
section shall be required to qualify an employee or contractor to
perform an inspection, testing, or maintenance task under this part.
(i) Standard procedures. The program under paragraph (a) of this
section shall include the railroad's written standard procedures for
performing all safety-critical equipment inspection, testing,
maintenance, and repair tasks necessary to ensure the safe and proper
operation of the equipment. The inspection, testing, and maintenance
program required by this section is not intended to address and should
not include procedures to address employee working conditions that
arise in the course of conducting the inspections, tests, and
maintenance set forth in the program. When reviewing the railroad's
program, FRA does not intend to review any portion of the program that
relates to employee working conditions.
(j) Annual review. The inspection, testing, and maintenance program
required by this section shall be reviewed by the railroad annually.
(k) Quality control program. Each railroad shall establish an
inspection, testing, and maintenance quality control program enforced
by railroad or contractor supervisors to reasonably ensure that
inspections, tests, and maintenance are performed in accordance with
Federal safety standards and the procedures established by the
railroad.
[[Page 25696]]
(l) Identification of safety-critical items. In the program under
paragraph (a) of this section, the railroad shall identify all
inspection and testing procedures and criteria as well as all
maintenance intervals that the railroad deems to be safety-critical.
Sec. 238.505 Program approval procedure.
(a) Submission. Not less than 90 days prior to commencing passenger
operations using Tier II passenger equipment, each railroad to which
this subpart applies shall submit for approval an inspection, testing,
and maintenance program for that equipment meeting the requirements of
this subpart with the Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal
Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Ave, Mail Stop 25, Washington,
D.C. 20590. If a railroad seeks to amend an approved program, the
railroad shall file with FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety a
petition for approval of such amendment not less than 60 days prior to
the proposed effective date of the amendment. A program responsive to
the requirements of this subpart or any amendment to the program shall
not be implemented prior to FRA approval.
(1) Each program or amendment under Sec. 238.503 shall contain:
(i) The information prescribed in Sec. 238.503 for such program or
amendment;
(ii) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary
person to be contacted with regard to review of the program or
amendment; and
(iii) A statement affirming that the railroad has served a copy of
the program or amendment on designated representatives of railroad
employees, together with a list of the names and addresses of persons
served.
(2) Each railroad shall serve a copy of each submission to FRA on
designated representatives of railroad employees responsible for the
equipment's operation, inspection, testing, and maintenance under this
subpart.
(b) Comment. Not later than 45 days from the date of filing the
program or amendment, any person may comment on the program or
amendment.
(1) Each comment shall set forth specifically the basis upon which
it is made, and contain a concise statement of the interest of the
commenter in the proceeding.
(2) Three copies of each comment shall be submitted to the
Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration,
1120 Vermont Ave., Mail Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20590.
(3) The commenter shall certify that a copy of the comment was
served on the railroad.
(c) Approval.
(1) Within 60 days of receipt of each initial inspection, testing,
and maintenance program, FRA will conduct a formal review of the
program. FRA will then notify the primary railroad contact person and
the designated employee representatives in writing whether the
inspection, testing, and maintenance program is approved and, if not
approved, the specific points in which the program is deficient. If a
program is not approved by FRA, the railroad shall amend its program to
correct all deficiencies and resubmit its program with the required
revisions not later than 45 days prior to commencing passenger
operations.
(2) FRA will review each proposed amendment to the program within
45 days of receipt. FRA will then notify the primary railroad contact
person and the designated employee representatives in writing whether
the proposed amendment has been approved by FRA and, if not approved,
the specific points in which the proposed amendment is deficient. The
railroad shall correct any deficiencies and file the corrected
amendment prior to implementing the amendment.
(3) Following initial approval of a program or amendment, FRA may
reopen consideration of the program or amendment for cause stated.
Subpart G--Specific Safety Planning Requirements for Tier II
Passenger Equipment
Sec. 238.601 Scope.
This subpart contains specific safety planning requirements for the
operation of Tier II passenger equipment, procurement of Tier II
passenger equipment, and the introduction or major upgrade of new
technology in existing Tier II passenger equipment that affects a
safety system on such equipment.
Sec. 238.603 Safety planning requirements
(a) Prior to commencing revenue service operation of Tier II
passenger equipment, each railroad shall prepare and execute a written
plan for the safe operation of such equipment. The plan may be combined
with any other plan required under this part. The plan shall be updated
at least every 365 days. At a minimum, the plan shall describe the
approaches and processes to:
(1) Identify all requirements necessary for the safe operation of
the equipment in its operating environment;
(2) Identify all known or potential hazards to the safe operation
of the equipment;
(3) Eliminate or reduce the risk posed by each hazard identified to
an acceptable level using MIL-STD-882C as a guide or an alternative
formal, safety methodology; and
(4) Impose operational limitations, as necessary, on the operation
of the equipment if the equipment cannot meet safety requirements.
(b) For the procurement of Tier II passenger equipment, and for
each major upgrade or introduction of new technology in existing Tier
II passenger equipment that affects a safety system on such equipment,
each railroad shall prepare and execute a written safety plan. The plan
may be combined with any other plan required under this part. The plan
shall describe the approaches and processes to:
(1) Identify all safety requirements governing the design of the
passenger equipment and its supporting systems;
(2) Evaluate the total system, including hardware, software,
testing, and support activities, to identify known or potential safety
hazards over the life cycle of the equipment;
(3) Identify safety issues during design reviews;
(4) Eliminate or reduce the risk posed by each hazard identified to
an acceptable level using MIL-STD-882C as a guide or an alternative,
formal safety methodology;
(5) Monitor the progress in resolving safety issues, reducing
hazards, and meeting safety requirements;
(6) Develop a program of testing or analysis, or both, to
demonstrate that safety requirements have been met; and
(7) Impose operational limitations, as necessary, on the operation
of the equipment if the equipment cannot meet safety requirements.
(c) Each railroad shall maintain sufficient documentation to
demonstrate how the operation and design of its Tier II passenger
equipment complies with safety requirements or, as appropriate,
addresses safety requirements under paragraphs (a)(4) and (b)(7) of
this section. Each railroad shall maintain sufficient documentation to
track how safety issues are raised and resolved.
(d) Each railroad shall make available to FRA for inspection and
copying upon request each safety plan required by this section and any
documentation required pursuant to such plan.
[[Page 25697]]
APPENDIX A TO PART 238--SCHEDULE OF CIVIL PENALTIES1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Willful
Section Violation violation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBPART A--GENERAL
238.15 Movement of power brake defects:
(b) Improper movement from Class I or IA 5,000 7,500
brake test...............................
(c) Improper movement of en route defect.. 2,500 5,000
(2), (3) Insufficient tag or record... 1,000 2,000
(4) Failure to determine percent 2,500 5,000
operative brake......................
(d) Failure to follow operating 5,000 7,500
restrictions.............................
(e) Failure to follow restrictions for 2,500 5,000
inoperative front or rear unit...........
238.17 Movement of other than power brake
defects: \1\
(c)(4), (5) Insufficient tag or record.... 1,000 2,000
(d) Failure to inspect or improper use of 2,500 5,000
roller bearings..........................
(e) Improper movement of defective safety (1)
appliances...............................
238.19 Reporting and tracking defective
equipment:
(a) Failure to have reporting or tracking 7,500 11,000
system...................................
(b) Failure to retain records............. 2,000 4,000
(c) Failure to make records available..... 1,000 2,000
(d) Failure to list power brake repair 2,000 4,000
points...................................
SUBPART B--SAFETY PLANNING AND GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS
238.103 Fire protection plan/fire safety:
(a) Failure to use proper materials....... 5,000 7,500
(b) Improper certification................ 1,000 2,000
(c) Failure to consider fire safety on new 5,000 7,500
equipment................................
(d) Failure to perform fire safety 5,000 7,500
analysis.................................
(e) Failure to develop, adopt or comply 5,000 7,500
with procedures..........................
238.105 Train hardware and software safety:
(a), (b), (c) Failure to develop and 7,500 11,000
maintain hardware and software safety
program..................................
(d) Failure to include required design 5,000 7,500
features in hardware and software........
(e) Failure to comply with hardware and 5,000 7,500
software safety program..................
238.107 Inspection, testing, and maintenance
plan:
(b) Failure to develop plan............... 7,500 11,000
(b)(1)-(5) Failure of plan to address 3,000 6,000
specific item............................
(d) Failure to conduct annual review...... 5,000 7,500
238.109 Training, qualification, and
designation program:
(a) Failure to develop or adopt program... 7,500 11,000
(b)(1)-(4) Failure of plan to address 3,000 6,000
specific item............................
(b)(5)-(12) Failure to comply with 5,000 7,500
specific required provision of the
program..................................
(b)(13) Failure to maintain adequate 2,500 5,000
records..................................
238.111 Pre-revenue service acceptance
testing plan:
(a) Failure to properly test previously 7,500 11,000
used equipment...........................
(b)(1) Failure to develop plan............ 7,500 11,000
(b)(2) Failure to submit plan to FRA...... 5,000 7,500
(b)(3) Failure to comply with plan........ 5,000 7,500
(b)(4) Failure to document results of 5,000 7,500
testing..................................
(b)(5) Failure to correct safety 5,000 7,500
deficiencies or impose operating limits..
(b)(6) Failure to maintain records........ 3,000 6,000
(b)(7) Failure to obtain FRA approval..... 5,000 7,500
238.113 Emergency window exits............... 2,500 5,000
238.115 Emergency lighting................... 2,500 5,000
238.117 Protection against personal injury... 2,500 5,000
238.119 Rim-stamped straight plate wheels.... 2,500 5,000
SUBPART C--SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR TIER I
EQUIPMENT
238.203 Static end strength.................. 2,500 5,000
238.205 Anti-climbing mechanism.............. 2,500 5,000
238.207 Link between coupling mechanism and 2,500 5,000
car body.....................................
238.209 Forward-facing end structure of 2,500 5,000
locomotives..................................
238.211 Collision posts...................... 2,500 5,000
238.213 Corner posts......................... 2,500 5,000
238.215 Rollover strength.................... 2,500 5,000
238.217 Side structure....................... 2,500 5,000
238.219 Truck-to-car-body attachment......... 2,500 5,000
238.221 Glazing.............................. 2,500 5,000
238.223 Fuel tanks........................... 2,500 5,000
238.225 Electrical System.................... 2,500 5,000
238.227 Suspension system.................... 2,500 5,000
238.231 Brake system: (a)-(g), (i)-(m)....... 2,500 5,000
(h) Hand or parking brake missing or 5,000 5,000
inoperative..............................
238.233 Interior fittings and surfaces....... 2,500 7,500
238.235 Doors................................ 2,500 5,000
238.237 Automated monitoring................. 2,500 5,000
[[Page 25698]]
SUBPART D--INSPECTION, TESTING, AND
MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR TIER I EQUIPMENT
238.303 Exterior mechanical inspection of
passenger equipment:
(a)(1) Failure to perform mechanical \1\ 2,000 4,000
inspection...............................
(a)(2) Failure to inspect secondary brake 2,500 5,000
system...................................
(b) Failure to perform inspection on car \1\ 2,000 4,000
added to train...........................
(c) Failure to utilize properly qualified 2,000 4,000
personnel................................
(e)(1) Products of combustion not released 2,500 5,000
outside cab..............................
(e)(2) Battery not vented or gassing 2,500 5,000
excessively..............................
(e)(3) Coupler not in proper condition.... 2,500 5,000
(e)(4) No device under drawbar pins or 2,500 5,000
connection pins..........................
(e)(5) Suspension system and spring 2,500 5,000
rigging not in proper condition..........
(e)(6) Truck not in proper condition...... 2,500 5,000
(e)(7) Side bearing not in proper 2,500 5,000
condition................................
(e)(8) Wheel not in proper condition:
(i), (iv) Flat spot(s) and shelled
spot(s):
(A) One spot 2\1/2\'' or more but 2,500 5,000
less than 3'' in length............
(B) One spot 3'' or more in length.. 5,000 7,500
(C) Two adjoining spots each of 2,500 5,000
which is 2'' or more in length but
less than 2\1/2\'' in length.......
(D) Two adjoining spots each of 5,000 7,500
which are at least 2'' in length,
if either spot is 2\1/2\'' or more
in length..........................
(ii) Gouge or chip in flange:
(A) More than 1\1/2\'' but less than 2,500 5,000
1\5/8\'' in length; and more than
\1/2\'' but less than \5/8\'' in
width..............................
(B) 1\5/8\'' or more in length and 5,000 7,500
\5/8\'' or more in width...........
(iii) Broken rim........................ 5,000 7,500
(v) Seam in tread....................... 2,500 5,000
(vi) Flange thickness of: 2,500 5,000
(A) \7/8\'' or less but more than
\13/16\''..........................
(B) \13/16\'' or less............... 5,000 7,500
(vii) Tread worn hollow................. 2,500 5,000
(viii) Flange height of:
(A) 1\1/2\'' or greater but less 2,500 5,000
than 1\5/8\''......................
(B) 1\5/8\'' or more................ 5,000 7,500
(ix) Rim thickness:
(A) Less than 1''................... 2,500 5,000
(B) \15/16\'' or less............... 5,000 7,500
(x) Crack or break in flange, tread,
rim, plate, or hub:
(A) Crack of less than 1''.......... 2,500 5,000
(B) Crack of 1'' or more............ 5,000 7,500
(C) Break........................... 5,000 7,500
(xi) Loose wheel........................ 5,000 7,500
(xii) Welded wheel...................... 5,000 7,500
(e)(10) Improper grounding or insulation.. 5,000 7,500
(e)(11) Jumpers or cable connections not 2,500 5,000
in proper condition......................
(e)(12) Door or cover plate not properly 2,500 5,000
marked...................................
(e)(13) Buffer plate not properly placed.. 2,500 5,000
(e)(14) Diaphragm not properly placed or 2,500 5,000
aligned..................................
(e)(15) Secondary braking system not in 2,500 5,000
operating mode or contains known defect..
(g) Record of inspection:
(1), (4) Failure to maintain record of 5,000 4,000
inspection...........................
(2) Record contains insufficient 1,000 2,000
information..........................
238.305 Interior mechanical inspection of
passenger cars:
(a) Failure to perform inspection......... \1\ 1,000 2,000
(b) Failure to utilize properly qualified 1,000 2,000
personnel................................
(c)(1) Failure to protect against personal 2,500 5,000
injury...................................
(c)(2) Emergency brake valve not stenciled 2,500 5,000
or marked................................
(c)(3) Door or cover plates not properly 2,500 5,000
marked...................................
(c)(4) Trap door unsafe or improperly 2,500 5,000
secured..................................
(c)(5) Doors not safely operate as 2,500 5,000
intended.................................
(i)-(iv) Condition for operating 2,000 4,000
defective door not satisfied.........
(c)(6) Safety signage not in place or 1,000 2,000
legible..................................
(c)(7) Vestibule steps not illuminated.... 2,000 4,000
(c)(8) Access to manual door release not 2,000 4,000
in place.................................
(c)(9) Emergency equipment not in place... 1,000 2,000
(e) Record of inspection:
(1), (4) Failure to maintain record of 2,000 4,000
inspection...........................
(2) Record contains insufficient 1,000 1,000
information..........................
238.307 Periodic mechanical inspection of
passenger cars and unpowered vehicles:
(a) Failure to perform periodic mechanical \1\ 2,500 5,000
inspection...............................
(b) Failure to utilize properly qualified 2,500 5,000
personnel................................
(c)(1) Floors not free of condition that 2,500 5,000
creates hazard...........................
(c)(2) Emergency lighting not operational. 2,500 5,000
(c)(3) Switches not in proper condition... 2,500 5,000
[[Page 25699]]
(c)(4) Truck not equipped with securing 2,500 5,000
arrangement..............................
(c)(5) Truck center casting cracked or 5,000 7,500
broken...................................
(c)(6) Roller bearings:
(i) Overheated........................ 5,000 7,500
(ii) Cap screw loose or missing....... 2,500 5,000
(iii) Cap screw lock broken or missing 1,000 2,000
(iv) Seal loose, damaged, or leaks 2,500 5,000
lubricant............................
(c)(7) General conditions endangering 2,500 5,000
crew, passengers.........................
(d)(1) Seat or seat attachment broken or 2,500 5,000
loose....................................
(d)(2) Luggage rack broken or loose....... 2,500 5,000
(d)(3) Bed, bunks, or restraints broken or 2,500 5,000
loose....................................
(d)(4) Emergency window exit not properly 2,500 5,000
operate..................................
(d)(5) Coupler not in proper condition.... 2,500 5,000
(f)(1) Record of inspection:
(i) Failure to maintain record of 2,000 4,000
inspection...........................
(ii) Record contains insufficient 1,000 2,000
information..........................
238.309 Periodic brake equipment maintenance:
(b) Failure to perform on MU locomotive... 2,500 5,000
(c) Failure to perform on conventional 2,500 5,000
locomotive...............................
(d) Failure to perform on passenger 2,500 5,000
coaches or other unpowered vehicle.......
(e) Failure to perform on cab car......... 2,500 5,000
(f) Record of periodic maintenance:
(1), (2) Failure to maintain record or 2,000 4,000
stencil..............................
238.311 Single car tests:
(a) Failure to test in accord with 2,500 5,000
required procedure.......................
(b) Failure to utilize properly qualified 2,500 5,000
personnel................................
(c), (e) Failure to perform single car 2,500 5,000
test.....................................
(f) Improper movement of car for testing.. 2,000 4,000
(g) Failure to test after repair or 2,000 4,000
replacement of component.................
238.313 Class I brake test:
(a) Failure to perform on commuter or \1\ 10,000 15,000
short distance intercity passenger train.
(b) Failure to perform on long-distance \1\ 10,000 15,000
intercity passenger train................
(c) Failure to perform on cars added to \1\ 5,000 7,500
passenger train..........................
(d) Failure to utilized properly qualified 5,000 7,500
personnel................................
(f) Passenger train used from Class I 5,000 7,500
brake test with less than 100% operative
brakes...................................
(g) Partial failure to perform inspection 5,000 7,500
on a passenger train.....................
(h) Failure to maintain record............ 2,000 4,000
238.315 Class IA brake test:
(a) Failure to perform inspection......... \1\ 5,000 7,500
(d) Failure to utilize properly qualified 2,500 5,000
personnel................................
(e) Passenger train used from Class IA 5,000 7,500
brake test with improper percentage of
operative brakes.........................
(f) Partial failure to perform inspection 2,500 5,000
on passenger train.......................
238.317 Class II brake test:
(a) Failure to perform inspection......... \1\ 2,500 5,000
(b) Failure to utilize properly qualified 2,500 5,000
personnel................................
(c) Improper use of defective equipment 2,500 5,000
from Class II brake test.................
238.319 Running brake tests:
(a), (b) Failure to perform test.......... 2,000 4,000
SUBPART E--SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR TIER II
PASSENGER EQUIPMENT
238.403 Crash energy management.............. 2,500 5,000
238.405 Longitudinal static compressive 2,500 5,000
strength.....................................
238.407 Anti-climbing mechanism.............. 2,500 5,000
238.409 Forward end structures of power car
cabs:
(a) Center collision post................. 2,500 5,000
(b) Side collision posts.................. 2,500 5,000
(c) Corner posts.......................... 2,500 5,000
(d) Skin.................................. 2,500 5,000
238.411 Rear end structures of power car
cabs:
(a) Corner posts.......................... 2,500 5,000
(b) Collision posts....................... 2,500 5,000
238.413 End structures of trailer cars....... 2,500 5,000
238.415 Rollover strength.................... 2,500 5,000
238.417 Side loads........................... 2,500 5,000
238.419 Truck-to-car-body and truck component 2,500 5,000
attachment...................................
238.421 Glazing:
(b) End-facing exterior glazing........... 2,500 5,000
(c) Alternate glazing requirements........ 2,500 5,000
(d) Glazing securement.................... 1,000 2,000
(e) Stenciling............................ 2,500 5,000
238.423 Fuel tanks:
[[Page 25700]]
(a) External fuel tanks................... 2,500 5,000
(b) Internal fuel tanks................... 2,500 5,000
238.425 Electrical system:
(a) Circuit protection.................... 2,500 5,000
(b) Main battery system................... 2,500 5,000
(c) Power dissipation resistors........... 2,500 5,000
(d) Electromagnetic interference and 2,500 5,000
compatibility............................
238.427 Suspension system:
(a) General design........................ 2,500 5,000
(b) Lateral accelerations................. 2,500 5,000
(c) Hunting Oscillations.................. 2,500 5,000
(d) Ride vibrations....................... 2,500 5,000
(e) Overheat sensors...................... 2,500 5,000
238.429 Safety Appliances:
(a) Couplers.............................. 5,000 7,500
(b) Hand/parking brakes................... 5,000 7,500
(d) Handrail and handhold missing......... 2,500 5,000
(d)(1)-(8) Handrail or handhold 2,500 5,000
improper design......................
(e) Sill step missing..................... 5,000 7,500
(e)(1)-(11) Sill step improper design. 2,500 5,000
(g) Optional safety appliances............ 2,500 5,000
238.431 Brake system......................... 2,500 5,000
238.433 Draft System......................... 2,500 5,000
238.435 Interior fittings and surfaces....... 2,500 5,000
238.437 Emergency communication.............. 2,500 5,000
238.439 Doors:
(a) Exterior side doors................... 2,500 5,000
(b) Manual override feature............... 2,500 5,000
(c) Notification to crew of door status... 2,500 5,000
(d) Emergency back-up power............... 2,500 5,000
(f) End door kick-out panel or pop-out 2,500 5,000
window...................................
(g) Marking and instructions.............. [Reserved]
238.441 Emergency roof hatch entrance 2,500 5,000
location.....................................
238.443 Headlights........................... 2,500 5,000
238.445 Automated monitoring................. 2,500 5,000
238.447 Train operator's controls and power 2,500 5,000
car cab layout...............................
SUBPART F--INSPECTION, TESTING, AND
MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR TIER II PASSENGER
EQUIPMENT
238.503 Inspection, testing, and maintenance
requirements:
(a) Failure to develop inspection, 10,000 15,000
testing, and maintenance program or
obtain FRA approval......................
(b) Failure to comply with provisions of 5,000 7,500
the program..............................
(c) Failure to ensure equipment free of 2,500 5,000
conditions which endanger safety of crew,
passengers, or equipment.................
(d) Specific safety inspections:
(1)(i) Failure to perform Class I 10,000 15,000
brake test or equivalent.............
(1)(ii) Partial failure to perform 5,000 7,500
Class I brake test or equivalent.....
(2)(i) Failure to perform exterior \1\ 2,000 4,000
mechanical inspection................
(2)(ii) Failure to perform interior \1\ 1,000 2,000
mechanical inspection................
(g) Failure to perform scheduled 2,500 5,000
maintenance as required in program.......
(h) Failure to comply with training, 5,000 7,500
qualification and designation program....
(i) Failure to develop or comply with 2,500 5,000
standard procedures for performing
inspection, tests, and maintenance.......
(j) Failure to conduct annual review...... 5,000 7,500
(k) Failure to establish or utilize 5,000 7,500
quality control program..................
SUBPART G--SPECIFIC SAFETY PLANNING
REQUIREMENTS FOR TIER II PASSENGER EQUIPMENT
238.603 Safety plan:
(a) Failure to develop safety operating 7,500 11,000
plan.....................................
(b) Failure to develop procurement plan... 7,500 11,000
(1)-(7) Failure to develop portion of 2,500 5,000
plan.................................
[[Page 25701]]
(c) Failure to maintain documentation. 2,500 5,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A penalty may be assessed against an individual only for a willful
violation Generally when two or more violations of these regulations
are discovered with respect to a single unit of passenger equipment
that is placed or continued in service by a railroad, the appropriate
penalties set forth above are aggregated up to a maximum of $10,000
per day. However, failure to perform, with respect to a particular
unit of passenger equipment, any of the inspections and tests required
under subparts D and F of this part will be treated as a violation
separate and distinct from, and in addition to, any substantive
violative conditions found on that unit of passenger equipment.
Moreover, the Administrator reserves the right to assess a penalty of
up to $22,000 for any violation where circumstances warrant. See 49
CFR part 209, appendix A. Failure to observe any condition for
movement of defective equipment set forth in Sec. 238.17 will deprive
the railroad of the benefit of the movement-for-repair provision and
make the railroad and any responsible individuals liable for penalty
under the particular regulatory section(s) concerning the substantive
defect(s) present on the unit of passenger equipment at the time of
movement Failure to observe any condition for the movement of
passenger equipment containing defective safety appliances, other than
power brakes, set forth in Sec. 238.17(e) will deprive the railroad
of the movement-for-repair provision and make the railroad and any
responsible individuals liable for penalty under the particular
regulatory section(s) contained in part 231 of this chapter or Sec.
238.429 concerning the substantive defective condition. The penalties
listed for failure to perform the exterior and interior mechanical
inspections and tests required under Sec. 238.303 and Sec. 238.305
may be assessed for each unit of passenger equipment contained in a
train that is not properly inspected Whereas, the penalties listed for
failure to perform the brake inspections and tests under Sec. 238.313
through Sec. 238.319 may be assessed for each train that is not
properly inspected.
Appendix B to Part 238--Test Methods and Performance Criteria for
the Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials
Used in Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs
This appendix provides the test methods and performance criteria
for the flammability and smoke emission characteristics of materials
used in passenger cars and locomotive cabs, in accordance with the
requirements of Sec. 238.103.
(a) Incorporation by reference. Certain documents are
incorporated by reference into this appendix with the approval of
the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. You may inspect a copy of each document
during normal business hours at the Federal Railroad Administration,
Docket Clerk, 1120 Vermont Ave., N.W., Suite 7000 or at the Office
of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 700,
Washington, D.C. The documents incorporated by reference into this
appendix and the sources from which you may obtain these documents
are listed below:
(1) American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), 100 Barr
Harbor Dr., West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959.
(i) ASTM C 1166-91, Standard Test Method for Flame Propagation
of Dense and Cellular Elastomeric Gaskets and Accessories.
(ii) ASTM D 2724-87, Standard Test Methods for Bonded, Fused,
and Laminated Apparel Fabrics.
(iii) ASTM D 3574-95, Standard Test Methods for Flexible
Cellular Materials--Slab, Bonded, and Molded Urethane Foams.
(iv) ASTM D 3675-95, Standard Test Method for Surface
Flammability of Flexible Cellular Materials Using a Radiant Heat
Energy Source.
(v) ASTM E 119-98, Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of
Building Construction and Materials.
(vi) ASTM E 162-98, Standard Test Method for Surface
Flammability of Materials Using a Radiant Heat Energy Source.
(vii) ASTM E 648-97, Standard Test Method for Critical Radiant
Flux of Floor-Covering Systems Using a Radiant Heat Energy Source.
(viii) ASTM E 662-97, Standard Test Method for Specific Optical
Density of Smoke Generated by Solid Materials.
(ix) ASTM E 1354-97, Standard Test Method for Heat and Visible
Smoke Release Rates for Materials and Products Using an Oxygen
Consumption Calorimeter.
(x) ASTM E 1537-98, Standard Test Method for Fire Testing of
Upholstered Seating Furniture.
(2) General Services Administration, Federal Supply Service,
Specification Section, 470 E. L'Enfant Plaza, S.W., Suite 8100,
Washington, D.C., 20407. FED-STD-191A--Textile Test Method 5830,
Leaching Resistance of Cloth; Standard Method (July 20, 1978).
(3) National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA), 1300
North 17th St, Suite 1847, Rosslyn, VA 22209. NEMA WC 3/ICEA S-19-
1981, Rubber Insulated Wire and Cable for the Transmission and
Distribution of Electrical Energy (part 6, section 19, paragraph 6),
Revision 1, Sixth Edition (February, 1994).
(4) State of California, Department of Consumer Affairs, Bureau
of Home Furnishings and Thermal Insulation, 3485 Orange Grove
Avenue, North Highlands, CA 95660. California Technical Bulletin
133, Flammability Test Procedure for Seating Furniture for Use in
Public Occupancies (January, 1991).
(5) The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
(IEEE), 345 East 47th Street, New York, New York 10017. ANSI/IEEE
Std. 383-1974, IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class 1E Electric
Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating
Stations (1974).
(6) Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL), 333 Pfingsten Road,
Northbrook, IL 60062-2096.
(i) UL 44, Standard for Safety for Thermoset-Insulated Wires and
Cables, 14th edition (January 27, 1997).
(ii) UL 83, Standard for Safety for Thermoplastic-Insulated
Wires and Cables, 12th edition (September 29, 1998).
(b) Definitions. As used in this appendix--
Critical radiant flux (C.R.F.) means, as defined in ASTM E 648,
a measure of the behavior of horizontally-mounted floor covering
systems exposed to a flaming ignition source in a graded radiant
heat energy environment in a test chamber.
Flame spread Index (Is) means, as defined in ASTM E
162, a factor derived from the rate of progress of the flame front
(Fs) and the rate of heat liberation by the material
under test (Q), such that Is=Fs x Q.
Flaming dripping means periodic dripping of flaming material
from the site of material burning or material installation.
Flaming running means continuous flaming material leaving the
site of material burning or material installation.
Peak heat release rate (q//max) means, as
defined in ASTM E 1354, the maximum heat release rate per unit (kW/
m2).
Specific optical density (Ds) means, as defined in ASTM
E 662, the optical density measured over unit path length within a
chamber of unit volume, produced from a specimen of unit surface area,
that is irradiated by a heat flux of 2.5 watts/cm2 for a
specified period of time.
Surface flammability means the rate at which flames will travel
along surfaces.
Time to ignition (tig) means, as defined in ASTM E 1354,
the time in seconds (s) to sustained flaming.
Time to ignition/Peak heat release rate (tig/
q//max) means the ratio of a given material's
time to ignition to its peak (maximum) heat release rate as measured in
the Cone Calorimeter (ASTM E 1354) under the stipulated exposure
conditions.
(c) Required test methods and performance criteria. The materials
used in locomotive cabs and passenger cars shall be tested according to
the methods and meet the performance criteria set forth in the
following table and notes:
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
[[Page 25702]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR12MY99.004
BILLING CODE 4910-06-C
[[Page 25703]]
\1\ Materials tested for surface flammability shall not exhibit
any flaming running or dripping.
\2\ The ASTM E 662-97 maximum test limits for smoke emission
(specific optical density) shall be measured in either the flaming
or non-flaming mode, utilizing the mode which generates the most
smoke.
\3\ Testing of a complete seat or mattress assembly (including
cushions, fabric layers, upholstery) according to ASTM E 1537-98
with application of pass/fail criteria of California Technical
Bulletin 133 shall be permitted in lieu of the test methods
prescribed herein, provided the assembly component units remain
unchanged or new (replacement) assembly components possess
equivalent fire performance properties to the original components
tested. A fire hazard analysis must also be conducted that considers
the operating environment within which the seat or mattress
assemblies will be used in relation to the risk of vandalism,
puncture, cutting, or other acts which may expose the individual
components of the assemblies.
\4\ Testing is performed without upholstery.
\5\ The surface flammability and smoke emission characteristics
shall be demonstrated to be permanent after dynamic testing
according to ASTM D 3574-95, Test I2 (Dynamic Fatigue
Test by the Roller Shear at Constant Force) or Test I3
(Dynamic Fatigue Test by Constant Force Pounding) both using
Procedure B.
\6\ The surface flammability and smoke emission characteristics
shall be demonstrated to be permanent by washing, if appropriate,
according to FED-STD-191A Textile Test Method 5830.
\7\ The surface flammability and smoke emission characteristics
shall be demonstrated to be permanent by dry-cleaning, if
appropriate, according to ASTM D 2724-87.
\8\ Materials that cannot be washed or dry-cleaned shall be so
labeled and shall meet the applicable performance criteria after
being cleaned as recommended by the manufacturer.
\9\ As a minimum, combustible component materials required to be
tested include seat and mattress frames, wall and ceiling panels,
seat and toilet shrouds, tray and other tables, partitions, shelves,
windscreens, HVAC ducting, thermal and acoustic insulation, exterior
plastic components, and interior and exterior box covers.
\10\ Materials used to fabricate miscellaneous, discontinuous
small parts (such as knobs, rollers, fasteners, clips, grommets, and
small electrical parts) that will not contribute materially to fire
growth in end use configuration may be exempted from fire and smoke
emission performance requirements, provided that the surface area of
any individual small part is not 16 square inches (100
cm2) in end use configuration and an appropriate fire
hazard analysis is conducted which addresses the location and
quantity of the materials used, and the vulnerability of the
materials to ignition and contribution of flame spread.
\11\ If the surface area of any individual small part is less
than 16 square inches (100 cm2) in end use configuration,
materials used to fabricate such small part shall be tested in
accordance with ASTM E 1354-97, unless such small part has been
shown not to contribute materially to fire growth following an
appropriate fire hazard analysis as specified in Note 10. Materials
tested in accordance with ASTM E 1354-97 shall meet the performance
criteria of tig/qmax 1.5. Testing
shall be at 50 kW/m2 applied heat flux.
\12\ Assessment of smoke generation by small miscellaneous,
discontinuous parts may be made by utilizing the results from the
ASTM E1354-97 test procedure conducted in accordance with Note 11,
rather than the ASTM E 662-97 test procedure, if an appropriate fire
hazard analysis is provided which addresses the location and
quantity of the materials used, and the vulnerability of the
materials to ignition and contribution of smoke spread.
\13\ Carpeting used as a wall or ceiling covering shall be
tested as a vehicle component.
\14\ Floor covering shall be tested with padding in accordance
with ASTM E 648-97, if the padding is used in the actual
installation.
\15\ For double window glazing, only the interior glazing is
required to meet the materials requirements specified herein. (The
exterior glazing need not meet these requirements.)
\16\ Elastomeric materials used for parts having a surface area
16 square inches (100 cm2) shall be tested in
accordance with ASTM C 1166-91. As a minimum, parts required to be
tested include window gaskets, door nosing, diaphragms, and roof
mats.
\17\ Testing shall be conducted in accordance with NEMA WC 3/
ICEA S-19-1981, paragraph 6.19.6; or UL 44 for thermosetting wire
insulation and UL 83 for thermoplastic wire insulation.
\18\ Testing shall be conducted in accordance with ANSI/IEEE
Standard 383-1974, section 2.5, with the additional requirement that
circuit integrity shall continue for 5 minutes after the start of
the test.
\19\ Penetrations (ducts, etc.) shall be designed to prevent
fire and smoke from entering a vehicle, and representative
penetrations shall be included as part of test assemblies.
\20\ Structural flooring assemblies shall meet the performance
criteria during a nominal test period as determined by the railroad.
The nominal test period must be twice the maximum expected time
period under normal circumstances for a vehicle to stop completely
and safely from its maximum operating speed, plus the time necessary
to evacuate all the vehicle's occupants to a safe area. The nominal
test period must not be less than 15 minutes. Only one specimen need
be tested. A proportional reduction may be made in the dimensions of
the specimen, provided the specimen represents a true test of the
ability of the structural flooring assembly to perform as a barrier
against under-vehicle fires. The fire resistance period required
shall be consistent with the safe evacuation of a full load of
passengers from the vehicle under worst-case conditions.
\21\ Portions of the vehicle body (including equipment carrying
portions of a vehicle's roof but not including floors) which
separate major ignition sources, energy sources, or sources of fuel-
load from vehicle interiors, shall have sufficient fire endurance as
determined by a fire hazard analysis acceptable to the railroad
which addresses the location and quantity of the materials used, as
well as vulnerability of the materials to ignition, flame spread,
and smoke generation.
Appendix C to Part 238--Suspension System Safety Performance
Standards
This appendix contains the minimum suspension system safety
performance standards for Tier II passenger equipment as required by
Sec. 238.427. These requirements shall be the basis for evaluating
suspension system safety performance until an industry standard
acceptable to FRA is developed and approved under the procedures
provided in Sec. 238.21.
(a) Passenger equipment suspension systems shall be designed to
limit the lateral and vertical forces and lateral to vertical (L/V)
ratios, for the time duration required to travel five feet at any
operating speed or over any class of track, under all operating
conditions as determined by the railroad, as follows:
(1) The maximum single wheel lateral to vertical force (L/V)
ratio shall not exceed Nadal's limit as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR12MY99.005
where: =flange angle (deg).
=coefficient of friction of 0.5.
(2) The net axle lateral force shall not exceed 0.5 times the
static vertical axle load.
(3) The vertical wheel/rail force shall not be less than or
equal to 10 percent of the static vertical wheel load.
(4) The sum of the vertical wheel loads on one side of any truck
shall not be less than or equal to 20 percent of the static vertical
axle load. This shall include the effect of a crosswind allowance as
specified by the railroad for the intended service.
(5) The maximum truck side L/V ratio shall not exceed 0.6.
(6) When stopped on track with a uniform 6-inch superelevation,
vertical wheel loads, at all wheels, shall not be less than or equal
to 60 percent of the nominal vertical wheel load on level track.
(b) For purposes of this appendix, wheel/rail force measurements
shall be processed through a low pass filter having a cut-off
frequency of 25 Hz.
Appendix D to Part 238--Requirements for External Fuel Tanks on
Tier I Locomotives
The requirements contained in this appendix are intended to
address the structural and puncture resistance properties of the
locomotive fuel tank to reduce the risk of fuel spillage to
acceptable levels under derailment and minor collision conditions.
(a) Structural strength.
(1) Load case 1--minor derailment. The end plate of the fuel
tank shall support a
[[Page 25704]]
sudden loading of one-half the weight of the car body at a vertical
acceleration of 2g, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the
material. The load is assumed to be supported on one rail, within an
eight inch band (plus or minus) at a point nominally above the head
of the rail, on tangent track. Consideration should be given in the
design of the fuel tank to maximize the vertical clearance between
the top of the rail and the bottom of the fuel tank.
(2) Load case 2--jackknifed locomotive. The fuel tank shall
support transversely at the center a sudden loading equivalent to
one half the weight of the locomotive at a vertical acceleration of
2g, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the material. The
load is assumed to be supported on one rail, distributed between the
longitudinal center line and the edge of the tank bottom, with a
rail head surface of two inches.
(3) Load case 3--side impact. In a side impact collision by an
80,000 pound Gross Vehicle Weight tractor/trailer at the longitudinal
center of the fuel tank, the fuel tank shall withstand, without
exceeding the ultimate strength, a 200,000 pound load (2.5g)
distributed over an area of six inches by forty-eight inches (half the
bumper area) at a height of thirty inches above the rail (standard DOT
bumper height).
(4) Load case 4--penetration resistance. The minimum thickness
of the sides, bottom sheet and end plates of the fuel tank shall be
equivalent to a \5/16\-inch steel plate with a 25,000 pounds-per-
square-inch yield strength (where the thickness varies inversely
with the square root of yield strength). The lower one third of the
end plates shall have the equivalent penetration resistance by the
above method of a \3/4\-inch steel plate with a 25,000 pounds-per-
square-inch yield strength. This may be accomplished by any
combination of materials or other mechanical protection.
(b) Sideswipe. To minimize fuel tank damage during sideswipes
(railroad vehicles and grade crossings), all drain plugs, clean-out
ports, inspection covers, sight glasses, gauge openings, etc., must
be flush with the tank surface or adequately protected to avoid
catching foreign objects or breakage. All seams must be protected or
flush to avoid catching foreign objects.
(c) Spill controls. Vents and fills shall be designed to avert
spillage of fuel in the event of a roll over.
Appendix E to Part 238--General Principles of Reliability-Based
Maintenance Programs
(a) Any maintenance program has the following four basic
objectives:
(1) To ensure realization of the design level of safety and
reliability of the equipment;
(2) To restore safety and reliability to their design levels
when deterioration has occurred;
(3) To obtain the information necessary for design improvements
of those items whose design reliability proves inadequate; and
(4) To accomplish these goals at a minimum total cost, including
maintenance costs and the costs of residual failures.
(b) Reliability-based maintenance programs are based on the
following general principles. A failure is an unsatisfactory
condition. There are two types of failures: functional and
potential. Functional failures are usually reported by operating
crews. Conversely, maintenance crews usually discover potential
failures. A potential failure is an identifiable physical condition,
which indicates that a functional failure is imminent. The
consequences of a functional failure determine the priority of a
maintenance effort. These consequences fall into the following
general categories:
(1) Safety consequences, involving possible loss of the
equipment and its occupants;
(2) Operational consequences, which involve an indirect economic
loss as well as the direct cost of repair;
(3) Non-operational consequences, which involve only the direct
cost of repair; or
(4) Hidden failure consequences, which involve exposure to a
possible multiple failure as a result of the undetected failure of a
hidden function.
(c) In a reliability-based maintenance program, scheduled
maintenance is required for any item whose loss of function or mode
of failure could have safety consequences. If preventative tasks
cannot reduce the risk of such failures to an acceptable level, the
item requires redesign to alter its failure consequences. Scheduled
maintenance is also required for any item whose functional failure
will not be evident to the operating crew, and therefore reported
for corrective action. In all other cases the consequences of
failure are economic, and maintenance tasks directed at preventing
such failures must be justified on economic grounds. All failure
consequences, including economic consequences, are established by
the design characteristics of the equipment and can be altered only
by basic changes in the design. Safety consequences can, in nearly
all cases, be reduced to economic consequences by the use of
redundancy. Hidden functions can usually be made evident by
instrumentation or other design features. The feasibility and cost
effectiveness of scheduled maintenance depend on the inspectablility
of the component, and the cost of corrective maintenance depends on
its failure modes and design reliability.
(d) The design reliability of equipment or components will only
be achieved with an effective maintenance program. This level of
reliability is established by the design of each component and the
manufacturing processes that produced it. Scheduled maintenance can
ensure that design reliability of each component is achieved, but
maintenance alone cannot yield a level of reliability beyond the
design reliability.
(e) When a maintenance program is developed, it includes tasks
that satisfy the criteria for both applicability and effectiveness.
The applicability of a task is determined by the characteristics of
the component or equipment to be maintained. The effectiveness is
stated in terms of the consequences that the task is designed to
prevent. The basics types of tasks that are performed by maintenance
personnel are each applicable under a unique set of conditions.
Tasks may be directed at preventing functional failures or
preventing a failure event consisting of the sequential occurrence
of two or more independent failures which may have consequences that
would not be produced by any of the failures occurring separately.
The task types include:
(1) Inspections of an item to find and correct any potential
failures;
(2) Rework/remanufacture/overhaul of an item at or before some
specified time or age limit;
(3) Discard of an item (or parts of it) at or before some
specified life limit; and
(4) Failure finding inspections of a hidden-function item to
find and correct functional failures that have already occurred but
were not evident to the operating crew.
(b) Components or systems in a reliability-based maintenance
program may be defined as simple or complex. A simple component or
system is one that is subject to only one or a very few failure
modes. This type of component or system frequently shows decreasing
reliability with increasing operating age. An age/time limit may be
used to reduce the overall failure rate of simple components or
systems. Here, safe-life limits, fail-safe designs, or damage
tolerance-based residual life calculations may be imposed on a
single component or system to play a crucial role in controlling
critical failures. Complex components or systems are ones whose
functional failure may result from many different failure modes and
show little or no decrease in overall reliability with increasing
age unless there is a dominant failure mode. Therefore, age limits
imposed on complex components or systems have little or no effect on
their overall failure rates.
(g) When planning the maintenance of a component or system to
protect the safety and operating capability of the equipment, a
number of items must be considered in the reliability assessment
process:
(1) The consequences of each type of functional failure;
(2) The visibility of a functional failure to the operating crew
(evidence that a failure has occurred);
(3) The visibility of reduced resistance to failure (evidence
that a failure is imminent);
(4) The age-reliability characteristics of each item;
(5) The economic tradeoff between the cost of scheduled
maintenance and the benefits to be derived from it;
(6) A multiple failure, resulting from a sequence of independent
failures, may have consequences that would not be caused by any one
of the individual failures alone. These consequences are taken into
account in the definition of the failure consequences for the first
failure; and
(7) A default strategy governs decision making in the absence of
full information or agreement. This strategy provides for
conservative initial decisions, to be revised on the basis of
information derived from operating experience.
(h) A successful reliability-based maintenance program must be
dynamic. Any prior-to-service program is based on limited
information. As such, the operating organization must be prepared to
collect and respond to real data throughout the operating life of
the equipment. Management of the
[[Page 25705]]
ongoing maintenance program requires an organized information system
for surveillance and analysis of the performance of each item under
actual operating conditions. This information is needed to determine
the refinements and modifications to be made in the initial
maintenance program (including the adjustment of task intervals) and
to determine the need for product improvement. The information
derived from operating experience may be considered to have the
following hierarchy of importance in the reliability-based
maintenance program:
(1) Failures that could affect operating safety;
(2) Failures that have operational consequences;
(3) The failure modes of units removed as a result of failures;
(4) The general condition of unfailed parts in units that have
failed; and
(5) The general condition of serviceable units inspected as
samples.
(i) At the time an initial maintenance program is developed,
information is usually available to determine the tasks necessary to
protect safety and operating capability. However, the information
required to determine optimum task intervals and the applicability
of age or life limits can be obtained only from age or life
exploration after the equipment enters service. With any new
equipment there is always the possibility of unanticipated failure
modes. The first occurrence of any serious unanticipated failure
should immediately set into motion the following improvement cycle:
(1) An inspection task is developed to prevent recurrences while
the item is being redesigned;
(2) The operating fleet is modified to incorporate the
redesigned part; and
(3) After the modification has proved successful, the special
inspection task is eliminated from the maintenance program.
(j) Component improvements based on identification of the actual
reliability characteristics of each item through age or life
exploration, is part of the normal development cycle of all complex
equipment.
Issued in Washington, D.C., on April 30, 1999.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Federal Railroad Administrator.
[FR Doc. 99-11333 Filed 5-10-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P