[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 82 (Thursday, April 29, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 23133-23136]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-10685]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Florida Power & Light Company, Inc.
[Docket No. 50-389]


St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2 Environmental Assessment and Finding of 
No Significant Impact

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-16, issued to Florida Power & Light Company, Inc., (the licensee), 
for operation of the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, located in St. Lucie 
County, Florida.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

    The proposed amendment would modify the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, 
Technical Specifications by changing the criticality requirements for 
the design of the spent fuel storage racks, referencing new tables that 
specify the reactivity effects of fuel assembly burnup and decay time, 
and increasing the listed capacity of the spent fuel pool. These 
changes would allow the use of credit for soluble boron in the spent 
fuel criticality analyses. This would allow Florida Power & Light to 
increase the capacity of the spent fuel storage pool. The proposed 
action is in accordance with the licensee's application for amendment 
dated December 31, 1997, as supplemented May 15, September 15, November 
25, 1998, and January 28, 1999.

The Need for the Proposed Action

    The proposed action would increase the allowed storage capacity of 
the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, spent fuel pool (SFP) to 1360 fuel 
assemblies, allowing the licensee to continue to operate beyond 2001. 
The Unit 2 SFP at St. Lucie Plant contains 1584 spent fuel storage 
cells, of which 1076 are currently allowed for storage by the technical 
specifications. The licensee estimates that, by the year 2001, St. 
Lucie Plant, Unit 2, will have filled all SFP storage locations not 
reserved for a full-core off-load of fuel. The projected loss of 
capability to store spent fuel from future operation of St. Lucie 
Plant, Unit 2, would affect the licensee's ability to operate St. Lucie 
Plant, Unit 2. The proposed amendment is needed in order to ensure the 
capability to perform a full-core off-load to the SFP until 
approximately 2007.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

Thermal Impact
    The licensee's thermal analysis on the effects of the proposed 
change revealed that the proposed increase in storage capacity will 
change the maximum decay heat load for a partial core offload from 
16.9E6 Btu/hr to 19.76E6 Btu/hr and for full core offload conditions 
from 31.7E6 Btu/hr to 35.22E6 Btu/hr. This increased heat load results 
in an increase of approximately 3 deg.F in the maximum fuel pool water 
temperature for the partial core offload case, and an increase of 
approximately 5 deg.F in water temperature for storage of the limiting 
full core offload (note: maximum fuel pool temperature will be 
maintained less than or equal to 150 deg.F). The total heat load 
rejected to the environment by St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, is about 6.2E9 
Btu/hr. The percentage increase in the heat rejected to the environment 
due to the increase in spent fuel storage capacity is on the order of 
0.05% for partial core discharges and 0.06% for fuel storage following 
a full core offload. This heat rejection to the environment is not 
considered a significant increase from current heat rejection levels.
Radiological Evaluation
    Solid Radioactive Waste. The net effect of increasing the St. 
Lucie, Unit 2, spent fuel pool storage capacity is that

[[Page 23134]]

older fuel elements will be retained in wet storage beyond the time 
when they would have otherwise been loaded into casks for dry storage 
on-site. Retaining already-aged fuel in wet storage for an additional 
period of time will not appreciably increase the activity in the fuel 
pool water or the amount of solid radioactive waste which must be 
disposed of because the short-lived isotopes associated with these fuel 
bundles will have had an opportunity to decay. Therefore, increasing 
the fuel pool storage capacity as proposed for St. Lucie, Unit 2, will 
have no significant effect on the quantity of radioactive waste 
collected.
    Gaseous Radioactive Waste. Storage of additional quantities of 
spent fuel in the SFP will not significantly increase the release of 
gaseous fission products such as Krypton-85 and Iodine-131. Experience 
has demonstrated that during the period between refueling outages, 
there is no longer a significant release of fission products, including 
Krypton-85, from stored spent fuel containing cladding defects. Iodine-
131 released from spent fuel assemblies to the SFP water will not be 
significantly increased as a result of the expansion of the fuel 
storage capacity since the Iodine-131 inventory in the fuel will decay 
to negligible levels in the period between refueling outages. The 
licensee has stated that fuel rod integrity at St. Lucie, Unit 2, has 
been very good, with most fuel cycles evidencing no leaking fuel rods. 
Additionally, the rod pressure, which tends to act as driving force for 
fission product release, is substantially decreased after long periods 
of fuel cooling.
    The increased heat load on the SFP from the storage of additional 
spent fuel assemblies could potentially result in an increase in the 
SFP evaporation rate, which may result in a slight increase in the 
amount of gaseous tritium released from the pool. However, the overall 
release of radioactive gases from St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, will remain 
a small fraction of the limits of 10 CFR Part 20, and is therefore 
considered insignificant.
    Radioactive Releases Due to Accidents. The existing analyses of 
record pertaining to the radiological consequences of a fuel handling 
accident within the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, Fuel Handling Building 
(FHB) and the postulated drop of a spent fuel cask just outside the FHB 
have been examined to assess the impact of the proposed license 
amendment. The assumptions and parameters previously employed in 
evaluating the fuel mishandling accident were consistent with NRC 
Regulatory Guides 1.13 and 1.25. The previously analyzed consequences 
of dropping a spent fuel cask were based on the guidelines provided in 
Section 15.7.5 of the Standard Review Plan. The licensee's review of 
the existing analysis of the fuel handling accident has concluded that 
the gap activities provided in the analysis of record for the fuel 
handling accident conservatively bound those values expected to occur 
at assembly discharge burnups of up to 60,000 MWD/MTU. As defined by 
Section 15.7.4 of the Standard Review Plan, calculated dose values are 
well within the guidelines if the calculated whole body dose is less 
than or equal to 6 rem and the calculated thyroid dose is less than or 
equal to 75 rem.
    The proposed license amendment does not involve any changes to the 
method of operating or range of motion of the spent fuel cask handling 
crane. No movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel 
assembly, control element assembly, and associated handling tool is 
permitted over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool. Protection 
against dropping the spent fuel cask into the spent fuel storage pool 
is provided by the basic layout of the FHB. As noted in updated final 
safety analysis report, Section 9.1.4.3.2, additional protection is 
afforded by the trolley bumpers and a set of limit switches that work 
together with bridge and trolley brakes to prevent movement of the 
crane hook into the restricted area.
    The proposed amendment will not involve any changes in the 
operation or range of motion of the spent fuel handling machine. During 
movement of a fuel assembly, the load on the hoist cable is monitored 
to ensure that movement is not restricted. Installed interlocks will 
continue to restrict movement of the handling machine when the hoist is 
withdrawing or inserting an assembly.
    The licensee has also examined the existing analysis of an accident 
involving the drop of a spent fuel cask containing ten irradiated fuel 
assemblies. This review has determined that conservative input 
assumptions were used and that the results of the existing analysis are 
well within the acceptance criteria for a Limiting Fault-2 event.
    Increasing the storage capacity of the St. Lucie, Unit 2, SFP as 
described in this proposed license amendment will have no effect on the 
radiological consequences of an assumed fuel mishandling event or on 
the consequences of dropping a loaded spent fuel cask. For each of 
these events, the calculated doses are small relative to the guideline 
values.
    The impact of the proposed increase in St. Lucie, Unit 2, spent 
fuel storage capacity and the implications of the use of reactivity 
credit for fuel pool soluble boron have been examined in the above 
discussion. Each of the impacts of the proposed change has been 
quantified and determined to be within acceptable limits by comparison 
to established acceptance criteria.
    Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Summary

    The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action. 
The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences 
of accidents, no changes will be made in the types of any effluents 
that may be released off-site, and there will be no significant 
increase in occupational or public radiation exposure. Accordingly, the 
Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
    With regard to potential non-radiological impacts, the proposed 
action involves features located entirely within the restricted area as 
defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It will not affect non-radiological plant 
effluents and has no other environmental impact. The proposed action 
does not involve any historic sites. Therefore, there are no 
significant non-radiological environmental impacts associated with the 
proposed action. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are 
no significant environmental impacts associated with the proposed 
action.

Alternatives to the Proposed action

Shipping Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility
    Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility 
is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity. 
However, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) high-level radioactive 
waste repository is not expected to begin receiving spent fuel until 
approximately 2010 at the earliest. In October 1996, the Administration 
did commit DOE to begin storing waste at a centralized location by 
January 31, 1998. However, no location has been identified and an 
interim federal storage facility has yet to be identified in advance of 
a decision on a permanent repository. Therefore, shipping spent fuel to 
the DOE repository is not considered an alternative to increased

[[Page 23135]]

onsite spent fuel storage capacity at this time.
Shipping Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility
    Reprocessing of spent fuel from the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, is not 
a viable alternative since there are no operating commercial 
reprocessing facilities in the United States. Spent fuel would have to 
be shipped to an overseas facility for reprocessing. This approach has 
never been used and it would require approval by the U.S. Department of 
State as well as other entities. Additionally, the cost of spent fuel 
reprocessing is not offset by the salvage value of the residual uranium 
and reprocessing represents an added cost. Therefore, this alternative 
is considered unacceptable.
Shipping Fuel to Another Utility or Site or to St. Lucie, Unit 1, for 
Storage
    Shipment of irradiated fuel from St. Lucie, Unit 2, to Turkey Point 
or to the St. Lucie, Unit 1, fuel pool would provide short-term relief 
from the storage problem at St. Lucie, Unit 2, but this transfer of 
fuel between units would create no additional storage locations for 
irradiated fuel. As a result, any fuel transfer would accelerate the 
loss of fuel pool storage at the receiving unit and give no benefit to 
the facility. Currently, the Turkey Point site has installed fuel pool 
storage capacity sufficient to handle site requirements for irradiated 
fuel storage until approximately the end of licensed life in 2012 (for 
Unit 3) and 2013 (for Unit 4). Further expansion of the storage 
capacity of the Turkey Point spent fuel pools is not feasible. Unlike 
the situation at Turkey Point, the St. Lucie site will require 
development of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (ISFSI) to 
permit operation to the end of licensed life. As a result, shipment of 
irradiated fuel from St. Lucie to Turkey Point would require the early 
development of an ISFSI at Turkey Point without eliminating the 
requirement to subsequently develop an ISFSI at the St. Lucie site. 
Additionally, the design of the Turkey Point fuel pool storage racks 
has been optimized for storage of fuel with a different lattice and 
different reactivity characteristics than that used at St. Lucie, Unit 
2; thus, storage of Unit 2 fuel at Turkey Point would both limit 
storage of future discharged Turkey Point fuel and represent a less 
than optimal use of the existing Turkey Point storage capability.
    Likewise, the shipment of irradiated fuel from St. Lucie, Unit 2, 
to St. Lucie, Unit 1, for storage does not eliminate the need to 
develop additional spent fuel storage capability at the St. Lucie site 
in the future. FPL knows of no other utility that is prepared to accept 
shipments of irradiated fuel from St. Lucie, Unit 2, for long-term 
storage at its site.
    For these reasons, and considering the increased fuel handling and 
additional occupational radiation exposure incurred during the shipment 
of irradiated fuel, the alternative of shipping St. Lucie, Unit 2, fuel 
to Turkey Point or to St. Lucie, Unit 1, for storage is not an 
acceptable alternative to the proposed action.
Alternatives Creating Additional Storage Capacity
    A variety of alternatives to increase the storage capacity of the 
St. Lucie, Unit 2, spent fuel pool were considered prior to developing 
the proposed license amendment based on soluble boron credit. Fuel rod 
consolidation was examined as a potential alternative and was 
eliminated because of the limited industry experience in disassembling 
irradiated fuel and because of the potential for fission product 
release due to rod breakage during disassembly. Additionally, because 
the Department of Energy (DOE) considers consolidated fuel to be a non-
standard waste form, FPL was concerned that the presence of fuel in 
this form would cause the DOE to delay its acceptance of waste from St. 
Lucie, Unit 2.
    The addition of poison inserts to the Unit 2 fuel pool was examined 
and later rejected because the large quantity of inserts necessary to 
adequately control the fuel pool reactivity had a significantly greater 
initial cost that the alternative selected. Additionally, use of poison 
inserts increases the volume of radioactive waste that must be disposed 
of or decontaminated during decommissioning of the spent fuel pool, 
making this alternative unacceptable.
    The early implementation of dry cask storage for irradiated fuel at 
the St. Lucie site was also considered. Dry cask storage involves 
transferring irradiated fuel, after several years of storage in the 
Unit 2 fuel pool, to high capacity casks with passive heat dissipation 
features. After loading, these casks would be placed on a concrete pad 
at an outdoor location on the St. Lucie site. This alternative was 
rejected by FPL because each of the alternatives discussed above would 
provide additional storage locations for irradiated fuel at lower cost 
and with less environmental impact.
    As a result, FPL concluded that none of the alternative 
technologies that could create additional spent fuel storage capacity 
at St. Lucie, Unit 2, could do so with an environmental impact less 
than the impacts associated with the chosen option.
Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation
    To minimize the quantities of irradiated fuel generated during full 
power operation at St. Lucie, FPL has developed efficient fuel loading 
patterns that maximize the utilization of fissile material within each 
assembly consistent with license limits on the integrated fuel rod 
exposure. Batch discharge burnups for St. Lucie, Unit 2, fuel regularly 
approximate 45 GWD/MTU with peak assembly burnups reaching 50 GWD/MTU 
by the time of discharge. St. Lucie, Unit 2, consistently depletes fuel 
assemblies to these burnups without experiencing cladding perforations 
so that the fission product inventory present in the spent fuel pool 
water remains low. The high values of batch average and peak assembly 
discharge burnup ensure that the electricity generated by St. Lucie, 
Unit 2, yields the minimum possible amount of spent fuel.
    The fuel assembly design used at St. Lucie, Unit 1, and at Turkey 
Point is not compatible with the St. Lucie, Unit 2, core. As a result, 
partially irradiated fuel from other FPL nuclear units can not be used 
at Unit 2 (or vice versa) to reduce the rate of spent fuel discharge.
    Operation of St. Lucie, Unit 2, at a reduced power level for long 
periods of time would extend the existing spent fuel pool storage 
capacity. However, to compensate for the reduced generation by St. 
Lucie, Unit 2, another power generation facility would be required to 
increase its power output, possibly resulting in an increase in 
airborne pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. The adverse 
environmental impact of increased airborne pollution and greenhouse gas 
emissions resulting from a long-term derate of St. Lucie, Unit 2, 
generating capacity is significantly greater than the environmental 
impact associated with increasing the storage capacity of the existing 
Unit 2 spent fuel pool.

The No-Action Alternative

    As an alternative to the proposed action, the NRC staff considered 
denial of the proposed action (i.e., the ``no-action'' alternative). 
Denial of the application would result in no significant change in 
current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the 
proposed action and the alternative action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

    This action does not involve the use of any resources not 
previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for St. 
Lucie, Unit 2.

[[Page 23136]]

Agencies and Persons Consulted

    By Letter dated March 8, 1991, Mary E. Clark of the State of 
Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, informed 
Deborah A. Miller, Licensing Assistant, U.S. NRC, that the State of 
Florida does not desire notification of issuance of license amendments. 
Thus, the State official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

    On the basis of the environmental assessment, the Commission 
concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission 
has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the 
proposed action.
    For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
licensee's letter dated December 31, 1997, as supplemented May 15, 
1998, September 15, 1998, November 25, 1998, and January 28, 1999. The 
May 15, 1998 supplement was a result of an U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission request for additional information dated April 8, 1998. All 
of these documents are available for public inspection at the 
Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, 
NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at 
the Indian River Community College Library, 3209 Virginia Avenue, Fort 
Pierce, Florida 34981-5596.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 23rd day of April 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William C. Gleaves,
Project Manager, Section 2, Project Directorate II, Division of 
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-10685 Filed 4-28-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P