[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 76 (Wednesday, April 21, 1999)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 19626-19666]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-9640]



[[Page 19625]]

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Part III





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Part 400 et al.



Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry 
Licensing Regulations; Proposed Rule



Proposed Advisory Circular (AC) 431-01, Reusable Launch Vehicle System 
Safety Process and AC 431-02, Expected Casualty Calculations for 
Commercial Space Launch and Reentry Missions; Notice

  Federal Register / Vol. 64, No. 76 / Wednesday, April 21, 1999 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 19626]]



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 400, 401, 404, 405, 406, 413, 415, 431, 433, and 435

[Docket No. FAA-1999-5535; Notice No. 99-04]
RIN 2120-AG71


Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and 
Reentry Licensing Regulations

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to amend the commercial space transportation 
licensing regulations by establishing operational requirements for 
launches of reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) and the authorized conduct 
of commercial space reentry activities. The proposed rule would respond 
to advancements in the development of commercial RLV and reentry 
capability and enactment of legislation extending the FAA's licensing 
authority to reentry activities. The agency is proposing requirements 
that limit risk to the public from RLV and reentry operations and seeks 
public comment on appropriate measures to carry out its licensing and 
safety responsibilities.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before July 20, 1999.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this document should be mailed or delivered, in 
duplicate, to: U.S. Department of Transportation Dockets, Docket No. 
FAA-1999-5535, 400 Seventh Street SW., Room Plaza 401, Washington, DC 
20590. Comments also may be sent electronically to the following 
Internet address: [email protected]. Comments may be filed and 
examined in Room Plaza 401 between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays, except 
Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Stewart W. Jackson, AST-100, Space 
Systems Development Division, Office of the Associate Administrator for 
Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, 
DC 20591, (202) 267-7903; or Ms. Esta M. Rosenberg, Attorney-Advisor, 
Regulations Division, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation 
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, (202) 366-9320.

Comments Invited

    Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the 
proposed action by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as 
they may desire. Comments relating to the environmental, energy, 
federalism, or economic impact that might result from adopting the 
proposals in this document also are invited. Substantive comments 
should be accompanied by cost estimates. Comments must identify the 
regulatory docket or notice number and be submitted in duplicate to the 
DOT Rules Docket address specified above.
    All comments received, as well as a report summarizing each 
substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed 
rulemaking, will be filed in the docket. The docket is available for 
public inspection before and after the comment closing date.
    All comments received on or before the closing date will be 
considered by the Administrator before taking action on this proposed 
rulemaking. Comments filed late will be considered to the extent 
possible without incurring expense or delay. The proposals in this 
document may be changed in light of the comments received.
    Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments 
submitted in response to this document must include a pre-addressed, 
stamped postcard with those comments on which the following statement 
is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-1999-5535.'' The postcard will be 
date stamped and mailed to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

    An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem 
and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section 
of the FedWorld electronic bulletin board service (telephone (703) 321-
3339) or the Government Printing Office's electronic bulletin board 
service (telephone (202) 512-1661).
    Internet users may reach the FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/
avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the Government Printing Office's web page at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara for access to recently published 
rulemaking documents.
    Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request 
to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 
800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 
267-9680. Communications must identify the notice number or docket 
number of this NPRM.
    Persons interested in being placed on the mailing list for future 
NPRMs should request from the above office a copy of Advisory Circular 
No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution System, that 
describes the application procedure.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

General

    The Commercial Space Act of 1998 (CSA), Public Law 105-303, extends 
the licensing authority of the Secretary of Transportation under 49 
U.S.C. Subtitle IX, chapter 701 (known as the Commercial Space Launch 
Act or CSLA), to reentry vehicle operators and the operation of reentry 
sites by a commercial or non-Federal entity. Under the CSA, the 
Secretary is authorized to license reentry of a reentry vehicle, 
including reusable launch vehicles, and the operation of reentry sites 
when those activities are conducted within the United States or by U.S. 
citizens abroad. The Secretary is charged with exercising licensing 
authority protection of public health and safety and the safety of 
property as well as consistency with U.S. national security and foreign 
policy interests, and treaty obligations entered into by the United 
States. By delegation of authority, the Administrator of the Federal 
Aviation Administration is responsible for carrying out the Secretary's 
licensing and safety mandate with respect to commercial space 
transportation and the Administrator has, in turn, delegated regulatory 
and related authority to the Associate Administrator for Commercial 
Space Transportation (AST).
    Amendment of the CSLA responds to development of reentry capability 
and reusable launch vehicle technology by the commercial space 
industry. Market forecasts of launch demand and international launch 
competition are driving industry to invest in means of accomplishing 
lower cost and more efficient access to space and specifically to low 
earth orbit. Reusable, or partially reusable vehicles that are capable 
of payload delivery and return to Earth for reflight are considered by 
many in industry as integral to reducing launch costs. For years, 
expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) have successfully provided commercial 
payload delivery services; however, the ability to survive the rigors 
of launch and the prospect of multiple missions per vehicle may 
dramatically lower price-per-pound-to-orbit launch costs. Growing 
interest in the ability to provide reliable round-trip space-route 
services, such as satellite

[[Page 19627]]

retrieval, package delivery, and ultimately space tourism, is 
attracting investment in a new class of space launch vehicle that can 
provide orbital launch and reentry services.
    A reusable launch vehicle, or RLV, differs from an expendable 
launch vehicle in that the vehicle, or a significant portion of it, 
would be designed to survive launch and reentry from space and maintain 
functional integrity. Proponents of reusable launch technology envision 
rapid reconditioning and turn-around time to maximize efficiency and 
profitability.
    Reusable launch vehicles are one form of reentry capability that 
would be subject to FAA licensing and safety requirements under the 
Commercial Space Act of 1998. Any vehicle, reusable or not, that is 
designed and operated such that it would intentionally return to Earth 
from Earth orbit or outer space, substantially intact, would require an 
FAA license. A person who offers use of a designated site for purposes 
of containing landing impacts would also be subject to FAA licensing to 
assure public safety is maintained if that person is a citizen of the 
United States or if the reentry site is in the United States.
    Launch vehicle survivability poses unique issues for the FAA in 
carrying out its safety mandate. Except for the U.S. Space 
Transportation System (STS) which transports the space shuttle, only 
ELVs are launched from the United States and the vast majority of ELV 
launches have been from federally owned and operated launch sites, such 
as Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) or Vandenberg Air Force Base 
(VAFB). ELVs having an orbital delivery capability are generally 
launched over unpopulated ocean areas so that debris generated from a 
vehicle failure would impact the Earth away from population. Risk to 
public safety is assessed by Federal ranges and launches proceed from 
Federal sites only if public risk is contained at an acceptable level. 
ELVs rely upon flight termination systems (FTS) that assure safe flight 
by destroying a vehicle if it is traveling beyond pre-approved 
boundaries so as to endanger the public. The boundaries, or impact 
limit lines, are drawn in advance of a launch and ensure that vehicle 
debris is confined within an unpopulated area in the event of vehicle 
failure or FTS activation.
    In contrast, RLVs would be designed for recovery and reuse. 
Therefore, launch safety, for the most part, may be assured through 
non-destructive means of terminating flight. In the event of a 
malfunction, an RLV may be able to return to its launch site or fly to 
an alternative landing site where the problem can be corrected and 
flight attempted again. Or, in another scenario, thrust termination 
combined with a soft or slowed landing may allow a vehicle operator to 
recover its vehicle for reconditioning and reuse. If a landing can be 
accomplished safely in terms of public risk, the operator would prefer 
it to total loss of the vehicle, and may purposely select an in-land 
site for the conduct of an RLV launch rather than risk launching over 
water where recovery would be difficult and costly.
    Return to Earth of a substantially intact vehicle also presents 
safety issues for the FAA. Although spent vehicle stages return to 
Earth periodically, as does other space debris, it is generally 
expected that reentering space objects burn up upon reentry into the 
Earth's atmosphere and do not present a threat to public safety. 
Reentry vehicles would be designed and controlled to the extent 
necessary to avoid burning up upon entry into the Earth's atmosphere 
and the FAA's safety program must ensure that they impact Earth in a 
manner that does not jeopardize public health and safety or the safety 
of property. Until accuracy and reliability of a vehicle's performance 
can be demonstrated through rigorous testing and numerous flights, 
other risk mitigation measures may be necessary to limit risks to the 
public from an off-site landing, explosion or release of toxic 
substances.
    The proposed rules would establish general performance-based 
standards for the launch of an RLV from any launch site and 
requirements applicable to commercial reentry activities. The approach 
proposed by the FAA in this notice is intended to provide the emerging 
commercial space transportation industry with the requisite flexibility 
to develop commercially feasible reentry and reusable launch vehicle 
systems whose operation would not jeopardize public safety.

Reentry Vehicles and Reusable Launch Vehicle Proposals

    Extension of the FAA's licensing authority to cover reentry 
operations responds to the development of RLV technology by a number of 
commercial entities that have begun to develop and test RLV concepts. 
Not all test operations require FAA launch and reentry licensing and 
may be covered by other agency authority. A number of RLV technology 
developers have begun preliminary consultations with the FAA to 
ascertain the nature and extent of FAA safety requirements and 
authorization needed for flight of their vehicles and the FAA 
encourages early discussion between the agency and aerospace companies 
to avoid regulatory obstacles down the road that may delay operations.
    The proposed rules would apply to both commercial reentry vehicle 
and RLV activities. Not all RLVs are reentry vehicles, and all reentry 
vehicles are not RLVs. A reentry vehicle is defined by the Commercial 
Space Act of 1998 to mean ``a vehicle designed to return from Earth 
orbit or outer space to Earth, or a reusable launch vehicle designed to 
return from outer space to Earth, substantially intact.'' Pub. L. 105-
303, Section 102(a)(3). Therefore, an RLV is a reentry vehicle under 
specific conditions of design and operation. Similarly, ``reentry'' is 
defined to mean ``to return or attempt to return, purposefully, a 
reentry vehicle and its payload, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer 
space to Earth.'' Pub. L. 105-303, Section 102(a)(3).
    An RLV is a launch vehicle designed to be launched more than once; 
however its return to Earth would be licensable as a reentry only if 
the vehicle achieves Earth orbit or outer space. Some RLVs are designed 
to operate in a suborbital fashion in that they do not enter Earth 
orbit. Others achieve Earth orbit and remain on orbit anywhere from one 
orbital revolution to several days prior to initiating reentry, 
depending on the nature of the mission. Some vehicle concepts employ a 
fully reusable vehicle that carries the payload to orbit and returns to 
Earth with the entire vehicle intact. This category of RLV includes 
single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) vehicles, such as the VentureStar vehicle 
planned by Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed Martin) and Rotary 
Rocket's Roton vehicle. For some, only certain stages, or portions, of 
the vehicle are designed to reenter . For example, Kistler Aerospace 
Corporation's (Kistler) K-1 vehicle relies upon a two-stage-to-orbit 
concept in which both the orbital vehicle and booster vehicle return to 
Earth for reuse; however only the orbital vehicle would qualify as a 
reentry vehicle under the statutory definition. An RLV also may be 
designed with one or more stages that are fully reusable and with other 
stages that are either partially reusable or even expendable. There are 
also airborne launch systems under development, such as that proposed 
by Kelly Aerospace, involving RLV and reentry operations.
    Further complicating the development of regulations for commercial 
space transportation activities is the variety of take-off and landing 
concepts that have been proposed. These concepts include

[[Page 19628]]

vertical launch from conventional launch pads, horizontal take-off from 
conventional runways, and airborne release using tow or air-drop 
configurations. Also included are vertical landing, horizontal landing, 
and a variety of ``soft'' landing concepts, such as parachutes, 
airbags, parafoils, rotors, water landings, or aerial recovery.
    The FAA does not want to constrain the development of emerging 
technology as operators seek effective and efficient methods of 
operation. Therefore, the regulatory requirements proposed by the FAA 
are not, generally speaking, based on type or design of a reentry 
vehicle or RLV, nor is the FAA proposing to certificate vehicle design. 
Rather, the FAA is proposing to examine closely those critical systems 
whose performance or reliability can affect public safety. Except for 
certain restrictions deemed critical to assuring public safety, the FAA 
proposes to employ a system safety engineering approach that 
effectively allows an operator to design its own operational 
restrictions and performance envelope within permissible risk 
thresholds established by the agency consistent with safety mandate. 
Limits and conditions on a licensee's RLV launch and reentry vehicle 
operations would be determined through the system safety process and 
risk assessments performed by a license applicant. The FAA envisions 
that future use of RLV operations may include passenger transport, in 
addition to cargo transport, to and from space. This notice is not 
intended to address these issues. Future rulemakings will address crew 
and passenger safety and other issues.

History of U.S. Commercial Reentry Capability

COMET/METEOR Program

    A number of the safety principles reflected in this proposal 
originate with the experience gained by the Department's Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation (OCST), the predecessor organization to 
AST, in evaluating the COMET (Commercial Experiment Transporter) 
Program and, later, the METEOR (Multiple Experiment to Earth Orbit and 
Return) Program.
    The COMET Program began as a commercial program administered 
through National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)'s Centers 
for the Commercial Development of Space (CCDS). COMET was intended to 
provide the services of a reentry vehicle system to carry and return to 
Earth experimental payloads. Three reentry missions were originally 
planned, with an option for two additional missions. The reentry 
vehicle system was comprised of a service module, manufactured by 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, and a capsule-shaped reentry 
vehicle, manufactured by Space Industries, Inc. Both companies were 
under contract with NASA's CCDS. The program was intended to 
demonstrate the capability of a low cost, medium-term (30-day) platform 
in space for the conduct and return to Earth of microgravity 
experiments. The COMET Program and the agency's approach to authorizing 
its activity is fully described in several Federal Register Notices . 
(See 57 FR 10213, March 24, 1992; 57 FR 55021, November 23, 1992; and 
60 FR 39476, August 2, 1995.) EER Systems Corporation (EER), also under 
contract to the CCDS, was responsible for launching the COMET reentry 
vehicle system into space using a Conestoga expendable launch vehicle.
    Upon command from Earth, the COMET would separate into two 
components and the reentry vehicle portion (Freeflyer), designed and 
operated by Space Industries, Inc., would reenter the Earth's 
atmosphere targeting a designated landing site on earth where 
experiments could be recovered. Because of funding problems the COMET 
Program was terminated and subsequently resurrected under a contract 
between NASA and Systems, Inc., which became responsible for both 
launch and reentry operations. Flight capability of the reentry vehicle 
system, renamed METEOR, was never demonstrated, however, because of the 
Conestoga launch failure which destroyed the METEOR system shortly 
after lift-off.
    The agency's initial approach to the COMET Program was to license 
the reentry event separately from the launch event under existing 
launch licensing authority. The determination to issue a separate 
license for return to Earth of the reentry vehicle was based, in large 
measure, on the fact that the reentry vehicle operator was a different 
entity than the launch operator, and that responsibility over the 
subsequent reentry (30 days following completion of the launch) ought 
not be imposed regulatorily on the launch operator, whose 
responsibility for launch safety would terminate after delivery of 
COMET to orbit and upon safing of the Conestoga expendable launch 
vehicle upper stage. Also, under typical circumstances, the launch 
provider's obligations to its customer would end upon successful 
deployment of the payload or cargo, in this case the COMET reentry 
vehicle system. By letter from the Chairman of the House Subcommittee 
on Space to the Director of OCST, the Department was advised that it 
did not have explicit licensing authority over payloads but that it 
should continue its safety review of reentry vehicle operations 
associated with the Launch. In the letter, dated September 2, 1992, the 
House Subcommittee Chairman indicated that the Committee would seek 
legislation to address commercial reentry vehicle licensing issues, 
including indemnification and liability. OCST continued its evaluation 
of the COMET reentry vehicle system, and then METEOR, under its 
authority to evaluate missions and payloads not otherwise licensed by 
the Federal government, for purposes of assuring whether the launch of 
the COMET payload would jeopardize public health and safety or safety 
of property.
    The Commercial Space Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-303, provides reentry 
licensing authority to the Department and imposes the financial 
responsibility and risk allocation provisions of 49 U.S.C. 70112 and 
70113 on licensed reentries. (Financial responsibility issues 
associated with licensed reentry activities are discussed in a separate 
rulemaking.)
COMET/METEOR Safety Approval
    The COMET Program safety review evaluated safety aspects of the 
reentry vehicle system when operated in accordance with certain 
operating limits. The review encompassed vehicle design, engineering 
analyses, testing, manufacturing, and integration. A vehicle safety 
evaluation determined the performance capabilities and limitations of 
the integrated reentry vehicle system. OCST did not dictate the 
methodology to be used by the applicant in performing the hazard and 
risk assessment required for vehicle safety approval; however, the 
applicant had to address engineering and safety analyses, component and 
system tests and checkouts, quality assurance procedures, manufacturing 
processes, and test plans and results. A separate operations review 
evaluated the operator's ability to carry out the reentry operation in 
a safe manner consistent with the capability and limitations of the 
reentry vehicle system. Vehicle safety and operations approvals issued 
by OCST were limited to the design and operating limits presented in 
the respective applications. Any subsequent changes would require an 
amendment of the application and further review and approval by the 
agency.
    For further assurance of public safety, OCST determined it prudent 
to conduct

[[Page 19629]]

independent evaluations of the reliability, design performance, and 
operation of the COMET reentry vehicle system in addition to assessing 
the data submitted by Space Industries, Inc., and later by EER, to 
support the application for vehicle safety approval. These independent 
evaluations were designed to serve as a means of ensuring all hazards 
had been identified and the applicant had adequately addressed all 
potential risks. The evaluation also provided technical verification of 
the applicant's analysis of the reliability of the reentry vehicle 
system.
COMET/METEOR Safety Approval Criteria
    The COMET Program was the first commercial reentry operation that 
proposed to land a reentry vehicle in the United States. The designated 
landing site for the reentry vehicle was the Utah Test and Training 
Range, a Federal facility located in a sparsely populated area.
    In fulfilling its statutory mandate to protect public safety, OCST 
selected three criteria against which the reentry vehicle system would 
be evaluated. The evaluation criteria were performance-based rather 
than design standards to afford the COMET Program participants maximum 
flexibility in developing a safe and cost-effective product. As a 
general matter, performance-based standards also further the public 
interest by encouraging innovation and technology development. The 
three criteria developed by OCST to evaluate the COMET Program reentry 
vehicle system were as follows:
    1. The probability of the Reentry Vehicle (RV) landing outside the 
designated landing site shall not be greater than 3 in 1,000 missions.
    2. The additional risks to the public in the immediate vicinity of 
the landing site (that is, the area within 100 miles of the designated 
landing site) shall not exceed the normal background risks to which 
those individuals ordinarily would be exposed but for the reentry 
missions. Normal background risk is characterized as: the probability 
of any casualty occurring within the 100-mile zone shall not exceed one 
in a million on an annual basis. In addition, the probability of any 
casualty occurring within the zone shall not exceed one in a million 
for a single mission.
    3. The additional risks to the general public beyond the 100-mile 
zone around the designed landing site, and to property on orbit, shall 
not exceed normal background risks to which the public ordinarily would 
be exposed but for the reentry missions. This normal background risk is 
characterized as: the probability of any casualty occurring shall not 
exceed one in a million on an annual basis. In addition, the 
probability of any casualty occurring in the area that is both outside 
the designated landing site and the 100-mile zone around the site shall 
not exceed one in a million for a single mission.
    The three criteria, established an acceptable level of risk that 
conservatively, did not exceed the normal background risk of 
individuals affected by the activity. The criteria were published in 
the Federal Register on March 24, 1992 (57 FR 10213).
    As explained in the March 24, 1992 Notice, the first criterion was 
directed at ensuring vehicle reliability and accuracy within a 
controlled area. The second criterion was intended to ensure that as a 
result of nominal operations, or in the event of a system error or 
deviation from planned trajectory of the vehicle, persons living within 
the vicinity of the landing site were not exposed to greater than the 
normal background risk that is accepted by the public in daily 
activities. The third criterion would limit public risk to normal 
background risk even if a major system failure resulted in an 
essentially random reentry; however, flight path, design, and limited 
cross-range capability of the vehicle made it possible to define the 
potential ``footprint'' in which a random reentry could occur.
    Believing that it could not satisfy the first criterion in the 
absence of flight performance history, Space Industries, Inc. 
petitioned for relief from the accuracy and reliability criterion. The 
program was discontinued in May 1994, before official action could be 
taken on the waiver request. Approximately one year later, NASA 
restarted the program, renamed METEOR by EER, which took over 
responsibility for development and operation of the reentry vehicle 
system in addition to launch of the METEOR, on its Conestoga launch 
vehicle. However, unlike the COMET Program, NASA contracted for reentry 
services and designated an area in the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of 
Virginia, for the program's initial reentry attempt. Changing the 
landing site from Utah to the Atlantic Ocean significantly reduced the 
public's exposure to risk if the vehicle were to land off-site as a 
result of a system failure. While analysis showed that the properly 
operating reentry vehicle would land within the designated landing area 
in 997 out of 1,000 nominal cases, Systems Corporation argued that it 
could not demonstrate that the vehicle met the criterion in non-nominal 
cases. Non-nominal cases were those that considered the probability of 
failure of certain safety critical systems and the resultant errors in 
the landing location. Therefore, EER pursued the requested relief from 
the accuracy and reliability criterion.
    OCST granted the requested waiver for the following reasons: OCST 
determined that the three criteria were designed to collectively ensure 
public safety, meaning that satisfaction of the second and third 
criteria would compensate if the ability of the reentry vehicle system 
to meet the accuracy and reliability criterion was marginal. OCST 
analyzed failure scenarios and determined that there were circumstances 
in which intentional reentry of the METEOR reentry vehicle could occur 
and public safety would be assured without the demonstrated level of 
accuracy required under the first criterion. Those circumstances were 
as follows: (i) if there were well-defined areas within which the 
vehicle was most likely to land if it missed the designated landing 
site, and the risk to the population within those areas fell within 
acceptable limits; (ii) if the condition of the vehicle following an 
errant reentry presented little risk to exposed populations because it 
would not survive reentry or because of its small size and mass and the 
absence of hazardous materials on the vehicle; and (iii) if risk 
mitigation measures could be implemented to limit public safety risk to 
acceptable levels. Because all of these circumstances were found to 
exist, and because criteria two and three were satisfied, OCST 
concluded that public safety and U.S. national interests would not be 
jeopardized if criterion one were not satisfied for non-nominal cases. 
A waiver of the accuracy and reliability criterion was therefore 
granted for the METEOR Program's first reentry. However, as a condition 
of the waiver, OCST required that the operator implement a public 
information communications plan under which the affected public would 
be informed of the reentry activity, including its estimated time and 
location. The operator also was required to have an emergency response 
plan whereby local officials would be notified in the event of an off-
site landing.
    The launch vehicle failed shortly after lift-off during first stage 
powered ascent and the vehicle and payload were destroyed. No 
subsequent application for a launch license or payload determination 
has been made under the COMET/METEOR Program and, as yet, no formal 
application has been submitted to the FAA to reenter a reentry vehicle.

[[Page 19630]]

Lessons Learned From COMET/METEOR Safety Approval Criteria

    The FAA concludes that a collective approach of using a number of 
safety standards, in combination, to limit risk is in the public 
interest. Accordingly, the FAA is proposing a three-prong interrelated 
approach to achieving safe reentry operations, in addition to requiring 
certain organizational safeguards derived from the government's 
experience in managing safe launch operations. First, the performance 
hazards and risks to public safety presented by a reentry vehicle 
proposal would be identified through a system safety process that 
defines the safe operating envelope for a particular reentry vehicle, 
much like the vehicle safety approval process utilized for evaluating 
the COMET reentry vehicle system. Second, an applicant for a reentry 
license would be required to satisfy a collective risk criteria, 
referred to as Ec. Third, as in COMET, the FAA is proposing 
certain risk mitigation measures that must be followed even if other 
standards are satisfied. These measures take the form of operational 
restrictions and are described below.
    The FAA proposes that the reentry site must be sufficiently large 
so as to encompass the three-sigma footprint of the vehicle, as 
explained in greater detail in a subsequent section elsewhere in this 
notice under supplementary information. This articulation of the 
landing site accuracy standard effectively limits the risk of an off-
site landing but does so in a way that is more readily demonstrable by 
an applicant, as it relates only to nominal performance of the vehicle 
and its systems.

General Approach to Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing

Purposeful Reentry From Earth Orbit or Outer Space

    Prior to enactment of the Commercial Space Act of 1998 (CSA), FAA 
licensing authority over launch vehicle flight was limited to launches 
of launch vehicles, defined to mean to place or try to place a launch 
vehicle and any payload in a suborbital trajectory, in Earth orbit in 
outer space, or otherwise in outer space. 49 U.S.C. 70102(3). A 
``launch vehicle'' is defined in 49 U.S.C. 70102 to mean a vehicle 
built to operate in, or place a payload in, outer space, and a 
suborbital rocket. 49 U.S.C. 70102(7).
    Recent amendment of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, chapter 701, grants to 
the agency explicit licensing authority over reentry operations. 
``Reentry,'' an event that must be authorized by the FAA, means the 
``return or attempt to return, purposefully, [of] a reentry vehicle and 
its payload, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer space to Earth.'' 
49 U.S.C. 70102(10). Two elements must be satisfied for an event to 
qualify as a ``reentry'' subject to FAA licensing jurisdiction. First, 
the vehicle (an undefined term) that is being returned to Earth must 
qualify as a ``reentry vehicle'' under the statutory definition. That 
is, not only must its reentry originate from Earth orbit or outer 
space, but the vehicle must be designed to reenter and land on Earth in 
substantially intact condition. Second, deliberate intent to reenter, 
or the element of purposefulness, must exist. Absent these two 
elements, the unintended, though foreseeable, return to Earth of an 
object capable of surviving reentry is not an event that requires 
licensing by the FAA.
    For example, the return to Earth in 1997 of a major part of a Delta 
II launch vehicle, a second stage tank, in substantially intact 
condition in a Texas field was foreseeable inasmuch as any object in 
orbit, and most immediately in low Earth orbit, will experience the 
effects of orbital decay over time and eventually reenter Earth 
atmosphere. Most such objects will burn up upon reentry into Earth 
atmosphere due to aerodynamic heating caused by atmospheric drag. The 
Delta II second stage tank is notorious because it failed to do so, 
however it would not require FAA licensing. The event illustrates that 
an object that is not intended to survive reentry substantially intact 
may in fact do so. The Delta II second stage is not a reentry vehicle 
under the statutory definition because it was not designed to survive 
reentry. However, even if it were a reentry vehicle, the event would 
not be subject to FAA licensing jurisdiction because there was never 
any deliberate intent by an operator to return the Delta II second 
stage to Earth, even though it was understood that the Delta stage, 
just like any other space object, would eventually reenter Earth 
atmosphere as a function of orbital decay.
    Certain RLV launch concepts operate in a suborbital 1 
fashion in that they do not achieve orbital velocity. However, until 
passage of the CSA, it remained doubtful (or at best unclear) as to 
whether Congress intended for the FAA to impose regulatory controls 
over the intact landing of such vehicles returning from outer space and 
whether financial responsibility and risk allocation requirements, 
specifically the so-called indemnification provisions of 49 U.S.C. 
70113, would apply to their landing on Earth. The matter is now 
resolved by legislation and, to ensure consistency in its regulatory 
approach to assessing and limiting risk to public safety, the FAA 
considers a suborbitally operated RLV the same as other reentry 
vehicles that return from Earth orbit or outer space. From a safety and 
risk standpoint, the difference between a suborbital reentry and an 
orbital one is a distinction without a difference, in the agency's 
opinion, because both pose comparable risks to public safety as a 
result of launch or ascent of the vehicle and intact descent or reentry 
of the vehicle. To ensure consistent application of standards in 
evaluating ascent and descent risks presented by RLV proposals, the FAA 
has determined that the better approach is to regard a suborbitally 
operated RLV as the launch and reentry of a reentry vehicle, rather 
than as a suborbital launch of a launch vehicle. As explained in the 
next section of this supplementary information, because the FAA would 
evaluate the safety of the entire mission, regardless of whether one 
authorization (launch) or two (launch and reentry) are combined in a 
single instrument known as a license, consistency in the agency's 
approach to risk assessment is assured.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The dictionary definition of the term ``suborbital'' means 
of or less than one orbit of the earth. A suborbital trajectory is a 
flight path that is not closed, whereas an orbit is a closed path. A 
suborbital trajectory may be ballistic, that is, acted on only by 
atmospheric drag and gravity, or it can be controlled by external 
forces and therefore maneuverable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA concludes that a suborbitally operated RLV that achieves 
outer space would satisfy the requisite element of purposefulness and 
would thus be subject to FAA reentry licensing authority, even though 
an intervening event of human control over vehicle operations is not 
required to return that vehicle to Earth. The term ``purposefully'' 
that appears in the definition of ``reenter'' and ``reentry'' is 
intended to include within the FAA's reentry licensing authority those 
vehicles whose return to Earth must be deliberately initiated by human 
or pre-programmed intervention, as well as those vehicles for which 
intentional reentry has been designed into the vehicle's capability 
without initiation of a reentry sequence, as is the case in a ballistic 
launch and reentry where there is no need to activate a reentry 
propulsion system. The term ``purposeful'' is, however, intended to 
eliminate from the scope of FAA licensing jurisdiction those spacecraft 
that are not designed to, but may, survive reentry into Earth 
atmosphere through application of natural deorbiting forces, such as 
orbital decay.

[[Page 19631]]

    Where the operator's intent, as evidenced through vehicle design 
and operation, is to launch and deliberately return to Earth the RLV, 
and the vehicle is designed to return from outer space to Earth 
substantially intact, the return to Earth is licensable as a 
``reentry.'' Thus, suborbitally operated RLVs that reach outer space 
are reentry vehicles whose reentry would be subject to FAA reentry 
licensing authority.
    As previously indicated, not all RLVs will satisfy the statutory 
definition of the term ``reenter'' because they do not achieve Earth 
orbit or outer space. However, RLVs and reentry vehicles share the 
common operational characteristic of intact, targeted reentry and it is 
this operational characteristic that presents risks to public safety 
warranting regulatory oversight. It is also this operational 
characteristic that heightens the risk of U.S. Government international 
liability under the Outer Space Treaties and therefore warrants 
regulatory supervision by the United States to ensure that reentry 
activities are conducted in a manner consistent with international 
obligations of the United States.
    Therefore, whether or not an RLV is also a reentry vehicle 
specifically subject to reentry licensing jurisdiction of the agency, 
the FAA is proposing a consistent measure of safety for ascent and 
descent flight phases of an RLV. The measure of safety would not vary 
on the basis of whether an RLV's flight and return to Earth meet the 
statutory definition of a ``reentry.'' In other words, the public 
should not be exposed to greater risk because a vehicle achieves Earth 
orbit or outer space, or is maneuvered in its return to Earth rather 
than returning through ballistic flight. However, where reentry must be 
deliberately initiated for de-orbit to occur, certain affirmative 
controls or safety standards, as described under a separate heading 
elsewhere in this supplementary information, would be imposed on the 
operator to ensure conditions for safe reentry are satisfied.

Mission Risk Assessment

    For all RLVs and most reentry vehicles, the FAA proposes to 
approach safety on an overall mission basis. The FAA would evaluate the 
safety of the ascent and descent phases of an RLV mission and would not 
allow it to proceed unless the combined risk of the ascent and descent 
phases of the mission satisfies the agency's safety criteria. That 
criteria is: Ec  30  x  10-6. For risk 
assessment purposes, the FAA proposes no distinction among space launch 
vehicles that combine expendable and reusable vehicle concepts, or that 
reenter in multiple stages (some or all of which may also be reentry 
vehicles). A single safety criteria, measured in terms of expected 
casualty for the mission, would apply to all public risk exposure from 
vehicle operations during both ascent and descent. Thus, a launch 
vehicle that utilizes an expendable first stage booster to achieve 
altitude and a second reusable stage for delivery on orbit followed by 
reentry would be required to satisfy the single Ec criterion 
cited above for the FAA to authorize the mission (launch and reentry).
    The FAA believes a caveat may be appropriate with respect to the 
appropriate public safety risk threshold to apply to a reentry vehicle 
that is designed to remain on orbit for an extended period of time and 
for which planned reentry is so remote from the launch event that there 
is no objective means or rational basis for combining reentry risk with 
launch or ascent risk. The FAA requests public comment on the 
circumstances, if any, under which it may be appropriate to separately 
assess the reentry risks of a reentry vehicle from those presented by 
the entire mission of launching a reentry vehicle into space and its 
subsequent reentry.
    That said, the FAA envisions combining launch and reentry 
authorizations under a single license whereby a single operator is 
responsible for launch and reentry phases of the mission.2 
The FAA would not use a ``wait and see'' approach to authorize a 
reentry. Reentry authorization would have to be issued in advance of 
launch, signifying the FAA's conclusion that both ascent and descent 
flight phases could be performed in a manner that does not expose the 
public to unreasonable risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Separate licenses would be appropriate in circumstances 
where different operators are each responsible for a particular 
phase of flight, as originally planned in the COMET Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Scope of License

    The report of the House Committee on Science, Report 105-347, 
addresses the intended scope of licensing authority over reentry 
operations granted to the FAA by H.R. 1702, the Commercial Space Act of 
1997. (The Commercial Space Act of 1998 was enacted into law during the 
second session of the 105th Congress as Public Law 105-303. No 
substantive changes to FAA reentry licensing authority from that 
reported on by the House Science Committee in Report 105-347 appear in 
the public law.) It provides that the legislation is not intended to 
extend FAA launch licensing authority, as far as the payload is 
concerned, beyond placement of the payload in orbit or its planned 
trajectory. According to the Committee Report, only the launch of a 
launch vehicle and reentry of a reentry vehicle requires FAA licensing 
and regulatory oversight. While non-reentry vehicle operations on-
orbit, maneuvers between orbits, and activities following launch that 
also precede reentry are not intended to be covered by an FAA license, 
the Committee Report recognized that the FAA may need to examine pre-
reentry procedures and activities to evaluate safe reentry capability.
    A discussion of launch duration and the commencement point of a 
reentry license appears in a separate rulemaking that addresses 
financial responsibility and risk allocation for licensed reentry 
activities so that space vehicle operators can manage risks 
appropriately. Unlicensed events would only be eligible for government 
payment of excess claims protection, known as indemnification, to the 
extent losses result from and are causally related to a licensed 
activity. Therefore, for purposes of insurance and indemnification 
under 49 U.S.C. 70112 and 70113, it is critical that the FAA define 
those activities to which statutory-based insurance and risk allocation 
would be applicable. For purposes of licensing, it is also important 
that the agency define the extent of activity that is covered by a 
license and is therefore subject to FAA safety standards.
    In determining the appropriate scope of a reentry license, the FAA 
considered the Committee Report language cited above, the scope of 
launch licenses for ELV launches, and reentry risks for which 
statutorily mandated financial responsibility and risk allocation are 
necessary.
    In its report accompanying H.R. 1702, the House Committee on 
Science stated that ``[b]y way of definition, the Committee intends 
that [``reentry''] begins when the vehicle is prepared specifically for 
reentry. By way of definition, the Committee intends the term to apply 
to that phase of the overall space mission during which the reentry is 
intentionally initiated. Although this may vary slightly from system to 
system, as a general matter the Committee expects reentry to begin when 
the vehicle's attitude is oriented for propulsion firing to place the 
vehicle on its reentry trajectory.'' (Report 105-347 at p. 21, 105th 
Cong., 1st Sess.)
    The Report acknowledges that to evaluate capability of a reentry 
operator to conduct a safe reentry, the agency

[[Page 19632]]

may need to examine certain proposed procedures and activities that 
would precede initiation of reentry; however, these procedures and 
activities are not events requiring a license or otherwise subject to 
regulations. ``Rather, they would represent aspects of an application 
that the Department would have to measure against standards and 
criteria that the Department has established are necessary to evaluate 
capability to conduct the reentry.'' The Committee further allows for 
both general and particular (case-by-case) applicability of such 
standards and criteria to a reentry proposal.
    The FAA proposes regulations adopting the analytical approach to 
assessing reentry capability envisioned by the House Science Committee. 
The FAA is not proposing design-based or prescriptive requirements 
applicable to RLV or reentry vehicle activities while on orbit. As 
described below, the agency's system safety approach to reentry risk 
requires that a reentry operator establish operating procedures and 
specifications that ensure reentry risks are confined within acceptable 
limits. Reentry authorization would be granted based on a demonstration 
by an applicant that its vehicle and reentry operations satisfy the 
agency's safety criteria when operated in accordance with operator-
designed procedures and criteria.
    For purposes of measuring reentry safety against FAA criteria 
(Ec), however, it remains necessary to define the extent of 
activities that enter into the Ec analysis. Most of the RLV 
and reentry activities currently contemplated by the aerospace industry 
involve very limited time on orbit. RLVs that operate suborbitally, as 
discussed above, would spend no time on orbit and would be subject to 
continuous FAA licensing. Unlike the COMET situation, RLVs that are 
reentry vehicles are not payloads for purposes of launch. Rather, they 
are both a launch and reentry vehicle.
    Except for extended microgravity experimentation, such as that 
contemplated by the COMET Program, regulation of on orbit activity of 
orbital reentry vehicles would be limited to that necessary to ensure 
reentry readiness, capability and safe return to a designated 
destination. Because additional time on orbit would raise costs and 
otherwise interfere with RLV objectives of prompt delivery and return 
services, the FAA envisions that the only on orbit time spent by an 
orbital reentry vehicle would be that required to assure reentry-
readiness through reentry safety-critical system check-out and attitude 
and orientation adjustment for return to the reentry site. Because a 
non-nominal reentry could occur as a result of or during reentry-
readiness activity following a vehicle's ascent to orbit, the agency 
concludes that such activities must necessarily be covered by a license 
in order to assure public safety. As discussed in a separate rulemaking 
on reentry financial responsibility, licensing reentry-readiness 
activity is also critical to a meaningful risk management scheme under 
49 U.S.C. 70112 and 70113.
    Accordingly, the FAA proposes to define reentry and the scope of a 
reentry license in a manner similar to that utilized for launch 
licensing. The term ``launch'' is characterized in the House Science 
Committee Report as including activities that precede flight that 
entail critical preparatory steps to initiating flight, are unique to 
space launch and are so hazardous as to warrant agency regulatory 
oversight, as long as they are conducted at a launch site in the United 
States, even if that site is not ultimately the site of the actual 
launch. (Report 105-347 at p. 22, 105th Cong., 1st Sess.) The FAA finds 
in this report language helpful guidance in attempting to delimit 
``that phase of the overall space mission during which the reentry is 
intentionally initiated.'' Just as pre-flight launch activities must be 
licensed because, among other things, they are critical and particular 
to the launch process, the reentry phase may be defined as encompassing 
those vehicle operations necessary to assure reentry readiness and 
safety that are uniquely associated with the purpose and performance of 
the reentry mission.
    The FAA also considered the point in time when licensing authority 
over a launch is concluded in an effort to define the point after 
launch when an authorized reentry may commence for licensing purposes. 
In a separate rulemaking governing licensing requirements for launches 
from Federal ranges, the FAA defines the end of licensed activity, for 
purposes of the launch vehicle, as the point after payload separation 
when the last action occurs over which a licensee has direct or 
indirect control over the launch vehicle. Typically, this point occurs 
when the vehicle's upper stage is rendered inert or safe from explosive 
risk. Currently, licensed launches from Federal ranges are exclusively 
launches of expendable launch vehicles (ELVs), and the licensing rule 
definition of the end of licensed launch activity is directed, quite 
properly, to ELV launches. If applied to RLV technology, however, a 
launch might not be concluded under the terms of this definition until 
reentry is complete because the RLV operator would retain (or design 
in) certain control over the vehicle in order to ready it for reentry. 
Because separate licensing authority over launch and reentry is granted 
to the agency by the amended statute, the FAA believes that the defined 
end of licensed launch activity for an ELV may not be appropriate in 
defining the end of licensed launch activity for an RLV. However, that 
portion of the definition that addresses payload delivery is 
instructive in defining the end of the launch phase of an RLV mission 
that involves both a launch and reentry. In fact, the Committee focuses 
on payload delivery in defining the end of launch under the original 
intent of the CSLA. ``The original Act intended that a launch ends, as 
far as the payload is concerned, once the launch vehicle places the 
payload in Earth orbit or in the planned trajectory in outer space.'' 
(House Science Committee Report 105-347, at p. 22.)
    The Committee report language employs terms that describe the 
appropriate end of a licensed launch of a reentry vehicle when the 
reentry vehicle itself is a payload, as was the case in the COMET/
METEOR experience, in an effort to ensure the FAA does not bootstrap 
licensing authority over payloads. If the COMET or METEOR vehicle were 
presented today for licensing, the end of launch would properly be 
defined as placement of the payload, the COMET or METEOR reentry 
vehicle, in Earth orbit or its planned trajectory, and safing of the 
ELV upper stage used to launch the reentry vehicle (payload) to orbit, 
consistent with FAA licensing rules and Committee report language. 
During the 30-day period following launch and preceding planned 
reentry, the COMET/METEOR payload would not be subject to FAA 
licensing, just as any other payload operating on orbit is not subject 
to FAA licensing. However, the intentional reentry to Earth of the 
COMET/METEOR reentry vehicle from Earth orbit would require FAA 
licensing because it was designed to return to Earth substantially 
intact.
    Reusable launch vehicles that are also reentry vehicles present a 
different situation from COMET/METEOR in that RLV operations on orbit 
are not payload operations. Based on pre-application consultations with 
RLV developers, the FAA understands that RLV operations on orbit 
following payload deployment would be those conducted generally for the 
purpose of assuring reentry readiness, such as safety system checkouts, 
vehicle orientation for the targeted landing site, and attitude control 
and adjustment prior to initiating a deorbit burn or other reentry

[[Page 19633]]

sequence necessary for the intended return to Earth. Accordingly, the 
FAA defines the end of licensed launch activity for an RLV launch at 
deployment of a payload. The licensed reentry phase of a mission begins 
immediately thereafter for vehicles that are intended to reenter when 
reentry-readiness is verified. In other circumstances, such as a 
planned or designed-in delay of reentry for an extended duration the 
FAA requests comments on the appropriate point for commencing reentry 
licensing authority.

Public Safety Strategy for Assessing Reusable Launch Vehicle and 
Reentry Safety

    This proposal reflects a three-pronged approach to assuring that 
risks to public safety are maintained at or below acceptable levels 
during an RLV mission and any licensed reentry. The three prongs, which 
are interrelated, are: (1) utilization by an applicant of a systematic, 
logical and disciplined system safety process; (2) an analysis that 
determines the expected casualty rate per mission; and (3) mandatory 
operational restrictions imposed by regulation for risk mitigation 
purposes. No single one of these processes is sufficient by itself to 
ensure that a reentry operation would not jeopardize public safety. The 
FAA believes that the combination of these elements will be effective 
in limiting public risk. The following chart demonstrates the 
interrelationship of the three elements of the agency's public safety 
strategy:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21AP99.003


    The first two elements are applied on a case-by-case, or 
individual, basis because the factors that comprise the necessary 
analyses are uniquely dependent on vehicle capability, design and 
intended operation. Mandatory operational restrictions would be 
specified in rules of general applicability.
    Assessment of expected casualties is a commonly used measure of 
launch risk within the aerospace community. The FAA proposes to measure 
collective risk, defined as the product of the probability (or 
frequency) of occurrence of all events and the severity of each events 
impact or consequences on public safety. A quantitative number is 
derived through analytic techniques in lieu of empirical launch data, 
because the actual number of launches of a particular type of launch 
vehicle is too small to be statistically significant. Presented below 
is the agency's proposed measure of acceptable casualty risk.
    Applicants will be required to utilize a system safety process. In 
some respects, this is similar to the FAA systems approach to examining 
aviation systems such as that contained in 14 CFR 25.1309. This process 
lays the foundation for the system safety engineering effort used in 
designing a vehicle and therefore the FAA believes the requirement 
would impose no additional burden on an applicant. A system safety 
process employs methods and techniques that may be utilized for 
identifying: (i) the hazards that result from a particular launch or 
reentry vehicle operation, (ii) the effects on or consequences to 
public safety of those hazards including vehicle failure, (iii) means 
of controlling or mitigating those consequences, and (iv) verification 
processes of the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures. Part of a 
system safety process is the application of techniques and tools to 
determine failure probabilities and to estimate the consequences of 
such failures, which in turn informs calculation of the expected 
casualty rate. Thus, the two analyses are interrelated. Through a 
system safety process, an applicant develops operational constraints 
and defines the operating envelope that will ensure its mission does 
not exceed acceptable risk thresholds .
    The FAA does not propose to define acceptable system safety 
processes as a regulatory matter; however, the process selected must be 
adequate to accomplish its intended purpose. The FAA will issue 
guidance material describing an acceptable system safety process and 
its elements as a means of compliance with regulations. The FAA will 
also issue guidance on acceptable methodology for calculating expected 
casualty risk. The FAA believes applying a flexible approach of this 
nature to assessing risk to public safety is particularly critical at 
this early stage of RLV and reentry technology development to 
accommodate, and encourage, the varied operational and design concepts 
envisioned within the industry.
    Calculation of casualty expectancy and system safety process 
analyses are analytical tools. Absent operational proof of vehicle 
reliability, the FAA believes that additional constraints on operations 
are also necessary to assure public safety until sufficient flight data 
is available to validate analytical demonstrations. The FAA is 
proposing to impose certain operational

[[Page 19634]]

restrictions on all RLV missions and reentries, and additional 
restrictions for unproven vehicles. The FAA will relieve or waive 
restrictions once sufficient performance data is available to support 
an agency determination that public safety is assured without their 
imposition.
1. Calculation of Ec (Acceptable public risk)
    Although risk is inherent in the operation of an RLV or reentry 
vehicle, this proposal would establish limits on the risk to public 
safety that may result from licensed flight of an RLV or reentry 
vehicle. Risk analysis has been widely used to support regulatory and 
industrial decision-making and to allocate limited resources. The 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy, for 
example, have made extensive use of risk analysis in analyzing, 
licensing, and regulating the operation of nuclear power plants; 
prioritizing nuclear waste disposal safety issues; and performing 
environmental impact analyses. The Department of Defense (DOD) also has 
used risk analysis to develop and test nuclear weapons systems.
    In the space launch arena, risk analysis is used to evaluate the 
hazards and consequences associated with a launch. One measure of 
acceptable flight risk used to determine whether a launch can proceed 
at a Federal launch range is calculation of the expected number of 
casualties (Ec) to the collective members of the public 
exposed to debris hazards from a particular launch. A casualty includes 
serious injury as well as death. Ec provides the advantage 
of a mathematically defined criterion on which to evaluate an event, 
such as a launch or reentry, without the necessity of completing 
detailed vehicle design analyses. The term ``public'' for purposes of 
Ec calculation means all persons who do not participate in 
the operation of the vehicle, hence, the term ``public'' would not 
include the crew on a manned vehicle.
    Federal range safety requirements developed over the last 40 years 
safeguard the public by limiting the public's exposure to the risks 
associated with launch activities. Because of operator adherence to 
Federal range safety requirements and practices, the public has not 
suffered any casualty from launches of ELVs. Therefore, it has not been 
necessary for the FAA to independently evaluate the design or 
manufacture of vehicles and duplicate the evaluation process undertaken 
when a vehicle is launched from a Federal range. The FAA has adopted 
the Federal range Ec standard of 0.00003 casualties per 
launch or Ec  30  x  10-6 in its 
licensing regulations and will license launches from non-Federal launch 
sites if equivalent safety is demonstrated. The FAA proposes to apply 
the same approach to evaluate RLV and reentry risks on a per mission 
basis.
    There are two fundamental components of Ec analysis: (1) 
determination of the probability of a failure event (pi), 
and (2) evaluation of the consequence of the failure event 
(Ci). The complete equation for Ec is the sum, 
over all possible failure events, of the product of the pi 
and Ci as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21AP99.004

where ``i'' is a failure event and where there are ``n'' failure events 
that could result in a non-zero consequence.
    The probability of a failure event is always a fraction between 0 
and 1, while the measure of the consequence of the failure event could 
be any number. The larger the number, the greater the risk. Reducing 
the probability of the failure event could lower the risk. Because the 
probability of a failure event is related directly to the reliability 
of a vehicle's safety critical systems and subsystems, having a very 
reliable vehicle could lower the risk. (Whether a system is safety 
critical such that a failure of the system might affect public safety 
would depend on a number of factors, including vehicle flight path and 
its capability to reach populated areas.)
    Lowering the consequence of the failure event also could reduce the 
risk. The consequence of the failure event is calculated by multiplying 
the surface area population density by the casualty area of the 
vehicle. This calculation would have to be made using the casualty area 
produced by an intact vehicle or the casualty area created by the 
debris fragments produced by a vehicle that has broken up in midair. 
The worst-case scenario should be used. The casualty area of the 
vehicle would consider the potential for casualties related to 
secondary explosions, hazardous material exposure, collateral damage, 
and the lateral movement of debris after impact. From the equation it 
can be deduced that Ec could be lowered by operating the 
vehicle so that a failure event causes few or fewer casualties. (ELVs 
generally have a small Ec because planned flight paths are 
over unpopulated areas, such as the ocean, and a destructive flight 
termination system (FTS) would be used to destroy the vehicle if it 
deviates from its planned flight path.)
    The basic elements for determining mission risk are discussed 
above; however, the real-world process for determining mission risk is 
a bit more complicated. The process must account for a large number of 
possible events, and there are likely to be many different failure 
modes that could affect the characteristics (e.g., size, location) of 
the debris and lethal area. Fortunately, the goal in conducting a risk 
analysis to determine Ec for a particular mission is not to 
determine the actual risk but to determine that the risk is below a 
certain threshold Ec of 30  x  10-6. The FAA 
believes that Ec calculations are best made using 
conservative estimates and worst-case assumptions to identify and limit 
the public's risk exposure for improbable hazardous events with high 
consequences.
    Recognizing that Congress has chosen to accept the risk of RLV 
operations and reentry to derive the benefits from evolving commercial 
technology, the FAA considered whether to separately assess launch risk 
from reentry risk and, if so, whether a different risk threshold should 
be used for launch as opposed to reentry. This proposal reflects the 
FAA's opinion that a single consistent standard for measuring 
acceptable public risk should be applied, and that it should apply on a 
per mission basis.
    The FAA has met with representatives of the space transportation 
industry in pre-application consultation on RLV proposals and to 
provide licensing guidance. On May 13, 1998, the FAA met with 
representatives of each RLV developer then known to the agency to 
discuss RLV and reentry safety assessment issues and to gather 
information from industry members who have begun to develop commercial 
RLVs and reentry vehicles. A summary of the meeting has been added to 
the docket for this proposal. Information obtained by the FAA indicates 
that a reentry accident may be comparatively less hazardous than a 
launch accident, a risk generally accepted by the public. A reentry 
accident could pose less of a risk than a launch accident because a 
reentry vehicle could carry substantially less propellant, if any, than 
a launch vehicle and could therefore pose less of an explosive or fire 
hazard under some circumstances. If this is so, it also could be 
expected that the Ec for the reentry of a vehicle of a 
particular design would be significantly less than the Ec 
for the launch of that same vehicle over any area of the same 
population density.
    On February 11, 1999, the FAA held a public meeting to discuss 
draft interim safety guidance concerning RLV operations and to gather 
information from industry representatives who are

[[Page 19635]]

developing commercial RLVs. The draft interim safety guidance, issued 
in advance of rulemaking proceedings, was prepared to assist 
prospective reentry license applicants in understanding the nature of 
the agency's public safety concerns when evaluating proposed RLV 
operations. A transcript of comments made at the public meeting have 
been added to the docket inasmuch as they may also address aspects of 
the agency's proposed regulatory approach to regulating safety of RLV 
and reentry operations. Written comments are also placed in the docket.
    In light of this information, the FAA considered whether a single 
Ec risk threshold should be applied to the mission as a 
whole or separately to each segment of the mission (launch and 
reentry). If it is assumed that a vehicle will operate at the absolute 
extreme allowed by the risk threshold, employing separate risk 
thresholds at the level currently tolerated for launch would make the 
total maximum risk exposure for an entire RLV mission nearly equal to 
60  x  10-6 (30  x  10-6 for launch plus 30  x  
10-6 for reentry, assuming independent events). The effect 
of using separate, independently applied standards would be to 
effectively nearly double the acceptable maximum risk exposure imposed 
on the public for an RLV mission in comparison to the public's risk 
from the launch of an expendable launch vehicle launching the same 
payload. (Note that applying separate risk thresholds for launch and 
reentry would result in an increased risk threshold for the mission if 
the aggregate risk allowed (launch Ec + reentry 
Ec) were greater than 30  x  10-6.)
    Next, the FAA considered the appropriate risk threshold to use in 
assessing risk on a per-mission basis if a single Ec value 
is applied to the mission, that is, whether the level of acceptable 
risk should be increased in the interest of technology advancement.
    Currently, the FAA's practice in evaluating the collective risks 
associated with a launch is to ensure that Ec is not greater 
than 30  x  10-6. This value was derived from launch risk 
guidance employed by the U.S. Air Force at Cape Canaveral Air Station 
and Vandenberg Air Force Base to define acceptable risk. ``Eastern and 
Western Range 127-1 Range Safety Requirements,'' Section 1.4 (October 
31, 1995). Since the beginning of the U.S. space program, the public 
has not suffered any serious injuries or fatalities as a result of a 
Government or commercial launch under this standard. Expected risks 
from eventual reentry of ELV stages due to orbital decay is relatively 
small because most are believed to burn up on reentry. While some 
components of the stages have been found to have survived, empirical 
data seems to support this conclusion.
    In fostering the nation's space launch capability, the government 
understands that some risk to public safety shall be endured for the 
national interest and economic well-being of the United States. And, 
the public accepts the very limited risks to which it is exposed, as 
evidenced by population growth in the vicinity of Federal launch sites. 
However, the FAA is reticent to impose greater risk on the public than 
that currently accepted for ELV launches in order to accomplish the 
comparable launch mission of placing payloads on orbit, but at reduced 
costs. Accordingly, the FAA proposes to continue use of the Federal 
range risk standard of Ec  30  x  10-6 
on a per mission basis for RLV and other launch and reentry missions. 
Nevertheless, the FAA acknowledges that there may be circumstances 
under which it would be appropriate to separate launch from reentry 
risk, such as where different operators are involved and may be 
apportioned allowable risk thresholds, or where intervening events or 
time make reentry risks sufficiently independent of launch risks as to 
warrant separate consideration.
2. System Safety Process and Risk Analysis
    As part of the system safety process and risk analysis, an 
applicant would be required to determine the probability and 
consequences of events that may affect public safety. Doing so requires 
population data, vehicle casualty areas, and vehicle failure modes and 
rates. Accurate population data generally are available and casualty 
areas could be estimated using accepted industry practices. However, 
development of vehicle failure rate is more complicated.
    Failure modes and rates for a vehicle are related to the failure 
modes and rates of its major systems, which in turn correlate to the 
failure modes and rates of major subsystems of a vehicle. To obtain a 
conservative risk assessment of a vehicle lacking an adequate flight 
history, an applicant could conduct a risk analysis and assume the 
probability of a catastrophic failure of 1.0. In the alternative, an 
applicant would have to complete a detailed risk analysis. This risk 
analysis would be similar to a traditional systems safety analysis used 
by DOD and NASA; however, it would not focus on mission success per se. 
However, while experience shows that such analyses are helpful, they 
are subject to error because of ``unknowns'' for unproven vehicles. 
Instead, it would focus solely on identifying and evaluating failure 
modes and rates affecting risks to public health and safety and the 
safety of property by conducting an evaluation of vehicle systems and 
proposed operations.
    Because of the variety of RLV and reentry vehicle designs and 
operational concepts, the FAA has not enumerated a specific evaluation 
methodology. Examples of acceptable techniques for determining failure 
conditions include, but are not limited to, the following: Preliminary 
Hazards Analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, Failure Mode Effect 
and Criticality Analysis, Fault Hazard Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, 
Double Failure Matrix, Hazard and Operability Analysis or Operability 
Hazard Analysis, and Fault Tree Analysis Methodology for Hazard 
Assessment. An applicant would use the evaluation methodology most 
appropriate for the system being evaluated. A separate analysis needn't 
be performed for each flight of a launch vehicle. If a previously 
approved mission utilized a risk assessment for a similar mission with 
a substantially similar vehicle, the earlier risk assessment may serve 
as the basis of a comparative analysis for the proposed mission.
    Potential risks identified in the analysis must be mitigated to 
protect public health and safety and the safety of property. The 
process of evaluating and mitigating the potential risk of a vehicle or 
operation would continue until all risks are mitigated to an acceptable 
level. In the aviation industry, typical hazard control and risk 
mitigation includes the following:
     Design integrity and quality, including life limits, to 
ensure intended function and prevent failures;
     Proven reliability of systems so that multiple, 
independent failures are unlikely to occur during the same flight;
     Capability to check a component's condition;
     Failure warning or indication to provide failure 
detection;
     Isolation of systems, components, and elements so the 
failure of one does not cause the failure of another;
     Redundancy or backup systems to enable continued function 
after any failure;
     Design failure effect limits, including the capability to 
sustain damage and to limit the safety impact or effects of a failure;
     Design failure path to control and direct the effects of a 
failure in a way that limits its safety impact;

[[Page 19636]]

     Margins or factors of safety to allow for any undefined or 
unforeseeable adverse conditions;
     Error tolerance that considers adverse effects of 
foreseeable errors during the vehicle's design, test, manufacture, 
operation, and maintenance;
     Computer software verification, validation, documentation, 
configuration management, and quality assurance;
     Personnel qualification and training;
     Contingency planning, including operator procedures after 
failure detection to enable continued safe flight, evacuating personnel 
from high risk areas, and modifying vehicle trajectory to avoid high 
risk areas; and
     Process approval, including an evaluation of risk 
reduction, mitigation strategies, and configuration management.
    The system safety process and associated risk analysis that the FAA 
proposes to require is substantially similar to the engineering 
analysis a vehicle developer would complete to assess the viability and 
the probability of success of an intended operation. Developers would 
also need this information to convince and assure investors of the 
soundness of their investment.
    The FAA is developing guidance material to assist the industry in 
complying with the proposed system safety approach. In discussions, 
industry representatives recommended that the FAA develop an approach 
built around engineering documentation during specific program phases, 
such as design and development, manufacturing, and vehicle operations. 
Others have stated that [an applicant's submission] [the documents] 
should outline the applicant's ``philosophy'' but that the FAA should 
require evidence supporting the documentation. The FAA invites further 
comments and recommendations that would assist in developing an 
acceptable analysis to ensure all factors affecting public health and 
safety and the safety of property are considered and addressed 
specifically.
3. Operational Restrictions on Reusable Launch Vehicle Launch and 
Reentry
    The system safety process, in combination with quantitative risk 
criteria, yields a performance envelope within which an applicant 
demonstrates its ability to operate without excessive risk to public 
safety. But these are analytical processes only and may not reflect 
real world performance even under the best of circumstances.
    As noted above, the risk a vehicle poses to public health and 
safety and the safety of property is a product of two factors: the 
probability of a failure event and the consequences of that failure 
event. If the probability of a failure event is related directly to 
vehicle reliability and that reliability cannot be determined 
accurately, public health and safety and the safety of property can be 
protected only by limiting the consequences of a failure event. 
Therefore, based on the uncertainties involved in the operation of an 
unproven RLV or reentry vehicle and the projected benefits resulting 
from the imposition of operational restrictions on such vehicles (based 
on a current assessment of probable system failures), the FAA proposes 
to impose operational restrictions on a vehicle that has not proven 
system performance and reliability through a flight test program or 
operational use.
    In support of proposed restrictions, the FAA notes that industry 
representatives have stated that, historically, predictions of vehicle 
performance and failure modes have often overlooked key events or 
circumstances. None of the significant failures in the Apollo program 
or other ELV programs were predicted. Also, failure rates for the first 
launch of new launch vehicles are significant. While a quantitative 
risk analysis is an important and necessary tool in the development of 
a vehicle concept, the FAA considers it inappropriate in this proposal 
to allow the flight of an unproven and untested RLV or reentry vehicle 
over populated areas in a manner that can affect public safety based 
solely on the favorable results of a quantitative risk analysis.
    The FAA does not believe an adequate determination of system 
performance and reliability for new flight concepts can be demonstrated 
solely through hazard analyses and ground tests. Accidents or other 
failures often are the result of an unforeseen combination of hardware 
and software failures in combination with external influences, such as 
human error. System design validation and functional performance 
verification could possibly be accomplished in 10 to 20 flights, 
depending on the design unique to each vehicle. However, a relatively 
large number of flights may be needed to demonstrate reliability and to 
understand unanticipated failure modes. Some industry representatives 
have expressed the opinion that one would need to complete 1,000 
flights to accurately determine reliability of a vehicle. At the May 
1998 FAA meeting with RLV industry representatives, industry noted that 
the STS (Space Shuttle) is still in the midst of its test program.
    Moreover, because of the costs and disadvantages of flight testing, 
the FAA expects that many RLV and reentry vehicle operators will 
propose to validate vehicle design through the use of sophisticated 
computer simulations, ground testing, or other detailed analyses. The 
FAA does not object to this anticipated approach but does believe it 
necessary to impose operational restrictions in the interest of public 
safety until vehicle performance is proven.
    Finally, the FAA is not proposing rules applicable to reuse or 
reflight of a particular vehicle. Each flight of a reusable launch 
vehicle would be required to satisfy the safety criteria promulgated by 
the agency in licensing rules, and an applicant's demonstration that it 
has satisfied the criteria would have to account for effects of prior 
flight on vehicle performance.
    For these reasons, the FAA proposes to impose operational 
restrictions that would apply to all RLV launches and reentries, with 
an additional restriction on the flights of unproven vehicles at least 
until sufficient data is obtained about vehicle performance to warrant 
relief from that restriction.
    A. Restricting flight over populated areas. The FAA defines flight 
restrictions applicable to flight of an RLV or reentry of a reentry 
vehicle in terms of its ``dwell time,'' which refers to the measured 
period of time during which an area is exposed to hazards from a 
vehicle's operation, and its instantaneous impact point, or IIP. The 
IIP reflects a projected impact point on the surface of the Earth where 
the vehicle or vehicle debris in the event of failure and break-up 
would land. A vehicle's IIP is not generally the area immediately under 
the vehicle's flight path because the vehicle's momentum and 
atmospheric conditions will cause the vehicle to impact in some other 
location. The projected IIP of a vehicle can be calculated with some 
degree of accuracy if the vehicle's aerodynamic characteristics are 
known. The projected IIP of an RLV during ascent to orbit moves across 
the surface of the Earth until the vehicle attains orbital velocity. 
Once on orbit, a vehicle no longer has an IIP.
    The FAA does not believe it would be appropriate to allow the IIP 
of an unproven RLV or reentry vehicle to pass over populated areas 
unless the risk is very low, even if failure occurs. In other words, if 
the vehicle were to fail and the vehicle or debris from vehicle break-
up were dispersed in the course of vehicle

[[Page 19637]]

flight, the flight path and trajectory must be designed to minimize the 
risk of debris impacting a populated area. The proposed regulation 
therefore limits public risk exposure to an Ec of not 
greater than 30  x  10-6 assuming a failure while the IIP is 
over each populated area.
    Thus, for unproven vehicles, the FAA proposes that during any 
segment of flight, the projected IIP of the vehicle shall not have 
substantial dwell time over a populated area. The applicant may either 
avoid any passage of the vehicle's IIP over populated areas or may 
demonstrate that the Ec criteria of 30  x  
10-6 would be satisfied even if the vehicle were certain to 
fail while its IIP is over a populated area.3 An applicant 
can select the approach to limiting public risk that best suits its 
proposed operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ The proposed restrictions would apply only to those segments 
of flight where the IIP touches the surface of the Earth. Certain 
reentry-readiness operations performed on orbit during the ``reentry 
phase of flight'' do not involve an IIP that touches the surface of 
the Earth and therefore would not be affected by the criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For a proven vehicle, the FAA proposes that a vehicle may not have 
substantial dwell time over densely populated areas but for the time 
being proposes to determine what is ``substantial'' and ``densely'' on 
a case-by-case basis to afford the agency flexibility in evaluating an 
RLV or reentry flight proposal. Substantial dwell time over a populated 
area could result from a stationary or slowly moving IIP that remains 
over a populated area or a rapidly moving IIP that traverses numerous 
populated areas. Typical dwell time for ELV operations ranges from four 
to six seconds of flight but varies depending upon the point in vehicle 
flight during which it occurs. For example, dwell time in the first 
seconds of a launch would not be tolerated because of the risk of 
vehicle failure. Later in flight when a vehicle is nearing orbital 
velocity, some dwell time over populated areas has historically been 
tolerated because the probability of failure and its consequences are 
much reduced. Thus, for any particular RLV flight or reentry proposal, 
the agency would evaluate on an individual basis the public safety 
risks associated with proposed dwell time over populated areas. 
However, in any event, vehicle operations would be assessed against 
Ec criteria, which may not be exceeded.
    The FAA is not prepared to state in a rule of general applicability 
the point at which an RLV transitions from an ``unproven'' state to a 
proven one. The number of flights necessary to determine the point of 
transition will depend on the unique design characteristics of the 
vehicle. The FAA believes that, at a minimum, an operator must validate 
its risk analysis with flight data in order to ``prove'' the 
performance of a vehicle. In this context, the term ``validate'' means 
that the vehicle's flight data show that the vehicle operated in a 
manner substantially similar to that predicted by the operator's risk 
analysis.
    As stated earlier, the number of flights necessary to validate a 
vehicle's risk analysis also would depend on the nature of the 
operations the vehicle would be expected to perform. For example, if an 
operator proposes to operate its vehicle over populated areas and to 
rely on an abort capability to achieve required levels of safety, the 
operator would be required to demonstrate that the vehicle can perform 
the critical abort and recovery maneuvers necessary to fly safely.
    The agency also believes it prudent to gain practical experience in 
observing the stresses of flight on reentry vehicles, particularly 
those intended for reuse, before issuing a pronouncement of the point 
at which a vehicle is ``proven'' for purposes of safety regulation. In 
adopting this stance, the FAA is mindful that the nation's STS, 
commonly referred to as the Space Shuttle, is still undergoing a test 
program under NASA's purview, despite its many flights. Therefore, 
before the FAA would allow an RLV or reentry vehicle to fly over 
densely populated areas, an applicant would need to prove that its 
vehicle maintains structural and aerodynamic integrity throughout its 
proposed flight regime (i.e., flight lifetime), and that the operator 
can maintain command and control of the vehicle during flight.
    That said, the FAA is not specifically mandating adherence to a 
flight test regime to demonstrate vehicle capability. Traditionally, 
flight testing has not been required of ELVs. Because ELVs are 
generally launched over ocean areas and the flight safety systems are 
subject to rigorous design and testing standards such that little 
public risk exposure is involved, there is little to be gained in terms 
of public safety risk mitigation from a requirement to conduct test 
flights of ELVs for the purpose of design validation. Moreover, because 
each flight of an ELV is its first flight, and its only flight, little 
would be learned about the effects of flight stress on reusability of 
the vehicle.
    RLV industry representatives have noted that for vehicles currently 
under development it would be impractical to require thousands of 
flight test hours, and the FAA concurs that a thorough flight test 
program similar to that required of commercial aircraft would stifle 
the emerging industry and pose a number of difficulties. Furthermore, 
by the nature of their operational envelopes, differences between an 
RLV or reentry vehicle test flight and operational flight are less 
distinct than those of an aircraft test flight and operational flight. 
While an aircraft may conduct tests of its full-flight envelope within 
a remote site, conducting full-flight tests of an RLV or reentry 
vehicle would require suborbital and/or orbital flights over 
substantially large areas. Because of the physical range of such 
flights, there would be little distinction between a test and an 
operational flight with its inherent risks. Imposition of a flight test 
requirement also would impose on the industry direct costs to conduct 
the tests and indirect costs through lost revenue, reduced life cycles, 
and vehicle test flight damage that would have to be repaired to ensure 
the vehicle meets regulatory standards for reentry operations. For 
these reasons, the FAA is not proposing requirements for the conduct of 
a flight test program but rather has proposed a regulatory structure 
that would require an applicant to demonstrate that its proposed 
operations meet an acceptable level of risk and conform to certain 
operational requirements. However, an operator may choose to conduct 
flight-testing to ensure its proposed operations meet proposed risk 
mitigation criteria.
    The FAA requests views on appropriate measures of validating new 
vehicle performance and criteria for determining the point at which a 
vehicle may be considered ``proven.''
    B. Monitoring critical systems. The operator of an RLV or reentry 
vehicle must be able to monitor and verify the status of launch and 
reentry safety-critical systems before launch, during launch flight, 
and before reentry flight. The status of a reentry safety-critical 
system before reentry would affect any decision to conduct reentry 
operations. To ensure an operator is aware of the status of the 
vehicle, the FAA proposes to require procedures for monitoring 
performance of on-board, safety critical systems just prior to enabling 
reentry. Monitoring would provide an operator with the status of key 
systems before conducting public safety critical operations and would 
ensure that reentry flight would be initiated only under nominal or 
non-nominal conditions that have been assessed through the system 
safety process and satisfy the risk threshold. Critical information 
would have to be provided perhaps through telemetry to a control

[[Page 19638]]

center or individual with command capacity and decision making 
responsibility. Other information used for system validation, system 
reuse, performance characterization, or post-flight anomaly 
investigation could be recorded for review after flight. This type of 
data may facilitate transition from an unproven to proven vehicle; 
however, the FAA is not mandating real-time monitoring of non-safety 
critical systems.
    C. Positive enabling of fail-safe reentry. To further enhance 
safety, the FAA proposes a fail-safe operational procedure whereby an 
operator must issue a command that enables vehicle reentry unless the 
vehicle is designed to operate suborbitally. In the event reentry 
cannot be enabled, the vehicle would remain in orbit. Totally 
autonomous initiation of reentry would not be allowed to ensure that 
certain clearances and system verifications are completed to assure 
that a reentering vehicle will not pose safety risks to the public. 
These may include clearance of airspace in the reentry corridor, 
securing reentry sites, verifying the configuration and status of 
reentry safety critical systems, and verifying reentry corridor weather 
is within vehicle operational constraints. Such activities would be 
external to the vehicle's systems and autonomous control systems would 
not verify them.
    D. Reentry sites. To minimize public safety risk due to an off-site 
landing, the site selected for reentry of a reentry vehicle or as the 
landing area for an RLV must be sufficiently large such that the 
vehicle will land within it with a certain degree of predictability. 
The agency assesses size suitability of a proposed reentry or landing 
site by using the three-sigma footprint measure commonly applied to 
launch operations. The three-sigma footprint describes the area where 
the vehicle will land with a .997 probability rate, assuming no major 
system failure.
    The statistical term ``three-sigma'' refers to three standard 
deviations from the mean, or average point, assuming a standard normal 
distribution. The area that is within three standard deviations from 
the mean point encompasses the area surrounding it with the mean at its 
center. An area within two or even one standard deviation of the mean 
point is a smaller, more precise measure; however, statistically there 
is less chance of an event falling within that range. The larger the 
area, the higher degree of confidence one has of an event falling 
within its boundary limits, assuming a normal distribution of events.
    For example, if the reentry site were an area on a target, the mid-
point or center point is the mean and the small area around it is the 
bulls-eye. The bulls-eye represents one standard deviation from the 
mean or center point. The first contour area is two standard deviations 
from the mean point and the second contour area is three standard 
deviations from that point. Assuming a normal distribution, the three-
sigma area, or the area within two contours of the bulls-eye, 
represents the area in which an archer's arrow would strike with a 
three-sigma probability.
    However, the size of the area must be adjusted for different 
conditions or variables, such as distance from the target, wind, or 
aerodynamic qualities of different kinds of arrows. If one's ability to 
meet the three-sigma probability distribution depends on the existence 
of certain conditions, then those conditions become requirements.
    From a regulatory standpoint, an applicant would be required to 
demonstrate that a proposed reentry or controlled landing site is large 
enough to contain the landing impacts of its vehicle with a three-sigma 
probability, assuming a nominal reentry, and the conditions or 
assumptions on which the demonstration is predicated would become 
conditions of the license.
    The size of the area must be large enough to accommodate potential 
trajectory deviations that may occur. Therefore, in determining the 
necessary size of the three-sigma area, an applicant should calculate 
the errors associated with physical forces that act on the vehicle to 
cause its flight path to deviate from the planned trajectory, if 
reentry is intended to occur despite those errors.
    Maneuverability of a vehicle is likely to affect the three-sigma 
area. For example, the three-sigma area for an airplane may be a narrow 
ellipse because the pilot can stand otherwise control the vehicle's 
descent such that it touches down within a narrow band. An uncontrolled 
or ballistic vehicle, such as the COMET/METEOR reentry vehicle, 
required a large three-sigma area because of imprecise orientation of 
the vehicle at the point at which reentry was initiated and the varying 
effects of atmospheric forces on the vehicle.
    In any case, a designated reentry site, including any designated 
contingency abort location, would have to be large enough to ensure the 
probability of landing outside the designated area is not greater than 
.997 for nominal vehicle operations.

Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission and Other Reentry Licenses

    For the near term, the FAA envisions that the majority of reentry 
activities subject to FAA licensing jurisdiction would involve reusable 
launch vehicle technology, as opposed to the COMET/METEOR type of 
reentry vehicle. The latter was intended for launch as a payload by an 
expendable launch vehicle, would enter its designated orbit and 
ultimately perform an unguided ballistic reentry to a designated 
reentry site about 30 days later. In the case of such reentries, the 
same risk criteria would apply to launch and reentry of the reentry 
vehicle as would apply to any other RLV mission, under the FAA's 
proposal. However, other regulatory requirements to assure public 
safety, such as operational restrictions, would be directed exclusively 
to RLV missions. Other safety requirements may only be appropriate for 
reentry vehicles resembling the COMET/METEOR vehicle system. Therefore, 
to make the requirements ``user friendly,'' the FAA proposes to address 
RLV mission licensing requirements in a separate part of the licensing 
regulations so that RLV operators can see, at a glance, the commercial 
space transportation regulations applicable to their operations. A 
separate part is proposed to address unique safety requirements 
applicable to licensing other types of reentries, that is, those that 
don't involve RLVs, even though policy, payload reentry, and 
environmental review requirements would be comparable to those applied 
to RLV missions.

1. Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Licensing Overview

    Before granting an applicant a safety approval, the FAA would 
review the appropriateness for a particular launch activity of the 
following items: the location, size, and design configuration of the 
proposed launch site; launch operational procedures; personnel 
qualifications; range safety equipment and instrumentation; vehicle 
safety systems; and the applicant's flight safety analysis.
    An RLV launch operator would be required to possess the ability to 
monitor the status of launch and reentry safety critical systems during 
countdown to launch. The FAA also proposes that an operator have the 
ability to activate the vehicle's flight safety system (FSS), if any, 
or to invoke contingency plans if the vehicle is not operating within 
approved mission parameters and poses an unreasonable risk to public 
health and safety. This

[[Page 19639]]

requirement does not mean that an FSS cannot also function 
automatically or autonomously. Such systems are desirable where, for 
example, a human monitor may not be able to react in sufficient time to 
achieve a safe condition.
    The term FSS encompasses a variety of devices designed to place a 
vehicle in a mode less hazardous to public health and safety and safety 
of property. A type of FSS commonly used on ELVs is a destructive-type 
FTS, which is used to terminate flight and destroy the vehicle. 
However, many reentry vehicles and RLVs do not propose to rely on a 
destructive-type FTS as a primary mechanism for protecting public 
safety because the vehicle may be capable of attempting a 
nondestructive abort. The proposal would not mandate any particular 
type of FSS. An applicant for a launch license would be permitted to 
use any type of FSS necessary to ensure public safety during the 
applicant's proposed operation of the vehicle. Mission rules derived 
from the applicant's risk analysis, among other things, would dictate 
whether and when to activate the FSS.
    Members of the RLV industry have agreed generally that some type of 
FSS would be necessary to meet the risk limitations imposed on launch 
vehicles by Federal ranges. Many believe that a reentry vehicle or RLV 
operator that proposed to operate without an FSS would have to improve 
overall vehicle reliability and performance to meet those risk 
limitations. Others have also asserted that some type of human 
intervention capability would be necessary before a vehicle could be 
allowed to operate within controlled airspace.
    An RLV may have the capability to abort launch flight to a pre-
planned and approved location. Other vehicles would require emergency 
planning so that in the event of a failure or anomaly, they can be 
directed to an unpopulated area or attempt a safe landing. Therefore, 
an operator without abort capability would be required to plan a flight 
path that allows for safe flight abort on an emergency basis before the 
vehicle reaches orbit.
    Once an RLV achieves orbit, the FAA was concerned that if the 
vehicle could not reenter or must abort during reentry, an operator 
would have to be able to incapacitate the vehicle so it would not 
substantially survive reentry. Agency concern was based on the view 
that, unlike an expendable launch vehicle, a reentry vehicle is 
designed to survive reentry intact. However, industry representatives 
have noted that reentry vehicles are designed to survive reentry under 
very specific reentry parameters. An operator must undertake 
significant effort to achieve a successful reentry. Industry has 
compared successful reentry to ``flying the vehicle through a key 
hole.'' Because an uncontrolled RLV or reentry vehicle may be unlikely 
to survive reentry, the FAA does not propose a requirement that an 
operator would have to be able to incapacitate the vehicle so that it 
would not survive a random return to Earth. However, the applicant must 
demonstrate that a random reentry will not exceed acceptable risk for 
the mission.
    The FAA is proposing a quantitative risk measure in evaluating RLV 
mission safety because it forces a vehicle designer to consider failure 
rates, consequences, and mitigation of unacceptable risks. Acceptable 
flight risk would be limited to the standard applied for launches from 
Federal launch ranges, that is, that the Ec is not greater 
than 30  x  10-6, a collective measure of risk, on a per-
mission basis. Issues related to risk limitation and risk analysis are 
discussed above in relation to RLV launch and reentry. An applicant 
proposing to conduct an RLV mission would also be subject to 
operational requirements and restrictions because the FAA believes them 
necessary to limit risk to public safety as the industry conducts 
operational flights of innovative vehicle concepts.
    The proposal would identify the two types of RLV mission licenses 
issued--a mission-specific license and an operator license. The 
mission-specific license would authorize an operator to conduct one or 
more RLV missions from a designated launch site to a designated reentry 
site, using essentially the same type or model of RLV such that it has 
substantially similar design, performance, and operational 
characteristics. Because more than one flight may be authorized, the 
license would be sufficiently broad to allow an operator to conduct a 
series of RLV test flights within identified parameters. The license 
would terminate automatically with the completion of all authorized 
activity or the expiration date of the license, whichever first occurs.
    The proposed operator license would authorize an operator to 
conduct RLV missions using any of a designated family of vehicles from 
any launch site specified in the license to any reentry site specified 
in the license. A family of RLVs has similar design and operational 
characteristics, but each member of the family may be capable of 
different performance characteristics. The term of the operator license 
would be set at a 2-year renewable period.
    The FAA expects it will first issue a new operator a mission-
specific license to conduct RLV missions. Mission-specific licenses can 
be structured so as to accommodate a proposed test program that may 
consist of a series of test flights within an envelope of approved 
parameters. After the operator has demonstrated several successful 
reentries, it may apply to the FAA for an operator license. The FAA has 
used a similar licensing approach successfully for new launch operators 
and operation of new vehicles.
    To receive an RLV license, an applicant would be required to obtain 
policy and safety approvals and complete a payload reentry 
determination and environmental review, if applicable. Procedural 
regulations governing the policy approval, payload reentry 
determination, and environmental review generally would be consistent 
with the corresponding regulations under part 415, Launch License.
    To complete a safety review and receive approval for an RLV 
mission, an applicant would need an acceptable safety organization; 
mission rules, procedures, and contingency plans; a communications 
plan; and a mishap investigation and emergency response plan. In 
addition, the proposed operation could not pose an unacceptable risk to 
public safety as demonstrated through a risk analysis designed to 
ensure compliance with regulations to mitigate risk and protect public 
health and safety and the safety of property.

2. Reentry Licensing Overview

    A separate part would prescribe reentry licensing and post-
licensing requirements and would be modeled after the RLV mission 
license regulations. Unique attributes of reentry vehicles that are not 
RLVs would be assessed by the FAA on an individual basis as part of the 
safety approval process. The same risk criteria covering launch and 
reentry and the system safety process approach would apply to an 
applicant for a license to reenter a reentry vehicle. Operational 
requirements and restrictions would result from the applicant's system 
safety program plan, which would define the safe operating limits and 
procedures for reentry vehicle operations. Requirements applicable to 
launch of a reentry vehicle would depend on the type of vehicle used to 
place the reentry vehicle in orbit or otherwise in outer space. For 
example, an expendable launch vehicle (ELV) launched from a Federal 
range would be subject to the

[[Page 19640]]

licensing requirements contained in part 415 of this subchapter.
    The FAA is proposing a mission approach to reentry licensing by 
assessing the combined risk of launch of a reentry vehicle with its 
reentry to determine that a reentry may be licensed. The agency 
considers that no less stringent safety criteria should be imposed upon 
a reentry because it occurs as a separate event, either by time or 
function, from the launch that placed it in Earth orbit or outer space. 
However, the FAA understands that reentry vehicles resembling the 
COMET/METEOR vehicle may remain in space for extended periods and may 
be operated under the responsibility of an operator different from that 
which launched the vehicle initially. To address these considerations, 
the FAA considered whether to apply a COMET/METEOR type of risk 
criteria to reentry, leaving launch risk as it currently is stated. The 
COMET risk criteria that there shall be no greater than one in a 
million probability of a casualty, when combined with acceptable launch 
risk, actually imposes a more stringent criteria on reentry than a 
combined collective risk measure of Ec  30  x  
10-6. The FAA wishes to utilize an appropriate measure of 
risk for reentry capability and requests comments on its proposed 
approach of applying mission risk.

Section-By-Section Analysis

    FAA regulatory and licensing responsibilities have been extended by 
statute to include reentry, as well as launch. It is therefore 
necessary to add the term ``reentry'' or ``operation of a reentry 
site'' to agency procedures and enforcement provisions, as follows.

Section 400.2  Scope

    Section 400.2 sets forth the scope of regulations presented in 14 
CFR Chapter III. The scope would be revised to refer generally to 
commercial space transportation activities subject to 49 U.S.C. 
Subtitle IX, chapter 701. The FAA proposes to generalize the scope of 
the regulations rather than to add specific reference to reentry 
licensing and other authority under the statute.

Section 401.5  Definitions

    New terms are added to the list of definitions. They are: 
``contingency abort,'' ``emergency abort,'' ``flight safety system,'' 
``operation of a reentry site,'' ``reenter,'' ``reentry accident,'' 
``reentry incident,'' ``reentry operator,'' ``reentry site,'' ``reentry 
vehicle,'' ``reusable launch vehicle,'' ``safety-critical,'' and 
``vehicle safety operations personnel.'' A reusable launch vehicle 
would be a reentry vehicle when it is designed to return from Earth 
orbit or outer space to Earth substantially intact.
    The term ``reentry accident'' refers to unplanned events resulting 
in certain consequences listed in the definition. Accordingly, reentry 
to a pre-planned abort location would not qualify as a reentry accident 
unless it resulted in a casualty to an uninvolved person or damage to 
unassociated, off-site property.
    The term ``mishap'' would be revised to include reentry events.

Section 404.1  Scope

    Section 404.1 sets forth the scope of the agency's procedures for 
issuing implementing regulations. Rather than referring to specific 
licensing authority of the agency under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, chapter 
701, Sec. 404.1 would be revised to refer to commercial space 
transportation activities falling within the agency's statutory 
authority.

Section 404.3  Filing of Petitions to the Associate Administrator

    Section 404.3 would be revised to include rulemaking petitions 
regarding reentry and operation of a reentry site.

Section 405.1  Monitoring of Licensed and Other Activities

    Reentry sites and reentry vehicle manufacturing, testing, assembly, 
and production facilities would be subject to FAA monitoring and 
observation and Sec. 405.1 would be revised accordingly.

Section 405.5  Emergency Orders

    The agency's authority to terminate, prohibit or suspend a licensed 
activity extend to reentry and operation of a reentry site. Section 
405.5 would be revised accordingly.

Section 406.1  Hearings

    Rights to a hearing extend to an owner or operator of a reentry 
payload, as well as a licensee, and section 406.1 is revised 
accordingly.

Section 413.1  Scope

    The procedures contained in part 413 of 14 CFR Chapter III would 
apply to an application for a license to reenter a reentry vehicle or 
to operate a reentry site. Reference to reentry licensing requirements 
is added to section 413.1 in this proposal.

Section 413.3  Who Must Obtain a License

    The proposal would revise paragraph (a) to require any person to 
obtain a reentry license to reenter a reentry vehicle in the United 
States or to operate a reentry site within the United States.
    Under the proposal, paragraph (b) would be revised to require an 
individual who is a U.S. citizen or an entity organized under the laws 
of the United States or any State to obtain a reentry license to 
reenter a reentry vehicle outside the United States or to operate a 
reentry site outside the United States.
    Proposed paragraph (d) would be added. That paragraph would require 
a foreign entity in which a U.S. citizen has a controlling interest to 
obtain a reentry license or, if the activity is occurring in certain 
locations and subject to certain conditions. The geographic constraints 
and conditions in the proposal would be identical to those imposed on 
licensed launch activities and launch site operators in current 
paragraph (c) of this section.

Section 415.1  Scope

    Part 415 contains the approvals necessary to obtain a license to 
launch a launch vehicle from a Federal or non-Federal launch site. The 
FAA proposes to limit the scope of part 415 to vehicles other than 
reusable launch vehicles (RLV) and to place licensing requirements for 
the conduct of RLV missions in a separate part of the regulations. 
Launch and reentry flight phases of a proposed RLV mission would be 
evaluated under a single set of risk criteria applicable to the 
mission. Placing RLV mission requirements in a separate part, part 431, 
should facilitate understanding of the licensing requirements 
applicable to RLV operations.

Part 431  Launch and Reentry of a Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV)

    The proposal would create a new part 431 that prescribes licensing 
requirements for the conduct of missions involving reusable launch 
vehicles. Part 431 would include subpart A (General), subpart B (Policy 
Review and Approval), subpart C (Safety Review and Approval for RLV 
Missions), subpart D (Payload Reentry Review and Determination), 
subpart E (Post-Licensing Requirements--RLV Mission License Terms and 
Conditions), and subpart F (Environmental Review). Part 431 is 
organized in the same manner as part 415 ``Launch License'' and has 
been modified to address regulatory concerns applicable to RLV 
operations. Because safety aspects of an RLV mission would be evaluated 
on a per mission basis, commencing upon initiation of vehicle flight, 
proceeding through orbital insertion and concluding with the vehicle's 
landing on Earth, comprehensive requirements applicable to all licensed 
flight phases

[[Page 19641]]

of an RLV mission are included in this part. Specific mention is made 
in part 431 where requirements of other parts of the commercial space 
transportation regulations are applicable.

Section 431.1  Scope

    Proposed Sec. 431.1 would establish the applicability of part 431. 
The proposed part would prescribe the requirements for obtaining an RLV 
mission license and any continuing requirements to remain licensed.

Section 431.3  Types of Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Licenses

    The proposed section would identify the two types of RLV mission 
licenses that would be issued and set forth the privileges and 
limitations of the licenses. Under the proposal the FAA would issue 
either a mission-specific license or operator license, on bases 
comparable to that used for issuing launch licenses. A licensed RLV 
mission includes launch or ascent, and reentry or descent, 
authorization. Both authorizations are necessary to conduct an RLV 
mission; however, they would be embodied in a single license. The term 
``mission'' is used to characterize both ascent and descent flight 
phases of an RLV operation but should not be confused with mission-
specific authorization.
    A mission-specific license need not be limited to a single RLV 
mission. The license would identify the specific RLV missions to which 
it applies and may authorize a proposed flight test program within an 
envelope of approved parameters. An expiration date would be stated in 
the license so that it is not unlimited as to time.
    An operator license would provide broader authority to the licensee 
and, as with launch licenses, would be issued to operators that have 
demonstrated capability to conduct safe operations on an ongoing basis. 
The FAA is proposing an initial two-year license term so that it can 
routinely reevaluate licensee qualifications. Operator licenses issued 
under part 415 were initially authorized for a two-year term and have 
recently been extended to a five-year term. The FAA considers two years 
a reasonable duration at the outset of RLV operations.

Section 431.5  Policy and Safety Approvals

    Under the proposal, a license applicant would be required to obtain 
policy and safety approvals from the FAA. Requirements for obtaining 
these approvals are contained in subparts B and C of this part.

Section 431.7  Payload and Payload Reentry Determinations

    For purposes of launching a payload into earth orbit or outer space 
there should be no unique issues presented by the fact that an RLV is 
the transportation vehicle that places the payload in space. 
Accordingly, proposed paragraph (a) of this section states that the FAA 
would require an applicant to obtain a payload determination in 
accordance with part 415 requirements unless the proposed payload were 
exempt from payload review. Payload reentry issues may be different, 
however, and the FAA would require a separate payload reentry 
determination, as indicated in paragraph (b), for purposes of returning 
a payload to Earth unless it is exempt from FAA review. Payloads exempt 
from FAA review include U.S. Government payloads. Payloads subject to 
reentry review by another Government agency would not be subject to 
duplicative review by the FAA. For a payload that would be 
substantially similar to a previously approved payload, the previously 
issued payload reentry determination could serve as the basis for a 
comparative analysis. Proposed paragraph (c) would allow a previous 
payload reentry determination to be used to meet the requirements of 
proposed paragraph (b). Proposed paragraph (d) identifies the payload 
review procedures applicable to reentering a payload. A payload review 
determination may be requested of the agency in advance of or 
separately from an RLV mission (or other reentry) license.

Section 431.9  Issuance of a Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission License

    The proposal states that the FAA would issue a license to an 
applicant who has obtained all approvals and determinations required 
under this chapter for an RLV mission license, including a policy and 
safety approval and payload reentry determination, if necessary. 
Although the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 
et seq.) requires the FAA to perform an environmental review of major 
Federal actions, such as issuing an RLV mission license, specific 
environmental requirements would not be set forth in this section, but 
rather in proposed subpart F of this part.
    The proposed section also would require a licensee to conduct its 
operations in accordance with the representations in its application 
and terms and conditions in license orders accompanying the RLV mission 
license, including financial responsibility requirements for launch and 
reentry activities.

Section 431.11  Additional License Terms and Conditions

    Under the proposal, the FAA could amend an RLV mission license by 
modifying or adding license terms and conditions to ensure compliance 
with 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, chapter 701, and applicable regulations. 
Although standard terms and conditions that apply to most RLV mission 
licenses are proposed in subpart E, the unique circumstances of a 
particular licensee may require the FAA to impose additional 
requirements to protect public health and safety, safety of property, 
or U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, or to ensure 
compliance with international obligations of the United States.

Section 431.13  Transfer of a Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission License

    Under proposed Sec. 431.13, only the FAA would be able to transfer 
an RLV mission license. The prospective transferee would need to 
satisfy all requirements for obtaining a license as specified in this 
chapter. The FAA would amend the license to reflect any changes 
necessary as a result of license transfer.

Section 431.15  Rights Not Conferred by a Reusable Launch Vehicle 
Mission License

    Proposed Sec. 431.15  would state that an RLV mission license would 
not relieve a licensee of its obligation to comply with applicable 
laws.

Subpart B--Policy Review and Approval for Launch and Reentry of a 
Reusable Launch Vehicle

    This subpart would describe the proposed requirements for a policy 
review. An applicant could choose to submit an application for a policy 
review with a comprehensive license application or separately in 
advance of submitting the complete application.

Section 431.21  General

    Under the proposal, the FAA would issue a policy approval to an RLV 
mission license applicant upon completion of a favorable policy review; 
it would be part of the licensing record.

Section 431.23  Policy Review

    Proposed Sec. 431.23 states that the FAA would coordinate the 
policy review with other Government agencies, including the Department 
of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), Department of Commerce 
(DOC), NASA, and Federal Communications

[[Page 19642]]

Commission (FCC). Under the policy review, the FAA would determine 
whether conduct of an RLV mission, inclusive of launch and reentry 
flight, would adversely affect U.S. national security or foreign policy 
interests, jeopardize public health and safety or the safety of 
property, or be inconsistent with international obligations of the 
United States. In determining whether the mission would jeopardize 
public health and safety or the safety of property under the policy 
review, the FAA would consider safety issues from a policy perspective 
rather than an engineering perspective.

Section 431.25  Application Requirements for Policy Review

    The proposed section would describe the information an applicant 
would be required to provide to obtain a policy review. The FAA would 
require this information to effectively begin consultation with other 
Government agencies regarding resolution of any potential policy 
issues. Proposed paragraphs (a) and (b) would require a basic 
identification of the vehicle and its systems. Foreign ownership 
information would be required to be identified in proposed paragraph 
(c).
    Under proposed Sec. 431.25(d), an applicant would be required to 
provide the range of proposed launch and reentry profiles, including 
reentry sites and any planned contingency abort locations. An applicant 
must also provide the sequence of planned events or maneuvers during an 
RLV mission. Although these vary by vehicle and mission, the FAA would 
expect to be informed of events such as engine burn time; stage 
separation events; pitch, yaw, and roll maneuvers; and engine cutoff. 
This information could be provided in the form of text, diagrams, or 
charts.
    For orbital RLVs, proposed Sec. 431.25(e) would require information 
concerning intermediate and final orbits intended for the vehicle and 
its upper stages, if any, and their estimated orbital lifetimes.

Section 431.27  Denial of Policy Approval

    Under the proposal, the FAA would notify an applicant in writing if 
a policy approval is denied. The notice would state the reasons for 
denial and allow an applicant to respond and request reconsideration. 
An applicant could correct the deficiencies identified in the denial 
and request reconsideration of the denial. Alternatively, an applicant 
could request a hearing upon denial of a license.

Subpart C--Safety Review and Approval for Launch and Reentry of a 
Reusable Launch Vehicle

    Subpart C would describe the FAA's safety evaluation process for 
reentry license applicants.

Section 431.31  General

    The proposal states that the FAA would conduct a safety review to 
determine whether an applicant is capable of launching and reentering, 
or otherwise landing, a reentry vehicle and payload, if any, from and 
to a designated site without jeopardizing public health and safety and 
the safety of property. The launch site may be different from the 
reentry landing site, but both must be approved by the FAA in the 
context of evaluating safety issues presented by a particular RLV 
mission. The safety review would be conducted from an engineering 
perspective to ensure that all aspects of the proposed RLV mission 
would be sufficient to support safe operations. The safety review is 
necessarily tailored to the unique attributes and capabilities of a 
vehicle and is conducted on an individual basis.
    Under the proposal, the FAA would notify an applicant in writing of 
any issues that might prevent issuance of a safety approval. The notice 
would state the reasons for lack of safety approval and allow an 
applicant to respond and correct the deficiencies identified.

Section 431.33  Safety Organization

    The FAA concurs with National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
reports and the Rodgers Commission report that indicate an independent 
safety organization is key to ensuring safe transportation operations. 
The proposal, therefore, would require an RLV mission license applicant 
to possess a safety organization. The FAA would evaluate an applicant's 
safety organization to determine whether the structure, lines of 
communication, and approval authority an applicant establishes would 
enable the applicant to identify and address safety issues and to 
ensure an applicant conducts operations in accordance with its license 
and the proposed regulations.
    The experience gained by the FAA in regulating aviation and launch 
operations has shown that an independent safety official with direct 
access to the person responsible for an applicant's licensed activities 
can positively influence safety. Therefore, the FAA also proposes that 
the safety official report directly to the person responsible for the 
conduct of licensed activity to ensure that management adequately 
considers public safety concerns before initiating either flight phase 
of the mission. The safety official may be dual-hatted in that he or 
she may perform functions other than safety-related or mission-driven 
operations for the applicant as long as there is no ``conflict of 
interest'' with safety responsibilities.
    The safety official would evaluate an applicant's readiness to 
safely conduct an RLV mission by conducting operational dress 
rehearsals and completing a readiness determination. Rehearsals would 
allow an operator to verify that vehicle safety operations personnel 
are ready for launch and reentry and can manage non-nominal events, 
especially if a considerable period of time has elapsed since the 
operator's most recent conduct of a mission. A review typically would 
be conducted before launch and, for orbital RLVs, would address reentry 
readiness as well. However, before initiating reentry, an operator 
would be required to conform with mission rules designed to ensure safe 
reentry and verify the status of safety critical systems. The reviews 
would ensure all system and personnel readiness problems are identified 
and resolved, all systems needed for safe conduct of the mission are 
checked and ready, and each participant is cognizant of his or her role 
in the operation. While a rehearsal may not be necessary in every case, 
it is critical in certain situations, such as operations with a new 
vehicle, reentering to a new site, or after significant personnel 
changes.
    This proposal also would impose an affirmative obligation on the 
person responsible for licensed activity to address any hazards and 
risks to public safety identified by the safety official. Such action 
would help ensure that RLV mission operations satisfy the proposed 
expected casualty criteria. The FAA believes that management attitude 
influences an organization's safety compliance; therefore, the proposed 
regulations would impose a safety obligation on the person responsible 
for licensed activity to address identified hazards.
    Proposed Sec. 431.33(a) would require an applicant to maintain and 
define its safety organization by identifying lines of communication 
and approval authority. A number of different individuals typically 
have input and decision authority with respect to the readiness of 
various vehicle and safety systems. FAA and NTSB investigations have 
shown that mishaps could result if the role of each critical individual 
in the organization is not defined clearly and understood by all 
parties. Therefore, the

[[Page 19643]]

applicant would have to identify these relationships by clearly 
establishing and identifying the lines of communication and approval 
authority for all mission decisions. An applicant would have to clearly 
identify persons with authority to make ``hold'' and ``go/no-go'' 
decisions and to authorize the resumption of the countdown or a recycle 
procedure, for both launch and reentry flight phases. The FAA 
recommends using organizational charts as an efficient method of 
depicting an applicant's organization, lines of communication, and 
other required information.
    Proposed Sec. 431.33(b) would require an applicant to designate a 
person responsible for the conduct of all licensed RLV mission 
activities.
    Proposed Sec. 431.33(c) would require an applicant to identify a 
qualified safety official to ensure compliance with the applicant's 
safety policies and procedures. The person assigned to the position of 
safety official would have the management and technical education, 
training, and experience to ensure the highest degree of safety in the 
applicant's operations. The safety official must be identified by title 
or position and by name and qualifications. Before mission operations 
begin, and before initiation of RLV reentry or descent, the person 
responsible for an applicant's licensed activities must address all 
hazards and risks to public safety identified by the safety official.
    The safety official would be responsible for evaluating an 
applicant's readiness to safely conduct an RLV mission by monitoring 
compliance with the applicant's safety policies and procedures, 
completing a readiness determination, and conducting operational dress 
rehearsals. Rehearsals would have to simulate both nominal and non-
nominal conditions, under the mission readiness requirements listed in 
proposed Sec. 431.37, including vehicle and range safety system 
failures.

Section 431.35  Acceptable Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Risk

    Under the proposal, paragraph (a) would establish the limits on the 
risk the FAA would allow for an RLV mission. The FAA proposes to assess 
risk on a per mission basis, commencing with initiation of vehicle 
flight through authorized landing on Earth. Application of risk 
criteria on a per mission basis means that risks presented by launch of 
a reentry vehicle and its subsequent reentry or other return to Earth 
are assessed in a cumulative manner. The expected average number of 
casualties from a proposed RLV mission could not exceed .00003 
(30x10-6) and casualties for any launch and reentry mission 
and .000001 (1x(10-6) casualties for persons in the areas 
adjacent to the reentry site. Risk criteria are presented in proposed 
Sec. 431.35(b). The term ``public'' would include all members of the 
general public but would not include the launch operator, reentry 
operator, and site personnel. Satisfaction of acceptable risk criteria 
under this part includes consideration of the size and configuration of 
planned landing sites, including contingency abort locations, and the 
surrounding area.
    The FAA would establish these risk limitations as a standard for 
all licensed RLV mission activities. An applicant proposing a mission 
that does not meet the FAA's risk criteria could request a waiver from 
requirements (or any requirement) under 14 CFR Sec. 404.3, by 
demonstrating that granting the waiver would be in the public interest.
    Proposed paragraph (c) would require an applicant to submit an 
analysis that assesses public safety risk for the proposed activity 
under nominal and non-nominal conditions. The analysis would need to 
demonstrate that the applicant's proposed activity would not expose the 
general public to an unreasonable level of risk at any time during 
vehicle flight, as defined in proposed Sec. 431.35(b), and would not 
expose the general public within a 100-mile area surrounding the 
reentry site to unreasonable risk, as defined in proposed paragraph 
(b). Based on the agency's experience in evaluating the COMET/METEOR 
vehicle system, the FAA believes that it is prudent to ensure that 
population located within a reasonable area of the intended landing 
site is not exposed to greater than normal background risk as a result 
of a licensed reentry. The one hundred mile area surrounding the 
proposed reentry site was utilized in COMET/METEOR because it limits 
public risk exposure in the event of a minor system failure during 
reentry causing a somewhat off-site, but not random, landing.
    If an applicant previously has submitted a risk assessment for a 
similar reentry, the applicant may not need to submit an additional 
analysis. An analysis that compares the parameters and assumptions of 
previously approved and proposed activities, after review by the FAA, 
may be deemed sufficient.
    Proposed paragraph (c) would require an applicant to employ a 
system safety process that identifies and assesses risks to public 
health, safety and property associated with a nominal and non-nominal 
mission. The FAA will issue advisory guidance on acceptability of a 
system safety process under this requirement. At a minimum, it must 
identify and assess the probability and consequences of reasonably 
foreseeable hazardous events and safety critical system failures during 
a mission including consequences of a random reentry that could 
jeopardize public safety.
    Proposed paragraph (d) would specify the data that must be provided 
by an applicant as part of the demonstration of acceptable risk under 
this subpart. Included are drawings and schematics for each safety 
critical system, a timeline identifying all safety critical events and 
empirical data to substantiate the risk analysis required by this 
section.

Section 431.37  Mission Readiness

    Under proposed Sec. 431.37, an applicant must include procedures 
for verifying mission readiness for both launch and reentry operations 
as part of its application. The procedures must enable the person 
designated and responsible for the conduct of licensed operations to 
make a judgment of mission readiness before initiating the mission, 
including launch and reentry site, equipment, vehicle, payload, 
personnel, and safety-critical system readiness. Mission rules, 
constraints and contingency or abort plans and procedures must be in a 
state of readiness as well by ensuring that they are contained in an 
approved form and coordinated with launch and reentry site operators. 
Launch and reentry readiness procedures must include dress rehearsal 
procedures covering nominal and non-nominal situations and provide 
bases for doing away with dress rehearsals under certain circumstances. 
Launch and reentry readiness procedures must also cover crew rest 
requirements and verification.

Section 431.39  Mission Rules, Procedures, Contingency Plans, and 
Checklists

    To ensure a licensee's procedures would be conducted as planned, 
the FAA proposes that an applicant submit as part of its application 
written mission rules, procedures, emergency plans, and contingency 
abort plans, if applicable, and that vehicle safety operations 
personnel have current and consistent mission checklists. 
Inconsistencies in critical countdown checklists and procedures can 
jeopardize public safety. While all mission participants may not have 
identical checklists, an applicant would need some means, such as a 
master checklist manual, to ensure participants have current and 
consistent

[[Page 19644]]

procedures. This process would ensure that flight safety critical 
procedures are completed successfully.
    Proposed paragraph (a) would require that an applicant possess 
adequate mission rules, procedures, contingency plans, and checklists 
to execute safe nominal and non-nominal operations throughout the 
mission. Proposed paragraph (b) would require that mission rules, 
procedures, contingency plans, and checklists be contained in a safety 
directive, notebook, or other compilation approved by the safety 
official designated under Sec. 431.33(c) of this part and concurred in 
by the reentry site operator, if applicable. Under proposed paragraph 
(c), operations personnel would need current and consistent reentry 
checklists.

Section 431.41  Communications Plan

    An applicant also would be required to submit a communications plan 
that describes personnel communications procedures during the mission. 
This requirement would be substantially similar to the current 
requirement for a launch license applicant to submit a communications 
plan describing communications procedures during launch, but the 
procedures would be required to apply throughout the mission. The NTSB 
has concluded that effective communications are critical to the conduct 
of a safe launch, and the FAA believes the same rationale applies to 
RLV and reentry operations.
    Personnel would be required to follow communication procedures and 
proper protocol to help eliminate confusion and cross talk that could 
cause a miscommunication leading to an unsafe condition. Personnel with 
decision-making authority over launch and reentry would be available on 
the same predetermined channel during launch countdown and reentry 
countdown, if any. Safety-critical communications would have to be 
recorded and would include hold/resume, go/no go, and emergency and 
contingency abort commands, and any other irrevocable decisions that 
could affect public safety or the safety of property.

Section 431.43  Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Operational 
Requirements and Restrictions

    Under proposed Sec. 431.43, the FAA would establish operational 
requirements and impose restrictions on RLV missions. Operational 
requirements would be implemented through procedures developed by an 
applicant to ensure that RLV mission risks are contained within 
acceptable levels. In keeping with the preference for performance-
based, rather than design, standards the FAA is not dictating the 
content of procedures. An applicant would be afforded flexibility in 
developing procedures specific to its vehicle and mission profile that 
accomplish certain objectives. Procedures would need to cover such 
safety requirements as ensuring that mission risks do not exceed stated 
risk criteria for nominal and non-nominal operations, ensuring RLV 
operations conform with operator procedures derived through the system 
safety process described in proposed Sec. 431.35(c), monitoring and 
verifying the status of safety critical systems during mission 
operations, and activating a flight safety system during the launch 
flight phase to safely terminate flight in the event the vehicle is not 
operating within approved limits. The FAA believes that sole reliance 
by an operator on an autonomous system to abort launch flight is not 
sufficient to ensure public safety and that, as is the case for nearly 
all expendable launch vehicles, human control capability is critical to 
safety.
    A reentry site proposed for use in conducting an RLV mission would 
have to be of sufficient size to accommodate the three-sigma landing 
dispersion and other landing impacts associated with the reentry 
vehicle or vehicle stage. The three-sigma footprint requirement for 
determining site suitability would apply to any reentry site 
contemplated as part of the mission, that is, the nominal targeted site 
as well as any contingency abort location identified in order to 
satisfy acceptable risk criteria during launch of an RLV. A broad ocean 
area may be a contingency abort location because it would satisfy 
requirements for site suitability. An applicant for RLV mission safety 
approval would be required to identify such sites and show that they 
are attainable given the operational capability of a proposed RLV. 
Restrictions are also proposed to further mitigate public safety risks 
during flight of any RLV.
    The space industry has been voicing a growing concern regarding the 
increasing number of objects being placed in orbit that increases the 
potential for collisions between objects in space. Collisions in space 
create additional objects that add to the orbital debris environment 
and increase the potential for damage to other objects. The 
requirements of this section serve to mitigate hazards associated with 
space debris. A collision avoidance analysis shall be performed prior 
to RLV launch to ensure that an RLV, its payload, and any jettisoned 
components do not pass closer than 200 kilometers to an inhabitable 
spacecraft. Window closures for launch and reentry activities should be 
adjusted to account for uncertainties in the predicted positions of 
inhabitable spacecraft. The 200 kilometer separation distance is 
currently practiced by Federal launch ranges.
    To further assure public safety, the FAA is proposing a number of 
additional restrictions applicable to all RLVs. The FAA is proposing 
that the projected IIP of the vehicle shall not have substantial dwell 
time over densely populated areas during any segment of mission flight. 
The agency is not setting design-type requirements for determining what 
constitutes a densely populated area. This determination is 
consequence-driven, in the agency's view. For example, even though an 
applicant has satisfied the agency's risk criteria of Ec no 
greater than 30 casualties in a million missions, if the consequence of 
a mission accident at a particular location would result in a 
significant number of actual casualties, then the FAA would view that 
area as densely populated for safety purposes. To mitigate debris risks 
that would interfere with the safety of other launch and reentry 
missions, the FAA proposes that RLV operators ensure no unplanned 
physical contact between its RLV and payload with other space objects 
and that explosive risks are minimized. The proposed requirement is 
intended to mitigate the hazards posed by orbital debris generation to 
the integrity of another vehicle and is in furtherance of the agency's 
safety responsibility for the conduct of licensed activities. This 
requirement is comparable to that imposed on licensed launch of an 
expendable launch vehicle involving an upper stage that remains on 
orbit.
    The proposal contains crew rest requirements for vehicle safety 
operations personnel because their performance might affect public 
safety. Experience has shown that crew rest criteria for those involved 
in supporting space operations are extremely important and would have a 
significant impact on organizational safety. Crew rest is of particular 
concern when the same crew is involved in pre-launch preparation, 
launch, on orbit operations, monitoring reentry-readiness, and reentry 
flight of the vehicle. The proposed crew rest rules are based on an 
NTSB investigation of an anomaly that occurred during a commercial 
launch from a Federal launch range and are intended to ensure RLV 
mission personnel readiness. The specific work and rest standards are 
similar to those currently used at Federal launch ranges ``Eastern and 
Western Range 127-1 Range Safety Requirements,'' Section 6.5.1.4 (March 
31, 1995). The FAA has

[[Page 19645]]

not reviewed the impact the proposed crew rest standards might have on 
an operator intending to launch and reenter a vehicle in a short time 
period. The FAA invites comments from the public on the practicality 
and potential burden to industry of the proposed crew rest standards 
and also requests information regarding analogous crew rest 
requirements in other industries or regulated areas.
    Proposed paragraph (d) establishes additional restrictions on an 
unproven vehicle. The projected IIP of an unproven reentry vehicle must 
not have substantial dwell time over a populated, as opposed to a 
densely populated, area during any segment of the mission unless the 
applicant can demonstrate that it satisfies stated risk criteria 
assuming the vehicle will fail while the IIP is over a populated area.
    To further enhance public safety when an RLV reenters from Earth 
orbit, the FAA proposes under Sec. 431.43(e) that the operator must be 
able to monitor the status of safety critical systems before enabling 
reentry and verify that the condition of the vehicle is such that it 
can reenter safely. The operator would also be required to issue a 
positive command to enable the vehicle's reentry. The FAA is aware that 
some RLV operators are contemplating totally autonomous reentry 
capability. The agency is concerned that authorizing reentry of such 
vehicles would not fulfill adequately its public safety responsibility. 
In the absence of active control, those systems and conditions 
determined necessary for safe reentry would not be verified before 
reentry is initiated and safety could be compromised. Accordingly, 
because of the possibility of system anomalies or other non-compliant 
conditions, the proposed rules require that an operator enable reentry.

Section 431.45  Mishap Investigation Plan and Emergency Response Plan

    The proposal also would require that an applicant prepare a mishap 
investigation plan (MIP) and emergency response plan (ERP) to respond 
to a launch or reentry accident or incident, or unplanned event during 
the mission. In addition to accident investigation plan requirements 
applicable to launches under part 415 of the regulations, the MIP would 
include procedures covering the reentry phase of a mission, including 
immediate notification to the FAA of a mishap and procedures for 
minimizing damage, preserving evidence, investigating or cooperating 
with an investigation conducted by the FAA or NTSB, reporting 
investigation results, and identifying and adopting preventive measures 
for avoiding recurrence of the event. This requirement would be 
substantially similar to the requirement for a launch license applicant 
to submit a plan describing accident and mishap investigation and 
emergency response procedures for a launch accident or incident.
    Also required would be emergency response plan whereby an RLV 
operator would be responsible for contacting local officials in the 
event a non-nominal reentry occurs and can be projected to impact at an 
identified location.

Section 431.47  Denial of Safety Approval

    Under the proposal, the FAA would notify an applicant in writing if 
a safety approval application is denied. The notice would state the 
reasons for denial and allow an applicant to respond and request 
reconsideration. An applicant could correct the deficiencies identified 
in the denial and request reconsideration of the denial or, upon denial 
of a license, an applicant may request reconsideration.

Subpart D--Payload Reentry Review and Determination

    Subpart D would explain when a payload reentry review and 
determination would be required and the factors considered in that 
review. Either an RLV mission license applicant or a payload owner or 
operator may apply for a payload reentry determination separately from 
an RLV mission license application. A license applicant could request a 
summary determination, if the risks to public safety posed by the 
payload proposed for reentry are substantially similar to a previously 
approved payload reentry determination issued earlier to the applicant, 
the payload owner or operator, or another RLV mission license 
applicant. For purposes of launching the payload, payload review 
procedures and requirements of part 415 would apply.

Section 431.51  General

    The proposed section would describe the scope of an FAA payload 
reentry review. Payloads owned and operated by the U.S. Government or 
subject to the reentry authority of another Government agency, such as 
the Department of Commerce, would be exempt from this subpart. A 
payload reentry review and determination is required to address the 
unique safety and policy issues presented by the return to Earth of a 
payload that has been launched or otherwise operated in outer space. A 
hazardous substance may be approved for launch over water or other 
unpopulated area, but disapproved for reentry if the consequences of 
dispersion cannot be adequately contained for a planned reentry to a 
site on land.

Section 431.53  Classes of Payloads

    The proposal would permit an applicant to request a payload 
determination for a type or class of payload. The applicant would 
describe the type or class of payload proposed for reentry under the 
license and general characteristics of the payload. If a payload 
reentry determination is issued for a class of payloads under this 
section, the RLV mission license applicant would have to later provide 
additional information regarding the specific payload before reentering 
it.

Section 431.55  Payload Reentry Review

    Proposed Sec. 431.55 describes how the FAA would coordinate a 
payload reentry review with other Government agencies, such as the 
Department of Defense, the Department of State, and NASA. Other 
agencies may include the Department of Commerce and the Federal 
Communications Commission. It also would describe those issues that 
would be addressed by the FAA in a payload reentry review. The FAA 
would notify an applicant of any issue raised during the payload 
reentry review that would impede a favorable payload reentry 
determination, and the applicant could respond or revise its 
application.

Section 431.57  Information Requirements for Payload Reentry Review

    The proposal would describe the specific information that an 
applicant would be required to provide to the FAA to perform a payload 
reentry review and conduct any necessary interagency review. In cases 
that present potential unique safety concerns, the FAA would require 
considerable detail regarding the physical characteristics, functional 
description, and operation of the payload, and its ownership.

Section 431.59  Issuance of Payload Reentry Determination

    Proposed Sec. 431.59 would explain that the FAA issues a payload 
reentry determination unless policy or safety considerations prevent 
reentry of the payload. If an applicant were to fail to obtain a 
favorable payload reentry determination, the applicant could attempt to 
correct the deficiencies that necessitated the denial and request 
reconsideration of the denial or, upon

[[Page 19646]]

denial of an RLV mission license, the applicant could request 
reconsideration.

Section 431.61  Incorporation of Payload Reentry Determination in 
License Application

    The proposal states that a favorable payload reentry determination 
may be included in the RLV mission license application. If, prior to a 
licensed mission, there is a change in the information submitted for a 
payload reentry determination, it is the licensee's responsibility to 
report the change to the FAA which may revisit its determination. The 
licensee must ensure that the payload owner or operator reports any 
such changes to the licensee so that the licensee is in compliance with 
the requirement.

Subpart E--Post-Licensing Requirements--Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission 
License Terms and Conditions

    Subpart E would describe post-licensing requirements for an RLV 
mission licensee, including license terms and conditions.

Section 431.71  Public Safety Responsibility

    Proposed paragraph (a) would state that an RLV mission licensee is 
responsible for ensuring a safe mission and protecting public health 
and safety and the safety of property at all times during the conduct 
of the mission.
    Proposed paragraph (b) would require the licensee to conduct its 
operations in accordance with representations made in its license 
application. Failure to conduct a licensed activity in accordance with 
the application would be cause for the FAA to revoke the license or 
take other appropriate enforcement action.

Section 431.73  Continuing Accuracy of License Application; Application 
for Modification of License

    The proposal would require a reentry licensee to ensure the 
continuing accuracy of representations contained in its application for 
the term of its license and to conduct procedures and operations in 
accordance with its application. An RLV mission licensee would be 
required to apply to the FAA for modification of the license if any 
representation material to public health and safety and the safety of 
property made in the application is no longer accurate. A license 
modification application would have to conform with part 413 of this 
chapter and indicate the part of the license or license application 
affected. The proposal also would state that the FAA would review its 
previous determinations and approvals to determine their continued 
validity.

Section 431.75  Agreements

    The proposed rules specify a number of agreements that an RLV 
mission licensee must have in place before conducting licensed 
activities. Just as launches of expendable launch vehicles from Federal 
launch ranges must be conducted under an agreement between a licensed 
launch operator and the Federal range for the provision of U.S. 
Government launch property and services, so must the conduct of an RLV 
mission or reentry using Federal range facilities. The FAA also 
envisions that licensed launch site operators will, through agreements 
with users of its facilities, require adherence to its safety rules and 
requirements and such agreements must be finalized before licensed 
launch or reentry activity occurs at the licensed site. In either case, 
the terms of an agreement between the RLV mission (or reentry) licensee 
and the site operator (whether Federal or non-Federal) would be 
expected to cover, as appropriate to the flight phase being conducted 
at the site, preparation for licensed flight, securing the vehicle 
before launch and after reentry, and transporting the vehicle from the 
site following its reentry, because these operations must be done in a 
manner that does not jeopardize public health and safety. A licensee 
would be required to comply with any portions of an agreement that 
would affect public health and safety and the safety of property during 
the conduct of a licensed RLV mission or reentry.
    Federal launch ranges coordinate Notices to Airmen and Notices to 
Mariners with the FAA and the U.S. Coast Guard, respectively. 
Consequently, there need be no additional responsibility imposed on an 
RLV mission or reentry licensee to issue such notices when utilizing a 
Federal range facility as the site of a licensed launch or reentry. In 
a separate rulemaking, the FAA intends to propose that a licensed 
launch site operator undertake responsibility for completing an 
agreement with the FAA and Coast Guard, respectively, for the issuance 
of such notices when launches are conducted at its launch site in order 
to assure a single point of contact. However, in the absence of such 
agreements, responsibility for safety coordination with regional FAA 
and Coast Guard offices would remain with the vehicle operator. An RLV 
mission (or reentry) licensee that utilizes a licensed site would be 
relieved of these responsibilities if issuance of notices is covered by 
an agreement between the licensed site operator and other modal 
administrations of the U.S. Department of Transportation. An RLV 
mission or reentry licensee authorized to conduct licensed activities 
at a private site, or one that is reserved for its exclusive use, would 
be obligated to complete such agreements. An example of an exclusive, 
although not private, launch and reentry site would be the lot at the 
Nevada Test Site authorized for use by Kistler Aerospace Corporation 
(Kistler) under a subpermit from the Nevada Test Site Development 
Corporation. Although the launch and reentry site to be utilized by 
Kistler are located on U.S. Government property and therefore not 
privately owned, the Nevada Test Site is not a Federal launch range as 
defined in the Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Regulations. 
Therefore Kistler would be responsible for completing an agreement with 
the appropriate FAA regional office for issuance of Notices to Airmen 
and compliance with other public safety measures involving air routes. 
Because the Nevada Test Site is an inland location, it is highly 
unlikely that a comparable agreement with the U.S. Coast Guard would be 
necessary.

Section 431.77  Records

    Proposed Sec. 431.77 would require a licensee to maintain for a 
period of 3 years all records, data, and other material related to a 
licensed RLV mission activity. In the event of a launch or reentry 
accident, or launch or reentry incident, the proposal would require a 
licensee to preserve all records related to the event until the FAA 
advises the licensee that the records need not be retained.

Section 431.79  Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Reporting Requirements

    Under the proposal, a licensee would be required to report certain 
information to the Associate Administrator at least 60 days before each 
RLV mission. Not later than fifteen days before a mission, a licensee 
would be required to report the time and date of the planned RLV 
mission to the Associate Administrator. The proposal also would require 
the immediate submission of accident, incident, and mishap information 
to the FAA in accordance with proposed Sec. 431.45. The FAA invites 
public comment on the timeframes proposed for reporting requirements in 
light of operator plans for rapid RLV launch and reentry services.

Section 431.81  Financial Responsibility Requirements

    Proposed Sec. 431.81 would require a licensee to comply with 
financial

[[Page 19647]]

responsibility requirements specified in its license.

Section 431.83  Compliance Monitoring

    Proposed Sec. 431.83 explains that a licensee is required to 
cooperate with the FAA's compliance monitoring policy.

Section 431.85  Registration of Space Objects

    Consistent with the recently issued Commercial Space Transportation 
Licensing Regulations, certain information must be reported to the FAA 
regarding placement of objects in space. Information requirements 
applicable to RLV missions and the associated timeframe for reporting 
information are consistent with those for ELV launches.

Subpart F--Environmental Review

    Subpart F would set forth the FAA's environmental review 
requirements. Regulations contained in this subpart would be 
substantially similar to the environmental review regulations 
applicable to launch licenses under part 415, subpart G.

Section 431.91  General

    Under the proposal, an applicant would be required to provide the 
FAA with the information necessary for the FAA to comply with 
applicable environmental laws and regulations, including 42 U.S.C. 4321 
et seq., the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for 
Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA; 40 CFR parts 1500-1508; 
and the FAA's Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts, FAA 
Order 1050.1D. The proposal also would indicate how copies of these 
documents could be obtained.

Section 431.93  Environmental Information

    Proposed Sec. 431.93 would require an applicant to provide the FAA 
with required environmental information for a reentry site and 
contingency abort locations, if any, and activities that may have new 
effects on established reentry sites. Use of a new vehicle, or reentry 
of a payload with characteristics falling measurably outside the 
parameters of existing environmental documentation, would also be 
subject to FAA environmental review requirements.

Part 433--License To Operate a Reentry Site

    The proposal would create a new part 433 that prescribes licensing 
requirements and procedures applicable to operation of a reentry site. 
Reentry sites may offer an array of reentry services or may simply 
provide a secured area within which reentry may occur. Given the 
breadth of possibilities, and the agency's desire to allow prospective 
reentry site operators to develop unique proposals for operation, the 
FAA intends to evaluate the safety of a particular site on an 
individual basis. This principle appears in proposed Sec. 433.1.

Section 433.1  General

    Proposed section 433.1 reflects the principle that the FAA will 
evaluate on an individual basis whether an applicant is capable of safe 
operation of a reentry site and whether a proposed site is suitable to 
support reentry operations.

Section 433.3  Issuance of a License To Operate a Reentry Site

    Under Sec. 433.3, the FAA would license an operator to offer use of 
a reentry site if its operation does not jeopardize public health and 
safety, safety of property and U.S. national security and foreign 
policy interests. As with other licenses, the authorization granted by 
an FAA license would be limited to the representations contained in the 
licensee's application and subject to terms and conditions stated in 
the license.

Section 433.5  Operational Restrictions on a Reentry Site

    A reentry vehicle may be authorized to reenter to a site that, 
among other things, satisfies within three standard deviations the 
probable dispersion of the vehicle upon landing. This measure of 
landing dispersion is known as the three-sigma footprint of a vehicle. 
A reentry site may be offered to support reentry of a particular 
reentry vehicle if the vehicle's three-sigma footprint is contained 
entirely within the reentry site.

Section 433.7  Environmental

    Issuance of a license to operate a reentry site is a major Federal 
action subject to agency review under the requirements of the National 
Environmental Policy Act. Section 433.7 provides that an applicant 
shall provide sufficient information to enable the FAA to fulfill its 
environmental review responsibilities under Federal law and FAA 
procedures.

Section 433.9  Environmental Information

    Although a reentry site may be covered by existing environmental 
documentation, its use to support licensed reentry activities and other 
site operations may not be adequately addressed. Section 433.9 provides 
that a reentry site operator must submit information to support 
environmental review of reentry impacts at the site, if not already 
covered in existing documentation.

Part 435--Reentry of a Reentry Vehicle Other Than a Reusable Launch 
Vehicle (RLV)

    The proposal would create a new part 435 that addresses FAA's 
anticipation that there may be some reentries that will not involve 
reusable launch vehicle (RLV) technology. A COMET/METEOR type of 
reentry vehicle or other reentry vehicle capability that is not also an 
RLV may be proposed for reentry, and regulations are required to 
address licensing requirements applicable to those vehicles. Under the 
proposal, the FAA would evaluate safety aspects of reentry vehicles of 
this nature on an individual basis using the same three-pronged 
approach proposed for RLVs. The three-pronged approach consists of a 
risk criteria assessed on a per mission basis so that it encompasses 
the risks to public safety presented by the launch of a reentry vehicle 
in addition to its reentry, operational requirements and restrictions, 
and utilization of a system safety process. Compliance with that 
portion of regulations and licensing procedures proposed for an RLV 
mission that pertain to its reentry would apply to a license to reenter 
a reentry vehicle. Any person seeking a license to reenter a reentry 
vehicle should refer to part 431 regulations governing RLV missions. 
Only those requirements and licensing considerations that are unique to 
reentry of a reentry vehicle that is not also an RLV would be expressly 
stated in part 435.

Section 435.1  Scope

    Proposed Sec. 435.1 would establish the applicability of part 435. 
The proposed part would prescribe the requirements for obtaining a 
license to conduct a reentry of a reentry vehicle other than an RLV and 
any continuing requirements to remain licensed.

Section 435.3  Types of Reentry Licenses

    The proposed section would identify the two types of reentry 
licenses that would be issued and set forth the privileges and 
limitations of the licenses. Under the proposal the FAA would issue 
either a reentry-specific or operator license, on bases comparable to 
that used for issuing launch.
    A reentry-specific license would identify the specific missions to 
which it applies. An expiration date would be

[[Page 19648]]

stated in the license so that it is not unlimited as to time.
    An operator license would authorize reentry operations on an 
ongoing basis, as is currently done for launch. An initial two-year 
license term is proposed.

Section 435.5  Policy and Safety Approvals

    Under the proposal, a license applicant would be required to obtain 
policy and safety approvals from the FAA. Requirements for obtaining 
these approvals are contained in subparts B and C of this part.

Section 435.7  Payload Reentry Determinations

    A payload reentry determination would be required, consistent with 
proposed requirements for RLV missions, for purposes of returning a 
payload to Earth unless it is exempt from FAA review. As with other 
payload determinations, a payload substantially similar to a previously 
approved payload may be reviewed using a comparative analysis. Under 
paragraph (b), a previous payload reentry determination may be used to 
meet the requirements of proposed paragraph (a). Proposed paragraph (c) 
identifies the payload review procedures applicable to reentering a 
payload. A payload review determination may be requested of the agency 
in advance of or separately from a reentry license application.

Section 435.9  Issuance of a Reentry License

    The FAA would issue a license to an applicant who has obtained all 
approvals and determinations required under this chapter for a reentry 
license, including a policy and safety approval and payload reentry 
determination, if necessary. The authorization would be limited to 
representations contained in an application and subject to licensee 
compliance with applicable requirements of the agency.

Section 435.11  Additional License Terms and Conditions

    As proposed, the FAA may amend a reentry license by modifying or 
adding license terms and conditions to ensure compliance with 49 U.S.C. 
Subtitle IX, chapter 701, and applicable regulations.

Section 435.13  Transfer of a Reentry License

    Consistent with other licensing authority of the agency, only the 
FAA would be able to transfer a reentry license. The prospective 
transferee would need to satisfy all requirements for obtaining a 
license as specified in this chapter.

Section 435.15  Rights Not Conferred by Reentry License

    Proposed Sec. 435.15 would state that the license would not relieve 
a licensee of its obligation to comply with applicable laws.

Subpart B--Policy Review and Approval for Reentry of a Reentry Vehicle

    This subpart would impose requirements for a policy review 
consistent with those for an RLV mission license.

Section 435.21  General

    Under the proposal, the FAA would issue a policy approval to a 
reentry license applicant upon completion of a favorable policy review; 
it would be part of the licensing record.

Section 435.23  Policy Review Requirements and Procedures

    An applicant for reentry policy review and approval would be 
referred to requirements expressed in proposed part 431, subpart B 
concerning policy review for an RLV mission. The FAA reserves authority 
to impose additional requirements unique to reentry policy concerns, if 
any.

Subpart C--Safety Review and Approval for Reentry of Reentry Vehicle

    Subpart C would describe the FAA's safety evaluation process for 
reentry license applicants. The safety review is conducted to ensure 
that all safety aspects of a proposed reentry have been adequately 
addressed. The safety review is necessarily based on the unique 
attributes and capabilities of a vehicle and is conducted on an 
individual basis, measured against a regulatory risk criteria.

Section 435.31  General

    The proposal states that the FAA would conduct a safety review to 
determine whether an applicant is capable of reentering a reentry 
vehicle and payload, if any, to a designated site without jeopardizing 
public health and safety and the safety of property. The suitability of 
a proposed reentry site would be assessed by the FAA in the context of 
evaluating safety issues presented in a particular reentry proposal.

Section 435.33  Safety Review Requirements and Procedures

    Safety review requirements proposed for the reentry or descent 
flight phase of an RLV mission would apply to the reentry safety 
review, unless otherwise stated in proposed subpart C of part 431.

Section 435.35  Acceptable Reentry Risk for Reentry of a Reentry 
Vehicle

    The FAA is proposing a mission approach to assessment of reentry 
safety and risk. As proposed, the risk presented by a proposed reentry, 
in combination with the launch of the reentry vehicle into Earth orbit 
or outer space, must not exceed acceptable risk for an RLV mission. As 
indicated previously in the supplementary information of this proposed 
rule, the FAA requests comment on its proposed approach to combined 
risk.

Subpart D--Payload Reentry Review and Determination

Subpart E--Post-Licensing Requirements--Reentry License Terms and 
Conditions

Subpart F--Environmental Review

    Consistent with the FAA's general approach to authorizing reentry, 
requirements governing payload reentry review, license terms and 
conditions, and environmental review for the reentry or descent phase 
of an RLV mission would apply to a reentry license application, unless 
otherwise stated in the regulations.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This proposal contains the following new information collection 
requirements subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 
Sec. 3507(d)).
    Title: Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and 
Reentry Licensing Regulations.
    Summary: The FAA proposes to amend the commercial space 
transportation licensing regulations by establishing operational 
requirements for launches of reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) and the 
authorized conduct of commercial space reentry activities. The proposed 
rule would respond to advancements in the development of commercial 
reentry capability and enactment of legislation extending the FAA's 
licensing authority to reentry activities. The agency is proposing 
requirements that limit risk to the public from RLV and reentry 
operations.
    Description of Respondents: Applicants seeking licenses to conduct 
licensed reentry operations and launches of RLVs.
    The proposed rule outlined is in accordance with the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. The required information 
will be used to determine whether applicants satisfy requirements for 
obtaining a launch license to protect the public

[[Page 19649]]

from risks associated with RLV missions and other reentries. The 
information to be collected includes data required for performing a 
safety review, which includes a technical assessment to determine if 
the applicant can safely reenter a reentry vehicle, including an RLV 
and payload, if any, to a designated reentry site without jeopardizing 
public health and safety and safety of property. The frequency of 
required submissions may depend upon the frequency of licensed launch 
activities; however, a license may authorize more than one launch. The 
estimated average burden hours per respondent are 4,384 hours.
    The agency is soliciting comments to (1) evaluate whether the 
proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper 
performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the 
information will have practical utility; (2) evaluate the accuracy of 
the agency's estimate of the burden; (3) enhance the quality, utility, 
and clarity of the information to be collected; and (4) minimize the 
burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, 
including through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, 
mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms 
of information technology (for example, permitting electronic 
submission of responses). Individuals and organizations may submit 
comments on the information collection requirement by June 21, 1999, to 
the address listed in the ADDRESSES section of this document.

International Compatibility

    The FAA has determined that a review of the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation Standards and Recommended Practices is not 
warranted because there is not a comparable rule under ICAO standards.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary

    Proposed and final rule changes to Federal regulations must undergo 
several economic analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that 
each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a 
reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation 
justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as 
amended in May 1996, requires agencies to analyze the economic effect 
of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Office of 
Management and Budget directs agencies to assess the effect of 
regulatory changes on international trade. In conducting these 
analyses, the FAA has determined that the proposed rule would generate 
benefits that justify its costs and is ``not a significant regulatory 
action'' as defined in the Executive Order and the Department of 
Transportation Regulatory Policies and Procedures. The proposed rule is 
not a significant action. The proposed rule would not have a 
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities and would 
not constitute a barrier to international trade. In addition, this 
proposed rule does not contain Federal intergovernmental or private 
sector mandates. Therefore, the requirements of Title II of the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply. These analyses, 
available in the docket, are summarized below.

Baseline for Economic Analysis

    The proposed rule implements certain policies developed by AST in 
1992 with respect to public safety for the first commercial space 
reentry operation. However, the safety criteria proposed in this 
rulemaking uses different measures that better reflect current agency 
and range safety practices. The 1992 policy established safety criteria 
pertaining to a unique and specific request to conduct a first-of-a-
kind payload reentry mission; that is, the COMET, later renamed METEOR, 
reentry vehicle. Accordingly, a comprehensive regulatory (benefit-cost) 
analysis was not required. Therefore, the baseline case used for this 
analysis views the proposed rule as a new requirement imposed on an 
emerging segment of the commercial space transportation industry that 
plans to operate reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) or conduct reentry 
operations with reentry vehicles (RVs). Doing so implies that, but for 
imposition of safety requirements by the agency, some compliance costs 
would not have been incurred by entities planning to conduct RLV 
missions (launch and reentry) and RV operations that are associated 
with launches from Federal ranges. (Regulatory costs and benefits 
associated with launches from Federal ranges are assessed as part of a 
separate rulemaking on launch licensing requirements for launches from 
Federal ranges.)

Costs

    The proposed rule is expected to impose a total estimated cost of 
$113 million ($65 million, discounted), in 1997 dollars, on the 
commercial space transportation industry and the FAA over the 15-year 
period from 2000 to 2014. Commercial space transportation industry 
operators potentially impacted by the proposed rule would incur 
approximately 27 percent (or $30 million) of this total cost estimate 
in the form of compliance costs. The FAA would incur about 73 percent 
(or $83 million) of the total cost estimate in the form of 
administrative costs. All monetary values shown in this regulatory 
evaluation summary are expressed in 1997 dollars over the 15-year 
period. Due to some of the operational requirements of the proposed 
rule, costs may materialize that have not been specifically considered 
in this evaluation. For example, the proposed requirement for each 
commercial space operator to have an independent safety inspector 
could, under certain circumstances, result in costs not examined in 
this evaluation. The independent safety inspector could require the 
operator to abort a launch or reentry for safety reasons, which would 
result in higher operating costs. Due to this additional safety 
oversight, it is uncertain whether all cost and benefit considerations 
have been captured in this evaluation. Accordingly, the FAA solicits 
industry comments on the extent to which this evaluation has captured 
critical costs associated with the proposed rule.
    Reentry of RLVs and RVs are subject to comparable safety 
requirements and therefore regulatory costs for reentry are assessed 
collectively. Costs are assessed on the basis that, over the next 15-
year period, five commercial operators of RLVs or RVs would be impacted 
by the regulations. It is assumed that five operators would obtain all 
necessary approvals to conduct RLV missions or RV reentries and that 
market demand is sufficient to support that level of vehicle operation.

Industry Compliance Costs

Section 431.25  Application Requirements for Policy Review and Section 
435.23 Policy Review

    These sections of the proposed rule would impose an administrative 
paperwork burden on each of the five anticipated commercial space 
industry operators potentially impacted by requiring them to provide 
specific policy review information to the FAA with regard to their 
anticipated RLV missions (launch and reentry) or RV reentry operations. 
Compliance with this proposed section would result in an estimated cost 
of $400 per operator to assemble the data and submit each application 
or $2,000 (5 x $400), in 1997 dollars, for all five operators over the 
15-year period. The cost estimate of $400 per operator assumes an 
employee with an annual loaded salary of approximately $103,000 (with 
fringe benefits) and a level of effort of eight hours.

[[Page 19650]]

Section 431.33  Safety Organization and Section 435.33 Safety Review 
Requirements and Procedures

    Under the baseline, a safety organization with clearly defined 
roles, responsibilities, authorities, and lines of communication is 
consistent with the findings and recommendations of the Rodgers 
Commission and National Transportation Safety Board. However, the 
proposed requirement to ``* * * designate a qualified safety official * 
* * to monitor independently compliance * * * with * * * [all] safety 
policies and procedures'' is not necessarily customary and usual 
practice. Inclusion of this proposed requirement suggests that it is a 
refinement of industry baseline practices designed to mitigate safety 
risks to the public. For example, to be ``responsible for the conduct 
of all * * * mission activities * * *''implies a degree of 
comprehensiveness that may not be common practice in industry. Because 
the safety official must be independent, the function cannot be 
assigned as a collateral duty to an individual with line responsibility 
for launch and reentry operations though it could conceivably be 
assigned to an existing employee. Furthermore, the magnitude of 
responsibilities of the safety official suggests that the level of 
effort required to perform this function would exceed part-time 
employment. Assuming that the independent safety official function will 
not be performed as a collateral duty, this proposed requirement would 
result in a commercial space transportation entity hiring a person to 
fulfill the safety official role. An annual loaded salary for this 
position would be about $103,000. Therefore, the total incremental 
compliance cost to a commercial operator attributable to the proposed 
requirement would be about $1.6 million or $8 million (5  x  $1.6 
million) for all five operators over the 15-year period.

Section 431.35  Acceptable Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Risk, and 
Section 435.35 Acceptable Reentry Risk for Reentry of a Reentry Vehicle

    Commercial space transportation entities are expected to incur 
additional costs for performance of risk analyses of vehicle 
operations, including reentry, and would incur costs in assessing the 
probabilities and consequences of all reentry hazards, events, and 
system failures that potentially expose the public to risk. 
Additionally, commercial entities would expend effort preparing 
documentation and establishing an associated document control system 
for drawings and schematics. This compliance activity is expected to 
fulfill the level of rigor implied by the requirements contained in the 
proposed rule. The cost impact to a commercial entity attributable to 
this proposed requirement would be approximately $757,000 in the first 
year of operation, with recurring costs of $3,600 annually, in 1997 
dollars. Over the 15-year period, from 2000 to 2014, the cost of 
compliance for each potentially impacted operator would be about 
$800,000. The total cost of compliance for all potentially impacted 
operators would be approximately $4 million (5  x  $800,000), over the 
15-year period.

Section 431.37  Mission Readiness and Section 435.33 Safety Review 
Requirements and Procedures

    The proposed requirement to provide specific procedures to the FAA 
that verify mission readiness presents an administrative paperwork 
burden to a commercial entity. This proposed requirement would cause an 
operator to incur costs for preparing and submitting the requisite 
information to the FAA. A knowledgeable employee having an annual 
salary of about $103,000 over a period of 80 hours would perform the 
requirement. This exercise would result in a paperwork cost to a 
commercial entity of approximately $4,000 per application submittal 
over the 15-year period. For all entities, this proposed requirement 
would impose an estimated cost of compliance of $20,000 (5  x  $4,000) 
over the 15-year period.

Section 431.39  Mission Rules, Procedures, Contingency Plans, and 
Checklists, and Section 435.33 Safety Review Requirements and 
Procedures

    Commercial space transportation entities are generally expected to 
fulfill the proposed requirements as part of their standard operating 
procedures. However, the FAA anticipates that these entities would 
incur some additional costs conforming to FAA requirements. 
Additionally, commercial entities are expected to incur costs from 
submitting updated documents with the FAA periodically, and preparing 
for, accommodating and reacting to FAA inspection and compliance 
monitoring activities. The cost impact to a single commercial space 
transportation entity to comply with this proposed requirement would be 
approximately $90,000 or $450,000 (5  x  $90,000) for five entities 
over the 15-year period.

Section 431.41  Communications Plan and Section 435.33 Safety Review 
Requirements and Procedures

    Commercial space transportation entities are expected to have in 
place a communications plan that, for the most part, are consistent 
with proposed regulatory requirement as a matter of standard business 
practice. However, they are expected to incur incremental costs 
complying with the requirement, annual recurring costs from interfacing 
and exchanging documents with the FAA periodically and preparing for, 
accommodating, and reacting to FAA inspection and compliance monitoring 
activities. The cost impact to a single commercial space transportation 
entity to comply would be approximately $90,000 or $450,000 for all 
five entities over the 15-year period.

Section 431.43  Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Operational 
Requirements and Restrictions, and Section 435.33 Safety Review 
Requirements and Procedures

(Mission Operational Requirements: Dwell Time)
    Commercial space transportation entities are expected to expend 
additional levels of effort to comply with risk mitigation requirements 
that, to some extent, may limit vehicle flight path options during 
nominal and non-nominal operations, specifically limitations on dwell 
time over populated areas and requirements for performing a collision 
avoidance analysis during launch windows to maintain adequate 
separation from orbiting objects.
(Rest and Duty Restrictions)
    This proposed rule would impose work restrictions and personnel 
rest requirements on commercial space transportation entities 
potentially impacted by this action. For example, an individual having 
direct control over reentry or involved in decisions affecting reentry 
operations is restricted to working 60 hours over the seven-day period 
preceding reentry. Further, the proposed rule would reduce the maximum 
permissible hours worked per shift to 12, limits the maximum number of 
consecutive workdays to 14, and specifies the minimum rest required (48 
hours) between five consecutive days of 12-hour work shifts.
    Currently, based on information received from industry, it is 
common practice among commercial space transportation entities to 
follow Air Force work and rest standards for launches. Those standards 
are similar to the proposed requirements. Ordinarily,

[[Page 19651]]

based on industry information, launch mission operations personnel work 
less than the maximum currently permissible, such as a 40-hour workweek 
comprised of five eight-hour shifts. Hence, the 72-hour workweek is 
generally an extreme condition that occurs infrequently.
    The duration of a reentry operation is likely to determine the 
extent of the impact that the proposed work and rest requirements would 
have on commercial space transportation entities. However, this impact 
would occur under extreme or limiting conditions only (e.g., one 
reentry operations person).
    Given the relatively small size of the entities comprising the 
emerging RLV segment of the commercial space transportation industry, 
staff augmentation of at least one person is not unlikely as a result 
of the proposed requirements. Additionally, the FAA anticipates that 
additional costs would be incurred for recordkeeping to ensure 
compliance with required work and rest standards, and preparing for, 
accommodating, and reacting to FAA inspection and monitoring 
activities.
    The incremental cost to a single commercial entity to comply with 
this proposed work and rest requirement would be slightly more than $3 
million over the 15-year period. Over this same period, for all five 
entities, the cost of compliance would be $16 million ($5  x  $3.2 
million).

Section 431.45  Mishap Investigation Plan and Emergency Response Plan, 
and Section 435.33 Safety Review Requirements and Procedures

    As a matter of standard business practice, commercial entities are 
expected to have prepared emergency response plans that are consistent 
with much of the regulatory requirement. However, the FAA anticipates 
that these plans would require additional annual maintenance to comply 
with certain elements of the proposed rule. For example, entities are 
likely to incur additional costs to establish their ability to 
successfully respond to accidents occurring in remote areas having 
sparse populations. Furthermore, additional annual maintenance costs 
are expected to arise from preparing for, accommodating, and reacting 
to FAA inspection and monitoring activities. Accordingly, a commercial 
space transportation entity would incur incremental costs of $542,000 
or $2.7 million (5  x  $542,000) for all five entities over the 15-year 
period.

Section 431.57  Information Requirements for Payload Reentry Review and 
Section 435.43 Payload Reentry Review Requirements and Procedures

    This proposed requirement to provide specific payload information 
to the FAA presents an administrative paperwork burden to a commercial 
entity. The submission of data to the FAA is estimated to impose costs 
of $400 per application or $2,000 for all five entities over the 15-
year period.

Section 431.73  Continuing Accuracy of License Application; Application 
for Modification of License

    The proposed requirement would impose minor costs on a licensee to 
advise the FAA of material changes to its application, and RLV and 
reentry missions that may impact public safety and property. Depending 
upon the types of changes reported, it is assumed based on input 
received from FAA and industry technical personnel that, on average, a 
licensee would incur incremental compliance costs of approximately 
$33,000 per modification application or $165,000 (5  x  $33,000) for 
five entities over the 15-year period.

Section 431.75  Agreements, and Section 435.51 Post Licensing 
Requirements--Reentry License Terms and Conditions (General)

    Entities that conduct commercial launches of ELVs from Federal 
ranges must enter into formal agreements with the Federal range 
authority prior to using such facilities. Entities planning to use 
these same facilities for reentry missions would also be required to 
enter into such agreements. The proposed requirement has no impact on 
commercial entities other than the negligible level of effort expended 
(e.g., less than one hour) to advise the FAA of compliance, and the 
incremental cost to industry to comply with this requirement would be 
negligible.

Section 431.77  Records and Section 435.51 Post Licensing 
Requirements--Reentry License Terms and Conditions (General)

    It is generally accepted practice among all commercial concerns to 
maintain business operations records for some period of time, often 
more than three years. Furthermore, the availability and capability of 
electronic storage systems renders records retention a manageable task. 
Accordingly, the proposed three-year requirement to maintain records 
for FAA review, upon request, would not impact commercial space 
transportation entities. From a worst case perspective, this evaluation 
assumes the FAA would exercise its record request authority. As a 
result the cost of compliance is expected to be about $400 per entity 
per year. Over the 15-year period, the cost would be $6,000 (400  x  
15) per entity or $30,000 (5  x  $6,000) for five entities.

Section 431.79  Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Reporting Requirements, 
and Section 435.51 Post Licensing Requirements--Reentry License Terms 
and Conditions (General)

    The information to be supplied by a licensee under this proposed 
requirement is similar to that supplied previously to the FAA during 
the application process in accordance with Section 431.57. The burden 
placed on the licensee is to provide more specific mission data than 
that supplied previously but closer in time to the actual conduct of 
the mission. Because an operator must have this data to perform a 
scheduled mission, the incremental cost to industry to comply with this 
proposed requirement would be zero.

Section 431.93  Environmental Information, and Section 435.61 
Environmental Review (General)

    Because licensing is a major Federal action, a commercial space 
transportation entity would be required to provide information 
addressing the environmental effects of its operations so that the 
agency can fulfil its responsibility under NEPA and CEQ environmental 
regulations, even in the absence of the proposed rule. Commercial 
entities planning to conduct launch and reentry missions must submit 
environmental assessment data to the FAA regarding environmental 
impacts of its proposed activities. Additional information must be 
submitted to evaluate environmental effects not previously assessed by 
the agency. This proposed requirement would cause a commercial entity 
to incur incremental compliance costs of $271,000 per entity or $1.4 
million (5  x  $271,000) for five entities over the 15-year period.

Section 433.7  Environmental

    An analysis of the environmental impacts of operating a reentry 
site is required under NEPA. The proposed requirement, as distinct from 
similar requirements for operation of a launch site, would cause a 
applicant to incur incremental compliance costs of $162,000 over the 
15-year period as a result of the need to submit additional information 
to the agency to evaluate environmental effects not previously assessed 
by the agency. For all

[[Page 19652]]

operators, the cost of compliance would be about $800,000 over the same 
period.

FAA Administrative Costs

    The proposed rule would result in the FAA expending great effort in 
evaluating RLV mission and reentry license applications and monitoring 
licensees for compliance.
    This evaluation estimates that the FAA would incur costs of 
approximately $83 million ($45 million, discounted), 1997 dollars over 
the 15-year period, as the result of administering its review of 
license applications and monitoring of licensees compliance in 
accordance with the proposed requirements of certain sections of parts 
431, 433, and 435.
    The FAA's actual experience in evaluating an application to conduct 
a reentry mission is limited to the COMET and METEOR programs. Much of 
the proposed rule reflects safety policies for reentry developed by the 
agency in 1992 to ensure that the COMET/METEOR payload reentry missions 
would not jeopardize public health and safety and health and the safety 
of property. Consequently, this experience provides a partial basis for 
establishing the costs to the FAA for administering the proposed rule. 
Using this past experience, AST expects that the costs to be incurred 
in performing its RLV mission and reentry licensing pre-application 
consultation, application evaluation, and compliance monitoring duties 
in the near term to be higher than that incurred for COMET/METEOR for a 
single application, with or without a formal reentry licensing 
regulation. The extent to which such costs would be higher than that 
incurred for COMET/METEOR is unknown since there is no history of U.S. 
commercial reentry activity. The assessment of higher application 
costs, however, is largely due to the expectation that inherently more 
complex RLV programs would dominate reentry missions in the future and 
initially these would require greater evaluative effort on the part of 
FAA personnel until they have developed experience in this area. While 
AST budget estimates for fiscal year 2000 reflect additional funding 
needed to exercise its reentry mission approval function, this need 
cannot be attributed to the proposed rule, but rather to the complexity 
associated with the advancing technology that would be evaluated.
    AST fiscal year 2000 budget estimates of the cost to perform its 
pre-application consultation and application evaluation licensing 
responsibilities may be correlated collectively to sections 431.23, 
431.27, 431.31, 431.47, 431.55, 431.59, and 431.91; 433.3, 433.9; and 
435.23, 435.31, 435.43, and 435.61 of the proposed regulation. The 
costs to be incurred by the FAA to implement its compliance monitoring 
responsibilities corresponding to sections 431.73, 431.83, and 435.51 
can vary widely, as the spectrum of changes to reentry program 
operations can range from minor to major. Therefore, the FAA expects to 
spend $2.5 million--an amount equivalent to that expended for COMET/
METEOR--to implement and administer these proposed requirements for a 
single application.
    Based on projections of the level of application activity over the 
15-year period from 2000 to 2014, the FAA is expected to spend 
approximately $83 million in administering the safety requirements of 
parts 431, 433, and 435. Approximately 94 percent (or $78 million) of 
the cost by the FAA to administer these parts would be incurred to 
approve the projected reentry license applications and modifications to 
be evaluated over the 15-year period. Approximately 6 percent (or $5 
million) of the cost to administer parts 431, 433, and 435 would be 
expended on the review of application denials and the reconsideration 
process.
    Unlike the estimates for potential benefits, the costs section of 
this evaluation uses a point (or single) estimate rather than a range. 
The point estimate approach was chosen in estimating FAA administrative 
costs because, due in large measure to the agency's experience with the 
COMET/METEOR Program, there is far less uncertainty associated with the 
estimation of costs for this proposed rule relative to benefits.

Benefits

    The proposed rule is expected to generate safety benefits of $119 
million ($66 million, discounted), in 1997 dollars, over the 15-year 
period. Benefits include enhanced safety by limiting reentry risk to a 
level that does not exceed an expected average number of 30 casualties 
per one million RLV missions or reentries for the general public, and 
an expected average number of no more than one casualty per million 
missions for the public in the vicinity of reentry sites.
    The potential safety benefits that are expected to accrue as the 
result of this proposed rule stem from two types of safety criteria 
implemented and administered by the FAA on commercial space 
transportation industry operators who wish to engage in RLV missions or 
reentries. The two criteria are:
    (1) Ec  30  x  10-6. This 
criterion applies on a per mission basis and includes both launch and 
reentry phases of an RLV mission. It requires that the risk to the 
public associated with each mission incorporate a level of safety that 
is equivalent to a probabilistic outcome of no more than an expected 
average number of 30 public casualties per one million missions.
    (2) Ec  1  x  10-6. This criterion 
pertains to the public adjacent to reentry sites. It requires that the 
risk to the public associated with each reentry mission incorporate a 
level of safety that is equivalent to a probabilistic outcome of no 
more than an expected average number of one public casualty per one 
million missions.
    Compliance by operators with these safety criteria, along with 
other restrictions addressed in the proposed rule are intended to limit 
risk to public safety. In estimating these potential safety benefits, 
the FAA employed the following steps: (First), the agency examined six 
accident types, grouped into two categories, related to airborne 
explosions and ground point-of-impact crashes. (For the purpose of this 
evaluation, the term accident is defined as any unplanned event with 
potential casualty losses). For each accident category--airborne or 
ground--the population density of the area surrounding the accident 
scene or accident zone can be either (1) none, (2) sparse (e.g. rural), 
or (3) dense (e.g., urban). An examination of the consequences of these 
types of accidents was conducted. To arrive at accident consequences, 
the accident scenes or zones for airborne and ground accidents are 
characterized in terms of fatalities, injuries, and property damage 
under the baseline and the proposed rule. The difference between the 
baseline scenario and proposed rule scenario represents the incremental 
safety benefits that would be generated by the proposed rule. This 
process was performed for each of the steps below: (Second), monetary 
values are assigned to each of the various types of accidents expected 
to occur during launch or reentry (including accidents at or near 
launch sites). (Third), probabilities are assigned to each of the six 
accident types based on the percentage of impacted landmass (e.g., no 
population, sparse population, and dense population) for the baseline 
and the proposed rule. That is, the probability of occurrence for each 
accident type over the next 15 years was determined by using the two 
types of risk criteria mentioned earlier.
    And last, expected values were estimated for each of the accident 
types under the baseline and the proposed

[[Page 19653]]

rule. For this proposed rule, the expected benefit values represent the 
difference between these two scenarios. One of the more difficult areas 
to ascertain is the probability of a reusable launch vehicle (RLV) or 
RLV accident in the absence of government regulation in order to 
calculate the expected value of an accident under the baseline and 
estimate the incremental safety benefits of the proposed rule. This 
difficulty stems from the fact there is no empirical evidence or 
historical RLV accident history. Because of this difficulty, there is 
uncertainty associated with estimating the probability of an RLV or RLV 
accident. As a result of this uncertainty, the FAA estimated a range of 
accident probabilities, which are based on historical experience with 
ELV accidents and incidents, and sorted them into six categories or 
types of accidents. In estimating the expected casualty and property 
loss values, the probability of each of the six accident types is 
multiplied by the accident consequence values (e.g., the cost of an 
accident). This process was repeated for all six accident types and 
summed. This procedure was done for both scenarios (baseline and 
proposal). Thus, the difference in casualty and property losses for 
these two scenarios was used as the estimated benefits for this 
proposed rule. The results of these calculations generate the potential 
safety benefits as discussed below.
    Safety benefits--accident costs avoided--are realized as RLV launch 
and reentry operations are performed, without incident. Therefore, the 
number of completed RLV missions and reentries projected over the 15-
year period is multiplied by incremental safety benefits per mission to 
estimate total incremental safety benefits over the period 2000 to 
2014. The total safety benefit resulting from the proposed rule is 
estimated to be $119 million for the period 2000 to 2014. This estimate 
of $119 million represents the midpoint of benefits ranging from $22 
million to $217 million over the 15-year period. This midpoint estimate 
of benefits was chosen because of the high degree of uncertainty 
associated with the wide range of accident probabilities. Uncertainty 
stems from the extent to which industry has already adopted and 
implemented safety measures similar to those proposed as part of this 
rulemaking action. (Based on information obtained from commercial space 
industry technical personnel, nearly all of the potentially impacted 
operators would be in compliance with the proposed rule to some 
degree.) The low end of the range of benefits assumes that practically 
all of the potentially impacted operators would be in almost complete 
compliance in the absence of the proposed rule. The high end of the 
range of benefits assumes the opposite. There is insufficient 
information that would support adopting the benefits estimates at 
either end of the range. Thus, the median (or midpoint) was chosen as 
an appropriate benefits estimate. It suggests that the actual benefits 
to be generated by the proposed rule lies somewhere between the lower 
and upper end of this range. Since uncertainty is associated with using 
a midpoint benefits estimate and range of benefits, the FAA solicits 
public comment as to whether its assumptions are appropriate and the 
validity of this approach. The agency asks that comments be specific 
and supported by quantitative data wherever possible.

Secondary Benefits

    The proposed rule would generate secondary benefits in the form of 
enhanced operational efficiency, due largely to regulatory and 
procedural clarifications that would be facilitated by the iterative 
pre-application consultation process, help ensure consistency in 
implementing the licensing process, and may result in cost-savings to 
the FAA as a result of repetitive operations. These cost-savings would 
also reduce the turnaround time between application submittal and 
licensing approval, help commercial space transportation entities gain 
familiarity with requirements, and facilitate government-industry 
interaction. Enhanced operational efficiency, in turn, would lead to 
industry cost-savings, possibly due to less rework or paperwork 
avoided.

Summary of Total Costs and Benefits

    The total potential benefits and costs of this proposed rule are 
shown below in Table 1. This Table shows that the potential cost 
imposed by the proposed rule would be approximately $113 million over 
the 15-year period. Also shown in Table 1, about $30 million of this 
total cost would be incurred by industry. The cost estimate of $30 
million is lower than the summation of those costs discussed in the 
above sections for industry because it takes into account the fact that 
certain operators would incur recurring costs for some of the 15-year 
period rather than for the entire period. Table 1 also shows that the 
proposed rule would generate potential safety benefits of $119 million 
over the 15-year period. Due to some of the operational requirements of 
the proposed rule, costs and benefits not considered in this evaluation 
may materialize. The FAA solicits comments from the commercial space 
industry as to what extent this evaluation has captured critical costs 
and benefits associated with the proposed rule.

              Table 1.--Summary of Total Costs and Benefits
                        [In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Category (in 1997 dollars, 15 yrs.)     Undiscounted     Discounted
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commercial Space Transportation Industry             $30             $20
 Compliance Costs.......................
Federal Aviation Administration                       83              45
 Implementation Costs...................
                                         -------------------------------
    Total Costs.........................             113              65
                                         -------------------------------
Accident Costs Avoided: Lower Bound                   22              12
 (Safety Benefits)......................
Accident Costs Avoided: Upper Bound                  217             121
 (Safety Benefits)......................
Total Accident Costs Avoided: Midpoint               119              66
 (Safety Benefits)......................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) was enacted by 
Congress to ensure that small entities (e.g., small business and small 
not-for-profit government jurisdictions) are not unnecessarily and 
disproportionately burdened by Federal Government regulations. The RFA, 
which was amended in March 1996, requires that whenever an agency 
publishes a general notice of proposed rulemaking, an initial 
regulatory flexibility analysis be performed if the proposed rule would

[[Page 19654]]

have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. The regulatory flexibility analysis must (1) identify the 
economic impact on small entities and (2) consider alternatives that 
may lessen those impacts.
    The Small Business Administration has defined small business 
entities relating to space vehicles (Standard Industrial Codes 3761, 
3764, and 3769) as entities comprising fewer than 1,000 employees. The 
FAA has determined that the proposed rule would impact five small 
businesses, imposing on an entity average compliance costs of 
approximately $6 million over the 15-year period (in 1997 dollars).
    The annualized compliance cost to each small business is 
approximately $700,000 (in 1997 dollars). Ordinarily, this section of 
the evaluation would be based on typical financial data (for example, 
annual net income or losses) as a means to determine any of the 
commercial space transportation small entities significantly impacted 
by the proposed rule. However, the traditional use of such financial 
data for these small entities cannot be employed since RLV operators 
(including a number of RV operators) represent relatively new companies 
and they have no revenue history. In fact, these small operators are in 
the process of raising funds to finance their new ventures. Due to the 
lack of data on the financial characteristics of these small RLV 
operators, this evaluation uses the 1998 average revenue received per 
launch for ELV operators. The revenue that RLV operators would obtain 
from their customers is expected to be similar to the revenue that 
established ELV operators currently receive from their customers. 
Revenue data based on ELV operators' experience would be used for the 
purpose of assessing the extent to which compliance with the proposed 
rule would impose significant economic impacts on each of the five 
potentially impacted small RLV operators. This assessment would be done 
by comparing the annualized cost of compliance to the annual average 
revenue expected to be received by each of the five small RLV operators 
over the next 15 years. While the long-term revenues of RLV operators 
are expected to exceed those of ELV operators, which would be due to 
inherent lower operating costs, for the purpose of this evaluation they 
are assumed to be nearly the same over the 15-year period. For this 
reason, the average revenue of about $50 million generated by each ELV 
launch in 1998 will be used as an indicator of what RLV operators would 
be expected to generate per RLV mission in future years. This 
assessment is based primarily on information received for orbital 
launch events for ELV operators from the FAA's Office of Commercial 
Space Transportation Report entitled, ``Commercial Space 
Transportation: 1998 Year In Review'', Table 1 and the Appendix 
(January 1999).
    Each of the five potentially impacted small RLV entities is 
expected to average about seven missions per year over the next 15 
years. Using $50 million as an average expected revenue per mission, 
each entity would be expected to receive about $350 million in revenue 
($50m  x  7 missions annually) for all missions annually. The FAA has 
determined that none of the five small entities would incur a 
significant economic impact, since the average annualized cost of 
compliance ($700,000) would be only 0.2 percent of the anticipated 
average annual revenues of $350 for missions conducted annually.
    The FAA certifies that the proposed rule would not impose a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
businesses. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not 
required. Furthermore, the proposed rule is not likely to cause small 
business failures or adversely impact their competitive position 
relative to larger businesses. However, the FAA requests comments on 
the validity of the assertions herein and additional information on the 
financial characteristics of these small businesses

International Trade Impact Assessment

    The proposed rule contains revisions to commercial space 
transportation licensing regulations that would not constitute a 
barrier to international trade, including the export of domestic goods 
and services out of the United States. The proposed rule would equally 
affect domestic and foreign organizations conducting commercial space 
transportation operations within the United States. The proposed rule 
is not expected to place domestic firms at a disadvantage with respect 
to foreign interests competing for similar business in international 
markets. Therefore, based on this evaluation and impacts reported 
herein, the proposed rule is not expected to affect trade opportunities 
for U.S. firms doing business abroad or for foreign firms doing 
business in the United States. The FAA invites comments on the validity 
of this assertion and any potential impacts related thereto.

Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995 Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, enacted as 
Public Law 104-4 on March 22, 1995, requires each Federal agency, to 
the extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment of the 
effects of any Federal mandate by State, local, and tribal governments, 
in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more 
(adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. Section 204(a) of 
the Act, Title 2 of the United States Code 1534(a), requires the 
Federal agency to develop an effectiveness process to permit timely 
input by elected officers (or their designees) of State, local, and 
tribal governments on a proposed ``significant intergovernmental 
mandate.'' A significant intergovernmental mandate under the Act is any 
provision in a Federal agency regulation that would impose an 
enforceable duty upon State, local, and tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one 
year. Section 203 of the Act, Title 2 of the United States Code 1533, 
which supplements section 204(a), provides that before establishing any 
regulatory requirements that might significantly or uniquely affect 
small governments, the agency shall have developed a plan that, among 
other things, provides for notice to potentially affected small 
governments, if any, and for a meaningful and timely opportunity any 
affected small governments to provide input in the development of 
proposed rules.
    Based on the evaluation and impacts reported herein, the proposed 
rule is not expected to meet the $100 million per year cost threshold. 
Consequently, it would not impose a significant cost on uniquely affect 
small governments. Therefore, the requirements of Title II of the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply to the proposed 
regulation.

Federalism Implications

    The regulations proposed herein will not have a substantial direct 
effect on the states, on the relationship between the national 
government and the states, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in 
accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this 
proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant 
the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

[[Page 19655]]

Environmental Assessment

    FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically 
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). 
In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, appendix 4, paragraph 4(i), 
regulatory documents which cover administrative or procedural 
requirements qualify for a categorical exclusion. Proposed sections 
431.91, 431.93, 433.7, and 433.9 would require an applicant to submit 
sufficient environmental information for the FAA to comply with NEPA 
and other applicable environmental laws and regulations during the 
processing of each license application. Accordingly, the FAA proposes 
that this rule qualifies for a categorical exclusion because no 
significant impacts to the environment are expected to result from 
finalization or implementation of its administrative provisions for 
licensing.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 400

    Space transportation and exploration.

14 CFR Part 401

    Organization and functions (Government agencies), Space 
transportation and exploration.

14 CFR Part 404

    Administrative practice and procedure, Space transportation and 
exploration.

14 CFR Part 405

    Investigations, Penalties, Space transportation and exploration.

14 CFR Part 406

    Administrative practice and procedure, Space transportation and 
exploration.

14 CFR Part 413

    Confidential business information, Space transportation and 
exploration.

14 CFR Part 415

    Aviation safety, Environmental protection, Space transportation and 
exploration.

14 CFR Part 431

    Aviation safety, Environmental protection, Investigations, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Rockets, Space transportation 
and exploration.

14 CFR Part 433

    Aviation safety, Environmental protection, Investigations, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Rockets, Space transportation 
and exploration.

14 CFR Part 435

    Aviation safety, Environmental protection, Investigations, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Rockets, Space transportation 
and exploration.

The Proposed Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration proposes to amend parts 400, 401, 404, 405, 406, 413, 
and 415, of Chapter III Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations and add 
parts 431, 433 and 435 as follows:

PART 400--BASIS AND SCOPE

    1. The authority citation for part 400 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.

    2. Section 400.2 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 400.2  Scope.

    These regulations set forth the procedures and requirements 
applicable to the authorization and supervision under 49 U.S.C. 
Subtitle IX, chapter 701, of commercial space transportation activities 
conducted in the United States or by a U.S. citizen. The regulations in 
this chapter do not apply to exempted-class rocket activities.

PART 401--ORGANIZATION AND DEFINITIONS

    3. The authority citation for part 401 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.

    4. Section 401.5 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 401.5  Definitions.

    As used in this chapter--
    Act means 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, Commercial Space Transportation, 
ch. 701--Commercial Space Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.
    Amateur rocket activities means launch activities conducted at 
private sites involving rockets powered by a motor or motors having a 
total impulse of 200,000 pound-seconds or less and a total burning or 
operating time of less than 15 seconds, and a rocket having a ballistic 
coefficient--i.e., gross weight in pounds divided by frontal area of 
rocket vehicle--less than 12 pounds per square inch.
    Associate Administrator means the Associate Administrator for 
Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, or 
any person designated by the Associate Administrator to exercise the 
authority or discharge the responsibilities of the Associate 
Administrator.
    Contingency abort means cessation of vehicle flight during ascent 
or descent in a manner that does not jeopardize public health and 
safety and the safety of property, in accordance with mission rules and 
procedures. Contingency abort includes landing at an alternative 
location that has been designated as a contingency abort location in 
advance of vehicle flight.
    Emergency abort means cessation of vehicle flight during ascent or 
descent in a manner that minimizes risk to public health and safety and 
the safety of property. Emergency abort involves failure of a vehicle, 
safety-critical system, or flight safety system such that contingency 
abort is not possible.
    Federal launch range means a launch site, from which launches 
routinely take place, that is owned and operated by the government of 
the United States.
    Flight safety system means a system designed to limit or restrict 
the hazards to public health and safety and the safety of property 
presented by a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle while in flight by 
initiating and accomplishing a controlled ending to vehicle flight. A 
flight safety system may be destructive resulting in intentional break 
up of a vehicle or nondestructive, such as engine thrust termination 
enabling vehicle landing or safe abort capability.
    Hazardous materials means hazardous materials as defined in 49 CFR 
172.101.
    Launch means to place or try to place a launch vehicle or reentry 
vehicle and any payload from Earth in a suborbital trajectory, in Earth 
orbit in outer space, or otherwise in outer space, and includes 
activities involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle for flight, 
when those activities take place at a launch site in the United States. 
The term launch includes the flight of a launch vehicle and pre-flight 
ground operations beginning with the arrival of a launch vehicle or 
payload at a U.S. launch site. Flight ends after the licensee's last 
exercise of control over its launch vehicle.
    Launch accident means:
    (1) A fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to 
any person who is not associated with the flight;
    (2) Any damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to property not 
associated with the flight that is not located at the launch site or 
designated recovery area.
    (3) An unplanned event occurring during the flight of a launch 
vehicle resulting in the known impact of a launch vehicle, its payload 
or any component thereof:

[[Page 19656]]

    (i) For an expendable launch vehicle (ELV), outside designated 
impact limit lines; and
    (ii) for an RLV, outside a designated landing site.
    Launch incident means an unplanned event occurring during the 
flight of a launch vehicle, other than a launch accident, involving a 
malfunction of a flight safety system or safety-critical system or 
failure of the licensee's safety organization, design or operations.
    Launch operator means a person who conducts or who will conduct the 
launch of a launch vehicle and any payload.
    Launch site means the location on Earth from which a launch takes 
place (as defined in a license the Secretary issues or transfers under 
this chapter) and necessary facilities at that location.
    Launch vehicle means a vehicle built to operate in, or place a 
payload in, outer space or a suborbital rocket.
    Mishap means a launch or reentry accident, launch or reentry 
incident, failure to complete a launch or reentry as planned, or an 
unplanned event or series of events resulting in a fatality or serious 
injury (as defined in 49 CFR Sec. 830.2), or resulting in greater than 
$25,000 worth of damage to a payload, a vehicle, a launch or reentry 
support facility or government property located on the launch or 
reentry site.
    Operation of a launch site means the conduct of approved safety 
operations at a permanent site to support the launching of vehicles and 
payloads.
    Operation of a reentry site means the conduct of safety operations 
at a fixed site on Earth at which a reentry vehicle and its payload, if 
any, is intended to land.
    Payload means an object that a person undertakes to place in outer 
space by means of a launch vehicle, including components of the vehicle 
specifically designed or adapted for that object.
    Person means an individual or an entity organized or existing under 
the laws of a state or country.
    Reenter means to return or attempt to return, purposefully, a 
reentry vehicle and its payload, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer 
space to Earth. The term ``reenter'' includes activities conducted in 
Earth orbit or outer space to determine reentry readiness and are 
therefore unique to reentry and critical to ensuring public health and 
safety and the safety of property during reentry.
    Reentry accident means any unplanned event occurring during the 
reentry of a reentry vehicle resulting in the known impact of the 
reentry vehicle, its payload, or any component thereof outside a 
designated reentry site; a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 
CFR 830.2) to any person who is not associated with the reentry; or any 
damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to property not associated with the 
reentry and not located within a designated reentry site.
    Reentry incident means any unplanned event occurring during the 
reentry of a reentry vehicle, other than a reentry accident, involving 
a malfunction of a reentry safety-critical system or failure of the 
licensee's safety organization, procedures, or operations.
    Reentry operator means a person responsible for conducting the 
reentry of a reentry vehicle as specified in a license issued by the 
FAA.
    Reentry site means the location on Earth where a reentry vehicle is 
intended to return. It includes the area within three standard 
deviations of the intended landing point (the predicted three-sigma 
footprint).
    Reentry vehicle means a vehicle designed to return from Earth orbit 
or outer space to Earth substantially intact. A reusable launch vehicle 
that is designed to return from Earth orbit or outer space to Earth 
substantially intact is a reentry vehicle.
    Reusable launch vehicle (RLV) means a launch vehicle that is 
designed to return to Earth substantially intact and therefore may be 
launched more than one time or that contains vehicle stages that may be 
recovered by a launch operator for future use in the operation of a 
substantially similar launch vehicle.
    Safety-critical means essential to safe performance or operation. A 
safety-critical system, subsystem, condition, event, operation, process 
or item is one whose proper recognition, control, performance or 
tolerance is essential to safe system operation.
    Vehicle safety operations personnel means those persons whose job 
performance is critical to public health and safety or the safety of 
property during RLV or reentry operations.
    State and United States means, when used in a geographical sense, 
the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, 
and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United 
States; and
    United States citizen means:
    (1) Any individual who is a citizen of the United States;
    (2) Any corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, or 
other entity organized or existing under the laws of the United States 
or any State; and
    (3) Any corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, or 
other entity which is organized or exists under the laws of a foreign 
nation, if the controlling interest in such entity is held by an 
individual or entity described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this 
definition. Controlling interest means ownership of an amount of equity 
in such entity sufficient to direct management of the entity or to void 
transactions entered into by management. Ownership of at least fifty-
one percent of the equity in an entity by persons described in 
paragraph (1) or (2) of this definition creates a rebuttable 
presumption that such interest is controlling.

PART 404--REGULATIONS AND LICENSING REQUIREMENTS

    5. The authority citation for part 404 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.

    6. Section 404.1 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 404.1  Scope.

    Under section 49 U.S.C. 70105, this part establishes procedures for 
issuing regulations to implement the provisions of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle 
IX, chapter 701, and for eliminating or waiving requirements of Federal 
law otherwise applicable to the licensing of commercial space 
transportation activities under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, chapter 701.
    7. Section 404.3 is amended by revising the section title and 
paragraph (a) to read as follows:


Sec. 404.3  Filing of petitions to the Associate Administrator.

    (a) Any person may petition the Associate Administrator to issue, 
amend, or repeal a regulation to eliminate as a requirement for a 
license any requirement of Federal law applicable to commercial space 
launch and reentry activities and the operation of launch and reentry 
sites or to waive any such requirement in the context of a specific 
application for a license.
* * * * *

PART 405--INVESTIGATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT

    8. The authority citation for part 405 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.

    9. Section 405.1 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 405.1  Monitoring of licensed and other activities.

    Each licensee must allow access by and cooperate with Federal 
officers or employees or other individuals authorized by the Associate 
Administrator to observe licensed

[[Page 19657]]

facilities and activities, including launch sites and reentry sites, as 
well as manufacturing, production, and testing facilities, or assembly 
sites used by any contractor or a licensee in the production, assembly, 
or testing of a launch or reentry vehicle and in the integration of a 
payload with its launch or reentry vehicle. Observations are conducted 
to monitor the activities of the licensee or contractor at such time 
and to such extent as the Associate Administrator considers reasonable 
and necessary to determine compliance with the license or to perform 
the Associate Administrator's responsibilities pertaining to payloads 
for which no Federal license, authorization, or permit is required.
    10. Section 405.5 is amended by revising the introductory text and 
paragraph (a) to read as follows:


Sec. 405.5  Emergency orders.

    The Associate Administrator may immediately terminate, prohibit, or 
suspend a licensed launch, reentry, or operation of a launch or reentry 
site if the Associate Administrator determines that--
    (a) The licensed launch, reentry, or operation of a launch or 
reentry site is detrimental to public health and safety, the safety of 
property, or any national security or foreign policy interest of the 
United States; and
* * * * *

PART 406--ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

    11. The authority citation for part 406 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.

    12. Section 406.1 is amended by revising paragraphs (a), 
introductory text, (a)(2), and (a)(3) to read as follows:


Sec. 406.1  Hearings.

    (a) Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 70110, the following are entitled to a 
determination on the record after an opportunity for a hearing in 
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 554.
* * * * *
    (2) An owner or operator of a payload regarding any decision to 
prevent the launch or reentry of the payload;
    (3) A licensee regarding any decision to suspend, modify, or revoke 
a license or to terminate, prohibit, or suspend any licensed activity; 
and
* * * * *

PART 413--LICENSE APPLICATION PROCEDURES

    13. The authority citation for part 413 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.

    14. Section 413.1 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 413.1  Scope.

    This part prescribes the procedures applicable to applications 
submitted under this chapter to conduct licensed activities. These 
procedures apply to all applications for issuance of a license, 
transfer of an existing license, and renewal of an existing license. 
More specific requirements applicable to obtaining a launch license or 
a license to operate a launch site are contained in parts 415 and 417 
of this chapter, respectively. More specific requirements applicable to 
obtaining a license to launch and reenter a reentry vehicle or to 
operate a reentry site are contained in parts 431, 433 and 435 of this 
chapter, respectively.
5. Section 413.3 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 413.3  Who must obtain a license.

    (a) A person must obtain a license--
    (1) To launch a launch vehicle from the United States;
    (2) To operate a launch site within the United States;
    (3) To reenter a reentry vehicle in the United States; or
    (4) To operate a reentry site within the United States.
    (b) An individual who is a U.S. citizen or an entity organized 
under the laws of the United States or any State must obtain a 
license--
    (1) To launch a launch vehicle outside the United States;
    (2) To operate a launch site outside of the United States;
    (3) To reenter a reentry vehicle outside of the United States; or
    (4) To operate a reentry site outside of the United States.
    (c) A foreign entity in which a United States citizen has a 
controlling interest, as defined in Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, must 
obtain a launch license to launch a launch vehicle from or a license to 
operate a launch site within--
    (1) Any place that is both outside the United States and outside 
the territory of any foreign nation, unless there is an agreement in 
force between the United States and a foreign nation providing that 
such foreign nation shall exercise jurisdiction over the launch or the 
operation of the launch site; or
    (2) The territory of any foreign nation if there is an agreement in 
force between the United States and that foreign nation providing that 
the United States shall exercise jurisdiction over the launch or the 
operation of the launch site.
    (d) A foreign entity in which a U.S. citizen has a controlling 
interest, as defined in Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, must obtain a 
license to reenter a reentry vehicle or to operate a reentry site in--
    (1) Any place that is outside the United States and outside the 
territory of any foreign nation, unless there is an agreement in force 
between the United States and a foreign nation providing that such 
foreign nation shall exercise jurisdiction over the reentry or the 
operation of the reentry site; or
    (2) The territory of any foreign nation if there is an agreement in 
force between the United States and that foreign nation providing that 
the United States shall exercise jurisdiction over the reentry or the 
operation of the reentry site.

PART 415--LAUNCH LICENSE

    16. The authority citation for part 415 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.

    17. Section 415.1 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 415.1  Scope.

    This part prescribes requirements for obtaining a license to launch 
a launch vehicle, other than a reusable launch vehicle (RLV), and post-
licensing requirements with which a licensee shall comply to remain 
licensed. Requirements for preparing a license application are 
contained in part 413 of this subchapter. Requirements for obtaining a 
license to launch an RLV and conduct an RLV mission are contained in 
part 431 of this subchapter.
    18. Part 431 is added to read as follows:

PART 431--LAUNCH AND REENTRY OF A REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE (RLV)

Subpart A--General

Sec.
431.1  Scope.
431.3  Types of reusable launch vehicle mission licenses.
431.5  Policy and safety approvals.
431.7  Payload and payload reentry determinations.
431.9  Issuance of a reusable launch vehicle mission license.
431.11  Additional license terms and conditions.
431.13  Transfer of a reusable launch vehicle mission license.
431.15  Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission 
license.
431.16-431.20  [Reserved]

Subpart B--Policy Review and Approval for Launch and Reentry of a 
Reusable Launch Vehicle

431.21  General.
431.23  Policy review.
431.25  Application requirements for policy review.
431.27  Denial of policy approval.
431.28-431.30  [Reserved]

[[Page 19658]]

Subpart C--Safety Review and Approval for Launch and Reentry of a 
Reusable Launch Vehicle

431.31  General.
431.33  Safety organization.
431.35  Acceptable reusable launch vehicle mission risk.
431.37  Mission readiness.
431.39  Mission rules, procedures, contingency plans, and 
checklists.
431.41  Communications plan.
431.43  Reusable launch vehicle mission operational requirements and 
restrictions.
431.45  Mishap investigation plan and emergency response plan.
431.47  Denial of safety approval.
431.48-431.50  [Reserved]

Subpart D--Payload Reentry Review and Determination

431.51  General.
431.53  Classes of payloads.
431.55  Payload reentry review.
431.57  Information requirements for payload reentry review.
431.59  Issuance of payload reentry determination.
431.61  Incorporation of payload reentry determination in license 
application.
431.62-431.70  [Reserved]

Subpart E--Post-Licensing Requirements-Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission 
License Terms and Conditions

431.71  Public safety responsibility.
431.73  Continuing accuracy of license application; application for 
modification of license.
431.75  Agreements.
431.77  Records.
431.79  Reusable launch vehicle mission reporting requirements.
431.81  Financial responsibility requirements.
431.83  Compliance monitoring.
431.85  Registration of space objects.
431.86-431.90  [Reserved]

Subpart F--Environmental Review

431.91  General.
431.93  Environmental information.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70119.

Subpart A--General


Sec. 431.1  Scope.

    This part prescribes requirements for obtaining a reusable launch 
vehicle (RLV) mission license and post-licensing requirements with 
which a licensee must comply to remain licensed. Requirements for 
preparing a license application are contained in part 413 of this 
subchapter.


Sec. 431.3  Types of reusable launch vehicle mission licenses.

    (a) Mission-specific license. A mission-specific license 
authorizing an RLV mission, authorizes a licensee to launch and 
reenter, or otherwise land, one model or type of RLV to a reentry site 
approved for the mission. A mission-specific license authorizing an RLV 
mission may authorize more than one RLV mission and identifies each 
flight of an RLV authorized under the license. A licensee's 
authorization to conduct RLV missions terminates upon completion of all 
activities authorized by the license or the expiration date stated in 
the reentry license, whichever occurs first.
    (b) Operator license. An operator license for RLV missions 
authorizes a licensee to launch and reenter, or otherwise land, any of 
a designated family of RLVs within authorized parameters, including 
trajectories, transporting specified classes of payloads to any reentry 
site designated in the license. An operator license for RLV missions is 
valid for a two-year renewable term.


Sec. 431.5  Policy and safety approvals.

    To obtain either type of RLV mission license, an applicant must 
obtain policy and safety approvals from the FAA. Requirements for 
obtaining these approvals are contained in subparts B and C of this 
part. Only the license applicant may apply for the approvals, and may 
apply for either approval separately and in advance of submitting a 
complete license application, using the application procedures 
contained in part 413 of this subchapter.


Sec. 431.7  Payload and payload reentry determinations.

    (a) A payload determination is required to launch a payload unless 
the proposed payload is exempt from payload review under Sec. 415.53 of 
this chapter. Requirements for obtaining a payload determination are 
set forth in part 415, subpart D.
    (b) A payload reentry determination is required to transport a 
payload to Earth on an RLV unless the proposed payload is exempt from 
payload review.
    (c) A payload reentry determination made under a previous license 
application under this subchapter may satisfy the requirements of 
paragraph (b) of this section.
    (d) The FAA conducts a review, as described in subpart D of this 
part, to make a payload reentry determination. Either an RLV mission 
license applicant or a payload owner or operator may request a review 
of the proposed payload using the application procedures contained in 
part 413 of this subchapter. Upon receipt of an application, the FAA 
may conduct a payload reentry review independently of an RLV mission 
license application.


Sec. 431.9  Issuance of a reusable launch vehicle mission license.

    (a) The FAA issues either a mission-specific or operator license 
authorizing RLV missions to an applicant who has obtained all approvals 
and determinations required under this chapter for the license.
    (b) An RLV mission license authorizes a licensee to launch and 
reenter, or otherwise land, an RLV and payload, if any, in accordance 
with the representations contained in the licensee's application, 
subject to the licensee's compliance with terms and conditions 
contained in license orders accompanying the license, including 
financial responsibility requirements.


Sec. 431.11  Additional license terms and conditions.

    The FAA may amend an RLV mission license at any time by modifying 
or adding license terms and conditions to ensure compliance with 49 
U.S.C. subtitle IX, chapter 701, and applicable regulations.


Sec. 431.13  Transfer of a reusable launch vehicle mission license.

    (a) Only the FAA may transfer an RLV mission license.
    (b) An applicant for transfer of an RLV mission license shall 
submit a license application in accordance with part 413 of this 
subchapter and satisfy the applicable requirements of this part. The 
FAA will transfer an RLV mission license to an applicant who has 
obtained all of the approvals and determinations required under this 
chapter for an RLV mission license. In conducting its reviews and 
issuing approvals and determinations, the FAA may incorporate any 
findings made part of the record to support the initial licensing 
determination. The FAA may modify an RLV mission license to reflect any 
changes necessary as a result of a license transfer.


Sec. 431.15  Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission 
license.

    Issuance of an RLV mission license does not relieve a licensee of 
its obligation to comply with requirements of law that may apply to its 
activities.


Secs. 431.16-431.20  [Reserved]

Subpart B--Policy Review and Approval for Launch and Reentry of a 
Reusable Launch Vehicle


Sec. 431.21  General.

    The FAA issues a policy approval to an RLV mission license 
applicant upon completion of a favorable policy review. A policy 
approval is part of the licensing record on which the licensing 
determination is based.


Sec. 431.23  Policy review.

    (a) The FAA reviews an RLV mission license application to determine

[[Page 19659]]

whether the proposed mission presents any issues, other than those 
issues addressed in the safety review, that would adversely affect U.S. 
national security or foreign policy interests, would jeopardize public 
health and safety or the safety of property, or would not be consistent 
with international obligations of the United States.
    (b) Interagency consultation.
    (1) The FAA consults with the Department of Defense to determine 
whether an RLV mission license application presents any issues 
adversely affecting U.S. national security.
    (2) The FAA consults with the Department of State to determine 
whether an RLV mission license application presents any issues 
adversely affecting U.S. foreign policy interests or international 
obligations.
    (3) The FAA consults with other Federal agencies, including the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, authorized to address 
issues identified under paragraph (a) of this section, associated with 
an applicant's RLV mission proposal.
    (c) The FAA advises an applicant, in writing, of any issue raised 
during a policy review that would impede issuance of a policy approval. 
The applicant may respond, in writing, or revise its license 
application.


Sec. 431.25  Application requirements for policy review.

    In its RLV mission license application, an applicant must--
    (a) Identify the model, type, and configuration of any RLV proposed 
for launch and reentry, or otherwise landing on Earth, by the 
applicant.
    (b) Identify all vehicle systems, including structural, thermal, 
pneumatic, propulsion, electrical, and avionics and guidance systems 
used in the vehicle(s), and all propellants.
    (c) Identify foreign ownership of the applicant as follows:
    (1) For a sole proprietorship or partnership, identify all foreign 
ownership;
    (2) For a corporation, identify any foreign ownership interests of 
10% or more; and
    (3) For a joint venture, association, or other entity, identify any 
participating foreign entities.
    (d) Identify proposed launch and reentry flight profile(s), 
including--
    (1) Launch and reentry site(s), including planned contingency abort 
locations, if any;
    (2) Flight trajectories, reentry trajectories, associated ground 
tracks, and instantaneous impact points for nominal operations, and 
contingency abort profiles, if any;
    (3) Sequence of planned events or maneuvers during the mission; and

For an orbital mission, the range of intermediate and final orbits of 
the vehicle and upper stages, if any, and their estimated orbital life 
times.


Sec. 431.27  Denial of policy approval.

    The FAA notifies an applicant, in writing, if the FAA has denied 
policy approval for an RLV mission license application. The notice 
states the reasons for the FAA's determination. The applicant may 
respond to the reasons for the determination and request 
reconsideration.


Secs. 431.28-431.30  [Reserved]

Subpart C--Safety Review and Approval for Launch and Reentry of a 
Reusable Launch Vehicle


Sec. 431.31  General.

    (a) The FAA conducts a safety review to determine whether an 
applicant is capable of launching an RLV and payload, from a designated 
launch site, and reentering the RLV and payload, if any, to a 
designated reentry site, or otherwise landing the RLV and payload, if 
any, on Earth, without jeopardizing public health and safety and the 
safety of property.
    (b) The FAA issues a safety approval to an RLV mission license 
applicant that satisfies the requirements of this subpart. The FAA 
evaluates on an individual basis all public safety aspects of a 
proposed RLV mission to ensure they are sufficient to support safe 
conduct of the mission. A safety approval is part of the licensing 
record on which the FAA's licensing determination is based.
    (c) The FAA advises an applicant, in writing, of any issue raised 
during a safety review that would impede issuance of a safety approval. 
The applicant may respond, in writing, or revise its license 
application.


Sec. 431.33  Safety organization.

    (a) An applicant shall maintain a safety organization and document 
it by identifying lines of communication and approval authority for all 
mission decisions that may affect public safety. Lines of communication 
within the applicant's organization, between the applicant and the 
launch site, and between the applicant and the reentry site, shall be 
employed to ensure that personnel perform RLV mission operations in 
accordance with plans and procedures required by this subpart. Approval 
authority shall be employed to ensure compliance with terms and 
conditions stated in an RLV mission license and with the plans and 
procedures required by this subpart.
    (b) An applicant must designate a person responsible for the 
conduct of all licensed RLV mission activities.
    (c) Safety official. An applicant shall designate by name, title, 
and qualifications, a qualified safety official authorized by the 
applicant to examine all aspects of the applicant's operations with 
respect to safety of RLV mission activities and to monitor 
independently compliance by vehicle safety operations personnel with 
the applicant's safety policies and procedures. The safety official 
shall report directly to the person responsible for an applicant's 
licensed RLV mission activities, who shall ensure that all of the 
safety official's concerns are addressed both before the mission is 
initiated and before reentry or descent of an RLV is initiated. The 
safety official is responsible for--
    (1) Conducting operational dress rehearsals in accordance with 
procedures required by Sec. 431.37(a)(4), that ensure the readiness of 
vehicle safety operations personnel to conduct a safe mission under 
nominal and non-nominal conditions; and
    (2) Completing a mission readiness determination as required by 
Sec. 431.37 of this subpart before an RLV mission is initiated. The 
safety official must monitor and report to the person responsible for 
the conduct of licensed RLV mission activities any non-compliance with 
procedures listed in Secs. 431.37 and 431.43 or any representation 
contained in the application, and the readiness of the licensee to 
conduct mission operations in accordance with the license and this 
part. The safety official is responsible for compliance with 
Secs. 431.37 and 431.43 and with representations contained in the 
application.


Sec. 431.35  Acceptable reusable launch vehicle mission risk.

    (a) To obtain safety approval for an RLV mission, an applicant must 
demonstrate that the proposed mission does not exceed acceptable risk 
as defined in this subpart. For purposes of this part, the mission 
commences upon initiation of the launch phase of flight, proceeds 
through orbital insertion of an RLV or vehicle stage, or flight to 
outer space, whichever is applicable, and concludes upon landing on 
Earth of the RLV.
    (b) Acceptable risk for a proposed mission is measured in terms of 
the expected average number of casualties (Ec) to the 
collective members of the public exposed to vehicle or vehicle debris 
impact hazards. To obtain safety

[[Page 19660]]

approval, an applicant shall demonstrate--
    (1) For public risk, the risk level associated with a proposed 
mission does not exceed an expected average number of 0.00003 
casualties per mission (or Ec criterion of 30  x  
10-6) to members of the public from the applicant's proposed 
activity; and
    (2) For persons within a 100-mile distance from the border of the 
designated reentry site and contingency abort locations, if any, the 
risk level associated with a proposed mission does not exceed an 
expected average number of .000001 casualties per mission (or 
Ec criterion of 1  x  10-6).
    (c) Hazard identification and risk assessment. To demonstrate 
compliance with acceptable risk criteria in this section, an applicant 
shall employ a system safety process to identify the hazards and assess 
the risks to public health and safety and the safety of property 
associated with the mission, including nominal and non-nominal 
operation and flight of the vehicle and payload, if any. An acceptable 
system safety analysis identifies and assesses the probability and 
consequences of any reasonably foreseeable hazardous events, and 
safety-critical system failures during launch and reentry that could 
result in a casualty to the public.
    (d) As part of the demonstration required under paragraph (c) of 
this section, an applicant must--
    (1) Identify and describe the structure of the RLV, including 
physical dimensions and weight;
    (2) Identify and describe any hazardous materials, including 
radioactive materials, and their container on the RLV;
    (3) Identify and describe safety-critical systems;
    (4) Identify and describe all safety-critical failure modes and 
their consequences;
    (5) Provide drawings and schematics for each safety-critical system 
identified under paragraph (d) (3) of this section;
    (6) Provide a timeline identifying all safety-critical events;
    (7) Provide data that validates the applicant's system safety 
analyses required in paragraph (c) of this section; and
    (8) Provide flight trajectory analyses covering launch or ascent of 
the vehicle through orbital insertion and reentry or descent of the 
vehicle through landing, including three-sigma dispersion.


Sec. 431.37  Mission readiness.

    (a) Mission readiness requirements. An applicant shall submit the 
following procedures for verifying mission readiness:
    (1) Mission readiness review procedures that involve the 
applicant's vehicle safety operations personnel, and launch site and 
reentry site personnel involved in the mission. The procedures shall 
ensure a mission readiness review is conducted during which the 
designated individual responsible for the conduct of licensed 
activities under Sec. 431.33(b) of this subpart is provided with the 
following information to make a judgment as to mission readiness--
    (i) Readiness of the RLV including safety-critical systems and 
payload for launch and reentry flight;
    (ii) Readiness of the launch site, personnel, and safety-related 
launch property and launch services to be provided by the launch site;
    (iii) Readiness of the reentry site, personnel, and safety-related 
property and services for reentry flight and vehicle recovery;
    (iv) Readiness of vehicle safety operations personnel to support 
mission flight, including results of dress rehearsals and simulations 
conducted in accordance with paragraph (a)(4) of this section;
    (v) Mission rules and constraints, including contingency abort 
plans and procedures, if any, as required under Sec. 431.39 of this 
part;
    (vi) Unresolved safety issues identified during the mission 
readiness review and plans for addressing them; and
    (vii) Any additional safety information required by the individual 
designated under Sec. 431.33(b) of this part to determine launch and 
reentry readiness.
    (2) Procedures that ensure mission constraints, rules, contingency 
abort and emergency abort procedures are listed and consolidated in a 
safety directive or notebook approved by the person designated by the 
applicant under Sec. 431.33(b) of this subpart, the launch site 
operator, and the reentry site operator, if any;
    (3) Procedures that ensure currency and consistency of licensee, 
launch site operator, and reentry site operator checklists;
    (4) Dress rehearsal procedures that--
    (i) Ensure crew readiness under nominal and non-nominal flight 
conditions;
    (ii) Contain criteria for determining whether to dispense with or 
add one or more dress rehearsals; and
    (iii) Verify currency and consistency of licensee, launch site 
operator, and reentry site operator checklists; and
    (5) Procedures for ensuring the licensee's vehicle safety 
operations personnel adhere to crew rest rules of this part.


Sec. 431.39  Mission rules, procedures, contingency plans, and 
checklists.

    (a) An applicant shall submit mission rules, procedures, 
checklists, emergency plans, and contingency abort plans, if any, that 
ensure safe conduct of mission operations during nominal and non-
nominal vehicle flight.
    (b) Mission rules, procedures, checklists, emergency plans, and 
contingency abort plans must be contained in a safety directive, 
notebook, or other compilation that is approved by the safety official 
designated under Sec. 431.33(c) of this part and concurred in by the 
launch site operator and reentry site operator, if any.
    (c) Vehicle safety operations personnel must have current and 
consistent mission checklists.


Sec. 431.41  Communications plan.

    (a) An applicant shall submit a plan providing vehicle safety 
operations personnel communications procedures during the mission. 
Procedures for effective issuance and communication of safety-critical 
information during the mission shall include hold/resume, go/no go, 
contingency abort, if any, and emergency abort commands by vehicle 
safety operations personnel. The communications plan shall describe the 
authority of vehicle safety operations personnel, by individual or 
position title, to issue these commands. The communications plan shall 
ensure that--
    (1) Communication networks are assigned so that personnel 
identified under this section have direct access to real-time, safety-
critical information required for making these decisions and issuing 
the commands;
    (2) Personnel identified under this section monitor a common 
intercom channel for safety-critical communications during launch and 
reentry;
    (3) A protocol is established for utilizing defined radio 
communications terminology; and
    (4) Communications affecting the safety of the mission are 
recorded.
    (b) An applicant shall submit procedures to ensure that licensee 
and reentry site personnel, if any, receive a copy of the 
communications plan required by this section and that the reentry site 
operator, if any, concurs with the communications plan.


Sec. 431.43  Reusable launch vehicle mission operational requirements 
and restrictions.

    (a) An applicant for RLV mission safety approval shall submit 
procedures--
    (1) That ensure RLV mission risks do not exceed the criteria set 
forth in

[[Page 19661]]

Sec. 431.35 of this part for nominal and non-nominal operations;
    (2) That ensure conformance with the system safety process and 
associated hazard identification and risk assessment required under 
Sec. 431.35(c);
    (3) That ensure conformance with operational restrictions listed in 
paragraphs (c) through (e) of this section;
    (4) To monitor and verify the status of RLV safety-critical systems 
immediately before and during mission operations; and
    (5) For human activation or initiation of a flight safety system 
that safely aborts the launch of an RLV if the vehicle is not operating 
within approved mission parameters and the vehicle poses risk to public 
health and safety and the safety of property in excess of acceptable 
flight risk as defined in Sec. 431.35.
    (b) To satisfy risk criteria set forth in Sec. 431.35(b)(1), an 
applicant for RLV mission safety approval shall identify suitable and 
attainable locations for nominal landing and vehicle staging impact, if 
any. An application shall identify such locations for a contingency 
abort if necessary to satisfy risk criteria contained in 
Sec. 431.35(b)(1) during launch of an RLV. A nominal landing, vehicle 
staging impact and contingency abort location are suitable for launch 
or reentry if--
    (1) For any vehicle or vehicle stage, the area of the predicted 
three-sigma dispersion of the vehicle or vehicle stage can be wholly 
contained within the designated location; and
    (2) The location is of sufficient size to contain landing impacts, 
including debris dispersion upon impact and any toxic release.
    (c) For an RLV mission--
    (1) A collision avoidance analysis shall be performed in order to 
maintain at least a 200-kilometer separation from any inhabitable 
orbiting object during launch and reentry. The analysis shall address:
    (i) For launch, closures in a planned launch window for ascent to 
outer space or, for an orbital RLV, to initial orbit through at least 
one complete orbit;
    (ii) For reentry, the reentry trajectory;
    (iii) Expansions of the closure period by subtracting 15 seconds 
from the closure start-time and adding 15 seconds to the closure end-
time for each sequential 90 minutes elapsed time period, or portion 
there of, beginning at the time the state vectors of the orbiting 
objects were determined;
    (2) The projected instantaneous impact point (IIP) of the vehicle 
shall not have substantial dwell time over densely populated areas 
during any segment of mission flight;
    (3) There will be no unplanned physical contact between the vehicle 
or its components and payload after payload separation and debris 
generation will not result from conversion of energy sources into 
energy that fragments the vehicle or its payload. Energy sources 
include, but are not limited to, chemical, pneumatic, and kinetic 
energy; and
    (4) Vehicle safety operations personnel shall adhere to the 
following work and rest standards:
    (i) A maximum 12-hour work shift with at least 8 hours of rest 
after 12 hours of work, preceding initiation of a reentry mission or 
during the conduct of a mission;
    (ii) A maximum of 60 hours worked in the 7 days, preceding 
initiation of an RLV mission;
    (iii) A maximum of 14 consecutive work days; and
    (iv) A minimum 48-hour rest period after 5 consecutive days of 12-
hour shifts.
    (d) In addition to requirements of paragraph (c) of this section, 
any unproven RLV may only be operated--
    (1) Such that the projected instantaneous impact point (IIP) of the 
vehicle does not have substantial dwell time over populated areas; or
    (2) Such that the expected average number of casualties to members 
of the public does not exceed 30  x  10-6 (Ec 
 30  x  10-6) given a probability of vehicle 
failure equal to 1 (pf = 1) at any time the IIP is over a 
populated area;
    (e) Any RLV that enters Earth orbit may only be operated such that 
the vehicle operator is able to--
    (1) Monitor the status of safety-critical systems immediately 
before enabling reentry flight and verify that the vehicle can reenter 
safely to Earth; and
    (2) Issue a command enabling reentry of the vehicle. Reentry cannot 
be initiated autonomously under nominal circumstances without prior 
enable.


Sec. 431.45  Mishap investigation plan and emergency response plan.

    (a) An applicant shall submit a mishap investigation plan (MIP) 
containing the applicant's procedures for reporting and responding to 
launch and reentry accidents, launch and reentry incidents, or other 
mishaps, as defined in Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, that satisfies 
requirements of Sec. 415.41 of this subchapter. An applicant shall 
submit an emergency response plan (ERP) that contains procedures for 
informing the affected public of a planned reentry. An ERP will provide 
procedures to notify local officials of an off-site landing. The MIP 
and ERP shall be signed by an individual authorized to sign and certify 
the application in accordance with Sec. 413.7(c) of this chapter, the 
person responsible for the conduct of all licensed RLV mission 
activities designated under Sec. 431.33(b) of this subpart, and the 
safety official designated under Sec. 431.33(c) of this subpart. MIPs 
covering launch and reentry flight phases of an RLV mission may be 
combined in a single document.
    (b) Report requirements. A MIP shall provide for--
    (1) Immediate notification to the FAA Washington Operations Center 
in case of an event identified in paragraph (a) of this section. In 
addition to requirements of Sec. 415.41(b), the notification shall 
include:
    (i) Date and time of occurrence;
    (ii) Description of the event;
    (iii) Intended and actual location of reentry, or other landing on 
Earth;
    (iv) Identification of the vehicle;
    (v) Identification of the payload, if applicable;
    (vi) Number and general description of any fatalities and injuries;
    (vii) Property damage, if any, and an estimate of its value;
    (viii) Identification of any hazardous material, as defined in 
Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, involved in the event, whether on the 
vehicle, payload, or on the ground;
    (ix) Action taken by personnel to contain the consequences of the 
event;
    (x) Description of weather conditions at the time of the event; and
    (xi) Potential consequences for other vehicles or systems of 
similar type and proposed operations.
    (2) Submission of a written preliminary report to the FAA Associate 
Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation in the event of a 
reentry accident or reentry incident, as defined in Sec. 401.5 of this 
chapter, within 5 days of the event. The report shall identify the 
event as either a reentry accident or reentry incident and must include 
the information specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
    (c) A mishap investigation plan must contain procedures to--
    (1) Ensure the consequences of a reentry accident, reentry 
incident, or other mishap are contained and minimized;
    (2) Ensure data and physical evidence are preserved;
    (3) Investigate the cause of a reentry accident, reentry incident, 
or other mishap;
    (4) Report the mishap to the FAA;
    (5) Designate a point of contact for the FAA and the National 
Transportation Safety Board;

[[Page 19662]]

    (6) Cooperate with investigations conducted by the FAA and the 
National Transportation Safety Board;
    (7) Delineate responsibilities, including reporting 
responsibilities, for personnel assigned to conduct investigations and 
for any unrelated entities retained by the licensee to conduct or 
participate in investigations.;
    (8) Report investigation results to the FAA; and
    (9) Identify and adopt preventive measures for avoiding a 
recurrence of the event.
    (d) An emergency response plan shall provide for--
    (1) Notification to local officials in the event of an off-site 
landing so that vehicle recovery can be conducted safely and 
effectively, with minimal risk to public safety. The plan must provide 
for the quick dissemination of up to date information to the public, 
and for doing so in advance of reentry to the extent practicable.
    (2) A public information dissemination plan for informing the 
potentially affected public, in laymen's terms and in advance of a 
planned reentry, of the estimated date, time and landing location for 
the reentry activity.
    (3) An ERP shall be submitted as part of the application process.


Sec. 431.47  Denial of safety approval.

    The FAA notifies an applicant, in writing, if the FAA has denied 
safety approval for an RLV mission license application. The notice 
states the reasons for the FAA's determination. The applicant may 
respond to the reasons for the determination and request 
reconsideration.


Secs. 431.48-431.50  [Reserved]

Subpart D--Payload Reentry Review and Determination


Sec. 431.51  General.

    (a) A payload reentry review is conducted to examine the policy and 
safety issues related to the proposed reentry of a payload, other than 
a U.S. Government payload or a payload whose reentry is subject to 
regulation by another Federal agency, to determine whether the FAA will 
approve reentry of the payload.
    (b) A payload reentry review may be conducted as part of an RLV 
mission license application review or may be requested by a payload 
owner or operator in advance of or separate from an RLV mission license 
application.
    (c) A payload reentry determination will be made part of the 
licensing record on which the FAA's licensing determination is based.


Sec. 431.53  Classes of payloads.

    (a) The FAA may approve the return of a type or class of payloads 
(for example, communications or microgravity/scientific satellites).
    (b) The RLV mission licensee that will return a payload approved 
for reentry under this section, is responsible for providing current 
information in accordance with Sec. 431.57 regarding the payload 
proposed for reentry no later than 60 days before a scheduled RLV 
mission involving that payload.


Sec. 431.55  Payload reentry review.

    (a) In conducting a payload reentry review to decide if the FAA 
should approve reentry of a payload, the FAA determines whether its 
reentry presents any issues that would adversely affect U.S. national 
security or foreign policy interests, would jeopardize public health 
and safety or the safety of property, or would not be consistent with 
international obligations of the United States.
    (b) The FAA consults with the Department of Defense to determine 
whether reentry of a proposed payload presents any issues adversely 
affecting U.S. national security.
    (c) The FAA consults with the Department of State to determine 
whether reentry of a proposed payload presents any issues adversely 
affecting U.S. foreign policy interests or international obligations.
    (d) The FAA consults with other Federal agencies, including the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, authorized to address 
issues identified under paragraph (a) of this section.
    (e) The FAA advises a person requesting a payload reentry 
determination, in writing, of any issue raised during a payload reentry 
review that would impede the issuance of a favorable determination to 
reenter that payload. The person requesting a payload reentry review 
may respond, in writing, or revise its application.


Sec. 431.57  Information requirements for payload reentry review.

    A person requesting reentry review of a particular payload or 
payload class must identify the following:
    (a) Payload name or class and function;
    (b) Physical characteristics, dimensions, and weight of the 
payload;
    (c) Payload owner and operator, if different from the person 
requesting the payload reentry review;
    (d) Type, amount, and container of hazardous materials, as defined 
in Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, and radioactive materials in the 
payload;
    (e) Explosive potential of payload materials, alone and in 
combination with other materials found on the payload or RLV during 
reentry;
    (f) Designated reentry site(s); and
    (g) Method for securing the payload on the RLV.


Sec. 431.59  Issuance of payload reentry determination.

    (a) The FAA issues a favorable payload reentry determination unless 
it determines that reentry of the proposed payload would adversely 
affect U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, would 
jeopardize public health and safety or the safety of property, or would 
not be consistent with international obligations of the United States. 
The FAA responds to any person who has requested a payload reentry 
review of its determination in writing. The notice states the reasons 
for the determination in the event of an unfavorable determination.
    (b) Any person issued an unfavorable payload reentry determination 
may respond to the reasons for the determination and request 
reconsideration.


Sec. 431.61  Incorporation of payload reentry determination in license 
application.

    A favorable payload reentry determination issued for a payload or 
class of payload may be included by an RLV mission license applicant as 
part of its application. Before the conduct of an RLV mission involving 
a payload approved for reentry, any change in information provided 
under Sec. 431.57 of this subpart must be reported by the licensee in 
accordance with Sec. 413.17 of this chapter. The FAA determines whether 
a favorable payload reentry determination remains valid and may conduct 
an additional payload reentry review.


Secs. 431.62-431.70  [Reserved]

Subpart E--Post-Licensing Requirements--Reusable Launch Vehicle 
Mission License Terms and Conditions


Sec. 431.71  Public safety responsibility.

    (a) A licensee is responsible for ensuring the safe conduct of an 
RLV mission and for protecting public health and safety and the safety 
of property during the conduct of the mission.
    (b) A licensee must conduct a licensed RLV mission and perform RLV 
safety procedures in accordance with representations made in its 
license application. A licensee's failure to perform safety procedures 
in accordance with the representations made in the license application 
or comply with any license condition is sufficient basis for

[[Page 19663]]

the revocation of a license or other appropriate enforcement action.


Sec. 431.73  Continuing accuracy of license application; application 
for modification of license.

    (a) A licensee is responsible for the continuing accuracy of 
representations contained in its application for the entire term of the 
license.
    (b) After a license has been issued, a licensee must apply to the 
FAA for modification of the license if'
    (1) The licensee proposes to conduct an RLV mission or perform a 
safety-critical operation in a manner not authorized by the license; or
    (2) Any representation contained in the license application that is 
material to public health and safety or the safety of property is no 
longer accurate and complete or does not reflect the licensee's 
procedures governing the actual conduct of an RLV mission. A change is 
material to public health and safety or the safety of property if it 
alters or affects the--
    (i) Mission rules, reentry plans, contingency abort plans, if any, 
or emergency plans submitted in accordance with Sec. 431.39 of this 
part;
    (ii) Class of payload;
    (iii) Type of RLV;
    (iv) Any safety-critical system;
    (v) Type and container of the hazardous material carried by the 
vehicle;
    (vi) Flight trajectory;
    (vii) Launch site or reentry site; or
    (viii) Any safety system, policy, procedure, requirement, criteria, 
or standard.
    (c) An application to modify an RLV mission license must be 
prepared and submitted in accordance with part 413 of this chapter. The 
licensee must indicate any part of its license or license application 
that would be changed or affected by a proposed modification.
    (d) The FAA reviews determinations and approvals required by this 
chapter to determine whether they remain valid after submission of a 
proposed modification.
    (e) Upon approval of a modification, the FAA issues either a 
written approval to the licensee or a license order amending the 
license if a stated term or condition of the license is changed, added, 
or deleted. An approval has the full force and effect of a license 
order and is part of the licensing record.


Sec. 431.75  Agreements.

    (a) Launch and reentry site use agreements. Before conducting a 
licensed RLV mission using property and services of a Federal launch 
range or licensed launch or reentry site operator, a licensee or 
applicant shall enter into an agreement with the Federal launch range 
and/or licensed site operator that provides for access to and use of 
property and services required to support a licensed RLV mission or 
reentry and for public safety related operations and support. The 
agreement shall be in effect before any licensed RLV mission or 
reentry. A licensee shall comply with any requirements of the agreement 
that may affect public health and safety and the safety of property 
during the conduct of its licensed activity.
    (b) Agreements for notices to mariners and airmen. Unless otherwise 
addressed in agreements between a licensed launch site operator and the 
U.S. Coast Guard and the FAA, respectively, a licensee authorized to 
conduct an RLV mission using a launch site or reentry site other than a 
Federal launch range shall complete the following:
    (1) An agreement between the licensee and the local U.S. Coast 
Guard district to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice to 
Mariners prior to a launch or reentry and other measures as the Coast 
Guard deems necessary to protect public health and safety; and
    (2) An agreement between the licensee and the FAA regional office 
having jurisdiction over the airspace through which a launch and 
reentry will take place, to establish procedures for the issuance of a 
Notice to Airmen prior to the conduct of a licensed launch or reentry 
and for closing of air routes during the respective launch and reentry 
windows and other measures deemed necessary by the FAA regional office 
in order protect public health and safety.


Sec. 431.77  Records.

    (a) Except as specified in paragraph (b) of this section, a 
licensee shall maintain for 3 years all records, data, and other 
material necessary to verify that a licensed RLV mission is conducted 
in accordance with representations contained in the licensee's 
application.
    (b) In the event of a launch accident, reentry accident, launch 
incident or reentry incident, as defined in Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, 
a licensee shall preserve all records related to the event. Records 
must be retained until completion of any Federal investigation and the 
FAA advises the licensee that the records need not be retained. The 
licensee shall make all records required to be maintained under the 
regulations available to Federal officials for inspection and copying.


Sec. 431.79  Reusable launch vehicle mission reporting requirements.

    (a) Not less than 60 days before each RLV mission conducted under a 
license, a licensee shall provide the FAA with the following 
information:
    (1) Payload information in accordance with Sec. 431.57 of this 
part; and
    (2) Flight information, including the vehicle, launch site, planned 
launch and reentry flight path, and intended landing sites including 
contingency abort sites.
    (3) Launch or reentry waivers, approved or pending, from a federal 
range for which the launch or reentry will take place, that are unique 
and may affect public safety.
    (b) Not later than 15 days before each licensed RLV mission, a 
licensee must notify the FAA, in writing, of the time and date of the 
intended launch and reentry or other landing on Earth of the RLV.
    (c) A licensee must report a launch accident, launch incident, 
reentry accident, reentry incident, or other mishap immediately to the 
FAA Operations Center and provide a written preliminary report in the 
event of a launch accident, launch incident, reentry accident, or 
reentry incident, in accordance with the mishap investigation and 
emergency response plan submitted as part of its license application 
under Sec. 431.45 of this part.


Sec. 431.81  Financial responsibility requirements.

    A licensee under this part must comply with financial 
responsibility requirements specified in its license.


Sec. 431.83  Compliance monitoring.

    A licensee shall allow access by, and cooperate with, federal 
officers or employees or other individuals authorized by the FAA to 
observe any activities of the licensee, or of the licensee's 
contractors or subcontractors, associated with the conduct of a 
licensed RLV mission.


Sec. 431.85  Registration of space objects.

    (a) To assist the U.S. Government in implementing Article IV of the 
1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 
each licensee shall provide to the FAA the information required by 
paragraph (b) of this section for all objects placed in space by a 
licensed RLV mission, including an RLV and any components, except:
    (1) Any object owned and registered by the U.S. Government; and
    (2) Any object owned by a foreign entity.
    (b) For each object that must be registered in accordance with this

[[Page 19664]]

section, a licensee shall submit the following information not later 
than thirty (30) days following the conduct of a licensed RLV mission :
    (1) The international designator of the space object(s);
    (2) Date and location of the RLV mission initiation;
    (3) General function of the space object; and (4) Final orbital 
parameters, including:
    (i) Nodal period;
    (ii) Inclination;
    (iii) Apogee; and
    (iv) Perigee.
    (c) A licensee shall notify the FAA when it removes an object that 
it has previously placed in space.


Secs. 431.86-431.90  [Reserved]

Subpart F--Environmental Review


Sec. 431.91  General.

    An applicant shall provide the FAA with sufficient information to 
analyze the environmental impacts associated with proposed operation of 
an RLV, including the impacts of anticipated activities to be performed 
at its reentry site. The information provided by an applicant must be 
sufficient to enable the FAA to comply with the requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., the Council 
on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the Procedural 
Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 40 CFR parts 1500-
1508, and the FAA's Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts, 
FAA Order 1050.1D. This incorporation by reference was approved by the 
Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 
1 CFR part 51. Copies of FAA Order 1050.1D may be obtained from the 
Office of Environment and Energy, AEE-300, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, 
(202) 267-3553. Copies of FAA Order 1050.1D may be inspected in the 
Rules Docket at the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the 
Chief Counsel, AGC-200, Room 915G, 800 Independence Avenue SW., 
Washington, DC 20591 weekdays between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., or at 
the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street NW., Suite 
700, Washington, DC 20001.


Sec. 431.93  Environmental information.

    An applicant shall submit environmental information concerning--
    (a) A designated reentry site, including contingency abort 
locations, if any, not covered by existing FAA environmental 
documentation;
    (b) A proposed new RLV with characteristics falling measurably 
outside the parameters of existing environmental documentation;
    (c) A proposed reentry to an established reentry site involving an 
RLV with characteristics falling measurably outside the parameters of 
existing environmental impact statements covering that site;
    (d) A proposed payload that may have significant environmental 
impacts in the event of a reentry accident; and
    (e) Other factors as necessary to comply with the National 
Environmental Policy Act.
    19. Part 433 is added to read as follows:

PART 433--LICENSE TO OPERATE A REENTRY SITE

Subpart A--General

Sec.
433.1  General.
433.3  Issuance of a license to operate a reentry site.
433.5  Operational restrictions on a reentry site.
433.7  Environmental.
433.9  Environmental information.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121


Sec. 433.1  General.

    The FAA evaluates on an individual basis an applicant's proposal to 
operate a reentry site.


Sec. 433.3  Issuance of a license to operate a reentry site.

    (a) The FAA issues a license to operate a reentry site when it 
determines that an applicant's operation of the reentry site does not 
jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national 
security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of 
the United States.
    (b) A license to operate a reentry site authorizes a licensee to 
operate a reentry site in accordance with the representations contained 
in the licensee's application, subject to the licensee's compliance 
with terms and conditions contained in any license order accompanying 
the license.


Sec. 433.5  Operational restrictions on a reentry site.

    A license to operate a reentry site authorizes the licensee to 
offer use of the site to support reentry of a reentry vehicle for which 
the three-sigma footprint of the vehicle upon reentry is wholly 
contained within the site.


Sec. 433.7  Environmental.

    An applicant shall provide the FAA with information for the FAA to 
analyze the environmental impacts associated with proposed operation of 
a reentry site. The information provided by an applicant must be 
sufficient to enable the FAA to comply with the requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (NEPA), the 
Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the 
Procedural Provisions of NEPA, 40 CFR Parts 1500-1508, and the FAA's 
Procedures for Consideration Environmental Impacts, FAA Order 1050.1D.


Sec. 433.9  Environmental information.

    An applicant shall submit environmental information concerning a 
proposed reentry site not covered by existing environmental 
documentation for purposes of assessing reentry impacts.
    20. Part 435 is added to read as follows:

PART 435--REENTRY OF A REENTRY VEHICLE OTHER THAN A REUSABLE LAUNCH 
VEHICLE (RLV)

Subpart A--General

Sec.
435.1  Scope.
435.3  Types of reentry licenses.
435.5  Policy and safety approvals.
435.7  Payload reentry determinations.
435.9  Issuance of a reentry license.
435.11  Additional license terms and conditions.
435.13  Transfer of a reentry license.
435.15  Rights not conferred by reentry license.
435.16-435.20  [Reserved]

Subpart B--Policy Review and Approval for Reentry of a Reentry Vehicle

435.21  General.
435.23  Policy review requirements and procedures.
435.24-435.30  [Reserved]

Subpart C--Safety Review and Approval for Reentry of a Reentry Vehicle

435.31  General.
435.33  Safety review requirements and procedures.
435.35  Acceptable reentry risk for reentry of a reentry vehicle.
435.36-435.40  [Reserved]

Subpart D--Payload Reentry Review and Determination

435.41  General.
435.43  Payload reentry review requirements and procedures.
435.44-435.50  [Reserved]

Subpart E--Post-Licensing Requirements--Reentry License Terms and 
Conditions

435.51  General.
435.52-435.60  [Reserved]

Subpart F--Environmental Review

435.61  General.
435.62-435.70  [Reserved]


[[Page 19665]]


    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70119.

Subpart A--General


Sec. 435.1  Scope.

    This part prescribes requirements for obtaining a license to 
reenter a reentry vehicle other than a reusable launch vehicle (RLV), 
and post-licensing requirements with which a licensee must comply to 
remain licensed. Requirements for preparing a license application are 
contained in part 413 of this subchapter.


Sec. 435.3  Types of reentry licenses.

    (a) Reentry-specific license. A reentry-specific license authorizes 
a licensee to reenter one model or type of reentry vehicle, other than 
an RLV, to a reentry site. A reentry-specific license may authorize 
more than one reentry and identifies each reentry authorized under the 
license. A licensee's authorization to reenter terminates upon 
completion of all activities authorized by the license or the 
expiration date stated in the reentry license, whichever occurs first.
    (b) Reentry operator license. A reentry operator license authorizes 
a licensee to reenter any of a designated family of reentry vehicles, 
other than an RLV, within authorized parameters, including 
trajectories, transporting specified classes of payloads to any reentry 
site designated in the license. A reentry operator license is valid for 
a 2-year renewable term.


Sec. 435.5  Policy and safety approvals.

    To obtain a reentry license, an applicant must obtain policy and 
safety approvals from the FAA. Requirements for obtaining these 
approvals are contained in subparts B and C of this part. Only a 
reentry license applicant may apply for the approvals, and may apply 
for either approval separately and in advance of submitting a complete 
license application, using the application procedures contained in part 
413 of this subchapter.


Sec. 435.7  Payload reentry determinations.

    (a) A payload reentry determination is required to transport a 
payload to Earth on a reentry vehicle unless the proposed payload is 
exempt from payload review.
    (b) A payload reentry determination made under a previous license 
application under this subchapter may satisfy the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this section.
    (c) The FAA conducts a review, as described in subpart D of this 
part, to make a payload reentry determination. Either a reentry license 
applicant or a payload owner or operator may request a review of the 
proposed payload using the application procedures contained in part 413 
of this subchapter. Upon receipt of an application, the FAA may conduct 
a payload reentry review independently of a reentry license 
application.


Sec. 435.9  Issuance of a reentry license.

    (a) The FAA issues a reentry license to an applicant who has 
obtained all approvals and determinations required under this chapter 
for a reentry license.
    (b) A reentry license authorizes a licensee to reenter a reentry 
vehicle and payload, if any, in accordance with the representations 
contained in the reentry licensee's application, subject to the 
licensee's compliance with terms and conditions contained in license 
orders accompanying the reentry license, including financial 
responsibility requirements.


Sec. 435.11  Additional license terms and conditions.

    The FAA may amend a reentry license at any time by modifying or 
adding license terms and conditions to ensure compliance with 49 U.S.C. 
Subtitle IX, chapter 701, and applicable regulations.


Sec. 435.13  Transfer of a reentry license.

    (a) Only the FAA may transfer a reentry license.
    (b) An applicant for transfer of a reentry license shall submit a 
reentry license application in accordance with part 413 of this 
subchapter and satisfy the applicable requirements of this part. The 
FAA will transfer a reentry license to an applicant who has obtained 
all of the approvals and determinations required under this chapter for 
a reentry license. In conducting its reviews and issuing approvals and 
determinations, the FAA may incorporate any findings made part of the 
record to support the initial licensing determination. The FAA may 
modify a reentry license to reflect any changes necessary as a result 
of a reentry license transfer.


Sec. 435.15  Rights not conferred by reentry license.

    Issuance of a reentry license does not relieve a licensee of its 
obligation to comply with requirements of law that may apply to its 
activities.


Secs. 435.16-431.20  [Reserved]

Subpart B--Policy Review and Approval for Reentry of a Reentry 
Vehicle


Sec. 435.21  General.

    The FAA issues a policy approval to a reentry license applicant 
upon completion of a favorable policy review. A policy approval is part 
of the licensing record on which the licensing determination is based.


Sec. 435.23  Policy review requirements and procedures.

    Unless otherwise indicated in this subpart, regulations applicable 
to policy review and approval of the reentry of an RLV contained in 
part 431, subpart B of this subchapter shall apply to the policy review 
conducted for a license to reenter a reentry vehicle under this part.


Secs. 435.24-435.30  [Reserved]

Subpart C--Safety Review and Approval for Reentry of a Reentry 
Vehicle


Sec. 435.31  General.

    The FAA conducts a safety review to determine whether an applicant 
is capable of reentering a reentry vehicle and payload, if any, to a 
designated reentry site without jeopardizing public health and safety 
and the safety of property. A safety approval is part of the licensing 
record on which the licensing determination is based.


Sec. 435.33  Safety review requirements and procedures.

    Unless otherwise stated in this subpart, regulations applicable to 
safety review and approval of the reentry of an RLV contained in part 
431, subpart C of this subchapter shall apply to the policy review 
conducted for a license to reenter a reentry vehicle under this part.


Sec. 435.35  Acceptable reentry risk for reentry of a reentry vehicle.

    To obtain safety approval reentry, an applicant must demonstrate 
that risk for the proposed reentry, when assessed in combination with 
launch of the reentry vehicle, does not exceed acceptable risk for the 
conduct of an RLV mission as defined in paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
Sec. 431.35 of this subchapter.


Secs. 435.36-435.40  [Reserved]

Subpart D--Payload Reentry Review and Determination


Sec. 435.41  General.

    The FAA conducts a payload reentry review to examine the policy and 
safety issues related to the proposed reentry of a payload, except a 
U.S. Government payload, to determine whether the FAA will approve the 
reentry of the payload.


Sec. 435.43  Payload reentry review requirements and procedures.

    Unless otherwise indicated in this subpart, regulations contained 
in part 431, subpart B of this subchapter applicable to a payload 
reentry review and determination for reentering a payload using an RLV 
shall apply to the payload reentry review conducted for a

[[Page 19666]]

license to reenter a reentry vehicle under this part.


Secs. 435.44-435.50  [Reserved]

Subpart E--Post-Licensing Requirements--Reentry License Terms and 
Conditions


Sec. 435.51  General.

    Unless otherwise indicated in this subpart, post-licensing 
requirements contained in part 431 subpart E of this subchapter 
applicable to a license to reenter an RLV shall apply to a license 
issued under this part.


Secs. 435.52-435.60  [Reserved]

Subpart F--Environmental Review


Sec. 435.61  General.

    Unless otherwise indicated in this subpart, environmental review 
requirements contained in part 431 subpart F, applicable to a license 
to reenter an RLV shall apply to an application for a reentry license 
under this part.


Secs. 435.62-435.70  [Reserved]

    Issued in Washington, DC, on April 13, 1999.
Patricia Grace Smith,
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation.
[FR Doc. 99-9640 Filed 4-20-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P