[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 55 (Tuesday, March 23, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 14012-14017]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-7029]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-336]


Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (Millstone Nuclear Power 
Station, Unit 2); Exemption

I

    Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., is the holder of Facility 
Operating License No. DPR-65 which authorizes operation of Millstone 
Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2. Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, 
is a pressurized water reactor located in Waterford, Connecticut. The 
license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to 
all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (the Commission or NRC) now or hereafter in effect.

II

    Appendix R, ``Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities 
Operating Prior to January 1, 1979,'' to Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, establishes fire protection 
features required to satisfy General Design Criterion 3, ``Fire 
protection,'' of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, with respect to certain 
generic issues for nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to 
January 1, 1979. By letter dated July 31, 1998, as supplemented by 
letters dated September 24 and November 13, 1998, Northeast Nuclear 
Energy Company (NNECO), the licensee for Millstone Nuclear Power 
Station, Unit 2, requested four exemptions from certain requirements of 
10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R. Specifically, for the Intake Structure 
(Appendix R Fire Area R-16) and the East 480 Volt Switchgear Room 
(Appendix R Fire Area R-11) the licensee requested exemptions from the 
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3 to the 
extent it requires the licensee to have automatic fire suppression 
systems in these areas. For the Charging Pump Room (Appendix R Area R-
4) the licensee requested an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 
Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 to the extent that it requires the 
licensee to meet the specific requirements of either Section III.G.2.a, 
b, or c. Finally, the licensee requested an exemption from the 
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J to the extent 
that it requires emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour 
battery power supply to light all areas needed for operation of safe 
shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto.

[[Page 14013]]

III

Intake Structure

Background
    As a result of a design basis review at Millstone, Unit 2, the 
licensee determined that the Intake Structure does not fully meet the 
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. The Intake Structure is an 
alternate shutdown area. Therefore, it is required to meet Appendix R, 
Section III.G.3. Section III.G.3 requires that a fixed fire suppression 
system be installed in an alternate shutdown area. The licensee 
requested an exemption from this requirement.
Description
    The Millstone Unit 2 Intake Structure is an alternate shutdown area 
because a fire in the Intake Structure could render all three of the 
service water pumps inoperable and the loss of all three service water 
pumps renders the emergency diesel generators inoperable. Alternative 
shutdown capability is provided by the backfeed of AC power from 
Millstone, Unit 1 for provision of power to Millstone, Unit 
2.1 This strategy eliminates the need to provide a service 
water pump to cool a Millstone, Unit 2 emergency diesel generator in 
the event of a fire in the Intake Structure.
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    \1\ In its September 24, 1998, letter responding to a request 
for additional information, the licensee stated that the 
decommissioning of Millstone, Unit 1 will not affect compliance with 
Appendix R for Millstone, Unit 2. As decommissioning progresses, 
both Millstone, Unit 1 and Millstone, Unit 2, must maintain the 
present licensing and design basis requirements unless or until 
revised by appropriate means.
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    The Intake Structure is a reinforced concrete structure and 
constitutes Fire Area R-16 in the Appendix R analysis. The structure 
consists of three fire hazard analysis (FHA) fire zones; I-1A, I-1B, 
and I-1C. The structure is constructed of concrete floors, ceiling and 
walls. Reinforced concrete walls separate the three fire zones within 
the Intake Structure. These walls are a minimum of 12'' thick. The 
ceiling height within the zones is approximately 24'.
    Three service water pumps (P-5A, 5B and 5C), three service water 
strainers (L-1A, L-1B and L-1C), two service water isolation valves (2-
SW-97A and 2-SW-97B), and associated cables used to support Appendix R 
safe shutdown are located in the pump room (fire zone I-1A). The pumps 
are approximately 19'' on center from each other. There is no Appendix 
R related equipment located in the sodium hypochlorite room (fire zone 
I-1B) or the motor control center (MCC) room (fire zone I-1C). The 
service water pumps supply service water through the tube side of the 
turbine building component cooling water (TBCCW), reactor building 
component cooling water (RBCCW), and emergency diesel generator heat 
exchangers. Following a fire, the only short-term need for service 
water is diesel generator cooling. In the long term, service water is 
used as part of the shutdown cooling process to transfer heat from the 
RBCCW system to the ultimate heat sink.
    A fixed fire suppression system is not provided in the Intake 
Structure. Detection is provided by ionization smoke detectors located 
in all three zones of the Intake Structure. The MCC room and the sodium 
hypochlorite room are each provided with one detector. The pump room is 
provided with eight detectors in the east portion of the structure. 
Three of these detectors are located directly above each of the service 
water pumps to provide hazard-specific coverage for the pumps. The 
automatic detection system alarms in the control room.
    Fire hose houses are located south of the Intake Structure between 
the Millstone Unit 1 and Millstone Unit 2 Intake Structures. Fire 
extinguishers are provided in the Intake Structure. Outdoor hydrants 
are located adjacent to the Intake Structure.

IV

East 480 Volt Switchgear Room

Background
    As a result of a design basis review at Millstone, Unit 2, the 
licensee determined that the East 480 Volt Switchgear Room does not 
fully meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. 
Specifically, the East 480 Volt Switchgear Room is an alternate 
shutdown area. Therefore, it is required to meet Appendix R, Section 
III.G.3. Section III.G.3 requires that a fixed fire suppression system 
be installed in an alternate shutdown area. The licensee requested an 
exemption from this requirement.
Description
    The East 480 Volt Switchgear Room is an alternate shutdown area 
because a fire in this area has the potential to affect the 
availability of electrical AC power from both emergency diesel 
generators. Facility Z2 power may be unavailable because 480 Volt Bus 
22F and the ``B'' emergency diesel generator room ventilation fan 
(F38B) power supply (MCC B62) are located in the fire area. The ``A'' 
emergency diesel generator may be unavailable because of fire damage to 
the power cable which supplies Facility Z1 Bus 24C. Coordination 
problems could also cause loss of the Z2 4160 volt switchgear. Thus, in 
the event of loss of offsite power, normal emergency AC power would not 
be available to shut down the plant. As discussed in an NRC letter of 
July 17, 1990, post-fire alternate shutdown capability for a fire in 
the East 480 Volt Switchgear Room is acceptable based, in part, on the 
ability to provide AC power from Millstone, Unit 1 via a backfeed from 
Unit 1 to Unit 2.
    The East 480 Volt Switchgear Room is located on the 36'-6'' 
elevation of the auxiliary building and consists of one Appendix R Fire 
Area (R-11). The boundaries of this area consist of a concrete floor, 
ceiling and walls. Barriers providing separation between this fire area 
and the adjacent fire areas are constructed of reinforced concrete 12'' 
to 18'' thick, or concrete blocks 8'' to 12'' thick. These walls 
contain rated fire doors and dampers, and a door that has been 
evaluated as adequate for the hazards.
    Cables associated with Appendix R cold shutdown equipment are also 
located in the area. Specifically cables associated with both trains of 
low pressure safety injection (LPSI A and B), and reactor building 
component cooling water (RBCCW A and B) are located in this area. 
However, the licensee has planned to repair the cables, to achieve cold 
shutdown, in the event of a fire.
    A fixed fire suppression system has not been provided in the East 
480 Volt Switchgear Room. Detection is provided by an ionization smoke 
detection system which alarms in the Control Room. Fire extinguishers 
are provided in this area and in adjacent areas. A hose station is 
located in the adjacent turbine building and is available for use in 
this area.

V

Charging Pump Area

Background
    As a result of a design basis review at Millstone Unit 2, the 
licensee has determined that the Charging Pump Area does not fully meet 
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Specifically, the 
Charging Pump Area does not fully meet any of the three options of 
Section III.G.2, which requires separation of cables and equipment and 
associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by one of the 
following means: (1) enclosure of cable and equipment and associated 
non-safety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 
3-hour fire rating; (2) a horizontal distance of more

[[Page 14014]]

than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards. In 
addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall 
be installed in the area; or (3) enclosure of cable and equipment and 
associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier 
having a 1-hour rating. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic 
suppression system shall be installed in the fire area. The licensee 
has requested an exemption from this requirement.
    As a result of its design basis review, the licensee has determined 
that the 3-hour rated fire wraps on the charging pump cables must be 
removed. Instead of relying on the protection of the fire wrap, the 
licensee stated that it would reroute the cables associated with the 
``B'' and ``C'' charging pumps (Facility Z2 train) outside Fire Area R-
4. These changes are necessary to resolve ampacity and fire rating 
issues with the previous fire wrap on the charging pump cables in Fire 
Area R-4. The licensee stated that the rerouting of the Facility Z2 
cables from the ``B'' and ``C'' pump cubicles to outside the fire area 
is a more effective approach than relying on cables protected with fire 
wrap within the area of concern.
Description
    The Charging Pump Room is located on the (-)25'-6'' elevation of 
the Auxiliary Building. All three of the Millstone, Unit 2 charging 
pumps (P18A, P18B, and P18C) are located in the same Appendix R Fire 
Area (R-4). The area is separated into two fire zones, A-6A and A-6B. 
Fire zone A-6A contains the Charging Pump Cubicles and fire zone A-6B 
contains the Degasifier Area. Fire area R-4 is mainly separated from 
adjacent fire zones and areas by reinforced concrete construction. The 
entrance to Fire Area R-4 is separated from Fire Area R-1 by a fixed 
water curtain.
    The charging pumps are spaced approximately 18' from each other and 
are separated by 10.5' high reinforced concrete missile shield walls 
approximately 17' on center and approximately 2' thick. A common 
walkway traverses the entrances to all three pump cubicles. Six lightly 
loaded cable trays represent the only intervening combustibles. Three 
raceways traverse the back of the ``A'' and ``B'' cubicles and cross 
the ``C'' cubicle. Three other raceways are in the walkway in front of 
the charging pump cubicles. Each charging pump contains approximately 
10 gallons of lube oil. A curbed dike area has been provided for each 
pump. The capacity of each dike area is sufficient to contain the 
volume of one 55 gallon oil drum. This is adequate to accommodate the 
approximately 10 gallons of lube oil contained within each respective 
charging pump plus any transient oil brought in for pump oil changes. 
The ceiling height in the Charging Pump Room is approximately 18'-0''.
    The entrance to the Charging Pump Room is through adjacent zone A-
6B, the Degasifier Area. The entrance to the Degasifier Area is via 
fire zone A-1B, the RBCCW Pump and Heat Exchanger Area. This entrance 
is protected with a locked gate. A water curtain has been provided at 
the entrance to zone A-6B.
Charging Pump Power Cables
    Charging pump ``A'' is powered from Facility Z1. The power cable 
for pump ``A'' is routed in conduit Z1A202 to a junction box inside the 
``A'' cubicle into conduit Z1A636 and out of the cubicle into a common 
walkway which traverses the entrance to the ``B'' and ``C'' cubicles. 
The cable exits the fire area via a raceway immediately near the 
entrance to the walkway (which is also the access point into the fire 
area).
    Charging pump ``B'' is the swing pump and can be powered from 
either Facility Z1 or Z2. The transfer switch for pump ``B'' power is 
located adjacent to the pump, mounted on the partial height wall which 
separates the ``B'' and ``C'' cubicles. The Facility Z1 power cable for 
pump ``B'' is routed in conduit Z1A210 from a transfer switch adjacent 
to the pump and out of the ``B'' cubicle into a raceway in the walkway. 
The raceway traverses the entrance to the ``C'' cubicle. The cable 
exits the fire area via a raceway immediately near the entrance to the 
walkway (which is also the access point into the fire area). The 
Facility Z2 power cable for pump ``B'' will be rerouted from another 
transfer switch near the pump, downward in new conduit Z2A1261, out of 
the ``B'' cubicle and into the adjacent fire area below (Fire Area R-
5). This cable will not re-enter Fire Area R-4.
    Charging pump ``C'' is powered from Facility Z2. The power cable 
for pump ``C'' will be re-routed from the pump downward in a new 
conduit, Z2A1262, out of the ``C'' cubicle and into Fire Area R-5, 
below. This cable will not re-enter Fire Area R-4.
    Fire Area R-5 does not contain any Facility Z1 power cables 
associated with charging pump ``A'' or ``B'.
Charging Pump Control Cables
    Charging pumps ``A'' and ``C'' have no safe-shutdown-related 
control cables located in Fire Area R-4.
    Charging pump ``B'' has several control cables which are located in 
the Fire Area R-4. One of these control cables (a Facility Z1 cable) is 
routed from a transfer switch in the ``B'' cubicle in conduit Z5A205 to 
a junction box and into conduit Z5A203, out of the ``B'' cubicle, and 
into a raceway in the walkway. The raceway traverses the entrance to 
the ``C'' cubicle and exits the fire area at the entrance to the 
walkway (which is also the access point into the fire area). The 
Facility Z2 control cable will be re-routed with the ``B'' pump power 
cable from a transfer switch near the pump downward in conduit Z2A1261, 
out of the ``B'' cubicle and into Fire Area R-5, below. All of the 
control cables can be isolated from P18B control circuits by operating 
the pump from the Fire Shutdown Panel, C10 (located in the Facility Z2 
4.6kV Switchgear Room).
    Fire Area R-5 does not contain any Facility Z1 control cables 
associated with charging pump ``A'' or ``B'.

VI

Yard Area

Background
    As a result of a revised Appendix R compliance strategy for 
achieving safe shutdown, two additional areas have been identified by 
the licensee in which operation of safe shutdown equipment will be 
required. In the event of certain fires, operators will have to operate 
equipment in the Intake Structure and the Refueling Water Storage Tank 
(RWST) pipe enclosure. Access to these areas requires travel through 
portions of the yard area at Millstone, Unit 2. As these areas are not 
addressed in the existing exemption, the licensee determined that an 
exemption from Section III.J of Appendix R is required.
Description
    The outdoor access and egress route to 4160V Bus 14H (formerly 
Electrical Bus 24F), extends from the east entrance of Millstone, Unit 
1, Building 118 (grade elevation), east to the access roadway, south on 
the roadway (at the fire water tanks), and then turning west to Bus 
14H.
    The access route to the Intake Structure extends west from Bus 14H, 
then north up to the northeast corner doorway of the Millstone, Unit 2 
Intake Structure.
    The outdoor access/egress route to the RWST Pipe Chase also extends 
from the east entrance of Millstone, Unit No. 1, Building 118 (grade 
elevation) and east to the access roadway (at the fire water tanks). 
The route then continues north, west, and south along the cyclone 
fence, through the fenced gate between the Primary Water Storage Tank 
(PWST) and RWST. Inside the fenced area, the

[[Page 14015]]

route continues to the southern portion of the pipe chase building to 
the stairway platform entrance.
    The licensee proposes to credit the security lighting system for 
access and egress route emergency lighting in lieu of an 8-hour battery 
supply in the yard area. The basis for this is as follows:
    1. The security lighting system illuminates the required access and 
egress routes;
    2. The security lighting power supply is backed by a security 
diesel generator with fuel storage capacity to ensure operation at 
greater than or equal to 8 hours;
    3. The security generator, components, and circuits are independent 
from the postulated fire areas which require access to the 4160V Bus 
14H enclosure, Intake Structure, or RWST Pipe Chase.
    Additionally, there are portable lighting units dedicated for 
operations department use. The equipment is administratively controlled 
and located inside the Millstone, Unit 2 Control Room.

VII

Evaluation

Intake Structure (Fire Area R-16)
    A postulated fire in the service water pump room is a cable or lube 
oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source, an electrical 
fault, or the overheating of a pump bearing. The majority of the 
combustible load in the area is cable insulation and lube oil. Plastic 
reinforced fiberglass traveling screen covers, wooden walkways, 
plastics, and rubber contribute relatively minor amounts to the 
combustible loading. The majority of the cable insulation is found in 
cable trays that are dispersed throughout the east portion of the 
structure. The cables meet the requirements for IEEE-383 qualified 
cables. The majority of the lube oil is contained within four non-
safety-related circulating water pumps. The remaining lube oil is in 
other mechanical equipment in relatively small amounts dispersed 
throughout the pump room.
    The traveling screen covers are mounted to four traveling screens. 
The wooden walkways cover approximately 900 ft \2\ in the area of the 
traveling screens and consists of treated plywood on structural support 
members. These combustibles are dispersed over the west portion of the 
structure while the service water pumps and strainers are located on 
the east side. The use of transient combustible materials in the plant 
is limited and controlled procedurally. Intervening combustibles in the 
form of cable insulation are located between the individual service 
water pumps and in the surrounding area. A fire in this area is 
expected to be restricted to the immediate area of the cables and/or 
equipment involved. A fire detected by the automatic detection system 
would result in annunciation in the Control Room which would lead to a 
fire brigade response and subsequent extinguishment utilizing manual 
fire fighting equipment.
    A significant fire in the sodium hypochlorite room is not 
anticipated due to minimal combustible loading and limited ignition 
sources. The majority of this combustible loading is in the form of 
cable insulation. The cables meet the requirements for IEEE-383 
qualified cables.
    If a fire were to occur in the sodium hypochlorite room, it is 
expected to be contained within the zone and not affect the service 
water pumps or related cables in zone I-1A due to the physical barrier 
separation between the zones and lack of intervening combustibles. Loss 
of the equipment in the zone (i.e., two sodium hypochlorite solution 
tanks) would not affect the ability of the plant to achieve safe 
shutdown and does not require the plant to invoke alternate shutdown 
methods. Smoke detection is present in the zone and will provide 
warning in the Control Room of a fire in its early stages. Rapid fire 
brigade response and subsequent extinguishment using manual fire 
fighting equipment is anticipated. Although sodium hypochlorite 
solution is considered non-flammable and non-combustible, the fumes 
that may be produced when it is heated are similar to chlorine gas. The 
licensee stated that its fighting strategies address concerns 
associated with fighting a fire involving the sodium hypochlorite 
tanks.
    A significant fire in the MCC room is not anticipated due to the 
limited amounts of combustible materials present. The majority of this 
combustible load is cable insulation in trays. The cables meet the 
requirements for IEEE-383 qualified cables. The majority of the 
remaining portion of the combustible load is contained in an approved 
flammable liquids storage cabinet. A fire occurring in this zone is not 
expected to spread beyond the general area of origin and should not 
affect the service water pumps or related cables in zone I-1A due to 
the physical fire separation between the zones and a limited amount of 
intervening combustibles. A normally open flood control door and 
unprotected cable tray penetration openings exist in the west wall to 
zone I-1A. The cable trays through the penetration openings contain 
combustibles, in the form of cable insulation, that may contribute to 
fire spread between the zones. Combustible loading is located in the 
area of the door opening. Due to the limited quantity of combustible 
material and the configuration of the combustible loading, fire is 
expected to be restricted to the general area of the cables and/or 
equipment involved. The loss of the equipment in this zone (i.e., non-
safety-related MCCs B-13 and B-42) would not affect the ability of the 
plant to achieve safe shutdown and does not require the plant to invoke 
alternate shutdown methods. There is reasonable assurance that a fire 
would be detected by the automatic detection system in its incipient 
stages prior to significant flame propagation through the openings or 
room temperature increase that may affect the service water pumps or 
related cables in the adjacent pump room. Annunciation in the Control 
Room will lead to fire brigade response and subsequent extinguishment 
using manual fire fighting equipment.
    As approved in the NRC letter dated July 17, 1990, safe shutdown of 
the plant can be achieved in the event that a fire goes undetected and 
renders all three service water pumps inoperable. Such a fire would 
cause loss of diesel generator cooling, and therefore, the diesel 
generators would not be available during a loss of offsite power. In 
that situation, power will be provided via a backfeed from Millstone, 
Unit 1.
    The underlying purpose of the requirement to install a fixed fire 
suppression system in the area, as required by Section III.G.3 of 
Appendix R, is to limit fire damage to the dedicated or alternate 
shutdown capability.
    Based on the amount of combustible loading and combustible loading 
configuration, the licensee's administrative procedures that limit and 
control transient combustibles, the existing fire detection system, and 
the expected fire brigade response and subsequent fire extinguishment, 
the possibility of a fire developing to involve all three of the 
service water pumps is not considered likely. However, if this were to 
occur, the loss of all three of the service water pumps would not 
adversely impact the safe shutdown capability of the plant, based on 
the ability to provide power via a backfeed from Millstone Unit 1, and 
the ability of the plant to make necessary repairs to a service water 
pump, strainer, and power cable to achieve cold shutdown. The licensee 
stated that the Appendix R safe shutdown strategy for a fire in the 
Intake Structure accounts for the loss of all three service

[[Page 14016]]

water pumps. In addition, the configuration for alternate shutdown in 
the Intake Structure had been previously found acceptable in the NRC SE 
dated July 17, 1990. The configuration has not changed since this 
approval.
    On the basis of its evaluation, the staff concluded that a fixed 
fire suppression system is not needed to satisfy the underlying purpose 
of the rule.
East 480 Volt Switchgear Room (Fire Area R-11)
    The majority of the combustible load in this area consists of cable 
insulation in cable trays and other electrical equipment. A postulated 
fire in the area would involve the cable insulation or electrical 
equipment. The use of transient combustible materials in the plant is 
limited and controlled procedurally. Potential ignition sources include 
cables, shorts, malfunctioning electrical equipment, and transient 
sources. If a fire should occur, there is reasonable assurance that it 
will be detected by the automatic detection system in its incipient 
stages prior to significant flame propagation or room temperature 
increase. This will result in annunciation in the Control Room, timely 
fire brigade response, and manual fire extinguishment utilizing 
available fire fighting equipment. In addition, access to the 
switchgear room from the continuously manned Control Room has been 
provided via a double door at the east end of the room. This direct 
route to the area will ensure rapid response by the Control Room 
operators to an alarm in this area.
    Due to the types of combustibles and the type of electrical fires 
expected in this area, as well as the fact that plant operators are 
situated in the Control Room directly adjacent to this room, and the 
presence of a dedicated site fire brigade, the licensee considers 
manual suppression to be the preferable method of protection in this 
area.
    In the event that there is a loss of electrical power from both 
emergency diesel generators, the plant is able to safely achieve 
shutdown by utilizing the backfeed from Millstone, Unit 1 to power the 
Z1 electrical facility.
    The underlying purpose of the requirement to install a fixed fire 
suppression system in the area, as required by Section III.G.3 of 
Appendix R, is to limit fire damage to the dedicated or alternate 
shutdown capability.
    Based on the amount of combustible loading and combustible loading 
configuration, the licensee's administrative procedures that limit and 
control transient combustibles, the existing fire detection system, the 
expected fire brigade response and subsequent fire extinguishment, and 
the close proximity to the Control Room, there is reasonable assurance 
that a fire would not involve the entire area or spread beyond the 
area. The loss of the equipment in the east 480V switchgear room does 
not adversely impact the safe shutdown capability of the plant based on 
the ability to provide power via a backfeed from Millstone Unit 1.
    Based on the above, the staff concluded that a fixed fire 
suppression system is not necessary to satisfy the underlying purpose 
of the rule.
Charging Pump Room (Fire Area R-4)
    The primary combustibles in the charging pump and degasifier rooms 
are cable insulation and lube oil. Potential ignition sources include 
hot surfaces, potential cable shorts, motors, and mechanical failure. 
Both fire zones are provided with an ionization smoke detection system. 
Activation of the detection system in either zone will initiate an 
alarm in the Control Room.
    Each charging pump contains approximately 10 gallons of lube oil. 
Spill containment curbing (capable of containing a 55-gallon spill) has 
been provided to separate each charging pump cubicle to protect each 
pump from a combustible liquid spill involving a redundant charging 
pump. The 55-gallon containment volume is adequate to accommodate the 
lube oil contained within each respective charging pump plus any 
transient oil brought in for pump oil changes. The separation provided 
by the reinforced concrete missile shield partial height walls prevents 
a direct line-of-sight between adjacent pumps. There are no openings in 
these walls.
    Intervening combustibles between the pump areas consists of six 
lightly-loaded cable trays (less than 20 cables in each tray). Three 
raceways traverse the back of the ``A'' and ``B'' cubicles, and cross 
the ``C'' cubicle. Three other raceways are in the walkway in front of 
the charging pump cubicles. The cable insulation satisfies IEEE-383 
qualification criteria.
    A fire extinguisher is provided in the Charging Pump Area. In 
addition, fire extinguishers and a fire hose station are located in the 
adjacent zone A-1B. Transient combustible materials in the plant are 
controlled procedurally and there is a locked access gate at the 
walkway entrance. The licensee stated that firefighting strategies have 
been prepared and are available to assist the fire brigade in combating 
any expected fire.
    Due to the functions required of the charging pumps in safe 
shutdown of the plant, the defense-in-depth concept for fire protection 
in this area is essential. This area is provided with detection and 
manual suppression in the form of a fire extinguisher. The area has low 
combustible loading. When the licensee completes the cable separation 
modifications, along with the partial barriers already in place, there 
is reasonable assurance that a single postulated fire would not damage 
redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment.
    The Charging Pump Room is required to meet 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 
R, Section III.G.2. Section III.G.2 requires separation of cables and 
equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by any 
one of three optional means. The underlying purpose of the three 
applicable options under Section III.G.2, is to provide reasonable 
assurance that at least one train of equipment relied on to achieve and 
maintain safe shutdown is free of fire damage.
    Based on the configuration of the charging pump room, the 
combustibles loading, the cable separation modifications, the in-place 
fire detection systems, the fire brigade and availability of manual 
fire suppression equipment, and preplanned fire fighting strategies 
there is reasonable assurance that a fire would not cause the loss of 
all charging pumps.
    Based on the above, the staff concluded that requiring the licensee 
to meet one of the three applicable options listed in 10 CFR Part 50, 
Appendix R, Section III.G.2, is not necessary to satisfy the underlying 
purpose of the rule.
Yard Area
    The underlying purpose of Section III.J of Appendix R is to ensure 
that fixed lighting of sufficient duration and reliability is provided 
to allow operation of equipment required for post-fire, safe shutdown 
of the reactor. Lighting for access/egress associated with the 
equipment is also required. The licensee is requesting an exemption 
from the access/egress portion of the Section III.J requirement 
relating to the yard area.
    Large area applications will typically impose electrical load 
requirements which are beyond the normal limits of battery units. The 
licensee stated that the security lighting system illuminates the 
required access and egress routes. The power supply is backed by a 
security diesel generator with fuel storage capacity to ensure 
operation greater than or equal to 8 hours. The security generator, 
components, and

[[Page 14017]]

circuits are independent from the fire areas which require access to 
the 4160V Bus 14H enclosure, Intake Structure, or RWST Pipe Chase. 
Consistent with the defense in depth approach to fire protection, 
portable lighting equipment is also available and can be relied upon 
for use in the event of a fire.
    Based on the availability and reliability of the security lighting 
of sufficient duration and the availability of portable lighting, there 
is reasonable assurance that the access/egress routes through the yard 
area that are relied on for safe shutdown of the facility can be 
accessed in the event of a fire.
    On the basis of its evaluation, the staff concluded that the 
application of the regulation in this circumstance is not necessary to 
satisfy the underlying purpose of the rule.

VIII

Conclusions

Intake Structure
    On the basis of its evaluation, the staff finds that special 
circumstances are present in that the application of the regulation in 
this circumstance is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of 
the rule. The licensee's request for an exemption from the requirements 
of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R, to the extent that it requires the 
installation of a fixed fire suppression system, is granted pursuant to 
10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) for fire area R-16, the Intake Structure, 
provided the factors the licensee used to justify its exemption request 
are maintained. The staff concludes that the exemption is authorized by 
law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, 
and is consistent with the common defense and security.
East 480 Volt Switchgear Room
    On the basis of its evaluation, the staff finds that special 
circumstances are present in that the application of the regulation in 
this circumstance is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of 
the rule. The licensee's request for an exemption from the requirements 
of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R, to the extent that it requires the 
installation of a fixed fire suppression system, is granted pursuant to 
10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) for fire area R-11, the East 480 Volt Switchgear 
Room, provided the factors the licensee used to justify its exemption 
request are maintained. The staff concludes that the exemption is 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health 
and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security.
Charging Pump Room
    On the basis of its evaluation, the staff finds that special 
circumstances are present in that the application of the regulation in 
this circumstance is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of 
the rule. The licensee's request for an exemption from the requirements 
of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, to the extent that it requires the 
licensee to meet one of the three applicable options (Section 
III.G.2.a, b, or c), is granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) for 
fire area R-4, the charging pump room, provided the factors the 
licensee used to justify its exemption request, including rerouting the 
charging pump cables, are maintained. The staff concludes that the 
exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the 
public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and 
security.
Yard Area
    On the basis of its evaluation, the staff finds that special 
circumstances are present in that the application of the regulation in 
this circumstance is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of 
the rule. The licensee's request for an exemption from the requirements 
of Section III.J of Appendix R, to the extent that it requires 
emergency lighting with an 8-hour battery supply for access and egress 
routes to safe shutdown equipment, is granted pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2)(ii) for the yard area, provided the factors the licensee 
used to justify its exemption request are maintained. The staff 
concludes that the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an 
undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the 
common defense and security.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of March 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Roy P. Zimmerman,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-7029 Filed 3-22-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P