[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 70 (Tuesday, April 13, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18059-18062]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-9172]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-220]
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; Nine Mile Point Nuclear
Station, Unit No. 1 Environmental Assessment and Finding of No
Significant Impact
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.
DPR-63, issued to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee), for
operation of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1 (NMP1),
located in the town of Scriba, Oswego County, New York.
Environmental Assessment
Identification of the Proposed Action
The proposed action would increase the number of fuel assemblies
that can be stored in the NMP1 spent fuel pool (SFP) from 2776 (i.e.,
1066 in the northern half of the pool and 1710 in the southern half of
the pool) to 4086. The modification will be achieved by two separate
campaigns. For the 1999 refueling outage (RFO15), the licensee will
first replace the non-poison racks in the northern half of the pool
with high density racks providing 1840 storage cells. Later, as further
capacity increase is warranted, the licensee will replace the racks in
the southern half of the pool with high density racks providing 2246
storage cells. The design of the new high density spent fuel storage
racks incorporates Boral as a neutron absorber in the cell walls to
allow for more dense storage of spent fuel.
The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's
application for amendment dated May 15, 1998, as
[[Page 18060]]
supplemented September 25, October 13, December 9 (two letters), 1998;
January 11 and April 1, 1999.
The Need for the Proposed Action
An increase in spent fuel storage capacity is needed to reestablish
full core off-load capability. Loss of that capability will occur as a
result of RFO-15, currently scheduled to start April 11, 1999. Thus,
after RFO-15, the licensee will replace the eight non-poison rack
modules in the northern half of the NMP1 pool (which currently provides
1066 spent fuel storage locations) with new poison rack modules
providing 1840 storage locations. Ultimately, additional capacity will
be needed to accommodate future refueling outages. Thus, as further
capacity increase is warranted by the increasing fuel inventory in the
pool, the licensee will increase the capacity of the southern half of
the pool (currently limited to 1,710 storage locations) so as to
provide a total pool capacity for 4086 spent fuel assemblies. This
capacity of 4086 storage locations is sufficient to extend full core
off-load capability to at least the expiration date of the plant
operating license, August 22, 2009.
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action
Radioactive Waste Treatment
NMP1 uses waste treatment systems designed to collect and process
gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that might contain radioactive
material. These radioactive waste treatment systems were evaluated in
the Final Environmental Statement (FES) dated January 1974. The
proposed SFP expansion will not involve any change in the waste
treatment systems described in the FES.
Gaseous Radioactive Wastes
The storage of additional spent fuel assemblies in the pool is not
expected to affect the releases of radioactive gases from the pool.
Gaseous fission products such as Krypton-85 and Iodine-131 are produced
by the fuel in the core during reactor operation. A small percentage of
these fission gases is released to the reactor coolant from the small
number of fuel assemblies that are expected to develop leaks during
reactor operation. During refueling operations, some of these fission
products enter the pool and are subsequently released into the air.
Since the frequency of refueling (and therefore the number of freshly
offloaded spent fuel assemblies stored in the pool at any one time)
will not increase, there will be no increase in the amounts of these
types of fission products released into the atmosphere as a result of
the increased pool fuel storage capacity.
The increased heat load on the pool from the storage of additional
spent fuel assemblies will potentially result in an increase in the
pool's evaporation rate. However, this increased evaporation rate is
not expected to result in an increase in the amount of gaseous tritium
released from the pool. The overall release of radioactive gases from
NMP1 will remain a small fraction of the limits of 10 CFR 20.1301.
Solid Radioactive Wastes
Spent resins are generated by the processing of SFP water through
the pool's purification system at NMP1. These spent resins are disposed
of as solid radioactive waste (``radwaste''). The water turbulence
caused by the removal and replacement operations in the pool
(``reracking'') may result in some resuspension of particulate matter
in the pool. This could result in a temporary increase in the
replacement frequency of the resin in the SFP purification system
during the pool reracking operation. The licensee will use an
underwater vacuum to clean the floor of the pool following removal of
the old spent fuel rack modules. Vacuuming the SFP floor will remove
any extraneous debris and crud and ensure visual clarity in the pool
(to facilitate diving operations). Filters from this underwater
vacuuming will be a source of solid radwaste. These filters and resins
are collected and disposed of in accordance with existing plant
radwaste procedures. Additional solid radwaste will consist of the old
spent fuel rack modules themselves, as well as any interferences or
pool hardware that may have to be removed from the pool to permit
installation of the new rack modules. The old rack modules and removed
hardware will be decontaminated, placed in shipping containers approved
by the U.S. Department of Transportation, and shipped offsite to a
licensed processing or disposal facility. Other than the radwaste
generated during the actual reracking operation, the NRC staff does not
expect that the additional fuel storage provided by the increased SFP
storage capacity will result in a significant change in the generation
of solid radwaste at NMP1.
Liquid Radioactive Wastes
The release of radioactive liquids will not be affected directly as
a result of the SFP modifications. The SFP ion exchanger resins remove
soluble radioactive materials from the pool water. When the resins are
replaced, the small amount of resin sluice water that is released is
processed by the radwaste system. As previously stated, the frequency
of resin replacement may increase slightly during the installation of
the new racks. However, the amount of radioactive liquid released to
the environment as a result of the proposed SFP expansion is expected
to be negligible.
Occupational Dose Consideration
Radiation Protection personnel at NMP1 will constantly monitor the
doses to the workers during the SFP expansion operation. If it becomes
necessary to utilize divers for the reracking operation, the licensee
will equip each diver with whole-body and extremity dosimeters having
remote, above surface, readouts that will be continuously monitored by
Health Physics personnel. The total occupational dose to plant workers
as a result of the SFP expansion operation is estimated to be between 6
and 12 person-rem. This dose estimate is comparable to doses for
similar SFP modifications performed at other nuclear plants. The
upcoming SFP rack installation will follow detailed procedures prepared
with full consideration of ALARA (as low as is reasonably achievable)
principles.
On the basis of its review of the licensee's proposal, the NRC
staff concludes that the NMP1 SFP reracking operation can be performed
in a manner that will ensure that doses to workers will be maintained
ALARA. The estimated dose of 6 to 12 person-rem to perform the proposed
SFP reracking operation is a small fraction of the annual collective
dose accrued at NMP1.
Accident Considerations
In its application, the licensee evaluated the possible
consequences of a fuel handling accident to determine the thyroid and
whole-body doses at the site's Exclusion Area Boundary, Low Population
Zone, and in the NMP1 Control Room. The proposed SFP rack installation
at NMP1 will not affect any of the assumptions or inputs used in
evaluating the dose consequences of a fuel handling accident and,
therefore, will not result in an increase in the doses from a
postulated fuel handling accident.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's analysis of a fuel handling
accident and performed confirmatory calculations to check the
acceptability of the licensee's doses. The NRC staff's calculations
confirmed that the thyroid doses at the Exclusion Area Boundary, Low
[[Page 18061]]
Population Zone, and in the Control Room from a fuel handling accident
meet the acceptance criteria and that the licensee's calculations are
acceptable. The results of the NRC staff's calculations are presented
in the Safety Evaluation to be issued with the license amendment.
An accidental cask drop into the pool continues to be unlikely as
none of the features preventing such a drop (e.g., design and
maintenance of the main hoist, the controlled cask movement path, and
the hydraulic guide cylinder cask drop protection system) are affected
by the proposed action. The licensee also found that the consequences
of a loss of SFP cooling was acceptable in that ample time would be
available for the operators to re-establish cooling before the onset of
pool boiling. Evaluation of a design basis seismic event indicated the
new racks would remain safe and impact-free, the structural capability
of the pool would not be exceeded, and the reactor building and crane
structure would continue to retain necessary safety margins. Thus,
these potential accidents have no environmental consequences.
In summary, the proposed action will not increase the probability
or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made to radioactive
waste treatment systems or in the types of any radioactive effluents
that may be released offsite, and the proposed action will not result
in a significant increase in occupational or offsite radiation
exposure. Accordingly the Commission concludes that there are no
significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the
proposed action.
With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed
action does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other
nonradiological environmental impact.
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
Alternatives to the Proposed Action
Shipping Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility
Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility
is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity.
However, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) high-level radioactive
waste repository is not expected to begin receiving spent fuel until
approximately 2010, at the earliest. In October 1996, the
Administration did commit DOE to begin storing waste at a centralized
location by January 31, 1998. However, no location has been identified
and an interim federal storage facility has yet to be identified in
advance of a decision on a permanent repository. Therefore, shipping
spent fuel to the DOE repository is not considered an alternative to
increased onsite spent fuel storage capacity at this time.
Shipping Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility
Reprocessing of spent fuel from the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
is not a viable alternative since there are no operating commercial
reprocessing facilities in the United States. Therefore, spent fuel
would have to be shipped to an overseas facility for reprocessing.
However, this approach has never been used and it would require
approval by the Department of State as well as other entities.
Additionally, the cost of spent fuel reprocessing is not offset by the
salvage value of the residual uranium; reprocessing represents an added
cost.
Shipping Fuel to Another Utility or Site or to the NMP2 Spent Fuel Pool
for Storage
The shipment of fuel to another utility or transferring NMP1 spent
fuel to the NMP2 spent fuel pool for storage would provide short-term
relief from the storage problem at NMP1. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act
of 1982 and 10 CFR Part 53, however, clearly place the responsibility
for the interim storage of spent fuel with each owner or operator of a
nuclear plant. The NMP2 spent fuel pool has been designed with capacity
to accommodate NMP2 and, therefore, transferring spent fuel from NMP1
to the NMP2 pool would create fuel storage capacity problems for NMP2.
The shipment of fuel to another site or transferring it to NMP2 is not
an acceptable alternative because of increased fuel handling risks and
additional occupational radiation exposure, as well as the fact that no
additional storage capacity would be created.
Alternatives Creating Additional Storage Capacity
Alternative technologies that would create additional storage
capacity include rod consolidation, dry cask storage, modular vault dry
storage, and constructing a new pool. Rod consolidation involves
disassembling the spent fuel assemblies and storing the fuel rods from
two or more assemblies into a stainless steel canister that can be
stored in the spent fuel racks. Industry experience with rod
consolidation is currently limited, primarily due to concerns for
potential gap activity release due to rod breakage, the potential for
increased fuel cladding corrosion due to some of the protective oxide
layer being scraped off, and because the prolonged consolidation
activity could interfere with ongoing plant operations. Dry cask
storage is a method of transferring spent fuel, after storage in the
pool for several years, to high capacity casks with passive heat
dissipation features. After loading, the casks are stored outdoors on a
seismically qualified concrete pad. Concerns for dry cask storage
include the potential for fuel or cask handling accidents, potential
fuel clad rupture due to high temperatures, the need for special
security provisions, and high cost. Vault storage consists of storing
spent fuel in shielded stainless steel cylinders in a horizontal
configuration in a reinforced concrete vault. The concrete vault
provides missile and earthquake protection and radiation shielding. Due
to large space requirements, a vault secured area for NMP1 would have
to be located outside the secured perimeter of the plant site. Concerns
for vault dry storage include security, land consumption, eventual
decommission of the new vault, the potential for fuel or clad rupture
due to high temperatures, and high cost. The alternative of
constructing and licensing a new fuel pool is not practical for NMP1
because such an effort would require about 10 years to complete and
would be the most expensive alternative.
The alternative technologies that could create additional storage
capacity involve additional fuel handling with an attendant opportunity
for a fuel handling accident, involve higher cumulative dose to workers
effecting the fuel transfers, require additional security measures, are
significantly more expensive, and would not result in a significant
improvement in environmental impacts compared to the proposed reracking
modifications.
Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation
Generally, improved usage of the fuel and/or operation at a reduced
power level would be an alternative that would decrease the amount of
fuel being stored in the pool and thus increase the amount of time
before full core off-load capacity is lost. With extended burnup of
fuel assemblies, the fuel cycle would be extended and fewer offloads
would be necessary. This is not an alternative for resolving the loss
of full-core offload capability that will occur as a result of the NMP1
refueling outage scheduled to begin about April 11, 1999, because the
spent fuel to be transferred to the pool for storage has now almost
completed its operating history in the core. For many years now, NMP1
has been
[[Page 18062]]
operating on the basis of 24-month refueling cycles, with core designs
and fuel management schemes optimized accordingly. Operating the plant
at a reduced power level would not make effective use of available
resources, and would cause unnecessary economic hardship on the
licensee and its customers. Therefore, reducing the amount of spent
fuel generated by increasing burnup further or reducing power is not
considered a practical alternative.
The No-Action Alternative
The NRC staff also considered denial of the proposed action, (i.e.,
the ``no-action'' alternative). Denial of the application would result
in no significant change in current environmental impacts. The
environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative
actions are similar.
Alternative Use of Resources
This action does not involve the use of any resources not
previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for the Nine
Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1.
Agencies and Persons Consulted
In accordance with its stated policy, on April 7, 1999, the NRC
staff consulted with the New York State official, Jack Spath of the New
York State Research and Development Authority, regarding the
environmental impact of the proposed action. The State official had no
comments.
Finding of No Significant Impact
On the basis of the environmental assessment, the Commission
concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect
on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission
has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the
proposed action.
For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the
licensee's letter dated May 15, 1998, as supplemented by letters dated
September 25, October 13, December 9 (two letters), 1998; January 11
and April 1, 1999. These letters are available for public inspection at
the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L
Street, NW., Washington, D.C., and at the local public document room
located at the Reference and Documents Department, Penfield Library,
State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of April 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
S. Singh Bajwa,
Chief, Section 1, Project Directorate I, Division of Licensing Project
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-9172 Filed 4-12-99; 8:45 am]
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