[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 82 (Thursday, April 29, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 23129-23131]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-10687]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Indiana Michigan Power Company
[Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316]


Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility 
Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration 
Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering 
issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-58 and 
Facility Operating License No. DPR-74 issued to Indiana Michigan Power 
Company (the licensee) for operation of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear 
Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 located in Berrien County, Michigan.
    The proposed license amendment would revise Technical Specification 
section 3/4.8.1.2, ``Electrical Power Systems, Shutdown,'' and its 
associated bases to provide a one-time extension of the 18-month 
surveillance interval for specific surveillance requirements for Units 
1 and 2. This surveillance will be performed prior to the first entry 
into Mode 4 subsequent to receipt of the requested T/S amendment. In 
addition, for Unit 2 only, a minor administrative change is included to 
delete a reference to T/S 4.0.8, which is no longer applicable. For 
Unit 1 only, an editorial change is made to add the word ``or'' to 
action statement 3.8.1.2.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:

1. Does the Change Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability of 
Occurrence or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated?

    A discussion of each of the applicable accidents follows.

Fuel Handling Accident

    The only time a fuel handling accident could occur is during the 
handling of a fuel assembly. The design of fuel handling equipment 
is such that an interruption of A.C. power would not cause a fuel 
element to be inadvertently dropped. Therefore, an interruption or 
loss of A.C. power does not significantly increase the probability 
of a fuel handling accident.
    At present, fission product activities in the fuel assembly 
pellet-to-cladding gaps are greatly reduced. The fuel handling 
accident analysis considers the thyroid dose at the site boundary 
and in the low population zone. This dose is dominated by the 
isotope iodine 131, which also decays more slowly than the other 
iodine contributors to the dose. The activity of iodine 131 
decreases by one-half every 8.05 days. The current shutdown period 
of approximately 18 months represents over 70 half-lives. Activity 
of a radioactive material is generally considered to be negligible 
after 7 half-lives (a reduction in activity of \1/128\). By 
contrast, the accident analysis assumes an iodine reduction of less 
than \1/10\ (from activated charcoal filtration) in the fuel 
handling building, and no reduction in the containment, prior to 
release. Therefore, the consequences of a fuel handling accident are 
clearly bounded by the existing safety analysis without taking 
credit for any iodine removal by charcoal filtration. The greatly 
reduced fission product activity at the current time provides 
assurance that the consequences of this event are bounded by the 
existing analysis. Therefore, the consequences are not significantly 
increased.

Accidental Release of Radioactive Liquids

    The inadvertent release of radioactive liquid wastes to the 
environment was evaluated for the waste evaporator condensate and 
monitor tanks, condensate storage tank, primary water storage tank,

[[Page 23130]]

refueling water storage tank (RWST), the auxiliary building storage 
tanks and the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) holdup 
tanks. It was concluded, in the UFSAR Chapter 14 evaluation, that 
loss of liquid from these tanks to the environment is not a credible 
accident. This conclusion does not depend on operating mode , hence, 
further evaluation of this event is not required.

Waste Gas Release

    Radioactive gases are introduced into the reactor coolant by the 
escape of fission products if defects exist in the fuel cladding. 
The processing of the reactor coolant by auxiliary systems results 
in the accumulation of radioactive gases in various tanks. The two 
main sources of any significant gaseous radioactivity that could 
occur would be the volume control tank (VCT) and the gas decay 
tanks. It is assumed that a tank ruptures by an unspecified 
mechanism after the reactor has been operating for one core cycle 
with 1% defects in the fuel cladding. There is no identified 
mechanism by which an interruption or loss of power could result in 
a tank rupture. Therefore, it is concluded that the probability of 
occurrence of a tank rupture would not be significantly increased by 
an interruption or loss of A.C. power. The greatly reduced fission 
product activities at the current time provides assurance that the 
consequences of this event are bounded by the current analysis and 
would, therefore, not be significantly increased.

Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) Withdrawal From a 
Subcritical Condition

    This event can only occur with the reactor trip breakers closed 
and the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) energized. With the 
exception of testing or special maintenance, the rod drive motor 
generator set remains tagged out until Mode 3 and this alone would 
preclude rod movement. If the conditions for rod withdrawal are met, 
two operable source range instruments and two reactor trip channels 
and trip breakers must be operable. An interruption or loss of power 
would preclude CRDM movement and release the control rods. The 
source range instruments would remain available. Therefore, it is 
concluded that the probability of occurrence of an uncontrolled RCCA 
withdrawal would not be significantly increased by an interruption 
or loss of A.C. power in Modes 5 or 6. Acceptable consequences for 
this event rely on precluding its occurrence.

Uncontrolled Boron Dilution

    This event requires a malfunction of the CVCS. The CVCS is 
designed to limit, even under various postulated failure modes, the 
potential rate of dilution to a value which provides the operator 
sufficient time to correct the situation in a safe and orderly 
manner. The rate of addition of unborated water makeup to the 
reactor coolant system is limited by the capacity of the primary 
water pumps. The maximum addition rate in this case is 225 gpm with 
both primary water pumps running. An interruption or loss of A.C. 
power would preclude pump operation and accidental dilution. The 
RWST is not a credible dilution source as recognized by a footnote 
to T/S 3/4.8.1.2. Therefore, the possibility of an uncontrolled 
boron dilution is not significantly increased. Acceptable 
consequences for this event rely on precluding its occurrence and by 
detection with the source range nuclear instrumentation required by 
the T/S in Modes 5 and 6.
    The proposed revision involves deferral of certain surveillance 
requirements when shut down but does not reduce the required 
operable power sources of the Limiting Condition for Operation 
(LCO), does not increase the allowed outage time of any required 
operable power supplies and does not reduce the requirement to know 
that the deferred SRs [surveillance requirements] could be met at 
all times. Deferral of the testing does not by itself increase the 
potential that the testing would not be met and the previously 
evaluated accidents described above do not rely on automatic 
starting or loading of the single operable EDG [emergency diesel 
generator] permitted in Modes 5 and 6. The monthly EDG starts, fuel 
level checks, and fuel transfer pump checks will continue to be 
performed to provide adequate confidence that the required EDG will 
be available if needed. Therefore, it is concluded that the required 
A.C. sources will remain available and the previously evaluated 
consequences will not be increased.
    The proposed administrative change for unit 2 deletes a 
reference to T/S 4.0.8 that is no longer applicable and, thus, does 
not increase the probability or consequences of an accident. The 
editorial change to unit 1 corrects a typographical error. The 
correction is not intended to change the meaning.
    Therefore, based on the above discussion, it is concluded that 
the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the Change Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of 
Accident From Any Accident Previously Evaluated?

    The proposed changes do not involve operation of the required 
electrical power sources in a manner or configuration different than 
those previously recognized or evaluated. No new failure mechanisms 
of the A.C. power supplies are introduced by extension of the 
subject surveillance intervals.
    The proposed administrative change for unit 2 deletes a 
reference to T/S 4.0.8 that is no longer applicable and, thus, does 
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. 
The editorial change to unit 1 corrects a typographical error. The 
correction is not intended to change the meaning. Therefore, it is 
concluded that the proposed changes do not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the Change Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin of 
Safety?

    The required operable power supplies have not been reduced. 
Deferral of the specified SRs does not by itself introduce a failure 
mechanism, and past performance of the SRs has demonstrated 
reliability in passing the deferred surveillances. Therefore, the 
availability of power supplies assumed for accident mitigation is 
not significantly reduced and previous margins of safety are 
maintained.
    The proposed administrative change for unit 2 deletes a 
reference to T/S 4.0.8 that is no longer applicable and thus, does 
not increase the probability or consequences of an accident. The 
editorial change to unit 1 corrects a typographical error. The 
correction is not intended to change the meaning. Therefore, these 
changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of 
safety.
    In summary, based upon the above evaluation, I&M has concluded 
that these changes involve no significant hazards consideration.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92 are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of 
written comments received

[[Page 23131]]

may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 
2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By May 26, 1999, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with 
respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating 
license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library, 
500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085. If a request for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Jeremy J. Euto, Esquire, 500 Circle 
Drive, Buchanan, MI 49107, attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(I)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated December 3, 1998, which is available 
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the 
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local 
public document room located at the Maud Preston Palenske Memorial 
Library, 500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd day of April 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John F. Stang, Sr.,
Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate III, Division of 
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-10687 Filed 4-28-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P