[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 61 (Wednesday, March 31, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15553-15567]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-7530]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration
[C-791-806]


Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Stainless 
Steel Plate in Coils from South Africa

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

EFFECTIVE DATE: March 31, 1999.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Copyak, Kathleen Lockard or 
Dana Mermelstein, Office of CVD/AD Enforcement VI, Group II, Import 
Administration, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 
20230; telephone: (202) 482-2786.

Final Determination

    The Department of Commerce (the Department) determines that 
countervailable subsidies are being provided to producers and exporters 
of stainless steel plate in coils from South Africa. For information on 
the estimated countervailing duty rates, please see the ``Suspension of 
Liquidation'' section of this notice.

Petitioners

    The petition in this investigation was filed by Allegheny Ludlum 
Corporation, Armco, Inc., J&L Specialty Steel, Inc., Lukens, Inc., and 
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO/CLC, Butler Armco Independent 
Union, and Zanesville Armco Independent Organization (the petitioners).

Case History

    Since the publication of our preliminary determination in this 
investigation on September 9, 1998 (63 FR 47263), the following events 
have occurred.
    We conducted verification of the countervailing duty questionnaire 
responses from November 2 through November 13, 1998. On January 2, 
1999, we terminated the suspension of liquidation of all entries of the 
subject merchandise entered or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption 
on or after that date, pursuant to section 703(d) of the Act. See the 
``Suspension of Liquidation'' section of this notice. Because the final 
determination of this countervailing duty investigation was aligned 
with the final antidumping duty determination (see 63 FR 47263), and 
the final antidumping duty determination was postponed, the Department 
extended the final determination of the countervailing duty 
investigation until no later than March 19, 1999 (see Countervailing 
Duty Investigations of Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium, 
Italy, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of South Africa: Notice 
of Extension of Time Limit for Final Determinations, 64 FR 2195 
(January 13, 1999)). Petitioners, the Government of South Africa, and 
Columbus Stainless (the operating unit of Columbus Joint Venture) filed 
case briefs on January 11, 1999, and rebuttal briefs on January 19, 
1999. A public hearing was held on January 21, 1999.

The Applicable Statute and Regulations

    Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the statute are 
references to the provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by 
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act effective January 1, 1995 (the Act). 
In addition, unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the 
Department's regulations are to the current regulations codified at 19 
CFR 351 (1998).

Scope of Investigation

    For purposes of this investigation, the product covered is certain 
stainless steel plate in coils. Stainless steel is an alloy steel 
containing, by weight, 1.2 percent or less of carbon and 10.5 percent 
or more of chromium, with or without other elements. The subject plate 
products are flat-rolled products, 254 mm or over in width and 4.75 mm 
or more in thickness, in coils, and annealed or otherwise heat treated 
and pickled or otherwise descaled. The subject plate may also be 
further

[[Page 15554]]

processed (e.g., cold-rolled, polished, etc.) provided that it 
maintains the specified dimensions of plate following such processing. 
Excluded from the scope of this investigation are the following: (1) 
Plate not in coils, (2) plate that is not annealed or otherwise heat 
treated and pickled or otherwise descaled, (3) sheet and strip, and (4) 
flat bars.
    The merchandise subject to this investigation is currently 
classifiable in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States 
(HTS) at subheadings: 7219.11.00.30, 7219.11.00.60, 7219.12.00.05, 
7219.12.00.20, 7219.12.00.25, 7219.12.00.50, 7219.12.00.55, 
7219.12.00.65, 7219.12.00.70, 7219.12.00.80, 7219.31.00.10, 
7219.90.00.10, 7219.90.00.20, 7219.90.00.25, 7219.90.00.60, 
7219.90.00.80, 7220.11.00.00, 7220.20.10.10, 7220.20.10.15, 
7220.20.10.60, 7220.20.10.80, 7220.20.60.05, 7220.20.60.10, 
7220.20.60.15, 7220.20.60.60, 7220.20.60.80, 7220.90.00.10, 
7220.90.00.15, 7220.90.00.60, and 7220.90.00.80. Although the HTS 
subheadings are provided for convenience and Customs purposes, the 
written description of the merchandise under investigation is 
dispositive.

Injury Test

    Because South Africa is a ``Subsidies Agreement Country'' within 
the meaning of section 701(b) of the Act, the International Trade 
Commission (ITC) is required to determine whether imports of the 
subject merchandise from South Africa materially injure, or threaten 
material injury to, a U.S. industry. On May 28, 1998, the ITC published 
its preliminary determination finding that there is a reasonable 
indication that an industry in the United States is being materially 
injured, or threatened with material injury, by reason of imports from 
South Africa of the subject merchandise (See Certain Stainless Steel 
Plate in Coils From Belgium, Canada, Italy, Korea, South Africa, and 
Taiwan, 63 FR 29251).

Period of Investigation

    The period for which we are measuring subsidies (the POI) is 
calendar year 1997.

Company History

    In 1988, Samancor Limited (Samancor) and Highveld Steel and 
Vanadium (Highveld) formed the Columbus Joint Venture (CJV) to explore 
the possibility of establishing a 500,000-ton capacity, stainless steel 
facility in South Africa. In 1991, the partners examined the option of 
building a plant in South Africa and made a proposal to the Industrial 
Development Corporation of South Africa (IDC) that it take a capital 
stake in the joint venture. The IDC is a state-owned corporation, 
established in 1940 to further the economic development goals of the 
Government of South Africa (GOSA). The partners approached the IDC 
because it provides equity investments, and facilitates and guarantees 
financing for projects which contribute to the GOSA's economic 
development objectives. After being approached by the partners, the IDC 
performed a detailed analysis of the 1991 proposal and decided that it 
would participate in the investment subject to certain conditions: That 
the project be based on the expansion of an existing facility rather 
than on the construction of a new plant; and, that its implementation 
be delayed pending the establishment of a program providing tax 
benefits for capital investments.
    To meet the IDC's condition, in October 1991, Samancor and Highveld 
purchased an existing stainless steel facility, the Middelburg Steel & 
Alloys (MS&A) company. In 1992, the partners again approached the IDC. 
Based on a revised proposal, the IDC conducted a detailed feasibility 
study to analyze the prospects for the venture. Based on the 
feasibility study, the IDC made a counterproposal which was accepted by 
the partners. (The counterproposal is detailed in the proprietary 
feasibility study. In general, it addresses the technical financial 
details of the IDC's participation in the CJV.) Samancor, Highveld, and 
the IDC entered into a new partnership agreement which is the basis for 
the current structure of the CJV. Effective January 1, 1993, the IDC 
became a one-third and equal partner in the venture.
    The implementation of the CJV expansion project began in 1993 and 
was undertaken over the course of two and one-half years. The expansion 
was completed in 1995. Columbus Stainless, the operating unit of the 
CJV, produces a range of stainless steel products including subject 
merchandise.

Subsidies Valuation Information

    Discount Rates: In identifying a discount rate, the Department's 
options are, in the following order of preference: (1) The cost of 
long-term fixed-rate debt of the firm in question, excluding loans 
found to confer a countervailable subsidy; (2) the average cost of 
long-term fixed-rate debt in the country in question; and (3) a rate 
which we consider to be most appropriate. See Countervailing Duties; 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Request for Public Comments 54 FR 
23336, 23384 (May 31, 1989) (1989 Proposed Regulations). With respect 
to the Department's first preference, the only loans which Columbus had 
outstanding during the relevant period were loans guaranteed by the 
IDC/Impofin. See ``IDC/Impofin Loan Guarantees'' section below. With 
respect to the average cost of long-term fixed-rate debt in South 
Africa, because we were unable to obtain information about such debt 
for the purposes of the preliminary determination, we used the long-
term government bond rate. We considered this rate to be the most 
appropriate rate as it was the only long-term fixed interest rate for 
which we had information during the relevant period. In the preliminary 
determination, we stated that we would seek a rate for the final 
determination that better reflects an average long-term commercial 
fixed interest rate in South Africa. Although we discussed commercial 
interest rates at length during our meetings with the IDC, the South 
African Reserve Bank, and commercial bankers, no information was 
provided that would enable us to determine a commercial long-term 
interest rate that could be used as the discount rate. As such, because 
the government bond rate does not represent a commercial rate, for 
purposes of this final determination, we have constructed a discount 
rate which we believe is more appropriate. For each of the years 1993 
through 1997, we have averaged the government bond rate as reported by 
respondents with the ``Lending Rate'' reported in International 
Financial Statistics, December 1998, published by the International 
Monetary Fund. This publication indicates that the ``Lending Rate'' 
represents financing that ``meets the short- and medium-term needs of 
the private sector.'' By averaging these two rates, we believe that we 
have identified a rate more appropriate than the rate used for the 
purposes of the preliminary determination, a rate which includes the 
necessary characteristics of both long-term borrowing and commercially-
available interest rates. See Department's Position on Comment 9 below.
    Allocation Period: In the past, the Department has relied upon 
information from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service on the industry-
specific average useful life of assets (AUL) in determining the 
allocation period for non-recurring subsidies. See General Issues 
Appendix (GIA), 58 FR 37225, 37227, appended to the Final 
Countervailing Duty Determination; Certain Steel Products

[[Page 15555]]

from Austria, et al., 58 FR 37217 (July 9, 1993). However, in British 
Steel plc v. United States, 879 F. Supp. 1254 (CIT 1995) (British Steel 
I), the U.S. Court of International Trade (the Court) ruled against 
this allocation methodology. In accordance with the Court's remand 
order, the Department calculated a company-specific allocation period 
for non-recurring subsidies based on the AUL of non-renewable physical 
assets. This remand determination was affirmed by the Court on June 4, 
1996. See British Steel plc v. United States, 929 F. Supp. 426, 439 
(CIT 1996) (British Steel II). In accordance with our new practice 
following British Steel II, we intend to determine the allocation 
period for non-recurring subsidies using company-specific AUL data 
where reasonable and practicable. See, e.g., Certain Cut-to-Length 
Carbon Steel Plate from Sweden; Final Results of Countervailing Duty 
Administrative Review, 62 FR 16551, 16552 (April 7, 1997). When such 
data are not available (or are otherwise unusable), our practice is to 
rely upon the IRS depreciation tables.
    Columbus did not provide the information necessary to calculate a 
company-specific AUL. Therefore, we are relying on the Internal Revenue 
Service's 1977 Class Life Asset Depreciation Range System (Rev. Proc. 
77-10, 1977-1, C.B. 548 (RR-38) (IRS Tables), which report a schedule 
of 15 years for the productive equipment used in the steel industry. 
See the Department's Position on Comment 10 below.

I. Programs Determined To Be Countervailable

A. Section 37E  Tax Allowances

    The GOSA enacted Section 37E of the Income Tax Act in 1991 to 
promote capital investment and thereby foster long-term economic 
development. This program was intended as a ``kick-start'' for the 
South African economy and was limited to investments made between 
September 1991 and September 1993. The purpose of the program was to 
encourage investment in large industrial expansion projects in value-
added sectors of the economy. For projects approved as valued-added 
processes, Section 37E allows for depreciation of capital assets and 
the deduction of pre-production interest and finance charges in 
advance, that is, in the year the costs are incurred rather than the 
year the assets go into use. The program also allows taxpayers in loss 
positions to receive ``negotiable tax credit certificates'' (NTCCs) in 
the amount of the cash value of the Section 37E tax deduction (i.e., 
deduction multiplied by the tax rate). The NTCCs can be sold (normally 
at a small discount) to any other taxpayer, who then can use them to 
pay taxes. The program does not provide for accelerated depreciation, 
nor does it provide for additional finance charge-related deductions 
beyond those available under the South African tax code. The advantage 
to users of this program is the receipt of these tax deductions in 
advance, i.e., when the expenses are incurred rather than when the 
equipment is put into use.
    According to the questionnaire response, eligibility for Section 
37E benefits was determined on a project-by-project basis by a 
committee appointed by the Minister of Finance in concurrence with the 
Minister of Trade and Industry. To demonstrate that their projects 
qualified for Section 37E, applicants were required to show: (1) That 
the project would add at least 35 percent to the value of the raw 
material or intermediate product processed; (2) that the project would 
be carried out on an internationally competitive scale; and (3) that 
the taxpayer would utilize foreign term credits, where possible, when 
financing the import of capital goods for the project. In addition, 
qualifying investments had to be made between September 12, 1991 and 
September 11, 1993.
    The CJV began receiving Section 37E benefits in 1993, two years 
before the 1995 completion of the plant expansion. Because the CJV is a 
partnership rather than a tax-paying corporation, Section 37E benefits 
earned by the CJV are claimed by the partners.
    When determining whether a program is countervailable, we must 
examine whether it is an export subsidy or whether it provides benefits 
to a specific enterprise, industry, or group thereof, either in law (de 
jure specificity) or in fact (de facto specificity). See Sections 
771(5A)(A), (B), and (D) of the Act. For the Preliminary Affirmative 
Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Countervailing 
Duty Determination with Final Antidumping Determination: Stainless 
Steel Plate in Coils from South Africa, 63 FR 47263, 47265 (September 
4, 1998) (Preliminary Determination), we determined that Section 37E 
provided benefits which were de facto specific, in accordance with 
section 771(5A)(D)(iii)(I) of the Act, because the number of users of 
the program was limited. (63 FR at 47265.) However, in the memorandum 
accompanying our preliminary determination, we noted that ``. . . 
information on the record suggests that an applicant's export 
performance may have been considered during the approval process. While 
there is not enough information in the record at this time to conclude 
that benefits provided under Section 37E constitute a de facto export 
subsidy, we will continue to examine this question for the final 
determination.'' See August 28, 1998, Memorandum to Maria Harris 
Tildon, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for AD/CVD Enforcement II, 
``Decision Memorandum: Countervailing Duty Investigation of Stainless 
Steel Plate in Coils from South Africa'' at 7, public version on file 
in the Central Records Unit, room B-099 of the main Commerce Building 
(CRU) (Decision Memorandum). Under section 771(5A)(B) of the Act, a 
subsidy is an export subsidy if it is, ``in law or in fact, contingent 
upon export performance, alone or as 1 of 2 or more conditions.''
    We now have a fuller understanding of the legislation which 
implemented the program, amendments which were made to that 
legislation, and the timing of Columbus' application and approval for 
benefits under the program. At verification, we learned that Section 
37E amending the Tax Act of 1962 was published in the Official Gazette 
on July 17, 1991 and became effective September 12, 1991. To be 
eligible for Section 37E, an applicant had to show that the planned 
investment was in a ``beneficiation process,'' which was defined as a 
process which: ``(a) Substantially adds to the value of the product 
processed; (b) is carried on on such a scale that it is competitive in 
the international market; and (c) is carried on with the intention of 
exporting at least 60 percent (or such lesser percentage as the 
committee may determine) by value of the product produced to countries 
outside the customs union.'' See the December 16, 1998, ``Memorandum to 
David Mueller, Director, Office of CVD/AD Enforcement VI, on 
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Stainless Steel Plate in Coils 
from South Africa: Verification Report of the Government of South 
Africa,'' at 15 and Verification Exhibit SARS-1 at 3, public version on 
file in the CRU (Government Verification Report).
    In 1992, the law was amended for the first time; the amendment was 
published on July 15, 1992, in the Official Gazette and was effective 
retroactively to March 18, 1992. The amendment broadened the definition 
of beneficiation of minerals in certain material respects and removed 
the committee's discretion to approve applicants intending to export 
less than 60 percent of production.
    On July 20, 1993, the second amendment to Section 37E was

[[Page 15556]]

published in the Gazette. This amendment was effective retroactively to 
September 12, 1992. This amendment made a material change to the law 
because it removed the export performance eligibility criterion. The 
deletion of this requirement is documented in the Explanatory 
Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 1993. See Verification 
Exhibit SARS-1 at 11. Although this amendment was retroactive, 
companies that applied before July 20, 1993, addressed the export 
performance criterion in their applications for Section 37E benefits. 
Columbus' application for Section 37E benefits, which was filed on 
August 11,1992, specifically addressed this criterion and specified the 
portion of Columbus' production that was intended for export. Based on 
this application, Columbus was approved for Section 37E benefits on 
December 8, 1992, prior to the July, 20, 1993, amendment.
    Although approved for Section 37E assistance on December 8, 1992, 
the exact amount of assistance to be provided was revised as the 
financial and technical aspects of the project developed (e.g., 
contracts for the supply of equipment and financing arrangements were 
being finalized, enabling Columbus to identify the related costs and 
expenditures more accurately than they had in the initial August, 1992 
application package). Columbus was in close communication with the 
relevant authorities throughout this period, and submitted an amended 
application on July 19, 1993. This application did not address any of 
the eligibility criteria, under the original law or the amended law, 
rather, it finalized information about the categorization of equipment 
and the costs of financing and amended the projected value of the 
Section 37E benefits.
    The Inland Revenue authority notified Columbus of its approval of 
the exact amount of its Section 37E benefits on August 20, 1993. 
Nevertheless, when Columbus was initially approved for Section 37E 
benefits (on December 8, 1992), the approval was based on consideration 
of the export performance criterion, which was in effect at that time. 
Even though the law was subsequently amended to remove the export 
criterion, and this amendment was retroactive to September 12, 1992, 
Columbus was approved for Section 37E benefits before this amendment 
was implemented. Making the amendment to remove the export criterion 
retroactively effective does not undo the fact that when Columbus was 
approved, it had to meet an export performance criterion.
    Moreover, even though Columbus amended its application on July 19, 
1993, that submission was not a revised application package. It did not 
address all of the criteria that had to be met in order to be approved 
and that were addressed in the initial application (of August 11, 
1992). Moreover, it did not remove the export performance information 
that was in the original application; rather, it contained a refinement 
of previously-provided financial and technical information, which was 
required by Inland Revenue to establish the final value of the Section 
37E benefits Columbus would receive. Accordingly, based on these facts, 
we must conclude that the Section 37E assistance provided to Columbus 
constitutes an export subsidy within the meaning of section 771(5A)(B) 
of the Act.
    The Section 37E program provides a financial contribution within 
the meaning of section 771(5)(D)(ii) of the Act as it constitutes 
revenue foregone by the GOSA. Because Section 37E allows companies to 
claim depreciation and finance-related deductions in advance of when 
such deductions would normally be allowed, the benefit within the 
meaning of section 771(5)(E) of the Act, is the value to the company of 
being able to claim the depreciation in advance. The Department 
normally considers that a benefit arises from a tax program in the 
amount of the difference between the taxes paid and the taxes that 
would have been paid absent the program. However, the Section 37E 
program does not operate as a normal tax program. According to the IDC, 
``[t]he accelerated tax allowances reduce the peak funding requirements 
of major capital investment projects.'' See IDC 1992 Annual Report, 
Annexure 7 of the July 31, 1998 Questionnaire Response, public version 
on file in the CRU. Through this program, capital requirements for 
investments are reduced, as evidenced by the partners' views that the 
program was essential in reducing the start-up costs of the venture. 
See Petition at Exhibit S-8, public version on file in CRU. 
Furthermore, there is a cash flow impact regardless of the company's 
tax position. As such, we consider that, although the Section 37E 
program is a ``tax'' program, it functions more like a capital 
contribution.
    Since the Section 37E program reduces a company's capital 
requirements, and because the receipt of Section 37E benefits required 
express government approval, we determine that it is more appropriate 
to treat the benefits provided under Section 37E as a non-recurring 
subsidy. See GIA, 58 FR at 37226. Therefore, we determine that the 
Section 37E program constitutes a countervailable subsidy within the 
meaning of section 771(5) of the Act.
    To determine the benefit, we ascertained the value of the Section 
37E allowances to the company. First, we calculated the cash value of 
each 37E claim by multiplying the total allowance claimed in each year 
by the relevant tax rate. Then, we determined the time value of 
obtaining the allowance in advance; in the preliminary determination, 
we used two years for discounting purposes, however, at verification we 
discovered that it was appropriate to use two years for one-third of 
the value of the allowances and three years for the remaining two-
thirds. This change reflects the fact that since Columbus Stainless was 
commissioned October 1, 1995, and the IDC and Samancor's tax year ends 
June 30, these partners would have had to wait until June 30, 1996, 
i.e., three years to take depreciation under the normal system (section 
12(c)) while Highveld, which has a December 31 year-end, would have had 
to wait until December 31, 1995, i.e., only two years. See Department's 
Position on Comment 5 below. The difference between the tax value of 
the allowances and the tax value discounted to reflect the time-value 
of money is the benefit to the company, for each year in which Section 
37E benefits are claimed. Finally, because we consider that the Section 
37E assistance should be allocated over time as a non-recurring 
subsidy, we treated each year's benefit as a non-recurring grant using 
our standard grant methodology. Since Columbus did not report its AUL, 
we are relying on the IRS Tables for purposes of establishing the 
allocation period. The IRS Tables show a depreciation schedule of 15 
years for the steel industry. See Department's Position on Comment 10 
below. We summed the benefit amounts allocated to the POI and divided 
by CJV's total export sales. Accordingly, we determine the net 
countervailable subsidy to be 3.84 percent ad valorem.

B. IDC/Impofin Loan Guarantees

    The IDC and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Impofin, Ltd., facilitate 
and guarantee foreign credits for the importation of capital goods into 
South Africa. The program was established in 1989, and was designed to 
facilitate foreign lending to South African firms; the availability of 
foreign credit in South Africa was extremely limited at that time. The 
IDC/Impofin maintain

[[Page 15557]]

blanket credit lines with banks in numerous countries which are used in 
two ways. First, the IDC may act as an intermediary lending authority, 
borrowing funds through these credit lines from the foreign bank and 
then re-lending them to the South African firm. Second, based on these 
credit lines, the South African firm may negotiate its own financing 
directly with the foreign lender which is then guaranteed by the IDC. 
Any company seeking financing for the purchase of foreign capital 
equipment may apply to Impofin to use the program. Whether the 
financing is arranged through the IDC/Impofin or directly with the 
foreign lender, it is guaranteed through the IDC/Impofin program. The 
IDC charges a fee for its guaranteeing and facilitating services.
    Columbus used the IDC/Impofin program to facilitate and to 
guarantee the financing of all of its foreign capital equipment 
sourcing. In the preliminary determination, we analyzed this program 
using our standard methodology for examining government-guaranteed 
loans and compared the benchmark interest rate to the interest rate 
charged by the lender on the guaranteed loans. However, based on 
information collected at verification, we now have a better 
understanding of this program and have revised our analysis of the 
program from the preliminary determination. Because these loans 
originate either with foreign government export credit agencies or 
offshore foreign banks in coordination with foreign government export 
credit agencies, which are not under the direction or control of the 
GOSA, the loans themselves are not countervailable. Thus, we find that 
it is not appropriate to compare the interest rates charged by offshore 
foreign banks to commercial interest rates in order to determine 
whether the program provides a financial contribution. However, the IDC 
did provide guarantees on these loans for a fee. This guarantee could 
constitute a financial contribution if the IDC charged less than what 
would have been charged by a commercial bank for a similar guarantee.
    At verification, we sought information about commercial loan 
guarantee practices in South Africa at the time Columbus received the 
IDC/Impofin guarantees. We learned that such guarantees were available 
on only a limited basis in South Africa at the time. However, a 
commercial banker informed us that the rates for providing these types 
of guarantees would range between 0.25 and 0.50 percent; the banker 
further stated that the fee would vary based on the quality of the 
borrower and the size of the credit (a high-quality borrower would 
likely pay fees at the low end of the range; a borrower seeking 
guarantees for large credits would likely pay fees at the high end of 
the range). See December 17, 1998, ``Memorandum for David Mueller, 
Director, Office of CVD/AD Enforcement VI, on Discussions with Private 
Sector and South African Reserve Bank'' (Banker's Verification Report), 
a public document on file in the CRU. Since Columbus is a ``high-
quality'' borrower but the size of the credits is large, we determine 
that the middle of this range, 0.375 percent, is a reasonable 
approximation of what a commercial bank would have charged Columbus for 
similar guarantees. Thus, when we compare what Columbus paid the IDC 
for the provision of guarantees, 0.25 percent, and what it would have 
paid a commercial bank, 0.375 percent, we find that the IDC did provide 
a financial contribution that confers a benefit within the meaning of 
the Act.
    Next, we analyzed whether the program is specific in law (de jure 
specificity), or in fact (de facto specificity), within the meaning of 
subsections 771(5A)(D)(i) and (iii) of the Act. The enacting 
legislation for the IDC/Impofin program does not explicitly limit 
eligibility for these financing programs to an enterprise, industry, or 
group thereof. Thus, we find that the law is not de jure specific, and 
we must analyze whether the program meets the de facto criteria defined 
under section 771(5A)(D)(iii). In our Preliminary Determination, we 
examined information provided by the GOSA and found that since 1990, 
the ``fabricated metal products'' and ``basic metal manufacture'' 
industries have been predominant users of the program. These industries 
have received more than fifty percent, by value, of the total 
guaranteed loans awarded over the life of the program. Information 
provided by the GOSA in its case brief demonstrates that the steel 
industry (including stainless steel) has received more than half the 
total value of loan guarantees awarded over the life of the program, 
while all of the rest of the users of the program (industries 
including, but not limited to mining, agriculture, pulp and paper, oil, 
gas, chemical, vehicles, telecommunications, and aluminum smelting and 
fabrication) together accounted for less than half of the total value 
of loan guarantees awarded over the life of the program. This 
information clearly indicates that the steel industry is a predominant 
user of this program. On this basis, we find IDC/Impofin loan 
guarantees to be de facto specific within the meaning of section 
771(5A)(D)(iii) of the Act. Therefore, we determine that the IDC/
Impofin guarantees constitute a countervailable subsidy within the 
meaning of section 771(5) of the Act. (See the Department's Position on 
Comment 6 below.)
    Since the guarantee fees are paid every year the loan is 
outstanding, we calculated the benefit by subtracting what Columbus 
paid the IDC under this program from what it would have paid on a 
comparable commercial guarantee during the POI. We then divided the 
result by Columbus' total sales during the POI. Accordingly, we 
determine the net countervailable subsidy to be 0.09 percent ad valorem 
for Columbus.

II. Program Determined to be Non-Countervailable

IDC Participation in the Columbus Joint Venture

    As discussed in the ``Company History'' Section above, in 1988, 
Highveld and Samancor formed the Columbus Joint Venture to explore the 
possibility of establishing a stainless steel facility in South Africa. 
In 1991, the partners proposed that the IDC make a capital investment 
in the venture. The IDC performed a detailed analysis of the 1991 
proposal and decided to participate in the investment subject to 
certain conditions: that the project would be based on the expansion of 
an existing facility and that its implementation would be delayed 
pending the establishment of the Section 37E program. In 1992, after 
the partners acquired an existing facility for the purpose of 
implementing the IDC's recommendations, the partners approached the IDC 
with a revised proposal. Based on this proposal, the IDC and the two 
partners conducted a detailed feasibility study to identify the 
prospects for the venture. The IDC made a counterproposal which the 
partners accepted. Effective January 1, 1993, the IDC became a one-
third and equal partner in the venture. Samancor, Highveld, and the IDC 
entered a new partnership agreement which is the basis for the current 
structure of the CJV.
    The Department considers the government's provision of equity or 
start-up capital to constitute a benefit ``if the investment decision 
is inconsistent with the usual investment practice of private 
investors, including the practice regarding the provision of risk 
capital, in the country in which the equity infusion is made.'' See 
section 771(5)(E)(i) of the Act. The Department applies this standard 
in a case-by-case analysis of the commercial context in

[[Page 15558]]

which the investment decision is made. Thus, we must determine whether 
the IDC's decision to participate in the CJV was consistent with the 
usual investment practices of private investors in South Africa.
    While Samancor and Highveld are both private investors, their 
participation in the venture, per se, is not an appropriate basis for 
determining whether the IDC's participation is consistent with usual 
investment practices. By the time the IDC decided to invest, Samancor 
and Highveld had been partners in this investment for five years. Both 
already had substantial stakes in the project, including the purchase 
of the MS&A facility in 1991. Thus, their evaluation of the CJV 
expansion project was affected by their interest in protecting their 
existing investment and they may have been willing to accept a higher 
level of risk than another private investor would. Therefore, their 
continued participation is not the appropriate background against which 
to examine the IDC's decision, and we have focused our analysis on the 
factors considered by the IDC in making its decision in order to 
determine whether it was consistent with the investment practices of a 
private investor.
    As discussed above, in 1991 and 1992, the partners made detailed 
presentations to the IDC of the risks and projected returns of the 
project. The IDC agreed to participate in the venture subject to 
modifications designed to increase the rate of return of the project by 
lowering its initial capital requirements. In 1992, the IDC conducted a 
detailed feasibility study to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of 
the venture and to project its financial performance, based upon the 
expansion of the MS&A facility. This detailed analysis, which Columbus 
submitted for the record, is the primary basis for the IDC's decision 
to invest in the CJV.
    Given the proprietary nature of the feasibility study, the specific 
analysis and projections contained in the study cannot be addressed in 
this public notice. At verification, we discussed at length this study 
and the analysis which preceded it. IDC officials explained how the IDC 
conducted its extensive analysis, and tested its projections for 
various changes in forecast market and economic circumstances. See 
Government Verification Report at 8-9. The study is based on reasonable 
assumptions and concludes that the CJV was a viable venture which would 
provide a positive real rate of return on the IDC's investment. The 
study concludes that the average nominal rate of return for the project 
would be 19.13 percent over an appropriate period.
    We compared the projected return on the investment to information 
available for other investments in South Africa during this period. 
Because of the proprietary nature of the feasibility study, this 
analysis cannot be detailed in this public notice. See Preliminary 
Determination, 63 FR at 47262; Decision Memorandum. The nominal rate of 
return of 19.13 percent exceeds government bond yields. The projected 
real rate of return is comparable to returns provided by other 
investment instruments at the time. We examined the dividend yields on 
industrial and commercial shares as reported in the Quarterly Bulletin 
of the South Africa Reserve Bank (appended to the August 28, 1998 
``Memorandum to the File on Calculations for the Preliminary 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Stainless Steel Plate in 
Coils from South Africa'' (Preliminary Calculation Memo) public version 
on file in the CRU). We also examined the return on assets of non-
financial private incorporated businesses as reported by the Reserve 
Bank of South Africa on its website: http://www.resbank.co.za (a 
printout of the information we examined is appended to Preliminary 
Calculation Memo). At verification, we gathered more information about 
the commercial investment climate in South Africa in order to inform 
our analysis for this final determination. See Banker's Verification 
Report. The information on the record indicates that the projected 
return was adequate and it supports a finding that the IDC's investment 
decision was consistent with the behavior of a reasonable private 
investor.
    Finally, we examined the structure of the partnership itself, to 
determine whether the IDC assumed more than its share of the risks 
involved in the venture or less than its share of the potential 
earnings. The three partners contributed capital to the venture 
equally. They all account for one-third of the project's year-end 
results in their financial statements, in accordance with the normal 
practice for partnerships. They each hold the same number of seats on 
the CJV's board. To the extent that the IDC's commitments and 
obligations to the joint venture differ from the other partners, these 
differences reflect the IDC's role as an investor, in contrast to the 
other partner's experience in industrial operations. Furthermore, the 
IDC took steps to protect its level of risk from the investment. For 
example, where the IDC has assumed more than its pro-rata share of the 
risk, it has required commitments from the other two partners which 
result in the risk being shared equally.
    While the partnership is structured so that the IDC's role in the 
CJV is slightly different from that of the other two partners, the 
agreement stipulates equal cash participation, equal representation on 
the Board of Directors, and equal distribution of any returns on the 
investments. In addition, the IDC protected its investment by requiring 
measures to ensure that the risks would be equally distributed among 
all of three partners. The IDC recommended ways to increase the 
project's earnings potential and negotiated safeguards in the 
partnership agreement. The IDC appears to have assumed only an amount 
of risk that is commensurate with its level of participation as a 
partner.
    The IDC's decision to invest in the CJV appears to be based upon a 
reasonable analysis that the project was viable, an informed assessment 
that the IDC would realize a positive real rate of return on its 
investment, and a partnership based on the equal distribution of the 
risks. On this basis, we determine that the IDC's capital contribution 
into the CJV was not inconsistent with the normal practice of private 
investors in South Africa, and thus, does not constitute a 
countervailable subsidy within the meaning of the Act.

III. Programs Determined to be Not Used

    Based on the information provided in the responses and the results 
of verification, we determine that Columbus did not apply for or 
receive benefits under the following programs during the POI:

A. Low Interest Rate Finance for the Promotion of Exports (which is the 
same program as the Low Interest Rate Scheme for the Promotion of 
Exports)
B. Competitiveness Fund
C. Export Assistance Under the Export Marketing Assistance and the 
Export Marketing and Investment Assistance Programs
D. Regional Industrial Development Program (RIDP)

IV. Programs Determined to be Terminated

    Based on information obtained at verification, we determine that 
the following programs have been terminated.

A. Export Marketing Allowance
B. Multi-Shift Scheme

[[Page 15559]]

Interested Party Comments

    Comment 1: IDC Participation in the Columbus Joint Venture: 
Petitioners contend that the Department did not adequately address all 
five factors of the test developed in Final Affirmative Countervailing 
Duty Determination: Certain Corrosion Resistant Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from New Zealand, 63 FR 37366 (July 9, 1993)(New Zealand 
Steel). Petitioners contend that the Department must examine the 
following five factors: (1) The (un)willingness of private sector 
participants to invest in the project; (2) the relative contributions 
of the partners and the expected returns; (3) the feasibility study; 
(4) the nature of the project (i.e., the existence of non-commercial 
considerations); and, (5) the economic environment prevailing at the 
time in South Africa. In addition, petitioners urge the Department to 
consider the implementation of Section 37E as a factor which affected 
the IDC's investment. Petitioners argue that a full examination of the 
five factors must lead the Department to the conclusion that the IDC's 
investment was not consistent with commercial considerations, and 
therefore constitutes a countervailable subsidy. While petitioners urge 
the Department to apply all five factors, and to do so completely, 
petitioners suggest that the test be modified to account for the 
relevant facts of record and to comport more closely with commercial 
reality.
    In examining the first factor, petitioners contend that record 
evidence shows that the private sector was unwilling to participate in 
the CJV project. With respect to the second factor, petitioners further 
argue that the Department should consider the expected returns from the 
project in the context of its associated risk, and this examination 
leads to the conclusion that the returns were relatively low. 
Petitioners also argue that the structure of the investment agreement 
itself, in particular Highveld and Samancor's option to buy out a 
portion of the IDC's ownership, was needed to protect the two partners 
from the significant risks at the outset of the project. With respect 
to New Zealand Steel factor three, petitioners argue that the IDC's 
feasibility study was flawed because it was not an independent analysis 
and includes consideration of government actions. In support of this 
contention, petitioners cite Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia 51 FR 
4206, 4209 (February 3, 1986) and Steel Wire Rod from Trinidad & 
Tobago, 49 FR 480, 483 (January 4, 1984), in which the Department 
established that only an independent feasibility study provides an 
objective analysis of a project's potential returns. According to 
petitioners, the fourth factor shows that the parties to the CJV made 
non-commercial decisions when they structured the venture as a 
partnership in order to maximize the tax benefits, despite statements 
in the feasibility study that advocate the contrary. Further, 
petitioners contend that the record shows that the CJV expansion would 
not have gone forward without the IDC's investment. With respect to the 
fifth factor, petitioners maintain that the Department should not 
consider the difficult economic conditions in the post-Apartheid era in 
which the investment was made, as this could create a loophole allowing 
foreign governments to subsidize without consequence simply by claiming 
that unique or difficult economic conditions exist. Finally, 
petitioners argue that the Department should consider an additional 
factor, that the investment was conditioned upon the receipt of Section 
37E benefits which, petitioners argue, creates a rebuttable presumption 
that the investment is inconsistent with commercial considerations. For 
these reasons, petitioners conclude that the IDC's investment is 
inconsistent with commercial considerations.
    The GOSA and Columbus (respondents) claim that the first New 
Zealand Steel factor addresses whether private-sector participants are 
willing to invest and not whether private-sector participants in 
addition to those already participating are willing to invest in a 
project. With respect to the second factor, respondents maintain that 
the record does not support petitioners' contention that the risk was 
extremely high. When considering the third factor, respondents argue 
that it is incorrect to liken the IDC's feasibility study with that 
analyzed in New Zealand Steel, because Section 37E had already been 
implemented unlike the commitments of the government in New Zealand 
Steel. In addition, respondents argue that the IDC feasibility study 
was objective and contained full analysis of the relevant 
considerations including a realistic projection of the stainless steel 
market. With respect to the ``nature of the project,'' the structure 
and capitalization of the CJV, respondents note that it is common in 
South Africa to structure an undertaking as a joint venture rather than 
a company, and the IDC has often used this structure for other projects 
in which it is involved. Respondents argue that there is no evidence to 
conclude that the project would not have gone forward absent the IDC's 
participation. Lastly, respondents maintain that the final project 
study and the IDC's decision to participate in the CJV were not 
conditioned on the receipt of Section 37E benefits, as verification 
documents indicate.
    Department's Position: As a threshold matter, the analysis 
conducted in New Zealand Steel does not constitute a ``test,'' or 
establish a standard that the Department must follow in analyzing every 
joint venture in which a government or government entity participates, 
as petitioners suggest, and therefore their reliance on New Zealand 
Steel is misplaced. Petitioners' identification of the ``five factors'' 
is an inaccurate interpretation of the analysis in New Zealand Steel. 
Furthermore, the facts in this case are sufficiently different from 
those in New Zealand Steel to support a conclusion different from the 
one reached in that case, i.e., that the IDC's investment in the CJV is 
not countervailable (see the ``IDC Participation in the Columbus Joint 
Venture'' section above). Nevertheless, we address the elements of 
petitioners' arguments below.
    In New Zealand Steel, the Department did not directly address the 
unwillingness of the private sector to participate in the project. 
Rather, the Department determined that ``the participation of NZS (the 
private sector participant) was not dispositive that the GONZ's 
investment was consistent with commercial considerations.'' New Zealand 
Steel at 37368. We made a similar finding in our preliminary 
determination: The continued participation of Highveld and Samancor 
``is not the appropriate background against which to examine the IDC's 
decision'' because of the substantial resources the two partners 
already had at stake by this time. Preliminary Determination at 47266. 
We stand by this finding and therefore disagree with respondents' 
position that the participation of Highveld and Samancor by itself 
satisfies this factor. However, we also disagree with petitioners that 
the inability of Highveld and Samancor to secure a foreign partner 
(efforts to conclude a partnership arrangement with a Taiwanese company 
were unsuccessful) is dispositive of private sector unwillingness to 
invest in the project. At verification, we discussed the Taiwanese 
investor, and the record shows that the existing two partners were 
willing to use their substantial resources to provide certain 
guarantees for the Columbus project, but that the Taiwanese investor 
was unwilling to provide the same guarantees in return. The two 
existing partners were interested in finding another partner to share 
the risk equally. See December 18,

[[Page 15560]]

1998, ``Memorandum to David Mueller, Director, Office of CVD/AD 
Enforcement VI, on Verification of Information Submitted by Columbus 
Stainless, Ltd. and the Columbus Joint Venture in the Countervailing 
Duty Investigation of Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from South Africa 
(C-791-806)'' (Company Verification Report) at 10, public version on 
file in the CRU. Furthermore, despite the general optimism nascent in 
South Africa at the time, there were still very few companies with the 
resources necessary for the project, and two of those companies were 
already involved in the project through their subsidiaries, Highveld 
and Samancor.
    As with the first factor, the second factor, the relative 
contributions and the expected returns, is not clearly identified or 
addressed in New Zealand Steel. Regardless, we reject petitioners' 
contention that we overlooked the risk and focused unduly on the 
return. Our preliminary determination stated that we found the returns 
projected in the IDC feasibility study were acceptable, and adequate to 
support the IDC's investment (Preliminary Determination at 47266). The 
feasibility study also contains an extensive analysis of the risk, 
which we discussed at length at verification. Company Verification 
Report at 9-10. In preparing the feasibility study, the IDC performed 
numerous sensitivity analyses to determine the result on projected 
returns of changes in variables related to the technical, marketing, 
and financial aspects of the project, including future demand for 
stainless steel, and world capacity for stainless steel production. The 
IDC determined that the investment provided acceptable returns even in 
the event of these contingencies. In addition, the IDC was deliberate 
and objective in evaluating the project and prepared more conservative 
projections (higher funding requirements and lower projected returns) 
than the two partners had, and still determined the project's risk/
return profile to be within its investment parameters, parameters which 
we find to be comparable to those that a private investor would accept. 
In short, there is nothing about the project's risk vs. return that 
indicates the IDC's investment is inconsistent with the usual 
investment practice of private investors. Furthermore, it is not 
appropriate, as petitioners urge, to conclude that the lack of 
willingness on the part of the private sector indicates that the risks 
outweighed the returns. The appropriate focus of our analysis is the 
basis for the IDC's decision, the feasibility study. We also disagree 
with petitioners' contention that the buy-out provision is one which 
affords Highveld and Samancor undue protection from the project's risk. 
To the contrary, we believe this provision protects the IDC's 
investment and enables the IDC to recover most of its investment with a 
guaranteed return, an option not available to the other two partners. 
(At verification, IDC officials indicated that the IDC commonly seeks 
to recover its capital in the medium term so it can use its resources 
elsewhere. The IDC has begun to formalize this strategy, as indicated 
in the CJV Agreement. See Government Verification Report at 6.)
    Unlike the first two ``factors'' petitioners identify in New 
Zealand Steel, the third factor, the feasibility study, is clearly 
identified and addressed in New Zealand Steel (58 FR at 37368). 
However, we find that the facts in New Zealand Steel differ 
considerably from those presented here. In that case, the Department 
discounted the objectivity of the feasibility study because so many of 
its assumptions and conclusions were premised on ``the implementation 
of specific commitments by the GONZ, such as the assurance of certain 
financing, domestic market share, supply of raw materials, and 
favorable tax treatment, in their projections of the revenues of the 
project. Therefore, we find that the studies did not present an 
objective assessment of the viability of the project, based on market 
conditions.'' Id. The commitments of the GONZ were made solely for the 
benefit of the steel producer. In other words, a private investor, 
considering the same investment, would not have been able to control 
the variables as the GONZ could (market share, tax treatment, raw 
materials supply), and the projections in the feasibility study were 
premised on controlling those variables.
    In this case, as discussed above, we find that the IDC's 
feasibility study was objective, and the availability of Section 37E 
benefits was objectively accounted for in the feasibility study. (As a 
tax-paying entity, the IDC appropriately analyzed the effects of this 
tax program.) As IDC officials explained at verification, ``[a]lthough 
the absence of 37E would have meant a higher level of capital 
expenditures, the projections were still within the range of what the 
IDC was prepared to undertake.'' Government Verification Report at 10. 
Furthermore, we disagree with petitioners' assumption that the 
feasibility study was not objective because it was not independently 
prepared. At verification, an independent third party noted that ``many 
commercial interests respect the IDC for its expertise in conducting 
feasibility studies.'' Banker's Verification Report at 2. As we noted 
in the Preliminary Determination, the IDC withheld its decision to 
participate subject to modifications in the proposed project. 63 FR at 
47266. This IDC action supports a conclusion that the IDC was actively 
engaged in shaping the financial and operational structure of the 
project, in order to protect its investment, as a commercial investor 
would do. Thus, we determine that the analyses and conclusions 
contained in the feasibility study are objective, and support a 
determination that the IDC's investment was not inconsistent with the 
usual investment practice of private investors.
    We disagree with petitioners that the ``nature of the project,'' 
i.e., its structure as a joint venture partnership, rather than as a 
corporation, indicates that the IDC's investment was inconsistent with 
commercial considerations. To the contrary, we agree with respondents 
that this structure supports a conclusion that the investment was not 
countervailable. Record evidence shows that the tax advantages of the 
partnership structure are clear, particularly for a capital-intensive 
start-up company expected to sustain tax losses for several years. The 
partners' interest in maximizing those tax advantages shows all three 
of them to be acting as commercial actors, and making commercially-
consistent financial decisions. Furthermore, since we find that the 
feasibility study which provided the basis for the IDC's investment 
decision was objective and commercially consistent, it is not relevant 
to our analysis whether the project would have gone forward without the 
IDC's participation. However, we note that record evidence indicates 
that the two partners had enough at stake and the resources to go 
forward without the IDC; they ultimately had no reason to do so.
    With respect to the fifth factor, we agree with respondents that we 
do not have before us any arguments with respect to the economic 
environment as a factor for analyzing the IDC's investment in Columbus. 
Furthermore, in New Zealand Steel, we stated that ``analysis of the 
economic environment is irrelevant,'' 58 FR at 37369, and we find no 
reason to address that factor here.
    Finally, we disagree with petitioners' argument that the IDC's 
investment was conditioned on the receipt of Section 37E benefits. 
While record evidence shows that this tax program enabled the partners 
to reduce their capital outlays, and that the IDC deferred its 
participation until that program was

[[Page 15561]]

implemented, the record also shows that the IDC did consider its 
investment in the absence of Section 37E and found that it provided 
acceptable returns nevertheless. The IDC's deferral was a commercially 
sound action taken to ensure that the IDC would be able to both 
consider all variables prior to making a final commitment and maximize 
its projected return.
    Comment 2: Specificity of Section 37E and IDC/Impofin Programs: 
Respondents argue that, although the Department correctly found that 
both the Section 37E and the IDC/Impofin lending programs were not de 
jure specific, the Department's finding that the programs were de facto 
specific was incorrect. Respondents contend that the Department failed 
to satisfy the preconditions of any inquiry into the possibility of de 
facto specificity, which is only to be made when ``there are reasons to 
believe that a subsidy may be specific as a matter of fact.'' See 
section 771(5A)(D)(iii) of the Act (implementing Article 2.1(c) of the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement)). Respondents contend that the Department made no effort to 
satisfy this precondition in its preliminary determination and 
``leaped'' from a determination of no de jure specificity to an 
application of the de facto specificity criteria without first 
identifying the reasons to believe that such specificity might exist. 
Thus, the Department's specificity finding is invalid as a matter of 
law.
    Petitioners argue that respondents have overstated the statutory 
requirements. While both the statute and the SCM Agreement contain the 
``reasons to believe'' language, the law does not require the 
Department to make or publish findings with respect to the ``reasons to 
believe'' that a subsidy may be de facto specific. Respondents' 
arguments read a requirement into the law that does not exist. In 
addition, petitioners argue that the Department's analysis of a 
domestic subsidy inherently demonstrates the agency's reasons to 
believe that a subsidy may be de facto specific. Petitioners cite the 
initiation standard (section 702(b)(1) of the Act) which instructs the 
Department to initiate an investigation when the elements necessary for 
the imposition of a countervailing duty are alleged, and conclude that 
a decision to initiate an investigation of a program implies that the 
Department has a reason to believe the subsidy may be de facto 
specific. Furthermore, petitioners note that the petition contained 
information which provided the Department with reasons to believe that 
both the Section 37E and the IDC/Impofin programs may be de facto 
specific.
    Petitioners contend that respondents ignore the fact that a de jure 
specificity analysis necessarily involves examining whether there are 
reasons to believe that a subsidy may be specific as a matter of fact; 
in the context of specificity in general, the Department examines the 
same factual information: eligibility criteria, application process, 
program records, and the identity of recipients. Finally, petitioners 
note, and cite numerous examples of, the Department's longstanding 
practice of first examining whether a subsidy is de jure specific and 
then proceeding to the de facto analysis. Petitioners argue that if 
this practice conflicted with the SCM, this conflict would have been 
addressed in the Statement of Administrative Action (SAA), which 
instead affirms the Department's practice in analyzing the de facto 
specificity of domestic subsidies. Thus, petitioners reject 
respondents' argument that the Department's analyses and determinations 
that Section 37E and IDC/Impofin are de facto specific are inconsistent 
with both the statute and the SCM.
    Department's Position: We disagree with respondent's interpretation 
of the ``reasons to believe'' language in section 771(5A)(D)(iii) of 
the Act. It is not stated as a precondition to a de facto analysis and 
we do not interpret it as such. While the language is part of the 
definition of de facto specificity it is not presented as a threshold 
requirement for positive evidence to justify an inquiry into how widely 
available a subsidy, in fact, is. The type of program itself (e.g., a 
development loan program) may be sufficient reason to believe that it 
may, in fact, be limited to a specific industry or group of industries. 
In contrast, there is normally no reason to believe that other types of 
programs (e.g., standard tax deductions ) that are, de jure, available 
to all businesses would, in fact, be specific. Thus, the Department 
would not be required to perform a de facto analysis of such a program. 
The nature of the subsidy at issue here warrants a de facto analysis. 
Moreover, we note that the allegations in the petition would be 
sufficient to meet even the higher standard that respondent would have 
us employ.
    Comment 3: de facto Specificity of Section 37E: Respondents argue 
that in finding Section 37E to be de facto specific, on the basis that 
the actual recipients of the subsidy, whether considered on an 
enterprise or an industry basis, are limited, the Department also 
ignored its statutory obligation to ``take into account the extent of 
diversification of economic activities within the jurisdiction of the 
authority providing the subsidy, and the length of time during which 
the subsidy program has been in operation.'' See Section 
771(5A)(D)(iii) of the Act. Respondents argue that the Department's 
failure to consider these conditions renders invalid the Department's 
finding that Section 37E is de facto specific. Respondents contend that 
if the Department takes these two factors into account, the Department 
will find that the recipients of Section 37E are not limited in number.
    Respondents cite the verification report, which shows that nine 
industries in six (of eleven) provinces, have benefitted from Section 
37E. Respondents argue that economic sanctions led to the 
diversification of the South African economy in the early 1990s, but 
that many of the industries were not world-competitive, relied on 
outdated technology, and were oriented to the domestic market, i.e., 
these industries would not be viable in an open economy. Thus, very few 
companies were in a position to take advantage of Section 37E. 
Respondents note that the applicants for Section 37E were further 
limited by statutory criteria (to add at least 35 percent to the raw 
material value, to be internationally competitive, to use foreign 
credits to import capital goods), reflecting the GOSA's objective to 
encourage growth in capital investment and employment. Thus, the most 
likely projects to receive approval were ``mega-projects'' in terms of 
capital, cost, timing and output, and such projects were rare.
    In addition, respondents note that Section 37E was in operation for 
only two years. The program's brief lifetime, therefore, further 
restricted the pool of potential claimants. Respondents have provided a 
letter from a former official of the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) who was involved in the development and administration of Section 
37E. This letter demonstrates, according to respondents, that given the 
economic conditions in South Africa at that time, 19 applications and 
13 approvals were considerably more than had been expected. The 13 
approved companies, according to the DTI official, reflected a spread 
of activity, size and geographic location, and viewed in the South 
African context, were not limited in number.
    Petitioners argue that the GOSA's concession that the statutory 
criteria limited the number of companies that could receive Section 37E 
benefits supports a conclusion that Section 37E is de jure specific, 
regardless of the extent of economic diversification in

[[Page 15562]]

South Africa. Petitioners note that verification documents show that 
the original purpose of Section 37E was to benefit mineral 
beneficiation projects, including Columbus. Petitioners further note 
that the GOSA's statement that the number of applicants was 
``considerably more than had been expected'' implies that, contrary to 
GOSA's claim, the statute was implemented to assist a few select 
industries and was not intended as a broad-based economic stimulus. 
Thus, the Department should find not that the limited economic 
diversification curtailed the potential number of program 
beneficiaries, but that the law itself limited access to Section 37E, 
making it de jure specific.
    Petitioners also argue that Section 37E is de facto specific. In 
making this argument, petitioners reject the GOSA's statement that 
because nine different industries benefitted, the program was widely 
used. Petitioners believe that the industrial breakdown provided by the 
GOSA incorrectly disaggregates the industry groups and that stainless 
steel, steel, aluminum, and ferrochrome should be considered as the 
``metals'' industry, reducing to six the number of industries 
benefitting from Section 37E. Finally, petitioners cite to the IDC's 
1997 Annual Report, which shows the IDC's involvement in many different 
sectors, in rejecting the GOSA's claim that there were few viable and 
diversified sectors in the South African economy.
    Finally, petitioners maintain that the short operation period of 
Section 37E did not necessarily limit the number of program users. 
Petitioners argue that since not all of the companies that were 
approved for the program actually used it, some of the approved 
companies may have applied without any definite investment plan, merely 
to keep open the option to use the program in the future. Petitioners 
conclude that, paradoxically, the narrow window of 37E operation may 
have actually increased the number of applicants, rather than limiting 
it.
    Department's Position: We note, as explained in the ``Section 37E 
Tax Allowances'' section above, that we have reconsidered our treatment 
of Section 37E and find, for purposes of our final determination, that 
it is specific because it constituted an export subsidy for purposes of 
section 771(5A) of the Act at the time the CJV partners applied and 
received approval for its benefits. Therefore, we need not address 
respondents' arguments with respect to the de facto specificity of 
Section 37E benefits.
    Comment 4: Benefits Under Section 37E: Petitioners contend that the 
Department should recognize the benefit under the Section 37E program 
as the full amount of the tax allowances claimed by Columbus, rather 
than use the time-value of money approach which the Department used for 
the preliminary determination. Petitioners advance two arguments in 
support of this proposed approach. First, petitioners contend that the 
verified record questions whether the Columbus expansion project would 
have gone forward without the availability of the 37E program to reduce 
the expansion's capital requirements. This, in turn, raises doubts 
about the potential receipt by the CJV partners of section 12C 
depreciation allowances. In other words, petitioners argue that if the 
CJV expansion had not gone forward (which it did, petitioners contend, 
only because of the existence of the 37E program), then the CJV 
partners would never have claimed any tax allowances related to 
Columbus, even the depreciation allowances normally available to all 
taxpayers under section 12C. Thus, petitioners contend that the 
Department's preliminary determination was inappropriately premised on 
the assumption that Columbus was clearly otherwise entitled to receive 
normal depreciation allowances under section 12C. Petitioners also 
contend that the Department erroneously calculated the benefit as the 
difference between the depreciation allowances allowed under Section 
37E and those normally available under section 12C (reducing the 
benefit to the time-value of money difference), rather than assuming 
that the full value of the allowances constituted a countervailable 
subsidy. In support of this argument, petitioners cite to the recently 
published countervailing duty regulations, which acknowledge the 
problems inherent in speculating upon future tax benefits to a company 
in relation to accelerated depreciation.
    Second, petitioners argue that the Section 37E program provides for 
the accelerated write-off of assets and therefore should be treated as 
an accelerated depreciation program by the Department, that is, the 
full amount of the allowances should be treated as a grant in the year 
of receipt consistent with the Department's practice. Petitioners 
reject the Department's time-value of money approach with respect to 
Section 37E, claiming that the Department itself has consistently 
rejected such an approach to accelerated depreciation programs, and 
treated the benefits provided by those program as grants in the full 
amounts of the accelerated depreciation claims. The Department's 
rejection of this approach is explicit in the new countervailing duty 
regulations. See Countervailing Duties; Final Rule, 63 FR 65348, at 
65376 (November 25, 1998) New Regulations. In conclusion, petitioners 
note that without Section 37E, there would have been no Columbus 
expansion, and therefore no depreciation allowances, either under 
Section 37E or 12C. Thus, the Department should not discount the value 
of these benefits based upon speculation about what Columbus may have 
received in the future under the South African tax code and should 
treat the full amount of the Section 37E allowances as grants in the 
years of receipt.
    In addition, petitioners support the Department's treatment of 
benefits under Section 37E as non-recurring benefits.
    Respondents argue that to capture the full amount of the Section 
37E benefits, without recognizing the applicable time-value of money 
discount, is to ignore record evidence which shows that in the absence 
of Section 37E, deductions in the same value were fully allowable under 
section 12C from the date of Columbus' commissioning, October 1, 1995. 
This record evidence clearly shows, according to respondents, that the 
benefit is merely a matter of timing: under Section 37E, the Columbus 
partners were able to claim the depreciation allowances (available 
under both sections 37E and 12C) beginning at the time the relevant 
expenses were incurred, rather than waiting nearly two years until the 
equipment was in use.
    Department's Position: We disagree with both of petitioners' 
arguments for treating the total value of Section 37E allowances as 
grants. First, whether the Columbus project would have gone forward 
absent the existence of the countervailable depreciation allowances 
under Section 37E is not relevant to our examination of the program and 
its benefits. While petitioners are correct in noting that, without the 
investment in the CJV, Columbus' partners would have claimed no 
depreciation allowances, either under Section 37E or the otherwise 
governing section 12C, it is not appropriate to speculate about the tax 
positions of the partners absent the investment which gave rise to the 
depreciation allowances (regardless of which provision of the tax code 
governed). It is the Department's long-standing practice to recognize 
that ``a benefit exists to the extent that the taxes paid by a firm as 
a result of the program are less than the taxes a firm would have paid 
in the absence of the

[[Page 15563]]

program.'' See 1989 Proposed Regulations 54 FR at 23372. In other 
words, the Department appropriately focused on the Columbus expansion 
project, and compared the tax experience (in this case of the partners) 
under the countervailable Section 37E program with the experience which 
would have prevailed absent the program. In the factual circumstances 
in this case, the Columbus partners' tax experiences in the absence of 
the investment are not relevant in quantifying the benefit provided to 
respondents from the Section 37E program.
    Furthermore, petitioners' statement that the Department wishes to 
avoid speculating on the future tax benefits to a company is misplaced 
for two reasons. In general, and consistent with the Department's 
practice of recognizing a benefit at the time that it is received, the 
Department avoids calculating tax benefits which are contingent on a 
company's future tax position--if a company is in a tax loss position 
during the POI or for a prolonged period, benefits from countervailable 
tax deductions or tax credit programs may not materialize. In 
particular, petitioners overlook two details in this case which remove 
any speculation from the Department's analysis: the existence of the 
Section 37E program reduced the partners' projection of the project's 
capital requirements and therefore resulted in a cash flow impact at 
the time the partners' investments were made (see Preliminary 
Determination at 47265); and, the provision of the Negotiable Tax 
Credit Certificates (NTCCs) which the users of the program could 
receive and convert into cash if they were in a tax-loss position 
(depreciation allowances under Section 12C can only be used as 
deductions to taxable income and therefore have no immediate value to 
taxpayers in tax-loss positions). Thus the cash-flow of the Section 37E 
benefits to the CJV partners is immediately measurable, and its timing 
is easily pinpointed; there is no speculation about the value of the 
countervailable allowances as there would be if the allowances were 
available only as deductions to taxable income and we were examining a 
company in a tax-loss position.
    We also disagree with petitioners that it would be appropriate to 
treat the tax benefits under Section 37E as accelerated depreciation. 
As a threshold matter, Section 37E does not operate like an accelerated 
depreciation program, which allows its users to depreciate assets over 
an accelerated (i.e., shorter) period of time. For example, where 
companies are normally allowed to depreciate equipment over 20 years, 
accelerated depreciation would allow for depreciation over ten years. 
Such a program would provide tax savings, vis-a-vis the normal 
depreciation schedule, over the period of the accelerated depreciation, 
in this example ten years. We would normally treat this tax savings as 
a recurring subsidy and allocate the benefits to the year in which tax 
savings were achieved.
    However, we note that Section 37E does not function like an 
accelerated depreciation program. As respondents reported, and as was 
confirmed at verification, users of this program depreciate their 
capital equipment, buildings and machinery, over the same five-year 
period allowed under section 12C, the tax code provision governing 
depreciation. We agree with respondents that the advantage which 
Section 37E allows is that companies can begin depreciating equipment, 
buildings and machinery, in the year in which the purchases of the 
equipment are made, rather than having to wait until the equipment is 
in use, as they would under section 12C. As we verified in the case of 
Columbus, a large, capital-intensive project with a necessarily long 
construction period, the use of Section 37E enabled the partners to 
claim depreciation allowances two or three years in advance (depending 
on the partner's tax year). (Capital equipment purchases began in 1993 
and the plant was officially commissioned on October 1, 1995. The 
plant's commissioning date was established by the South African tax 
authorities, as equipment purchases made beyond that date were not 
eligible for Section 37E depreciation.)
    Thus, the benefits under this program are twofold: the opportunity 
to claim the depreciation allowances in advance of the time a company 
would otherwise be able to do so--that is, the time value of receiving 
the allowances in advance; and, the ability to turn the allowances into 
cash, through the use of the NTCCs, if a company has no tax liabilities 
to reduce with the depreciation allowances which would otherwise 
constitute tax deductions. Therefore, we will continue to use the 
calculation methodology we used for the purposes of the preliminary 
determination, with only the modifications indicated in the discussion 
of the program above and in the Department's Position on Comment 5 
below.
    Comment 5: Calculation Methodology for Section 37E: Respondents 
note that if the Department persists in finding Section 37E benefits 
countervailable, the Department must correct errors in the calculation 
of the subsidy rate. Respondents argue that the Department should 
calculate the time-value of money, and thus the grant equivalents of 
Columbus' Section 37E advanced depreciation claims, only for Section 
37E allowances claimed prior to the date of Columbus' official 
commissioning--October 1995. Respondents contend that depreciation 
claims for years after that date do not result in countervailable 
benefits to Columbus' partners because, after commissioning, the 
partners would have begun claiming depreciation of Columbus' assets 
under section 12C; these claims would have been in the same value as 
and contemporaneous to depreciation allowances claimed under Section 
37E. Therefore, respondents contend that Columbus only benefitted from 
advanced depreciation under Section 37E for the years 1995/1996 
(depending on the partners' respective tax years) and earlier. They 
propose that the benefit is limited to the time-value of money realized 
by the depreciation claims made for years for which Columbus otherwise 
could not have claimed depreciation.
    Petitioners reject respondents' proposed corrections to the 
calculations on two accounts. First, petitioners reiterate their 
argument that the time-value of money treatment is flawed and has been 
rejected by the Department (see Department's Position on Comment 4 
above). Second, petitioners argue that respondents' proposed correction 
rests on an erroneous analytical assumption with respect to the timing 
of depreciation claims (the details of which are proprietary).
    Department's Position: We disagree with respondents that Columbus 
benefitted from Section 37E only to the extent that the partners 
claimed depreciation allowances for years for which they otherwise 
could not have claimed depreciation allowances under section 12C. As 
explained above, by claiming depreciation in advance, Columbus' 
partners were able to realize capital savings which directly reduced 
the projects's financing requirements. Section 37E benefits were more 
than just a tax benefit. Therefore, the advanced depreciation claimed 
under Section 37E results in an ongoing benefit to the company, and the 
Department correctly found a benefit to Columbus in the advanced 
depreciation claimed under Section 37E throughout the length of the 
depreciation schedule. In other words, for each of the five years of 
the depreciation schedule, we calculated a grant equivalent; we then 
allocated each grant equivalent over the AUL of 15 years.

[[Page 15564]]

    With regard to the contentions that the preliminary calculations 
contained errors, we have reviewed the calculation methodology used for 
our preliminary determination and have made corrections. For the 
preliminary determination, we incorrectly used two years as the sole 
basis for determining the time value, and thus the grant equivalent, of 
the advanced depreciation claimed under Section 37E by the three 
Columbus partners in each year of the depreciation schedule. We have 
adjusted our final calculations to reflect two years as the basis for 
calculating the time value of the yearly claims made by Highveld and 
three years as the basis for calculating the time value of the yearly 
claims made by Samancor and the IDC. This adjustment reflects the 
different tax years of the companies, the actual timing of the 
companies' tax claims, and their actual receipt of benefits under the 
program.
    Comment 6: De Facto Specificity of IDC/Impofin Lending: 
Notwithstanding what respondents view as the Department's failure to 
satisfy the statutory preconditions to a de facto specificity analysis, 
discussed in Comment 2 above, respondents argue that the IDC/Impofin 
program is not de facto specific. The preliminary determination was 
based on the fact that the ``fabricated metal products'' and the 
``basic metal products'' industries are predominant users of the 
program and that these industries have received more than fifty 
percent, by value, of the total loan guarantees awarded over the life 
of the program. Preliminary Determination at 47266. Respondents argue 
that by examining value, the Department did not account for the three 
``mega projects'' in the basic metal manufacture industries; these huge 
and extraordinary projects necessarily skew the results of any analysis 
based on value. Respondents note that in order to properly evaluate 
whether there is a predominant user of a program, one must analyze the 
number of loans and their distribution by industry, not the value of 
the loans and the distribution of that value by industry. Respondents 
cite verification documents which show no predominant user on this 
basis: 12 percent of approvals were for the basic metal manufacturing 
and fabricated metal products industries; the mining industry received 
14.7 percent; the pulp and paper industry and the engine and vehicle 
industry each received 11.2 percent.
    Respondents further note that the South African economy is 
dependent on the beneficiation of local raw materials for economic 
growth. The abundance of minerals and energy resources present 
competitive advantages for large-scale beneficiation; thus, investment 
in industrial infrastructure, in value terms, favors large 
beneficiation projects. These competitive advantages are centered in 
South Africa's basic metal manufacture industry. The fact that 
industrial development initiatives and the accompanying IDC/Impofin 
financing are weighted by value toward this industry does not indicate 
disproportionate use; rather, respondents conclude, it is a valid 
reflection of the sources available for beneficiation.
    Petitioners note that respondents' comparison of the number of 
users, without examining the distribution of benefits, suggests not 
that the program was disproportionately used but rather that the steel 
industry was a dominant user of the program. Petitioners argue that the 
statute does not require the Department to make an exception for ``mega 
projects'' which may skew the distribution of benefits, and that this 
factor would necessarily lead the Department to a de facto specificity 
finding based on disproportionate use. According to petitioners, the 
Department cannot view only the number of projects without considering 
the relative weights of assistance by enterprise, industry, or group 
thereof. In addition, petitioners note that the Department's 
examination of IDC/Impofin financing over a seven-year period accounts 
for any ``skewed'' result caused by a mega-project in a particular 
year. Petitioners also note that the sectoral distribution of benefits 
was confirmed at verification.
    Department's Position: We stand by our preliminary determination 
that the IDC/Impofin loan guarantee program provides benefits which are 
de facto specific to an enterprise, industry, or group thereof within 
the meaning of section 771(5A)(D)(iii) of the Act. We disagree with 
respondents' suggestion that the appropriate basis for our analysis is 
the number of loan guarantees and their distribution by industry and we 
note the Department's practice of examining the distribution of 
benefits, by value, when analyzing whether a program is de facto 
specific because an industry or group of industries is the predominant 
user of the program or receives a disproportionate share of the 
benefits granted under a program. See, e.g., Final Affirmative 
Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Stainless Steel Wire Rod 
from Italy, 63 FR 40474, 40485 (July 29, 1998). Respondents' statement 
that there were three ``mega-projects'' which necessarily skewed the 
distribution of benefits in fact supports the Department's specificity 
finding. In our preliminary determination, we found that the 
information provided by the IDC regarding the distribution of benefits 
(by value) over the life of the program showed that the ``basic metals 
manufacture industry'' (which includes the manufacture of stainless 
steel) and the ``fabricated metal products industry'' together received 
more than half of the loan guarantees awarded over the life of the 
program. See Preliminary Determination, 63 FR at 47266. In fact, 
information which respondents submitted with their brief enables us to 
refine our finding of de facto specificity for this final 
determination. This information shows that, by value, the steel 
industry (including stainless steel) received more than half of all 
loan guarantee approvals (the rest of the industries using the 
program--including the mining, agriculture, and chemical industries, 
among others--together accounted for less than half of the loan 
approvals by value). This is clear evidence that the steel industry is 
a predominant user of this program and thus it is de facto specific. 
Furthermore, if we perform an analysis of the information which 
respondents presented in their case brief parallel to the analysis in 
our preliminary determination, this information shows that the basic 
metals manufacture and the fabricated metal products industries 
received more than three-quarters of all loan guarantee approvals, by 
value. Thus, these two industries together are clearly predominant 
users of the program.
    By examining the distribution of benefits over time, the Department 
accounts for any anomalous industry-specific activity in a particular 
year. The fact that three mega-projects received the bulk of the loan 
guarantees supports our finding of de facto specificity based on 
predominant use, as these three projects are in the basic metal 
manufacture industry (basic iron and steel, stainless steel and 
aluminum). Finally, the information which respondents have provided 
with respect to the South African economy's dependence on the 
beneficiation of raw materials is not relevant to our analysis.
    Comment 7: Calculation Methodology for IDC/Impofin Lending: 
Respondents argue that the interest rates which Columbus paid for IDC/
Impofin financing were not preferential, as they were established by 
reference to independently-prescribed rates that reflected prevailing 
market conditions. The interest rates for the loans were either the 
Commercial Interest Reference Rate (CIRR) or the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus a

[[Page 15565]]

margin. The CIRR were fixed by the foreign export credit agency (ECA) 
for the full loan term at the time of the loan negotiation and 
contract; the LIBOR-based rates were variable rates.
    For all of the loans, respondents note, Columbus paid to the 
foreign banks management and commitment fees, typically 0.5 percent and 
0.25 percent, respectively, and to the IDC/Impofin a facility 
(guarantee) fee of 0.25 percent. Respondents argue that these fees were 
comparable to fees paid by other borrowers. In addition, for some of 
the loans, Columbus paid export credit insurance premiums to the banks, 
which in turn paid these fees to their respective export credit 
agencies. Respondents argue that there is no evidence in the record 
that the various fees and premiums paid by Columbus were preferential.
    Petitioners argue that regardless of how the interest rates were 
established (by the CIRR or LIBOR), the verification report indicates 
that the rates were clearly not based upon loans to Columbus; rather 
they were ``based on the risk associated with lending to the IDC.'' 
(Government Verification Report at 11-12.) Since, as the verification 
report indicates, ``foreign banks like to use the IDC as a borrower 
because they do not have to investigate the credit of each borrowing 
firm,'' id., petitioners argue that the interest rates paid by Columbus 
program are preferential.
    Petitioners also contend that Columbus would not have received 
financing without the IDC and GOSA guarantees. Petitioners note that, 
because the IDC was a partner, Columbus did not have to formally apply 
for financing or undergo the IDC's risk assessment; foreign lenders 
required the IDC to guarantee the loans because Columbus had no 
established credit history; and, some countries required an additional 
back-up guarantee from the GOSA. Id. at 13. Petitioners contend that 
this information further demonstrates that IDC financing conferred a 
benefit.
    Department's Position: As discussed in the ``IDC/Impofin Loan 
Guarantee Program'' section above, the Department has revised the 
analysis of the program from the preliminary determination. Because 
these loans originate either with foreign government export credit 
agencies or offshore foreign banks in coordination with foreign 
government export credit agencies, which are not under the direction or 
control of the GOSA, the loans themselves are not countervailable and 
it is inappropriate to compare the interest rates charged by offshore 
foreign banks to commercial interest rates in order to determine 
whether the program provides a benefit to Columbus. For the same 
reason, an examination of the fees paid to the foreign government banks 
is inappropriate. Thus, respondent's and petitioners' comments on the 
benchmark, fees to foreign government banks, and whether the program 
provides a benefit using this type of analysis, need not be addressed. 
Instead, we have determined that it is appropriate to focus on the fee 
charged by the IDC for the guarantee on these loans.
    With respect to respondent's comment that there is no evidence that 
the fees charged by the IDC were preferential, we disagree. As 
discussed in greater detail in the ``IDC/Impofin Loan Guarantee 
Program'' section above, we have determined, based on conversations 
with an independent banker in South Africa, that a commercial bank 
would offer Columbus similar guarantees at a slightly higher rate, 
0.375 percent. Thus, when we compare what Columbus paid the IDC for the 
provision of guarantees, 0.25 percent, and what it would have paid a 
commercial bank, 0.375 percent, we find that the IDC did provide a 
financial contribution that confers a benefit within the meaning of the 
Act.
    Comment 8: IDC/Impofin Financing Calculation Adjustments: 
Petitioners argue that the Department's calculations for the IDC/
Impofin financing understate the benefits to Columbus from this 
program. First, petitioners urge the Department to adhere to the 
preliminary determination, in which the Department stated that it would 
gather information about commercial fees and add an appropriate amount 
to the benchmark for the purposes of calculating the benefit for the 
final determination. Second, petitioners urge the Department to treat 
interest capitalizations not as interest payments but as increases in 
principal and to avoid double-counting the payment of capitalized 
interest in calculating the net present value. Third, in the absence of 
any record information regarding grace periods on loans in South 
Africa, petitioners argue that the Department should capture any 
countervailable benefits associated with the grace periods granted to 
Columbus for its IDC/Impofin financing. Fourth, the Department should 
correct errors which resulted in the finding of no benefit for some of 
the loan tranches examined. Finally, the Department should include in 
its loan calculations several loans, outstanding during the POI, which 
were omitted from Columbus' questionnaire responses and which were 
discovered at verification.
    Respondents argue that since the Department's de facto specificity 
finding is in error, and the interest rates provided on the IDC/Impofin 
financing are not preferential, there is no need to comment on the 
manner in which the benefit should be calculated.
    Department's Position: As discussed above, we have changed our 
analysis of the IDC/Impofin loan program. Thus, we need not address 
petitioners' comments with respect to adding fees to the benchmark, 
interest capitalization and grace periods. The Department did collect 
information about the guarantee fees that commercial banks charged, and 
based on this information, we have calculated a benefit comparing what 
Columbus paid the IDC to guarantee the loans under this program and 
what Columbus would have paid on comparable commercial guarantees. We 
have included the fees paid during the POI on loan tranches that were 
discovered at verification in our calculation of the benefit from the 
program.
    With respect to Respondent's comment, we disagree. As discussed in 
the program description above and the Department's Position on Comment 
6 above, we find that the IDC/Impofin loan guarantee program is de 
facto specific.
    Comment 9: Discount Rate: Petitioners argue that the Department 
should adjust the discount rate used in the preliminary determination 
because, although the Department relied on the long-term South African 
government bond rate as the discount rate, the Department noted its 
interest in finding a more appropriate rate for the final 
determination. Petitioners contend that discussions at verification of 
the Prime Overdraft rate (the rate at which commercial banks lend to 
their best customers), and the spreads added to it, support the use of 
this rate plus 50 to 60 basis points as the discount rate for the final 
determination.
    Respondents note that the CIRR and LIBOR are the appropriate 
benchmark interest rates, and that application of these rates yields no 
countervailable benefits from the IDC/Impofin loans. Therefore, a 
benchmark based on South African lending rates is irrelevant.
    Department's Position: Petitioners are correct that the Department 
expressed interest in finding an alternative discount rate for use in 
the final determination. However, as discussed in the section entitled 
``Discount Rates'' above, we did not find an alternative long-term 
fixed interest rate. Thus, for the purposes of this final 
determination, we have constructed a discount rate by averaging the 
government bond rate as

[[Page 15566]]

reported by respondents with the ``Lending Rate'' reported in 
International Financial Statistics, December 1998, published by the 
International Monetary Fund. By averaging these two rates, we believe 
that we have identified a rate more appropriate than the rate used for 
the purposes of the preliminary determination, a rate which includes 
the necessary characteristics of both long-term borrowing and 
commercially-available interest rates.
    We disagree with petitioners' suggestion of using the Prime 
Overdraft rate plus 50 to 60 basis points, as that rate is not a long-
term fixed interest rate. Respondents' comment is misplaced as the 
original comment addressed the choice of discount rates for use in 
calculating the benefit from non-recurring subsides, not the benchmark 
used in calculating the benefit from the IDC/Impofin loan program. The 
calculation methodology for the IDC/Impofin loan program is discussed 
in the Department's Position on Comment 8, above.
    Comment 10: Average Useful Life of Assets: Petitioners argue that 
the Department should use five years as the average useful life of 
assets (AUL), as facts available, for purposes of allocating non-
recurring benefits over time. In support of this argument, petitioners 
note that Columbus did not provide information that would allow the 
Department to calculate an AUL, despite the Department's repeated 
requests for such information. Petitioners note that the statute 
justifies the Department's use of adverse facts available (see sections 
776, 782(d) and (e) of the Act) because of Columbus' unwillingness to 
provide the requested information. Petitioners argue that five years is 
the appropriate AUL for two reasons: first, the Department confirmed at 
verification that Columbus depreciates assets for tax purposes over 
five years from the date of commissioning; second, Columbus' refusal to 
provide the information after a preliminary determination in which the 
Department used 15 years, as facts available and based on the IRS 
tables, supports the conclusion 15 years is more beneficial than the 
AUL that Columbus would have reported. Petitioners cite D & L Supply 
Company versus United States, 113 F. 3d 1220, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and 
Censaldo Componenti S.p.A. versus United States, 628 F. Supp. 198 (CIT 
1986) to support their contention that Columbus should not be allowed 
to benefit from its refusal to cooperate with the Department's 
information requests.
    Respondents argue that petitioners are incorrect in stating that 
Columbus has persistently failed to provide information about its AUL. 
Questionnaire responses indicate that Columbus depreciates buildings 
over 40 years and plant and machinery, vehicles and equipment over four 
to 25 years. Further, Columbus has consistently expressed its view 
that, since Columbus has never received a non-recurring grant or any 
other allocable subsidy from the GOSA, further information about its 
AUL is unnecessary. Thus, petitioners inappropriately draw an adverse 
inference from Columbus' carefully explained response.
    Department's Position: We disagree with petitioners. Using five 
years as the allocation period for any non-recurring grants received by 
Columbus is unwarranted for two reasons. First, respondents did provide 
information about their general depreciation practices: buildings are 
depreciated over 40 years and plant and machinery, vehicles and 
equipment are depreciated over four to 25 years. While this information 
does not enable the Department to calculate an average useful life of 
assets, it does not warrant the use of an adverse inference in 
determining Columbus' AUL, as petitioner urges. Second, five years is 
not at all relevant to the actual average useful life of assets in the 
steel industry. Thus, without a basis for calculating a company-
specific AUL, we find that the most reasonable alternative is to rely 
on the IRS Tables, which do reflect a reasonable determination of the 
AUL of assets in the steel industry. In addition, using 15 years as the 
allocation period is reasonable in light of the information which 
Columbus did provide about its depreciation practices. Further, the 
``Allocation Period'' section above discusses the Department's practice 
of determining the allocation period for non-recurring subsidies using 
company-specific AUL data where reasonable and practicable, and relying 
on the IRS Tables when company-specific AUL data are not available or 
otherwise cannot be used.

Verification

    In accordance with section 782(i) of the Act, we verified the 
information used in making our final determination. We followed 
standard verification procedures, including meeting with the government 
and company officials, and examining relevant accounting records and 
original source documents. Our verification results are outlined in 
detail in the public versions of the verification reports, which are on 
file in the CRU.

Suspension of Liquidation

    In accordance with section 705(c)(1)(B)(i) of the Act, we have 
calculated an individual subsidy rate for Columbus Stainless, the 
operating unit of the Columbus Joint Venture. Because this is the only 
company under investigation, Columbus' rate serves as the all-others 
rate. We determine that the total estimated net countervailable subsidy 
rate is 3.93 percent ad valorem for Columbus.
    In accordance with our preliminary affirmative determination, we 
instructed the U.S. Customs Service to suspend liquidation of all 
entries of stainless steel plate in coils from South Africa which were 
entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after 
September 4, 1998, the date of the publication of our preliminary 
determination in the Federal Register. In accordance with section 
703(d) of the Act, we instructed the U.S. Customs Service to 
discontinue the suspension of liquidation for merchandise entered on or 
after January 2, 1999, but to continue the suspension of liquidation of 
entries made between September 4, 1998, and January 1, 1999. We will 
reinstate suspension of liquidation under section 706(a) of the Act if 
the ITC issues a final affirmative injury determination, and will 
require a cash deposit of estimated countervailing duties for such 
entries of merchandise in the amounts indicated above. If the ITC 
determines that material injury, or threat of material injury, does not 
exist, this proceeding will be terminated and all estimated duties 
deposited or securities posted as a result of the suspension of 
liquidation will be refunded or canceled.

ITC Notification

    In accordance with section 705(d) of the Act, we will notify the 
ITC of our determination. In addition, we are making available to the 
ITC all non-privileged and non-proprietary information related to this 
investigation. We will allow the ITC access to all privileged and 
business proprietary information in our files provided the ITC confirms 
that it will not disclose such information, either publicly or under an 
administrative protective order, without the written consent of the 
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
    If the ITC determines that material injury, or threat of material 
injury, does not exist, this proceeding will be terminated and all 
estimated duties deposited or securities posted as a result of the 
suspension of liquidation will be refunded or canceled. If, however, 
the ITC determines that such injury does

[[Page 15567]]

exist, we will issue a countervailing duty order.

Return or Destruction of Proprietary Information

    In the event that the ITC issues a final negative injury 
determination, this notice will serve as the only reminder to parties 
subject to Administrative Protective Order (APO) of their 
responsibility concerning the return or destruction of proprietary 
information disclosed under APO in accordance with 19 CFR 355.34(d). 
Failure to comply is a violation of the APO.
    This determination is published pursuant to sections 705(d) and 
777(i) of the Act.

    Dated: March 19, 1999.
Robert S. LaRussa,
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 99-7530 Filed 3-30-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P