[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 44 (Monday, March 8, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 11067-11069]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-5599]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-368]


Entergy Operations, Inc.; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of 
Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-6, issued to Entergy Operations, Inc., (the licensee), for 
operation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit-2 (ANO-2) located in Pope 
County, Arkansas.
    The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) 
Table 3.3-1, ``Reactor Protective Instrumentation,'' Action 2 through 
the addition of a footnote. The proposed footnote would allow startup 
and operation with the functional units associated with the Channel 
``D'' ex-core nuclear instrumentation to be maintained in the bypassed 
or tripped condition following the restart from Refueling Outage 2R13. 
This footnote is intended to support normal plant operations until such 
time that the Channel ``D'' ex-core detector assembly can be restored 
to an operable condition. This footnote will be in effect for a time 
period not to extend beyond Mid-Cycle Outage 2P99 which is the next 
scheduled entry into cold shutdown for ANO-2.
    The licensee requested that this proposed amendment be processed as 
an exigent request, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6). The exigency is 
created by the inability of ANO-2 to fully comply with TS Table 3.3-1, 
Action 2. TS Table 3.3-1 requires that three of four channels of linear 
power level-high, local power density-high, departure from nucleate 
boiling ratio-low and core protection calculators be operable in Modes 
1 and 2. In addition, TS Table 3.3-1 requires three of four channels of 
the logarithmic power level-high function be operable in Mode 2, and in 
Modes 3, 4, and 5 when the system is capable of control element 
assembly (CEA) withdrawal. Action 2 states, ``With the number of 
channels Operable one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation 
in the applicable Modes may continue provided the inoperable channel is 
placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour. If the 
inoperable channel is bypassed for greater than 48 hours, the 
desirability of maintaining this channel in the bypassed condition 
shall be reviewed at the next regularly scheduled PSC [Plant Safety 
Committee] meeting in accordance with the QA Manual Operations. The 
channel shall be returned to Operable status prior to startup following 
the next Cold Shutdown.'' During the previous operating cycle Channel 
``D'' ex-core detector failed and was maintained in the bypassed or 
tripped condition until Refueling Outage 2R13 which began on January 9, 
1999. During Refueling Outage 2R13, the Channel ``D'' detector assembly 
was replaced with a spare detector assembly. The detector assembly 
passed all pre- and post-installation electrical tests. However, with 
the unit in Mode 3, plant operators noticed that the instrument was not 
responding as anticipated. Subsequent troubleshooting determined that 
the detector or its associated cables were faulty and no spare 
assemblies were readily available on-site or from the vendor. Since 
Channel ``D'' was inoperable prior to the unit shutdown for 2R13, TS 
Table 3.3-1, Action 2, requires that it be returned to operable status 
prior to restart.
    Based on the circumstances described above, the NRC verbally issued 
a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) on February 23, 1999. The 
NOED was documented by letter dated February 24, 1999. The NOED 
expressed the NRC's intention to exercise discretion not to enforce 
compliance with TS Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.4 and TS Table 
3.3-1, Action 2, until the NRC staff acts on the licensee's exigent TS 
amendment request to revise TS Table 3.3-1, Action 2, with a footnote 
to address this condition until such time that the Channel ``D'' ex-
core detector assembly can be replaced. This footnote will be in effect 
for a time period not to

[[Page 11068]]

extend beyond Mid-Cycle Outage 2P99 which is the next scheduled entry 
into cold shutdown for ANO-2. The licensee submitted the exigent TS 
amendment request on February 25, 1999.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under 
exigent circumstances, the NRC staff must determine that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:

    An evaluation of the proposed change has been performed in 
accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a)(1) regarding no significant hazards 
considerations using standards in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A discussion of 
these standards as they relate to this amendment request follows:
    Criterion 1--Does not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    Startup and operation with the ANO-2 Reactor Protective System 
(RPS) linear power level-high and logarithmic power level-high 
functional units, and the Core Protection Calculator (CPC) local 
power density-high (LPD-high), and departure from nucleate boiling 
ratio-low (DNBR-low) functional units in a 2-out-of-3 logic mode has 
no effect on the probability of any accidents previously evaluated 
as it has no impact on the causes of initiating events in the plant.
    Startup and operation with these functional units in a 2-out-of-
3 logic mode has no effect on the consequences of an event 
previously evaluated since, with one channel of each functional unit 
in bypass, the functional units maintain a functional redundancy of 
one. This ensures protective system actuation in accordance with the 
assumptions of the accident analysis. The accident analysis has 
accounted for those events that might have an effect on the 
functional units due to the geometry of the installed sensors, and 
demonstrated acceptable results in such a case, assuming a single 
failure and a channel in bypass.
    Therefore, startup and operation with the ANO-2 RPS linear power 
level-high and logarithmic power level-high functional units, and 
the CPC LPD-high, and DNBR-low functional units in a 2-out-of-3 
logic mode does not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    Criterion 2--Does not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    The only way the proposed change could alter the course of an 
event would be by the ANO-2 RPS linear power level-high and 
logarithmic power level-high functional units, and the CPC LPD-high, 
and DNBR-low functional units failing to actuate when required. 
These functional units maintain a functional redundancy of one when 
operating in a 2-out-of-3 logic mode, thus the functional units will 
not fail in this manner.
    Therefore, startup and operation with the ANO-2 RPS linear power 
level-high and logarithmic power level-high functional units, and 
the CPC LPD-high, and DNBR-low functional units in a 2-out-of-3 
logic mode does not create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
    Criterion 3--Does not involve a significant reduction in the 
margin of safety.
    The ANO-2 technical specification (TS) for RPS linear power 
level-high and logarithmic power level-high functional units, and 
the CPC LPD-high, and DNBR-low functional units allows operation 
through the remainder of the cycle with only three channels 
operable, providing that the desirability of maintaining this 
configuration is reviewed at the next regularly scheduled Plant 
Safety Committee (PSC) meeting. The TS requires that the inoperable 
functional unit be returned to operable status prior to startup 
following the next Cold Shutdown. Per the Safety Evaluation Report 
for TS Amendment 159, which added these provisions to the TS, the 
goal of the PSC review and the requirement to return the system to 
an operable status prior to startup was to repair the inoperable 
channel and return it to service as quickly as practical. Review of 
the design and installation of these functional units has 
demonstrated that, while starting up or operating in a 2-out-of-3 
logic mode, their functional redundancy is one. For any design bases 
event, with the occurrence of any postulated single failure, the 
ANO-2 RPS linear power level-high and logarithmic power level-high 
functional units, and the CPC LPD-high, and DNBR-low functional 
units will provide the protection assumed in the accident analysis.
    Therefore, startup and operation with the ANO-2 RPS linear power 
level-high and logarithmic power level-high functional units, and 
the CPC LPD-high, and DNBR-low functional units in a 2-out-of-3 
logic mode does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of 
safety.
    Based upon the reasoning presented above, Entergy Operations has 
determined that startup and operation with the ANO-2 RPS linear 
power level-high and logarithmic power level-high functional units, 
and the CPC LPD-high, and DNBR-low functional units in a 2-out-of-3 
logic mode does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 14 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 14-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period, such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 14-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance. The Commission expects that the need to 
take this action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of 
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By April 7, 1999, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714

[[Page 11069]]

which is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Tomlinson Library, Arkansas Tech 
University, Russellville, Arkansas 72801. If a request for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If the amendment is issued before the expiration of the 30-day 
hearing period, the Commission will make a final determination on the 
issue of no significant hazards consideration. If a hearing is 
requested, the final determination will serve to decide when the 
hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, 
Winston and Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20005-3502, 
attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated February 25, 1999, which is available 
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the 
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local 
public document room, located at the Tomlinson Library, Arkansas Tech 
University, Russellville, Arkansas 72801.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of March 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
M. Christopher Nolan,
Project Manager, Project Directorate IV-1, Division of Licensing 
Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-5599 Filed 3-5-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P