[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 76 (Wednesday, April 21, 1999)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 19586-19624]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-9639]



[[Page 19585]]

_______________________________________________________________________

Part II





Department of Transportation





_______________________________________________________________________



Federal Aviation Administration



_______________________________________________________________________



14 CFR Parts 401 et al.



Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Regulations; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 64, No. 76 / Wednesday, April 21, 1999 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 19586]]



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 401, 411, 413, 415 and 417

[Docket No. 28851; Amdt. Nos. 401-01, 411-01, 413-01, 415-01 and 417-
01]
RIN 2120-AF99


Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Regulations

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Associate Administrator for Commercial Space 
Transportation of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department 
of Transportation (DOT) is amending the FAA's commercial space 
transportation licensing regulations. The FAA amends its licensing 
regulations in order to clarify its license application process 
generally, and for launches from federal launch ranges, specifically. 
The regulations are intended to provide applicants and licensees 
greater specificity and clarity regarding the scope of a license, and 
to codify and amend licensing requirements and criteria.

EFFECTIVE DATE: June 21, 1999. An application pending at the time of 
the effective date must conform to any new requirements of this 
rulemaking as of the effective date. All license terms and conditions, 
and all safety requirements of this rulemaking also apply as of the 
effective date.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: J. Randall Repcheck, Licensing and 
Safety Division (AST-200), Associate Administrator for Commercial Space 
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, DOT, Room 331, 800 
Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-
8379; or Laura Montgomery, Office of the Chief Counsel (AGC-250), 
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., 
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-3150.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Availability of Final Rules

    Any person may obtain a copy of this final rule by submitting a 
request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, 
800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 
267-9680. Communications must identify the amendment number or docket 
number of this final rule. Persons interested in being placed on a 
mailing list for future FAA notices of proposed rulemaking and final 
rules should request a copy of Advisory Circular No. 11-2A, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking Distribution System, which describes application 
procedures.
    An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem 
and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section 
of the Fedworld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 703-321-
3339) or the Government Printing Office's electronic bulletin board 
service (telephone 202-512-1661) or the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking 
Advisory Committee Bulletin Board service (telephone: 800-322-2722 or 
202-267-5948). Internet users may reach the FAA's web page at http://
www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the Government Printing Office's 
webpage at http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/aces/aces140.html for access 
to recently published rulemaking documents.
    In order to enhance communications regarding commercial space 
transportation with the public, the FAA developed an internet-based 
information system, which provides the public with electronic access to 
the FAA. The system provides on-line information to interested parties, 
and allows applicants, through a secure portion of the system, to check 
the status of applications and licenses. The system currently contains 
a limited amount of information, but includes schedules of upcoming 
commercial launches, the FAA's regulations, guidance documents, and 
research studies. The address is: http://ast.faa.gov/.

Small Entity Inquiries

    If you are a small entity and have a question, contact your local 
FAA official. If you do not know how to contact your local FAA 
official, you may contact Charlene Brown, Program Analyst Staff, Office 
of Rulemaking, ARM-27, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 
Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, 1-888-551-1594. Internet 
users can find additional information on SBREFA in the ``Quick Jump'' 
section of the FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov and may send 
electronic inquiries to the following Internet address: 9-AWA-
[email protected].

Introduction

    By this rulemaking, the FAA clarifies license application 
procedures and requirements. The FAA's revisions to its regulations 
provide information regarding the scope of a launch license, the 
criteria for obtaining a license for expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) 
launching from federal launch ranges, and the underlying safety 
rationale for the FAA's launch licensing regime. These regulations also 
explain that the FAA will license the operation of a launch site or the 
launch of a launch vehicle from a site that is not operated by a 
federal launch range on a case by case basis.

History and Current Revisions

    The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as codified at 49 U.S.C. 
Subtitle IX--Commercial Space Transportation, ch. 701, Commercial Space 
Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121 (the Act), authorizes the 
Secretary of Transportation to oversee, license and regulate commercial 
launch and reentry activities and the operation of launch and reentry 
as carried out by U.S. citizens or within the United States. 49 U.S.C. 
70104, 70105. The Act directs the Secretary to exercise this 
responsibility consistent with public health and safety, safety of 
property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the 
United States, 49 U.S.C. 70105, and to encourage, facilitate and 
promote commercial space launches by the private sector, 49 U.S.C. 
70103.
    The FAA carries out the Secretary's responsibilities for licensing 
and regulating launches and the operation of launch sites. Prior to 
November 15, 1995, the Secretary's responsibilities were implemented by 
the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (the Office), which was 
located within the Office of the Secretary in the Department of 
Transportation. Now, the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space 
Transportation is part of DOT's Federal Aviation Administration. When 
this administrative change was effected, the Secretary delegated the 
statutory authority over the regulation of commercial space 
transportation to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
Administration, and the Administrator redelegated this authority to the 
Associate Administrator.
    On August 4, 1994, President Clinton announced a new National Space 
Transportation Policy reaffirming the government's commitment to the 
commercial space transportation industry and the critical role of the 
Department of Transportation in encouraging and facilitating private 
sector launch activities. In 1996, President Clinton signed a National 
Space Policy, which recognized the Department of Transportation as the 
lead federal agency for regulatory guidance regarding commercial space 
transportation activities. The FAA's

[[Page 19587]]

rules, by offering greater specificity and certainty regarding 
licensing requirements and the scope of a license, should assist the 
launch industry in its business and operational planning. This will 
facilitate the private sector's launch activities by increasing 
certainty and by easing its regulatory burden.

Background on the FAA's Commercial Launch Licensing History and Process

    The FAA licenses commercial launches and the commercial operation 
of launch sites through 14 CFR Ch. III. In April 1988, when the then 
Office of Commercial Space Transportation first issued final 
regulations, no licensed launches had yet taken place. Accordingly, the 
Office established a flexible regime intended to be responsive to an 
emerging industry while at the same time ensuring public safety. The 
Office noted that it would ``continue to evaluate and, when necessary, 
reshape its program in response to growth, innovation and diversity in 
this critically important industry.'' Commercial Space Transportation 
Licensing Regulations, 53 FR 11004, 11006 (Apr. 4, 1988). Under the 
1988 regulations the Office implemented a case-by-case approach for the 
evaluation of launch license applications. All commercial launches at 
the time took place from federal launch ranges.
    In conjunction with information guidelines describing the Office's 
application process, the Office's regulations reflected the intent of 
Congress that the Office evaluate the policy aspects and safety of a 
proposed launch. The Office followed a case-by-case approach to 
performing these reviews, tailoring its information requests to the 
specifics of a given launch proposal.
    Later, the Office took further steps designed to simplify the 
licensing process for launch operators with established safety records. 
For example, before issuing its final rules in 1988, the Office issued 
interim regulations, in which it had contemplated the possibility that 
``one license could cover a specified series of launches where the same 
safety resources [would] support identical or similar missions.'' 
Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Regulations; Interim Final 
Rule and Request for Comments, 51 FR 6870, 6872 (Feb. 26, 1986). In 
1991, the Office implemented this option by instituting a launch 
operator license for similar launches carried out by a single licensee. 
The launch operator license currently authorizes a licensee to conduct 
any number of launches within defined parameters over the course of a 
two year period. The FAA has continued to apply a case by case analysis 
to licenses authorizing a single launch or to licenses authorizing a 
set of specifically identified launches.
    The FAA, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 70112 and 14 CFR Ch. III, 
part 440, imposes financial responsibility requirements on a licensee, 
commensurate with the scope of its license, pursuant to which a 
licensee is required either to purchase insurance to protect launch 
participants in the event of claims by third parties and to protect 
against damage to government property, or to otherwise demonstrate 
financial responsibility. In the event that there were a launch 
accident and third party claims arising out of that launch exceeded the 
financial responsibility required by the FAA, the Act contains 
procedures through which the government of the United States may pay 
those excess claims up to a statutory ceiling. See 49 U.S.C. 70113. The 
possible payment of excess claims by the government for damages related 
to a particular launch is commonly referred to, albeit erroneously, as 
``indemnification'' of the launch industry. The payment of excess 
claims constitutes, in fact, only a provisional agreement by the 
government of the United States subject to conditions, including 
Congressional appropriation of funds.

Growth and Current Status of Launch Industry

    The number of commercial space launches has steadily grown over the 
years since the first licensed commercial launch in 1989. As of April 
13, 1999, 110 licensed launches have taken place from five different 
federal launch ranges, and from two non-federal launch sites. Launch 
vehicles have included traditional orbital launch vehicles such as the 
Atlas, Titan and Delta, as well as suborbital vehicles such as the 
Starfire. New vehicles using traditional launch techniques include 
Lockheed Martin's Athena I and II, EER's Conestoga, Orbital Sciences 
Corporation's Taurus, and Boeing's Delta III. Unique vehicles such as 
the Pegasus are also included in this count. New launch vehicles are 
proposed every year. For example, the Pegasus air-launched rocket has 
been developed since the passage of the Act. On the horizon are sea-
launched rockets, Lockheed Martin's Atlas III and Boeing's and Lockheed 
Martin's evolved expendable launch vehicles. A number of companies are 
proposing partially and fully reusable launch vehicles. Several 
companies are participating in partnership with the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to develop X-33 and X-34 
launch vehicles incorporating reusable and single-stage-to-orbit 
technology, which could result in vehicles for commercial use.
    Currently, commercial launches take place from federal launch 
ranges operated by the Department of Defense and NASA. Launch operators 
bring launch vehicles to federal ranges such as Cape Canaveral Air 
Station, Vandenberg Air Force Base, White Sands Missile Range and 
Wallops Flight Facility for launch. A launch operator obtains a number 
of services from a federal range, including radar, tracking and 
telemetry, flight termination and other launch services. Pursuant to an 
agreement between a federal launch range and a launch operator, the 
federal range has final authority over decisions regarding whether to 
allow a launch to proceed. A federal range operates pursuant to its own 
internal rules and procedures, and the launch operator must comply with 
those rules and procedures in addition to the requirements of the FAA.
    The U.S. commercial space transportation industry faces strong 
international competition. Ariane, Europe's launch vehicle, continues 
to be the market leader, with other competition coming from China, 
Russia, and Ukraine. The U.S. industry still obtains a significant 
percentage of launch contracts, and AST projects over seventy 
commercial orbital launches within the next three years.
    Additionally, U.S. participation in international ventures is 
increasing. For example, International Launch Services (ILS), comprised 
of Lockheed Martin Corporation, Khrunichev Enterprise and NPO Energia, 
markets Russia's Proton rockets and the U.S. Atlas. Another 
international partnership, Sea Launch Limited Partnership (Sea Launch), 
involves Boeing Commercial Space Company, S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space 
Corporation Energia, KB Yuzhnoye and PO Yuzhnoye Mashinostroitelny 
Zavod, and Kvaerner Moss Technologies a.s., which are U.S., Russian, 
Ukrainian and Norwegian companies, respectively. Sea Launch has 
launched a commercial rocket from a modified oil rig located in the 
Pacific Ocean. Orbital Sciences Corporation has conducted a launch 
outside the United States and envisions more.

Current Revisions to Licensing Regulations

    With six years of experience in regulating the commercial launch 
industry, the DOT Office of Commercial Space Transportation initiated a 
process for standardizing its licensing

[[Page 19588]]

regulations. Originally, when the Office first initiated its licensing 
program, the Office did not possess standardized rules or requirements. 
Accordingly, it evaluated each license application individually to 
ensure that a proposed launch would not jeopardize public health and 
safety, the safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign 
policy interests or international obligations of the United States. 
Over the course of time, and with the input of licensees and federal 
launch ranges, the FAA has evolved a standardized approach to licensing 
launches from federal launch ranges. Accordingly, the FAA now 
implements that approach through revisions to its regulations.
    On October 13, 1994, in anticipation of issuing a notice of 
proposed rulemaking, the Office of Commercial Space Transportation, 
DOT, announced that it was holding a public meeting to obtain 
industry's views to assist the Office in developing an NPRM that would 
address specific requirements for launch and launch site operator 
licenses. Notice of Public Meeting, 59 FR 52020 (1994). The Office 
stated that it would streamline its launch licensing process by 
standardizing requirements and by codifying certain information 
requirements in its regulations. Id. The Office also advised the public 
that it would promulgate rules concerning licensing the operation of a 
launch site. Id. The FAA proposes to implement rules of general 
applicability for operation of a launch site through an additional 
notice of proposed rulemaking in order to foster certainty for this new 
industry as well. Id. The public meeting took place on October 27, and 
28, 1994, and was attended by representatives of the commercial launch 
industry, payload companies, prospective commercial launch site 
operators, interested government agencies, both state and federal, and 
the public.
    On March 19, 1997, the FAA released a notice of proposed rulemaking 
proposing to amend its licensing requirements. Commercial Space 
Transportation Licensing Regulations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM), 62 FR 13216 (Mar. 19, 1997). In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to 
narrow its definition of launch from ``gate to gate,'' which resulted 
in the licensing of the launch related activities of a launch operator 
at a federal launch range prior to the arrival of the launch vehicle, 
to ``vehicle at the gate,'' which encompasses only the launch 
operator's activities once its vehicle arrives. The NPRM proposed a 
launch license application process developed through its case by case 
license history, including the implementation of certain safety 
proposals recommended by the National Transportation Safety Board. The 
FAA also proposed to streamline and reorganize a variety of other 
licensing provisions. The comment period closed May 19, 1997. At the 
request of several launch operators, the FAA reopened the comment 
period until August 4, 1997. The FAA received comments from a number of 
interested parties, including launch operators, a payload provider, a 
launch site operator and prospective reusable launch vehicle operators.
    The Environmental Protection Agency commented on the FAA's 
environmental procedures. The launch operators who filed comments 
included Boeing Commercial Space Company, Lockheed Martin Corporation, 
McDonnell Douglas Aerospace, and Orbital Sciences Corporation. Reusable 
launch vehicle operators' views were represented by Kistler Aerospace 
Corporation, Rotary Rocket Company, and Space Access. Hughes 
Electronics, Spaceport Florida Authority, and the National 
Transportation Safety Board also filed comments. The comments focused 
on several major issues, with the proposed definition of launch 
eliciting the most attention. Foreign ownership of a license applicant 
also proved a topic of concern, as did issues surrounding the FAA's 
proposed risk threshold and various safety requirements. In light of 
the great variety of topics encompassed by this rulemaking, rather than 
devoting a single section to all of the comments, the FAA addresses the 
comments by subject matter throughout the preamble and section by 
section analysis in the relevant context.
    On October 28, 1998, the Commercial Space Act of 1998 was signed 
into law. Among other things, it revised the definition of launch to 
include activities ``involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle or 
payload for launch, when those activities take place at a launch site 
in the United States.'' P.L. 105-303 (1998), 49 U.S.C. 70102(3). The 
change affects this rulemaking's definition of launch by both 
confirming the more narrow application proposed in the NPRM and 
expanding the scope of launch to encompass launch vehicle preparatory 
activities occurring at any launch site in the United States, even when 
those activities take place at a launch site from which flight of the 
launch vehicle does not take place.

Launch License

    The amendments to the FAA's launch licensing regulations address 
the definition of ``launch,'' licensing requirements, including payload 
determinations and policy reviews, and information required from an 
applicant proposing to launch a vehicle employing established 
technology and procedures from a federal launch range. The FAA here 
changes its interpretation of the definition of ``launch'' and thus 
changes the scope of a launch license. Additionally, in contrast to 
what was originally proposed in the NPRM, which was to define with 
particularity the beginning of launch for purposes of those taking 
place from a federal launch range, the FAA will apply its proposed 
definition of launch to a launch taking place at any launch site 
located in the United States, whether that launch site is a federal 
launch range or not. Through this rulemaking the FAA is formalizing its 
practice of issuing two different types of launch licenses, a launch 
operator license pursuant to which a licensee may conduct any launches 
that fall within the broad parameters described in its license, and a 
launch-specific license, which allows a licensee to conduct only those 
launches enumerated in the license.

Scope of Launch License and Definition of ``Launch''

    The Act requires a launch operator to obtain a license for the 
launch of a launch vehicle. Accordingly, the definition of ``launch'' 
controls the scope of a launch license. Greater certainty regarding 
this definition will allow a licensee to plan better regarding a number 
of issues. Because the FAA's financial responsibility requirements and 
eligibility for payment by the United States of excess claims for 
liability for damages to third parties are coextensive with a licensed 
launch, knowledge of the scope of a launch license allows a licensee to 
manage its risks appropriately and to make its own provisions for 
financial responsibility or insurance coverage in addition to that 
required under the statute. Through this rulemaking, the FAA defines 
launch to begin with the arrival of a launch vehicle at a federal 
launch range or other U.S. launch site.1 Launch ends, for 
purposes of ground operations, when the launch vehicle leaves the 
ground, and, for purposes of flight, after the licensee's last exercise 
of control over the vehicle. The NPRM had proposed to include within 
the new definition ``[t]he term launch includes the flight of a launch 
vehicle, and those hazardous pre-flight activities that are closely

[[Page 19589]]

proximate in time to flight and are unique to space flight.'' That 
sentence is now omitted as superfluous in light of the application of 
the launch license period to all U.S. launch sites, regardless of 
whether the launch site is located on a federal launch range or not. 
The concepts guided the creation of the definition for this rulemaking, 
and will still guide the FAA in defining the beginning of launch 
outside the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ As discussed in greater detail in response to comments, the 
FAA does not define launch to commence with the arrival of a payload 
at a launch site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its NPRM, the FAA considered three options to defining launch 
and the scope of a launch license and, by necessary implication, 
possible ``indemnification'' for government property and third party 
damages arising out of a launch. The FAA noted that its approach of 
licensing the activities of a launch operator within the gates of a 
federal launch range, commonly referred to as ``gate to gate,'' had 
been criticized as too broad. The criticism came from Congress through 
non-binding report language; however, because Congress would ultimately 
prove the source of funding for any possible ``indemnification,'' the 
FAA was concerned that ``gate to gate'' might eventually mislead 
industry into inappropriately relying on the government for money that 
was not available. Congress might deny funding on the grounds that pre-
flight preparation did not constitute part of launch under 49 U.S.C. 
Subtitle IX, ch. 701.2 Accordingly, the FAA considered two 
approaches to narrowing its definition of launch. It considered, but 
rejected, defining launch as commencing with ignition. Instead, it 
proposed to define launch as commencing with the arrival of a launch 
vehicle at a federal launch range from which flight would occur. The 
FAA also proposed in its NPRM to clarify when launch ended. With 
flight, launch ends when the last action over which a licensee has 
direct control is performed. As proposed in the NPRM, ground operations 
would no longer be deemed part of launch when an expendable launch 
vehicle left the ground. With the changes to the definition brought 
about by the Commercial Space Act of 1998, the FAA revises the 
definition to include activities involved in the preparation of a 
launch vehicle for launch, when those activities take place at a launch 
site in the United States. The FAA now adopts those changes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Although originally prompted to revisit the scope of launch 
out of concern for the availability of funding, the FAA's revision 
derives from its interpretation of the Act as a whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In reaching its final decision regarding its interpretation of 
launch, the FAA considered a number of factors. The statutory 
definition provided the first line of inquiry. The FAA also took into 
account the commenters' desire for a consistent and broad 
interpretation. Ease of administration played a role as well. In the 
end, the change in the level of risk proved determinative as to where 
in the course of preparation for flight the FAA would deem launch to 
commence.
    The FAA received comments on its proposed revisions. Boeing 
Commercial Space Company (Boeing) voiced its concern with the FAA's 
proposed definition of launch, opposing the inclusion of ground 
operations out of concern for the precedent such a definition might 
establish for launches conducted by Sea Launch, which proposes to 
launch from the ocean, and in which Boeing participates as a partner. 
Boeing believes that although some hazardous activities are part of 
launch preparation, these activities do not ``in themselves constitute 
uniquely hazardous events which should be covered in the scope of a 
launch license. Such activities should [be] and are regulated by 
existing hazardous material and operations regulations that are 
applicable to industry at large.'' Boeing at 1. According to Boeing, 
the purpose of the Act was to define the scope of launch ``so as to 
cover those operations which directly placed the general public at 
risk.'' Boeing at 1. Where more innovative launch technologies are 
employed, such as that contemplated by Sea Launch, Boeing expects that 
launch will be defined consistently with this purpose.
    Hughes Electronics (Hughes) requested that the FAA clarify whether 
a launch vehicle's payload is part of launch site activities in order 
for Hughes to determine when the possible indemnification provisions of 
the Act apply. Hughes proposed that indemnification provisions of the 
FAA's rules be clarified to apply to a payload and its components, or 
that a payload be included within the definition of launch vehicle. 
Hughes asked, in essence, that the FAA define launch, for purposes of 
including payload activities, to commence with the arrival of a payload 
at the launch site. Launch would end, under Hughes' proposal, either 
after a defined period of time or after such time as a launch vehicle 
could cause a payload accident, whichever came later. Hughes did not 
elaborate on the implementation of its proposals.
    Kistler Aerospace Corporation (Kistler), concerned that the 
proposed regulations governing expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) might 
serve as a model for rules governing reusable launch vehicles (RLVs), 
argued against including ground operations within a launch license. 
Kistler recommended, instead, that, for a liquid-fueled vehicle, launch 
be defined to commence with the fueling of a vehicle. In support of 
this position Kistler first noted that defining launch as commencing 
with the arrival of a launch vehicle at a federal launch range, may not 
or should not apply to the launch of an RLV, pointing out that although 
an ``RLV may ``arrive'' at the launch range initially, it thereafter 
returns directly and repeatedly to the launch range. Clearly, however, 
the RLV is not constantly in a ``launch'' state.'' Kistler at 7. 
Kistler also argued against the FAA position that pre-flight activities 
constitute uniquely hazardous activities. ``Many of these activities 
are entirely routine industrial activity and pose no unique hazards.'' 
Kistler at 7. Kistler maintained that subjecting all these activities 
to FAA review and prohibiting them without the issuance of a license 
would constitute an unnecessary and costly regulatory burden. Moreover, 
if the FAA were to require a license for ground activities, Kistler and 
its customers would have to sign cross-waivers with its contractor and 
subcontractors, its customers and the contractors and subcontractors of 
its customers. This, Kistler maintained, ``would distort the normal 
commercial allocation of risk and legal remedies for fault and, 
consequently, would increase insurance costs to the licensee.'' Kistler 
at 7-8.
    Kistler recommended, for a liquid fueled vehicle, that launch 
commence with fueling. This is because fueling is closely proximate in 
time to flight and may be directly attributable to space flight, unlike 
other activities, which Kistler characterized as routine industrial 
activities not directly attributable to space flight. Kistler at 8. 
Kistler did not describe the other ``routine industrial'' activities. 
Nor did it describe its basis for distinguishing between routine 
industrial activities and those that are directly attributable to space 
flight. Nonetheless, its point of view is interesting, indicating as it 
does, that there is an insurance market for ground operations, and one 
apparently affordable to a start up company such as Kistler.
    Kistler also advised that it believes that an RLV launch ends with 
the landing of the RLV, and would include any ``proximate 
consequences'' of the landing. Kistler at 9. Kistler was silent with 
respect to what it considers a proximate consequence. Kistler would not 
include post-launch ground activities within the definition of launch.

[[Page 19590]]

    Lockheed Martin also filed comments, which included correspondence 
from Marsh & McLellan, an aviation underwriter. Lockheed Martin stated 
that it ``views with serious reservations the Office's proposed 
definition of ``launch'' that would narrow the scope of a license 
issued by the Office and effectively standardize the treatment of all 
launch systems from federal ranges, without regard for the[ir] unique 
attributes * * *.'' Lockheed Martin at 1. Lockheed Martin supported the 
FAA's proposal to dispense with gate to gate as a means of defining 
launch, agreeing that it resulted in illogical exclusions. Lockheed 
Martin at 3. It maintained, however, that ``vehicle at the gate'' 
achieves the same illogical exclusions of hazardous activities 
depending on whether they take place before or after a vehicle's major 
components arrive at a federal launch range. Lockheed Martin at 3. 
Lockheed Martin also believes that the FAA's concerns regarding 
congressional report language were groundless. Lockheed Martin at 3-4.
    Lockheed Martin proposed that the FAA adopt an activity test to 
determine what may be included within the scope of a launch license. 
Lockheed Martin at 6. The FAA should ``address hazardous risks 
associated with a particular launch campaign,'' presumably on a case-
by-case basis for each license it issues. Lockheed Martin at 6. 
Lockheed Martin believed it would be instructive for the FAA, in 
considering hazardous risks, to consider the Public Law 85-804 
3 indemnification that the Department of Defense 
contractually offers its contractors. Lockheed Martin at 5. It noted 
that DoD contracts for Atlas, Titan and Delta launch services provide 
government indemnification for ``unusually hazardous risks,'' which 
include, in part, the burning, explosion or detonation of propellants, 
liquid fueled rocket engines or solid fueled rocket motors, or launch 
vehicles or their components during testing, transporting, launch 
preparation or launch. Lockheed Martin at 5. ``Unusually hazardous 
risks'' also include, according to Lockheed Martin's list, the toxic or 
other unusually hazardous properties of propellants or inert gases, 
their constituent ingredients, or their degradation products and the 
flight or surface impact of launch vehicles or components or fragments 
thereof. Lockheed Martin at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ P.L. 85-804, 50 U.S.C.A. Secs. 1431-1435 (1991 and West 
Supp. 1997), is effective only during a national emergency. 50 
U.S.C. Sec. 1435. It does not define launch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The former McDonnell Douglas Aerospace filed draft comments with a 
request for an extension of time. In its draft comments, McDonnell 
Douglas asked that the FAA continue to employ gate to gate as the scope 
of a launch license, with certain modifications. Specifically, 
McDonnell Douglas sought to extend license coverage off of a federal 
launch range, for activity that ``is consistent with standard 
commercial space industry practice.'' McDonnell Douglas does not 
elaborate on what it envisions as consistent with standard commercial 
space industry practice. The main thrust of its argument appears to be 
that it favors centralizing questions of liability and insurance within 
the FAA and removing them as subjects of Air Force launch support 
agreements.
    Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital) opposed that portion of the 
proposed definition of launch that confined a licensed launch to the 
launch site from which flight would occur. According to Orbital, the 
FAA's proposed approach was illogical because it meant that identical 
activities might in some instances be licensed and in others not. Also, 
the proposed approach would discriminate against modern launch vehicle 
technologies, so that they would be ``penalized by the denial of 
license coverage.'' Orbital at 2. Orbital, relying on 1997 report 
language, also argued that the House Science Committee opposed the 
FAA's narrowing of the definition of launch. See Civilian Space 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999, H.R. 1275, H. Rep. 65, 
51, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 21, 1997).
    Orbital proposed that the FAA adopt an activity test to determine 
what activities might be included in the definition of launch. It 
recommended that the FAA ``identify pre-launch activities generally 
common to launch systems and cover them for all launch systems if they 
are sufficiently hazardous and integral to a licensed launch, 
regardless of where or when they occur.'' Orbital at 4. Orbital 
provides a list of those of its pre-flight activities it considers 
hazardous. Orbital, Attachment 2.
    Space Access, which intends to operate a reusable launch vehicle, 
also filed comments. Space Access' comments focused on the impact on 
future developments, such as reusable launch vehicles, of the FAA's 
proposed definition of launch. Space Access opposed defining launch to 
encompass a vehicle's entire time at a launch site, and believes that 
there is no way to consistently and fairly apply the FAA's proposed 
definition of launch. Space Access noted that the FAA ``does not 
regulate the development, testing, or transportation of solid rocket 
boosters at a manufacturer's facility, even though this [is a] 
significant hazardous activity, so it should not license nor should the 
government offer to indemnify that activity just because it occurs on a 
Federal Launch Range.'' Space Access at 6. Furthermore, defining a 
vehicle's ``major components'' may ultimately prove a burdensome task 
for the FAA. Space Access at 4. Space Access also questioned the FAA's 
legal authority for its proposed definition, and does not believe that 
the Act supports the ``gate to gate'' approach. In support of this, 
Space Access pointed out that under the Act, as the NPRM also notes, 
launch does not start with launch services.
    After reviewing a number of conceptual approaches, Space Access 
recommended that the FAA define launch to begin with ``an intentional 
self propelled change in the state of equilibrium of the launch vehicle 
and any payload toward Earth orbit or outer space [that] continues 
until the launch vehicle and payload achieve[] a new state of 
equilibrium or exit[]the Earth's dominant gravitational influence.'' 
Space Access at 5. By this, Space Access intended ``vertical or 
horizontal takeoff.'' Id. For the end of launch, this would mean that 
once a vehicle completes its propellant expulsion and no other changes 
in equilibrium are planned, the launch process is over. Space Access at 
5. A change in equilibrium to reach other places in earth orbit or 
outer space would not be part of launch.
    The Spaceport Florida Authority (SFA) supported the proposed 
definition of launch as including those hazardous pre-flight activities 
that are closely proximate in time to flight and are unique to space 
flight. SFA at 1. SFA also supported the FAA's proposal to define the 
beginning of launch as commencing with the arrival of a vehicle's major 
components at a federal range. SFA opposed limiting the scope of a 
licensed launch to those activities that occur at the federal launch 
range from which flight would occur because this approach would result 
in some of the current pre-flight activity of at least two launch 
companies not being licensed. SFA at 2. SFA accordingly viewed this 
approach as discriminatory. SFA also maintained that the proposal was 
contrary to the statute, which requires consistency with public health 
and safety. SFA pointed out that in some situations the FAA would 
review certain pre-flight activities and in others it would not, thus 
resulting in no FAA safety oversight and no possibility of 
indemnification by the federal government. SFA at 2. On a separate

[[Page 19591]]

note, SFA stated its support for excluding the storage of solid rocket 
motors from the definition of ``launch.'' SFA at 3. SFA notes that such 
storage is not extremely hazardous and that commercial insurance for 
storage is available at a reasonable premium.
    The FAA considered three possible options in defining ``launch'' 
for purposes of developing proposed regulations. The FAA considered 
codifying its ``gate to gate'' definition but was concerned that ``gate 
to gate'' created a false impression that indemnification would be 
available for all commercial activities taking place within the 
confines of a federal range. The FAA also weighed the most narrow 
approach, which would employ the ordinary definition of ``launch'' as 
only those flight activities beginning at ``T minus zero (T-0),'' or 
intentional first stage ignition; but the FAA initially determined in 
its NPRM that this approach failed to provide regulatory oversight of 
certain hazardous activities and that concerns regarding international 
competition weighed against this formulation. In light of the 1998 
change to the Act, the FAA must reject this narrow definition as 
inconsistent with the new law. A less expansive approach than ``gate to 
gate,'' one within the scope of the FAA's mandate, will include within 
a launch license those activities that are part of a launch as 
contemplated by the new directive to license activities involved in the 
preparation of a launch vehicle for launch, when those activities take 
place at a launch site in the United States. This satisfies the 
requirements of the statutory change and the wishes of commenters such 
as Orbital and the Spaceport Florida Authority. Under the approach the 
FAA now adopts, because of the 1998 changes and because risks change 
shortly after the launch vehicle or its components enter the gate of a 
launch site, launch begins, for purposes of licensing, upon the arrival 
of that vehicle to be prepared for flight at a U.S. launch site.

Vehicle at the Gate

    By this rulemaking, the FAA will license as launch those 
preparatory activities that may be considered part of a launch. As 
noted in the NPRM, the FAA's licensing authority derives from the Act, 
which states that a license is required ``to launch a launch vehicle.'' 
49 U.S.C. Sec. 70104(a). The word ``launch'' is commonly understood to 
mean ignition, lift-off and flight of a launch vehicle, as well as, 
perhaps only in popular parlance, certain immediately preliminary 
activities such as countdown and other final steps necessary to 
effectuate flight. The Act defines ``launch'' to mean ``to place or try 
to place a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle 4 and any 
payload from Earth-(A) in a suborbital trajectory; (B) in Earth orbit 
in outer space; or (C) otherwise in outer space, including activities 
involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle or payload for launch, 
when those activities take place at a launch site in the United 
States.'' 49 U.S.C. Sec. 70102(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ The Commercial Space Act of 1998 also amends the definition 
of launch to add ``reentry vehicle and any payload from Earth--.'' 
Because reentry will be the subject of a separate rulemaking it will 
not be addressed here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The recently enacted change to the definition of launch in the Act 
establishes which pre-flight activities are part of a launch. There are 
certain pre-flight activities so integral to the launch of a launch 
vehicle that they should be considered part of the launch itself even 
though they do not constitute flight. Additionally, there are hazards 
associated with pre-flight activity that are proximate in time to 
flight and unique to space flight. Because the changes to the Act 
dictate that launch include preparation of a launch vehicle and payload 
for flight, the FAA defines the commencement of launch as the moment at 
which hazardous activities related to the assembly and ultimate flight 
of the launch vehicle begin, which, for purposes of consistency and 
clarity, the FAA deems to be when the major components of a licensee's 
launch vehicle enter, for purposes of preparing for flight, the gate of 
a U.S. launch site, whether situated on a federal launch range or not, 
and regardless of whether flight occurs from there or not.
    In its NPRM, the FAA determined that defining ``launch'' as the 
arrival of the launch vehicle at the gate of a launch site accorded 
with the proposals of a number of earlier commenters, who suggested 
that the FAA define ``launch'' to begin when hazardous activities 
start. The FAA is charged by statute with protecting the public, and a 
definition that recognizes hazards will address concerns regarding 
public health and safety. Only if an activity is so hazardous as to 
pose a threat to third parties should regulatory oversight by the FAA 
be exercised, and ``indemnification'' to recompense third parties be 
available. Because shortly after vehicle components arrive, hazardous 
activities related to the assembly and ultimate flight of the launch 
vehicle begin, the arrival of the vehicle or its parts is a logical 
point at which the FAA should ensure that a launch operator is 
exercising safe practices and is financially responsible for any damage 
it may cause. These hazardous activities include, but are not limited 
to, fuel tank wet testing, ordnance installation, spin balancing and 
the stacking of motors. They are hazardous because they expose third 
parties and government property to risk of damage or loss. The FAA 
believes that this test is well within the new licensing authority 
conferred by the Congress' 1998 revision to the Act. Also it both 
broadly incorporates the activity test advocated by commenters such as 
Lockheed Martin and Orbital and accommodates the FAA's need for 
simplicity in administration. A launch license will encompass hazardous 
activities without requiring numerous decisions regarding individual 
hazardous activities on a piecemeal basis.
    Moreover, with the expansion of the definition as originally 
proposed to encompass the ground operations of a launch operator at a 
commercial launch site not situated on a federal launch range, the 
advisability of this approach is further evident. The FAA believes that 
a launch operator contracting with a licensed launch site operator 
should be the licensee responsible for activities in preparation for 
flight. To the extent that the government may hope to achieve seamless 
safety and financial responsibility coverage, the FAA would rather look 
to a launch operator, who has control and authority over its employees, 
contractor and subcontractors, including any launch site operator 
providing services as well as a location from which to launch, for 
regulatory responsibility. Otherwise, the FAA might have to attempt to 
apportion responsibility for ground operations between a launch 
operator and a launch site operator and develop additional criteria for 
doing so. In this regard, commenters such as Kistler and Space Access 
should note that were a launch license for ground operations not 
required a license to operate a launch site might be.
    For purposes of ascertaining the start of launch, and particularly 
with the 1998 addition to the definition of launch, the FAA reviewed 
the hazardous activities associated with the launch of a launch vehicle 
to determine when those hazardous activities started. The FAA's 
experience shows that commercial launch vehicles share a number of 
hazardous procedures, and that most of those procedures take place once 
the vehicle is at a launch site in order to minimize hazardous 
transport and exposure time. The DOT Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation prepared a study in 1994, available in draft, titled 
``Prelaunch Hazardous

[[Page 19592]]

Operations for the Delta, Atlas, Titan at Cape Canaveral Air Station, 
Pegasus at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Conestoga at Wallops Flight 
Facility and Black Brant at White Sands Missile Range.'' The study 
analyzed similarities in the risk profiles for pre-flight processing of 
these vehicles, and compared the pre-flight processing timelines for 
the various vehicles. The results complement information available in a 
DOT ``Hazard Analysis of Commercial Space Transportation,'' May 1988. 
The amount of damage that a vehicle may cause varies from vehicle to 
vehicle, depending upon such factors as the mass of the vehicle, the 
number of stages, the presence and number of solid rocket motors, and 
the type and quantity of propellants. The launch vehicles studied and 
their pre-flight processing procedures are similar in that each has a 
similar hazardous potential.
    The study showed that even though pre-flight processing procedures 
and the sequence of those procedures may vary among vehicles, the 
vehicles studied share such pre-flight processing procedures as solid 
rocket motor handling and processing, flight termination system or 
separation ordnance installation and checkout, and fueling. These 
activities occur at different times for different vehicles. The 
likelihood of a mishap 5 resulting from these procedures is 
similar for each vehicle. These procedures constitute hazardous 
operations that have an identifiable or otherwise quantifiable 
probability of occurrence (Po) of a mishap. The 
probabilities that these operations will result in a mishap are 
approximately Po=10-4 to 10-5 for 
solid rocket motor handling and processing; 
Po=10-5 for flight termination system or 
separation ordnance installation and checkout, and 
Po=10-3 to 10-6 for fueling. ``Eastern 
Launch Site Safety Programs,'' Louis J. Ullian, Commercial Space Risk 
and Insurance Symposium, Cocoa Beach, Florida (Oct. 26, 1988). These 
probabilities are relied upon by launch companies, federal agencies and 
federal launch ranges for their analyses of hazardous operation risks, 
and reflect the rigorous safety standards, analysis and review process 
required at federal launch ranges for hazardous ground operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ The term ``mishap'' means a launch accident, a launch 
incident, failure to complete a launch as planned, or an unplanned 
event or series of events resulting in a fatality or serious injury 
(as defined in 49 CFR Sec. 830.2) or resulting in greater than 
$25,000.00 worth of damage to a payload, a launch vehicle, a launch 
support facility or government property located on the launch site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA considers these operations hazardous because their 
processes may lead to identifiable mishaps and dangerous 
consequences.6 Solid rocket motor handling and processing 
may result in ignition of the propellant, either explosively or 
otherwise. This may be caused by the unconstrained burning or explosion 
of a major portion of the propellant if circumstances prevented proper 
venting of the propellant. Casualties and property damage may result if 
an installed igniter initiates and causes an engine or solid rocket 
motor to become fully propulsive, as during flight. Casualties or 
damage may result from fire, explosion or toxic fumes that may be a by-
product of combustion. These events may result in direct damage or 
casualties as the consequence of blast and debris effects. These events 
may also lead to secondary effects such as fires, explosions or 
unintended motor stage flight that may be caused by the direct blast 
and debris effects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ These findings are based on the DOT Office of Commercial 
Space Transportation's 1994 review of launch vehicle manufacturers' 
data, FAA commercial launch baseline assessments, past FAA maximum 
probable loss determination analyses and Ullian's 1988 presentation 
at the Commercial Space Risk and Insurance Symposium.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Flight termination system or separation ordnance installation and 
checkout may result in lethal or damaging releases of energy. The 
inadvertent ignition of installed or uninstalled ordnance, including 
that of the flight termination system and explosive bolts installed on 
various separation systems could result in explosion and debris. 
Fueling may result in a range of consequences, including fires, either 
pool fires or fireballs, or the release of vapor clouds, which may be 
toxic or which may ignite. These events may occur because of leakage 
during fueling or spills during an accident. If such a mishap involves 
toxic propellants, toxic components of the fuels may be released into 
the atmosphere or spilled on the ground. If a vehicle releases its 
hazardous materials into the atmosphere, it could expose people at a 
launch site or in the public at large to those hazards.
    As a general rule, hazardous operations begin as soon as, or 
shortly after, a launch vehicle's major systems arrive at a launch 
site. The FAA relies on the new 1998 definition to employ a geographic 
element in defining launch by using entry of a launch vehicle onto a 
launch site in the United States as part of its definition of 
``launch.'' This ensures consistency and clarity of interpretation. 
Consistency is guaranteed by the fact that regardless of vehicle type, 
each vehicle will receive the same regulatory coverage within the 
United States. Although some commenters maintain that launch begins at 
different points for different vehicles, because the FAA wishes to 
treat launch operators in an equivalent fashion, the FAA will not 
define ``launch'' on the basis of the launch vehicle. Moreover, 
reliance on a geographic element provides clarity of interpretation 
even for a launch operator of a new vehicle using different technology. 
An applicant seeking a license for a new vehicle will know to plan for 
license coverage at the time its vehicle enters a U.S. launch site.
    Some commenters dispute this conclusion, arguing that defining a 
launch to commence with a vehicle's arrival results in different 
licensing treatment of different activities. The FAA recognizes this 
dilemma. It believes, however, that a single test such as a vehicle's 
arrival will avoid an administrative burden on both the FAA and its 
licensees. Rather than creating an activity test, as recommended by 
some, which would result in a series of tests, the FAA will face only 
questions attendant to a single activity. Many of the questions that 
will plague determining when a vehicle arrives at a federal launch 
range'' launch vehicles show up in parts, a lot of them'would also 
bedevil any particular hazardous activity related to the preparation of 
any particular vehicle for flight. Additionally, the FAA considers it 
outside of its statutory mandate to license pre-flight activities 
located outside of a launch site in light of the new definition of 
launch. That definition limits launch to activities taking place at a 
U.S. launch site. In any event, that commercial operations exist 
outside of federal launch ranges to manufacture and process vehicle 
components and payloads indicates to the FAA that the hazards are not 
so extreme as to stifle the development of facilities and services off 
of a federal launch range. Additionally, as some of the comments 
indicate, insurance does appear to be available.
    Another aspect of the FAA's definition attempts to capture those 
activities that constitute preparation for flight. For example, fueling 
for liquid-fueled vehicles usually takes place not long before flight 
to minimize the risks attendant to the exposure to a fueled vehicle, 
and the FAA would consider that activity to be a component of launch 
under the Act. On the other hand, the FAA does not intend a launch 
license to encompass components stored at a launch site for a 
considerable

[[Page 19593]]

period of time prior to flight. The FAA is aware that the definition of 
launch may be construed to encompass motor storage as well. However, if 
motors arrive at a launch site for purposes of storage rather than as 
part of a launch campaign in preparation for flight, the FAA does not 
consider that storage part of a launch. SFA's comments support this 
interpretation.
    Orbital questioned one element of the FAA's proposed definition. 
Orbital disputed that part of the FAA's definition that included within 
the definition of launch only those activities that take place at the 
launch site from which flight will occur. Orbital's concern is 
addressed in the 1998 amendment to the definition of launch. The 
statutory revision expands launch to include preparatory activities 
that ``take place at a launch site in the United States.'' 49 U.S.C. 
70102(3) (emphasis added). This provision includes preparatory 
activities at any U.S. launch site. The FAA notes that the revision 
excludes preparatory activities outside of a U.S. launch site.
    Hughes asked for clarification regarding the commencement of launch 
with respect to payloads. Hughes suggested that launch be defined to 
commence with the arrival of a payload. Under current conditions, a 
payload tends to arrive after a launch vehicle, and its integration to 
a launch vehicle has been included within the definition of launch. The 
FAA does not consider payload processing absent launch vehicle 
integration to constitute part of launch or part of a licensee's 
licensed activities. Although the 1998 amendment appears to provide 
that preparation of a payload for launch at a U.S. launch site is part 
of launch, the revision does not require the definition of launch to 
encompass payload processing at a launch site until the payload is 
being integrated with a launch vehicle. The revision itself provides 
for activities involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle or 
payload for flight to ensure that launch may begin with a launch 
vehicle's arrival alone at a launch site, regardless of the presence of 
a payload. Read in the context of existing statutory provisions and 
requirements, the revised definition does not encompass payload 
activities that are not otherwise associated with a launch vehicle. The 
original and still unchanged definition of launch means, in relevant 
part, the launch of a launch vehicle and any payload. 49 U.S.C. 
70102(3). Section 70104 further confirms the inadvisability of 
commencing launch with the arrival of a payload. Section 70104 requires 
a license for the launch of a launch vehicle, not for the launch of a 
payload or for the launch of a launch vehicle and a payload. Moreover, 
were launch to begin with the arrival of a payload it would constitute 
unlicensed launch, and a payload operator is not required to obtain a 
launch license in any event. Additionally, the launch operator, who is 
the licensee, is not necessarily participating in the payload 
processing until integration of the payload with the vehicle. For all 
these reasons, the FAA will not change its definition.

``T Minus Zero (T-0)'' or Intentional First Stage Ignition

    The FAA also considered defining ``launch'' as the word is 
ordinarily understood. This would have limited the scope of a launch 
license to activities commencing at intentional first stage ignition. 
Were a launch license to cover only those activities, the launch 
industry would no longer have been eligible for so-called 
indemnification for damages arising out of any preparatory activities. 
The regulatory burden, however, would be correspondingly less. Such a 
licensee would not, for instance, be required to obtain a license as 
early in the process as it must for gate to gate, nor would it be 
required to provide the FAA as much information. Likewise, this 
approach would have resulted in similar treatment of licensees 
regardless of the type of vehicle employed or the timing or location of 
hazardous activities. The FAA carefully weighed this approach, 
especially in light of those comments advocating a more narrow 
definition of launch. With the changes brought about by the 1998 
revision to the Act, which expands the scope of launch, defining launch 
as commencing with intentional first stage ignition is no longer an 
option.

``Gate to Gate''

    The FAA's practice of licensing ground operations associated with 
the conduct of a launch, commonly referred to as ``gate to gate,'' was 
to license all commercial, launch related activities by a launch 
operator operating within the gates of a federal range. Through this 
rulemaking the FAA abandons this approach. Under this view, a launch 
operator's operations were licensed, even if ignition and flight were 
not imminent and even if the launch vehicle itself was not present at 
the range. The 1998 amendment to the definition of launch confirms the 
FAA's intent to abandon this approach. A launch vehicle must be present 
for preparatory activities to constitute part of launch.
    The ``gate to gate'' approach constituted an attempt to treat 
different launch vehicles similarly. Whether a launch vehicle undergoes 
hazardous integration significantly in advance of flight, as the Delta 
and Pegasus do, or closer in time as an Atlas does, a license covered 
the same pre-launch activities: all launch related activities performed 
by a launch operator within the gates of a federal range. Additionally, 
``gate to gate'' licensing ensured that the FAA required launch 
operators to demonstrate financial responsibility through the purchase 
of insurance coverage or other appropriate measures for possible damage 
arising out of commercial activities to government property. ``Gate to 
gate'' licensing received support because of the belief that a launch 
operator would be indemnified for damage to third parties caused by 
pre-flight and post-flight ground operations.
    The FAA does not define ``launch'' to encompass all pre-flight 
activities by a launch operator at a launch site because not all 
activities are part of the launch of a launch vehicle. A launch 
operator may be present on the range, and engaged in preparatory 
activities, but not be working on a launch vehicle or its component 
parts in preparation for flight. A licensed launch operator may be 
present at a federal range between launches. The FAA is aware of launch 
operators who perform construction activities within the gates of a 
federal range months or years prior to any anticipated flight of a 
launch vehicle. At that point, the launch operator may or may not be 
engaged in the type of hazardous activities warranting FAA oversight or 
indemnification because construction activity, however hazardous, is 
not part of the process of preparing the vehicle itself for flight.
    In support of ``gate to gate'' licensing it has been suggested that 
pre-launch licensing authority arises out of the Act's directive to 
license ``operation of a launch site.'' See 49 U.S.C. 70104(a). In the 
case of a launch taking place from a federal launch range, the launch 
operator is not, in fact, operating a launch site. The site is operated 
by the federal range. Moreover, it is the FAA's opinion that a person 
requires a license to operate a launch site only if offering the site 
to customers for their launch. Otherwise, activities related to 
preparation for flight are part of a launch license rather than a 
license to operate a launch site.
    As noted in the NPRM, ``gate to gate'' evolved out of an industry 
desire for broad license coverage, and this approach was the FAA's 
official position with respect to the scope of its licenses. Other 
government sectors, including NASA, have criticized this

[[Page 19594]]

approach as overly broad. Civilian Space Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1998 and 1999, H. Rep. 65, 51 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 21, 
1997). In 1995, House Science Committee Report No. 104-233, 
accompanying H.R. 2043, the NASA Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1996, noted that members of Congress view with concern this approach to 
covering all licensee activities within the gates of a federal range, 
and considered it too broad.7 Although recognizing that the 
report language does not carry the force and effect of law, the FAA is 
concerned that launch operators might be pursuing their pre-launch 
activities in reliance on an indemnification that must be enacted by 
Congress and that may or may not be available from Congress. This 
prompted the FAA in its NPRM to revisit the issue of the scope of a 
license and, thus, necessarily, of the definition of ``launch.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ In 1994, a House Space, Science and Technology Committee 
Report expressed the same sentiments. The report accompanied H.R. 
4489, the NASA Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, a bill that 
was not enacted into law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lockheed Martin questioned the FAA's concern over the possibility 
that Congress would refuse to vote for indemnification for all of a 
launch operator's activities at a federal launch range. As stated in 
the NPRM, while the FAA recognizes that the report language of concern 
does not have the effect of law, see, e.g., Public Employees Retirement 
Systems of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168, 109 S. Ct. 2854, 2862 
(1989), it nonetheless remains a fact that Congress does play a role in 
deciding whether to provide ``coverage'' for damages in excess of the 
FAA's financial responsibility requirements. In Betts, the Court noted 
that it ``has observed on more than one occasion that the 
interpretation given by one Congress (or a committee or Member thereof) 
to an earlier statute is of little assistance in discerning the meaning 
of that statute.'' Id. However, in this funding context, the FAA does 
not believe that it behooves either the FAA or licensed launch 
operators to ignore these warnings. That is the source of the FAA's 
concern. Additionally, the fact that 1997 also produced report language 
recommending a more narrow definition indicates to the FAA, as it 
should to industry, that the better course is to rely on a definition 
grounded in the Act rather than on fluctuating Congressional report 
language.

End of Launch

    The FAA notes that the end of launch may be expressed both in terms 
of flight activity and ground operations. For purposes of flight, the 
FAA will continue to define the end of a launch as the point after 
payload separation when the last action occurs over which a licensee 
has direct or indirect control over the launch vehicle. For a liquid-
fueled stage, that point may be when any remaining fuel is emptied from 
the upper stage, the vehicle propellant and gas tanks are vented and 
other stored energy is released. For solid rocket motors, that point 
may arrive when the upper stage fuel is expended or the stage is inert, 
and the payload is released. For purposes of ground operations, launch 
no longer ends with the cessation of supporting ground operations but 
when the vehicle leaves the surface.
    With respect to flight, others apply different definitions to the 
end of launch. The most recent House Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No. 
347, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 (1997), suggests that launch ends when 
a payload is placed into orbit or in its planned trajectory in outer 
space. The 45th Space Wing considers a launch complete when all 
hazardous activities are secured and, for purposes of flight safety, 
upon orbital insertion. NPRM, 62 FR at 13223. Orbital insertion takes 
place when a launch vehicle achieves orbital velocity or when its 
instantaneous impact point leaves the earth. In other words, orbital 
insertion is achieved when a launch vehicle is moving horizontally to 
the earth's surface sufficiently fast enough, given its altitude, to 
counteract the effects of the earth's gravity. The FAA believes that 
although defining launch to end at orbital insertion may make sense 
from a federal range ``flight termination'' perspective, such a 
definition would halt FAA oversight of certain aspects of launch too 
soon for safety. For example, damage to other orbiting material may 
still ensue as the result of activities subsequent to orbital 
insertion. Absent a licensee taking appropriate measures, risk exists 
of the possible collision of a launch vehicle or its components with 
other objects in space. Additionally, dangerous orbital debris might be 
generated. Accordingly, in the interests of safety, the FAA will retain 
its current practice of defining the cessation of launch.
    With respect to ground operations, the FAA now changes its current 
practice of including post-flight ground operations for expendable 
launch vehicles in a launch license and thus as part of launch. 
Instead, ground operations are no longer part of launch once the 
vehicle leaves the ground. The FAA considered several options as to 
when ground operations were no longer considered part of a launch. 
Under the chosen option, ground operations would not be considered part 
of launch once the launch vehicle left the ground. Reentry activities 
aside, it has not been the FAA's experience that post-flight activities 
involve the same levels of public safety risk as pre-flight handling, 
integration and fueling of a vehicle. The FAA reviewed another option. 
Ground operations for launch could end with the end of launch in the 
context of flight, namely, when the last action occurs over which a 
licensee has direct or indirect control over the launch vehicle. This 
alternative would have allowed for at least part of the post-flight 
ground operations to be covered by the license. The end of launch for 
purposes of flight is not, however, related to activities on the 
ground. The FAA is concerned that attempting to create such a 
connection would be arbitrary and might inappropriately influence a 
licensee's post-flight ground operation procedures. The third option 
the FAA considered was to define the end of ground operations for 
launch as that point at which all personnel may resume operations at 
the launch pad and related environs. This approach recognized that 
hazardous operations do occur subsequent to ignition and lift off. 
These operations include such activities as securing ground propellant 
and pneumatic systems and inspecting the launch pad to verify that no 
post-flight hazards exist. With this option, ground operations would no 
longer have been part of launch when the launch pad and other launch 
related facilities no longer endangered personnel. Because, however, 
the hazards associated with ground operations subsequent to lift off 
are not related to the preparation of the vehicle for flight, the FAA 
defines the end of launch for purposes of ground operations as the 
point at which the launch vehicle leaves the ground. This analysis 
applies to expendable launch vehicles. For the time being, judgment is 
reserved with respect to reusable launch vehicles.

Formalizing Launch and Launch Operator Licenses

    This rulemaking, through section 415.3, codifies the FAA practice 
of issuing two types of launch licenses, the launch-specific and the 
launch operator, and amends the duration of a launch operator license 
from two to five years. In order to enable the FAA to issue a license 
for a single mission or for multiple missions, the FAA's licensing 
structure provides for two types of launch licenses, the launch-
specific and the launch operator license. A launch specific license 
authorizes a licensee to conduct a single launch, or a specified

[[Page 19595]]

number of identical launches, from a single launch site. The launch 
vehicle for each authorized launch must be the same and launch 
parameters must present no unique public safety issues or other issues 
affecting U.S. national interests. The licensee's authorization to 
conduct launches terminates upon completion of all launches authorized 
by the license or the expiration date set forth in the license, 
whichever comes first. A launch operator license authorizes a licensee 
to conduct launches from a specified launch site, using the same family 
of launch vehicles, carrying specified classes of payloads, within the 
range of launch parameters defined by the license.
    Initially, the FAA's launch operator license allowed a launch 
operator to conduct launches authorized by its license for a period of 
two years. Under the new section 415.3(b), a launch operator license 
authorizes the conduct of launches for five years from the date of 
issuance.
    The option of issuing a launch operator license, as opposed to 
requiring a launch-specific license for every launch, provides 
advantages both to the licensee and to the FAA. Although the 
application preparation for and review of a launch operator license 
will be more extensive than for a launch specific license, use of this 
class of license will ultimately result in cost reductions and 
efficiency gains for licensees by reducing the number of applications 
that a company with an active launch schedule must submit, and that the 
FAA must review. The FAA's increase of the term of a launch operator 
license from the current practice of two years to five years reflects 
the FAA's experience with its licensees during the past few years. 
During that time, the FAA has encountered very few serious safety 
problems with launch operator licensees.
    On the basis of this record, the FAA proposed in the NPRM that a 
launch operator with a safe launch record should not be required to 
apply for a new license every two years. The FAA will continue to 
verify, through compliance monitoring, that a licensee is operating in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of its license. In this 
regard, the longer the license term, the more important the role 
compliance monitoring plays in enabling the FAA to provide safety 
oversight regarding how a licensee implements its procedures.
    The FAA received comments regarding the duration of a launch 
operator license. Several launch operators supported the proposed 
increase from two to five years. Boeing at 1; Lockheed Martin at 7; 
Orbital Sciences at 6; Rotary Rocket Company at 4-5 (while emphasizing 
its need for a launch operator license for a reusable flight test 
program); Space Access at 6. Kistler Aerospace Corporation requested 
that the FAA consider issuing launch operator licenses of indefinite 
duration. Kistler at 4. Kistler maintains that the choice of five years 
is arbitrary and of little utility in regulating a licensee. Id. 
Kistler notes that the proposed regulations vest the FAA with 
continuing oversight powers, require a licensee to ensure the 
continuing accuracy of its application representations and allow the 
FAA to amend the terms and conditions of a license at any time. Id. 
Kistler claims that renewing a license every five years poses an 
unnecessary burden and creates an uncertainty that adversely affects a 
licensee's ability to enter into contracts, attract capital and 
otherwise make long term plans. Id.
    Although the FAA appreciates the issues raised by Kistler, the FAA 
will increase the duration of a launch operator license from two to 
five years as originally proposed rather than creating a license of 
indefinite duration. This is because an increase in duration from two 
to five years already place greater reliance on the FAA's compliance 
monitoring program. A license renewal application has the benefit of 
compelling the FAA and a licensee to perform a comprehensive review of 
a licensee's operations. Experience has shown that a renewal process 
ensures that oversight is performed.
    Space Access raises a separate issue, namely the question of how 
the FAA will determine who is qualified for a launch operator license 
as opposed to a launch-specific license. Space Access asks what 
constitutes a safe launch record. To this, the FAA is able to respond 
with some guidance culled from its past practices. The FAA licensed the 
first launch of a Pegasus launch vehicle on a launch-specific basis. It 
is currently contemplating a launch-specific license for Sea Launch's 
proposed first launch from the Pacific Ocean. Other examples of launch-
specific licenses include the first launches of Lockheed Martin's LMLV-
1 and 2, EER's Conestoga launch and AMROC's hybrid launch vehicle 
launch. To date, the FAA has not considered a new launch operator one 
with a safe launch record. A new launch operator has no record.
    Although a launch-specific license might be required for a new 
vehicle, an established operator may apply for a launch operator 
license after the first launch, but a newer entity may have a greater 
showing to make. A first launch may be safe without being successful. A 
first launch LMLV-1 failure that demonstrated that a safety system 
worked led to a launch operator license for Lockheed Martin. 
Historically, launch operators who received launch operator licenses 
had already demonstrated some level of capability in conducting 
launches, either by conducting launches for the government or with 
other launch vehicles.
    The FAA policy of considering an applicant for a launch operator 
license after a safe launch conducted under a launch-specific license 
has, to date, applied to launches from federal launch ranges. This 
policy may not always be appropriate under other circumstances. The 
complexity of the proposed operations, whether a vehicle is reusable 
and the potential for endangering the public may also play a role in 
whether the FAA decides a launch operator license is appropriate for 
subsequent launches.
    Space Access also asks whether an overall accident history of 
approximately ten to fifteen percent is acceptable. The FAA has not 
made a determination regarding an acceptable mishap rate at this point, 
and is hesitant to prejudge the question. The answer may turn more on 
the facts underlying a mishap rather than on a particular rate. The FAA 
would also like to stress what it defines as a launch accident. By 
definition, a launch accident is an unplanned event occurring during 
the flight of a launch vehicle resulting in the known impact of a 
launch vehicle, its payload or any component thereof outside designated 
impact limit lines, or a fatality or serious injury to any person who 
is not associated with the flight, or resulting in damage estimated to 
exceed $25,000 to property not associated with the flight. This has 
rarely, if ever, happened in the history of the U.S. space program. 
Space Access appears to be referring to other mishaps such as mission 
failures that are not launch accidents. An unsuccessful mission is not 
necessarily an un-safe flight. In fact, a successful mission may not 
even be a safe one, as recognized by the FAA's definition of ``launch 
incident,'' which is an unplanned event occurring during the flight of 
a launch vehicle, other than a launch accident, involving a malfunction 
of a flight safety system or failure of the licensee's safety 
organization, design or operations. Because the FAA is concerned with 
public safety, a safe launch record is judged based on whether an 
applicant's launches have placed the public at risk,

[[Page 19596]]

not whether the launches have placed payloads in space.
    Space Access contends that any launch accident, incident or mishap 
should result in a license amendment reflecting changes made to prevent 
a reoccurrence. If circumstances warrant, this may prove a likely 
result. Space Access also asks whether a launch operator accident that 
is not covered by an FAA license, that is, perhaps, a government 
launch, is considered part of a licensee's accident history, and 
whether an accident would result in a license revocation. An un-
licensed launch resulting in a mission failure may certainly raise 
safety concerns for future licensed launches, but need not necessarily 
lead to license revocation. When a mishap occurred with McDonnell 
Douglas' Delta vehicle in January 1997, during a government launch, the 
FAA did not revoke, suspend or modify McDonnell Douglas' launch 
operator license. This was because McDonnell Douglas' license specified 
that it comply with the requirements of the federal launch range from 
which it was authorized to launch, and the FAA knew that the Air Force 
would not allow additional Delta launches to take place until the 
problem was identified and resolved. Space Access' inquiry arises, 
perhaps, out of contemplating launch activity that is not governed by 
federal launch range oversight. To avoid prejudging a hypothetical 
situation, the FAA will not address that situation until confronted 
with it.

Relationship Between FAA and Federal Government Launch Ranges

    The FAA's launch requirements as promulgated through part 415, 
subpart C, of this rulemaking apply to launches as they currently take 
place from Department of Defense (DOD) or NASA launch ranges. Public 
meeting comments strongly supported avoidance of duplication of launch 
safety oversight for launches that take place from a federal launch 
range. The rules are consistent with that desire. Although the FAA 
requires information and analyses not required by federal launch ranges 
to ensure that all flight safety issues are addressed, and imposes 
certain additional requirements derived from a National Transportation 
Safety Board investigation, the FAA will not duplicate the safety 
assessments performed by federal launch ranges.
    Federal launch ranges manage the launch facilities from which the 
great majority of commercial launches now take place. The federal 
ranges act, in effect, both as landlords and as providers of launch 
facilities and services. The ranges require compliance with their 
safety rules as a condition of using their facilities and services. 
Because different federal launch ranges confront different safety 
issues, practices are not always standardized; the Air Force ranges 
did, however, produce a joint set of documentation requirements and 
procedures, ``Eastern and Western Range Requirements 127-1'' (Mar. 
1995).8 In addition to providing for public safety, the 
federal launch range procedures protect government property and launch 
capability, and are designed, to some extent, to ensure mission 
success.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ The latest version of these requirements may be found at 
http://www.pafb.af.mil/45SW/rangesafety/ewr97.htm. The Air Force up-
dates its requirements on an ongoing basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA fully recognizes the comprehensive and responsible safety 
oversight that DOD and NASA have exercised at their ranges for over 
forty years. The FAA communicates on an ongoing basis with the federal 
launch ranges regarding standards and launch activities. The FAA also 
recognizes the scope of information that a launch operator employing 
federal range services must submit for approval over a two to three 
year period in order to conduct launch operations. Therefore, for 
launches that take place from DOD or NASA launch ranges, the FAA's 
regulatory program makes maximum use of information provided by an 
applicant to the federal launch range and of federal launch range 
analyses and approvals. This means that the FAA relies on the processes 
of the federal launch range and does not duplicate those safety 
analyses conducted by a federal launch range.
    A federal launch range requires a launch operator to provide data 
regarding its proposed launch. The range evaluates the data to 
ascertain whether the launch operator will comply with range 
requirements. The range also uses the data to prepare range support for 
the mission. DOD ranges require that a launch operator apply for and 
obtain specific mandatory approvals from the range in order to conduct 
certain specified operations. For example, the Air Force's Eastern and 
Western Range Requirements 127-1 require a launch operator to obtain 
approvals for hazardous and safety critical procedures before the range 
will allow those operations to proceed. In the event that a launch 
operator's proposal does not fully comply with range requirements, a 
range may issue a deviation or a waiver if the mission objectives of 
the launch operator could not otherwise be achieved. A range may issue 
a deviation to allow a launch even when a launch operator's designs or 
proposed operations do not comply with range requirements. A range may 
issue a waiver when it is discovered after production that hardware 
does not satisfy range requirements or when it is discovered that 
operations do not meet range requirements after operations have begun 
at a federal range. A range will allow a deviation or grant a waiver 
only under unique and compelling circumstances, or when the intent of 
the range requirements is met.
    The FAA's baseline assessments 9 of various federal 
launch ranges found their safety services adequate. The FAA will not 
require an applicant to demonstrate the adequacy of the range services 
it proposes to employ if the applicable baseline assessment included 
those services and if those services remain adequate. Certain showings 
regarding the applicant's own capabilities are still required. The FAA 
requires specific information regarding the interface between the 
safety organizations of a federal launch range and of an applicant. In 
the event that a service or procedure upon which an applicant proposed 
to rely was not within the documented experience of the federal launch 
range that the applicant proposed to utilize, the applicant would have 
to demonstrate the safety of that particular aspect of its launch. This 
is also true if a documented range safety service has changed 
significantly or has experienced a recent failure. In those cases, the 
burden of demonstrating safety shifts to the applicant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ ``Commercial Launch Baseline Assessment, NASA Goddard Space 
Flight Center, Wallops Flight,'' DOT (Oct. 1989); ``Commercial 
Launch Baseline Assessment, U.S. Air Force Western Space and Missile 
Center,'' DOT (Jul. 1989); ``Commercial Launch Baseline Assessment, 
U.S. Air Force Eastern Space and Missile Center,'' DOT (Sept. 1988).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The revisions also codify FAA guidelines containing National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendations concerning launch 
readiness and countdown procedures. The FAA's guidelines implement NTSB 
recommendations made following an investigation of a commercial launch 
anomaly occurring during a launch from a federal launch range. These 
guidelines are designed to ensure that a launch licensee has clear 
lines of authority and communication during launch, and has specific 
procedures governing other safety aspects of its launch operations. The 
NTSB filed comments to the docket stating that the regulations proposed 
in the NPRM would, if implemented, satisfy the intent of the NTSB's

[[Page 19597]]

recommendations. Accordingly, the NTSB supports their adoption.

Discussion of Parts Affected by the Rule

Part 401--Organization and Definitions

    Section 401.5 contains definitions of significant terms used in the 
FAA's regulations. Proposed amendments include both changes to existing 
definitions and the addition of new terms. Certain changes are intended 
only to reflect changes resulting from the 1994 codification of the 
Act. Others are editorial.
Deletions
    The FAA proposes to remove the terms ``Director,'' ``launch 
activity,'' ``licensee,'' ``mission,'' and ``safety operations.'' 
``Director'' no longer constitutes a title related to the FAA's 
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation and is 
therefore deleted. ``Launch activity'' refers to activities licensed by 
the FAA. The term is overly broad and lacking in specificity. 
``Licensee'' is also deleted as a term whose meaning is self-evident. 
``Mission'' is no longer necessary because the FAA is modifying and 
renaming the mission review contained in part 415, subpart C. ``Safety 
operations'' does not appear in the regulations and the FAA has 
therefore removed it.
Revisions
    Some of the proposed revisions merely reflect the codification of 
the Act. These include ``Act,'' ``launch,'' ``launch vehicle,'' 
``payload,'' and ``person.'' The FAA revises the term ``launch,'' 
however, not only to reflect the codification of Pub. L. 98-575 and the 
Commercial Space Act of 1998, but to clarify that launch, for purposes 
of licensing, includes the flight of a launch vehicle and preflight 
activities commencing with the arrival of a launch vehicle at a U.S. 
launch site as discussed earlier.
    As noted in the NPRM, the FAA proposed to change the definition of 
``launch vehicle'' to reflect the changes made to the Act when it was 
codified in 1994. This rulemaking implements that change. Space Access 
provides an interesting analysis of one of the constituent parts of a 
launch concerning an element that the NPRM did not address in detail, 
namely, that vehicle stages are part of launch. ``Space Access believes 
anything that does not achieve orbit should be considered as part of 
launch, just like multiple stage boosters are today.'' Space Access at 
5. Space Access points out that if the FAA's intent is to cover the 
hazardous elements of launch, ``the return of any boosters is 
pertinent.'' Id. at 5-6. For these reasons, the FAA's proposed 
definition of launch vehicle should clearly encompass ``all physically 
connected parts used to propel or to otherwise place [a] launch vehicle 
and any payload into an Earth orbit or otherwise in outer space.'' Id. 
at 5. Space Access believes that its proposed definition would clearly 
encompass first stage boosters that fall back to earth and a carrier 
aircraft such as is used to launch a Pegasus. Id.
    Under the Act, launch vehicle means ``(A) a vehicle built to 
operate in, or place a payload in, outer space; and (B) a suborbital 
rocket.'' 49 U.S.C. Sec. 70102(7). Congress chose this definition, and 
the FAA designed the new regulatory definition to match the 
congressional choice. Space Access fears that the definition could 
imply that only the parts of a launch vehicle that reach outer space 
are part of a launch vehicle, thus excluding both the carrier aircraft 
for an air launch and any vehicle stages that fall back to earth. Space 
Access at 5. The definition does not preclude the inclusion of carrier 
aircraft or vehicle stages as part of the definition of launch vehicle. 
The FAA agrees with Space Access that vehicle stages are included 
within the definition of a launch vehicle. It should be noted that 
because the definition includes a vehicle that either operates in or 
places a payload in outer space, the definition includes the entire 
vehicle necessary to accomplish that objective. This necessarily 
includes the first and intermediate stages of a launch vehicle. 
Therefore, the FAA will not change what it proposed as the new 
definition of ``launch vehicle'' with the exception that it will change 
``and'' to ``or'' to clarify that a suborbital rocket is also a launch 
vehicle.
Additions
    New terms include ``Associate Administrator,'' ``federal launch 
range,'' ``hazardous materials,'' ``launch accident,'' ``launch 
incident,'' ``launch operator,'' ``launch site,'' and ``mishap.'' 
Although the NPRM proposed ``Office,'' that term is no longer included.
    ``Associate Administrator'' reflects a change in title of the 
person in charge of Commercial Space Transportation within the FAA and 
arises out of the transfer of the Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation from the Office of the Secretary, DOT, to the Federal 
Aviation Administration. The term describes the FAA's Associate 
Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation.
    ``Federal launch range'' means a launch site from which launches 
take place that is owned and operated by the government of the United 
States. Federal launch ranges include Cape Canaveral Air Station, 
Vandenberg Air Force Base, White Sands Missile Range and Wallops Flight 
Facility. In its comments, Kistler Aerospace Corporation recommended 
that the FAA clarify that only these four facilities constitute federal 
launch ranges. The FAA is not prepared to do this, but will reach a 
separate accommodation. The FAA agrees that the definition of a federal 
launch range should only encompass those federal launch facilities 
where the government facilities, services and organization routinely 
support launch activities. The four listed above, however, are not the 
only current ones, and others could emerge in the future.
    The FAA assumes that Kistler's interest in this topic arises out of 
its proposed launch plans for the Nevada Test Site, which is not 
currently a federal launch range. The Nevada Test Site should not, in 
its current operational status, be considered a federal launch range 
because the U.S. government does not routinely oversee the launch of 
launch vehicles from the site. Although it is true that the U.S. 
government has conducted launches from the site, this does not mean 
that the Nevada Test Site is a federal launch range for purposes of 
this rule because the activities that have occurred there are not 
routine. No staff is dedicated to routinely supporting launch activity, 
and the FAA is not aware of any permanent launch infrastructure at the 
site. Nor is the Nevada Test Site a member of the Range Commander's 
Council. Accordingly, the FAA here clarifies its definition by adding 
``routinely.''
    ``Hazardous materials'' mean hazardous materials as defined in 49 
CFR Sec. 172.101.
    ``Launch accident,'' ``launch incident,'' and ``mishap'' all 
address related issues. The term ``mishap'' is a general term for all 
unplanned events at a launch site or during a launch resulting in 
injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of equipment or 
property. Mishaps include but are not limited to launch accidents and 
launch incidents. Launch accidents and launch incidents are types of 
``mishaps.'' ``Launch accident'' and ``launch incident'' derive from 
the FAA's current definition of ``accident'' and ``incident'' as the 
terms appear in the FAA's accident investigation plan. Both terms 
encompass unplanned events occurring during flight. ``Launch accident'' 
is

[[Page 19598]]

defined by the seriousness of the results, and ``launch incident'' 
focuses on the failure of a safety system or process that may or may 
not have caused serious harm. Special reporting and investigation 
requirements attach if a launch accident or incident occurs. 
``Accident'' is also defined in a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). A launch accident will 
entail NTSB involvement. A ``launch incident'' may or may not involve 
the NTSB, depending on the seriousness of the safety issues involved. 
Other mishaps, such as a mission failure, have fewer reporting and 
investigation requirements.
    Orbital raised a concern regarding the reporting requirements for a 
mishap. Orbital at 5. It noted that, if read literally, section 415.41 
would require FAA notification every time a piece of the licensee's own 
equipment was damaged. The FAA does not require this and now amends its 
definition of mishap from that originally proposed in the NPRM to 
include only a launch accident, a launch incident, failure to complete 
a launch as planned, or an unplanned event resulting in fatal or 
serious injury or greater than $25,000 damage to a payload, a launch 
vehicle, a launch support facility, or government property located at 
the launch site. The notification requirement has also been modified 
for mishaps other than launch accidents and launch incidents. For a 
mishap that is not a launch accident or launch incident, or one that 
does not involve a fatality, a licensee must notify the FAA within 24 
hours of the event. Such mishaps may involve insurance claims or may 
uncover flaws in a licensee's safety procedures.
    ``Launch operator'' is defined as a person who launches or plans to 
launch a launch vehicle and any payload.
    The definition of ``launch site'' reflects changes resulting from 
the codification of the Act and a subsequent revision. The definition 
of ``launch site'' in the original Commercial Space Launch Act includes 
``facilities located on a launch site which are necessary to conduct a 
launch.'' 49 U.S.C. App. 2603(5) (emphasis added). As noted in the 
NPRM, the codified definition of ``launch site'' merely included 
``necessary facilities'' with no mention of their location. Now, 
Congress has remedied that oversight, and the definition of ``launch 
site'' means the location on Earth from which a launch takes place and 
necessary facilities at that location. 49 U.S.C. 70102(6) (emphasis 
added). The FAA correctly proposed to include only those facilities 
located at the launch site. In order, however, to reflect accurately 
the new language of the codified statute, the FAA's definition of 
launch site will not, as proposed in the NPRM, include ``necessary 
facilities located at the site,'' but ``necessary facilities at that 
location.''
    The FAA will not include the term Office in its definitions as 
originally proposed in the NPRM. There is greater familiarity with the 
term ``FAA'' and the agency believes that its use will result in less 
confusion.

Part 411--Policy

    The FAA deletes as unnecessary and reserves part 411, which 
establishes the policies of the FAA for licensing commercial launch 
activities. This part identified how the FAA addressed safety and 
mission reviews, which, pursuant to this rulemaking, are addressed in 
parts 413, 415 and 417.

Part 413--License Application Procedures

    Part 413 continues to describe those license application procedures 
applicable to all license applications. As explained by section 413.1, 
which clarifies the former section of the same number, the procedures 
apply to any application for a license to launch a launch vehicle or to 
operate a launch site. These procedures should also be used by a 
payload owner or operator requesting a payload review. More specific 
requirements applicable to obtaining a launch license or a license to 
operate a launch site are set forth in parts 415 and 417, respectively. 
The majority of the revisions to this part are editorial or self-
explanatory. A few bear individual mention.
    Section 413.3, which renumbers the former section 415.3 and amends 
the provision by including operation of a launch site, identifies who 
must obtain a license to launch a launch vehicle or to operate a launch 
site. Any person proposing to launch a launch vehicle or to operate a 
launch site within the United States must obtain a license authorizing 
the launch or the operation of the launch site. 49 U.S.C. 
Sec. 70104(a)(1). A U.S. citizen or entity proposing to launch outside 
the United States or to operate a launch site outside of the United 
States must obtain a license authorizing the launch or the operation of 
the launch site. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 70104(a)(2). A foreign corporation, 
partnership, joint venture, association or other foreign entity 
controlled by a U.S. citizen and proposing to launch from, or to 
operate a launch site within, international territory or waters must 
obtain a license if the United States does not have an agreement with a 
foreign nation providing that the foreign nation shall exercise 
jurisdiction. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 70104(a)(3). A foreign corporation, 
partnership, joint venture, association or other foreign entity 
controlled by a U.S. citizen does not require an FAA license to launch 
from foreign territory, unless that foreign nation has agreed that the 
United States shall exercise jurisdiction over the launch. 49 U.S.C. 
Sec. 70104(a)(4).
    Section 413.5, which renumbers and amends the former section 413.3, 
requires a prospective applicant to consult with the FAA prior to 
submitting an application. Pre-application consultation is now 
mandatory in order to allow both an applicant and the FAA the 
opportunity to identify potential issues relevant to the FAA's 
licensing determination. Pre-application consultation does not possess 
a formal structure or timetable. Nor does it require personal meetings. 
For many proposals consultations may be made by telephone, electronic 
mail or other means.
    Pre-application consultation is intended to provide an efficient 
and effective process leading to the development of a substantially 
complete application. It should also ensure that an applicant is aware 
of the responsibilities of a licensee. Pre-application consultation 
allows a prospective applicant to familiarize the FAA with its proposal 
and the FAA to familiarize the prospective applicant with the licensing 
process. It has been the FAA's experience that pre-application 
consultation helps speed the overall licensing process by ensuring that 
any unique safety issues are uncovered early. It also avoids 
potentially wasted efforts by a prospective applicant in preparation of 
an application. For new launch concepts, the pre-application process 
allows a prospective applicant and the FAA's Commercial Space 
Transportation Licensing and Safety Division to identify the most 
efficient process for the applicant to demonstrate the safety of any 
proposed launch. Experience shows that this often is best carried out 
through a series of meetings, and other interchanges, each focusing on 
different issues. The schedule and order of such discussions is nearly 
always driven by a prospective applicant's concept, issues and 
schedule. In all cases, the FAA encourages the proposed applicant to 
submit, as part of the process, application material in draft, and the 
FAA will review and provide feedback on the content.
    Although the FAA will answer general questions regarding the 
licensing process at any time, the pre-

[[Page 19599]]

application process is best begun when a prospective applicant is ready 
to discuss specific application requirements or to begin preparation of 
an application. At this time, the Licensing and Safety Division will 
assign a primary staff engineer who will be responsible for working 
with the prospective applicant. Typically, a second engineer is also 
assigned to track the project and to be available should the primary 
engineer not be available. Other support staff may also be assigned to 
help in specialized areas such as environmental reviews.
    Section 413.7, which renumbers and amends the former section 413.5, 
contains a change in the name of the entity regulating commercial space 
transportation. Effective November 15, 1995, the DOT Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation became a part of the Federal Aviation 
Administration, where it now operates as the FAA's seventh line of 
business. With that move, the name was changed from the Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation to that of the Associate Administrator 
for Commercial Space Transportation. Section 413.7(a), which directs an 
applicant where to file an application, reflects that change, as well 
as the new address. Section 413.7(b)(2) requires an applicant to 
provide the FAA with one or more points of contact to receive notices 
from the FAA.
    Section 413.9, which renumbers the former section 413.7, describes 
how an applicant may request confidential treatment for trade secrets 
or proprietary commercial or financial data. The treatment of 
confidential information is governed by applicable law, including the 
Freedom of Information Act.
    Section 413.11, amending former section 413.9, describes the 
process by which an application is accepted or rejected. Section 
413.11(a) provides for an initial screening of an application in order 
for the FAA to determine whether the application is sufficiently 
complete to allow the FAA to initiate the required reviews. The Act 
requires the FAA to complete its evaluation of an application within 
180 days. The FAA determines when an application is sufficiently 
complete for the 180 days review period to commence and how those 180 
days will be measured. If the FAA receives an application that fails to 
provide sufficient information for the FAA to commence a meaningful 
review, then a review cannot be performed. The FAA returns applications 
that are not substantially complete, noting the areas of deficiency. 
Accordingly, the 180-day review period will start to run only upon 
receipt of an acceptable application.
    The FAA considered the option of not commencing any review of an 
application and thus of not starting to count the 180-day statutory 
time limit until the application was complete in order to ensure that 
the FAA did not receive piecemeal applications. The FAA also considered 
rejecting or denying an incomplete application, which would also 
prevent the 180-day review period from commencing. Instead, the FAA 
determined that if an applicant presented sufficient material to allow 
at least some meaningful review to commence, the FAA would do so in the 
interests of the applicant. Commencing the review of even an incomplete 
application should allow for earlier identification of required 
information not addressed, hasten the process and increase efficiency.
    In order for the FAA to review an application, however, the 
application must be sufficiently complete to allow review to commence. 
Accordingly, under section 413.13, the FAA's acceptance of an 
application does not constitute a determination that the application is 
complete. That section now contains an additional provision that was 
not explicit in the NPRM. The new provision clarifies that the FAA may 
ask for additional information in the course of the licensing process. 
It states that if, in addition to the information required by the 
applicable parts of this chapter, the FAA requires other information 
necessary for a determination that public health and safety, safety of 
property and national security and foreign policy interests of the 
United States are protected during the conduct of a licensed activity, 
an applicant shall submit the additional information required to show 
compliance with this chapter. The FAA anticipates that there will be 
situations where an applicant's proposal contemplates activities, 
vehicle configurations or technologies not envisioned in the course of 
this rulemaking. In that case, it is necessary for the regulations to 
reflect clearly the FAA's authority to request additional information 
prior to issuing a license.
    Although review of an incomplete application may commence, section 
413.13 requires an applicant to complete an incomplete application, and 
section 413.15 allows for tolling in the event an applicant does not 
submit the remaining material in sufficient time to avoid affecting the 
evaluation process. Section 413.15, a new provision, tolls, or stops 
the clock of, the review period of 180 days when an applicant fails to 
provide information required for the FAA to complete its review. 
Although the FAA will commence its application review once it receives 
a substantially complete application, the fact that an application is 
only substantially complete means that more information may be required 
before the application is entirely complete. If an application does not 
address requests for required information in sufficient detail, or if 
the application contains inconsistencies, the FAA will advise the 
applicant and provide a time by which the requested information must be 
provided. Once the deadline has passed, and while the FAA waits for any 
information necessary to complete its review, the 180-day time limit on 
the FAA does not run. The FAA considered the option of denying a 
license and returning the application for resubmission if the requested 
information were not submitted within the time provided. Because of the 
new submission of the application, a new 180-day review period would 
commence. This course would provide the applicant a strong incentive to 
respond to the FAA's information request in a timely fashion, and, 
perhaps, result in the processing of only those applications where the 
applicant possesses the actual capacity to respond. This would 
discourage frivolous applications. The FAA determined, however, that 
most applicants, provided with information regarding how soon the FAA 
would require information necessary to complete a review, would respond 
in the time allotted. Thus, so extreme an incentive would not be 
required. However, it has been the FAA's experience that applicants do 
not always respond in a timely fashion to requests from the FAA for 
clarification or additional information. Accordingly, some incentive to 
respond promptly is necessary, and in the event an applicant fails to 
respond within the time provided, the FAA will toll the 180-day 
statutory review period.
    Both Orbital and Rotary Rocket objected to this provision. Oribital 
at 5; Rotary Rocket at 5. Neither, however, proposed a different 
solution for addressing the problem of an applicant not supplying 
requested information in a timely fashion. For the reasons discussed 
above, the FAA adopts the tolling provision.
    Section 413.17, which renumbers and amends former section 413.19, 
describes an applicant's responsibility for the continuing accuracy and 
completeness of the information contained in the applicant's license 
application. Orbital objects to requiring that an applicant update its 
application any time it is no longer accurate and complete in all 
respects, and recommends retaining the

[[Page 19600]]

language of former section 413.19. Orbital at 6. The FAA agrees that it 
need not be advised of any and all changes, and will therefore 
incorporate a materiality standard. An applicant should note, however, 
that the FAA considers a great majority of the information required for 
an application to be material. Otherwise, the FAA would not require 
that information. An applicant must advise the FAA in a timely manner 
of any proposed material change in any representation contained in its 
application, including, without being limited to, its launch plans or 
operations, launch procedures, classes of payloads, orbital 
destinations, safety requirements, the type of launch vehicle, flight 
path, launch site, and launch point, or any safety related system, 
policy, procedure, requirement, criteria or standard, related to 
commercial space launch or launch site operation activities, that may 
affect public health and safety, the safety of property, including 
government property, or hazards to the environment. Because the FAA 
proposes to rely upon federal launch ranges for launches from those 
sites, an applicant must also notify the FAA in a timely manner in the 
event the applicant applies to the federal range for a waiver to, or 
deviates from the federal range's safety requirements or procedures.
    Changes to an application may lengthen the time that the FAA 
requires to complete its reviews in support of a license determination. 
The FAA will reserve to itself the right to toll the 180-day review 
period in the event that any amendment to an application so radically 
changes the applicant's proposal that the change, in effect, 
constitutes a new application. The FAA's experience, however, has been 
that most amendments, while important, have a relatively minor impact 
on the processing time, particularly if those amendments are submitted 
in a timely manner.
    Section 413.19 addresses issuance of a license.
    Section 413.21 contains the procedures employed by the FAA when it 
denies an applicant a license, and describes the recourse available to 
that applicant. An applicant may attempt to correct the deficiencies 
that resulted in the denial of its application and request 
reconsideration of its application, or it may request a hearing to show 
why the application should not be denied.
    Section 413.23 allows a licensee to apply for renewal of an 
expiring license. A licensee seeking authorization to conduct 
activities that are substantially different from those authorized under 
the expiring license is not eligible for renewal of the license and 
must apply for a new license.

Part 415--Launch License

    Part 415 establishes requirements applicable to obtaining a license 
to launch a launch vehicle and establishes post-licensing requirements. 
The provisions of this part apply to prospective and licensed launch 
operators and to prospective payload owners and operators, and should 
be read in conjunction with the general application requirements of 
part 413. This part replaces and amends the former part 415. A flow 
chart of the launch license application process is provided in Figure 
1.
    Subpart A describes the scope and types of launch licenses, 
required approvals or determinations, and procedures governing issuance 
or transfer of a launch license. Like the former section 415.1, the new 
section 415.1 explains that part 415 prescribes requirements for 
obtaining a launch license and adds that it prescribes post-licensing 
requirements. Section 415.3, a new provision arising out of this 
rulemaking, addresses the types of launch licenses issued, as discussed 
previously.
    Sections 415.5 and 415.7 identify the approvals and determinations 
required to qualify for a launch license. These sections require a 
license applicant to obtain policy and safety approvals from the FAA. 
Section 415.7 constitutes an administrative change, although the FAA 
has conducted payload reviews in the past. This provision requires an 
applicant to obtain a payload determination unless the payload is 
otherwise exempt from FAA consideration. The owner or operator of the 
proposed payload may also apply for a payload determination. Only a 
launch license applicant may apply for safety and policy approvals, 
and, as with former section 415.5, may apply for either approval 
separately and in advance of submitting a complete license application. 
An applicant applying for a separate approval should note, however, 
that some of the information described as required for one approval may 
be necessary for a different approval. In order to avoid duplication, 
the FAA is requesting only once material that is relevant to more than 
one review. For example the information required by section 415.25 is 
germane to an FAA safety review although it is also pertinent to a 
policy review.
    In addition to the approvals and determinations that the FAA 
requires of an applicant for a launch license, an applicant should bear 
in mind that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires the 
FAA, prior to considering a license application, to perform 
environmental reviews of major federal actions such as issuing a launch 
license. Accordingly, if a proposed launch vehicle is not otherwise 
already encompassed by a 1986 Programmatic Environmental Assessment of 
Commercial Expendable Launch Vehicle Programs, then NEPA may direct the 
FAA to perform an additional environmental review. No other approvals 
or determinations are required from the FAA in order for an applicant 
to obtain a license for launch of a launch vehicle.
    This subpart also contains new provisions for issuance and transfer 
of a launch license. Once an applicant has obtained all required 
approvals, the FAA will issue a launch license under section 415.9.
    Section 415.11, a new provision, allows the FAA to modify a launch 
license at any time by modifying or adding terms and conditions to the 
license to ensure compliance with the Act and regulations. Although 
standard license terms and conditions, contained in subpart E, apply to 
all licensees, it is the experience of the FAA that a particular 
licensee's launch may present unique circumstances which apply only to 
that licensee. In that event, the FAA may issue or modify a license 
with terms and conditions not identified in subpart E to protect public 
health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security and 
foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United 
States. A licensee may also initiate license modification.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ Should a licensee wish to protest an FAA modification of 
its license, it is entitled to a hearing pursuant to section 
406.1(a)(3) of part 406. In the event safety requires that 
additional terms and conditions be applied to all licensees, the FAA 
would revise subpart E by rulemaking to implement any such 
standardized terms. As provided in part 415, a licensee may request 
modification of its license to reflect changes in its proposed 
launches.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under section 415.13, a new provision, only the FAA may transfer a 
license, and only upon application by the transferee. The prospective 
transferee must satisfy all requirements for obtaining a license as 
specified in parts 413 and 415.
    Subpart B describes the requirements for a policy review. To date a 
policy review has been known as a mission review under former sections 
415.21-415.25. Because the FAA now separates a payload determination 
from any mission review, it is changing the name of the review to 
policy review to more accurately identify its purpose. Under sections 
415.21 and 415.23, a policy

[[Page 19601]]

review addresses whether some aspect of a proposed launch presents any 
issues affecting U.S. national security or foreign policy interests or 
is inconsistent with international obligations of the United States. 
Specific launch safety issues will be addressed only in a safety review 
although the FAA will address payload safety issues in the course of a 
payload determination. Only a launch license applicant may request a 
policy approval. An applicant must provide the information required by 
subpart B so that the FAA may review those aspects of an applicant's 
launch proposal that are not related to safety. The FAA coordinates 
this review with other government agencies, including the Departments 
of Defense, State, and Commerce, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration and the Federal Communications Commission. Space Access 
questioned the inclusion of NASA in the policy review. Space Access at 
12. Space Access states that NASA does not determine U.S. national 
security, foreign policy or questions of international obligations. Id. 
The FAA's experience has been that NASA, as the primary civilian 
government launch operator, often offers insights of value with respect 
to issues of concern. The FAA plans to continue to consult with NASA 
for a number of reasons. NASA has a long history of launching 
expendable launch vehicles, and currently operates the Space Shuttle. 
NASA also operates a federal launch range . NASA procures launch 
services from the private sector for a wide range of satellites and 
space probes. Also, NASA has programs and assets that it may wish to 
bring to the FAA's attention in the context of a particular launch. 
Accordingly, NASA will remain one of the agencies regularly consulted 
regarding any launch license application.
    An applicant may choose to submit an application for policy review 
separately from its license application, or, as do most applicants, it 
may submit a complete license application. The FAA will allow separate 
submission of a request for a policy review because of the possibility 
that an applicant might be uncertain about policy issues surrounding 
its proposal, and might wish to allay concerns over reactions to any 
proposed launch. An applicant might then request only a policy review 
prior to undertaking the additional effort necessary to prepare a 
complete license application. Past experience indicates that the FAA 
accomplishes these reviews relatively quickly in comparison with a 
safety review.
    Section 415.25, a new provision, describes the information an 
applicant must provide to obtain a policy approval. As described in the 
NPRM, the information required reflects current FAA information 
requests. The FAA requires this information in order to inform it and 
other agencies of what is being launched, by whom, for what purpose, 
and where a vehicle and its payload are going. The State Department, 
for example, may identify overflight issues regarding particular 
countries.
    Accordingly, the FAA requires that an applicant supply sufficient 
information to describe a proposed launch vehicle and its mission. The 
information requested by paragraph 415.25(b) is required in the event 
there are any policy issues surrounding the launch vehicle itself. The 
FAA requires a brief description of the launch vehicle, including the 
propellants used and the vehicle's major systems, such as its 
structural, pneumatic, propulsion, electrical or avionics systems. 
Policy questions may arise, for example, over the use of nuclear power, 
or the Department of Defense may have concerns over the allocation of 
resources to a commercial launch if a sole source manufacturer is 
involved.
    The information requested by paragraph 415.25(c)(2), that an 
applicant identify any foreign ownership interests of 10% or more means 
that an applicant must identify any foreign owner possessing a ten 
percent or greater interest in a license applicant. This provision is 
intended to provide the FAA and the Departments of State and Defense 
the identities of foreign interests involved in a licensed launch. The 
Departments of State and Defense have interests in foreign involvement 
in the U.S. launch industry, including, for example, issues surrounding 
technology transfer and national security. The FAA believes that a ten 
percent ownership interest is sufficiently high for a foreign owner to 
be able to influence a prospective licensee. The FAA is aware that a 
publicly traded corporation will not always know the identity of each 
of its smaller shareholders. However, such an applicant should be aware 
of any shareholders possessing that significant an interest in the 
corporation. Reporting requirements of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Department of Defense are often triggered by an 
ownership interest of ten percent or even less, and the FAA believes 
that this constitutes a reasonable threshold.
    Through the comment process, Kistler Aerospace Corporation and 
Lockheed Martin Corporation requested that the FAA not require an 
applicant to identify its foreign ownership interests. Kistler at 10; 
Lockheed Martin at 7. Kistler recommended that the FAA require, 
instead, a statement from the applicant that it is in compliance with 
all federal requirements governing foreign ownership in certain 
sensitive industries under 50 U.S.C. Secs. 1701 et seq. and 31 CFR Part 
800. Kistler notes that the Treasury Department examines and passes 
upon foreign involvement in sensitive industries such as the launch 
industry. Thus, according to Kistler, the FAA's information 
requirements concerning foreign ownership would be duplicative. 
Lockheed Martin maintains that the FAA offers an insufficient 
explanation regarding the purposes of obtaining the information.
    The statutory and regulatory provisions upon which Kistler relies 
for its argument do address certain elements of foreign ownership, but 
address a more narrow area of concern than identified in the Act. The 
provisions of 50 U.S.C. ch. 35--International Emergency Economic 
Powers, Secs. 1701-1706, apply to the President's exercise of authority 
in a national emergency. The FAA, on the other hand, may apply the 
information on a more routine basis, and for its own purposes. For 
example, the FAA has occasion, as with Sea Launch, to determine whether 
a U.S. citizen controls a license applicant for purposes of 
ascertaining whether the launch operator requires a license. Nor do the 
regulations Kistler cites address all forms of foreign ownership. On 
its face, part 800 only applies to mergers, acquisitions and takeovers 
by foreign persons. 31 CFR Part 800. There are transactions that are 
not acquisitions under part 800. See 31 CFR Sec. 800.302 and examples 
provided. In light of the fact that not all foreign ownership receives 
scrutiny under part 800, the FAA finds that its information 
requirements concerning foreign ownership will not duplicate those of 
the Treasury. The FAA also takes note of the fact that part 800 does 
not alter or affect any other reviews. Accordingly, because the FAA 
itself may require the information regarding foreign ownership in order 
to determine whether a U.S. citizen exercises control over an 
applicant, because the Departments of State and Defense have interests 
in foreign ownership issues, and because the Treasury regulations do 
not address all forms of foreign ownership, the FAA adopts paragraph 
415.25(c)(2) as proposed.
    Section 415.25(d)(2) requires an applicant to identify proposed 
vehicle flight profiles. Space Access maintains

[[Page 19602]]

that compliance may be difficult when planning large numbers of 
launches. To date, it has been the experience of the FAA that 
compliance is possible. An applicant may satisfy this requirement by 
providing a range of proposed flight azimuths, trajectories, ground 
tracks, and instantaneous impact points. Launch frequency should not 
affect an accurately identified range of flight profiles. In any event, 
this same information is also used by the FAA in its safety review and 
is critical to assessing public risk.
    Section 415.25(d)(3) requires information regarding the sequence of 
major launch events during flight. In this regard, the FAA expects to 
be informed of events such as approximate engine burn times of all 
stages, stage separation events, pitch and yaw maneuvers and engine 
cutoff. An applicant may provide this information through a text 
explanation or through diagrams and charts.
    Section 415.25(d)(4) requests a description of the range of nominal 
impact areas for all spent motors and other discarded mission hardware. 
The area identified for each impacting component shall include that 
area within three standard deviations of the nominal impact point, a 
calculation otherwise known as a 3-sigma footprint.
    Section 415.27 contains procedures employed by the FAA when it 
denies an applicant a policy approval and describes the recourse 
available to that applicant. If an applicant fails to obtain a policy 
approval, the applicant may attempt to correct the deficiencies which 
resulted in the denial and request reconsideration of the denial, or, 
upon denial of a license, it may request a hearing. The final version 
of this provision differs slightly from what the NPRM proposed. The 
NPRM stated that an applicant who was denied a policy approval could 
reapply. In order to avoid confusion, the provision now permits an 
applicant to request the FAA's reconsideration of its denial. This 
makes clear that the FAA need only reconsider an issue once rather than 
an unlimited number of times. The particular issue in controversy may 
serve as one of the reasons for requesting a hearing before an 
administrative law judge after denial of a license.

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

[[Page 19603]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21AP99.000



BILLING CODE 4910-13-C

[[Page 19604]]

    Subpart C addresses the FAA's safety evaluation process for license 
applications for launch from a federal launch range. This subpart is 
new and replaces the former subpart B--Safety Review, 14 CFR 415.11-
415.17. Because of the history and safety record of the federal launch 
ranges, and because the FAA's baseline assessments provide a written 
record of the federal launch range's experience relevant to commercial 
space transportation, the FAA accepts that a federal launch range will 
perform its safety role. Accordingly, the FAA's information 
requirements are directed more toward an applicant's own safety 
capabilities and its integration with a federal launch range's safety 
organization. The FAA requires information regarding an applicant's 
safety organization, vehicle design and operational safety practices. 
This subpart includes standards regarding acceptable flight risk and 
requires an applicant to submit procedures and plans that demonstrate 
that it will satisfy certain other safety requirements if it obtains a 
license.
    The FAA recognizes that federal launch ranges provide a number of 
safety services for launch operators, and that these sites have an 
historically good record of safety. Section 415.31 explains that the 
FAA will issue a license to an applicant proposing to launch from a 
federal launch range if the applicant satisfies the requirements of 
subpart C and has contracted with the federal launch range for the 
range to provide launch services and property, as long as the safety 
related launch services and proposed use of property are within the 
experience of the federal launch range. All other safety services and 
property associated with an applicant's proposal are evaluated on an 
individual, case by case basis.
    The FAA has assessed the four federal launch ranges which provide 
launch services and facilities. The federal ranges assessed include 
Cape Canaveral Air Station, Vandenberg Air Force Base, Wallops Flight 
Facility and White Sands Missile Range. The FAA does not duplicate 
federal launch range analyses or routinely review those analyses during 
the launch safety review conducted by the FAA. Instead, the FAA relies 
on its knowledge of the range processes as documented in the FAA's 
baseline assessments. The FAA's assessments provide a basis for the 
FAA's reliance on the adequacy of the services provided by each of the 
federal launch ranges. Some safety issues, however, may not be 
adequately addressed by a federal launch range. The failure of federal 
launch range safety systems or procedures may, for example, affect the 
FAA's ability to rely on a federal launch range. The FAA may ascertain 
this during the course of a pre-application consultation or once an 
applicant submits its application, or through its communications 
regarding launch activities with the federal ranges. The FAA may then 
require the applicant to demonstrate safety with respect to those 
specific areas of concern on an individual or case by case basis. In 
addition to requiring a showing of safety from the applicant, the FAA 
will also work with the federal launch range to address the issue, and 
will update the FAA's baseline assessment as appropriate.
    The FAA also makes maximum use of the information an applicant must 
provide a federal launch range. The applicant, to save paperwork, may 
submit to the FAA either entire, or appropriate sections of, documents 
it prepares and submits to a federal launch range that are relevant to 
the applicant's launch application. It has been the FAA's experience 
that because information requested by federal launch ranges provides 
greater detail than the FAA requires, the FAA's requirements may be 
satisfied by this material.
    Section 415.33 requires an applicant to document its safety 
organization. An applicant must possess a functioning safety 
organization because an applicant cannot ensure safety without someone 
designated as responsible for safety issues. The FAA will evaluate 
whether the structure, lines of communication, and approval authority 
an applicant establishes will enable the applicant to identify and 
address safety issues and to ensure compliance with the requirements of 
range safety and the FAA's regulations. How a federal launch range's 
safety services are integrated with the licensee is also relevant. The 
FAA expects that for launches from federal launch ranges an applicant 
will structure its safety organization to ensure compliance with 
federal launch range requirements, such as, for example, Eastern and 
Western Range Regulation 127-1 for Air Force launch ranges. The FAA 
believes that charts are the most efficient way to depict much of the 
required information, and encourages applicants to include one or more, 
as appropriate, organizational charts that will delineate the lines of 
communication and the internal decision making process. The lines of 
communication must depict the lines of communication within the 
applicant's organizational structure, and between the applicant and any 
federal launch range providing launch services. In providing this 
information, the applicant should include those services of the federal 
launch range upon which the applicant proposes to rely, and those of 
any other organization providing flight safety services. The 
applicant's description must include interfaces with the federal launch 
range and should explain how the safety policies and procedures of all 
segments of the safety organization identified above will be 
implemented.
    Section 415.33(b) requires an applicant to have a safety official 
possessing authority to examine launch safety operations and to monitor 
independently personnel compliance with safety policies and procedures. 
In order to keep safety concerns separate from mission goals, the 
person responsible for safety should have the ability to perform 
independently of those parts of the applicant's organization 
responsible for mission assurance, and should also have the authority 
to report directly to the licensee's personnel in charge of licensed 
launches. The safety official should be identified by name, title or 
position, and by qualifications.
    Orbital suggests that a safety official should not be required to 
report to someone who has a vested interest in the outcome of the 
launch. Orbital at 7. According to Orbital, such a person might be in a 
position to exert undue influence or pressure on the safety official. 
Id. When it proposed this requirement, the FAA intended just the 
opposite. The FAA intended that the safety official have authority to 
report directly to the person in charge of licensed launches in order 
to ensure that safety decisions were made at appropriately elevated 
levels, rather than becoming low priority issues buried in the lower 
levels of an organization. As noted in the NPRM, the FAA intends the 
reporting to ensure that the person responsible for the licensed launch 
ensure that all of a safety official's concerns are addressed prior to 
launch. Accordingly, because both the safety official and the person 
responsible for licensed launch possess safety obligations, no conflict 
of interest should exist. The FAA also believes that this decision 
reflects a reality within industry, namely, that the person in charge 
of mission success may well make final decisions regarding safety. The 
regulations impose safety obligations on that individual as well.
    Space Access also questioned this provision, querying the value of 
an applicant identifying the qualifications of a safety official's 
position. Space Access believes that this could result in an applicant 
identifying the qualifications of the position even though the 
individual performing the

[[Page 19605]]

job is not qualified. In order to clarify the FAA's intent, section 
415.33(b) now states that an applicant shall identify the safety 
official by name, title, and qualifications. An applicant must show 
that there is a relationship between the individual's experience and 
responsibilities. The FAA agrees with Space Access that a safety 
official's experience be provided. The FAA will not at this time impose 
requirements governing the particulars of a person's education and 
years of experience. Instead, it will rely on the performance standard 
articulated in 415.33(b).
    Although risk is inherent in the launch of a launch vehicle, 
section 415.35, which is promulgated through this rulemaking, 
establishes limits on how much risk the FAA will allow for a licensed 
launch. The FAA has clarified this section from that originally 
proposed in the NPRM to better describe the FAA's expected casualty 
(Ec) measure of risk by deleting ``the probability of 
occurrence'' and including mention of suborbital launch vehicles. The 
FAA is also classifying the scope of the hazards addressed. An 
Ec measure reflects risk from debris, not from toxic 
releases or blast overpressure, which the federal launch ranges handle 
through other means. Additionally, the proposed term ``collective 
risk'' in the second sentence is now deleted to state more specifically 
that an applicant's proposed launch shall not exceed an expected 
average number of 30 casualties in one million launches. This phrasing 
still describes collective risk, but with more precision. With these 
clarifying editorial changes, the FAA now adopts its measure of 
acceptable risk of Ec  30  x  10-6 per 
launch.
    The FAA received comments regarding its proposed risk threshold. 
Boeing supported the FAA's proposal. Boeing at 1. Space Access argued 
that the Ec was insufficiently strict, and should be 
compared to involuntary rather than voluntary risk. Space Access 
recommended an individual risk threshold of Ec  1 
 x  10-7. Space Access at 11. The FAA anticipates that a 
better explanation of what Ec measures and the differences 
between individual and collective risk will respond to Space Access' 
arguments against an Ec of 30  x  10-6. In short, 
when expressed in terms of individual risk, the FAA's collective risk 
measure satisfies the concerns voiced by Space Access. Space Access 
also maintains that a comparison to voluntary risk is inappropriate and 
that involuntary risk provides the better measure. The FAA, however, 
like the Air Force, defines background risk as the risk voluntarily 
accepted in the course of day to day activities, and finds that 
voluntary risk provides an acceptable basis of comparison for 
determining acceptable risk. Moreover, even when compared to 
involuntary risk, as Space Access recommends, if the FAA's collective 
risk measure is described in terms of its individual risk counterpart, 
the measure compares favorably.
    Section 415.35(a) requires that acceptable flight risk through 
orbital insertion for an orbital launch vehicle, and through impact for 
a suborbital launch vehicle, be measured in terms of collective risk. 
Pursuant to section 415.35(a), the collective risk associated with 
debris from an applicant's proposed launch, measured by casualty 
expectancy, shall not exceed 0.00003 (30  x  10-6) 
casualties per launch. Ec represents the FAA's measure of 
the collective risk to the population exposed to the launch of a launch 
vehicle. The measure represents the expected average number of 
casualties for a specific launch mission. In other words, if there were 
thousands of the same mission conducted and all the casualties were 
added up and the sum divided by the number of missions, the answer and 
the mission's expected casualty should statistically be the same. This 
Ec value defines acceptable collective risk.11
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ The Ec value adopted originated with the Air 
Force's stated measure of acceptable risk. ``Eastern and Western 
Range 127-1 Range Safety Requirements,'' Sec. 1.4(d), 1-12 (Mar. 31, 
1995). Space Access brought a number of risk levels to the FAA's 
attention, requesting that the FAA reconcile the apparent 
discrepancies between those risk levels, including the agency's own 
past descriptions of risk levels, and the FAA's proposed risk 
measure. A rulemaking is the appropriate mechanism for the FAA to 
adopt new standards. Thus, although the FAA now adopts a standard 
different than those its earlier reviews described, this rulemaking 
provides the forum for doing so. The conflicts Space Access 
identifies stem, in relevant part, from the fact that the risk 
figures Space Access cites pre-date the Eastern and Western Ranges' 
publication of an acceptable risk threshold of Ec 
 30  x  10-6. For example, although it is true 
that DOT's ``Hazard Analysis of Commercial Space Transportation'' 
(1988) (``DOT Hazard Analysis'') states that the Department of 
Defense (DOD) ranges do not have published standards for acceptable 
levels of public risk, DOD's Eastern and Western Ranges have since 
published the risk criteria on which the FAA now bases its own 
measure. Likewise, ``Financial Responsibility for Reentry Vehicle 
Operations,'' DOT, 27 (May 1995) describes general background risk 
as 1  x  10-6 per year. Prior to 1990, a collective risk 
of Ec  1  x  10-6 was thought to be 
the typical safety level at the DOD ranges. However, studies using 
the most up to date models for predicting risk, undertaken to 
support the effort by the Eastern and Western Ranges to adopt a 
common standard showed that this was not always the case. The Air 
Force eventually published an Ec  30  x  
10-6 in 1995 instead. Again, the ``Commercial Launch 
Baseline Assessment for US Air Force Western Space and Missile 
Center'' DOT, 79, Sec. D.7.e (Jul. 1989) states that Ec 
should lie between 1.9  x  10-7 and 4.6  x  
10-7. The referenced passage was a relatively simple 
calculation of risk in the launch area for a representative launch, 
and provides an example of the risks rather than a worst case limit. 
This estimate today proves low with the availability of more 
accurate data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Collective risk is estimated prior to launch, and constitutes the 
sum total launch related risk to that part of the public exposed to the 
hazards of a launch. The public includes everyone except launch 
personnel. Government personnel who are not essential to a launch are 
defined as the public for purposes of measuring acceptable risk.
    The FAA's standard derives from launch risk guidance employed by 
the Air Force at its Eastern Range, Cape Canaveral Air Station, and its 
Western Range, Vandenberg Air Force Base, to define acceptable risk. 
The FAA adopts this standard because the FAA believes that commercial 
launches should not expose the public to risk greater than normal 
background risk, which the FAA defined in its NPRM as those risks 
voluntarily accepted in the course of normal day-to-day activities. The 
FAA is using the Air Force standard because it reflects the standard 
already in place for the majority of commercial U.S. launches, and for 
the majority of government launches of vehicles of a comparable size. 
No casualties arising out of a government or commercial launch have 
occurred to the public under this standard. It is the FAA's 
understanding that although the Air Force published this figure in 
1995, it did so because it found that this figure best represented 
historical launch risk levels.
    The FAA is aware that the Air Force implements this standard as 
``acceptable launch risk without high management (Range Commander) 
review.'' ``Eastern and Western Range 127-1 Range Safety 
Requirements,'' Sec. 1.4.1, 1-12. This means that based on national 
need and the approval of a range or wing commander the Air Force may 
allow a launch with a predicted expected casualty risk of greater than 
30  x  10-6. Id. As mentioned in the NPRM, the FAA 
recognizes that many commercial launches carry government payloads, and 
that there may be a national need to launch a critical national payload 
with a predicted launch risk of greater than 30  x  10-6. An 
applicant proposing to launch a government payload, where the launch 
would not meet the FAA's risk requirement, would have to request a 
waiver from the FAA and show that national need warranted waiver of 
this standard. The FAA would work with any government payload owner or 
operator to resolve such an issue. The FAA establishes this standard, 
however, for all commercial launches, so that the

[[Page 19606]]

general public will not be exposed to a higher than normal risk from a 
commercial activity.
    The FAA also recognizes that the federal launch ranges may perform 
separate Ec analyses for three different hazard categories, 
including debris, toxic releases and blast overpressure. When the FAA 
relies on a federal launch range's Ec analysis to determine 
whether the FAA Ec requirement is met, the FAA is interested 
only in the debris analysis performed by a range, and this provision 
makes that clear. For toxic releases and blast overpressure, the 
federal launch ranges implement specific safety requirements designed 
to keep toxic releases and the effects of blast from reaching the 
public. For example, if more than a given number of parts per million 
of a toxic release would reach people, a launch will be delayed until 
conditions improve. Likewise, if atmospheric effects threaten to carry 
overpressure impact to persons outside the federal launch site, a 
launch will be delayed. Because these measures achieve safety, the FAA 
will rely on them rather than implementing an Ec analysis 
requirement for toxic releases and blast overpressure.
    Space Access raised the question of whether an Ec of 30 
x  10-6 meant that if an accident occurred and 100,000 
people were exposed then 3 deaths would occur. Space Access at 8. The 
FAA wishes to take advantage of this opportunity to clarify the 
concepts involved. Ec is the expected average number of 
casualties per launch of a launch vehicle. The consequence measured is 
casualties, which includes serious injury as well as deaths, and the 
measure is per event, namely, launch. Space Access based its question 
on the assumption that 30  x  10-6 is ``3 per 100,000'' 
persons. That Ec is a measure of casualties rather than 
deaths aside, expected casualty is measured for each event, which, in 
this case is a single launch. Although Space Access is, of course, 
correct that an Ec of 30  x  10-6 is equivalent 
to 3 per 100,000, the 100,000 refers not to exposed persons, but to the 
number of launches that would have to be conducted before one would 
expect statistically that total number of casualties. One would have to 
launch 100,000 times to statistically reach 3 casualties.
    Space Access sought clarification on the differences between 
individual and collective risk. In contrast to the more familiar 
measure of risk, namely, individual risk, which describes the 
probability of serious injury or death to a single person, the launch 
industry's common measure of risk is collective risk. Collective risk 
constitutes the sum total launch related risk, that is, the probability 
of injury or death to that part of the public exposed to a launch. 
Collective risk is analogous to an estimate of the average number of 
people hit by lightning each year, while individual annual risk would 
be an individual's likelihood of being hit by lightning in any given 
year. Collective risk may be expressed in terms of individual risk if 
certain factors associated with any given launch are taken into 
account. Also, individual risk may be--and will be, in most instances--
less than collective risk, depending on the size of the population 
exposed. For example, a collective risk of Ec of 30  x  
10-6 for a defined population of one hundred thousand people 
exposed to a particular launch results (assuming the risk is spread 
equally throughout the defined population) in a probability of injury 
or death to any one individual exposed of 3  x  10-10 (three 
per ten billion).
    In its comments, Space Access argued for a stricter standard on the 
basis of what it understood to be other measures of risk. Space Access 
analyzed the FAA's proposed measure in terms of two categories: 
background risk, which may be further categorized as a combination of 
voluntary and involuntary risk, and other launch risk thresholds. 
Contrary to the contentions of Space Access, the FAA finds that the 
comparison to voluntary risks is appropriate. Even, however, when 
compared to involuntary risk, if the risks of launch are expressed in 
terms of individual risk, launch risk usually compares favorably. In 
fact, it is possible to have an unacceptably high expected casualty 
value while still having an extremely low individual risk level.
    Space Access inquired whether the proposed standard appropriately 
reflects risk levels voluntarily accepted by the public in normal daily 
activity. Voluntary risk provides an appropriate comparison. The FAA 
defines background risk in the context of its statutory mandate to 
regulate and facilitate the commercial launch industry. Congress has 
chosen to accept the risk of launch in order to reap the benefits 
attendant to the activity. Recognizing that this country has decided to 
accept these risks, the FAA believes, as the federal launch ranges do 
(see ``Eastern and Western Range 127-1 Range Safety Requirements'', 
Sec. 1.4(d), 1-12), that it is appropriate to compare launch risks to 
other measures of voluntary risk. A recent study proves helpful for 
making that comparison. See Acceptable Risk Criteria for Launches from 
National Ranges: Rationale, Rep. No. 97/350-2.1-01, ACTA, for the 
Department of the Air Force, 30th and 45th Space Wings (Sept. 1997) 
12. ACTA estimated the average annual accidental fatality 
probability for any individual, which is defined as all accidental 
causes of death. ACTA estimated the fatality probability by adding the 
estimated annual individual fatality probability from accidents outside 
the home and the reported annual individual fatality probability from 
accidents in the home. This excludes risk of disease. ACTA estimated a 
total risk of 2  x  10-4. Id. at 18. The FAA's measure of 
acceptable risk for casualties may be as much as four orders of 
magnitude lower than this accident death risk. The comparison may only 
be made, of course, by translating the FAA's collective risk measure 
into individual risk and by employing the same time scale for both. If 
the comparison is made on an annual basis, and the example of an 
exposed population of 100,000 persons continues to be employed, then 
individual risk for a launch is, as mentioned earlier, 3  x  
10-10. Assuming 100 launches per year, then the individual 
annual risk results in a figure of 3  x  10-8, which is four 
orders of magnitude lower than the risks, both voluntary and 
involuntary, of day to day activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ ACTA prepared this study in support of Range Commander's 
Council Standard 321-97, which articulates federal launch range 
policies and criteria for protection of personnel, aircraft, ships, 
and spacecraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Space Access also makes the point that the FAA would have to assign 
a maximum number of launches per launch site if the agency intends 
acceptable risk to remain below background risk. In the NPRM, the FAA 
acknowledged that its standard is based on present launch rates, and it 
still finds that this threshold is appropriate for the scope and 
frequency of launch operations planned over the next several years. 
Even if launch rates increase by an order of magnitude, individual 
annual risk will still compare favorably with other voluntary and 
involuntary risks. An exponential rise in launch rates may require a 
reassessment, although the FAA does not foresee an exponential increase 
in launch rates in the near term.
    Space Access also suggests that other launch risk standards provide 
the proper measure of acceptable risk. Space Access notes that the 1988 
DOT Hazard Analysis states that ``acceptable risk criteria'' for NASA's 
Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) is Ec  1  x  
10-7. Space Access at 10. As noted in its NPRM the FAA 
recognizes that WFF does not use an expected casualty standard of 
Ec  30

[[Page 19607]]

 x  10-6. Although at the time of the publication of DOT's 
Hazard Analysis WFF may have reported Ec  1  x  
10-7, since that time, NASA has stated that WFF uses an 
Ec of less than or equal to 1  x  10-6. ``Range 
Safety Manual for Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)/Wallops Flight 
Facility,'' 24 (Jun. 23, 1993); Beyma, ``Flight Safety Range Safety 
Officer Training Manual, NASA/Wallops Flight Facility,'' 2 (Sept. 
1993). The FAA must choose one standard. The level of safety at the 
Eastern and Western Ranges, represented by the collective risk standard 
of Ec  30  x  10-6 has resulted in no 
harm to the public. The vast majority of U.S. commercial launches take 
place from CCAS and VAFB. The FAA therefore finds that this accepted 
standard is appropriate for all licensed launches.
    Space Access also maintains that in order to adopt an Ec 
standard of Ec  30  x  10-6, the FAA 
would have to obtain NASA's acceptance. This is not in fact the case. 
NASA and the FAA have different roles. Commercial launches are 
regulated by the FAA, not NASA. As the operator of a launch site, NASA 
is free to require a different measure of acceptable risk than that 
required by the FAA. Any FAA licensed commercial launch, regardless of 
where it takes place, must, however, at least meet FAA standards, even 
were a particular federal launch range to impose less stringent 
requirements. In this case, the more stringent NASA standard with which 
a user of WFF would have to comply does not conflict with the FAA 
standard.
    Paragraph 415.35(b), which the NPRM proposed as paragraph 
415.35(c), requires an applicant to submit an analysis that identifies 
the hazards and assesses the risks for flight under nominal and non-
nominal conditions.13 This requirement has been modified to 
clarify that the risk assessment serves the purpose of demonstrating 
compliance with paragraphs 415.35(a). A federal launch range will 
sometimes perform a quantitative analysis for flight until orbital 
insertion, or for a suborbital mission until impact. A range may 
determine that an analysis of previously approved missions applies or 
may serve as a basis for a comparative analysis. If an applicant's 
previously submitted application contains a risk assessment, the 
applicant need not submit additional analyses for similar launches. In 
such cases, a comparative analysis may be supplied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ This section is renumbered in order to accommodate the move 
of the NPRM's proposed paragraph 415.35(b) into section 415.39, 
which addresses safety at the end of launch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As an alternative to relying on federal launch range procedures, an 
applicant may perform its own quantitative risk analysis. Pursuant to 
section 415.35(b), although an applicant may submit a federal launch 
range risk analysis, the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating 
that predicted risk does not exceed an expected casualty of 30  x  
10-6. To assist applicants, the FAA has documented the range safety 
process for each of the federal launch ranges. A launch hazard event 
tree, such as the one described in the DOT Hazard Analysis of 
Commercial Space Transportation, page 10-29, provides an acceptable 
method for identifying hazards and assessing risks.
    Section 415.35(c), which was proposed in the NPRM as section 
415.37(a), ensures that an applicant identify the design of its launch 
vehicle. In its application, an applicant shall identify and describe 
its launch vehicle's design, including its structure and the vehicle's 
hazardous and safety-critical systems, and provide drawings and 
schematics for each system identified. Because federal launch ranges 
require an applicant to provide a detailed description of the 
applicant's launch vehicle and its systems, including drawings and 
schematics, an applicant may satisfy the requirements of this paragraph 
by providing the FAA with a copy of all or appropriate portions of the 
documentation provided to a federal launch range. The FAA will not use 
the data to duplicate the federal launch range's design approval 
process, but to document the characteristics of the launch vehicle 
being licensed and upon which the hazard identification and risk 
assessment are based.
    Section 415.35(d) requires that an applicant's launch vehicle be 
operated in a manner that meets the criteria of paragraph 415.35(a). To 
that end, an applicant must describe the launch operations and 
procedures that the applicant will employ to mitigate risks for flight. 
The applicant should eliminate or control by design and operations all 
identified hazards to the levels specified in paragraph (a). Typical 
hazard controls for flight until orbital insertion used at current 
federal launch ranges include flight termination systems, and, for 
suborbital launches, azimuth and elevation adjustments based on a wind 
weighting analysis. Other hazard controls may involve modifying a 
vehicle trajectory to avoid high risk areas, and delaying launch until 
more favorable conditions exist. An applicant for a license to launch 
from a federal launch range may rely on the methods used by federal 
launch ranges to identify hazard controls and to ensure that the hazard 
controls will be effective.
    Section 415.37(a), which was originally proposed as section 
415.37(c), implements the FAA's current flight readiness guidelines. As 
noted in the NPRM, the requirements arise out of recommendations from a 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation 14 
of an anomaly that occurred during a commercial launch from a federal 
launch range. Requirements intended to ensure the readiness of a launch 
team include designation of an individual responsible for flight 
readiness, launch readiness reviews, rules and abort procedures and, 
countdown checklists, dress rehearsals procedures, and procedures for 
crew rest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ ``Special Investigation Report, Commercial Space Launch 
Incident, Launch Procedure Anomaly, Orbital Sciences Corporation 
Pegasus/SCD-1 80 Nautical Miles East of Cape Canaveral, Florida,'' 
NTSB (Feb. 9, 1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA recognizes that there are many reviews conducted of a 
launch system from its initial design up to flight. However, in section 
415.37(a)(1), the FAA places special emphasis on a flight readiness 
review, or its equivalent. A review is typically conducted not more 
than one or two days prior to scheduled flight. In most cases a flight 
readiness review is standard practice at federal launch ranges, but the 
FAA considers the review, and the topics required in this section, to 
be so important that the applicant must, in its application, commit to 
a meeting and identify the topics to be addressed. This review must 
ensure that all system and personnel readiness problems are identified 
and are associated with a plan to resolve them, that all systems needed 
for flight have been checked out and are ready, and that each 
participant is cognizant of his or her role on the day of flight. If 
this review reveals unresolved issues, the licensee will be able to 
assess its ability to resolve those issues before the intended launch 
time or to delay the flight, as appropriate.
    Section 415.37(a)(2) requires an applicant to possess procedures 
that ensure mission constraints, rules and abort procedures are 
contained in a single document approved by licensee flight safety and 
federal launch range personnel.
    Section 415.37(a)(3) requires an applicant to employ procedures 
that ensure that all launch countdown checklists are current and 
consistent. Past inconsistencies in critical countdown checklists and 
procedures have raised serious safety concerns. The FAA recognizes that 
it may be

[[Page 19608]]

impractical for all launch participants to have identical checklists 
due to differences in the roles of launch participants. The applicant 
should, however, have some process, such as a master countdown manual, 
to ensure the currency and consistency of all participants' checklists 
during countdown to flight. This will ensure that confusion and 
uncertainties on launch day are minimized, that flight safety critical 
procedures are completed successfully, and that those individuals with 
launch decision authority know what is going on and are able to make 
sound decisions.
    Section 415.37(a)(4) requires an applicant to have procedures for 
the conduct of dress rehearsals. As demonstrated in the past, poor 
performance at a dress rehearsal may indicate a lack of readiness of 
individuals or systems responsible for safety. An applicant's 
procedures should include criteria for determining when dress 
rehearsals are not necessary. A number of launch companies, for 
example, have been conducting routine launches of the same vehicle for 
many years. The FAA recognizes that although dress rehearsals may not 
be necessary in every case, they may be critical to those launch 
companies that are new to a launch site, to those that have significant 
changes in personnel, or to those launching a new launch vehicle.
    Even those launch operators that routinely conduct launches 
typically have certain criteria and procedures in place to verify that 
a launch team is ready for launch, especially if a considerable period 
of time has elapsed since the last launch took place. In this regard, 
Space Access recommends that the FAA impose a currency requirement of 
45 days. Space Access at 11. The FAA will take the recommendation into 
account in future rulemakings, but for the time being declines to 
impose a currency requirement of 45 days. The need for dress rehearsals 
is driven by issues specific to particular vehicles, including the 
number of personnel required to launch the vehicle, the complexity of 
their tasks, and the amount of communication required among team 
members to launch safely.
    For those situations where dress rehearsals are necessary, the 
dress rehearsal should simulate both nominal and non-nominal 
conditions, induced not only by the launch vehicle or payload, but by 
the range safety system as well. Anomalies introduced during the 
rehearsal should exercise and prove the abilities of all launch 
participants, including federal launch range personnel, to recognize an 
event that compels a launch hold, delay or flight termination decision. 
In the NPRM, the FAA noted its interest in views as to any need for 
future standards relating to rehearsals and the criteria for deciding, 
based on performance during the rehearsal, that it is acceptable to 
proceed with the launch. In response, Space Access suggested that no 
discrepancies be permitted for a nominal profile, and only minor 
discrepancies be permitted for failure profiles, if the discrepancies 
involve non-critical actions. Space Access at 11. The FAA agrees, and 
will interpret section 415.37(a)(4)(i) according to Space Access' 
recommendation.
    Section 415.37(a)(5) responds to another NTSB recommendation, and 
requires that an applicant ensure that its flight safety personnel 
adhere to federal launch range crew rest rules. Experience has shown 
that launch crew rest criteria for all those involved in supporting 
launch operations are extremely important and can have a significant 
impact on public health and safety. Federal launch ranges typically 
have such requirements. Based on current knowledge and the demonstrated 
safety history of the federal ranges, the FAA would consider adequate 
adherence to these requirements. Other rest criteria proposed by an 
applicant may be acceptable if the applicant requests a waiver of the 
FAA's rules and demonstrates that the criteria would be adequate.
    Section 415.37(b) and (c), originally proposed as a separate 
section, 415.39, require an applicant to submit a communications plan 
that ensures that licensee and federal launch range personnel receive 
safety-critical information during countdown and flight. The NTSB, 
after its investigation of a launch anomaly, concluded that effective 
communications are critical to the conduct of a safe flight. Everyone 
involved in a launch needs to know not only what channel has been 
assigned for particular communications, but also the proper protocol 
for communicating on that channel. The FAA recognizes that a number of 
different individuals typically have input and decision authority with 
respect to the readiness of various launch and safety systems. Past 
experience has shown that serious mishaps could result if these 
relationships are not clearly defined and understood by all parties. 
These relationships must therefore be identified by the applicant. 
Identifying persons with authority to make ``hold'' and ``go/no-go'' 
decisions is critical to ensuring that on launch day, everyone knows 
who can call a ``hold'' and, more importantly, who has the authority to 
authorize the resumption of the countdown or a recycle procedure, and 
under what specific conditions. This will help eliminate confusion and 
cross-talk that could cause a miscommunication leading to an unsafe 
condition. In addition, the FAA requires that everyone who has a 
decision-making role, or who, by action or inaction can either prevent 
or allow a launch to take place, be on the same predetermined channel 
during countdown and flight.
    Under section 415.39, which was included in the NPRM as paragraph 
415.35(b), an applicant must demonstrate that for any proposed launch 
that for all launch vehicle stages or components that reach earth orbit 
that there will be no unintended physical contact of the vehicle or its 
components with its payload after payload separation. The applicant's 
proposal must also ensure that debris generation will not result from 
the conversion of energy sources into energy that fragments the vehicle 
or its components. In addition, although not specifically proposed in 
the NPRM, the FAA now adds paragraph (c) to specify required measures 
that prevent the conversion of energy sources into energy that 
fragments a vehicle or its components, unless other measures are 
approved in the course of the licensing process. The FAA discussed the 
new measures in the NPRM.
    Those involved in commercial, defense and scientific uses of space 
have been voicing a growing space safety concern due to the increasing 
number of objects being placed in orbit, which increases the potential 
for collisions between objects in space. Collisions in turn create 
additional objects, increasing the potential for harm or damage. The 
operation of launch vehicles in space affects and is affected by 
hazards associated with space debris. Accordingly, the requirements of 
this section serve to mitigate hazards associated with space debris. 
Federal launch ranges perform a collision avoidance analysis, or 
conjunction on launch assessment, commonly referred to as a COLA, prior 
to launch only to ensure that manned or potentially manned spacecraft 
will not be affected through orbital insertion. The FAA has elected to 
adopt only selected debris mitigation practices that are of almost 
universal applicability. It has not, for example, opted for requiring 
collision avoidance measures or post-mission disposal, or for 
specifying a minimum lifetime on orbit.
    Orbital noted in its comments that preventing unplanned contact is 
a primary goal of each launch because it ``represents sound technical,

[[Page 19609]]

operational, safety and financial business practice,'' rendering a 
regulation prohibiting such contact unnecessary. Orbital at 10. Orbital 
recommends that the prohibition on unintended contact be deleted or 
modified so that rather than ensuring there be no contact, such contact 
be prevented ``to the fullest extent feasible.'' Id. For the reasons 
stated in the NPRM the FAA now implements this requirement. In light of 
the fact that preventing unplanned contact is already a primary goal of 
a launch operator, the FAA does not consider the requirement unduly 
burdensome. At the time of the NPRM, the FAA intended that the original 
requirement constitute a performance standard that could be implemented 
in any manner that achieved the goal, thus avoiding an overly intrusive 
degree of regulation.
    Orbital's recommendation that a licensee ensure against unplanned 
contact ``to the fullest extent feasible'' cannot be adopted because it 
only adds ambiguity to what is required. Ensuring against an event is a 
clear requirement. It means that the event must not occur. Ensuring 
against that event to the fullest extent feasible raises questions 
regarding whether something need not be done if it is technically not 
feasible, too expensive or for some other reason. The FAA does not 
discern a reason for making such distinctions that outweigh the safety 
benefits of requiring a licensee to prevent unplanned contact.
    Orbital also maintains that it is impossible to ensure that debris 
generation will not result from the conversion of energy sources into 
energy that fragments the vehicle as required by paragraph (b). 
Although Orbital is correct that it is impossible to ensure with utter 
certainty that energy will not fragment the vehicle, or, indeed that 
any given event could be prevented with utter certainty, there are 
practices that have been shown to prevent this occurrence. As noted in 
the NPRM, the FAA is aware of a number of standard industry practices 
designed to prevent or reduce this on-orbit risk. These practices 
include depleting residual fuels and leaving fuel lines valves open, 
venting pressurized systems, and leaving batteries in a permanent 
discharge state. These practices are routine. The NPRM intended to 
require that these practices be employed for all commercial launches, 
rather than ignored for reasons of cost or otherwise. The FAA recently 
uncovered ambiguity in the proposed requirements. Therefore, the FAA 
now clarifies the requirement by specifying that a licensee must remove 
stored energy by depleting residual fuels and leaving fuel line valves 
open, venting pressurized systems, leaving batteries in a permanent 
discharge state, and removing any remaining sources of stored energy, 
or other equivalent procedures. The practices enumerated in paragraph 
(c) should satisfy the requirement in paragraph (b).
    A number of standard industry practices reduce potential on-orbit 
risks arising out of flight following orbital insertion. A launch 
operator may maneuver its launch vehicle orbital stage after payload 
separation to minimize the likelihood that the orbital stage will 
recontact the payload. This avoids the consequences of either a 
malfunctioning payload or orbital debris. In order to reduce the 
possibility of future explosions that could create orbital debris, a 
launch operator must render liquid fueled orbital stages as inert as 
possible by expelling all propellants and pressurants and protecting 
batteries from spontaneous explosion. A launch operator may keep stage-
to-stage separation devices and other potential debris sources captive 
to a stage with lanyards or other means. Also, a launch operator may 
choose launch times to geosynchronous transfer orbit designed to align 
the final orbit of the orbital stage so as to lower the perigee of the 
stage more quickly than other orbits.
    Section 415.41 requires an applicant to submit an accident 
investigation plan. The accident investigation plan must comply with 
the reporting requirements identified in section 415.41(b), and must 
contain procedures for responding to a launch accident, incident or 
other mishap. As noted in the discussion of the definition of 
``mishap,'' the proposed rules have been modified to require 
notification of mishaps only above a threshold severity level.
    Section 415.43 contains the procedures employed by the FAA when it 
denies an applicant a safety approval and describes the recourse 
available to that applicant. If an applicant fails to obtain a safety 
approval, the applicant may attempt to correct the deficiencies which 
resulted in the denial and request reconsideration of the denial, or, 
upon denial of a license, it may request a hearing. The final version 
of this provision differs slightly from what the NPRM proposed. The 
NPRM stated that an applicant who was denied a safety approval could 
reapply. In order to avoid confusion, the provision now permits an 
applicant to request the FAA's reconsideration of its denial. This 
makes clear that the FAA need only reconsider an issue once rather than 
an unlimited number of times.
    Under subpart D, the FAA conducts a payload review and 
determination pursuant to 49 U.S.C. Sec. 70104(c). The Act provides 
that the Secretary of Transportation may prevent the launch of a 
particular payload if the Secretary determines that the payload's 
launch would jeopardize the public health and safety, safety of 
property, or national security or foreign policy interests, or 
international obligations of the United States. Subpart D explains when 
a payload review and determination are required and the elements of 
that review. Addition of this subpart constitutes a change from the 
FAA's current practice because the payload review will no longer be 
performed as part of the policy review. This subpart allows either a 
launch license applicant or a payload owner or operator to apply for a 
payload determination separately from a launch license application, as 
was also provided under the former section 415.23 of a mission review. 
A launch license applicant's decision to seek a payload determination 
separately from a license application might be based on uncertainty 
with respect to payload issues and a desire to gain a payload 
determination before undertaking the additional effort required to 
prepare a complete launch license application.
    Although a payload determination is required for a license, it is 
not necessarily a requirement imposed on a license applicant. An 
applicant need not itself apply for a payload determination if a 
determination has otherwise been issued to a payload owner or operator. 
In addition to the fact that many payloads are exempt from FAA 
consideration, an applicant may incorporate by reference a payload 
determination issued earlier to the applicant or to a payload owner or 
operator. Alternatively, an applicant may reference a separate 
application submitted by another launch license applicant for a payload 
determination and request that the FAA incorporate its earlier 
determination.
    The FAA does not believe that this flexible approach affects the 
statutory requirement that the FAA complete its license application 
review within 180 days. Submission of a request for a payload 
determination does not constitute the filing of a complete application, 
and a license application is not complete without a request for a 
payload determination. The FAA stated in its NPRM that it was 
considering issuing conditional licenses on those occasions when a 
request for a payload determination had yet to be completed. This would 
mean that a license would be issued subject to or conditional upon

[[Page 19610]]

issuance of a payload determination. The FAA once issued a conditional 
license to an applicant who proposed to launch a reentry vehicle as its 
payload. The reentry vehicle was still under development, but the FAA 
issued a launch license conditioned upon eventual submission of all 
required payload information and a final determination by the FAA 
regarding the payload. The FAA has decided, however, that with these 
rules it will not adopt such a course. A license will be issued only 
for a complete application.
    The FAA also addresses payload safety issues because payload safety 
is not otherwise part of the safety evaluation of a launch. Payload 
issues considered during the review include, but are not limited to, 
safety issues associated with the launch of the payload and its 
intended operation and design, the payload owner(s), and the payload 
function. For example, a past payload issue included the nature of the 
cargo. In that case the payload cargo consisted of cremains, which are 
human remains reduced to small pellets. A safety issue addressed was 
whether the pellets would be dispersed while in orbit.
    Section 415.51 describes the scope of an FAA payload review, 
clarifying part of the former section 415.21. Pursuant to proposed 
section 415.53, the FAA will not review payloads owned and operated by 
the government of the United States or those that are subject to the 
regulation of the Federal Communications Commission or the Department 
of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
    As explained in the NPRM, new section 415.55 allows the FAA to make 
a determination regarding a proposed class of payloads, including, for 
example, communications, remote sensing or navigation satellites. When 
an applicant requests an operator license to conduct unspecified but 
similar launches over a period of five years, the applicant will not 
always be able to identify specifically each payload to be launched. 
The applicant must describe the class or classes of payloads proposed 
for launch under the license and general characteristics of those 
payloads. In these cases, the licensee must later provide additional 
descriptive information regarding the specific payload prior to flight 
as described in section 415.79(a). That section refers a licensee to 
the information requirements of section 415.59, which specify the 
information required for a payload review.
    The FAA must take this opportunity to clarify an issue raised by 
the comments of Kistler Aerospace Corporation. Kistler expressed 
concern that the launch reporting requirement under section 415.79 
amounted to an additional payload review by the FAA for each payload 
within the class encompassed by a launch operator license. Kistler at 
5-6. In point of fact, the information submitted sixty days prior to 
launch would not trigger additional policy and safety reviews. It would 
merely identify the characteristics of what is being launched for 
compliance monitoring purposes. Kistler recommends that a licensee 
whose class of payload has been approved and is proposing to launch a 
payload within that approved class merely submit a copy of a launch 
manifest ``describing the payload, the payload owner, pertinent details 
about the launch, etc.'' Kistler at 6. By requiring the information 
described in section 415.59, the FAA intends just that.
    Section 415.57 provides procedures an applicant must follow to 
obtain a payload determination. The FAA coordinates a payload review 
with other government agencies such as the Departments of Defense, 
State, and Commerce, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
and the Federal Communications Commission.
    The information requested under section 415.59 for a payload review 
is required to identify and address possible safety and policy issues 
related to the payload, and to conduct any necessary interagency 
review. In most instances, the information submitted may be brief, but 
in cases which present potential unique safety concerns considerable 
detail may be necessary regarding the physical characteristics, 
functional description and operations of the payload.
    Section 415.61(a), which reflects certain requirements of former 
section 415.21, explains that the FAA will issue a payload 
determination unless policy or safety considerations prevent launch of 
the payload. Section 415.61(b) contains the procedures employed to deny 
an applicant a payload determination and describes the recourse 
available to that applicant. If an applicant fails to obtain a payload 
determination, the applicant may attempt to correct the deficiencies 
which resulted in a denial and request reconsideration of the denial, 
or, upon denial of a license, it may request a hearing. The final 
version of this provision differs slightly from what the NPRM proposed. 
The NPRM stated that an applicant who was denied a payload 
determination could reapply. In order to avoid confusion, the provision 
now permits an applicant to request the FAA's reconsideration of its 
denial. This makes clear that the FAA need only reconsider an issue 
once rather than an unlimited number of times.
    Section 415.63 addresses incorporation of a payload determination 
into subsequent license reviews. It also explains that any change in 
information provided to the FAA must be reported in accordance with 
applicable rules.
    Subpart E addresses post-licensing requirements, including license 
terms and conditions. This subpart describes a licensee's public safety 
responsibilities under section 415.71.
    Section 415.73 describes the circumstances that require a licensee 
to apply for a modification to its license. This section modifies and 
builds upon the former section 413.19. That provision required an 
applicant or a licensee to notify the FAA whenever the information that 
formed the basis for any approval, determination or license action was 
no longer substantially accurate and complete in all significant 
respects, or whenever there has been a substantial change as to any 
matter of decisional significance. The FAA has required licensees to 
report material changes in order for the FAA to determine their 
significance. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed requiring that it be 
notified of all changes regardless of materiality, but now adopts a 
materiality standard in response to comments. A launch licensee must 
ensure the continuing accuracy of representations contained in its 
application for the term of its license, and must conduct its licensed 
launches as it has represented that it will. This means that if any 
information a licensee provides pursuant to part 415 will no longer be 
accurate, a licensee must apply for a modification to its license in 
advance of instituting the proposed change. For example, if a licensee 
intends to alter its accident investigation plan, it must obtain 
authorization in advance through a license modification to do so. 
Orbital describes this requirement as overly broad and undefined. 
Orbital at 9. Orbital recommends that the FAA incorporate a materiality 
standard, so that an applicant or licensee would only notify the FAA of 
any significant changes. Id. The FAA agrees in part. It does not wish 
to be advised of any and all changes, only of those material to public 
health and safety or safety of property. The FAA wishes to be advised 
of any material changes so that it may determine whether to modify a 
license.

[[Page 19611]]

    The FAA also wishes to draw attention to an editorial change from 
the provision as originally proposed. In its NPRM, the regulations 
required a licensee to ``amend'' its application even after its license 
was issued. Now, the same provisions require a license 
``modification.'' This results in no substantive change. It does 
clarify, however, that an application is part of any ensuing license 
and that a licensee must obtain advance authorization from the FAA for 
any material changes.
    The remainder of subpart E contains license terms and conditions 
applicable to all licensees. Section 415.75 requires a licensee to 
enter into an agreement with the federal launch range from which it 
proposes to launch. Orbital recommends that rather than require the 
range agreement to remain in effect for the term of the license, that 
the FAA require that it be in effect during the conduct of licensed 
launches. Orbital at 9. The FAA sees no practical difference, but 
agrees, and revises the regulation accordingly. A licensee should bear 
in mind, however, that ``launch'' begins with the arrival of a vehicle 
at the launch site. Accordingly, any agreement must be in place at the 
time of the vehicle's arrival.
    Section 415.77 requires a licensee to maintain those records that 
pertain to activities carried out under a license issued by the FAA. 
These records must be retained for at least three years after the 
completion of all launches conducted under the license.
    Section 415.79, as proposed in the NPRM, required a licensee to 
report certain information before each launch. Because launch begins 
with the arrival of a launch vehicle at the gate, this section is now 
clarified to require reporting 60 days prior to flight. Section 
415.79(b) regarding provision of the FAA's Launch Notification Form has 
also been clarified from the FAA's original proposal. The FAA files the 
Launch Notification Form with U.S. Space Command 15 days prior to 
flight. Accordingly, the form is now due at noon, Eastern Standard 
Time, 15 days prior to flight so that the FAA may provide the form to 
U.S. Space Command in a timely manner. The Federal Aviation 
Administration/ U.S. Space Command Launch Notification Form is provided 
in this notice. See Appendix A. Section 415.79(c) is now modified from 
what was proposed in the NPRM to add a requirement for immediate 
notification of any mishap involving a fatality or serious injury.
    Section 415.81, which replaces former section 415.10, contains 
requirements for registration of space objects, including a new 
provision that a licensee need not provide registration information 
concerning objects owned and registered by the government of the United 
States. The former version of this requirement provided that a licensee 
need not provide registration information for objects it placed in 
space that were owned by a foreign entity. The new provision contains 
the same proviso. It has, however, come to the attention of the FAA 
that this requires clarification. The Act requires that a foreign 
entity controlled by a U.S. citizen which launches outside the 
territory of any nation obtain an FAA license to launch. 49 U.S.C. 
70104(a)(3). Applying these principles to an actual case, the FAA found 
that Sea Launch, a Cayman Islands partnership, which intends to launch 
from international waters, required a launch license on account of the 
control Boeing Commercial Space Company, a U.S. company, exercised over 
the partnership. 49 U.S.C. 70104(a)(3), 70102(1)(C); 14 CFR 401.5. 
Because Sea Launch is a U.S. citizen for licensing purposes, the FAA 
requires data pertinent to registration for Sea Launch's upper stage.
    Section 415.83 requires a licensee to comply with financial 
responsibility requirements as specified in a license or license order.
    Section 415.85 explains that a licensee is required to cooperate 
with the compliance monitoring responsibilities of the FAA.
    Subpart F describes the FAA's safety review for a proposed launch 
from a launch site not operated by a federal launch range. The FAA will 
conduct a review on an individual, case by case basis until it issues 
regulations of general applicability. The FAA will take this 
opportunity to advise applicants to bear in mind that a case by case 
review still must conform to existing standards and precedent. For 
example, part of the reason that the FAA relies on federal launch range 
safety reviews is because of the testing and reviews the ranges conduct 
of a launch operator's flight safety system, which, in most cases, 
contain a flight termination system. Accordingly, when a federal launch 
range is not assessing the adequacy of a launch operator's flight 
safety system, it is incumbent upon the FAA to do so.
    Subpart G incorporates the FAA's environmental review requirements, 
the former sections 415.31 and 415.33, which require the FAA to comply 
with applicable environmental laws and regulations, and state that an 
applicant must provide the FAA with the information required for doing 
so. The renumbering of these provisions represents no substantive 
change from the current regulations. In response to the NPRM relocation 
proposal, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) commented that the 
environmental review process for licensing commercial launch activities 
should reference FAA Order 1050.1D. This change is incorporated here. 
Additionally, the EPA requested that section 415.101 reference other 
informal FAA guidance documents. The FAA notes that informal guidance 
documents are available, and will confer with a license applicant 
regarding the applicability of the guidance. The FAA also notes that 
the NPRM text omitted the proposed section revisions. They are now 
included in the regulatory text.

Part 417--License To Operate a Launch Site

    Because the FAA is removing and reserving part 411, which contains 
section 411.3 regarding the operation of a launch site, the FAA now 
creates part 417 to govern licensing the operation of a launch site. 
The FAA will license the operation of a launch site on an individual, 
case by case basis until it issues regulations of general 
applicability. Until then, an applicant for a license to operate a 
launch site should refer to the FAA's draft guidelines and pre-
application consultation for assistance. This part also now contains 
the requirements governing an environmental review for licensing the 
operation of a launch site previously located in 14 CFR 415.31-33.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    Section 441 of this rule contains information collection 
requirements. In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 
44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq., the information collection requirements 
associated with this rule and titled, Commercial Space Transportation 
Licensing Regulations, were submitted to the Office of Management and 
Budget for review. The collection of information was approved and 
assigned OMB control number 2120-0608. Information collected includes: 
data to support both policy and payload reviews; evidence that supports 
launch safety requirements, and submitted environmental impact 
statement (EIS) materials. The required information will be used to 
determine if applicant proposals for conducting commercial space 
launches can be done in a safe manner as set forth in regulations and 
in the licenses and the license orders issued by the FAA. Comments 
received on the reporting requirements associated with this rule have 
been discussed earlier in the preamble. Respondents are license

[[Page 19612]]

applicants and licensees. The estimated number of respondents on an 
annual basis is six. The estimated annual burden is 2914 hours.
    An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required 
to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a 
currently valid OMB control number. The OMB control number associated 
with this collection of information is 2120-0608.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary

    This section summarizes the full regulatory evaluation prepared by 
the FAA that provides more detailed estimates of the economic 
consequences of this regulatory action. This summary and the full 
evaluation quantify, to the extent practicable, estimated costs to the 
private sector, consumers, Federal, State and local governments, as 
well as anticipated benefits. This evaluation was conducted in 
accordance with Executive Order 12866, which directs that each Federal 
agency can propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify the 
costs. This document also includes an initial regulatory flexibility 
determination, required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, and 
an international trade impact assessment, required by the Office of 
Management and Budget. This rule is considered a significant regulatory 
action under section 3 (f) of Executive Order 12866 and, therefore, was 
reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget. The rule is considered 
significant under Department of Transportation Policies and Procedures, 
44 FR 11034 (Feb. 26, 1979). In addition, for the reasons stated under 
the ``Trade Impact Statement'' and the `` Regulatory Flexibility 
Determination,'' the FAA certifies that this rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

Economic Impacts

    The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is modifying its 
commercial space licensing regulations to streamline its licensing 
process while continuing to ensure safety and continuing to preserve 
the flexibility required to address multiple launch technologies and 
associated issues. With this rulemaking, the FAA is clarifying its 
license application procedures, codifying its practice of issuing 
launch-specific licenses and launch operator licenses, increasing the 
duration of launch operator licenses from two years to five years, and 
defining the launch period so that the scope of a launch license is 
narrower than it has been under current practice.
    This rulemaking is expected to result in quantifiable cost savings 
compared to current practice because of the increased duration of the 
launch operator license. Increasing the duration of the launch operator 
license will decrease paperwork and administrative costs both to 
government and to industry.
    The cost savings to industry over ten years resulting from the 
administrative and paperwork impacts are estimated to be $305,000, 
undiscounted and $185,000, discounted. These savings are primarily due 
to the fewer number of license renewal applications that are likely to 
be submitted. The cost savings reflect primarily the fewer number of 
hours necessary for both submitting the license applications to the FAA 
and for complying with the financial responsibility requirements when 
there are fewer licenses covering the same number of launches. No added 
costs from the paperwork and administrative impacts are expected.
    The FAA is expected to receive some cost savings, as well, because 
of reduced paperwork and administrative costs that result from 
processing and issuing fewer applications and licenses. Cost savings to 
the FAA over ten years is estimated to be $424,000, undiscounted and 
$256,000, discounted. The FAA is expected to incur no costs resulting 
from the paperwork and administrative impacts. Over the ten-year time 
horizon of this analysis, the total cost savings to both industry and 
the FAA is expected to be approximately $729,000, undiscounted and 
$441,000, discounted.
    There are numerous non-quantifiable impacts associated with this 
final rulemaking. The information coding requirements are expected to 
increase clarity to both industry and government. Probably more 
importantly, however, is the fact that firms will be better able to 
plan future operations because this rulemaking extends the time period 
of the launch operator license to five years.
    The narrower scope of launch licenses under this rulemaking is 
expected to slightly increase the launch operator's risk of having to 
pay for any damages to third parties or government property. The 
activities that will no longer be covered under the narrower scope of 
the launch license are of low risk (such as ground activities prior to 
the arrival of the hazardous components of the launch vehicle). The 
higher burden of risk borne by the licensee should be considered low 
and inconsequential.
    There is also a slightly lower risk to the U.S. Treasury that it 
will be called upon to indemnify for third-party damages under the 
``indemnification'' provisions of the statute, because the launch phase 
is now more limited. The change in risk to the U.S. Treasury is 
expected to be minimal. This risk has not been quantified.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 establishes ``as a principle 
of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, consistent with 
the objective of the rule and of applicable statues, to fit regulatory 
and informational requirements to the scale of the business, 
organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to regulation.'' 
To achieve that principal, the Act requires agencies to solicit and 
consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the rationale for 
their actions. The Act covers a wide-range of small entities, including 
small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and small governmental 
jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. If the determination is that it will, the 
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis (RFA) as 
described in the Act.
    However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule is 
not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 act provides that 
the head of the agency must so certify and an RFA is not required. The 
certification must include a statement providing the factual basis for 
this determination, and the reasoning should be clear.
    The FAA conducted the required review of this final rulemaking and 
determined that it would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, pursuant to the 
regulatory Flexibility Act, U.S.C. 605(b), the Federal Aviation 
Administration certifies that this rule will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

Potentially Affected Entities

    The Small Business Administration has defined small business 
entities relating to space vehicles [SIC codes 3761, 3764, and 3769] as 
entities comprising fewer than 1000 employees. The potentially affected 
entities are Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, Orbital Sciences Corporation, Sea 
Launch, Beal Aerospace Technologies and Universal Space Lines. 
Lockheed-Martin, Boeing and Orbital Sciences Corporation all

[[Page 19613]]

have more than 1,000 employees and are therefore not small entities. 
Sea Launch is a partnership of various entities that includes Boeing 
and therefore would not be considered a small entity. Beal and 
Universal Space Lines each have under 1,000 employees and can therefore 
be considered small entities. According to an FAA forecast, Beal 
Aerospace Technologies will be issued a launch operator license in 2000 
and Universal Space Lines will be issued a launch operator license in 
2002.
    This final rulemaking will result in a cost savings to the launch 
operator. It primarily results from renewing a license every five years 
instead of two years. To calculate the annualized cost savings, the FAA 
discounted the costs or cost savings for the appropriate year. The net 
total cost savings for Beal Aerospace is $13,204 and the net total cost 
savings for Universal Space Lines is $8,442. The net total cost savings 
for the period 1999-2008 is then annualized by multiplying the net 
total cost savings for each of the affected firms by the 10 year, 7 
percent annualization factor (.142378). The FAA estimates that the 
annualized cost savings for Beal Aerospace is $1,880 ($13,204  x  
142378 = $1,880) and the annualized cost savings for Universal Space 
Lines is $1,202 ($8,442  x  142378 = $1,202).
    The FAA has little financial information to calculate whether the 
projected cost savings represents a significant amount to these two 
firms. However, according to the Beal Aerospace website, over 70 people 
currently work for Beal Aerospace. They project that the firm will grow 
to more than 200 people over the next ten years. Moreover, the same 
source states that: ``Beal Aerospace is fully financed, up to $250M.'' 
The FAA concludes that the annualized cost savings of $1,880 does not 
represent a significant amount for this firm. Even less information is 
available on Universal Space Lines. However, one article quotes John 
Grady, Universal's chief financial officer by stating that: ``Initially 
the company will hire about 40 people--mostly in technological and 
engineering positions. In three years, employment is expected to rise 
to 100.'' The same article states that: ``The initial plan is to 
manufacture low-cost, two-stage orbital launch vehicles capable of 
launching 3,000-pound and greater satellite payloads.'' If 40 people 
each hypothetically earned $50,000 annually, then the annual cost to 
employ these individuals would be at least $2 million. Comparing the 
hypothetical annual cost of employing these individuals against the net 
cost savings of this final rulemaking, the FAA again concludes that the 
annualized cost savings of $1,202 does not represent a significant 
amount for this firm.

International Trade Impact Assessment

    This final rulemaking will not constitute a barrier to 
international trade. This rulemaking affects launch activities located 
within the United States and launch activities abroad that have 
substantial U.S. involvement. In fact, if the anticipated cost savings 
result and are passed along to launch service customers in the form of 
reduced prices, it is possible that the international competitiveness 
of U.S. commercial launch services will be enhanced.

Federalism Implications

    The regulations herein will not have substantial direct effects on 
the states, on the relationship between the national government and the 
states, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive 
Order 12612, it is determined that this rule will not have sufficient 
federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism 
Assessment.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the UMRA), 
enacted as Pub. L. 104-4 on March 22, 1995, requires each Federal 
agency, to the extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment 
of the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency 
rule that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. 
Section 204(a) of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal 
agency to develop an effective process to permit timely input by 
elected officers (or their designees) of State, local, and tribal 
governments on a proposed ``significant intergovernmental mandate.'' A 
``significant intergovernmental mandate'' under the Act is any 
provision in a Federal agency regulation that will impose an 
enforceable duty upon State, local, and tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one 
year. Section 203 of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which supplements section 
204(a), provides that before establishing any regulatory requirements 
that might significantly or uniquely affect small governments, the 
agency shall have developed a plan that, among other things, provides 
for notice to potentially affected small governments, if any, and for a 
meaningful and timely opportunity to provide input in the development 
of regulatory proposals.
    This final rule does not contain a Federal intergovernmental or 
private sector mandate that exceeds $100 million a year. Therefore, the 
requirements of Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do 
not apply.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 411

    Space transportation and exploration.

14 CFR Part 413

    Confidential business information, Space transportation and 
exploration.

14 CFR Part 415

    Aviation safety, Environmental protection, Space transportation and 
exploration.

14 CFR Part 417

    Environmental protections, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Rockets, Space transportation and exploration.

The Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration amends Chapter III of Title 14 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations as follows:

SUBCHAPTER A--GENERAL

PART 401--ORGANIZATION AND DEFINITIONS

    1. The authority citation for part 401 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70102.

    2. Section 401.5 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 401.5  Definitions.

    As used in this chapter--
    Act means 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, Commercial Space Transportation, 
ch. 701--Commercial Space Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.
    Amateur rocket activities means launch activities conducted at 
private sites involving rockets powered by a motor or motors having a 
total impulse of 200,000 pound-seconds or less and a total burning or 
operating time of less than 15 seconds, and a rocket having a ballistic 
coefficient--i.e., gross weight in pounds divided by frontal area of 
rocket vehicle--less than 12 pounds per square inch.
    Associate Administrator means the Associate Administrator for 
Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation

[[Page 19614]]

Administration, or any person designated by the Associate Administrator 
to exercise the authority or discharge the responsibilities of the 
Associate Administrator.
    Federal launch range means a launch site, from which launches 
routinely take place, that is owned and operated by the government of 
the United States.
    Hazardous materials means hazardous materials as defined in 49 CFR 
172.101.
    Launch means to place or try to place a launch vehicle or reentry 
vehicle and any payload from Earth in a suborbital trajectory, in Earth 
orbit in outer space, or otherwise in outer space, and includes 
activities involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle for flight, 
when those activities take place at a launch site in the United States. 
The term launch includes the flight of a launch vehicle and pre-flight 
ground operations beginning with the arrival of a launch vehicle or 
payload at a U.S. launch site. Flight ends after the licensee's last 
exercise of control over its launch vehicle.
    Launch accident means an unplanned event occurring during the 
flight of a launch vehicle resulting in the known impact of a launch 
vehicle, its payload or any component thereof outside designated impact 
limit lines; or a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 
830.2) to any person who is not associated with the flight; or any 
damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to property not associated with the 
flight that is not located at the launch site or designated recovery 
area.
    Launch incident means an unplanned event occurring during the 
flight of a launch vehicle, other than a launch accident, involving a 
malfunction of a flight safety system or failure of the licensee's 
safety organization, design or operations.
    Launch operator means a person who conducts or who will conduct the 
launch of a launch vehicle and any payload.
    Launch site means the location on Earth from which a launch takes 
place (as defined in a license the Secretary issues or transfers under 
this chapter) and necessary facilities at that location.
    Launch vehicle means a vehicle built to operate in, or place a 
payload in, outer space or a suborbital rocket.
    Mishap means a launch accident, a launch incident, failure to 
complete a launch as planned, or an unplanned event or series of events 
resulting in a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) 
or resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to a payload, a 
launch vehicle, a launch support facility or government property 
located on the launch site.
    Operation of a launch site means the conduct of approved safety 
operations at a permanent site to support the launching of vehicles and 
payloads.
    Payload means an object that a person undertakes to place in outer 
space by means of a launch vehicle, including components of the vehicle 
specifically designed or adapted for that object.
    Person means an individual or an entity organized or existing under 
the laws of a state or country.
    State and United States when used in a geographical sense, mean the 
several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, American Samoa, The United States Virgin Islands, Guam, and any 
other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States; and
    United States citizen means:
    (1) Any individual who is a citizen of the United States;
    (2) Any corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, or 
other entity organized or existing under the laws of the United States 
or any State; and
    (3) Any corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, or 
other entity which is organized or exists under the laws of a foreign 
nation, if the controlling interest in such entity is held by an 
individual or entity described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this 
definition.
    Controlling interest means ownership of an amount of equity in such 
entity sufficient to direct management of the entity or to void 
transactions entered into by management. Ownership of at least fifty-
one percent of the equity in an entity by persons described in 
paragraph (1) or (2) of this definition creates a rebuttable 
presumption that such interest is controlling.

SUBCHAPTER C--LICENSING

PART 411--[REMOVED AND RESERVED]

    3. Part 411 is removed and reserved.
    4. Part 413 is revised to read as follows:

PART 413--LICENSE APPLICATION PROCEDURES.

Sec.
413.1  Scope.
413.3  Who must obtain a license.
413.5  Pre-application consultation.
413.7  Application.
413.9  Confidentiality.
413.11  Acceptance of an application.
413.13  Complete application.
413.15  Review period.
413.17  Continuing accuracy of application; supplemental 
information; amendment.
413.19  Issuance of a license.
413.21  Denial of a license application.
413.23  License renewal.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.


Sec. 413.1  Scope.

    This part prescribes the procedures applicable to all applications 
submitted under this chapter to conduct licensed activities. These 
procedures apply to applications for issuance of a license, transfer of 
an existing license and renewal of an existing license. More specific 
requirements applicable to obtaining a launch license or a license to 
operate a launch site are contained in parts 415 and 417 of this 
chapter, respectively.


Sec. 413.3  Who must obtain a license.

    (a) Any person must obtain a license to launch a launch vehicle 
from the United States or a license to operate a launch site within the 
United States.
    (b) An individual who is a United States citizen or an entity 
organized or existing under the laws of the United States or any state 
must obtain a license to launch a launch vehicle outside of the United 
States or a license to operate a launch site outside of the United 
States.
    (c) A foreign entity in which a United States citizen has a 
controlling interest, as defined in section 401.5 of this chapter, must 
obtain a launch license to launch a launch vehicle from or a license to 
operate a launch site within--
    (1) Any place that is both outside the United States and outside 
the territory of any foreign nation, unless there is an agreement in 
force between the United States and a foreign nation providing that 
such foreign nation shall exercise jurisdiction over the launch or the 
operation of the launch site; or
    (2) The territory of any foreign nation if there is an agreement in 
force between the United States and that foreign nation providing that 
the United States shall exercise jurisdiction over the launch or the 
operation of the launch site.


Sec. 413.5  Pre-application consultation.

    A prospective applicant shall consult with the FAA before 
submitting an application to discuss the application process and 
potential issues relevant to the FAA's licensing decision. Early 
consultation enables an applicant to identify potential licensing 
issues at the planning stage when changes to a license application or 
to proposed licensed activities are less likely to result in 
significant delay or costs to the applicant.


Sec. 413.7  Application.

    (a) Form. An application must be in writing, in English and filed 
in

[[Page 19615]]

duplicate with the Federal Aviation Administration, Associate 
Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, AST-200, Room 331, 
800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20591. Attention: 
Licensing and Safety Division, Application Review.
    (b) Administrative information. An application must identify the 
following:
    (1) The name and address of the applicant;
    (2) The name, address, and telephone number of any person to whom 
inquiries and correspondence should be directed; and
    (3) The type of license for which the applicant is applying.
    (c) Signature and certification of accuracy. An application must be 
legibly signed, dated, and certified as true, complete, and accurate by 
one of the following:
    (1) For a corporation: An officer authorized to act for the 
corporation in licensing matters.
    (2) For a partnership or a sole proprietorship: A general partner 
or proprietor, respectively.
    (3) For a joint venture, association, or other entity: An officer 
or other individual duly authorized to act for the joint venture, 
association, or other entity in licensing matters.


Sec. 413.9  Confidentiality.

    (a) Any person furnishing information or data to the FAA may 
request in writing that trade secrets or proprietary commercial or 
financial data be treated as confidential. The request must be made at 
the time the information or data is submitted, and state the period of 
time for which confidential treatment is desired.
    (b) Information or data for which any person or agency requests 
confidentiality must be clearly marked with an identifying legend, such 
as ``Proprietary Information,'' ``Proprietary Commercial Information,'' 
``Trade Secret,'' or ``Confidential Treatment Requested.'' Where this 
marking proves impracticable, a cover sheet containing the identifying 
legend must be securely attached to the compilation of information or 
data for which confidential treatment is requested.
    (c) If a person requests that previously submitted information or 
data be treated confidentially, the FAA will do so to the extent 
practicable in light of any prior distribution of the information or 
data.
    (d) Information or data for which confidential treatment has been 
requested or information or data that qualifies for exemption under 
section 552(b)(4) of Title 5, United States Code, will not be disclosed 
to the public unless the Associate Administrator determines that the 
withholding of the information or data is contrary to the public or 
national interest.


Sec. 413.11  Acceptance of an application.

    The FAA will initially screen an application to determine whether 
the application is sufficiently complete to enable the FAA to initiate 
the reviews or evaluations required under any applicable part of this 
chapter. After completion of the initial screening, the FAA notifies 
the applicant, in writing, of one of the following:
    (a) The application is accepted and the FAA will initiate the 
reviews or evaluations required for a licensing determination under 
this chapter; or
    (b) The application is so incomplete or indefinite as to make 
initiation of the reviews or evaluations required for a licensing 
determination under this chapter inappropriate, and the application is 
rejected. The notice will state the reason(s) for rejection and 
corrective actions necessary for the application to be accepted. The 
FAA may return a rejected application to the applicant or may hold it 
pending additional submissions by the applicant.


Sec. 413.13  Complete application.

    Acceptance by the FAA of an application does not constitute a 
determination that the application is complete. If, in addition to the 
information required by the applicable parts of this chapter, the FAA 
requires other information necessary for a determination that public 
health and safety, safety of property and national security and foreign 
policy interests of the United States are protected during the conduct 
of a licensed activity, an applicant shall submit the additional 
information required to show compliance with this chapter.


Sec. 413.15  Review period.

    (a) 180-day review. Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, the 
FAA reviews and makes a determination on a license application within 
180 days of receipt of an accepted application.
    (b) Review period tolled. If an accepted application does not 
provide sufficient information to continue or complete the reviews or 
evaluations required by this chapter for a licensing determination, or 
an issue exists that would affect a licensing determination, the FAA 
notifies the applicant, in writing, and informs the applicant of any 
information required to complete the application. If further review is 
impracticable, the 180-day review period shall be tolled pending 
receipt by the FAA of the requested information.
    (c) 120-day notice. If the FAA has not made a licensing 
determination within 120 days of receipt of an accepted application, 
the FAA informs the applicant, in writing, of any outstanding 
information needed to complete the reviews or evaluations required by 
this chapter for a licensing determination, or of any pending issues 
that would affect the licensing determination.


Sec. 413.17  Continuing accuracy of application; supplemental 
information; amendment.

    (a) An applicant is responsible for the continuing accuracy and 
completeness of information furnished to the FAA as part of a pending 
license application. If at any time information provided by an 
applicant as part of a license application is no longer accurate and 
complete in all material respects, the applicant shall submit a 
statement furnishing the new or corrected information. As part of its 
submission, the applicant shall recertify the accuracy and completeness 
of the application in accordance with section 413.7. An applicant's 
failure to comply with any of the requirements set forth in this 
paragraph is a sufficient basis for denial of a license application.
    (b) An applicant may amend or supplement a license application at 
any time prior to issuance or transfer of a license.
    (c) Willful false statements made in any application or document 
relating to an application or license are punishable by fine and 
imprisonment under section 1001 of Title 18, United States Code, and by 
administrative sanctions in accordance with part 405 of this chapter.


Sec. 413.19  Issuance of a license.

    After the FAA completes its reviews and makes the approvals and 
determinations required by this chapter for a license, the FAA issues a 
license to an applicant in accordance with this chapter.


Sec. 413.21  Denial of a license application.

    (a) The FAA informs a license applicant, in writing, if its 
application has been denied and states the reasons for denial.
    (b) An applicant whose license application is denied may either:
    (1) Attempt to correct any deficiencies identified by the FAA and 
request reconsideration of the revised application. The FAA has 60 days 
or the number of days remaining in the 180-day review period, whichever 
is greater, within which to reconsider its licensing determination; or
    (2) Request a hearing in accordance with part 406 of this chapter, 
for the

[[Page 19616]]

purpose of showing why the application should not be denied.
    (c) An applicant whose license application is denied after 
reconsideration under paragraph (b)(1) of this section may request a 
hearing in accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of this section.


Sec. 413.23  License renewal.

    (a) Eligibility. A licensee may apply to renew its license by 
submitting to the FAA a written application for renewal of the license 
at least 90 days before the expiration date of the license.
    (b) Application.
    (1) A license renewal application shall satisfy the requirements 
set forth in this part and any other applicable part of this chapter.
    (2) The application may incorporate by reference information 
provided as part of the application for the expiring license or any 
modification to that license.
    (3) The applicant must describe any proposed changes in its conduct 
of licensed activities and provide any additional clarifying 
information required by the FAA.
    (c) Review of application. The FAA conducts the reviews required 
under this chapter for a license to determine whether the applicant's 
license may be renewed for an additional term. The FAA may incorporate 
by reference any findings that are part of the record for the expiring 
license.
    (d) Grant of license renewal. After completion by the FAA of the 
reviews required by this chapter for a license and issuance of the 
requisite approvals and determinations, the FAA issues an order 
amending the expiration date of the license. The FAA may impose 
additional or revised terms and conditions necessary to protect public 
health and safety and the safety of property and to protect U.S. 
national security and foreign policy interests.
    (e) Denial of license renewal. The FAA informs a licensee, in 
writing, if the licensee's application for renewal has been denied and 
states the reasons for denial. A licensee whose application for renewal 
is denied may follow the procedures set forth in section 413.21 of this 
part.
    5. Part 415 is revised to read as follows:

PART 415--LAUNCH LICENSE

Subpart A--General

Sec.
415.1  Scope.
415.3  Types of launch licenses.
415.5  Policy and safety approvals.
415.7  Payload determination.
415.9  Issuance of a launch license.
415.11  Additional license terms and conditions.
415.13  Transfer of a launch license.
415.15  Rights not conferred by launch license.
415.16-415.20  [Reserved]

Subpart B--Policy Review and Approval

415.21  General.
415.23  Policy review.
415.25  Application requirements for policy review.
415.27  Denial of policy approval.
415.28-415.30  [Reserved]

Subpart C--Safety Review and Approval for Launch From a Federal Launch 
Range

415.31  General.
415.33  Safety organization.
415.35  Acceptable flight risk.
415.37  Flight readiness and communications plan.
415.39  Safety at end of launch.
415.41  Accident investigation plan.
415.43  Denial of safety approval.
415.44-415.50  [Reserved]

Subpart D--Payload Review and Determination

415.51  General.
415.53  Payloads not subject to review.
415.55  Classes of payloads.
415.57  Payload review.
415.59  Information requirements for payload review.
415.61  Issuance of payload determination.
415.63  Incorporation of payload determination in license 
application.
415.64-415.70  [Reserved]

Subpart E--Post-Licensing Requirements--Launch License Terms and 
Conditions

415.71  Public safety responsibility.
415.73  Continuing accuracy of license application; application for 
modification of license.
415.75  Agreement(s) with federal launch range.
415.77  Records.
415.79  Launch reporting requirements.
415.81  Registration of space objects.
415.83  Financial responsibility requirements.
415.85  Compliance monitoring.
415.86-415.90  [Reserved]

Subpart F--Safety Review and Approval for Launch From a Launch Site not 
Operated by a Federal Launch Range

415.91  General.
415.93  Denial of safety approval.
415.94-415.100  [Reserved]

Subpart G--Environmental Review

415.101  General
415.103  Environmental information

Appendix A to Part 415--FAA/USSPACECOM Launch Notification Form

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.

Subpart A--General


Sec. 415.1  Scope.

    This part prescribes requirements for obtaining a launch license 
and post-licensing requirements with which a licensee shall comply to 
remain licensed. Requirements for preparing a license application are 
contained in part 413 of this subchapter.


Sec. 415.3  Types of launch licenses.

    (a) Launch-specific license. A launch-specific license authorizes a 
licensee to conduct one or more launches, having the same launch 
parameters, of one type of launch vehicle from one launch site. The 
license identifies, by name or mission, each launch authorized under 
the license. A licensee's authorization to launch terminates upon 
completion of all launches authorized by the license or the expiration 
date stated in the license, whichever occurs first.
    (b) Launch operator license. A launch operator license authorizes a 
licensee to conduct launches from one launch site, within a range of 
launch parameters, of launch vehicles from the same family of vehicles 
transporting specified classes of payloads. A launch operator license 
remains in effect for five years from the date of issuance.


Sec. 415.5  Policy and safety approvals.

    To obtain a launch license, an applicant must obtain policy and 
safety approvals from the FAA. Requirements for obtaining these 
approvals are contained in subparts B, C and F of this part. Only a 
launch license applicant may apply for the approvals, and may apply for 
either approval separately and in advance of submitting a complete 
license application, using the application procedures contained in part 
413 of this subchapter.


Sec. 415.7  Payload determination.

    A payload determination is required for a launch license unless the 
proposed payload is exempt from payload review under Sec. 415.53 of 
this part. The FAA conducts a payload review, as described in subpart D 
of this part, to make the determination. Either a launch license 
applicant or a payload owner or operator may request a review of its 
proposed payload using the application procedures contained in part 413 
of this subchapter. Upon receipt of an application, the FAA may conduct 
a payload review independently of a launch license application.


Sec. 415.9  Issuance of a launch license.

    (a) The FAA issues a launch license to an applicant who has 
obtained all approvals and determinations required under this chapter 
for a license.
    (b) A launch license authorizes a licensee to conduct a launch or 
launches in accordance with the representations contained in the 
licensee's application, subject to the

[[Page 19617]]

licensee's compliance with terms and conditions contained in license 
orders accompanying the license, including financial responsibility 
requirements.


Sec. 415.11  Additional license terms and conditions.

    The FAA may modify a launch license at any time by modifying or 
adding license terms and conditions to ensure compliance with the Act 
and regulations.


Sec. 415.13  Transfer of a launch license.

    (a) Only the FAA may transfer a launch license.
    (b) An applicant for transfer of a launch license shall submit a 
license application in accordance with part 413 of this subchapter and 
shall meet the requirements of part 415 of this subchapter. The FAA 
will transfer a license to an applicant who has obtained all of the 
approvals and determinations required under this chapter for a license. 
In conducting its reviews and issuing approvals and determinations, the 
FAA may incorporate by reference any findings made part of the record 
to support the initial licensing determination. The FAA may modify a 
license to reflect any changes necessary as a result of a license 
transfer.


Sec. 415.15  Rights not conferred by launch license.

    Issuance of a launch license does not relieve a licensee of its 
obligation to comply with all applicable requirements of law or 
regulation that may apply to its activities, nor does issuance confer 
any proprietary, property or exclusive right in the use of any federal 
launch range or related facilities, airspace, or outer space.


Secs. 415.16-415.20  [Reserved]

Subpart B--Policy Review and Approval


Sec. 415.21  General.

    The FAA issues a policy approval to a license applicant unless the 
FAA determines that a proposed launch would jeopardize U.S. national 
security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of 
the United States. A policy approval is part of the licensing record on 
which the FAA's licensing determination is based.


Sec. 415.23  Policy review.

    (a) The FAA reviews a license application to determine whether it 
presents any issues affecting U.S. national security or foreign policy 
interests, or international obligations of the United States.
    (b) Interagency consultation.
    (1) The FAA consults with the Department of Defense to determine 
whether a license application presents any issues affecting U.S. 
national security.
    (2) The FAA consults with the Department of State to determine 
whether a license application presents any issues affecting U.S. 
foreign policy interests or international obligations.
    (3) The FAA consults with other federal agencies, including the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, authorized to address 
issues identified under paragraph (a) of this section, associated with 
an applicant's launch proposal.
    (c) The FAA advises an applicant, in writing, of any issue raised 
during a policy review that would impede issuance of a policy approval. 
The applicant may respond, in writing, or revise its license 
application.


Sec. 415.25  Application requirements for policy review.

    In its launch license application, an applicant shall--
    (a) Identify the model and configuration of any launch vehicle 
proposed for launch by the applicant.
    (b) Identify structural, pneumatic, propellant, propulsion, 
electrical and avionics systems used in the launch vehicle and all 
propellants.
    (c) Identify foreign ownership of the applicant as follows:
    (1) For a sole proprietorship or partnership, identify all foreign 
ownership;
    (2) For a corporation, identify any foreign ownership interests of 
10% or more; and
    (3) For a joint venture, association, or other entity, identify any 
participating foreign entities.
    (d) Identify proposed launch vehicle flight profile(s), including:
    (1) Launch site;
    (2) Flight azimuths, trajectories, and associated ground tracks and 
instantaneous impact points;
    (3) Sequence of planned events or maneuvers during flight;
    (4) Range of nominal impact areas for all spent motors and other 
discarded mission hardware, within three standard deviations of the 
mean impact point (a 3-sigma footprint); and
    (5) For each orbital mission, the range of intermediate and final 
orbits of each vehicle upper stage, and their estimated orbital 
lifetimes.


Sec. 415.27  Denial of policy approval.

    The FAA notifies an applicant, in writing, if it has denied policy 
approval for a license application. The notice states the reasons for 
the FAA's determination. The applicant may respond to the reasons for 
the determination and request reconsideration.


Secs. 415.28-415.30  [Reserved]

Subpart C--Safety Review and Approval for Launch From a Federal 
Launch Range


Sec. 415.31  General.

    (a) The FAA conducts a safety review to determine whether an 
applicant is capable of launching a launch vehicle and its payload 
without jeopardizing public health and safety and safety of property. 
The FAA issues a safety approval to a license applicant proposing to 
launch from a federal launch range if the applicant satisfies the 
requirements of this subpart and has contracted with the federal launch 
range for the provision of safety-related launch services and property, 
as long as those launch services and the proposed use of launch 
property are within the federal launch range's experience. The FAA 
evaluates on an individual basis all other safety-related launch 
services and property associated with an applicant's proposal. A safety 
approval is part of the licensing record on which the FAA's licensing 
determination is based.
    (b) The FAA advises an applicant, in writing, of any issue raised 
during a safety review that would impede issuance of a safety approval. 
The applicant may respond, in writing, or revise its license 
application.


Sec. 415.33  Safety organization.

    (a) An applicant shall maintain a safety organization and document 
it by identifying lines of communication and approval authority for all 
launch safety decisions. Lines of communication, both within the 
applicant's organization and between the applicant and any federal 
launch range providing launch services, shall be employed to ensure 
that personnel perform launch safety operations in accordance with 
range safety requirements and with plans and procedures required by 
this subpart. Approval authority shall be employed to ensure compliance 
with range safety requirements and with plans and procedures required 
by this subpart.
    (b) Safety official. An applicant shall identify by name, title, 
and qualifications, a qualified safety official authorized to examine 
all aspects of the applicant's launch safety operations and to monitor 
independently personnel compliance with the applicant's safety policies 
and procedures. The safety official shall report directly to the person 
responsible for an applicant's

[[Page 19618]]

licensed launches, who shall ensure that all of the safety official's 
concerns are addressed prior to launch.


Sec. 415.35  Acceptable flight risk.

    (a) Flight risk through orbital insertion or impact. Acceptable 
flight risk through orbital insertion for an orbital launch vehicle, 
and through impact for a suborbital launch vehicle, is measured in 
terms of the expected average number of casualties (Ec) to 
the collective members of the public exposed to debris hazards from any 
one launch. To obtain safety approval, an applicant shall demonstrate 
that the risk level associated with debris from an applicant's proposed 
launch shall not exceed an expected average number of 0.00003 
casualties per launch (Ec  30  x  
10-6).
    (b) Hazard identification and risk assessment. To demonstrate 
compliance with this section, an applicant shall submit an analysis 
that identifies hazards and assesses risks to public health and safety 
and safety of property associated with nominal and non-nominal flight 
under its launch proposal.
    (c) A launch vehicle shall be designed to ensure that flight risks 
meet the criteria set forth in this section. An applicant shall 
identify and describe the following:
    (1) Launch vehicle structure, including physical dimensions and 
weight;
    (2) Hazardous and safety critical systems, including propulsion 
systems; and
    (3) Drawings and schematics for each system identified under 
paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
    (d) A launch vehicle shall be operated in a manner that ensures 
that flight risks meet the criteria set forth in this section. An 
applicant shall identify all launch operations and procedures that must 
be performed to ensure acceptable flight risks.


Sec. 415.37  Flight readiness and communications plan.

    (a) Flight readiness requirements. An applicant shall designate an 
individual responsible for flight readiness. The applicant shall submit 
the following procedures for verifying readiness for safe flight:
    (1) Launch readiness review procedures involving the applicant's 
flight safety personnel and federal launch range personnel involved in 
the launch. The procedures shall ensure a launch readiness review is 
conducted during which the individual designated under paragraph (a) of 
this section is provided with the following information to make a 
judgement as to flight readiness:
    (i) Flight-readiness of safety-related launch property and services 
to be provided by a federal launch range;
    (ii) Flight-readiness of launch vehicle and payload;
    (iii) Flight-readiness of flight safety systems;
    (iv) Mission rules and launch constraints;
    (v) Abort, hold and recycle procedures;
    (vi) Results of dress rehearsals and simulations conducted in 
accordance with paragraph (a)(4) of this section;
    (vii) Unresolved safety issues as of the launch readiness review 
and plans for addressing and resolving them; and
    (viii) Any additional safety information required by the individual 
designated under paragraph (a) of this section to determine flight 
readiness.
    (2) Procedures that ensure mission constraints, rules and abort 
procedures are listed and consolidated in a safety directive or 
notebook approved by licensee flight safety and federal launch range 
personnel;
    (3) Procedures that ensure currency and consistency of licensee and 
federal launch range countdown checklists;
    (4) Dress rehearsal procedures that--
    (i) Ensure crew readiness under nominal and non-nominal flight 
conditions;
    (ii) Contain criteria for determining whether to dispense with one 
or more dress rehearsals; and
    (iii) Verify currency and consistency of licensee and federal 
launch range countdown checklists.
    (5) Procedures for ensuring the licensee's flight safety personnel 
adhere to federal launch range crew rest rules.
    (b) Communications plan requirements. An applicant shall submit a 
communications plan providing licensee and federal launch range 
personnel communications procedures during countdown and flight. 
Effective issuance and communication of safety-critical information 
during countdown shall include hold/resume, go/no go and abort commands 
by licensee and federal launch range personnel during countdown. The 
communications plan shall describe the authority of licensee and 
federal launch range personnel, by individual or position title, to 
issue these commands. The communications plan shall also ensure that--
    (1) Communication networks are assigned so that personnel 
identified under paragraph (b) of this section have direct access to 
real-time safety-critical information required for issuing hold/resume, 
go/no go and abort decisions and commands;
    (2) Personnel identified under paragraph (b) of this section 
monitor common intercom channel(s) during countdown and flight; and
    (3) A protocol is established for utilizing defined radio telephone 
communications terminology.
    (c) An applicant shall submit procedures that ensure that licensee 
and federal launch range personnel receive a copy of the communications 
plan required by paragraph (b) of this section, and that the federal 
launch range concurs in the communications plan.


Sec. 415.39  Safety at end of launch.

    To obtain safety approval, an applicant must demonstrate for any 
proposed launch that for all launch vehicle stages or components that 
reach earth orbit--
    (a) There will be no unplanned physical contact between the vehicle 
or its components and the payload after payload separation;
    (b) Debris generation will not result from the conversion of energy 
sources into energy that fragments the vehicle or its components. 
Energy sources include chemical, pressure, and kinetic energy; and
    (c) Stored energy will be removed by depleting residual fuel and 
leaving all fuel line valves open, venting any pressurized system, 
leaving all batteries in a permanent discharge state, and removing any 
remaining source of stored energy. Other equivalent procedures may be 
approved in the course of the licensing process.


Sec. 415.41  Accident investigation plan.

    (a) An applicant shall submit an accident investigation plan (AIP) 
containing the applicant's procedures for reporting and responding to 
launch accidents, launch incidents, or other mishaps, as defined in 
Sec. 401.5 of this chapter. The AIP shall be signed by an individual 
authorized to sign and certify the application in accordance with 
Sec. 413.7(c) of this chapter, and the safety official designated under 
Sec. 415.33(b) of this subpart.
    (b) Reporting requirements. An AIP shall provide for--
    (1) Immediate notification to the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) Washington Operations Center in case of a launch accident, a 
launch incident or a mishap that involves a fatality or serious injury 
(as defined in 49 CFR Sec. 830.2).
    (2) Notification within 24 hours to the Associate Administrator for 
Commercial Space Transportation or the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) Washington Operations Center in the event of a mishap, other than 
those in

[[Page 19619]]

Sec. 415.41 (b) (1), that does not involve a fatality or serious injury 
(as defined in 49 CFR 830.2).
    (3) Submission of a written preliminary report to the FAA, 
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, in the 
event of a launch accident or launch incident, as defined in Sec. 401.5 
of this chapter, within five days of the event. The report shall 
identify the event as either a launch accident or launch incident, and 
shall include the following information:
    (i) Date and time of occurrence;
    (ii) Description of event;
    (iii) Location of launch;
    (iv) Launch vehicle;
    (v) Any payload;
    (vi) Vehicle impact points outside designated impact lines, if 
applicable;
    (vii) Number and general description of any injuries;
    (viii) Property damage, if any, and an estimate of its value;
    (ix) Identification of hazardous materials, as defined in 
Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, involved in the event, whether on the 
launch vehicle, payload, or on the ground;
    (x) Action taken by any person to contain the consequences of the 
event; and
    (xi) Weather conditions at the time of the event.
    (c) Response plan. An AIP shall contain procedures that--
    (1) Ensure the consequences of a launch accident, launch incident 
or other mishap are contained and minimized;
    (2) Ensure data and physical evidence is preserved;
    (3) Require the licensee to report to and cooperate with FAA and 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations and 
designate one or more points of contact for the FAA or NTSB; and
    (4) Require the licensee to identify and adopt preventive measures 
for avoiding recurrence of the event.
    (d) Investigation plan. An AIP shall contain--
    (1) Procedures for investigating the cause of a launch accident, 
launch incident or other mishap;
    (2) Procedures for reporting investigation results to the FAA; and
    (3) Delineated responsibilities, including reporting 
responsibilities for personnel assigned to conduct investigations and 
for any one retained by the licensee to conduct or participate in 
investigations.


Sec. 415.43  Denial of safety approval.

    The FAA notifies an applicant, in writing, if it has denied safety 
approval for a license application. The notice states the reasons for 
the FAA's determination. The applicant may respond to the reasons for 
the determination and request reconsideration.


Secs. 415.44-415.50  [Reserved]

Subpart D--Payload Review and Determination


Sec. 415.51  General.

    The FAA reviews a payload proposed for launch to determine whether 
a license applicant or payload owner or operator has obtained all 
required licenses, authorization, and permits, unless the payload is 
exempt from review under Sec. 415.53 of this subpart. If not otherwise 
exempt, the FAA reviews a payload proposed for launch to determine 
whether its launch would jeopardize public health and safety, safety of 
property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or 
international obligations of the United States. A payload determination 
is part of the licensing record on which the FAA's licensing 
determination is based.


Sec. 415.53  Payloads not subject to review.

    The FAA does not review payloads that are--
    (a) Subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) or the Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA); or
    (b) Owned or operated by the U.S. Government.


Sec. 415.55  Classes of payloads.

    The FAA may review and issue findings regarding a proposed class of 
payload, e.g., communications, remote sensing or navigation. However, 
each payload is subject to compliance monitoring by the FAA before 
launch to determine whether its launch would jeopardize public health 
and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign 
policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. 
The licensee is responsible for providing current information, in 
accordance with Sec. 415.79(a), regarding a payload proposed for launch 
not later than 60 days before a scheduled launch.


Sec. 415.57  Payload review.

    (a) Timing. A payload review may be conducted as part of a license 
application review or may be requested by a payload owner or operator 
in advance of or apart from a license application.
    (b) Interagency consultation. The FAA consults with other agencies 
to determine whether launch of a proposed payload or payload class 
would present any issues affecting public health and safety, safety of 
property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or 
international obligations of the United States.
    (1) The FAA consults with the Department of Defense to determine 
whether launch of a proposed payload or payload class would present any 
issues affecting U.S. national security.
    (2) The FAA consults with the Department of State to determine 
whether launch of a proposed payload or payload class would present any 
issues affecting U.S. foreign policy interests or international 
obligations.
    (3) The FAA consults with other federal agencies, including the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, authorized to address 
issues identified under paragraph (b) of this section associated with 
an applicant's launch proposal.
    (c) The FAA advises a person requesting a payload determination, in 
writing, of any issue raised during a payload review that would impede 
issuance of a license to launch that payload or payload class. The 
person requesting payload review may respond, in writing, or revise its 
application.


Sec. 415.59  Information requirements for payload review.

    (a) A person requesting review of a particular payload or payload 
class shall identify the following:
    (1) Payload name;
    (2) Payload class;
    (3) Physical dimensions and weight of the payload;
    (4) Payload owner and operator, if different from the person 
requesting payload review;
    (5) Orbital parameters for parking, transfer and final orbits;
    (6) Hazardous materials, as defined in Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, 
and radioactive materials, and the amounts of each;
    (7) Intended payload operations during the life of the payload; and
    (8) Delivery point in flight at which the payload will no longer be 
under the licensee's control.
    (b) [Reserved]


Sec. 415.61  Issuance of payload determination.

    (a) The FAA issues a favorable payload determination unless it 
determines that launch of the proposed payload would jeopardize public 
health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or 
foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United 
States. The FAA advises any person who has requested a payload review 
of its determination, in writing. The notice states the reasons for the

[[Page 19620]]

determination in the event of an unfavorable determination.
    (b) Any person issued an unfavorable payload determination may 
respond to the reasons for the determination and request 
reconsideration.


Sec. 415.63  Incorporation of payload determination in license 
application.

    A favorable payload determination issued for a payload or class of 
payload may be included by a license applicant as part of its 
application. However, any change in information provided under section 
415.59 of this subpart must be reported in accordance with section 
413.17 of this chapter. The FAA determines whether a favorable payload 
determination remains valid in light of reported changes and may 
conduct an additional payload review.


Sec. 415.64-415.70  [Reserved]

Subpart E--Post-Licensing Requirements--Launch License Terms and 
Conditions


Sec. 415.71  Public safety responsibility.

    A launch licensee is responsible for ensuring the safe conduct of a 
licensed launch and for ensuring that public safety and safety of 
property are protected at all times during the conduct of a licensed 
launch.


Sec. 415.73  Continuing accuracy of license application; application 
for modification of license.

    (a) A launch licensee is responsible for the continuing accuracy of 
representations contained in its application for the entire term of the 
license. A launch licensee must conduct a licensed launch and carry out 
launch safety procedures in accordance with its application. A 
licensee's failure to comply with the requirements of this paragraph is 
sufficient basis for suspension or revocation of a license.
    (b) After a launch license has been issued, a licensee must apply 
to the FAA for modification of the license if:
    (1) The launch licensee proposes to conduct a launch or carry out a 
launch safety procedure or operation in a manner that is not authorized 
by the license; or
    (2) Any representation contained in the license application that is 
material to public health and safety or safety of property would no 
longer be accurate and complete or would not reflect the launch 
licensee's procedures governing the actual conduct of a launch. A 
change is material to public health and safety or safety of property if 
it alters or affects the licensee's launch plans or procedures 
submitted in accordance with subpart D of this part, class of payload, 
orbital destination, type of launch vehicle, flight path, launch site, 
launch point, or any safety system, policy, procedure, requirement, 
criteria or standard.
    (c) An application to modify a launch license shall be prepared and 
submitted in accordance with part 413 of this chapter. The launch 
licensee shall indicate any part of its license or license application 
that would be changed or affected by a proposed modification.
    (d) The FAA reviews approvals and determinations required by this 
chapter to determine whether they remain valid in light of a proposed 
modification. The FAA approves a modification that satisfies the 
requirements set forth in this part.
    (e) Upon approval of modification, the FAA issues either a written 
approval to the launch licensee or a license order modifying the 
license if a stated term or condition of the license is changed, added 
or deleted. A written approval has the full force and effect of a 
license order and is part of the licensing record.


Sec. 415.75  Agreement(s) with federal launch range.

    Prior to conducting a licensed launch from a federal launch range, 
a launch licensee or applicant shall enter into an agreement with a 
federal launch range providing for access to and use of U.S. Government 
property and services required to support a licensed launch from the 
facility and for public safety related operations and support. The 
agreement shall be in effect for the conduct of any licensed launch. A 
launch licensee shall comply with any requirements of the agreement(s) 
that may affect public safety and safety of property during the conduct 
of a licensed launch, including flight safety procedures and 
requirements.


Sec. 415.77  Records.

    (a) A launch licensee shall maintain all records necessary to 
verify that licensed launches are conducted in accordance with 
representations contained in the licensee's application. A launch 
licensee shall retain records for three years after completion of all 
launches conducted under the license.
    (b) In the event of a launch accident or launch incident, as 
defined in Sec. 405.1 of this chapter, a launch licensee shall preserve 
all records related to the event. Records shall be retained until 
completion of any federal investigation and until the FAA advises the 
licensee that the records need not be retained. The licensee shall make 
available to federal officials for inspection and copying all records 
required to be maintained under these regulations.


Sec. 415.79  Launch reporting requirements.

    (a) Not later than 60 days before each flight conducted under a 
launch operator license, a licensee shall provide the FAA the following 
launch-specific information:
    (1) Payload information contained in Sec. 415.59 of this part;
    (2) Flight information, including the launch vehicle, planned 
flight path, including staging and impact locations, and on-orbit 
activity of the launch vehicle including payload delivery point(s); and
    (3) Mission specific launch waivers, approved or pending, from a 
federal launch range from which the launch will take place, that are 
unique to the launch and may affect public safety.
    (b) Not later than noon, EST, 15 days before each licensed flight a 
licensee shall submit to the FAA a completed Federal Aviation 
Administration/U.S. Space Command (FAA/USSPACECOM) Launch Notification 
Form (OMB No. 2120-0608).
    (c) A launch licensee shall report a launch accident, launch 
incident, or a mishap that involves a fatality or serious injury (as 
defined in 49 CFR 830.2) immediately to the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) Washington Operations Center and provide a written 
preliminary report in the event of a launch accident or launch 
incident, in accordance with the accident investigation plan (AIP) 
submitted as part of its license application under Sec. 415.41 of this 
part.


Sec. 415.81  Registration of space objects.

    (a) To assist the U.S. Government in implementing Article IV of the 
1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 
each licensee shall provide to the FAA the information required by 
paragraph (b) of this section for all objects placed in space by a 
licensed launch, including a launch vehicle and any components, except:
    (1) Any object owned and registered by the U.S. Government; and
    (2) Any object owned by a foreign entity.
    (b) For each object that must be registered in accordance with this 
section, not later than thirty (30) days following the conduct of a 
licensed launch, a licensee shall submit the following information:
    (1) The international designator of the space object(s);
    (2) Date and location of launch;
    (3) General function of the space object; and
    (4) Final orbital parameters, including:
    (i) Nodal period;

[[Page 19621]]

    (ii) Inclination;
    (iii) Apogee; and
    (iv) Perigee.


Sec. 415.83  Financial responsibility requirements.

    A launch licensee shall comply with financial responsibility 
requirements specified in a license or license order.


Sec. 415.85  Compliance monitoring.

    A launch licensee shall allow access by, and cooperate with, 
federal officers or employees or other individuals authorized by the 
FAA to observe any activities of the licensee, or of the licensee's 
contractors or subcontractors, associated with the conduct of a 
licensed launch.


Sec. 415.86-415.90  [Reserved]

Subpart F---Safety Review and Approval for Launch From a Launch 
Site Not Operated by a Federal Launch Range


Sec. 415.91  General.

    The FAA evaluates on an individual basis the safety-related 
elements of an applicant's proposal to launch a launch vehicle from a 
launch site not operated by a federal launch range. The FAA issues a 
safety approval to a license applicant proposing to launch from a 
launch site not operated by a federal launch range when the FAA 
determines that the launch demonstrates an equivalent level of safety 
to that provided by a launch from a federal launch range as set forth 
in subpart C of this part. A safety approval is part of the licensing 
record on which the FAA's licensing determination is based.


Sec. 415.93   Denial of safety approval.

    The FAA notifies an applicant, in writing, if it has denied safety 
approval for a license application. The notice states the reasons for 
the FAA's determination. The applicant may respond to the reasons for 
the determination and request reconsideration.


Secs. 415.94-415.100   [Reserved]

Subpart G--Environmental Review


Sec. 415.101  General.

    An applicant shall provide the FAA with information for the FAA to 
analyze the environmental impacts associated with a proposed launch. 
The information provided by an applicant must be sufficient to enable 
the FAA to comply with the requirements of the National Environment 
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (NEPA), the Council on Environmental 
Quality Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA, 
40 CFR parts 1500-1508, and the FAA's Procedures for Considering 
Environmental Impacts, FAA Order 1050.1D.


Sec. 415.103  Environmental information.

    An applicant shall submit environmental information concerning:
    (a) A proposed launch site not covered by existing environmental 
documentation;
    (b) A proposed launch vehicle with characteristics falling 
measurably outside the parameters of existing environmental 
documentation;
    (c) A proposed launch from an established launch site involving a 
vehicle with characteristics falling measurably outside the parameters 
of any existing environmental impact statement that applies to that 
site;
    (d) A proposed payload that may have significant environmental 
impacts in the event of a mishap; and
    (e) Other factors as determined by the FAA.

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

[[Page 19622]]

Appendix A to Part 415--FAA/USSPACECOM Launch Notification Form
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21AP99.001


[[Page 19623]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21AP99.002



BILLING CODE 4910-13-C

[[Page 19624]]

    6. Subchapter C of Chapter III, title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations, is amended by adding a new part 417 to read as follows:

PART 417--LICENSE TO OPERATE A LAUNCH SITE

Sec.
417.101  General.
417.103  Issuance of a license to operate a launch site.
417.105  Environmental.
417.107  Environmental information.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.


Sec. 417.101  General.

    The FAA evaluates on an individual basis an applicant's proposal to 
operate a launch site.


Sec. 417.103  Issuance of a license to operate a launch site.

    (a) The FAA issues a license to operate a launch site when it 
determines that an applicant's operation of the launch site does not 
jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national 
security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of 
the United States.
    (b) A license to operate a launch site authorizes a licensee to 
operate a launch site in accordance with the representations contained 
in the licensee's application, subject to the licensee's compliance 
with terms and condition contained in any license order accompanying 
the license.


Sec. 417.105  Environmental.

    An applicant shall provide the FAA with information for the FAA to 
analyze the environmental impacts associated with proposed operation of 
a launch site. The information provided by an applicant must be 
sufficient to enable the FAA to comply with the requirements of the 
National Environment Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (NEPA), the 
Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the 
Procedural Provisions of NEPA, 40 CFR Parts 1500-1508, and the FAA's 
Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts, FAA Order 1050.1D.


Sec. 417.107  Environmental information.

    An applicant shall submit environmental information concerning:
    (a) A proposed launch site not covered by existing environmental 
documentation; and
    (b) Other factors as determined by the FAA.

    Issued in Washington, DC on April 13, 1999.
Patricia G. Smith,
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation.
[FR Doc. 99-9639 Filed 4-20-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P