[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 70 (Tuesday, April 13, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18059-18062]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-9172]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-220]


Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; Nine Mile Point Nuclear 
Station, Unit No. 1 Environmental Assessment and Finding of No 
Significant Impact

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
DPR-63, issued to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee), for 
operation of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1 (NMP1), 
located in the town of Scriba, Oswego County, New York.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

    The proposed action would increase the number of fuel assemblies 
that can be stored in the NMP1 spent fuel pool (SFP) from 2776 (i.e., 
1066 in the northern half of the pool and 1710 in the southern half of 
the pool) to 4086. The modification will be achieved by two separate 
campaigns. For the 1999 refueling outage (RFO15), the licensee will 
first replace the non-poison racks in the northern half of the pool 
with high density racks providing 1840 storage cells. Later, as further 
capacity increase is warranted, the licensee will replace the racks in 
the southern half of the pool with high density racks providing 2246 
storage cells. The design of the new high density spent fuel storage 
racks incorporates Boral as a neutron absorber in the cell walls to 
allow for more dense storage of spent fuel.
    The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's 
application for amendment dated May 15, 1998, as

[[Page 18060]]

supplemented September 25, October 13, December 9 (two letters), 1998; 
January 11 and April 1, 1999.

The Need for the Proposed Action

    An increase in spent fuel storage capacity is needed to reestablish 
full core off-load capability. Loss of that capability will occur as a 
result of RFO-15, currently scheduled to start April 11, 1999. Thus, 
after RFO-15, the licensee will replace the eight non-poison rack 
modules in the northern half of the NMP1 pool (which currently provides 
1066 spent fuel storage locations) with new poison rack modules 
providing 1840 storage locations. Ultimately, additional capacity will 
be needed to accommodate future refueling outages. Thus, as further 
capacity increase is warranted by the increasing fuel inventory in the 
pool, the licensee will increase the capacity of the southern half of 
the pool (currently limited to 1,710 storage locations) so as to 
provide a total pool capacity for 4086 spent fuel assemblies. This 
capacity of 4086 storage locations is sufficient to extend full core 
off-load capability to at least the expiration date of the plant 
operating license, August 22, 2009.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

Radioactive Waste Treatment
    NMP1 uses waste treatment systems designed to collect and process 
gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that might contain radioactive 
material. These radioactive waste treatment systems were evaluated in 
the Final Environmental Statement (FES) dated January 1974. The 
proposed SFP expansion will not involve any change in the waste 
treatment systems described in the FES.
Gaseous Radioactive Wastes
    The storage of additional spent fuel assemblies in the pool is not 
expected to affect the releases of radioactive gases from the pool. 
Gaseous fission products such as Krypton-85 and Iodine-131 are produced 
by the fuel in the core during reactor operation. A small percentage of 
these fission gases is released to the reactor coolant from the small 
number of fuel assemblies that are expected to develop leaks during 
reactor operation. During refueling operations, some of these fission 
products enter the pool and are subsequently released into the air. 
Since the frequency of refueling (and therefore the number of freshly 
offloaded spent fuel assemblies stored in the pool at any one time) 
will not increase, there will be no increase in the amounts of these 
types of fission products released into the atmosphere as a result of 
the increased pool fuel storage capacity.
    The increased heat load on the pool from the storage of additional 
spent fuel assemblies will potentially result in an increase in the 
pool's evaporation rate. However, this increased evaporation rate is 
not expected to result in an increase in the amount of gaseous tritium 
released from the pool. The overall release of radioactive gases from 
NMP1 will remain a small fraction of the limits of 10 CFR 20.1301.
Solid Radioactive Wastes
    Spent resins are generated by the processing of SFP water through 
the pool's purification system at NMP1. These spent resins are disposed 
of as solid radioactive waste (``radwaste''). The water turbulence 
caused by the removal and replacement operations in the pool 
(``reracking'') may result in some resuspension of particulate matter 
in the pool. This could result in a temporary increase in the 
replacement frequency of the resin in the SFP purification system 
during the pool reracking operation. The licensee will use an 
underwater vacuum to clean the floor of the pool following removal of 
the old spent fuel rack modules. Vacuuming the SFP floor will remove 
any extraneous debris and crud and ensure visual clarity in the pool 
(to facilitate diving operations). Filters from this underwater 
vacuuming will be a source of solid radwaste. These filters and resins 
are collected and disposed of in accordance with existing plant 
radwaste procedures. Additional solid radwaste will consist of the old 
spent fuel rack modules themselves, as well as any interferences or 
pool hardware that may have to be removed from the pool to permit 
installation of the new rack modules. The old rack modules and removed 
hardware will be decontaminated, placed in shipping containers approved 
by the U.S. Department of Transportation, and shipped offsite to a 
licensed processing or disposal facility. Other than the radwaste 
generated during the actual reracking operation, the NRC staff does not 
expect that the additional fuel storage provided by the increased SFP 
storage capacity will result in a significant change in the generation 
of solid radwaste at NMP1.
Liquid Radioactive Wastes
    The release of radioactive liquids will not be affected directly as 
a result of the SFP modifications. The SFP ion exchanger resins remove 
soluble radioactive materials from the pool water. When the resins are 
replaced, the small amount of resin sluice water that is released is 
processed by the radwaste system. As previously stated, the frequency 
of resin replacement may increase slightly during the installation of 
the new racks. However, the amount of radioactive liquid released to 
the environment as a result of the proposed SFP expansion is expected 
to be negligible.
Occupational Dose Consideration
    Radiation Protection personnel at NMP1 will constantly monitor the 
doses to the workers during the SFP expansion operation. If it becomes 
necessary to utilize divers for the reracking operation, the licensee 
will equip each diver with whole-body and extremity dosimeters having 
remote, above surface, readouts that will be continuously monitored by 
Health Physics personnel. The total occupational dose to plant workers 
as a result of the SFP expansion operation is estimated to be between 6 
and 12 person-rem. This dose estimate is comparable to doses for 
similar SFP modifications performed at other nuclear plants. The 
upcoming SFP rack installation will follow detailed procedures prepared 
with full consideration of ALARA (as low as is reasonably achievable) 
principles.
    On the basis of its review of the licensee's proposal, the NRC 
staff concludes that the NMP1 SFP reracking operation can be performed 
in a manner that will ensure that doses to workers will be maintained 
ALARA. The estimated dose of 6 to 12 person-rem to perform the proposed 
SFP reracking operation is a small fraction of the annual collective 
dose accrued at NMP1.
Accident Considerations
    In its application, the licensee evaluated the possible 
consequences of a fuel handling accident to determine the thyroid and 
whole-body doses at the site's Exclusion Area Boundary, Low Population 
Zone, and in the NMP1 Control Room. The proposed SFP rack installation 
at NMP1 will not affect any of the assumptions or inputs used in 
evaluating the dose consequences of a fuel handling accident and, 
therefore, will not result in an increase in the doses from a 
postulated fuel handling accident.
    The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's analysis of a fuel handling 
accident and performed confirmatory calculations to check the 
acceptability of the licensee's doses. The NRC staff's calculations 
confirmed that the thyroid doses at the Exclusion Area Boundary, Low

[[Page 18061]]

Population Zone, and in the Control Room from a fuel handling accident 
meet the acceptance criteria and that the licensee's calculations are 
acceptable. The results of the NRC staff's calculations are presented 
in the Safety Evaluation to be issued with the license amendment.
    An accidental cask drop into the pool continues to be unlikely as 
none of the features preventing such a drop (e.g., design and 
maintenance of the main hoist, the controlled cask movement path, and 
the hydraulic guide cylinder cask drop protection system) are affected 
by the proposed action. The licensee also found that the consequences 
of a loss of SFP cooling was acceptable in that ample time would be 
available for the operators to re-establish cooling before the onset of 
pool boiling. Evaluation of a design basis seismic event indicated the 
new racks would remain safe and impact-free, the structural capability 
of the pool would not be exceeded, and the reactor building and crane 
structure would continue to retain necessary safety margins. Thus, 
these potential accidents have no environmental consequences.
    In summary, the proposed action will not increase the probability 
or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made to radioactive 
waste treatment systems or in the types of any radioactive effluents 
that may be released offsite, and the proposed action will not result 
in a significant increase in occupational or offsite radiation 
exposure. Accordingly the Commission concludes that there are no 
significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the 
proposed action.
    With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed 
action does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other 
nonradiological environmental impact.
    Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Shipping Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility

    Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility 
is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity. 
However, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) high-level radioactive 
waste repository is not expected to begin receiving spent fuel until 
approximately 2010, at the earliest. In October 1996, the 
Administration did commit DOE to begin storing waste at a centralized 
location by January 31, 1998. However, no location has been identified 
and an interim federal storage facility has yet to be identified in 
advance of a decision on a permanent repository. Therefore, shipping 
spent fuel to the DOE repository is not considered an alternative to 
increased onsite spent fuel storage capacity at this time.

Shipping Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility

    Reprocessing of spent fuel from the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station 
is not a viable alternative since there are no operating commercial 
reprocessing facilities in the United States. Therefore, spent fuel 
would have to be shipped to an overseas facility for reprocessing. 
However, this approach has never been used and it would require 
approval by the Department of State as well as other entities. 
Additionally, the cost of spent fuel reprocessing is not offset by the 
salvage value of the residual uranium; reprocessing represents an added 
cost.

Shipping Fuel to Another Utility or Site or to the NMP2 Spent Fuel Pool 
for Storage

    The shipment of fuel to another utility or transferring NMP1 spent 
fuel to the NMP2 spent fuel pool for storage would provide short-term 
relief from the storage problem at NMP1. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
of 1982 and 10 CFR Part 53, however, clearly place the responsibility 
for the interim storage of spent fuel with each owner or operator of a 
nuclear plant. The NMP2 spent fuel pool has been designed with capacity 
to accommodate NMP2 and, therefore, transferring spent fuel from NMP1 
to the NMP2 pool would create fuel storage capacity problems for NMP2. 
The shipment of fuel to another site or transferring it to NMP2 is not 
an acceptable alternative because of increased fuel handling risks and 
additional occupational radiation exposure, as well as the fact that no 
additional storage capacity would be created.

Alternatives Creating Additional Storage Capacity

    Alternative technologies that would create additional storage 
capacity include rod consolidation, dry cask storage, modular vault dry 
storage, and constructing a new pool. Rod consolidation involves 
disassembling the spent fuel assemblies and storing the fuel rods from 
two or more assemblies into a stainless steel canister that can be 
stored in the spent fuel racks. Industry experience with rod 
consolidation is currently limited, primarily due to concerns for 
potential gap activity release due to rod breakage, the potential for 
increased fuel cladding corrosion due to some of the protective oxide 
layer being scraped off, and because the prolonged consolidation 
activity could interfere with ongoing plant operations. Dry cask 
storage is a method of transferring spent fuel, after storage in the 
pool for several years, to high capacity casks with passive heat 
dissipation features. After loading, the casks are stored outdoors on a 
seismically qualified concrete pad. Concerns for dry cask storage 
include the potential for fuel or cask handling accidents, potential 
fuel clad rupture due to high temperatures, the need for special 
security provisions, and high cost. Vault storage consists of storing 
spent fuel in shielded stainless steel cylinders in a horizontal 
configuration in a reinforced concrete vault. The concrete vault 
provides missile and earthquake protection and radiation shielding. Due 
to large space requirements, a vault secured area for NMP1 would have 
to be located outside the secured perimeter of the plant site. Concerns 
for vault dry storage include security, land consumption, eventual 
decommission of the new vault, the potential for fuel or clad rupture 
due to high temperatures, and high cost. The alternative of 
constructing and licensing a new fuel pool is not practical for NMP1 
because such an effort would require about 10 years to complete and 
would be the most expensive alternative.
    The alternative technologies that could create additional storage 
capacity involve additional fuel handling with an attendant opportunity 
for a fuel handling accident, involve higher cumulative dose to workers 
effecting the fuel transfers, require additional security measures, are 
significantly more expensive, and would not result in a significant 
improvement in environmental impacts compared to the proposed reracking 
modifications.

Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation

    Generally, improved usage of the fuel and/or operation at a reduced 
power level would be an alternative that would decrease the amount of 
fuel being stored in the pool and thus increase the amount of time 
before full core off-load capacity is lost. With extended burnup of 
fuel assemblies, the fuel cycle would be extended and fewer offloads 
would be necessary. This is not an alternative for resolving the loss 
of full-core offload capability that will occur as a result of the NMP1 
refueling outage scheduled to begin about April 11, 1999, because the 
spent fuel to be transferred to the pool for storage has now almost 
completed its operating history in the core. For many years now, NMP1 
has been

[[Page 18062]]

operating on the basis of 24-month refueling cycles, with core designs 
and fuel management schemes optimized accordingly. Operating the plant 
at a reduced power level would not make effective use of available 
resources, and would cause unnecessary economic hardship on the 
licensee and its customers. Therefore, reducing the amount of spent 
fuel generated by increasing burnup further or reducing power is not 
considered a practical alternative.

The No-Action Alternative

    The NRC staff also considered denial of the proposed action, (i.e., 
the ``no-action'' alternative). Denial of the application would result 
in no significant change in current environmental impacts. The 
environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative 
actions are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

    This action does not involve the use of any resources not 
previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for the Nine 
Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

    In accordance with its stated policy, on April 7, 1999, the NRC 
staff consulted with the New York State official, Jack Spath of the New 
York State Research and Development Authority, regarding the 
environmental impact of the proposed action. The State official had no 
comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

    On the basis of the environmental assessment, the Commission 
concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission 
has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the 
proposed action.
    For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
licensee's letter dated May 15, 1998, as supplemented by letters dated 
September 25, October 13, December 9 (two letters), 1998; January 11 
and April 1, 1999. These letters are available for public inspection at 
the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L 
Street, NW., Washington, D.C., and at the local public document room 
located at the Reference and Documents Department, Penfield Library, 
State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of April 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
S. Singh Bajwa,
Chief, Section 1, Project Directorate I, Division of Licensing Project 
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-9172 Filed 4-12-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P