[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 66 (Wednesday, April 7, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 17019-17021]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-8598]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Carolina Power & Light Company; H. B. Robinson Steam Electric 
Plant, Unit No. 2 Environmental Assessment and Finding of No 
Significant Impact

Docket No. 50-261
    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License DPR-
23 issued to Carolina Power and Light Company (the licensee) for 
operation of the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit 2, 
located at the licensee's site in Darlington County, South Carolina.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

    The proposed action would amend the Facility Operating License to 
reflect a revision to the HBRSEP Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 
(UFSAR) to include the evaluation of a previously unanalyzed spent fuel 
cask drop scenario. The analysis also considered a second scenario of 
potential damage by lateral movement of the cask into plant equipment 
that results in damage to the valves while shipping with the valve 
covers removed. The cask drop scenario is hypothesized to occur during 
movement of spent fuel shipping cask model IF-300, without the cask 
valve covers installed, from the decontamination facility at the HBRSEP 
to the shipping railcar using a crane in a non-single-failure-proof 
configuration, i.e. using a non-redundant cask lifting yoke. The 
maximum potential height from which the cask could be dropped during 
the time of transfer with a non-redundant cask lifting yoke is 30 feet. 
The postulated accident associated with lateral movement of the cask 
could occur anytime during the general handling of the cask without the 
cask valve covers installed. The proposed action is in accordance with 
the licensee's request for NRC review dated August 28, 1997, as 
supplemented by letters dated June 17, 1998, October 29, 1998, and 
February 11, 1999.

The Need for the Proposed Action

    At HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, loaded Spent Fuel Shipping Casks are shipped 
by rail

[[Page 17020]]

to CP&L's Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP), where the fuel is 
placed in long-term storage in the SHNPP spent fuel pool. With the cask 
valve covers installed the IF-300 shipping cask is designed to 
withstand being dropped from 30 feet onto an unyielding surface. The 
current Certificate of Compliance (CoC) for the IF-300 cask requires 
the valve box covers be fully installed. However, during a portion of 
the overall cask handling process, CP&L is constrained in its movement 
of this cask. The cask cannot be transferred by crane in the single-
failure-proof configuration from the railcar to the cask 
decontamination area of the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) or returned to 
the railcar because the redundant lifting yoke cannot fit onto the cask 
while the cask is on the railcar. The maximum height of the cask while 
being lifted with a non-redundant yoke is 30 feet. The valve box covers 
must be removed to provide access to the valves for off-gas venting 
from the cask. Because the FHB cask decontamination area cannot 
accommodate installation or removal of the valve box covers, the covers 
are removed at the rail car and remain off the cask during all 
movements in the FHB. Lateral movement of the cask into plant equipment 
with the valve covers removed or a cask drop while the cask is being 
transferred using a non-redundant lifting yoke could result in damage 
to the valves, resulting in a release of noble gas and iodine gap 
activity to the environment. These scenarios create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident not previously evaluated. The 
consequences of the cask drop scenario would bound any consequences due 
to impact during lateral movement. For all of the above reasons, there 
is a need for a revision to the HBRSEP UFSAR to include the evaluation 
of a previously unanalyzed spent fuel cask drop scenario to allow the 
licensee to ship spent fuel using fuel handling procedures that are not 
currently within the plant's licensing basis.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

    An evaluation has been performed by the licensee to determine the 
consequences of a postulated 30 foot cask drop accident with less than 
full integrity, i.e, with the valve box covers removed. The evaluation 
determined that, while the fuel components would be retained in the 
cask, the vent/drain valves may be damaged and thus not be gastight. 
Using the maximum activity loading for the IF-300 cask, this type of 
release has been evaluated and the whole body and thyroid doses which 
could result are a small fraction of those previously analyzed for the 
fuel handling accident in Section 15.7.3 of the UFSAR. The personnel 
involved in a cleanup after a postulated accident would need to 
decontaminate a maximum of one cubic foot of material with a dose rate 
of up to 10 rem/hr at one meter based on the limit established for the 
maximum allowable water remaining in the cask after loading operations. 
Personnel exposure rates could be effectively limited by use of 
temporary shielding and remote handling tools. The release of activity 
would not be sufficient to initiate the Control Room radiation alarm or 
pressurization mode of the Control Room ventilation system. The 
postulated dose to a Control Room occupant was calculated to be 3.5E-03 
rem (whole body) and 7.8E-04 rem (thyroid). Dose assessments were 
performed using maximum potential releases assuming failure of the 
spent fuel within the cask and radionuclide release from damage to the 
valves. Calculated doses at the site boundary were 0.0072 rem (whole 
body) and 0.1233 rem (thyroid). This evaluation also concluded that it 
will also bound any consequences of the damage due to an impact during 
a lateral movement, since the dose risks would be a fraction of the 
consequences of cask drop with less than full integrity.
    These results have been, in part, independently verified by the NRC 
staff. The NRC staff also reviewed the assumptions and methods of 
analysis in the licensee's radiological consequence analysis to ensure 
they are conservative, bounding, and consistent with the HBRSEP design 
basis. Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the 
licensee has demonstrated with reasonable assurance that maximum 
radiological consequences of dropping an IF-300 cask at the HBRSEP are 
radiation doses to members of public that are a small fraction of the 
numerical criteria in 10 CFR Part 100 and are well within the 
acceptance criteria in the Standard Review Plan and, therefore, are 
acceptable. The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed 
action and concludes that there will be an insignificant increase in 
environmental impact on the dose consequences of a spent fuel cask drop 
with this change in shipping configuration.
    The proposed action will not increase the probability or 
consequences of accidents previously analyzed. No changes are being 
made in the types of any effluents that may be released off-site and 
there is no significant radiological environmental impacts associated 
with the proposed action.
    With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed 
action does not involve any historic sites. It does not affect 
nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. 
Therefore, there are no significant nonradiological environmental 
impacts associated with the proposed action.
    Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

    The Spent Fuel Shipping Cask cannot be lifted in the single 
failure-proof configuration from the cask decontamination area of the 
FHB to the railcar with this configuration because the redundant 
lifting yoke cannot fit onto the cask while the cask is on the railcar. 
Therefore, alternatives to the proposed activity were considered which 
include (1) designing a new redundant lifting rig and modifying the 
shipping cask to allow the Spent Fuel Cask Crane to fit onto the cask 
while the cask is situated on the railcar; (2) modifying the FHB to 
accommodate installing the valve box covers on the Spent Fuel Shipping 
Cask in the cask decontamination area before movement of the cask to 
the railcar; or (3) ceasing spent fuel shipping operations and loading 
the spent fuel into Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) 
canisters. For the purposes of this review, the alternatives to the 
proposed action have been evaluated using the dollar value per Person-
Rem of $2000 recommended by NUREG-1530, ``Reassessment of NRC's Dollar 
Per Person-Rem Conversion Factor Policy.'' Since the postulated 
consequences at the Site Boundary have been calculated to be 0.0072 
Rem, the proposed change to the UFSAR can be assigned a value of 
approximately $15 per person. From the HBRSEP, Unit No. 2 Emergency 
Plan, the most populous 90 deg. sector out to 10 miles contained a 
population of 23,210. Therefore, a dollar value of $350,000 was used 
for comparison of the proposed activity with its alternatives.
    Development of a redundant yoke and modification of the Spent Fuel 
Cask Crane will involve the design, fabrication, and installation of a 
one-of-a-kind redundant yoke that can be used for lifts of the Spent 
Fuel Shipping Cask that include lifting of the cask to the railcar. 
Modifying the FHB to accommodate installation of the valve box covers 
prior to lifting the Spent Fuel Shipping Cask from the cask

[[Page 17021]]

decontamination area to the railcar would involve a major modification 
to the unit to enclose a larger cask decontamination area within a 
controlled air space. It is difficult to provide accurate estimates for 
the cost of these alternatives because of the numerous variables 
involved. It is believed that the cost for either of these alternatives 
will be in excess of $1,000,000.
    As an alternative to the proposed amendment, the staff considered 
denial of the requested amendment; thus, shipment of spent fuel to 
SHNPP could be terminated. The result of termination of spent fuel 
shipment would be to require the storage of additional spent fuel 
onsite until all existing capacity is used or additional capacity is 
added to allow continued operation until the termination of the HBRSEP, 
Unit No. 2, operating license on July 31, 2010. The Spent Fuel Pit has 
already been reracked with high density fuel storage racks, and the 
addition of storage capacity to the Spent Fuel Pit by further re-
racking is not feasible. CP&L maintains an ISFSI license for 8 ISFSI 
canisters currently containing 56 spent fuel assemblies. No additional 
capacity is available under the current ISFSI license. The license 
could be amended to allow additional capacity using a new canister 
design, or a canister licensed under a general license could be used. 
The estimated cost of adding sufficient ISFSI storage capacity to 
permit operation of the unit until the end of the current operating 
license has been estimated to be approximately $5,000,000.
    The action proposed by the licensee of performing the cask lifting 
operations between the decontamination facility and the railcar with 
the valve covers removed and using a non-redundant cask lifting yoke 
has no significant impact on the environment either from routine 
operations or from a postulated accident in this configuration. The 
postulated accident dose is only a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 
limits and within the acceptance criteria of the Standard Review Plan. 
Therefore, the benefits of the proposed activity substantially outweigh 
the costs of the alternatives to the proposed activity. Denial of the 
application would result in no change in current environmental impacts. 
The environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative 
action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

    This action does not involve the use of any resources not 
previously considered in the ``Final Environmental Statement Related to 
the Operation of H.B. Robinson.''

Agencies and Persons Consulted

    In accordance with its stated policy, on February 17, 1999, the 
staff consulted with the South Carolina State official, Virgil Autry, 
South Carolina Department of Health, Bureau of Radiological Health and 
Environmental Control. The State official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

    On the basis of the environmental assessment, the Commission 
concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission 
has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the 
proposed action.
    For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
licensee's letters dated August 28, 1997, June 17, 1998, October 29, 
1998, and February 11, 1999, which are available for public inspection 
at the Commission's Public Document Room, which is located at The 
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local 
public document room located at the Hartsville Memorial Library, 147 
West College, Hartsville, South Carolina 29550.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of March 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Sheri R. Peterson,
Section Chief, Project Directorate II/Section II-2, Division of 
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-8598 Filed 4-6-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P